Beforethe FEDERALCOMMUNICATIONSCOMMISSION Washington,DC20554 IntheMatterof ) ) ProtectingandPromotingtheOpenInternet ) GNDocketNo.14Ͳ28 ) ) ) COMMENTSOFTHEINDEPENDENTFILM&TELEVISIONALLIANCE TheIndependentFilm&TelevisionAlliancerespectfullysubmitsthefollowingcommentsinresponseto theFederalCommunicationsCommission’sMay15,2014NoticeofProposedRulemakingintheaboveͲ referencedproceeding.
JeanM.Prewitt President&ChiefExecutiveOfficer SusanCleary VicePresident&GeneralCounsel ArchieF.Iskaq AssociateCounsel IndependentFilm&TelevisionAlliance 10850WilshireBoulevard,9thFloor LosAngeles,CA90024Ͳ4321 July15,2014 TABLEOFCONTENTS PAGE I. INTRODUCTION……….……………………………………………………...... 1 II. BACKGROUND……………………………………………..….……………………………………………………………………………………..3 III. THEMARKETPLACEREQUIRESPERMANENTOPENINTERNETACCESSASSUREDBYREGULATION...... 5 A. BroadbandProvidersHavetheIncentiveandAbilitytoLimittheOpenInternet……………………………5 B. IndividualizedArrangementsforPriorityTreatmentShouldBeProhibitedOutright………………………7 IV. THEPRINCIPLESOFTRANSPARENCY(DISCLOSURE),NOͲBLOCKINGANDNONͲDISCRIMINATIONARE ESSENTIALFOREFFECTIVEREGULATION……………………………………………………………………………………………….8 V. MOBILESERVICES………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….11 VI. ENFORCEMENT…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………….11 VII. REGULATORYFRAMEWORK………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….12 VIII. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...... 12 AppendixA:U.S.Production2002–2013:Independentv.Major. AppendixB:MediaConsolidationintheU.S.:ListingofConglomerates’Holdings. AppendixC:ComcastͲTimeWarnerCableProposedMergerConsolidation. AppendixD:AT&TͲDirecTVProposedMergerConsolidation. AppendixE:ExamplesofCommonlyOwnedorAffiliatedBroadbandProvidersandContentProviders. AppendixF:Top4BroadbandProviderMarketShareAnalysis:BroadbandShare/MultiͲChannelVideo ProgrammingDistributionShare. I. INTRODUCTION
TheIndependentFilm&TelevisionAlliance(“IFTA”)isthetradeassociationfortheindependentfilmand televisionindustryworldwide.IFTArepresentsmorethan145MemberCompaniesfrom21countries,consistingof theworld’sforemostindependentproductionanddistributioncompanies,salesagents,televisioncompaniesand financial institutions engaged in film finance.1 Collectively, IFTA Members produce over 400 feature films and countless hours of programming annually with U.S. sales revenues of approximately $2.16 billion.2 IFTA also producestheAmericanFilmMarket,thelargestmotionpicturetradeeventintheworld,atwhichover$800million inlicensefeesarenegotiatedannually.
Duringthelasttwelveyears,independentproductioncompanieshaveproducedthevastmajorityofallU.S. featurefilms.3Formorethan30years,IFTAMembershaveproduced,distributedandfinancedmanyoftheworld’s most prominent and critically acclaimed films, 21 of which have won the Academy Award® for “Best Picture,” including12YearsaSlave,TheArtist,TheKing’sSpeech,TheHurtLocker,SlumdogMillionaire,NoCountryforOld
Men,Crash,MillionDollarBaby,LordoftheRings:TheReturnoftheKing,DanceswithWolves,andGandhi.
IndependentfilmandtelevisionproductiondependsupontheabilitytosecurefinancingonapictureͲbyͲ picture or programͲbyͲprogram basis and on the ability to provide collateral for such financing through preͲ productiondistributionagreements.Inmostcircumstances,noindependentfilmproductioncanproceedunless and until commercial distribution is secured. Only a permanently open Internet will ensure that independent content producers, as well as independent online video distributors, can compete fairly with other content producersanddistributors,especiallythoseaffiliatedwithbroadbandproviders.Thiscanonlyoccurifbroadband providersarerequiredbyregulationtorefrainfromdiscriminatoryorcommerciallyunreasonablepractices.
1IFTAdefines“independent”producersanddistributorsasthosecompaniesandindividualsapartfromthemajorstudiosthatassumethe majority(morethan50%)ofthefinancialriskforproductionofafilmortelevisionprogramandcontrolitsexploitationinthemajorityof theworld.AlistofIFTAMemberscanbefoundatwww.iftaͲonline.org. 22013U.S.salesrevenuebaseduponlinearregressionanalysis,IFTAMembershipSalesSurveyresults2001Ͳ2012. 3SeeAppendixA:U.S.Production2002–2013:Independentv.Major. 1 In2010,IFTAfiledcommentsinresponsetotheFCC’sOpenInternetNoticeofProposedRulemaking4as wellastheFCC’sNoticeofFurtherInquiryinthesameproceeding.5Inthosecomments,IFTAoutlineditsconcerns thatthepatternsofverticalintegrationintraditionalmediawouldbereplicatedintheemergingonlinemarketplace unless regulatory action was taken. In the four years since, the consolidation of the marketplace with large conglomeratesowningorcontrollingbroadbandnetworks,alongwithtelevisionnetworksandchannels,production units,andcontentsuppliers,hasonlyexpanded.TheComcastͲNBCUniversalmergeracceleratedtheconsolidation trend,6andrecentlyproposedmergers(e.g.,ComcastwithTimeWarnerCable7andAT&TwithDirecTV8)would continuetheconsolidationandexpandtheabilityandincentivesforbroadbandInternetproviderstoengagein preferential treatment of affiliated services and content. This will shut out or restrict consumer access to independentlysuppliedcontentandplaceindependentlyownedonlinevideodistributionservicesandcontentat aseveredisadvantage.
Theprinciplesoftransparency,noͲblockingandnonͲdiscriminationarecriticalinpreventingbroadband providersfromdisadvantaginglawfulindependentcontentbyfavoringofselfͲownedoraffiliatedcontent,services andapplications.Anysuchconductshouldbeprohibited.Moreover,anyindividualizedarrangementsforpriority treatmentbetweenbroadbandprovidersandthirdͲpartiesshouldbeprohibitedsincethesearrangementsarelikely topreventnewinnovativeservicesfromevenenteringintocompetitionwithexistingofferings.
TheproposedFCCreviewproceduresforsucharrangements(boththroughcomplaintprocessesandother formsofdisputeresolution9orviaanadvancefactorͲbasedreviewofpotentiallydiscriminatoryarrangements),10 cannotprovideeffectiveprotections.Theinformationnecessarytoassesshowsucharrangementswouldaffect
4IFTACommentstoPreservingtheOpenInternetBroadbandIndustryPractices,NoticeofProposed Rulemaking,FCC09Ͳ93,GNDocketNo.09Ͳ191,WCDocketNo.07Ͳ52(filedJan.4,2010),currentlyavailableathttp://www.iftaͲ online.org/sites/default/files/IFTA%20Comments%20January%2014,%202010%20Ͳ%20FINAL.pdf. 5IFTACommentstoFurtherInquiryintoTwoUnderdevelopedIssuesintheOpenInternetProceeding,NoticeofProposedRulemaking,GN DocketNo.09Ͳ191,WCDocketNo.07Ͳ52(filedOct.12,2010),availableathttp://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020916598. 6SeeAppendixB:MediaConsolidationintheU.S.:ListingofConglomerates’Holdings. 7SeeAppendixC:ComcastͲTimeWarnerCableProposedMergerConsolidation. 8SeeAppendixD:AT&TͲDirecTVProposedMergerConsolidation. 9ProtectingandPromotingtheOpenInternet,FCCNoticeofProposedRulemaking,FCC14Ͳ61,GNDocketNo.14Ͳ28,Para.172Ͳ176 (adoptedMay15,2014)(“NPRM”). 10NPRMPara.122Ͳ136. 2 othercustomersandconsumersandwhatbarriersmaybecreatedforyetͲtoͲbeͲlaunched,innovativeapplications isuniquelyinthehandsofthebroadbandprovidersthemselves.Thosemostlikelytobeharmed–entrepreneurs newtothemarketplace,smallventuresandconsumers–aretheleastlikelytobeabletopursuearemedythrough theseregulatoryprocesses.Ifthesearrangementsareallowed,thefullandrapiddevelopmentofavibrantonline marketplacewillberestrictedtothepublic’sdetriment.
II. BACKGROUND
IFTA’sapproachtotheissuesbeforetheCommissionandourresponsetotheregulatorysolutionsproposed intheCommission’sMay15,2014NoticeofProposedRulemaking(“NPRM”)arebasedonthehistoryofthevideo marketplaceintheU.S.andontheevolutionoftheonlinemarketplaceforvideoprogrammingthathastakenplace inthepastfouryears.Overthepast20years,accesstotraditionaldistributionplatformshasnarrowedasregulatory restraintsagainstverticalintegrationbetweenprogramproducersandbroadcastandcablenetworkshavebeen easedorhavedisappearedaltogether.Inthepastfewyears,opportunitiestogeneratefinancialreturnsonmultiͲ milliondollarinvestmentsinindependentproductionshavebeendevelopedprincipallyfrom“videoondemand”
(“VOD”) services. VOD may be defined generally to include the right to offer programs on demand to consumers/purchasersforaoneͲofftransactionfeeoronasubscriptionbasis.VODisdistributedonbroadband networksthroughservicesofferedbythebroadbandprovidersthemselves(e.g.,TimeWarnerOnDemand)aswell asbyedgeproviderssuchasNetflixthatrelyuponthebroadbandnetworksforaccesstocustomers.
VODofferedviabroadbandandstreamedtotheconsumerhasbeenanincreasingrevenuesourcefor independent producers. However, that market is dominated by programming owned by or affiliated with the verticallyͲintegratedlargemediaconglomerates.Notwithstandingclaimstothecontrary,themajorVODsystems
(includingComcastXFINITY,etal.)donotdedicateunlimitedcapacitytoVODofferings.Theyofferconsumersonly asmallnumberoftitlesatanygiventimeandretaintitlesonitsserversforonlyafewmonths.Moreover,the program“slots”thatdoexistareallocatedroutinelytofilmsandprogramsthathavehadsignificantpriorexposure inthecinemasoronprominenttelevisionchannels–traditionalplatformsthatindependentsalreadyfinddifficult toaccess.
3 Further, while independents routinely produce and license programs on a pictureͲbyͲpicture basis, the majorVODservicesrefusetoacceptprogramsonthisbasis.Themajorservices(especiallythoseofferedbythe broadbandprovidersthemselves)filltheirslotsthroughrelianceonaffiliatedentities11orbyacquiringpackagesof multipletitlesthroughthirdͲpartyaggregators.ThesethirdͲpartyaggregatorsselectandbundlecontentandreͲ licensetotheonlinedistributionservices,thusallowingtheservicestoavoidthetransactionalcostsofprogram acquisition,intakeandaccounting.Theseaggregatorsactas“middlemen,”selectingonlyaverysmallnumberof titlesforreͲlicensetotheVODplatformsandtakingasignificantportionoftheproducers’shareofanyrevenue generatedforperformingthefunction.SomethirdͲpartyaggregatorsareevencontrolledbyoraffiliatedwiththe broadbandproviders,suchasthecoͲownershipofiNDEMAND(oneofthelargestaggregatorsofcontentinthe world),12whichisjointlyownedbyComcastandTimeWarnerCablealongwithCoxCommunicationsandTWCspinͲ offBrightHouseNetworks.13
Increasingly,independentsmustlookforopportunitiesthroughsmallervideoservicesthatcultivatespecific communitiesofinterestasaudiences.Theseservicesarethemselveslimitedincapacityandvulnerabletoany disadvantageous terms dictated by the broadband providers. As the market currently stands, conglomerates possessdisproportionatemarketleverageandquasiͲmonopolisticpowertocontrolthemeansandconditionsunder whichindependentcontentgetstotheconsumer.ThesebroadbandproviderscannotbereliedupontoselfͲpolice andtounilaterallydeterminetheircompliancewithopenInternetprinciples.
ItisinthisenvironmentthatweseekstrongregulationbytheCommissiontoensureapermanentlyopen
Internetforcontentprovidersanddistributorswhomustrelyonbroadbandproviderstoreachthepublic.Itisa marketthatrequiresregulationtopreventandprohibitbroadbandprovidersfromreflexivelyengagingininherently discriminatoryandcommerciallyunreasonablepractices.
11Forexample,Comcast’sownershipofcontentproviderNBCUniversal,whichownsedgeproviderHulu,andComcast’sexclusivelicensing dealwithmajorstudio21stCenturyFoxInc.forbroadcastandcableshowstoappearonComcast’sXFINITYonͲdemandservice.Shalini Ramachandran,TheWallStreetJournal,CableFightstoFeed‘Binge’TVViewers(Sept.20,2013)availableat http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324807704579083170996190590. 12See“AboutiNDEMAND”athttp://www.indemand.com/about/. 13See“AboutiNDEMAND–Ownership”athttp://www.indemand.com/business/businessͲoverview/about/ownership.php. 4 III. THEMARKETPLACEREQUIRESPERMANENTOPENINTERNETACCESSASSUREDBYREGULATION
TheCommissionseekscommentsonthepotentialfor,anddevelopmentof,newbusinessarrangements betweenbroadbandprovidersandedgeprovidersandonwhethersometypesofarrangements(oraspectsofsuch arrangements) raise greater concerns about Internet openness than others.14 In order to promote innovation, economicgrowthandcompetitioninanincreasinglydigitalmarketplace,theCommissionmustadoptrulesthat adheretotheopenInternetprinciplesoftransparency,noͲblockingandnonͲdiscrimination.Additionally,IFTAurges theprohibitionofanytypeof“priority”arrangements(eitherforthe“onramp”orinthe“lastmile”connectionsto thepublic).Sucharrangementsslanttheplayingfieldinfavorofthebroadbandproviderandshouldbeprohibited outrightundertheCommission’snewopenInternetrules.
A. BroadbandProvidersHavetheIncentiveandAbilitytoLimittheOpenInternet
TheCommissionasksforcommentonchangesinthemarketplacesincethe2010OpenInternetOrderwas adoptedandhowsuchchangeshaveaffectedbroadbandproviders’incentivesandeconomicabilitytoengagein practicesthatwouldlimitInternetopenness.15Examinationofthelackofcompetitioninthebroadbandnetwork industry in terms of both broadband providers and their VOD offerings shows that in the absence of a clear regulatoryframework,andinthefaceofincreasingconsolidationandpartnershipsamongstbroadbandproviders andmajorstudiocontentproviders,16theInternetandopportunitiestodistributelawfulcontenttothepublicwill not remain “open.” In the absence of strong deterrents and consequences for discrimination, independent producersandthepublicforeseeanInternetthat,liketelevisionandcablebeforeit,reflectsonlythebusinessand profitinterestsofthelarge broadbandprovidersrather thanthepublic’sinterestindiverseprogrammingand independents’interestinopportunitiestocompeteforU.S.audiences.
The advantage to the broadband provider is clearly to protect its commercial interests in its content offerings and those that benefit the conglomerates’ other media holdings. Collectively, the top 4 broadband networks–Comcast(24.6%),ATT(19.5%),Verizon(10.7%),andTimeWarnerCable(13.8%)–comprisenearly69%
14NPRMPara.38. 15NPRMPara.39Ͳ40. 16SeeAppendixE:ExamplesofCommonlyOwnedorAffiliatedBroadbandProvidersandContentProviders. 5 of the U.S. broadband market with over 57 million subscribers. For most U.S. consumers, broadband network competition is narrowly limited to a single cable company and a single wireline telephony company. Further, wireless and satellite broadband services are generally slower and may be more expensive or otherwise disadvantagedandthereforenotanequivalentcompetitivealternativefortheconsumer.Thisisreflectedinthe respectivemarketshares.
ThesamefourbroadbandnetworkprovidersalsoaccountforthetopfourslotsoftheMultiͲchannelVideo
ProgrammingDistributor(“MVPD”)marketshare.17AsoutlinedinAppendixB(MediaConsolidationintheU.S.), thesebroadbandprovidershavebuiltͲinrelationshipsandcommercialinterestswithcontentsuppliers,television and cable channels and networks, leaving little room for independent content for consumers. Independent producersarerightlyconcernedthattheentireplayingfieldisalreadyheavilytiltedinfavorofthebroadband providers,theirvideoprogrammingservicesandaffiliatedcontent.
Theseconglomeratesincreasinglyareacquiringaflowofcontentfortheirdistributionplatformsthrough merger, acquisition or exclusive partnerships (or “output deals”) with other media conglomerates. The 2010
ComcastͲNBCUniversalmergerillustratesthatthefutureforlargebroadbandprovidersmaybeinthecontentthey are able to secure and control and the ability to leverage the value of that content across multiple platforms
(including broadcast, cable and the Internet itself).18 These conglomerates have strong incentive to act as
"gatekeepers"andtodiscriminateagainstothercontenteitherovertlythroughpriorityarrangementsifallowed,or covertlyundertheguiseof“networkmanagement”byaccordingpreferentialcarriagetotheirownvideoprogram services.
TheCommission(andtheDepartmentofJustice)areaddressingthequestionofwhetherornottoapprove theComcastͲTimeWarnerCableandAT&TͲDirecTVmergers.Inthisproceeding,theCommissionmusttakeinto accountthevirtualinevitabilitythatbroadbandproviderswillseektoacquireandthentocontroltheflowofcontent
17SeeAppendixF:Top4BroadbandProviderMarketShareAnalysis:BroadbandShare/MultiͲChannelVideoProgrammingDistributor Share. 18SeeComcastͲNBCdealshowsfutureisincontent:ComcasttriestofutureͲproofwithcontrolofNBCUniversalMoviesandTVProgramming, availableat http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ComcastNBCͲdealͲshowsͲfutureͲapfͲ1002116126.html. 6 andmusttakeactiontoprotectthepublicfrompracticesthatbolsterthebroadbandprovider’svideoprogram serviceorgoalsattheexpenseofthepublicandotherexistingorfuturecompetitors.TheCommissionhasasked forcommentonwhetheritshouldengageinamarketpoweranalysiswithrespecttobroadbandproviders.19IFTA strongly urges the Commission to quantify and measure in a transparent manner the power that broadband providershaveinthemarketplaceasabasisforappropriateregulationtoprotecteffectivecompetition.However, thatissueandprocessdonotalterinanywaytheneedfortheactionswerecommendinthiscurrentproceeding.
B. IndividualizedArrangementsforPriorityTreatmentShouldBeProhibitedOutright TheCommission’sproposedopenInternetruleswouldtoleratebroadbandprovidersofferinghigherquality ofservicestothoseserviceproviderswhoarewillingtopaymore,resultinginothercompetitorsreceivingslower orlessflexibletransportoptions,providedthosepreferentialarrangementsare“reasonable.”Inthecontextof videoprogramming,thisisunacceptable.HighͲqualityserviceisessentialtothedeliveryofvideoprogrammingon theInternet,andinadequateserviceisveryperceptibletoconsumers.Themarketplacethatexiststodayalreadyis significantlybiasedinfavorofonlineservicesownedbyverticallyͲintegratedbroadbandprovidersandthecontent suppliedtothoseservicesbyaffiliatedentities.Aregulatorystructurethatwouldpermitfurthercostburdenstobe imposedonindependentvideoservicesandedgeprovidersunderanyconditionwillultimatelydefeatnewand innovative services at their inception. Because these newer edge services are increasingly the lifeline for independently produced content, it is virtually inevitable that consumers will lose access to that diverse programming and its much broader range of ideas, contrary to the public interest standard that guides the
Commission.Thus,weurgetheCommissiontoprohibitoutrightanysuchpriorityarrangementsinanyformby broadbandproviders.
TheCommissionsuggeststheadoptionarebuttablepresumptionthatabroadbandprovider’sexclusive(or effectivelyexclusive)arrangementprioritizingservicetoanaffiliatewouldbecommerciallyunreasonable.20IFTA does not support a rebuttable presumption and urges a brightͲline prohibition of priority arrangements. The
19NPRMPara.49. 20NPRMPara.126Ͳ127. 7 promulgationofarebuttablepresumptionwillonlyimposedelay,costanduncertaintyonallparties,renderingita pooralternativetooutrightprohibition.
Foreshadowingwhatcouldbecomeawidespreadpracticeandaveryunevenplayingfield,Netflixrecently agreedtopayComcasttoensurefasterandmorereliableaccesstoComcast’ssubscribers.21Similarly,backbone provider Level 3 has also agreed to pay for faster onͲramping to Comcast’s servers.22 These “paid peering” arrangementsarespecificallyexcludedbythescopeofthisNPRM,23butclearlydemonstratetheincentiveand abilityofbroadbandproviderstofavortheirowncommercialinterestsorusetheircontroltodiscriminate,blockor exact additional revenue from wouldͲbe content competitors. Despite being an outspoken proponent of net neutrality and opponent of such tolls, Netflix has said that it would continue paying broadband providers to guaranteeagoodexperienceforitscustomers.24Currently,NetflixisnegotiatingwithbothVerizonandAT&T25 becauseNetflix’sstreamingspeedshavealsosufferedrecentlywiththesebroadbandproviders.26InJune2014 alone,Netflix’saverageprimetimestreamingspeedintheU.S.dropped17%onVerizonFiOS,13%onVerizonDSL,
12%onAT&TUͲverse,and10%onAT&TDSL.27
IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY (DISCLOSURE), NOͲBLOCKING AND NONͲDISCRIMINATION ARE
ESSENTIALFOREFFECTIVEREGULATION
TheCommission’scurrentproposal,asin2010,wouldcontinuetoallowbroadbandproviderstheflexibility toengagein“reasonablenetworkmanagement.”TheCommissionmustagainbeextremelycarefulthatreasonable network management cannot be used to compromise the principles of transparency, noͲblocking and nonͲ
21TimothyB.Lee,Comcast’sdealwithNetflixmakesnetworkneutralityobsolete,TheWashingtonPost(February23,2014)availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theͲswitch/wp/2014/02/23/comcastsͲdealͲwithͲnetflixͲmakesͲnetworkͲneutralityͲobsolete/. 22JonBrodkin,Level3andCogentaskFCCforprotectionagainstISP“tolls”,ArsTechnica(March21,2014)availableat http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/03/levelͲ3ͲandͲcogentͲaskͲfccͲforͲprotectionͲagainstͲispͲtolls/. 23NPRMPara.59. 24JonBrodkin,Netflixsaysitwillpay“tolls”tomoreISPs,notjustComcast,ArsTechnica(March20,2014)availableat http://arstechnica.com/techͲpolicy/2014/03/netflixͲsaysͲitͲwillͲpayͲtollsͲtoͲmoreͲispsͲnotͲjustͲcomcast/. 25JonBrodkin,VerizonCEOconfidentaboutgettingpaymentsfromNetflix,too,ArsTechnica(February24,2014)availableat http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/02/verizonͲceoͲconfidentͲaboutͲgettingͲpaymentsͲfromͲnetflixͲtoo/. 26MaxEhrenfreund,ThishilariousgraphofNetflixspeedsshowstheimportanceofnetneutrality,WashingtonPost(April25,2014) availableathttp://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/04/25/thisͲhilariousͲgraphͲofͲnetflixͲspeedsͲshowsͲtheͲimportanceͲofͲnetͲ neutrality/. 27NetflixISPSpeedIndex,NetflixBlog(July14,2014)availableathttp://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/. 8 discrimination. The Commission should consider any agreement or practice that grants more favorable terms, carriageortreatmenttoanaffiliatedserviceorentity(including,onthewirelessside,practicessuchaswaivingdata capsonlyforaffiliatedservices)asunreasonablenetworkmanagementandaccordinglyprohibitanysuchpractice.
TransparencyRule(Disclosure).TheCommissionseeksgeneralcommentonhowwelltheCommission’s existingtransparencyrule28isworking,whiletentativelyconcludingthatitshouldenhancethetransparencyrule29 toimproveitseffectivenessforendusers,edgeproviders,theInternetcommunity,andtheCommission.30Tothe extentthatbroadbandprovidersengageinnetworkmanagement,itisessentialthattheyberequiredtodisclosein sufficientdetailthenatureandpurposeofsuchtechniques.Wherenetworkmanagementpracticesaffectinany waythefreeflowoftrafficoflawfulcontentandapplications,thepracticesmustbeclearlyandpubliclydetailed.
TheCommissionmustensurethatallpracticesarenarrowlydesignedtoaddressatechnicalandnotacompetitive needandnothingmore.Inparticular,broadbandprovidersmustberequiredtodiscloseanynetworkmanagement practicesthataffectabroadbandprovider’s(oranaffiliate’s)ownproductorserviceofferings.31
IFTAbelievesthatenhancedtransparencyisnecessaryandtheguidingprinciplemustbetorequirethat broadband providers fully disclose the details of any practice or arrangement that is intended to or could be expectedtoimpedethedeliveryoforaccesstoanylawfulcontentorapplicationsorthatisknowntoconferan advantage(whetherfinancialorintermsofqualityofservice)toanyaffiliatedserviceorapplication.Subscribers mustalsobeprovidedwithsufficientdetailstounderstandallofthetermsoftheservicetheyarepurchasingand thenatureofanypracticethatmayimpedeorlimittheiraccesstothenetworkorservices.Otherstakeholders–
28Theexistingtransparencyruleprovides:“ApersonengagedintheprovisionofbroadbandInternetaccessserviceshallpubliclydisclose accurateinformationregardingthenetworkmanagementpractices,performance,andcommercialtermsofitsbroadbandInternetaccess servicessufficientforconsumerstomakeinformedchoicesregardinguseofsuchservicesandforcontent,application,service,anddevice providerstodevelop,market,andmaintainInternetofferings.”OpenInternetOrder,25FCCRcdat17937,Para.54. 29Inthe2010OpenInternetOrder,theCommissionnotedthatakeyobjectiveofthetransparencyruleistoenabletheCommissionto collectinformationnecessarytoassess,report,andenforcetheopenInternetrules.TheCommissionnowseekscommentonhowitcan bestdesignaprocessforenforcingthetransparencyrulethatprovidescertainty,flexibility,andaccessforallaffectedparties.Forinstance, shouldtheCommissionestablishandmakepublicalistofthosebroadbandprovidersthatblockorotherwiselimitcertaintypesoftraffic? ShouldtheCommissioncollectandpublishinformationonpriorityarrangements?NPRMPara.87Ͳ88. 30NPRMPara.66Ͳ67. 31Inthe2010OpenInternetOrder,theCommissionnotedthatakeyobjectiveofthetransparencyruleistoenabletheCommissionto collectinformationnecessarytoassess,report,andenforcetheopenInternetrules.TheCommissionnowseekscommentonhowitcan bestdesignaprocessforenforcingthetransparencyrulethatprovidescertainty,flexibility,andaccessforallaffectedparties.Forinstance, shouldtheCommissionestablishandmakepublicalistofthosebroadbandprovidersthatblockorotherwiselimitcertaintypesoftraffic? ShouldtheCommissioncollectandpublishinformationonpriorityarrangements?NPRMPara.87Ͳ88. 9 edge providers, content delivery networks and backbone providers – must be able to easily access the details neededtostructuretheirownofferingstoworkeffectivelywithandonthenetwork.Finally,theCommissionmust require regular detailed reporting by the broadband providers of any material changes to existing network architecture,ofnetworkmanagementpracticesandofthenatureandhistoryofanycomplaintsregardingviolations oftheseopenInternetrulesandregulations.
InitsCommentsfiledinthismatter,CogentCommunicationssuggests“thatanyefforttoenhancethe transparencyrulemustfocusonrequiringbroadbandproviderstoprovidemoredetailed,timelyandaccessible disclosuresthatareusefultoallpersonsinvolvedintheoperationoruseoftheInternet—notjustthecustomersof lastͲmile broadband providers. Moreover, disclosures of the type will facilitate the Commission's enforcement effortsbyprovidingadetailedbodyofdatafromwhichitcandetermineifabroadbandproviderisengagingin practicesthatimpedethereasonableandtimelydeploymentofbroadbandservicetoallAmericans.”32IFTAstrongly supportsthisposition.
No Blocking Rule. The Commission proposes to reͲadopt the text of the noͲblocking rule that the
Commissionadoptedin2010,withaclarificationthatitdoesnotprecludebroadbandprovidersfromnegotiating individualized, differentiated arrangements with similarly situated edge providers (subject to the separate commercialreasonablenessruleoritsequivalent),andtheCommissionalsoseekscommentonwhetheritshould adoptarulethatprohibitsbroadbandprovidersfromenteringintopriorityagreementswithedgeproviders.33The
CommissionreiteratesandseekscommentonthetentativeconclusionthatunderitsproposedopenInternetrules such individualized arrangements for priority treatment would be subject to scrutiny under the proposed commercialreasonablenessruleandprohibitedunderthatruleiftheyharmInternetopenness.34Toensureanopen
Internet,IFTAsupportsthereͲadoptionofastandͲalonenoͲblockingrule.Further,theCommissionshouldnot permit priority arrangements subject to a proposed commercial reasonableness standard, but rather should
32PreservingtheOpenInternet:OnRemandfromtheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuit,Commentsof CogentCommunicationsGroup,Inc.,FCC14Ͳ61,GNDocketNo.14Ͳ28,at7Ͳ8(March21,2014)[emphasisadded]. 33NPRMPara.95. 34NPRMPara.101. 10 prohibitoutrightanyagreementorpracticethatgrantsmorefavorableterms,carriageortreatment(including,on wirelessservices,waivingdatacapsonlyforownedoraffiliatedservices).
NonͲDiscrimination Rule. IFTA believes that there should also be a nonͲdiscrimination rule to prevent broadbroadprovidersfromengaginginselfͲinterestednetworkmanagement.WhilethecurrentNPRMdoesnot tentatively include nonͲdiscrimination as a separate rule (subject to reasonable network management), IFTA believesanonͲdiscriminationruleisalsonecessarytopreventbroadbandprovidersfromengaginginpreferential treatmentofaffiliatedservicesandcontent.
V. MOBILESERVICES
TheCommissionalsoseekscommentonwhethertheproposedopenInternetrulesshouldcontinueto distinguish between fixed and mobile broadband.35 Wireless broadband networks have become increasingly importanttothedistributionofcontentandbroadbandInternetaccess.IFTArecognizestheparticularsinvolvedin theapplicationofopenInternetprinciplestodifferentplatformsandtheunderlyingtechnologicalvariations,but thestandardforhowbothfixedandwirelessbroadbandnetworkprovidersdeliverthirdͲpartyapplications,services andcontenttoconsumersshouldnotdiffer.Thesamerulesthatapplytofixedbroadbandshouldapplytomobile broadband.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
AstheCommissionitselfhasnoted,enforcementoftheproposedopenInternetrulesispotentiallydifficult.
Thepartiesaffectedbyaviolationofsuchrulesareunlikelytohavethetechnicalknowledgeorresourcestofully diagnosewhytheir broadband networkhasfailedtodeliverhighͲqualityorfastservice.Few consumers,edge providersorcontentdeliverynetworkswillhavethefinancialresourcestopursueafullcomplainttoconclusionat theCommission(especiallyifthenetworkfailurehasdefeatedtheirbusiness).TheCommission’sDataRoaming
Orderprocedure–whichrelatessolelytoentitiesawareofandseekingtoconcludecommercialarrangements–
35NPRMPara.62. 11 doesnotprovideanappropriateprecedent.Thisinabilitytocraftaneffectiveenforcementsystemcallsevenmore stronglyfortheadoptionofpoliciesthatareeasytounderstandbyallstakeholdersandeasytopolice.
VII. REGULATORYFRAMEWORK
IFTAtakesnopositionatthistimeonwhetherbroadbandnetworkservicesshouldbereclassifiedunder
TitlesIIoftheCommunicationsActof1934asamended.However,theCommissionmusttakethemosteffective actionsavailabletoittoensurethattheregulationsitadoptsguaranteethattheopenInternetisprotected,are sustainableandprovidecertaintytothepublic.
VIII. CONCLUSION
TheopenInternetisvitaltoAmerica’sfutureeconomicwellͲbeing,culturalgrowthandsocialenrichment.
IFTA and its Members strongly believe that the Commission should adopt transparency, noͲblocking and nonͲ discrimination rules and prohibit outright any broadband provider from engaging in any and all priority arrangementsinordertopreserveandpromoteapermanentlyopenInternet.
Respectfullysubmitted, INDEPENDENTFILM&TELEVISIONALLIANCE JeanM.Prewitt President&ChiefExecutiveOfficer SusanCleary VicePresident&GeneralCounsel ArchieF.Iskaq AssociateCounsel 10850WilshireBoulevard,9thFloor LosAngeles,CA90024Ͳ4321 July15,2014
12 AppendixA U.S.Production2002Ͳ2013:Independentv.Major
Independent MajorStudio Year Productions Indie/MajorCoͲprod Production IntlCoProduction Total 377 14 105 12 508 2002 74% 3% 21% 2% 100%
251 12 104 13 380 2003 66% 3% 27% 3% 100%
434 50 63 16 563 2004 77% 9% 11% 3% 100%
435 33 91 25 584 2005 74% 6% 16% 4% 100%
393 22 78 11 504 2006 78% 4% 15% 2% 100%
477 24 103 18 622 2007 77% 4% 17% 3% 100%
321 21 77 5 424 2008 76% 5% 18% 1% 100%
251 13 75 32 371 2009 68% 4% 20% 9% 100%
422 33 105 1 561 2010 75% 6% 19% 0% 100%
480 9 87 60 636 2011 75% 1% 14% 9% 100%
393 17 83 14 507 2012 62% 3% 13% 2% 80%
335 6 77 4 422 2013Ͳnotverified 53% 1% 12% 1% 66%
415 23 95 19 553 12YearAverage 75% 4% 17% 3% 100%
*Source:IFTAanalysisofproductionlistingspublishedinTheHollywoodReporter&DailyVariety(2002Ͳ2008)andBaseline&IMDBPro(2009Ͳ2013). AppendixB MediaConsolidationintheU.S.: ListingofConglomerates’Holdings Sources:ColumbiaJournalReviewwebsite(http://www.cjr.org/resources),CompanyWebsites
AT&T Ͳ E!Entertainment Ͳ ExerciseTV Ͳ FEARnet(w/Lionsgate&Sony) Television Ͳ G4 ͲUͲVerseTV Ͳ GolfChannel ͲproposedmergerwithDirecTV Ͳ MSNBC Internet Ͳ Oxygen* InternetServiceProvider(ISP) Ͳ PBSKidsSprout(PartialwithPBS) ͲAT&TUͲVerse Ͳ StyleNetwork VOD Ͳ SyFyChannel* ͲUͲVerseOnDemand Ͳ TheWeatherChannel Ͳ TVOne TelephoneCommunications Ͳ USANetwork* Ͳ Versus LandlinePhoneService Internet ͲUͲVerseVoice InternetServiceProvider(ISP) ͲSouthwesternBell Ͳ Comcast ͲBellSouth InternetProgrammingSites MobilePhoneService Ͳ NBC.com ͲAT&T4GLTE Ͳ OnDemandOnline ͲCricketWireless Ͳ USANetworkOnline CablevisionSystemsCorp. VOD AMCNetworks(FormerlyRainbowMediaHoldingsLLC.) Ͳ Hulu.com32%(ownedbyseveralcompanies,Fox,NBC, ABC) CableTelevision Ͳ iNDEMAND(partialw/Cox,TimeWarnerCableand MultiͲServiceOperator(MSO) BrightHouse) - IO Ͳ XFINITY CableChannels - AmericanMovieChannel(AMC)* - IFC* DirecTV(formersubsidiaryofLibertyMedianowstandalone) - TheSundanceChannel(purchasedfromNBC5/7/08)* - Women’sEntertainment(WEtv)* BroadcastSatelliteServiceProvider Internet - DirecTV(possibleacquisitionbyAT&Tasof2014) InternetServiceProvider(ISP) - OptimumOnline VOD - DirecTVOnDemand Comcast/NBCUniversal ProductionEntities: HearstCorp. Ͳ FocusFeatures Ͳ UniversalStudios CableTelevisionChannels - A&E(partialw/Disney)* BroadcastTelevision - BiographyChannel(partialDisney) Ͳ NBCTVNetwork - ESPN(partialw/Disney) Ͳ Telemundo - TheHistoryChannel(partialw/Disney)* - LifetimeNetwork(partialw/Disney)* CableTelevision - LifetimeMovieNetwork(partialw/Disney) - LifetimeRealWomen(partialw/Disney) MultiͲServiceOperator(MSO) Ͳ Comcast CableChannels Ͳ Bravo* Ͳ Chiller Ͳ Cloo(FormerlySleuth) Ͳ CNBC * Major fiction programming cable channel 1 AppendixB MediaConsolidationintheU.S.: ListingofConglomerates’Holdings Sources:ColumbiaJournalReviewwebsite(http://www.cjr.org/resources),CompanyWebsites NationalAmusements NewsCorp(FOX) CBS ProductionEntities: BroadcastTelevision Ͳ 21thCenturyFox Ͳ CBSTVNetwork Ͳ FoxSearchlight Ͳ CWNetwork(partialw/WarnerBros.) BroadcastTelevision CableTelevisionChannels Ͳ FoxBroadcasting - FLIX* Ͳ MyNetworkTV(syndicationservice) Ͳ Showtime* o Showtime CableTelevisionChannels o Showtime2 Ͳ BigTenNetwork o ShowtimeShowcase Ͳ FoxMovieChannel* o ShowtimeBeyond Ͳ FoxNewsChannel o ShowtimeExtreme Ͳ FoxSportsNet o ShowtimeFamilyZone Ͳ FX* o ShowtimeNext Ͳ NationalGeographicChannel(partialw/NGTF) o ShowtimeWomen Ͳ SPEEDChannel Ͳ TheMovieChannel* Ͳ FUEL InternetProgrammingServices InternetProgramming Ͳ MySpace Ͳ CBS.com Ͳ FOX.com Ͳ CWVideo VOD - Hulu.com(ownedbyseveralcompanies,Fox,NBC,ABC) Viacom/Paramount (formersubsidiaryofLibertyMedianowstandalone ProductionEntities: StarzInc. ParamountStudios company) Ͳ ParamountVantage CableTelevisionChannels Ͳ Encore*(ownedbyStarzInc.) CableChannels Ͳ EncoreAction Ͳ BET* Ͳ EncoreDrama Ͳ ComedyCentral* Ͳ EncoreLove Ͳ CMT Ͳ EncoreMystery Ͳ LOGO Ͳ EncoreWam Ͳ MTV Ͳ EncoreWestern Ͳ mtvU Ͳ MOVIEplex(ownedbyStarzInc.) Ͳ Nickelodeon Ͳ INDIEplex Ͳ Nick@Nite Ͳ RETROplex Ͳ Palladia Ͳ Starz*(nowownedbyStarzInc.) Ͳ Spike* Ͳ StarzCinema Ͳ TVLand Ͳ StarzComedy Ͳ VH1 Ͳ StarzEdge Internet Ͳ StarzInBlack Ͳ BET.com Ͳ StarzKids&Family Ͳ ComedyCentral.com Ͳ StarzOnDemand Ͳ Spike.com VOD - Epix(partialwithMGMandLionsgate) * Major fiction programming cable channel 2 AppendixB MediaConsolidationintheU.S.: ListingofConglomerates’Holdings Sources:ColumbiaJournalReviewwebsite(http://www.cjr.org/resources),CompanyWebsites TheWaltDisneyCompany o MoreMax o ActionMax ProductionEntities: o ThrillerMax Ͳ MarvelEntertainment o OuterMax Ͳ PixarAnimationStudios o Wmax Ͳ WaltDisneyPictures o 5StarMax Ͳ TouchstonePictures Ͳ CartoonNetwork* Ͳ Boomerang BroadcastTelevision Ͳ CNN Ͳ ABCTV Ͳ TBS* Ͳ TNT* CableTelevisionChannels Ͳ TurnerClassicMovies(TCM)* Ͳ ABCFamilyChannel* Ͳ A&E(partialw/Hearst)* MultiServiceOperator Ͳ BiographyChannel(partialw/Hearst) Ͳ DisneyChannel* Ͳ None(TimeWarnerCablespunfromTWinMarch09) Ͳ ESPN(partialw/Hearst) Ͳ TheHistoryChannel*(partialw/Hearst) Internet Ͳ LifetimeNetwork*(partialw/Hearst) Ͳ LifetimeMovieNetwork(partialw/Hearst) InternetServiceProvider(ISP) Ͳ LifetimeRealWomen(partialw/Hearst) Ͳ SOAPnet Ͳ NoneͲAOL(spunfromTWinDec09) Ͳ DisneyXD(fkaToonDisney) InternetProgrammingSites InternetProgrammingServices Ͳ CWVideo Ͳ ABC.com Ͳ TBS.com Ͳ DisneyOnline Ͳ TNT.tv Ͳ ABCFamily.com VOD TimeWarnerCable Ͳ Hulu.com(ownedbyFox,NBC,ABC) Ͳ MultiͲserviceOperator(MSO) TimeWarner(WarnerBros.) InternetServiceProvider(ISP) ProductionEntities: Ͳ WarnerBros.Pictures ͲTimeWarnerCableInternet(fkaRoadrunner) Ͳ NewLinePictures VOD BroadcastTelevision ͲiNDEMAND(partialwithCox,Comcast&BrightHouse) Ͳ TheCW(withCBS) Verizon CableTelevision Internet CableChannels InternetServiceProvider(ISP) Ͳ HBO* ͲVerizonFiOS o HBO o HBO2 TelephoneCommunications o HBOComedy o HBOFamily LandlinePhoneService o HBOLatino ͲFiOSVoice o HBOSignature o HBOZone MobilePhoneService o HBOOnDemand ͲVerizon4GLTE Ͳ Cinemax* Television o Cinemax ͲFiOSTV * Major fiction programming cable channel 3 AppendixC ComcastͲTimeWarnerCable ProposedMergerConsolidation ComcastPreͲMergerAssets TWCPreͲMergerAssets AfterMerger Assets BroadbandService BroadbandService BroadbandService *20.66Millionsubscribers *11.6MillionSubscribers *32.26Millionsubscribers 24.43%ofmarket 13.76%ofmarket 38.2%ofMarket DigitalCableService DigitalCableService DigitalCableService *21.69Millionsubscribers *11.39millionsubscribers *33.08millionsubscribers 22.9%ofmarket 12%ofmarket 35%ofmarket DigitalPhoneService DigitalPhoneService DigitalPhoneService *10.73Millionphonelines *4.80Millionphonelines *15.53Millionphonelines iNDemandVODService iNDemandVODService iNDemandVODService 53.9%** 23.9%*** 77.8%(estimated) ComcastChannels GolfChannel AllChannelsListedas FEARnet(w/Lionsgate&SPE) ComcastPreͲMerger Versus Assets: G4 StyleNetwork Comcast E!Entertainment ComcastSportsnet NBCUniversal MLBNetwork(minoritystake) PBSKidsSprout NonUS (w/PBS,SesameWorkshop&HiTEnt) TVOne NBCUniversalChannels NBC CNBC(50%) MSNBC Bravo Telemundo USA Syfy UniversalHD TheWeatherChannel Hulu(32%) Mun2 Sleuth Oxygen NonUSChannels 13thStreet SyFyChannel Movies24 divaTV Steel StudioUniversal *LeichtmanResearchGroup(figuresasofYearͲEnd2013) **EstimatebasedonfigureinSECAnnualReportfiled2/25/2011 ***SECAnnualReportfiled2/18/2014
AppendixD AT&TͲDirecTV ProposedMergerConsolidation AT&TAssets DirecTVAssets AfterProposedMerger UͲVerseIPTVService: DirecTVSatelliteTVService UͲVerse/DirecTVServices: *5.46Millionsubscribers *20.25Millionsubscribers *25.71Millionsubscribers 5.8%oftheMVPDmarket 21.4%oftheMVPDmarket 27.18%oftheMPVDmarket ChannelsAvailable ChannelsAvailable ChannelsAvailable ABC,AMC,A&E,BBCAmerica,BET, ABC,AMC,A&E,BBCAmerica,BET, ABC,AMC,A&E,BBCAmerica,BET, Bravo,CW,ComedyCentral,Chiller, Bravo,ComedyCentral,Chiller, Bravo,CW,ComedyCentral, Cloo,CNN,CNBC,CartonNetwork, Cloo,CNN,CNBC,CartonNetwork, Chiller,Cloo,CNN,CNBC,Carton CMT,Cinemax,Disney,E!,Encore, CMT,Cinemax,Disney,E!,Encore, Network,CMT,Cinemax,Disney, FOX,FNC,FX,Fuse,HBO,HGTV,IFC, FOX,FNC,FX,Fuse,HBO,HGTV, E!,Encore,FOX,FNC,FX,Fuse, Lifetime,LOGO,TheMovie IFC,Lifetime,LOGO,TheMovie HBO,HGTV,IFC,Lifetime,LOGO, Channel,MTV,MSNBC,NBC, Channel,MTV,MSNBC,NBC, TheMovieChannel,MTV,MSNBC, Nickelodeon,OWN,Oxygen,PBS, Nickelodeon,OWN,Oxygen,PBS, NBC,Nickelodeon,OWN,Oxygen, Showtime,Starz,SundanceTV, Showtime,Starz,SundanceTV, PBS,Showtime,Starz,Sundance SpikeTV,Syfy,TNT,TBS,TVOne, SpikeTV,Syfy,TNT,TBS,TVOne, TV,SpikeTV,Syfy,TNT,TBS,TV TruTV,TLC,TCM,USA,VH1,WGN, TruTV,TLC,TCM,USA,VH1,WGN, One,TruTV,TLC,TCM,USA,VH1, WeTV WeTV WGN,WeTV BroadbandService BroadbandService *16.42MillionSubscribers *16.42Millionsubscribers 19.47%ofthemarket 19.47%ofthemarket ResidentialPhone ResidentialPhone *16.25MillionSubscribers *16.25Millionsubscribers VOD VOD VOD DIRECTVOnDemand UͲVerseOnDemand UͲVerseOnDemand DIRECTVOnDemand
*LeitchmanResearchGroup,figuresasofendof2013 AppendixE ExamplesofCommonlyOwnedorAffiliatedBroadbandProvidersandContentProviders BroadbandProvider OnlineService ContentforService Channels:NBC,Showtime,Starz,Movieplex,HBO,Encore,Cinemax,A&E,ABC, AMC,BET,BBCAmerica,Bravo,CartoonNetwork,CW,Disney,E!Entertainment, Comcast XFINTIY Fox,FoodNetwork,HallmarkChannel,IFC,MTV,Nickelodeon,Oxygen,OWN, Sundance,SpikeTV,SPEED,Syfy,TBS,TCM,Telemundo,TLC,TNT,TruTV,USA, Vh1,WeTV,WGNAmerican
Channels:A&E,ABC,AMC,BBCAmerica,BET,CBS,CMT,ComedyCentral, TimeWarner DisneyChannel,E!Entertainment,FOX,FX,IFCTV,Lifetime,Logo,MTV,NBC, OnDemand Cable Nickelodeon,OWN,Oxygen,Syfy,TBS,Telemundo,TNT,TLC,TruTV,TVOne, USA,VH1,WEtv
Channels:ABC,NBC,CBS,Fox,PBS,CW,Nickelodeon,A&E,USA,TBS,HGTV, Verizon FiOS Disney,Syfy,ComedyCentral,TravelChannel,FX,OWN,BBC,Cinemax,HBO, Showtime,Starz,TheMovieChannel,Encore,Flix,IFCandSundance.
Channels:HBO,Showtime,Starz,Cinemax,Disney,A&E,ABC,Bravo,Cartoon Cox onDEMAND Network,Fox,Lifetime,NBC,Oxygen,Syfy,TBS,USA,TruTV,
Channels:A&E,ABC,AMC,BET,Bravo,CartoonNetwork,CMT,CNN,Comedy Central,Disney,FLIX,Fuse,FX,HBO,HGTV,IFC,Indie&Int’lFilms,Lifetime, Charter CharteronDemand MTV,NBC,Nickelodeon,Oxygen,SoapNet,SPEED,Syfy,TBS,TLC,TNT,truTV, UFC,USA,WVH1
Channels:ABC,Disney,HBO,Showtime,Starz,Nickelodeon,CartoonNetwork, OptimumOnline Encore,A&E,AMC,BET,Bravo,CMT,ComedyCentral,E!Entertainment, OptimumTVtoGO (CablevisionSystems) Esquire,Fox,FX,Hallmark,IFC,Lifetime,LOGO,MTV,Oxygen,Spike,Sundance TV,Syfy,TBS,TMC,TNT,TruTV,USA,VH1,WEtv
Channels:CartoonNetwork,CNN,Disney,HBO,Encore,Cinemax,Encore, Nickelodeon,Showtime,Starz,TheMovieChannel,TBS,TNT,ABC,A&E,AMC, AT&T UͲverse BET,Bravo,CMT,ComedyCentral,E!Entertainment,Esquire,Fox,FX,Hallmark, IFC,Lifetime,LOGO,MTV,Oxygen,Spike,SundanceTV,Syfy,TBS,TMC,TruTV, USA,VH1
AmericaOnline AOLOn AOLOriginalSeries(shortepisodes) Channels:ABC,AMC,Bravo,CartoonNetwork,Cloo,CNBC,ComedyCentral,E! CenturyLink PrismOnDemand Entertainment,Fox,FX,FuelTV,HBO,IFC,NBC,Oxygen,PBS,Showtime,SPEED, Starz,SundanceChannel,Syfy,TBS,TCM,CW,TLC,TNT,TruTV,USA
MSN(Microsoft) XboxLIVE Netflix,HBOGo,HuluPlus,YouTube,AmazonInstantVideo
AppendixF
Top4BroadbandProviderMarketShareAnalysis: BroadbandShare/MultiͲChannelVideoProgrammingDistributorShare
TopFourBroadbandProvidersMarketShare 2009* 2013** Chg2009Ͳ2013 Subscribers(M) %Total Subscribers(M) %Total Subscribers(M) % Comcast 15.7 19.3% 20.7 24.6% 5.0 31.8% ATT 17.1 21.1% 16.4 19.5% Ͳ0.7 Ͳ4.1% Verizon 9.2 11.3% 9.0 10.7% Ͳ0.2 Ͳ2.2% TimeWarnerCable 8.8 10.8% 11.6 13.8% 2.8 31.8% FourCompanyTotal 50.8 62.6% 57.7 68.4% 6.9 13.6%
AllOther 30.4 37.4% 26.6 31.6% Ͳ3.8 Ͳ12.5%
TotalU.S. 81.2 100.0% 84.3 100.0% 3.1 3.8%
TopFourBroadbandProvidersMVPDMarketShare 2010*** 2013** Chg2010Ͳ2013 Subscribers(M) %Total Subscribers(M) %Total Subscribers(M) % Comcast 22.8 22.8% 21.7 22.9% Ͳ1.1 Ͳ4.8% ATT 3 3.0% 5.5 5.8% 2.5 83.3% Verizon 3.5 3.5% 5.3 5.6% 1.8 51.4% TimeWarnerCable 12.4 12.4% 11.4 12.1% Ͳ1.0 Ͳ8.1% FourCompanyTotal 41.7 41.7% 43.9 46.4% 2.2 5.3%
DirectTV 19.2 19.2% 20.3 21.5% 1.1 5.7% 4Co.&DirectTVTotal 60.9 60.8% 64.2 67.9% 3.3 5.4%
AllOther 39.2 39.2% 30.4 32.1% Ͳ8.8 Ͳ22.4%
TotalU.S. 100.1 100.0% 94.6 100.0% Ͳ6.6 Ͳ6.6%
Source:IFTAanalysisofdatafromthesourceslistedimmediatelybelow: *ComcastCorporateOverview9/09;Verizon3rdQt.209New;ATT2009CorporateProfile;OECDDataset6/09 **LeichtmanResearchGroup,"ResearchNotes",4Qt.2013 ***NCTAwebsitesourcing:Companywebsites,filings,etc.;SNLKagan,SpecialReport,U.S.MultichannelSubscriberUpdate& GeographicAnalysis,June2011