America's Aims in Space
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906 FLIGHT, 14 December 19C Missiles and Space flight . AMERICA'S AIMS IN SPACE 2. The Launch Vehicles and their Operation By KENNETH OWEN VERSHADOWING all else on the United States space-flight scene is Project Apollo, the accelerated manned lunar pro- O gramme called for as a major national goal by President Kennedy on May 25 last. The President said, "No single space pro- ject will be more exciting or more impressive, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish." Within six months, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had selected Massachusetts Institute of Technology as associate contractor for Apollo guidance and control, and were negotiating with North American a S400m prime contract for two of the three main sections of the actual spacecraft. Most of the difficulty and expense referred to by President Kennedy in connection with Apollo will arise in the developmeni of the launch vehicles needed to transport the three-man spacecraft to the Moon and back to Earth. Not that this is confined to Apollo, for vehicle development is an obvious key factor in accomplishing all the space missions on which, as described in last week's issue, NASA is currently engaged. The environment in which these launch-vehicle systems are being developed was described at the recent American Rocket Society meeting in New York by Mr Willis M. Hawkins, vice-president and general manager of Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, who listed four main points of overall design philosophy. First, Mr Hawkins commented, "What we are doing now is just barely possible and just barely reliable. And on this basis, we are making highly ambitious plans." Secondly, it was true that dollars were available—but only one year at a time. Thirdly, the USA did not possess the initiative in space; and finally, a new and better idea was often discovered halfway through a project, i.e., one had to face America's heavy workhorse for space will be change. Saturn. The eight-engined first stage (below right) Among the tasks ahead, Mr Hawkins listed three in particular: was fitted with dummy upper stages for a 0) reliability must be improved, (2) costs must be matched to the successful first flight on October 21. Be/ow, budget by using the "building block" principle, and (3) changes the Saturn blockhouse at Cape Canaveral should be recognized as being desirable and honourable. There 907 FLIGHT, 14 Decembe. 1961 These three vehicles have important roles in the US space programme: from the left, the four-stage, all-solid Scout; the three-stage Delta (with Thor as first stage); and the two-stige Centaur (Atlas first stage) now being developed were in fact three areas of reliability, termed by Mr Hawkins rei- Canaveral, described in Flight of November 9. 1961]. The heavy back reliability (a multi-engined safety standard should he aimed at), service gantries and reinforced blockhouses were typical of the long-life reliability (the fewer the components the longer the life), massive facilities which had evolved. and stay-sane reliability (it would be much simpler if men could The purpose of the servicing tower was for assembly and pre- hibernate during journeys to the Moon or Mars). Failure rates paration of the vehicle (and for protection against hurricanes, which could be reduced and reliability improved, he concluded, by made it very expensive); the tower was necessary because assembly- attention to simplifying system design. building tests were not considered valid when the vehicle was For long-range manned missions, nuclear rocket engines have subsequently moved to the launch-pad. As for the blockhouse, this more potential than the liquid and solid chemical systems, and in was separated from the vehicle by a minimum distance because of particular have a greater potential specific impulse. To obtain this the required transfer of intelligence. Ground support equipment specific impulse, the basic problem is one of materials capable of had to be as close as possible, hence all the reinforced concrete. operating at the required high temperatures. A preparation time of approximately two months, plus one Project Rover, under which nuclear rocket engines are being month to re-prepare the pad after each successful firing, was typical developed, is directed by the joint NASA/AEC Space Nuclear for a Saturn-class vehicle in this type of launch complex—i.e., the Propulsion Office established last year. It should result in an oper- limit was four equally spaced shots per year. The complex repre- ational nuclear rocket engine, i.e., one capable of carrying out an sented an investment of some S45m, plus real estate. actual manned mission in space, "within about a decade.'" according Mr Debus went on to describe a possible Saturn C-3 complex, to Dr Glen T. Seaborg, chairman of the US Atomic Energy which contained neither service tower nor blockhouse. A fixed, Commission, with test flights in 1965-67. Although Dr Seaborg four-bay vertical-assembly building would be employed, with the has expressed his opinion that the space funds budgeted for nuclear launch vehicle and umbilical tower mounted on rails or on a propulsion are adequate, this view was obviously not shared by barge. After the vehicle had been checked out in the assembly bay. Mr R. W. Bussard of the Nuclear Propulsion Division of Los it would be moved on rails to an arming tower, where escape rockets Alamos Scientific Laboratory, who maintained vigorously at the would be fitted. Then by rail again a distance of, say, 10,000 fr ARS meeting that the US was not nearly as diligent as she might be to one of about five launch pads. For solid-propellant vehicles. in this new field. a second assembly building could be used in order to double the Mr KrafTt Ehricke, Centaur programme director for General launch rate. The same equipment would be used for both checkout Dynamics/Astronautics, joined Mr Bussard in urging an accelerated and launch, so that a blockhouse would not be needed. nuclear-propulsion programme. Both maintained that the budget Although such an installation would cost an estimated SI90m for this should be increased: Mr Bussard suggested that more money compared with the S45m for Complex 34, it would permit a much could perhaps be justified if the military use of snace were recon- higher rate of launching. To obtain a comparable rate of 32 shots sidered; if, however, the total for space remained fixed and some per year, one would need eight conventional pads, amounting to other programme had to cut to provide more funds for the nuclear S360m plus real estate—and a larger area would be covered. For work, he would suggest reducing the amount of pure scientific Saturn C-3 and C-4 vehicles. Mr Debus suggested the new scheme research in space carried out by unmanned vehicles. described above. Two other ARS speakers had important comments to mike on Costs and Vehicles Before continuing from the above general other aspects of vehicle development. Mr Kurt H. Debus, director comments to details of specific vehicles, it is interesting to note the of NASA's Launch Operations Directorate at Huntsville and Cape expenditures involved in four of the major programmes—Saturn. Canaveral, spoke on launch operations; and Mr Norris F. Dow of Rover, the F-l engine and solid propellants. NASA's estimated General Electric's Space Sciences Laboratory, on special vehicle costs up to and including the budget for the current 1962 fiscal problems. Mr Dow discussed the radiation hazard in manned snace year (Julv I, 1961 to June 30, 1962) are: Saturn, $558m; Rover, flights (if 20,000 volts/cm could be generated in space, shielding S58.lm; F-l engine, SI60.2m and solid propellants, $6.8m. When weight could be reduced markedly), the re-entry problem (the Defense Department and Atomic Energy Commission figures are paraglider or Rogallo wing concept should be considered as a added, the overall totals are Saturn, S659.3m, Rover S24l.2m. re-entry aid); and the rendezvous problem (rendezvous could be F-l engine $16Im and solid propellants S68.8m. made, not only in Earth orbit, but also "at the other end." i.e., in NASA's development of the F-l 1.5m lb thrust liquid-propellant iunar orbit, using ferry vehicles). engine for use in Nova is being augmented by a parallel Defenre On the subject of launch operations, Mr Debus claimed that a Department programme leading to large solid boosters. The current quantum jump" was necessary to meet the challenge of the lunar tentative plan is for a segmented solid-propellant motor weighing programme. "The present launch-system concept is a victim of the some 375 tons and providing 2-3m lb thrust for 60sec, which could evolution which created it," he said; "Now we have reached the end be clustered as required to give the desired total first-stage thrust, of evolution, culminating in Complex 34" [the Saturn pad at Cape and used if necessary also in the second stage. 'Continued overleaf 908 FLIGHT, 14 December 196! likely that both the C-3 and C-4 versions of Saturn would be buil and the choice would be between Saturn C-3 plus Nova, and Satur C-4 alone (since the performance of Nova was markedly bettc; than the C-3, but not so much better than the C-4). Dr von Braun and NASA Administrator James E. Webb bot i emphasized that orbital rendezvous would be developed in am case as a general spaceflight technique, whether or not it was employed to accomplish Project Apollo.