THE , ITS EFFECTS ON THE , AND THE APPROACHES OF , , SYRIA, AND ON THE KURDISH ISSUE By Aylin Ünver Noi*

This article addresses the approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in dealing with the Kurdish issue, with a special focus on historical background. In addition, the article discusses how this issue affects relations among the aforementioned countries and whether cooperation on this issue is possible. The article also examines how the Arab Spring has impacted the Kurds and the attitudes of these countries toward the Kurdish issue.

INTRODUCTION Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This article The Kurds, an Iranian ethno-linguistic evaluates the Arab Spring and its effects on group, living in the area where the borders of the Kurds and the approaches of these four Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria converge, are the countries the Kurdish issue. It also addresses largest ethnic group without a state. 1 Since the whether in light of these circumstances, Justice and Development Party (JDP) or continued collaboration among these countries Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) came to on the Kurdish issue is possible. power in 2002, Turkey has embraced a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy TURKEY AND THE KURDISH ISSUE approach. This has coincided with a shift from confrontation to collaboration among Turkey, In 1984, the Kurdish separatist movement Syria, Iran, and Iraq on the Kurdish issue. Yet resurfaced, with the goal of establishing an the Arab Spring and the ensuing developments independent Kurdish state. The roots of the in the region have led to a deterioration in problem date back to the nineteenth century Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iran, and the “Eastern Question,” which involved bringing the validity of Turkey’s “zero competition between the great powers, Russia problems with neighbors” policy into and Britain, for influence over the Ottoman question. Empire. 2 A series of agreements intended to Turkey’s increasing pressure on the Syrian partition the Ottoman Empire were signed regime, its decision to host a NATO missile between 1915 and 1917. Accordingly, Kurdish defense system, and Turkey’s “rising-star” populated areas would come under the control status in the region have led to competition of Britain, France, and Russia. During the between Iran and Turkey and an exacerbation Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the allies of both Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Syrian supported the idea of a future Kurdish state. relations. In addition, Turkish military The division of the empire and the final intervention in northern Iraq in response to settlement of the “Eastern Question” by intensified PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) promising Kurds their own country were attacks since August to November 2011 have formalized in the Sèvres Treaty, which was strained Turkish-Iraqi relations, since such signed between the allies and the Ottoman attacks could potentially be perceived as a government in 1920. 3 The Sèvres Treaty was threat to Iraqi territorial integrity. In addition, never ratified by the signatories. A resistance Turkish-Iraqi relations deteriorated after the movement, which opposed the terms of Sèvres bitter exchange between Turkish Prime Treaty, emerged in Anatolia and ended with

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the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurdish deputies, including Hatip Dicle, establishment of the Republic of Turkey. 4 Feridun Yazar, and Leyla Zana, formed the Following First World War I, the map of HEP (People’s Labor Party) with the goal of the Middle East was redrawn. Most Kurds campaigning within the National Assembly for found themselves living in Turkey, Iran, and laws guaranteeing equal rights for the Kurds. 8 two new Arab states--Syria and Iraq--which However, as of 1995, the use of Kurdish in were under French and British mandate after government institutions such as the courts and WWI. 5 The newly established Republic of schools still was prohibited. 9 Turkey designated a single nationality for all During the mid-1990s, the PKK began a Turks in its constitution, which did not series of suicide bombing attacks. In the late recognize ethnic group. After the 1990s, Turkey increased its pressure on the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the PKK and its supporters. Both Iran and Syria, Kurds did not renounce their goal to establish Turkey’s neighbors, were among the an independent Kurdish state. supporters of the PKK. From 1979 to 1999, The Shaykh Said Rebellion of 1925 Syria provided support to PKK in the Beq’a emerged as a Kurdish separatist movement, Valley region. However, Syria placed some but was suppressed by the Republic of Turkey. restrictions on PKK activity within its territory Since the 1930s, the Kurds have resisted when an undeclared war between Turkey and government efforts to assimilate them, yet Syria emerged. Turkey threatened to invade uprisings have repeatedly been suppressed by Syria if it continued harboring PKK leader the Turkish army. During the 1960s and mid- Abdallah Ocalan. Damascus quickly expelled 1970s, Kurdish intellectuals attempted to him. After Ocalan’s arrest in Kenya, Syria establish Kurdish-language journals and expelled many PKK terrorists, many of whom newspapers. However, the publications were relocated to northern Iraq. According to a soon shut down. detailed report by the Turkish parliament's Kurdish opposition to the government’s Border Security Research emphasis on linguistic homogeneity was Committee, Iran allowed the PKK to train and spurred by agitation in neighboring Iran and maintain logistical support camps on its Iraq on behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan territory as well as cross the border into that some proposed would include all the Turkey in order to launch attacks and lay Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Since mines. However, once the PKK began 1984, the PKK, an organization officially operations on its own territory, Iran listed the classified as “terrorist” by Turkey, the United group as a terrorist organization. 10 States, and the European Union (EU), has Despite the frequency and intensity of their carried out a violent armed struggle to obtain a operations, Turkey could not achieve its goal Kurdish state. Prior to 1991, the majority of of wiping out the PKK from northern Iraq due Kurds, however, continued to participate in to the support of the Iranian and Syrian Turkish political parties, in particular the governments. 11 In September 1996, the Social Democratic People's Party or the SHP, Turkish authorities announced that they would the party most sympathetic to their goal of intervene in northern Iraq to establish a equality for all citizens of Turkey and security zone extending several miles into assimilating them into Turkish society. 6 Iraqi territory. Iran called on Turkey to abort Turgut Ozal, who became prime minister in the plan. By the end of October 1996, the PUK 1983 and president in 1989, not only broke the (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) had regained official taboo by using the term “Kurd,” but practically all its lost territory with Iranian also called for a more liberal policy toward support, and the danger of an immediate Kurds and supported a bill that revoked the Turkish-Iranian clash receded. 12 ban on the use of the Kurdish language and Turkish military interventions in northern possession of materials in Kurdish. 7 Following Iraq again took place in May and October the parliamentary elections of 1991, several 1997. Along with these interventions, Turkish

16 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue forces escalated their support for the KDP made by France and Britain were forgotten. 17 (Kurdish Democratic Party) by bombing PUK The Syrian Kurds were expected to be easily and PKK positions and actually approached assimilated into an Arab majority. This seems the cities of Irbil and . The largest more plausible, since demands for a Kurdish Turkish military intervention into the northern identity came only from leading land-owning Iraq took place on May 14, 1997, by a families responding to their loss of traditional reported 50,000 Turkish troops. The purpose power in the new state. 18 of this incursion was: to destroy PKK units, During the 1920s, the Kurdish political strengthen Massoud Barzani's KDP (hoping he movement faced the scrutiny of the French would prevent future PKK raids), and balance Mandatory authorities. The newly established Iran’s relationship with the PUK. With this Republic of Turkey was also keeping an eye act, Turkey also sought to counter Iran’s on Kurdish developments in Syria. The failure growing role in northern Iraq as a step toward of the Shaykh Said rebellion in Turkey in preventing Iranian domination of the region. 13 1925 led to the exodus of a substantial number In 1999, Ocalan, leader of the PKK-- of Kurdish rebels to Kurdish regions in Syria. officially classified as a terrorist organization The Kurdish exiles from Turkey continued to responsible for the deaths of an estimated retaliate against the Turkish government. The 30,000 people to create an independent first such attempt against the Turks was the Kurdish state in the Southeastern Turkey--was founding of the pan-Kurdish Xoybun captured in Nairobi, Kenya. He was extradited (Independence) League on October 5, 1927, in to Turkey to stand trial. He was prosecuted Bhamdoun, Lebanon. The league’s political and sentenced to death. He was, however, branch was headed by Celadet Bedirxan. commuted to life imprisonment in Imrali Syrian Kurds joined Xoybun and its branches, Island Prison, since the death penalty is offering a space for Syrian-Kurdish forbidden in EU member states and Turkey, in intellectuals to gain experience speaking about the process of trying to gain EU membership, issues of nationalism, self-determination, and had removed the death penalty from its legal oppression, and providing a foundation for the code. emergence of the Kurdish political movement In July 2009, Turkish Prime Minister throughout the Kurdish region. Xoybun was Erdogan announced the Kurdish Opening dissolved in 1946, when Syria gained (later referred to as the Democratic Opening). independence from France. At the time, The initiative marked the achievement of Kurdish-Soviet relations were on the rise, and several rights for Kurds: 1) the use of formerly interest in “nationalism” was diminishing. The Kurdish titles for districts was permitted; 2) Syrian Communist Party was gaining legal barriers for speaking Kurdish during popularity among the Kurds. 19 prison visits were eliminated; 3) Kurdish Kurdish political parties, which were weak language and literature departments at various and fragmented, operated with limited universities were established; 4) giving interference from the government during the Kurdish names to Kurdish children was rule of Hafız al-Asad (1970-2000), since permitted; 5) TV channels broadcasting in the Damascus considered them to pose little Kurdish language were allowed. 14 threat. Asad was not concerned with Kurdish movements in Syria. He saw the Kurds in SYRIA AND THE KURDISH ISSUE Syria’s neighbors, Iraq and Turkey, as sources of leverage in his various disputes with From the 1920s onward, the Kurds and Ankara. Syria thus supported represented the largest non-Arab Muslim opposition groups in Saddam’s Iraq and minority group in Syria. 15 However, they were allowed the opening of PUK offices in also divided along tribal and other lines, a Damascus in 1975. In 1979, Damascus situation reinforced by the French during the formalized relations with Barzani’s party. mandate. 16 All promises of minority rights Syria sought to weaken the regime in Baghdad

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by bringing the rival factions among the Kurds regime’s stance toward the Kurds. The regime of Iraq together. Both parties established removed much of the state security apparatus offices in Qamishli. They recruited Kurds in from the Kurdish regions and ordered Ba’th Syria to join their and fight against officials to meet with Kurdish party leaders. the . 20 The parties organized a series of The Hafiz al-Asad regime also supported demonstrations, hopeful that the regime might the PKK against Turkey. PKK terrorists relax some of its repressive laws. 23 operated freely in Syria during the 1980s and This transition period ended when the 1990s. Moreover, an estimated 20 percent of Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), PKK terrorists hold Syrian citizenship. which preserved the autonomous “Kurdistan However, the Asad regime could not sustain Regional Government” (KRG), was adopted in this game and signed a security accord, the Iraq on March 8, 2004. Syrian Kurds Adana Agreement, with Turkey in 1998 in celebrated the announcement. In response, order to avoid a major confrontation with Damascus moved extra security forces into Turkey. With this agreement, Syria labeled the Kurdish areas and placed its troops on alert in PKK a terrorist organization, prohibited its order to monitor repercussions on Syrian activities and those of its affiliates, and agreed Kurds. 24 Four days later, during a soccer to block the supply of weapons, logistical match in Qamishli between the Qamishli materiel, and money to the PKK from Syrian team--whose fans were mostly Kurds--and territory. This move forced PKK leader Davr al-Zawr--whose fans were mostly Sunni Ocalan out of his Syrian refuge and opened the Arabs, Davr al-Zawr fans insulted Barzani and way for capture and imprisonment of the PKK . They held up photographs of leaders and militants. Hence, the remaining Saddam while the Kurds shouted slogans in PKK terrorists left the country. However, the support of George W. Bush. The events soon PKK’s presence in Syria brought to an end escalated into Kurdish riots, in which seven this period of relative calm for Syria’s Kurdish football fans were killed. Syrian Kurds. 21 security forces responded to these anti- Following the death of Hafiz al-Asad in government riots known as the “Qamishli 2000 and the accession of his son Bashar al- Revolts,” which took place in Qamishli, Asad, the Kurdish population was more Aleppo, and Damascus, by killing dozens of politicized than ever before. They protested to Kurds and deploying several Arab tribes demand an improvement in their political and against the protestors. 25 cultural rights since Syria’s treatment of the These protests led to intense repression of Kurds differed from that of other minorities in Kurdish cultural and political expression. The the country. The Syrian regime forbids Kurds Kurds were told, for instance, that the state from building private schools, teaching in would no longer tolerate the teaching of the Kurdish, giving their businesses and children Kurdish language, even in the private sphere. Kurdish names, and publishing books in Hence, the Kurdish activists maintained their Kurdish. In the eyes of the Syrian Kurds, the ties to other oppositionists. Eight Kurdish worst injustice is the denial of Syrian parties were signatories to the 2005 Damascus citizenship to Syria’s 300,000 Kurds and their Declaration. However, the parties that did not resulting deprivation of civil rights. sign this document objected to it on the During the “Damascus Spring,” Kurdish grounds that it did not include a provision for cultural activists joined other Syrian constitutional recognition of the Kurds as the intellectuals in demanding more rights. 22 Yet largest ethnic minority in the country. 26 the Damascus Spring, which called for an end The Kurds of Syria have long had a to the emergency law, a constitutional brotherly relationship with the Kurds of Iraq. convention, and other democratization When the KRG was established in Iraq, the measures, was suppressed by the Asad regime. unified KRG downgraded its formal links to However, this act led to change in the the parties in Syria. Most Kurdish parties in

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Syria continue to keep offices in Irbil, by Iraq. They were put down through a however, and the KRG intervenes in those systematic campaign of repression. In 1983, parties’ internal affairs. For instance, Barzani the PUK agreed to cooperate with Saddam by appointed Bashar as the new head of the signing an autonomy agreement. However, the KDPS in 2008. These developments indicate KDP remained opposed. In 1985, the PUK and that the KRG may be looking to rebuild more the KDP joined forces. This led to widespread robust ties with its Kurdish political allies in guerilla warfare in until the Syria. 27 end of the war in 1988. 30 Attempts to negotiate a settlement on IRAN AND THE KURDISH ISSUE Kurdish autonomy with the Iranian government resulted in the assassination of There is a long history of tension between Kurdish leaders. The KDPI leader, Abd al- the Kurds and the government in Iran. This Rahman Qasimlu, was assassinated in 1989. began with Reza Shah Pahlavi recapturing the Iranian Kurdish opposition leader (Democratic lands that Kurdish leaders had gained control Party of Iranian Kurdistan, PDKI) Sadiq of between 1918 and 1922. The Kurds spread Sharafkandi and three other Iranian dissidents their control in western Iran when Iran was were killed in the Mykonos Restaurant in occupied and divided into three zones in 1941 Berlin in 1992. The minister of intelligence at by the United States, Britain, and the USSR. the time, Ali Fallahian, was the only official This development left the country with a weak named in the Mykonos verdict, which revealed government that had little control over areas the high-level government involvement in this outside of the central province of Tehran and political assassination. 31 created an environment in which the Kurds set Following the First (1991), a no- up a political organization different from prior fly zone was established to protect rebellious organizations, which had mostly been clan Kurds from Saddam’s military attacks and to dominated, feudal infiltrated, and religious facilitate the return of Kurdish refugees. Kurds organized groups. The KJK (Committee of continued to fight against Iraqi forces. When Kurdish Resurrection) thus was set up in 1941 Iraqi forces left Kurdistan to the Kurds, its in Mahabad,28 changing its name to the KDP territory became a base for Kurdish separatists (Kurdish Democratic Party) in 1945. In 1946, in the region. On September 15, 1993, Iran the KDP, with Soviet support, announced the and Turkey signed an agreement to prevent establishment of the Mahabad Kurdish illegal border crossings. With Syria, they held Republic, which only lasted 11 months. The an ad hoc series of tripartite conferences Iranian government recaptured Mahabad and between 1992 and 1995 to prevent the eliminated the Kurdish leaders involved. The establishment of a Kurdish state in northern 1960s land reform further reduced the political Iraq. When Turkey and Iran increasingly power of Kurdish landowners. 29 provided support to opposing factions, the Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, KDP and PUK, in the , struggles for independence in the Kurdish these conferences came to an end. Turkey regions continued. The Kurdish Democratic supported Barzani’s KDP in order to wipe out Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, and the the PKK and keep open the Iraqi-Turkish oil Kurdish branch of the Fadayan launched a pipeline. Iran supported the PUK in order to well-organized rebellion in 1979. The Iranian interfere within Iraq and to prevent the regime responded harshly with the banning of influence of Turkey and the United States on the KDPI, followed by an armed campaign its western border. 32 against the Kurds. During the Iran-, Turkish military interventions into northern both sides became engaged in ongoing Iraq following the PKK’s attacks led to heavy violence in order to bring the Kurdish areas criticism from Tehran. Following this event, under their own control. Hence, Iran was faced Iran took steps to strengthen its position in with a rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan supported northern Iraq. It deployed Iraqi opposition

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fighters near Sulaymaniyya in 1995, most of Turkey and Israel. Its leader, Ocalan, argued them members of the Badr Forces, the military that the Turkish “operation was launched arm of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic through the cooperation secured between the Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). The Iranians sent US, Israel, and Turkey.” He further claimed 2,000 to 3,000 Iranian troops into PUK that its aim was “not only to hit the PKK, but territory to pursue rebellious Iranian Kurds in Iran as well.” 35 1996. This move strengthened the PUK and In the wake of Turkey’s arrest of PKK weakened the KDP. The KDP reached an leader Ocalan in 1999, pro-Ocalan agreement with Saddam that permitted demonstrations among Kurdish nationalists Barzani to retake Irbil from Talabani in took to the Iranian cities and turned into August 1996. Both sides justified this action in protests against the Iranian government. In part by referring to Iranian support for the 2000, a Kurdish member of parliament made a PUK. Iran used terrorism for its political ends, public allegation of the existence of a providing logistical support to the PKK to campaign of repression and serial killings harm established order in Turkey. 33 against the Kurdish community in Iran. In the The Iranian side saw U.S. efforts in Iraqi following year, all six members of the Iranian Kurdistan as directed against them. After the Parliament from Kurdistan province failure of U.S.-Turkish sponsored peace talks collectively resigned in joint letter to the between the KDP and the PUK to reach a interior minister claiming that the legitimate settlement of their internal conflict in rights of the Kurds, especially the Sunni Drogheda in 1995, al-Hakim, the SAIRI’s among them, were denied and their calls for leader, declared that “the talks failed because justice on the political, economic, cultural, and they were conducted with the aims of the US social levels had been neglected. Their and Turkey behind them and were against the resignation was later apparently withdrawn. 36 policies of Iran.” Saddam’s attacks on Kurds According to Amnesty International reports, in 1996 led the Iranians to claim that three Kurds were killed and many Kurds were “Saddam’s army moved into the Kurdish area injured by police during a demonstration for with the US green light.” Iranian Kurdish rights in Mahabad in February 2007. commentaries denounced the “Ankara Reporters without Borders announced that two process,” renewed mediation attempts by the Kurdish journalists who had written on United States, Turkey, and Britain to end the Kurdish issues for a banned magazine in KDP-PUK civil war in 1996 as a U.S. attempt August 2005 were sentenced to death in to establish “a spying base and spring board to Marivan. The prosecution cited interviews one carry out its malicious schemes in the region” of them conducted with the Voice of America and “a concerted effort by the US and the as evidence of “activities subverting national Zionist regime…. to create another Israel in security” and “spying.” A Kurdish journalist the Kurdish areas.” 34 and human rights activist was arrested in Turkey’s military interventions in northern October 2008 and held incommunicado. 37 Iraq, combined with its perceived role by Iran The New Constitution of Iraq, which was as America’s cat’s-paw, exacerbated tensions ratified in 2005, defined Iraqi Kurdistan as a with Iran. Tehran denounced the Turkish federal entity of Iraq. This development has invasion as both a violation of international been watched with alarm by the Iranian laws and sovereign rights and territorial regime due to the possibility that the integrity of the Iraqi Muslim nation, while it establishment of a Kurdish state would make characterized accusations of Iranian support claims on Iranian territory. An Iranian Kurdish for the PKK as a “joint conspiracy by the militant group, the Party for a Free Life in Turkish military and Israel.” The Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK), which is affiliated with the reaction was clearly intensified by Turkey’s PKK of Turkey, operates in Iran from bases in growing military ties to Israel in 1997. The the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. Tehran PKK also focused on this growing tie between accuses the United States and Israel of

20 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue supporting the PJAK, and shelled northern the Iranian border. The Iranian army had Iraq in response in 2007. 38 previously pushed Iraqi forces out of the town. The town was attacked with conventional IRAQ AND THE KURDISH ISSUE bombs and chemicals, including mustard gas and nerve agents. An estimated 17,000 people Many tribal Kurdish uprisings, aimed at died as a result of these chemical attacks, gaining a sort of autonomy, had taken place in which lasted for three days. 44 Iraq between 1919 and 1932. Shaykh After the Gulf crisis, UN Security Council Mahmoud of Sulaymaniyya was the first to Resolution 688 led to the emergence of a safe rise against the Iraqi monarchy and the British. haven for Kurdish refugees. Operation Provide He was followed by Shaykh Ahmad of Comfort provided security and humanitarian Barzan. These uprisings were suppressed by assistance to refugees in camps along the Iraq- the Iraqi monarchy implementing an Turkey border. 45 A no-fly zone over northern assimilation policy. This policy created a Iraq was established by the U.S. and British breach between nationalist Kurds and the Iraqi governments. Despite these precautions, some government and led to a new Iraqi identity, of the Kurdish populated areas were still which did not appeal to Kurds. 39 These unprotected. Clashes between Iraqi forces and suppressions continued after the creation of Kurdish troops continued in these areas. the modern state of Iraq in 1932. Since 1932, However, the Iraqi government voluntarily the Kurds have been subject to political and and fully withdrew its civil administration in cultural repression, ethnic cleansing, and 1991. With this act, it allowed Iraqi Kurdistan genocide because of their struggle to gain to function de facto independently. In 1992, autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. Al- elections were held, and the Kurdistan Anfal (The Spoils) was the code name for an National Assembly (KNA) and the KRG were aggressive planned military operation against created. The region was left to be ruled by the the Iraqi Kurds. Anfal took place in 1988 two Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK. under the direction of Ali Hasan al-Majid, who This time, tensions between the two principle became known as “Chemical Ali” because of Kurdish Parties led to a Kurdish civil war. 46 his use of chemical and biological weapons in The KDP and the PUK joined forces with Kurdish towns and villages. The broad Turkey to evacuate the PKK from its purpose of the campaign was to eliminate sanctuaries in northern Iraq in 1992. However, resistance by the Kurds by any means the PKK’s surrender to the PUK turned out to necessary. 40 be a charade. Two Iraqi Kurdish parties had In addition to these campaigns against the partially lost control over their fates due to Kurds, economic blockades were placed on ongoing civil war, since the KDP was these villages to cut them off from all support. supported by Turkey whereas PUK was The evacuation and relocation of Kurds were backed by Iran. The KDP blamed Tehran due also planned by the army. During this process, to its direct intervention in support of the many of the men were executed while the PUK, which included sending several others were removed to the collective towns or thousand new troops with heavy weapons to camps in the south of Iraq. 41 The campaign across the border. The reason behind these also included the Arabization of Kirkuk in Iranian attacks was the KDP’s friendship with order to drive Kurds out of the oil-rich city Turkey. Turkey was called upon to help the and replace them with Arab settlers. 42 Kurdish KDP. 47 groups’ cooperation with Iran during the Iran- Iran and Turkey cooperated in several ways Iraq War also became one of the motivating to limit any autonomy and prevent any factors of the Anfal operations. 43 Among these independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. The two operations, the most widely known was countries signed agreements to stop illegal Halabja, which occurred in 1998. The town if border crossings in 1993 and worked together Halabja is located about 11 kilometers from to prevent a Kurdish state from forming in

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northern Iraq in 1992-1995. Nevertheless, some national laws in Kurdish-populated Turkey and Iran also continued to support the areas. The constitution not only retained KDP and PUK, especially after 1995, when substantial Kurdish autonomy but also they increasingly provided support to included the Kurds’ insistence on opposing factions in the Iraqi Kurdish civil “federalism,” providing them with a regional war.48 government. The constitution recognizes the In 1995, Turkey sent 35,000 troops into three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and northern Iraq to eradicate the PKK. This was Sulaymaniyya as a legal “region” of the KRG, followed by Turkish President Demirel’s with the power to amend the application of statement that proposed the Turkey-Iraq national laws not specifically under national border be changed in favor of Turkey. Demirel government purview, to maintain internal withdrew his suggestion as a result of the security forces, and to establish embassies responses from the Arab states and Iran. The abroad. In addition, Arabic and Kurdish are KDP supported the Turkish intervention, the official languages. 52 whereas the PUK joined Iran in denouncing Iraqi Kurds supported the division of Iraq Turkey’s actions. 49 into federal units under a federal system. 53 Large scale Turkish military interventions However, Turkey raised concerns about the in northern Iraq took place in 1997. Turkish establishment of a federal system, which forces escalated their support for the KDP by would cede and the oil-rich city of bombing PUK and PKK positions. With this Kirkuk to a new Kurdistan federal unit. In operation, Turkey aimed to destroy the PKK, addition, since the establishment of the KRG, strengthen the KDP, and balance Iran’s the community has also been a relationship with the PUK. In addition to these concern to Turkey, as the Iraqi Turkmen Front goals, Turkey also aimed to counter Iran’s has called for the establishment of a Turkmen growing role in northern Iraq and to prevent federal unit to include the cities of Mosul and Iranian domination in the region. 50 The Kirkuk if a permanent Kurdistan federal Ankara Process led to renewed mediation region is formed. The future establishment of a attempts by the United States, Turkey, and Kurdistan federal region to include Kirkuk is Britain to end the KDP-PUK civil war in determined as a casus belli by Turkish leaders. 1996. Barzani and Talabani signed the The Kurds have repeatedly and publicly Washington Agreement of September 17, assured the United States and Turkey that they 1998, thus ending the four year civil war do not seek independence but prefer a unified, between Iraqi Kurdish factions. 51 federal, and democratic Iraq. 54 Prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Some analysts fear that violence could Turkey had refused to allow the U.S. forces to escalate in Iraq due to the struggle over Kirkuk cross its territory into northern Iraq. Turkey’s and the disputed internal border, also referred decision made the Iraqi Kurds a powerful ally as the “trigger line” between the KRG and for the United States. Kurds joined the United Baghdad after the withdrawal of U.S. troops States and British forces with the aim of from Iraq. Furthermore, the decreased U.S. defeating Saddam’s regime. The Kurds presence could allow Iran to increase its entered post-Saddam national politics on an influence. 55 The other important issue relates equal footing with Iraq’s Arabs. The Iraqi to its future relations with its neighbors. For Governing Council (IGC)--which Barzani, instance, despite warming economic and even Talabani, and three independent Kurds became political relations between Turkey and the part of--was established as a provisional KRG, Turkey began bombing PKK militants government in 2003. In 2004, a transition in northern Iraq in August 2011 and then even government was established, and Hoshyar sent troops over the border to pursue them as a Zebari became foreign minister. legitimate act of self-defense following The transition government preserved the growing attacks by the PKK, which killed KRG and its power to alter the application of more than 40 Turkish soldiers. Turkey also

22 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue asked the KRG for help in these efforts, even special forces to the Iraqi border, where it led though it is clear that the KRG does not want transborder military strikes against Kurdish to fight against fellow Kurds in the PKK. PKK targets in northern Iraq. Iraq’s other neighbor, Iran, has also been Nevertheless, the role of the Kurds in shelling the PJAK, which is entrenched just Turkey cannot be characterized only by the over the border in northern Iraq. Both Turkey PKK attacks. The BDP (Peace and Democracy and Iran have a freer hand in intervening in Party), a Kurdish separatist party, gained 36 northern Iraq. 56 (out of 550) seats at the national parliament and is fully integrated in the national THE ARAB SPRING, TURKEY, AND parliamentary process. Efforts by the THE KURDISH ISSUE government to engage in peaceful relations with moderate Kurdish parties have stepped up When the Arab Spring commenced in and culminated in Erdogan’s recognition on Tunisia and was followed by other Arab November 23, 2011, of the Dersim massacre, countries, a search for a role model for these which took place in the late 1930s.58 In newly established governments of the region addition, Turkey has been in the process of emerged. Turkey’s “soft power” and its reforming its system to support a economic, social, and political performance democratization initiative through a new during the last decade inspired many in the constitution. A meeting between the AKP and Arab world. However, the Kurdish issue poses the BDP was held in this regard.59 a serious handicap for the Turkish model and The Arab Spring and its effects on an obstacle to Turkey’s regional ambitions and Turkey’s neighbor Syria, which has a great stability. In addition, speculations that the impact on Turkey’s stance toward this issue, Kurds across the Middle East could follow suit led to elimination of their newly established were raised when uprisings began to spread good relations as a part of Turkey’s “zero throughout the Arab world. problem with neighbors” policy. Growing These speculations came true when the tensions between Turkey and Syria caused a PKK imitated the Arab Spring and attempted deterioration of relations between the two to bring about a “Kurdish Spring” in the countries. This development created an region. An analogy between the Kurdish environment in which the Asad regime used situation and Arab Spring has been made by the Iraqi and the Syrian “Kurdish terrorists” Kurds, including by the PKK’s imprisoned against Turkey. This could possibly turn the leader, Ocalan. On February 14, 2011, Ocalan “Arab Spring” into a “Kurdish Spring” in made a statement to his advocates that “the Turkey with the help of the PKK. Kurds could only be free if they pour on to the Besides Syria, the withdrawal of U.S. streets and call for their rights in the Kurdish troops from Iraq and the PKK residing in Iraq cities, like Diyarbakir.” 57 The PKK had hoped are additional factors that could bring about a they would poor out onto the streets on a “Kurdish Spring” in Turkey. This too pushed massive scale and become subjects of a Turkey to increase its presence in the region in popular Kurdish Spring. A Kurdish Civil order to weaken the PKK. This clearly Disobedience Campaign thus began in explains Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s southeast Turkey for broader rights. demand to remove all weapons and military This campaign widened the confidence gap equipment when the U.S. troops leave Iraq. with Ankara and led to deadly PKK attacks on Although prime minister of the KRG, Barzani police, despite the that had been stated that Turkey could not combat terrorism declared by the PKK in August 2010. The effectively by conducting military operations PKK intensified its attacks in Turkey. The in northern Iraq and urged both sides lay down escalation of Kurdish separatist violence their arms and start negotiations. Ankara, through terrorist attacks between August and however, is not willing to accept this call for November 2011 pushed Turkey to deploy its dialogue by Iraq, which has never taken

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serious measures against the PKK. 60 It has even been observed that some of the Following a meeting with his Iraqi counterpart KDP and PKK are used by the regime as “al- Zebari, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Shabiha” (pro-Asad regime armed thugs and Ahmet Davutoglu said Turkey would not mobs). The PKK receives further support from tolerate it if the PKK were to threaten Turkey the regime. 68 The Asad regime is using the from Iraqi territory. 61 PKK card as leverage against Turks. The PKK has done little to dispel such suspicions, and THE ARAB SPRING, SYRIA, AND THE some statements made by Kurds seem to KURDISH ISSUE verify this argument. For instance, in an interview, Cemil Bayik, one of the group’s The wave of protests calling for greater leaders, warned that if Turkey were to freedoms, respect for human rights, and intervene against Assad, the PKK would fight improving living conditions throughout the on Syria’s side. 69 The PKK also serves as a Arab world reached Syria. Operations such as means for the Asad regime to keep the Syrian massive naturalization of undocumented Kurds in check. The PKK’s Syrian branch, the migrants have been organized by granting PYD, pulled out of the negotiations with other Syrian citizenship to more than 300,000 Kurds Kurdish parties. They do not support the to ease the mass disturbances. 62 Besides this, protests. Some Kurds have accused the PKK Syrian Kurdish opposition leader Tammo, of playing a role in Tammo’s assassination leader of the Future Movement, who openly and claim that they warned not to work with called for the Asad’s overthrow, was the mainstream Arab opposition.70 assassinated by the Asad regime in October 2011. The day of the funeral, tens of thousands THE ARAB SPRING, IRAQ, AND THE of people took to the streets of Qamishli. It KURDISH ISSUE was the largest protest in the northeast since the beginning of the uprisings against the Asad The Iraqi Kurds have had their own regime. 63 “Kurdish Spring” of sorts. First, the Gorran Some Kurdish groups are wary of joining Party (Movement for Change), which is the the Syrian National Council (SNC) due to the Iraqi Kurdish opposition party, split from the SNC’s lack of clear-cut policies regarding the PUK in the KRG elections held in 2009. status of the Kurds in a post-Asad era and Inspired by the Arab Spring, particularly by disputes concerning the number of seats the the uprising in Egypt, the Gorran Party called Kurds would hold in the SNC. 64 For instance, for the resignation of the cabinet and the the only Kurdish party that attended the disbanding of the KRG. In this respect, violent Istanbul meeting of Syrian oppositionists, demonstrations broke out in Sulaymaniyya on Tammo’s Future Movement, wanted the name February 17, 2011. Protesters chanted “This is of the country changed from the “Syrian Arab Tahrir Square. Do you remember Mubarak?”71 Republic” to the “Republic of Syria.” When The demonstrations protested corruption and the other delegates at the conference refused the lack of jobs, electricity, and government this request, these Kurds walked out in services. The protests also centered around protest. 65 The Kurds’ concern is that the limits on freedom of speech and press. There opposition against the Asad regime is was a visible anger against the KDP and PUK dominated by Islamists, the Muslim due to their joint monopoly in controlling Brotherhood, and that they do not support society and government. These protests Kurdish demands for local autonomy. 66 continued until they were forcibly curtailed by Turkey’s active role in Syria’s uprisings also the KRG leadership on April 19, 2011. 72 raises concerns with the Kurds. Kurds believe Besides this, Turkey’s increasing military that Turkey would not leave things to take intervention in northern Iraq as a result of their own course in Syrian Kurdistan if Asad’s intensified PKK terrorist attacks has not been regime in the country were to fall. 67 welcomed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari, an

24 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue ethnic Kurd. He called for an immediate halt claims that Karayilan was captured and later to Turkish army operations in the territories of released by Iran. Iraq. He also condemned the operations as a Kurdish Labor Group leader Kamal Karimi breach of Iraqi sovereignty. He added that has stated that the Kurds would be the major resolving the problem of the PKK presence in component of an uprising in Iran: “In 2009, northern Iraq should be left to a trilateral Iraqi- the public protests had very narrow slogans Turkish-American joint committee, which thus which were calls for a recount of the votes and far has not able to resolve the issue. The PKK, repeating the elections, but this time there will on the other hand, accused the Iraqi be a radical change in Iran that might end with government of collaborating with Turkey in an the toppling of the Islamic regime. In that effort to empty the villages close to the PKK case, the Kurdish areas of Iran will become the hideouts in the Kandil Mountains. 73 strongest base, after Tehran, for confronting Iraqi Kurds also have an active policy the Islamic regime.” 76 regarding Kurds in Syria. For instance, the In addition, some experts say Israel has Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party enhanced its ties with Iranian Kurds in order to (PDKS) and KDP-Syria report directly to the exploit ethnic fissures between the Kurds and leaders of their counterparts, the KDP and the Shi’i Persians. 77 There are also claims that PUK of northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds have not Israel has supported the PKK and PJAK by pushed their Syrian counterparts to participate providing equipment and training to encourage in the anti-Asad revolt. Neither the PDKS nor their efforts to undermine the regime’s KPDS encouraged protesters when a revolt authority. Sometimes this has been overtly broke out in Qamishli in 2004. These two implied by the Israelis. For instance, Maj. parties were supported in this stance by Iraqi Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan called upon Israel to Kurds, since Iraq’s government supported the take a diplomatic initiative and advocate Asad regime 74 Kurdish independence, saying: “There are some 30 million Kurds in a clearly-defined THE ARAB SPRING, IRAN, AND THE region spread across four countries. They KURDISH ISSUE deserve statehood no less than Palestinians.”78

Iran fears that the creation of a semi- CONCLUSION autonomous state in northern Iraq might motivate its own Kurdish minority to press for The Kurdish issue has not only been greater independence. However, Iran’s employed by external forces to weaken concern about Kurdish separatism does not regional states, but has also been used by approach the level of Turkey’s concern. Still, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq against each there have been repeated clashes between other to counter each other’s domination of the Kurds and Iranian security forces. 75 PJAK, region. The approaches of these four states to which is affiliated with the PKK, took up arms the Kurdish issue thus led to confrontation. for self-rule in the Kurdistan province of Iran However, the adoption of a “zero problems beginning in 2004. In parallel with increasing with neighbors” policy by Turkey changed PKK attacks, PJAK has increased its attacks in this, leading to collaboration among them in Iran. The PKK and PJAK were declared suppressing Kurdish separatist movements. common problems of Turkey and Iran. Turkey Since 2008, this has involved a joint effort to and Iran have thus worked together to defeat fight against the PKK, PJAK, and their Syrian the two groups. The PJAK has had a ceasefire counterpart. Yet the Arab uprisings, which with Iran since September 2011. There are emerged in Tunisia and quickly spread to the some claims that PJAK evacuated its camps in other countries of the region, ended this Iran following PKK leader Murat Karayilan’s alliance against the Kurds. release by the Iranian government in August The Arab Spring, first reached Syria and 2011. Yet top officials in Iran have denied led to the deterioration of Turkish-Syrian

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relations, followed by the worsening of politician, succeeded Ghalioun in June 2012 to Turkish-Iranian relations. The AKP reconcile rival factions within the SNC. government increased its pressure on the Asad The worsening of relations between Turkey regime to end violence by imposing sanctions and Syria’s Asad regime has also affected on Syria. In addition, Turkey hosted the SNC Turkish-Iranian relations. This might hinder and deployed its military along the Syrian Iran, which made a ceasefire with the PJAK border. after serious attacks on the group, from Turkey’s actions against Asad regime also maintaining its collaboration with Turkey on led to strained relations between Turkey and the PKK issue. Yet in light of Turkey’s anti- Iran. In this case, the main reasons for this Assad approach and its relations with NATO included: 1) Iran might lose its only Arab ally including its hosting a NATO missile defense that gives it direct access to Hizballah and system against Iran, this collaboration does not Lebanon; 2) of the end of the Assad regime seem long-lasting. Last, in the case of Iraq, its would lead to the rise of the Muslim preference appears to be siding with Iran and Brotherhood, which would mean Syria would Syria on this issue. This is despite the fact that no longer belong to the Shi’i bloc. Turkey’s the KRG has very good relations with decision to host missile defense radar as part Turkey.80 In the wake of the latest of NATO BMD capability in September 2011 developments in the region, it thus seems also contributed to the deterioration of impossible for these four states to maintain Turkish-Iranian relations. In this case, Iraq collaboration on the PKK issue. However, sided with Iran and Syria due to Iraq’s cooperation in preventing the establishment of increasing economic and political ties with an independent Kurdish state does seem Syria and Iran in the post-Saddam era. feasible and likely to continue. The common policy among Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq concerning the Kurdish issue is *Aylin Unver Noi is assistant professor at the that they are all opposed to the establishment Faculty of Economics and Administrative of an independent Kurdish state in the region Sciences, Gedik University, Istanbul. She is due to fears that this could have a domino author of The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership effect in the region. Hence, it is obvious to say and the Broader Middle East and North Africa that there is collaboration among these four Initiative: Competing or Complementary states on this issue. However, this Projects? collaboration does not seem to apply to their approaches to the PKK in the wake of the NOTES Arab Spring. According to one political analyst, Syria’s 1 Carole A. O’Leary, “The Kurds of Iraq: regime is not taking action against the PKK Recent History, Future Prospects,” Middle due to Turkey’s current anti-Asad position. East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) , Furthermore, the Asad regime uses the PKK to Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002), control Syria’s Kurds and prevent the Kurds in http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4 Syria from taking an active part in the Syrian a5.html . uprisings. The SNC hopes to win over the 2 Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurds against the Asad regime by changing its Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of former stance on the Kurdish issue. To this a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank end, former SNC President Burhan Ghalioun Cass & Co. Ltd., 1997), p. 67. has promised a decentralized government, 3 O’Leary, “The Kurds of Iraq.” which would enable local authorities to take 4 Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question control of their affairs and would allow for and Turkey , p. 68. national recognition of Kurdish identity in the 5 Ibid., p. 67. post-Assad Syria. 79 Moreover, Abdulbaset 6 “Iran, Iraq, Syria and the PKK”, Hurriyet Sieda, a secular Kurdish academic and Daily News , August 25, 2011,

26 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=ir 28 “60th Anniversary of the Kurdish Republic an-iraq-syria-and-the-pkk-2011-08-25 . of 1946,” PDKI - Democratic Party of Iranian 7 Ibid; Helen Chapin Metz, Turkey: A Country Kurdistan, February 6, 2006, Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library http://pdki.org/articles1-198-61.htm . of Congress, 1995), 29 “World Directory of Minorities,” http://countrystudies.us/turkey/ . Minorityrights.org , 2011, 8 Ibid. http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=5097&tmp 9 Metz, Turkey: A Country Study. l=printpage . 10 Michael Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face Off 30 Ibid. in Kurdistan,” Middle East Quarterly (March 31 Kenneth Katzman, “The Kurds in Post- 1998), http://www.meforum.org/384/turkey- Saddam Iraq,” CRS Report for Congress, and-iran-face-off-in-kurdistan . Foreign Press Center, U.S. Department of 11 Ibid. State, 2009, 12 Ibid. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/12 13 Ibid. 2959.pdf , pp. 89-90; Aylin Unver Noi, “Iran’s 14 Michael Gunter, “ in Nuclear Program: EU’s Approach to Iran in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Comparison to US Approach,” Perceptions Policy , November 8, 2011, Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/1 1 (Spring 2005), p. 87. 1/08/kurdish_nationalism_in_the_aftermath_o 32 Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face Off in f_the_arab_spring . Kurdistan.” 15 Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics 33 Ibid. and Society (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 34 Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face Off in 8. Kurdistan”; Lokman I. Meho, The Kurdish 16 Ibid., p. 9. Question in US Foreign Policy: A 17 Ibid., p. 13. Documentary Source Book (Westport: Praeger 18 Ibid., p. 1. Publishers, 2004), p. 581. 19 Christian Sinclair and Sirwan Kajjo, “The 35 Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face Off in Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria,” Kurdistan.” Middle East Research and Information Project 36 “World Directory of Minorities.” (MERIP) , August 31, 2011, 37 Ibid. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero083111 . 38 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 39 Sa’ad N. Jawad, “The Kurdish Problem in 21 Ibid. Iraq,” in Abbas Kelidar (ed.), The Integration 22 “A Decade in Power, Part 4: Syrian Kurds-- of Modern Iraq (New York: St. Martin’s Bolder, But Still Oppressed,” Press, 1979), p. 172. Damascusbureau.org , July, 22, 2010, 40 O’Leary, “The Kurds of Iraq.” http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=864 . 41 Ibid. 23 Sinclair and Kajjo, “The Evolution of 42 Sonia Roy, “The Kurdish Issue: The Impact Kurdish Politics in Syria.” on Politics Iraq and Turkey and Their Bilateral 24 Ibid. Relations Regarding Kurds Post-Saddam 25 “Syria’s Kurds: Are They About to Join the Hussein Regime,” Foreign Policy Journal , Uprisings Against Assad?” Time World , April 22, 2011, October 21, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,859 /22/the-kurdish-issue/ . 9,2097529-1,00.html . 43 O’Leary, “The Kurds of Iraq.” 26 Sinclair and Kajjo, “The Evolution of 44 Ibid. Kurdish Politics in Syria.” 45 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 46 Roy, “The Kurdish Issue.”

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47 Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face Off in (Open Dialogue Research Journal ), April 29, Kurdistan.” 2011, 48 Ibid. http://orientalreview.org/2011/04/29/turkey- 49 Ibid. iran-approach-and-rivalry-ii/ . 50 Ibid. 63 “Syria’s Kurds: Are They About to Join the 51 Gareth R. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Uprisings Against Assad?” Political Development and Emergent 64 Dugulin, “The Kurds’ Place in the Arab Democracy Spring.” (London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 65 Sinclair and Kajjo, “The Evolution of 2003), p. 100. Kurdish Politics in Syria.” 52 Katzman, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” 66 “Syrian Kurds Take Up Anti-Assad p. 2. Struggle,” Deutsche Welle , November 4, 2011, 53 O’Leary, “The Kurds of Iraq.” http://www.dw- 54 Ibid. world.de/dw/article/0,,6652453,00.html . 55 Gunter, “Kurdish Nationalism in the 67 “Syrian Kurds Want Bashar Assad to Stay,” Aftermath of the Arab Spring.” Pravda , October 12, 2011, 56 Mustafa Akyol, “Why Turkey Is Bombing http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/12- the PKK?” Aljazeera , September 4, 2011, 10-2011/119307-kurds_syria-0/ . http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/201 68 Ibid; Salam Kawakibi, Personal 1/08/2011831135154436928.html ; Gunter, Communication, 2011. “Kurdish Nationalism in the Aftermath of the 69 “Syria’s Kurds: Are They About to Join the Arab Spring.” Uprisings Against Assad?” 57 “Noam Chomsky on Kurds’ Arab Spring,” 70 Ibid. Today’s Zaman, July 21, 2011, 71 “Two Killed, 47 Hurt in Iraq Protest http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist- Violence,” Reuters, February 17, 2011, 251259-noam-chomsky-on-kurds-arab- http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us- spring.html . iraq-protests-idUSTRE71G6PF20110217 . 58 Ricarrdo Dugulin, “The Kurds’ Place in the 72 “Two Killed, 47 Hurt in Iraq Protest Arab Spring,” December 12, 2011, Violence”; Gunter, “Kurdish Nationalism in http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc201 the Aftermath of the Arab Spring.” 1/12/state5673.htm . 73 “Iran, Iraq, Syria and the PKK.” 59 “AKP Heyeti Yeni Anayasa için BDP’de” 74 Maria Fantappie, “From Iraqi Kurdistan to [“AKP Delegation Visited BDP for New Syria: Kurdish Youth Call for Change,” Constitution”], IMC TV, October 10, 2011, (November 3, 2011), http://www.imc- http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc201 tv.com/haber_detay.php?id=251/#!/akp- 1/11/syriakurd379.htm . heyeti-yeni-anayasa-icin-bdp-de . 75 Hussein D. Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and 60 “PKK & Kurdish Spring,” Trend , October Religious Minorities , CRS Report for 19, 2011, Congress, November 25, 2008, p. 5. http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1946457.html . 76 Hemin Khoshnaw, “Iranian Kurdish 61 “Iraq’s Zebari: PKK Shall Not Poison Opposition Weight Impact of Syrian Regime Bilateral Ties with Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily Change,” December 13, 2011, News , October 13, 2011, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/ http://archive.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n= misc2011/12/irankurd821.htm . iraq8217s-zebari-pkk-shall--not-poison- 77 Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and Religious bilateral-ties-2011-10-13 . Minorities, p. 5. 62 Salam Kawakibi, Personal Communication, 78 “BESA Center Experts Say: Iran Is an 2011; Gregory Tinsky, “Turkey-Iran: Intolerable Threat; Arab Spring Not Resulting Approach and Rivalry?” OrientalReview.org in Democracy,” BESA Center, 2011,

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http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/Conferen ceSummary231111.pdf . 79 “Syria’s Opposition SNC Outlines Post- Assad Vision and Reaches Out to Kurds,” al- Arabiya News , February 24, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/24/1 96755.html . 80 The PKK’s increasing activity in Syria was one of the major issues discussed with Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) leader Barzani during his visit to Turkey. The KRG’s relations with the Shi’i-led central government, which has disputed with Kurds over territory and oil, were strained further when Iraq’s leading Sunni politician, Vice- President Tariq al-Hashimi, fled Baghdad for the Kurdish north to avoid prosecution, since the KRG refuses to hand over the fugitive Hashimi to the central government. The bitter exchange between Turkish Prime Minster Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister of Iraq al- Maliki came after KRG leader Barzani’s visit to Turkey and Prime Minister Erdogan’s remarks: “Turkey would not remain silent if a sectarian conflict erupted in Iraq.” In response, Maliki said that “Turkey was becoming an enemy state in the region in a sign of growing tensions between Turkey and Iraq and Turkey had started to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs.” See “Babacan: Problem in Iraq Stems from Baghdad,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly , April 28, 2012, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/135095/ba bacan-problem-in-iraq-stems-from- baghdad.html .

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