May 2005 A Comedy of Errors: U.S.-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War By Michael Rubin Although the mistakes of the past two years in relations between the United States and Turkey cannot be undone, Washington and Ankara stand to lose a great deal if relations continue to deteriorate. If differ- ences can be overcome, however, this partnership could help to resolve important regional issues such as the status of Kirkuk and Iraqi constitutional debates, and to ensure Iraqi stability and Turkish security. On the Issues Turkey and the United States have for more Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group.2 American than half a century enjoyed a special relation- officials, long friends of Turkey, also sounded alarm ship. Turkish troops fought alongside Americans bells. Despite frequent assurances from both Turk- in the Korean War. As one of only two North ish and American diplomats that U.S.-Turkish Atlantic Treaty Organization members to border relations were on the mend, Under Secretary of the Soviet Union, Turkey truly was a frontline Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith acknowledged state throughout the Cold War. In the wake of the problems during a February 17, 2005, speech at the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the the Council on Foreign Relations in New York Turkish government reaffirmed its alliance. City. Responding to a question from a Turkish Within a month, the Turkish Grand National reporter, Feith said, “It’s crucial that the apprecia- Assembly voted 319 to 101 to send troops to tion of . relationships extend beyond govern- Afghanistan to assist the United States in its ment officials [and] down to the public in general, Global War on Terror.1 because otherwise the relationship is not really sus- Three years later, U.S.-Turkish ties are in disar- tainable.” He implied that the AKP was responsi- ray. In December 2004, Mehmet Elkatmis, head of ble for the rise of anti-Americanism, commenting, the Turkish Parliament’s Human Rights Commis- “We hope that the officials in our partner coun- sion, accused the United States of “conducting tries are going to be devoting the kind of effort to genocide in Iraq.” Faruk Anbarcioglu, a Justice and building popular support for the relationship that Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, we build in our own country.”3 or AKP) deputy, suggested the dissolution of the An opinion article entitled “The Sick Man Grand National Assembly’s Turkish-American of Europe—Again” examining Turkish anti- Americanism sent shockwaves through Turkish intelligentsia, both because of its sharp tone and Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is a resident scholar because of its publication in the Wall Street at AEI and editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Between 2002 and 2004, he served as the staff adviser Journal, a conservative daily generally supportive on Iraq and Iran in the Office of the Secretary of of both the George W. Bush administration and Defense, in which capacity he was seconded as a U.S.-Turkish relations.4 political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Author- ity in Baghdad. A version of this article appeared in While AKP has done little to improve the Spring 2005 issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly. relations—and indeed leading figures like Foreign 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2 - Minister Abdullah Gül and Chairman of Parliament contributed to the bill’s failure. According to a number Bülent Arinç have done much to worsen them—the ero- of Iraqi Kurdish businessmen and politicians, Kurdistan sion in U.S.-Turkish relations revolve around the deci- Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani encouraged— sion to use military force to overthrow Iraqi president sometimes financially—AKP deputies from southeastern Saddam Hussein. While both the American and Turkish Turkey to vote against the war so as to undercut the pos- media focus on the March 1, 2003, Turkish Grand sibility of Turkish forces entering his territory. Regardless National Assembly decision against the deployment of of the reason for the failure to win permission for the use Turkish troops in Iraq, the events leading to the down- of Turkish territory, in their shock at the motion’s failure, turn in U.S.-Turkish relations are more complicated. many American officials fairly or unfairly began to ques- tion Erdogan and Gül’s sincerity. A Rude Awakening American diplomacy was not without fault and, indeed, bears much of the blame. While the use of The March 1, 2003, Grand National Assembly vote Turkish bases and territory were not indispensable from shocked an American public that had long taken Turk- an American military standpoint, Turkey’s participation ish support for granted. “In Blow to U.S., Turks Deny in the 2003 Iraq War was nevertheless highly desirable Bases,” headlined the Boston Globe.5 “Turkey Snubs to the United States from both a military and diplomatic U.S., Rejects Troops,” declared the Chicago Tribune.6 perspective. This makes the failure of the State Depart- While the majority of parliamentarians present voted in ment to engage in high-level diplomacy all the more favor of the motion, Arinç ruled that the motion failed curious: Between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the because, considering the nineteen abstentions, the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, Secretary of majority did not vote in favor of the U.S. deployment. State James Baker visited Turkey four times. Aside from Both Turkish and American commentators—especially a brief 2001 visit, Secretary of State Colin Powell did those opposed to the war in Iraq—trumpeted the vote as not travel to Turkey until a month after the National an example of democracy. While true, the machinations Assembly’s vote.9 Powell’s failure to visit Turkey in late leading to the motion’s defeat were far more complex, a 2002 and early 2003—while he found time to fly to combination of AKP disorganization, internal political Angola, Cape Verde, and Colombia—was indicative of machinations, and misguided American diplomacy. the failure in American public diplomacy under his The March 1 vote was not the first time the Turkish leadership. parliament voted on American military action. On Janu- Both the State Department and the U.S. embassy in ary 17, 1991, the Grand National Assembly voted to Ankara fumbled the American approach to Turkey in authorize American forces to attack Iraq from Turkish other ways. In February 2003, Powell dispatched Ambas- bases.7 Even with fifty-two absent or abstaining parlia- sador Marisa Lino to lead negotiations. Lino was the mentarians, President Turgut Özal, whose Motherland wrong woman for the wrong job. While she had experi- Party held a parliamentary majority, had little trouble ence in Syria and Iraq and had been ambassador to rallying the necessary votes. American officials assumed Albania, she had little experience in Turkey.10 As the that AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and then-prime head of the U.S. delegation negotiating military memo- minister Abdullah Gül could muster the same party dis- randa of understanding regarding U.S.-Turkish coopera- cipline in 2003. “It’s a huge setback for our purposes. It tion in Iraq, Lino was antagonistic and, according to stunned me,” Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), ranking even pro-American Turkish diplomats, dishonest.11 Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, told CNN the Simultaneously, though, Ankara’s choice of Ambassador day after the vote.8 Deniz Bölükbaúi as head of the Turkish team was unfor- Both Turkish and American journalists covering the tunate. While Ankara and Washington eventually politicking prior to the vote confided privately to Ameri- reached agreement, the excessive nationalism for which can officials that, while Erdogan was sincere in his desire Bölükbaui is well-known in Ankara, coupled with both for the motion’s success, AKP deputies and party man- his and Lino’s lack of negotiation experience, soured the agers each denied their own responsibility for canvassing atmosphere. party members; the party leadership, because of AKP’s The bulk of responsibility on the American side for disorganization, may have been unaware that it did not the erosion of bilateral relations in the run-up to the war have the votes to win. Other factors may have also rests on the U.S. embassy in Ankara. During pre-war - 3 - negotiations, Ambassador W. Robert Pearson leaked visa fees for many in the American delegation arriving derogatory comments about Turkey to both the Ameri- for negotiations at Esenboga airport in March 2003. At can and the Turkish press.12 He had a tin ear for Turkish the Sheraton in Ankara, hotel authorities forced early politics. Despite private entreaties by Turkish officials, morning room changes upon American delegates he ignored warnings that the presence of American “because of plumbing problems.” Later that day—in full diplomats in the Grand National Assembly on the day view of American officials and shortly before the arrival of the vote would spur a nationalist backlash against the of the Iraqi Kurdish delegations—Turkish security offi- American deployment. He also shirked his own responsi- cials moved into those very same rooms. Turkish intelli- bilities, shocking American policymakers when, shortly gence operations may have been understandable, but before his departure, he remarked at a diplomatic recep- the lack of subtlety was counterproductive. tion that he had spent the day before the vote playing The choice of Ankara for Iraqi opposition talks the golf with Turkish businessman Mustafa Koç. week before the war was also unwise. The most con- Both Pearson and his staff failed to make the case for tentious discussion centered upon the role of the Iraqi American policy to the Turkish press. Journalists who Turkmen Front in the Iraqi opposition leadership.