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Section Two the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1967-1993

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Section Two the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1967-1993 Section Two The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1967-1993 There are two clear dimensions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the international dimension (involving Israel, the PLO, and nations in the region and beyond) and the domestic dimension (involving Israel, the PLO and Palestinians in the occupied territories). In reality, these two dimensions should not be separated, but for our purposes it is best to divide the post-1967 period into two sections. This section will mainly examine the conflict at the international level. Until the first intifada (or ‘uprising’) in the occupied territories beginning in 1987, most initiatives to end Israeli occupation came from the PLO leadership in exile. Other important actors at the international level discussed here, aside from Israel and the PLO, include the US, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. To keep this unit brief, we will give less attention to the roles of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Students, however, are strongly encouraged to further investigate the role of these states in influencing the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the domestic-level Israeli- Palestinian peace negotiations covered in Section Three. Before we examine the major international issues, actors and events of the post-1967 period, it is a good idea to briefly highlight the important role of the US in the conflict. Following the 1967 war, the US and Israel developed a close partnership. During the Cold War (1946-1991), US strategic goals in the Middle East focused on containing Soviet influence, in addition to maintaining regional political stability and Western access to oil resources. These last two goals continue into the present, and often mean that the US supports authoritarian Arab leaders who can contain their citizens’ opposition to US policies—leading to regional ‘stability’ but also to frustration among Arab citizens who desire both a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and greater democracy in their own countries. Israel, on the other hand, is the only full-fledged democracy in the region, although as we will see, there are problems for Israeli Arabs in achieving equal citizenship. Israel has long supported US strategic interests in the region, and in return, Israel enjoys US political support at the UN and in the region, and receives the highest amount of US foreign aid of all countries in the world (followed by Egypt, after signing the Camp David accords). During the following discussion of the international dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is important to keep thinking about the US-Israel partnership. It is also a good idea to remember that when we discuss international relationships (or relationships between states), the opinions and activities of state leaders do not necessarily represent the opinions of all of their citizens. This is also true of leaders of the PLO, the Palestinian organization that seeks a state for the Palestinian people. More broadly, while it may seem easier to think that ‘all Israelis’ or ‘all Palestinians’ think or behave in a certain way, it is very important to realize that these generalizations contribute to misleading and sometimes dangerous stereotypes. As we will see, Palestinians and Israelis often strongly disagree among themselves about their own leaders’ choices and actions. 13 UN Security Council Resolution 242 In the 1967 war Israel captured the West Bank (from Jordan), Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt) and the Golan Heights (from Syria). Palestinians, who did not receive the independent state mandated by the 1947 UN partition plan, now found themselves under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza (Map 2). The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which established a framework for future peacemaking and the principle of ‘land for peace’ (Document 5). Resolution 242 notes the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,” and calls for Israeli withdrawal from lands seized in the war and the right of all states in the area to peaceful existence within secure and recognized boundaries. The grammatical construction of the French version of Resolution 242 says that Israel should withdraw from “the territories,” whereas the English version of the text calls for withdrawal from “territories.” [Both English and French are official languages of the UN.] Israel and the US use the English version to argue that Israeli withdrawal from some, but not all, the territories occupied in the 1967 war satisfies the requirements of this resolution. Resolution 242 placed Israeli leaders in an excellent bargaining position. After 1967 Israeli leaders sought diplomatic recognition from neighboring Arab states, and normalization of regional economic and social relationships. Israel’s advantage, and the disadvantage to the leaders of the Arab states and to the PLO, was that 242 required that Arab states first recognize Israel, and then negotiate for peace. The leaders of neighboring Arab states in the post-1967 period faced domestic public opinion that overwhelmingly supported the Palestinian cause. The identities of many Arab states were long bound up with the goal of attaining justice for the Palestinians, and leaders of these states could not easily recognize Israel before achieving some kind of clear solution to the Palestinian problem. If they recognized Israel but failed to achieve a just solution, they would be deeply vulnerable to regional and domestic criticism. Naturally, Israeli withdrawal from the territories before recognition and negotiation seemed more reasonable to them, and to their domestic constituents. For many years the Palestinians rejected Resolution 242 because it does not acknowledge their right to national self-determination, or the right to return to their homeland. It calls only for an unspecified “just settlement of the refugee problem”, and does not detail the specifics of future Israeli withdrawal or the status of territories after that withdrawal. Palestinians also distrusted the resolution’s requirement that the Arab states recognize Israel without Israeli withdrawal or recognition of Palestinian national rights. Because Israel did not recognize the PLO until 1993, Palestinians could not negotiate for themselves. For this reason, Palestinians were understandably suspicious of any efforts by the Arab states to negotiate peace. They worried that Arab states might either seek Palestinian land for themselves (Jordan after 1948, see below), or make peace without resolving Palestinian demands for a just solution (Egypt’s failure at Camp David, see below). 14 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) It is important to understand how Palestinian views have changed over the years. Keep in mind two points as you read this section and those that follow. First, people respond to the circumstances in which they live. If you are rich, you see problems one way; if you are unemployed, you see them a second way; if you own a small shop or farm the land, you see them a third and fourth way. Similarly, opinions among members of the same national or ethnic group may vary for other reasons, including gender, age and education. We must understand the circumstances in which Palestinians (and Israelis) live if we are to understand their positions and actions as individuals and as members of groups. Second, there are at least eight million Palestinians—in Israel, the occupied territories and abroad. Palestinians are the largest refugee group in the world—one in three refugees is Palestinian. Like Americans, Mexicans, Canadians and Israelis, they disagree on political issues. They also change their minds as new circumstances develop. It is a mistake to think Palestinians have a common view that remains unchanged. As we will see, their views have changed considerably over the years. In the immediate aftermath of 1948, Palestinians took two different paths. One group, under a leader named Amin Husseini, called for the end of partition and the creation of a secular state in all of Palestine that would include Muslims, Jews, and Christians. A second group, led mainly by Palestinian elites living in exile in Jordan, agreed to unite the West Bank and East Jerusalem with Jordan to form one country under Jordanian leadership. Many Palestinians were so angry at Jordan’s apparent attempt to grab their land that they came to view Jordan as an enemy almost as much as Israel. No Arab state recognized the unification with Jordan as a permanent solution, nor did the US. By the early 1950’s, however, Palestinian leaders seemed ineffective and unable to speak for their people. The Arab League established the PLO in 1964 in an effort to control Palestinian nationalism while appearing to champion their cause. Although it was supposed to represent the Palestinians, the PLO really represented the views of President Nasser of Egypt. Its first leader, Ahmad Shuqairi, made wild and irresponsible threats to drive Israelis into the sea. He had little support among Palestinians for he was seen as a puppet of the Egyptians. In fact, early PLO leaders were selected by the Arab League based on their commitment to containing radical nationalism and limiting guerilla activity against Israel. Leaders of the Arab states sought to expand Arab unity and build up stronger military forces so as to better negotiate with Israel. Some Palestinians, however, refused to wait for Arab unity and military strength, and tried instead to stimulate popular support in the region for a war of liberation. In the 1960s Palestinian students began to form their own organizations independent of control by Arab governments (although the Syrians, Libyans, and Iraqis continued to fund and control particular groups). From 1965-1967 Yasser Arafat’s group, Fatah, abstained from joining the PLO and chose instead to conduct guerilla raids into Israel from neighboring Arab states. These activities proved so popular among Palestinians that groups within the PLO soon began to organize paramilitary activities, and younger, more militant Palestinians began to take over the PLO.
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