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National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ 5 August 1986 THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAF/AA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FDR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING ANO IMPACT OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TD THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

'Pgs. 38, 39, 40-48, 49-52, 53-55, WORLD&! · March 1986 56-63, 64-65, 66-69, 70-75, 76-80, 81-86, 87-91, 92-97, 98-102

A Publication of lfJe ~ington timff C.Orporation

SPECIAL REPORT

2 9 23 TERRORISM TRAONG 'S SHADOWY · CASTRO'S aJBA1 CONDUIT TO This new global warfar. DEEDS GLOBAL nRRORISM has~ th. foe. of Yonah Alexander L. Francis Bouchey international politia, Is it just a series of 12 28 1pOnta11eous outbursts by independent opeiatives? ABU NIDAL-THE SPUNTER "nRRORISM'S TENAOOUS ROOTS Or is rt.... a delib.. ate FESTERS IN LA TIN AMERICA orchestration behind th. Yonah Alexander Charles Franklin various incidents? 14 32 2 THE UFE AND TIMES OF UNRA VEUNG THE SOVIET EXPLODING THE MYTH OF THE MUAMMAR AL.QADDAR TERRORIST WEB PLO John Rees, Martha Yossef Bodansky, J1ll1an Becker C.Powers Louis Rees 19 37 NATIONS THAT SUPPORT TAUCING SENSE TO nRRORISTS TERRORISM David Nissen

•Map of countries hosting terrorist 41 . training camps - FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE I", . •• •. ·------20 Neil C. Livingstone JIHAD: NO EXQJSE FOR 45 nRRORISM r DEFUSING THE RADICAL ENTENTE William Willoughby Evans Johnson

Reprinted with permission

'"------Denise Brown, Editor------..... Harry Zubkoff. Chief, News Clipping & Analysis Service.(SAF/AA). 695-2884 SPECIAL EDITION -- ·S AUGUST 1986 Special Report TERRORISM uring the year 1985 alone, war targets civilians. It follows renowned experts have lent their there were 3,012 incidents none of tenets of the Geneva Con­ experience to this report, supply­ Dof terrorism perpetrated vention. Prisoners taken have no ing information yet unpublished throughout the world. These acts, rights, no protections. They wear about the inner workings of sever­ most of which took place in Latin no uniform, carry no weapons; but al of these groups. America, the , and they are the direct object of this Terrorism may be the World , represent a new interna­ deliberate carnage. . War of our day. The need for an tional warfare. This month, THE WORLD & I ex­ intelligent counter to it cannot be This war, though never de­ amines the current status of overemphasized. The very struc­ clared, is being fought every day. the most active terrorist organiza­ ture of the future world may well Unlike openly declared hostilities tions, and traces the background be at stake. ". · ·· with clearly defined sides, this of their development. World-

EXPLODING THE MYTH OF THE PLO by Jillian Becker f the Palestine Liberation Or­ The largest group was , tian named , ganization (PLO) can be said led by , who from who developed a closer relation­ I to exist at all anymore, it can February 1969 had the title of ship than the others with the So­ only be as a political fiction. This . chairman of the PLO. He received viet Union . has been the case for some years money chiefly from , Hostility between the three now, but until a few months ago some from other Arab oil produc­ groups remained intense through it suited the interests of many ers, and some from taxes levied all the years that they were nom­ states, both Western and East­ on Palestinian workers in a num­ inally associated with each other ern, to believe in it the way older ber of Arab states. under the PLO umbrella-from children still let themselves be­ The second biggest was Saiqa, which, at times, the PFLP all but lieve in Santa Claus-and for the supported by , whose in­ totally severed itself. same reason: most of them still terest in wliberating" Palestine Then there was the ALF (Arab hoped it might bring them a pres­ was to acquire it as a Syrian prov- Liberation Front), an Iraqi group ent, namely, peace negotiations. , ince. Another was the Popular with few Palestinian members, Front for the Liberation of Pales­ which positively did not seek a The PW before 1982 tine (PFLP), led by a Greek Or­ Palestinian state since its de­ The PLO was never a cohesive thodox Lebanese doctor, George clared aim was a single, unified organization. Before its ultimate Habash, whose first patron was Arab state under Iraqi hegem­ disintegration in 1982, it consist­ President Nas3er of . ony. ed of eight groups, supported by From his group two others had In 1977, another group broke different Arab powers. These broken off in the late 1960s and off from the PFLP-GC, naming were inimical to each other, and become constituent factions in itself the Palestine Liberation within the PLO the enmities were their own right: first, the PFLP­ Front ( PLF ). Its main backer was fought out, frequently and with GC (General Command), led by a , but it was also partly fi­ bloodshed, group against group, Syrian named Ahmad Jibril, sup­ nanced by Libya. One of the so representative were they, not ported by Syria; and then, the smallest groups was the Pales­ of the , but of their PDFLP (the Democratic Front), tine Popular Struggle Front, masters. ' led by a Jordanian Chris- formed by Palestinians of the

2 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

West Bank and consisting of to impose peace and gain con­ TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE about 100 members. trol of the territory, but lllDDU•AST PALESTINIANS What bound them together just warned them not to advance or Arab liberation Fronl (ALF) sufficiently was the 1968 coven· dig in too close to her border. Abu Nidal Group Al·Aaifa ant, which declared that the aim President Hafez Assad of Syria Al·Seeir of the PLO was the total annihi· handed over West to Yas­ Arab Nationa~at Movement Atab Nationalist Youth OrganizetiOn tor the Lib· lation of Israel through armed ser Arafat and drew back his eration of Palestine Arab RavOlutionary Army-Paleetine Command struggle only. forces to the east of , Oemoc:ratic Front tor the Uberation of Paleatine After the 1973 war, which the where they remain to this day. (DFLP) Group claimed as a victory, the The PLO gained unchallenged Black September-June Organization possibility arose of a Palestinian possession of most of southern Eagles of the Palestine The Storm (al-Saiga) state being established by nego­ Lebanon, subjecting the Lebanese Popular Front for the liberation of Pateatine tiation at a multinational peace and Palestinian· refugees alike to (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Paleafine· conference presided over by the the arbitrary and trigger-happy General Command (PFLP-GC) Popular Struggle Front (PSF) and the Soviet rule of its internally warring fac­ Palestine Liberation Front Union. tions. Palestine Communist Party Palestine National Front (PNF) The question of whether to en· When President Sadat of Palestine Liberation Organization ter into negotiations or not split . Egypt made his histo:i:ic journey Movement for the National Liberation of Pa· lea tine the loosely bound PLO into two to Jerusalem in November 1977, BAHRAl-N main policy groups opposed to the immediate responae of all the Al·Sanduq Al·Huaaeini Society lalamic Front for the Liberation ot ·. ·each other. On the one side, Fa­ PLO groups was to declare them­ National Liberation Front Bahrain Popular Liberation Front of Aman and The Arab tab, the PDFLP (which followed selves united in their opposition Gulf the Soviet line, and the Soviet to Egypt's treachery. But within IRAQ Al·Daa- (The CaH) Union wanted the peace confer­ a few weeks, they split apart ir- Oa-hf'9rty ence), and Saiqa (which did as , revocably over reactions to the Oiasident Baathiats Democratic Party of (DPK) Syria wished it to do, and Syria 1Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. lr•qi Communist Party (ICP) Arafat wanted to keep· a line Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was being armed by the Soviet Kurdish (Bassok) Union) agreed that their aims open to Sadat, but the oth­ National Front for the Liberation of Iraq (NFLI) N91ional Dernoc:ratic end Pan-Arab Front could be attained by negotiation er groups wanted only Sad­ 1'9triotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as well as armed struggle and at's blood. Mutinies raged with­ ~ Council of the Islamic Revolution of lrtq that "Palestine" could be "recov­ in Fatah itself, not for the first Unified Kurdistan Socialist Party (UKSP) ered" in stages instead of all at time. IS RAEL Arab Liberation Front once-first; the occupied territo­ In 1973, a splinter group led by Black June Organization ries of the and Gaza; Abu Nidal (real name, Sabri al­ Black September Orgtnization o.moctalic Front for the Liberation of Palestine then, Israel. Banna) mutinied and has at­ Heron of the Return ~of Atab Nationllttsts On the other side, the remain­ tacked Arafat men with as much Palestine Armed Struggle Command ing groups (not including the fury as ever since. Ara­ Palestine Liberation Army Paleltine Liberation Front PLF, which had not yet come into fat, in turn, condemned Abu Ni­ Palestine Liberation Organization existence) rejected both modifica­ dal to death and ordered the Pateatine Nationlll Front in Occupied Territories Palestine National Liberation Movement tions and so came to be known as death of a number of his rival's . Pateatlne Popular Struggle Front Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine the "rejectionists." The Fatah-led followers. In 1978, some 140 Fa­ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine side was the majority by far, and tah men broke away, most of General Command Rejection Front so the new "moderate" proposals them under the leadership of Abu Sa'lqa were adopted as official policy Daoud who had planned the mas­ Natura Carta Redemption of Israel by subsequent Palestine National sacre of the Israeli athletes at ~~tA~lense League Councils (PNCs), one which met the Olympic games in Munich in Arab Natioialial Movement in 1974, when the "stages" idea 1972; some of Abu Nidal's men Fote. 17 Jordanian Convnunist Party (JCP) was ratified, and one in 1977, joined forces with the new rebels. Moslem Brotherhood when political negotiation was ac­ Groups proliferated as the "unit­ KUWAIT cepted as an auxiliary means to ed" organization continued to Moslem Fundamentalists achieve the Palestinian state. crumble away. For all the divisions within it, The final, visible dissolution of The rest of the fighters who the PLO occassionally gave the the PLO came when the organiza­ remained loyal to him, about one· appearance of unity during the tion was pushed out of Beirut by third of the Palestinian fighting years that it held territory in Le­ . the Israelis in August 1982. Ara­ force, were banished to an island banon. In 1975 and 1976, the alien fat sought for somewhere to go, off the coast of . Among PLO, heavily armed by Syria, and for an Arab government that those who went with Arafat to in alliance with some revolution­ would take him in. President Tunis was the leader of the PLF, ary Lebanese factions, waged a Bourguiba finally agreed to let Abu Abbas, and most of its small civil war against the Lebanese him lodge in Tunis, with a small membership, although some of Christians. Syrian forces came in eonUngent of armed supporters. them broke away and went to 3 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

Damascus. The ALF retracted had to live under his tyranny be­ to call that piece the PLO. He also into Iraq. tween 1976 and 1982. He would held another asset: a fair amount The other faction leaders were certainly have been killed had he of support among Palestinians in allowed into Syria by Assad, and not run for his life to the sea and the Israeli-occupied territories. there they went, unreconciled to sailed away under the protection The great powers still hoped that each other, and their fighting of the United Nations. he might be able to speak for the men were shut away in camps. From then on, Arafat was the Palestinian people if only negotia­ An initial restlessness among leader of a minority faction of the tions could be launched to settle them was soon settled by the ·PLO-except that it was no long­ territorial disputes. prompt arrival of Assad's tanks. er possible to speak of the PLO It must have seemed to Arafat and its factions. New groups were that his luck was endless. With ·After1982 formed out of the disintegrated no effective armed strength, with In 1982, a full-scale internecine parts. Arafat's remnant of Fa­ such as he had removed too far war broke out within the Fatah tah, along with the PDFLP, t}le from Israel to launch attacks organization. Arafat returned to PFLP, a part of the PLF, and a across its borders, with Arab Lebanon, to the northern town of newly formed communist group, leaders-Qaddafi and Assad-re­ , where he still had some banded together as the"Democrat­ fusing to let him set foot in their supporters in the ·camps. Angry ic Alliance. The remaining fac­ territory, he was nevertheless cohorts of rebel Fatah fighters, tions, those under the protection courted by newsmen, received by armed and paid by Syria and led of Assad, called themselves the the Pope, and made welcome and ... by · a Fatah officer, Abu Musa National Salvation Alliance. treated as a head of state in many (real name, Musa Sa'id), besieged Which group now was "the sole lands, both East and West. His the camps; they were bitter at representative of the Palestinian "minister of foreign affairs," Far­ what they saw as their betrayal people"-as the PLO had been ouq Qaddoumi, was sought out in in 1982 by inept, cowardly, and termed by the Arab states since Tunis by a junior minister of the greedy commanders, especially 1974? British Foreign Office, Douglas ·Abu An1mar (better known as Hurd, now Home Secretary. Yasser Arafat) and Haj Ismail, Westem wishful thinking who had ruled Sidon with the gun Still the world-that is, the Which group now and greatly enriched himself with United Nations, Western govern­ loot but had fled ignominously be­ ments and the media, and the was "the sole fore the Israeli advance in June Soviet Union spoke of "the PLO." representative of the 1982. What they meant by it was Ar­ Palestinian They rained fire upon Arafat afat and his broken piece of a and his last few supporters in group. He still bore the title of people"-as the PLO Lebanon, Palestinians who, being PLO Chairman, making it possi­ had been termed by encamped in the north,. had not ble, with a little political license, the Arab states since STUCTURE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PW) 1974'! PLO It was rumored that President ..------..J Ya-Arafat, Chairman Assad was worried that Arafat might set up a Palestinian government-in-exile in ; Mu­ PAL.ESTINAN NATIONAL SALVATION barak of Egypt received him with FRONT (pro-Syrianl ;';,.··~ ·-:: . ~t~ -:~ · ·· . ~~ ".~ •.;,,. NMlonll Counclt \~ honor, and King Hussein of Jor­ ...... , .dan conducted a series of talks .. P,L.Pi,.; Geoni9 ~ . . ~ ' ffLP-GC ;.;. Ahmed JCbrl .. with him. Something was expect­ ed of him by the powers, and as .;: iii111a.;;.;;~a1-1

4 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 the United Nations (just fourteen of whether it would be a province TERRORIST GROUPS M'ORLDW/DE months after the Munich Massa· of Jordan, as the king wished it to LEBANON Al Amal ere by his Black September ter­ be or a Palestinian state, as he Arab Democratic Party rorists) or when he had sat like a must have it, would be clarified, Arab Sociabat Action Party Armenian Community . president of his own little state in once the territory had been wrest· Armenian Revolutionllry F9daration Lebanon. ed from Israel's grasp. Al-Mourabitoun Militia Alawil' Youth Yet he may have suspected how But the conference itself had to Arab Liberation Party hollow was the ground on which Cedar Guardians get under way without his conced· Chriatian Militia he walked, how it quaked beneath ing recognition to Israel, without · Conservative or Kufur Front Druse Progresaive Socialist Party red carpets spread for him even seeming to abandon the armed Free Lebanese Army in Western Europe. In November struggle, and with his own men Front lor Iha Liberation of Lebanon Fityin Ali Organization 1984, he managed to call a PNC as the Palestinian side of the Guardians of the Ced•ra of Lebanon in Damascus, with some slight Arab negotiating team to prove Islamic Amal support from his less unfriendly that his PLO was still the ·sole Islamic Group partners in the old PLO. The as· Independent NHMrite Movement representative of the Palestinian Kataeb sembly itself was packed with people." Lebanese National Movement LebaneM Revolutionary Party (LAP) notables on whom he could rely. Even to Arafat himself, it must Lebanese Communiat Party The idea was that he would be have looked like a tough proposi­ Lebanese Youth Movement strengthened by their assured tion. But his luck might hold. and Lebanese Red Brigades support by the mere fact that a Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions something might turn up to help Marada Militia ·PNC of some kind had been sum· him unexpectedly as it so often Maronite League moned to lend a semblance of leg­ Marade Brigade had before. Movement of the Oiainherited itimate sanction to such decisions Murabitoun Whatever the media had re­ . Muslim Brotherhood and actions as he might be pushed ported, he had not, in fact, Musewi to take, however much opposition Nationa~ll Front conceded the Israeli conditions National Guards might be voiced by other faction backed by the United States: rec· National Liberation Militia leaders and the heads of the "pro­ National Movement ognition of Israel's right to exist. Nationlll Resistance Front gressive" Arab states. :abandonment of the armed strug­ Organization of Holy Struggle Organization ol Revolutionaries of the North ·gle, and no PLO members in the (ORN) The Events of 1985 Jordanian team. The talks he had Organization ol the Beath Party Organization ol Communist Action In February 1985, Arafat reached been having over many months Organiation ol the Oppressed in the Vtbrld an agreement with King Hussein Palestine Liberation Organization with the government of Jordan Perrna-.1 Congress of the Lebanese Order ol of Jordan. It was widely hailed as had not been about how to make Monks a breakthrough. There would be a Phat 'Ange, or Lebanese Phalangist Party :peace with Israel or about which Pink Panther Militia joint Jordanian-Palestinian dele­ Palestinians could join a Jordani­ l'l:lpuliat Nasserite Organization gation, the media claimed, ready Prograaaive Socialist Party' .an negotiating team. Progressive Vanguards to start peace talks with Israel. They had for most of that time Rawnajf Al Isiah Militia The Israeli government declared Revolutionary Islamic Organization :been about whether or not the South Lebanon Anny itself willing to enter into such Syrian Socialist NationaMat Party king could be persuaded to let Tanzim talks, provided there were no Arafat's fighters come from their Towhid Tigers Militia PLO members in the Arab team. Union of Forces of the Vtbrking Paople­ distant island and establish them­ Corrective Movement King Hussein wanted the long· selves in bases in Jordan so they Zahl• Btoc sought multinational conference. Zghartan Liberation Army could make raids on Israel. The Vtbrkera· Uague He would understandably feel February 1985 agreement had Popular Front lor the Liberation of Oman safer from the wrath of other been a compromise. The king fi. (PFLO) Arab heads of state if both the Ollolar Literation Front (DLF) . nally conceded that Arafat might Popular Front lor the Liberation of Oman and United States, as arms suppliers have a headquarters in the Arabian Gull (PFLOAG) to the "conservatives," and the but no bases for the Fatah Popular Front for the Uberation of the Arabian Soviet Union, as arms suppliers militiamen-the /edayeen-any­ Peninaula to the "progressives," were to par­ where in Jordan. Shi'ite Mo51em Fundamentalists ticipate. The prospects for a nego­ Arafat was disappointed but tiated peace looked more promis· did not contradict the king when lier, the had established ing than ever before. Arafat must he announced his joint-delegation their own state within a state in have felt head-of-stateship for plan (Palestinian names to be de­ his kingdom. Armed by Syria, himself, or something very much cided later). After all, Arafat had they had nearly toppled him from like it; to be almost within his agreed, that negotiation might his throne by force. They had cov­ grasp. He had to bring off just accompany armed struggle more eted Jordan as part of Palestine. one more trick. The conference than ten years ago, so there was In 1970 and 1971, he had gone to would have to declare the West nothing new in that. war against them and finally ex· Bank and Gaza a self-governing King Hussein had learned his pelled them after much Palestinian entity, but the issue lesson bitterly. Fifteen years ear· bloodshed. They would have won

5 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

if Syrian intervention on their . Passing the political buck f'ERRORIST GROUPS JJ'ORWWIDE side had not been stopped by President Assad owes his swol­ SAUDI ARABIA Baeth Party of Saudi Arabia the Israelis, who, as a warning, len prestige chiefly to the refusal Communist Party of Saudi Arabi• CommittM tor the Def111911 of the Right1 of Man massed their own forces on the of the West to insist on bis with­ in Saudi Ar1bi1 Israeli-Syrian-Jordanian border. drawing from Lebanon; to its El-51111 El-Saleh (Sunnite) Moelem Revolulionlry Movement in the Arabian King Hussein will not easily be failure to condemn or even offi· Fllnlneule persuaded to give another oppor­ cially notice bis command over Party of Llbor A:lpular Front for the Liberation of the Ar1bi1n tunity to Arafat brethren to at­ . the suicide terrorist squads that FllninlUll tempt his destruction again. emerged from Baalbek to kill Shi'ite Moelem Fundlrnentetteta Union of the People of the Arebian Peninsula Arafat lacked strength in his hundreds of Americans in the SYRIA Arab Communist Orgeniution bargaining position. He had only U.S. embassy in Beirut and the Islamic Front In Syria one ace in his hand. King Hussein Marine headquarters in 1983 and Moalem Brotherhood National Alliance for the Liberetion of Syria bad, under threat of death, recog· 1984; and to the stream of visit­ National Selv•tion Commend nized the PLO as "the sole repre­ ing Arab leaders, and occasional Party of Communist Action Vanguard of the Arab Revolution sentative of the Palestinian peo­ American diplomats, who come to SOUTH YEMEN ple" at an Arab summit held at kneel figuratively speaking on his Front for the Liberation of Oec:upjed South Ye­ man - FLOSV Rabat in 1974. At least two-thirds mat. He can say a decisive Mno" National Democratic Front • NOF of his subjects on the East Bank and there is no one to,compel him National liberation Front - NLF Organisation for the Liberation of the Occupied of the Jordan are Palestini- to change his mind. South-OLOS South Arabian l.Alegue . .. an-that is, they were born in Or is there? The Soviet Union YUGOSLAVIA the area designated as Palestine has some 7,000 advisers in Syria Corninlormista Croat INegal Revolutionary Orgeniaation (Hrvat­ when it came under British man· and has armed Assad's army so aka lllegelna Ravolucionarna OrganizeciJa datory rule after the First World heavily with small arms, artil· -HIRO) Croat Liberation Movement (Hrvataki Oalobodi· War. That fact could, however. be lery, fighter aircraft, and SAM lacki Fokret-HOP) Croat National Congreaa (Hrvatsko Narodno Vi­ overlooked. (surface to air) missiles, that it is jeCe-HNV) The West Bank was a different reasonable to believe that he is Croat National Resistance (Hrvatakl Narodni Otpor-HNO) story: there, just about all the susceptible to Soviet influence. Croatlen Intelligence Service Arab inhabitants are Palestinian. The Soviet Union, however, was Croatian National liberation Forces-Fighters for a Free Croatia His acquiescing in the Rabat de· still looking to Arafat to get them Croatian National Reaiatance cision was tantamount to a for· into a peace conference with a Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (Hrvateko RevOluelonarno Bratavo-HRB) mal acknowledgment that the status equal to that of the United Croatien Youth (Hrv1t11rld League of Croat Youth (Svetaka Lige thing widely recognized as own· ·western European governments, Hrvatske Omladine-SLHOJ ing that name. He needed Ara· anxious that there should be Young Croatian Army tor Freedom Young Croatian Republican Army fat's consent-unless the other :somebody who could negotiate for ALBANIA Arab states were willing to recon· ;the Palestinians, were prepared Anti-Communist Mmtary Coune~ AUSTRIA sider the Rabat decision. ito grant him recognition, in vary­ Justice Guerrilla iing degrees, as leader of a Mrepre­ Jordan was not strong enough Julien Llhaut Brigade to defy the veto of the PLO alone, isentative" body, which they con· Revenge and Freedom tinued to call the PLO. The West­ CYPRUS as Egypt had done. But all deci­ i Enoaia M~•ement (EOIVrB) sions of the have to iern European governments gave Ethniki (lrganoais Kyprion Agonieton-EOKA (National of Cypriot Figll..,_) be unanimous. If Arafat could not lhim that recognition partly be­ Ethniki Org1noai1 Kypnon Agoniaton-8 icause the Soviet Union did, which -EOKA-8 INational Orgeniaation of Cypriot make the king's peace with Israel Fight.,.. BJ possible, then Assad, King Hus­ ;meant that the Soviets would not sein's worst enemy, would have to ·oppose any agreement he might be persuaded to let him negotiate reach, and partly because the and inclination to their side of the with Israel, recognize Israel, call conservative Arab states contin­ great conservative-progressive off the holy war against Israel ued to recognize him as chair­ divide. -all that Assad stood fiercely man of the PLO. The conserv­ Israel blocked the possibility of against! But last summer, it still ative Arab leaders had to re­ the Soviet Union participating in looked as if Arafat was capable cognize somebody as leader of the multinational peace talks by in· of giving King Hussein the go­ PLO in which they had invested sisting that it would accept no ahead, so the king did not need to special rights of decision; and Ar· country with which it does not petition Assad. That hopeless at­ afat, unlike the other faction have diplomatic relations. This tempt was to come later. · chiefs, belonged by background ·has prompted the Soviets to con-

6 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 sider reestablishing such re-· ior minister was to meet with his lations, which were broken off people now, but the foreign secre­ But the cold-blooded after Israel's victory in 1967. Is­ tary himself. Perhaps, through rael has another object in view in · Thatcher, his shrunken PLO murder ofan elderly, entering discussions to this end might even reach the best posi­ crippled American, with the patron of her bitterest tion of all-recognition by the enemies: the release of Jewish United States government. Leon Kltnghoffer, on would-be emigrants from the So­ Thatcher could not have ex­ the Achille Lauro was viet Union. amined the Israeli-Jordanian­ not so easily Palestinian question of the mo­ The British invitation ment with her usual care and in­ :digestible. The months of 1985 wore on, sight. If the role of mediator was and visible developments were what she had in mind, the choice of Israel. A clear statement in slow. Arafat prevaricated. He of two men entirely unacceptable plain English? No. They would could not now, at this vital junc­ to one side of any proposed peace not, could not do it, they said. ture, give up his claim to "sole talks-the Israeli side-was They went away without meeting representative" status and let counterproductive. Perhaps she Howe. other men acceptable to Israel hoped that if she extracted from The British government was but distant from him negotiate these two representatives a left with egg on its face, though for territory. He wanted Pales­ promise that the PLO would re­ not nearly as much as if the meet- tine on the map, but he could not cognize Israel and give up vio­ ing had taken place. The excuse 1 · take the step that might now lence, it would be so significant a for having ventured to the brink bring it into existence. He wait­ ·breakthrough that Israel would was that assurances had been ed. And his luck held. Something relent and smooth the way to a given by King Hussein. But King turned up for him once more. ·settlement after all. Hussein, through the national Prime Minister Margaret Probably assurances were giv­ press, denied all culpability. He Thatcher, while on her official en by King Hussein, or attributed himself, he said innocently, had visit to Egypt and Jordan in Sep­ to him, that the two PNC men been misled. termber 1985, decided that two would declare themselves willing Howe also wore a look of members of Arafat's PNC might to pursue peaceful means only to wounded innocence. Yet inno­ have talks with the foreign secre­ settle the Palestinian question cence had not been within splash­ tary. Her decision was sudden. In and that they would recognize Is­ ing range. The truth is, there had Cairo, she told the press that she, rael's right to exist. It is more been excellent reason to call off like President Reagan, hoped for than likely that Arafat believed the meeting before the arrival of a Palestinian delegation as part that once Mr. Milhem and Bishop the two PNC envoys, had not the of a Jordanian negotiating team Khoury were in London, a .verbal foreign office been blindly deter­ and was only waiting for accept­ formula might be devised, like so mined that it should take place. able names of persons not con­ ·often in the past, of such a kind What is remarkable in retrospect nected with the PLO to be put as to convey one meaning to Brit­ is how tenaciously some civil ser­ forward. In Aqaba, Jordan, a few ain and the West (moderation) vants must have clung to their days later, she announced that and quite another to the Arab plan of getting the foreign secre­ Mr. Mohammed Milhem and Bish­ world (steadfastness). tary to receive Arafat's men in op Elia Khoury, both members of Sir Geoffrey Howe did not offer the face of events that should Arafat's PNC, were to come to proofs to back up his assurances have induced anyone in a position London for talks with the foreign that these were "men of peace" of responsibility for Britain's fair secretary. Somewhere up in the who were willing to recognize Is­ name to abandon it. clouds between Cairo and Amman rael's right to exist, although it seems, she had changed her such proofs were requested. In Arafat overreaches himseH mind. Or perhaps King Hussein fact, all available evidence point­ It was while the visit of Ara­ persuaded her to accept the per­ ed the other way. Both men had fat's envoys to London was await­ sons Arafat was prepared to gone on record as saying, firmly ed that the murder of three Israe­ send. and publicly, several times in lis at Larnaca was carried out by The invitation restored Arafat the preceding months, that they members of Arafat's Force 17, to the forefront of the world­ would most certainly not abandon one of whom was a British citi­ shaking Middle East political the armed struggle. zen. And soon afterwards came drama. Fair prospects opened be­ Howe did, however, assure the terrorist attack on the Achille fore him again. Here at last was Britain and the world that they Lauro cruiser, carried out by official recognition of his organi­ would sign a clear statement com· members of the PLF. zation's representative status by mitting themselves to abandon­ The Larnaca affair did not the British government.. No jun- ment of violence and recognition send a noticeable tremor through

7 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

Britain or any other Western Still, the British foreign office did fat himself as he shifts insecurely country and the news media gen­ not call off the projected meeting between Tunis and . In erally found that those killings with Arafat's men. Tunis, he is no longer welcome could be borne with fortitude. But But the case is worse even than since Israel's punitive raid on his the cold-blooded murder of an that. The disastrous and ugly headquarters there after the Lan­ elderly, crippled American, Leon truth aboui ail that diplomatic arca killings. In Baghdad, he has Klinghoffer, on the Achille Lauro folly is this: the very fact that the ·been granted a narrow foothold was not so easily digestible. The British government declared Mil­ ·by President , · media hastened to report that Ar­ hem and Khoury to be men of perhaps through Abu Abbas's afat was acting as honest broker, peace, its insistence that Arafat's honest brokerage. For Arafat trying to persuade the terrorists PLO was willing to abandon the himself, the question of how he on the vessel to stop their action. armed struggle and recognize Is­ can use his fighters has impor­ He was being assisted by another rael, forced Arafat to launch the tance but not for the rest of the honest broker, Abu Abbas, but' Larnaca and Achille Lauro plans. world. He has fallen, and it will then again they were his men, He had to prove to the not be easy for him· to rise again. and not members of the other that he was still what he. was paid His power of veto has been sus­ piece of the PLF loyal to Assad. . to be-the wager of the holy war pended. What will happen now And if he was their leader, then against Israel. depends on King Hussein, Hafez he must surely have had some- Assad, Israel, the United States, . .. · thing to do with their activities in Pride before a fall the Soviet Union and Western the first place. Furthermore, Abu He had made his worst mis­ Europe, all of which are watching Abbas had his office in Arafat's take. Just as it seemed that each other for the next .• Tunis headquarters. If such ac­ Thatcher would raise him to the tions as this could be planned in heights of success, he fell. Jillian Becbr has tra11tkd tzttnai11tl11 those headquarters without Ar­ Arafat is now thoroughly dis­ tltroiiohOMt tilt Middk Ea.t, inurtii1toin11 afat knowing, there was little credited. Even his own propagan­ tho11 on aU rides of tilt conflict. In addi­ point in negotiating with him, dists cannot deny it, but they are tion to ninntroua articlta and broataata on tht 111bjtct of the PLO, BM haa authored a or getting his signature to any doing their best to repair the co­ book, The PLO, The Rise and Fall of the ·agreement whatsoever, since he lossal damage. They print head­ Palestine Liberation Orianization, 1984, clearly had no control even over lines announcing his "comeback." St. Martin's Prtu. those nearest to him. If, on the As yet, however, no such thing other hand, he had been party to is perceptible, nor is it very likely. the plans, did this not contradict If the West looks upon him with the British foreign secretary's as­ distaste, it is not worth the So­ sertion that his two representa­ viets' while to go on backing him tives were men of peace who had as their most likely entry ticket abandoned violence in favor of to a peace conference. After all, negotiation? he had never really been their Abu Abbas welcomed his. men sort. ashore in Cairo, and the Egyptian But Arafat knows that if he President, Hosoi Mubarak, made loses Soviet support he will drop a plane available to them. When out of the wide political arena the United States asked him not where he has circled and per­ to let them go, he replied that it formed for nearly twenty years. was too late, they had already He is therefore very anxious to gone. But they had not, and the ;please the Soviets. When, very Americans knew it. When it did · recently, he was warned by Mos­ leave Egypt, the United States cow not to interfere in the bloody Air Force compelled the plane to faction fighting between rival land on Italian soil. The Italian power groups of communist prime minister, Mr. Craxi, pre­ South Yemen, he strove to obey. ferred to uphold the tale of Abu His fighters remained passive on Abbas being an honest broker their Kamaran Island-which in­ and thus let him go, to the fury of dicates that over them, at least, the United States administration. he still has some control. By then, it was fairly obvious How long these wild men will that Arafat's faction had no in­ contain their frustration is a tention of abandoning violence. question that might trouble Ara-

8 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 'TRACING LIBYA'S SHADOWY .:DEEDS by Yonah Alexander

n alleged Libyan connec­ Libyan Revolutionary Commit­ According to some reports, Li­ tion to the December 27, tees. byan embassies also serve as A 1985, terrorist attacks on Dissidents in Greece, West Ger­ arms warehouses. Even terrorists the Rome and Vienna airports many, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria organizations based in Indonesia has focused attention on Tripoli's were attacked in 1985, as Qaddaf• have received money and wea­ role in the global spread of con­ i's instructions were imple­ pons from Libya. In these cas­ temporary terrorism. mented. es, the Libyan Embassy in Ku­ To be sure, "state-sponsored Moderate Arab leaders Qaddafi ala Lumpur, Malaysia, serves as terrorism" may be defined as the deems as insufficiently. dedicated the contact for the Asian terror­ deliberate employment of violence to the armed strugglt! against Is­ ists and the Libyans. or threat by sovereign states or rael are an additional target of The involvement of Libyan em­ their proxies to attain strategic Libyan terrorism. Lioya has been bassies is not limited to the role of objectives by creating overwhelm· connected to assassination plots supplier. Two Libyan diplomats ing fear in a target . population against Egyptian President Mu­ were forced to leave Spain in De­ larger than the actual victims at­ barak and former Sudanese Pres­ cember 1985, following the dis· tarked or threatened. ident Nimeiri. covery of evidence that they had In other words, the main goal Other moderate leaders, such been planning an attack. of state-sponsored terrorism is to as the presidents of Zaire and Diplomatic messages of sup­ undermine the stability of plural- , have also been the object port are broadcast from Libya to ist states with representative of Libyan-backed plots. Moderate encourage terrorist organizations governments. Arab states are themselves vic­ in their activities. The Libyan se­ Indeed, Libya's policy and ac­ tims of Libyan attacks as illus­ cretary of information, Muham­ tions are a manifestation of state­ trated by the implication of a Li­ mad al-Zuway, has confirmed Li­ sponsored terrorism in the Middle byan ship in the July 1984 mining bya's support of terrorism by pro­ East and the international arena. of the Suez Canal. claiming that MWe are proud to Under the leadership of Colonel be used .... We assert to the whole Muammar Qaddafi, Libya spon­ Diplomatic channels world that we provide material, sors and provides substantial as­ Libyan diplomatic support of moral, and political support to ev­ sistance to the rejectionist ele­ terrorist groups is extensive and ery liberation revolution in the ments among the Palestinian ter­ diverse. Libya's diplomatic serv· world." rorist groups, and also supports ice was used, for example, to ass­ In the international arena, Lib­ terrorist groups in Europe, Afri­ ist the Palestinian terrorists in­ ya serves Soviet foreign policy ob­ ca, Asia, and Latin America. volved in the 1972 Olympic Mun­ jectives (although no formal re­ In pursuit of Qaddafi's objec­ ich massacre. Libyan diplomatic lationship exists), and Soviet tives of expanded state power and pouches are used to smuggle weapons are distributed through influence, Libya employs tactics money and weapons to Palestini· Libya to subversive groups and of assassination and violence an terrorists operating in West­ terrorist organizations. against opponents of its regime ern Europe. Forged passports, and against other targets. Libya cash, and documents are provided Greasing palms is also one of the main centers for by Libyan authorities to interna­ Aided by its oil revenues, Lib­ the training of international ter­ tional terrorists. ya provides substantial financial rorists. Libya has also sent arms, by support to terrorist groups world­ diplomatic courier, to many revo­ wide. According to the U.S. State Primary target: other Libyans lutionary groups that engage in Department, Libya ia a wpotential Direct Libyan terrorist activity terrorist acts. For example, the source of funds for virtually any is focused upon Libyan dissidents PLO attack against the Saudi ·groups claiming to be anti-Israel living in exile and involves Libyan Embassy in was perpetrat· and anti-United States." Alloca­ embassies as operational bases. ed with weapons received through tions for the funding of various Continuing his campaign to si­ Libya's diplomatic pouch and the terrorist organizations have been lence the opposition, in February Libyan charge d'affaires in Switz· reported at $100 million annually. 1984, Qaddafi once again ordered erland was expelled when he was The PLO, for example, received all Libyan exiles to return home · accused of t:ranaferring arms to Libyan grant money to fund spe­ or to face death at the barids of local terrorists in Apri1 1983. cific terrorist acts such as the

9 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

1972 Munich Olympic murders, i als from Eritrea, Syria, Somal· ' TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDAWE iAl'lllCA the 1975 Vienna kidnapping of ia, South Yemen, Chad, Mor­ LIBYA OPEC ministers, and the 1976 at-. occo, , the Philippines, Arab Revolutionary Brigade• Libyan National Aaeociation tack on an Israeli jet at the Istan- . Sardinia, and Corsica. Latin Libyan National Salvation Front bul airport. Also, Libyan funds . Ubyan Baathiet Party America is represented in the Red October have become available to leftist training camps with Colombians, Pan Arab Command elements throughout Latin Amer­ V.rriora lor Imam Mou... Sadr Salvadorans, Surinamese, Chi· 7 April Libyan Organization ica. leans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans, Martyr• of Pal81tine In 1981, for example, Libya and Nicaraguans in attendance. National Liberation Front (Fronl de Lib8ration provided $100 million to the San­ According to ~r Sa 'a, the Nationale-FLN) RevOlulionary Committee for Unity and Action dinistas in Nicaragua and, since semi-official Egyptian weekly (Comite RevOlutionnaire pour Nnit• at !'Action May 1982, has made several deliv­ -CRUA) magazine, at least ten camps Secret Army Organiaation (Organiution de rAr­ eries of arms to the Sandinistas have been identified in Libya for mee Secrete-OAS> and the Salvadoran guerrillas. Secret Organiaation (OrgeniHtion Sacritte training terrorists. Newspapers -OSI Consistent with its policy of com­ have reported that mercenaries· of ANGOLA batting Western influence, Libya Front for the Ut>eration of the Enclave of Cabin· various nationalities are working d8 (Frenta da ubarta~ do Enclave de C.bin­ has also provided guerrilla train­ for the Libyans and receive their da-FLEC) ing and almost $5 million in fi. National Front for the Liberation of AngOla training in these camps. (Frante NaciOnal da Liberta~to de Angola nancial aid to the New Caledonian -FNL.A) National Union for the Total Independence of National Socialist Kanak Libera- Handing out arms Angola (Uni6o Nacional para a lndependitncia ' ·· tion Front. Total de AngOla-UNITA) Massive quantities of weapons Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngOla Among the terrorist groups are supplied by Libya to var­ (Movimento Popular para• Uberta~6o da Ango­ that received Libyan financial as­ la-MPLA) ious terrorist organizations. Li­ CABIN DA sistance are the Irish Republican byan involvement in Lebanon is Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabin­ da (FLEC) Army, Muslim insurrectionists in no secret, as indicated by Druse CANARY ISLANDS the Philippines, Iranian terrorists Canary lalande lndepeodeoce Mov-..t leader Walid Jumblatt: "I receive Canary Islands Intelligence Service during the Shah's rule, and Pales­ arms from my friend Colonel Qad­ Movement for Sell-Determination and Inde­ tinian terrorists. Testimony of the pendence for the Canary lalanda (MPAIAC) dafi and I don't hide this. The massive scale of Libyan financial weapons come through Syria.... ft Central African MoVMnent for National Libera­ tion (MouvM*lt Centraafricain de Ub8fation aid to the PLO can be found in the Nicaragua is another recipient Nationllle-MCLN) statement by , head of Libyan arms. In April 1985, Independent Reflection Group (Groupe In­ dependent pour la Reflexion-GIRA) ·. of the Popular Front for the Lib­ weapons, including a supply for Movement for the Liberation of the Central Afri­ eration of Palestine General Com­ can People ( Mouvernent pour la Ub9retion du the Colombian M-19 terrorist F'ltupla Centraafricain-MLPC) mand wing of the PLO, in an group, were sent from Libya to Oubenguian Liberation Front (Front de Libera· interview with the Beirut daily, lion Oubenguienne-FLO) Nicaragua on jets supposedly Oubenguian Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique As-Safir, July 19, 1981, "Libyan transporting medical supplies. Oubenguien-FPO) aid is such that there is no end for CHAD The jets were intercepted before Chad Armed Force (Force Armee du Tchad further Arab aid .... Libyan aid ; they reached their destination. -FAT) Chad Liberation Movement (Mou.,..,_t pour la to the Palestinians amounts to Libya is also the conduit Liberation du Tchad-MPLT) hundreds of millions of dollars, ft ::had National Liberation Front (Front de Liber­ i through which Soviet arms are ation Nationale du Tchad-FrOlinal) Jibril said. · distributed to terrorist groups Common Action Front (Front d'Aclion Commune -FAC) Teaching terror worldwide. In 1981, for example, National Patriotic MCMllT*lt (Mouvement Na­ Instruction in terrorist tactics large quantities of Soviet wea· tional Patriotique-MNP) Northern Armed Forces (Forces Armeea du and weapons is provided by Libya : pons from various sources were Nord-FAN) to a wide variety of terrorist or­ Popular Armed Forces (Forces Anneea Popu­ transferred by Libya to the PLO. lairee-FAP) ganizations. A series of · camps This weaponry included multiple Popular Front for the l.ila

10 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

the terrorist who had taken 60 hostages at the Vienna OPEC meeting. The Venezuelan terror­ ist, "Carlos," has operated out of Libya for many years and in re­ turn for his activities has been given a home in Libya. Egypt has asserted that the Libyan connec- · tion to the hijacking of the Egyp­ tian Boeing 737 to Malta "is very · clear." The Palestinian Abu Nidal group, accused of the Rome and Vienna airport attacks, has con­ firmed ties to Libya. The Egyp­ tian magazine Al-Mussawar re­ ported that a member of Fatah verified that Abu Nidal works with -Libyan intelligence services. - Abu Nidal operates without con­ straints in Libya and, according to the State Department, it has been reliably reported that the group is now headquartered in Libya. Libya openly welcomes ter­ rorist groups; the Libyan News Agency encourages Palestinians Sprinkled throughout Libya are to relocate their camps and bases camps to train revolutionaries in to Libya. Time for reassessment specific functions such as desert The State Department reports It is becoming increasingly 1Darfare, underwater sabotage, clear that Libya's role in promot­ auaBBination, explosives and that Libya is attempting to combat. strengthen its ties with other ter­ ing terrorism calls for an imme­ rorist groups in the region. Ac­ diate reexamination of all options cordingly, in April 1985, Qaddafi available to the Free World in It is essential for the Free established a "command" of revo­ combatting this form of covert World to protect vigorously the lutionary groups in the region. He warfare. moral and cultural system that stated: "Our mission in this com­ The most important first step entitles it to resist and, if possi­ mand is to turn the individual for the Free World is to develop a ble, banish terrorism as an un­ suicide operations and the aspira­ comprehensive program of aware­ lawful form of conflict. tions of the Arab citizens into an ness, education, and response re­ It is the principle that should organized civilized act," and that garding terrorist threats and guide democracies in the fight Arab goals can be realized only countermeasures within the con­ against terrorism. Otherwise, the through the use of revolutionary text of state-sponsored terrorism Free World will remain hostage groups. when it can be identified as con­ to blackmailers well into the Qaddafi also said: "There is no stituting an act of war. twenty-first century. • escape and no way out but con­ Liberal democracies must try frontation." Qaddafi has imparted to break down the distinction be­ this same message in the Carib­ tween terrorists and national lib­ bean islands where, according to eration movements used by Libya Yonah Alezander ia a profuaor of inter­ the State Department, he advised and some other Third World na­ national atudita and director of the Insti­ tions, discrediting these liberation tute for Studies in International Terror· leftist politicians to by-pass legal ism, SUNY, and senior research staff means and move directly to vi­ ideologies and creating an atmos­ membtr of the Center for Strategic and olent a.Cts to replace the region's phere more conducive to a wide International Studita, Georgetown Uni· moderate regimes. range of self-defense strategies. tJersit~. Wash,ngton, D.C.

11 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 ABU NID.AL-THE SPLINTER ·FESTERS

by YonahA.lexander he December 27, 1985, ter· . the early . Abu Nidal re· Murder on the rorist attacks on the Rome mained under Iraqi patronage un· Egypt often finds itself the vie· T and Vienna airports have til 1983, when Iraq expelled the tim of Abu Nidal operations. Abu ·brought the Abu Nidal group of group and closed all except one of Nidal was linked to the 1978 kill· · Palestinian revolutionaries to a its offices. ing of the secretary-general of the new position of prominence in the Most of the FRC's severa1 Afro-Asian People's Organization, world's attention. hundred members currently re­ a former Egyptian minister, in Although the group remained side in Syria and Lebanon. In ad· Cyprus. This eventuated a gun out of the limelight for a period of dition, there are a nun1ber of .cells battle between Egyptian com· time prior to this, Abu Nidal was throughout Western ~urope and mandos sent to Cyprus and Cy­ not inactive. The State Depart· the rest of the Middle East. Lib­ priot forces who, according to ment reported connections be· ya has been increasingly involved Egypt, were Palestinian-backed. tween Abu Nidal and 60 terror­ with Abu Nidal since 1984; some The skirmish led to Egypt's deci· ist attacks·during the past eight sources indicate that the group's sion to revoke all special privi· years, 30 of these occurring since headquarters are now situated in leges given to Palestinians resid· the beginning of 1984. Attacks Libya. ing in Egypt. More recently, Abu took place in over 20 countries on Nidal's hijacking of the EgyptAir three continents, illustrating the . Agenda: no compromises craft to Malta caused the death of group's ability to operate where it Abu Nidal's objective is to liber· 59 people following an Egyptian wishes. ate the Palestinian homeland us· rescue attempt. Abu Nidal's involvement in the ing violence as its leading tool. Abu Nidal increased its activ· airport attacks and the Novem· The group seeks to sabotage all ities against Jordan after King her 1985 hijacking of an EgyptAir diplomatic efforts aimed at re· Hussein agreed to host a Nov· passenger plane have renewed in· newing negotiations between the ember 1984 Palestinian National terest and concern about the Arab states and Israel, viewing Committee meeting. The Febru· group's activities. such actions as capitulationist. ary 1985 agreement between Hus· The group was established in Accordingly, Abu Nidal's attacks sein and Arafat to work towards 1974, when Sabri al-Bana, known · target those states and individu· a common negotiating position as Abu Nidal, broke away from als that are partial to reconcilia· in the Arab-Israeli conflict only Yasser Arafat's Fatah organiza· tion attempts. served to enhance Abu Nidal's tion following disputes over ideol· Arafat and the PLO are not campaign against Jordan. The ogy and methodology. Specifical· immune themselves to the group's Jordanian Alia airlines has been a ly, in 1974, Arafat limited PLO terrorist activities. Arafat has frequent target with explosions terrorist activity to Israel and the been the object of many assas· at its offices in Spain, Greece, and occupied territories. Nidal disa· sination attempts, and in 1978, Italy; a rocket was fired at one of greed with the restriction, believ· PLO representatives in Britain, its planes as it prepared to take ing that any operations forward· Kuwait, and Paris were mur· off from Athens-luckily the ing the Palestinian cause were dered. Four people died in an at· rocket failed to explode. warranted, regardless of their lo­ tack on the PLO's Istanbul office. An attempt to blow up another cation. Abu Nidal was implicated not Jordanian jet enroute from Pakis· Abu Nidal found an ally in Iraq only in these events, but also in tan to Jordan was foiled. Jordani· who aided him in forming his or· the 1984 assassination of former an diplomats and embassies are ganization, officially named the West Bank Mayor Fahd Qawas· also favorite targets. In 1983, two Fatah Revolutionary Council meh, a Palestinian moderate, security men at the Jordanian (FRC), also known as Black June, shortly after his election to the Embassy in Athens were at· and allowed him to operate from PLO Executive Council, and the tacked, and in 1985 alone the em· Iraqi soil. Syria also influenced 1985 murder of a Palestinian in bassy in Rome was fired upon, the group beginning in the late Amman. For the part he played a Jordanian diplomat in Turkey 1970s and elements of the organi· in these and other extremist acts, was killed, and a plot to assassi­ zation relocated to Syria as Bag· a PLO tribunal sentenced Abu Ni­ nate the Jordanian ambassador to dhad began curtailing Abu Nidal dal to death in absentia. Greece was discovered. activity originating from· Iraq in

12 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

The moderate Gulf state of Ku­ · and Vienna airports took place. ' TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE wait has been a victim of Abu IOYPT Abu Nidal's strengthened Li· Alonen.11 MCI Hal)' fight from Sin CAI Takfir Nidal attacks. In 1982, there were byan ties have enabled it to o~ ~IHijlra) • Al Ojill8d eor-...1w. Organization attempts on the lives of Kuwaiti e~ate _ in . W~stern Europe with Al lllamiya diplomats in Spain and Pakistan. greater ease. According to Brit· Al Jamiyat Arab Egypt Ubefation front Two restaurants in Kuwait were ish military sources in December Coptic Sociatin In Iha Near Ea1t bombed in 1985. In late 1985, Abu Egyptian National front • ENF CJabllal al· 1985, Abu Nidal's services were •taniye al·Miarl)'a) Nidal stated that attacks against acquired by Libya's Qaddafi for Holy •r (Al·Jihad) Mualim BrotharllooO Egyplian C--.t f'WtY Kuwait would continue as long as $12 million a year. The group was CECP) Kuwaiti ties with the organiza· · to focus its attention on hijack­ Egyptian National front front for Iha Liberation of Egypt tion remained severed. ings with Britain, the United lllamlc Aaloclation As the prime obstacle to the States, Israel, and Egypt as its Libyan National LN(IU9 Moal9rn Brotharhood realization of a Palestinian state, primary targets. These acts were National Coalition Israel has been subjected to many National front to be implemented in conjunction Naw •fd l.'anguard terrorist attacks. The latest incl· with Libyan intelligence. • Repentance and Holy FliQht Social Arab NHMrill l'Wty dent was the attack on the Tile Coptie Orthodox Church counters at the Rome and Vien­ The group seeks-to ITHIOf'IA I Erilrean Lllar9tlon front CELI') na airports. Assaults in the past, EU'-Ganlral Command such as the June 1982 shooting of sabotage all Elf ·Aawlutionlry Counc:11 Eritrean Ublrltton ffOlll-,..,.., Ubaratlon the Israeli ambassador tO Britain, diplomatic efforts fon:411 (ELF·Plf) .. · have also been linked to Abu Ni­ ErltrMn Ptopie'I Ubaratlon front CEPlf) Ethlopien Democratic Union (EDU) dal. Three Abu Nidal terrorists aimed at renewing Ethiopian P9opie'I Revolutionary Pllrty (EPRP) Oromo National Ubar1tion Front CONU') were caught, tried, and received 1negotlatlons between Fl:Jilullr Uberation Forc:a1 (PU') SO-year sentences in connection Somali-Abo Ubarltlon front CSAl.f) the Arab states and Tiglw ~ Uber1tion Front (TPU') with the ambassador's shooting. WHtam Somali Uber1tton front (WSLf) The arrest of Abu Nidal mem­ Israel, viewing such OUfNU alllAU African l'Wty for Iha Liberation of Oulnaa Ind bers in London precipitated a Cape~ (Plirtido Afrlclno di ~1depand•11cla ,actions as di Guini I Cabo lillrde-PAIGC) rash of attacks against British ICINYA targets. Operating under the icapltulatlonlst. Mau Mau Northern frontier Dl1trlct Liberation front name Revolutionary Organization CNf'DU') of Socialist Moslems (ROSM), the Perhaps in accordance with the LllOTHO lluocho Congr- Pllrty CBCP) group assassinated British diplo­ arrangement, Abu Nidal sent a ~tho Ubaration Army CU.A) mats in India and Greece in 1984. number of terrorist squads to Eu­ U81111A Movement for Ju1tice In Africa (MOJA) The attacks continued in 1985 as rope, two of which were responsi­ A'ogleaaive Alliance of Uberia (PAL) the British Airways offices in ble for the Vienna and Rome Coordination of United Revolutionary Organiaa· tiona (CoordiNlci6n de OrganizacioMI Ravolu· both Spain and Rome were airport attacks. The surviving cionariu IJnidaa-CORU) OuBoia Club1 bombed. Once again using the gunman from the attacks was George Jackson Brigade name ROSM, the group kid­ quoted saying: "There are 300 Jawleh Defence League as Ku Kiwi Klan (KKK) napped a British journalist in Le­ of us, all devoted to· suicide ac­ May2McN-t banon. tions. We have support from Qad· National SociaU1t Whit• ~·· ii.rty CNSWPP) If other Western European dafi and maybe Syria." Libyan New Amarican Movement CNAM) N-Vtbrld Liberation Front (NWU') countries are not direct targets of financing, training, and provision October League Abu Nidal assaults, an increasing of safe haven in addition to lo­ Omaga7 number of them are being utilized gistical support will most likely OrganilltlOn ol Afro-American Unity as staging sites for operations. translate into further Abu Nidal ~~rPllrtv CongrM1 OI Second Rapubllc of Two-third's of Abu Nidal's almost European operations against a Malawi frledom Mo~t CMAFAEMO) Soc:ialiat League of Malawi (LESOMA) 20 attacks in 1985 happened in variety of targets. • MAU ..ITANIA Europe, according to the State Alliance for a Democratic Maurlllnla frM Man Movemenl Department. In 1981, a city coun­ Mauritanian Democratic Union selor involved in the Austrian Is· Wll.f°"91 front raeli lobby was murdered and fol· Yonah Altzandtr ir Dirttlor of tht l111ti· lowing this the C:Ongregation of tMlt for Studits in lnltrnalio11al Ttrror· irm, in lht Stolt Unirtr1it11 of Ntll' York, Vienna Synagogue was attacked. a11d Editor in rhitf of Terrorism: An In· Also, in Vienna, a bomb exploded temational Journal. next to the door of the apartment of the chief rabbi of Vienna in 1982. Two terrorists attacked Jews in the Central Synagogue in Rome that same year. In 1985, two hotels were bombed in Ath· ens and the assaults on the Rome

13 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

THE LIFE AND TIME.S OF. MUAMMAR AL·QADDAFI by John Rees and Martha C. Powers

ebha, a town of less than· Revolution in the classroom By hook or by crook 40,000 people deep in the Under the inspiration of Nas­ Turned down by Chinese Pre­ SFezzan desert, the geo­ ser's vision of a pan-Islamic em­ mier Chou En-lai, Qaddafi graphical heart of Libya, pro- ' pire, the young Qaddafi formed scoured the world to find the tech­ vided a genesis for Muammar al- 1 a revolutionary cell among his_ nicians and materials for an "Is­ Qaddafi's Green Revolution. ; classmates. Some of his Sebha lamic bomb." By 1981, two West It is conceivable that Sebha · high school classmates he lat­ German firms, Orbital Transport may also be Qaddafi's nemesis. er persuaded to follow ·military und Rakenten-Aktiengesellschaft It was in Sebha high school in ·careers in order to pface them­ (OTRAG) and Kraftwerkunion 1959 that the 15-year-old son selves in a position to take power. AG (KWU), had commenced oper­ of Abu Meniar and Aissha al­ These men became the core of ations in Sebha under the direc­ Qadaffi first heard Egypt's char­ Qaddafi's Free Officers movement tion of the Libyan military, to ismatic leader, Gamal Abdul Nas­ and the coup of September l, manufacture and test rockets. ser, on the radio program, wvoice 1969. . Other Western technicians are re­ of the Arabs," beamed from · The names of the other cell ported to be in Sebha to help Cairo. members, then of little signifi­ reach Qaddafi's goal of providing AB Colonel Qaddafi, now 44, cance, now are critical 'to an un­ Libya with the capacity to man­ said recently in an interview with derstanding of Qaddafi. They ufacture weapons-grade enriched Peter Enahoro of Africa N

14 SPECIAL EDITION~- 5 AUGUST . 1986

•io . &bdicate in favor of his desig­ good, if perhaps fundamentalist, nateci heir. After several post­ With hlndstght... tt ts Moslem; and concluded that this pcmements, Qaddafi's coup began ·apparent that meant that he therefore had to be at dawn on September l, 1969. It a good anti-Communist. was over quickly with little vi­ neither President olence and much bluff. Qaddafi ·Nixon nor National Mr. Nice Guy tells how he led the attack on the :Secu:rlty Advisor During this period, from the main Benghazi garrison from a coup to the first Soviet-Libyan Centurion tank-with no ammu­ i Henry Klssl.nger arms deal in 1974, Qaddafi pro­ nition! The garrison quickly sur­ 1 understood the vided a considerable amount of rendered. M All they asked was not corroboration that this was, in­ to be fired at from the tank," significance of deed, the case. In Qaddafi's early recounted Qaddafi. · Qaddafi's seizure of speeches, there was frequent crit­ Central to his success were the icism of the Soviet Union and three years that he and his form­ pawer... Qaddafl was - : communism. He denounced Mos­ er schoolmates from Sebha spent ·perceived as a cow's role in the lndo-Pakistan in Benghazi's military college, war of 1971, and sent Moslem from which he graduated in 1966; protector of w,.ttern Pakistan several squadrons of and the expertise in radio and ·Interests. Northrop F-5 fighter bombers. He signals intelligence that he ac- complained about the Soviet-Iraqi .. quired during a nine-month mili­ friendship treaty of 1972 and sup­ tary course in England. This ported Egypt's President Anwar made him aware of the central tionalism and to court favor with the populace. Sadat in his expulsion of the near­ importance of secure eommunica­ ly 18,000 Soviet "military advisers tiona cbannels among the plot­ Qaddafi imposed the Islamic Sharia-the laws of the Koran and experts" that same year. ters; and so Qaddafi developed -and strictly enforced the ban Only one year earlier, the gov­ codes for radio transmissions on alcohol. Street names were ernments of Libya and Egypt had among the Free Officers' Move­ changed into ; Christian cooperated in preventing a coup ment plotters who became the churches were closed and their by Sudanese Communists against Revolutionary Command Council crosses torn down; and the Italian that country's President Jaafer (RCC). and Jewish communities were ex­ Nimeiry. Qaddafi ordered his air With the advantage of hind­ pelled-Qaddafi's revenge for the force to force down in Libya a sight, it is apparant that neither period when Libya was an Italian British airliner carrying two of President Nixon nor National Se­ colony and for the 1967 humi­ the coup's leaders. He handed the curity Adviser Henry Kissinger liation of Nasser in the Six-Day plotters over to Nimeiry who had understood the significance of War. them hanged. Qaddafi's seizure of power in Lib­ Foreign banks were turned into These actions and policies of ya. The 25-year-old lieutenant Libyan stock companies; and not militant anticommunism resulted (who promptly promoted himself only was the sale of alcohol in his being termed an "ignorant to colonel) was regarded by the banned, but frivolous entertain­ anti-Soviet" by the Kremlin, and policymakers of the U.S. State ment, now termed "cultural de­ Soviet publications delivered Department during his first few pravity" in Tripoli's nightclubs many attacks on Libya. Not only years in power as an American and cabarets was ended. Indeed, did these attacks and actions by asset. This warmth towards Qad­ soon after the coup, Qaddafi, ac­ the Soviets keep Libya in active dafi continued despite his expul­ companied by a squad of mili­ commercial collaboration with the sion of British and American tary police, went to the Bowdler­ Western world, but also provided forces from Wheelus Airfield in ina nightclub. Pistol in hand, he "what amounted to CIA protec­ 1970. Qaddafi was perceived as a walked into the middle of the tion of Qaddafi's regime and per­ protector of Western interests by floor show and announced that son," according to John K. Cool­ continuing to pump large quanti­ the club was closed. Qaddafi's ey, author of Libyan Sandstorm ties of oil. dramatic gesture led at least one [Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Yet there were many signs that member of the intelligence com­ 1982). a visionary or fanatical element munity in Libya to speculate that Cooley, who served in the Mid­ was present in Qaddafi's charac­ the colonel had been using the dle East as a correspondent for ter. His dramatic raising of movie Casablanca, as his training the Christian Science Monitor, wages and living conditions was film. United Press International, NBC viewed as a sort of "populism" not But despite these excesses, /News, and ABC News, has de- revolutionary . "lslamici­ the State Department remained 1tailed a number of instances zation of Libya" under Qaddafi quiescent, accepting them as !where the CIA, sometimes joined was seen as an outgrowth of na- proof-positive that Qaddafi was a iby colleagues from the British

15 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, · plauded Sadat's expulsion of the Lover's spat also called Ml6), French SDECE, 18,000 Soviet experts and advi­ Qaddafi's visit to Moscow last and the Italian intelligence serv­ sors from Egypt. The Kremlin did fall was a complete failure for the ices, prevented Qaddafi's enemies not dwell on its loss, and intensi­ Libyans. First, the Soviets would from overthrowing his regime. fied attempts to find, create, or not agree to invest more money Within the Arab world, Qadda­ cultivate another friendly regime into the 880-megawatt nuclear fi was perceived, with excellent in North Africa. power plant being built on the reason, as the CIA's prime asset They judged that Libya made Gulf of Sirte, which Libya needs in North Africa. Apparently with· the best target despite Qaddaf- to meet its growing demands for in the CIA itself there were some i's early record of anticommun· electricity. Second, the Kremlin who believed that the "Brother ism and his promotion of strict rejected his attempt to barter oil Colonel" could be of use to Amer· application of Islamic law. Ap­ in lieu of cash, to pay for his arm~ ica. Interestingly, when he im· proaches were made regarding purchases (after all, the Soviets posed restrictions on the press, sales of Soviet arms. Qaddafi sent already accept 150,000 barrels of and his courts in 1972 began to his deputy, Major Jallud, who wis Libyan oil per day by way of the integrate Sharia laws into the se- then holding the post of prime Finnish state oil company Nes­ minister, to Moscow. · teoy ). Third, Qaddafi wanted but Jallud negotiated d deal with did not get, a mutual defense Apparently within the Soviets intended to give Libya treaty. In other words Qaddafi . the CIA Itself there an armory amounting to one bil· was informed that the "Brezhnev lion dollars. It included modem doctrine does not extend to the were some who Soviet MiG fighters, bombers, shores of Tripoli." believed that the surface-to-air missiles, and Qaddafi retaliated by refusing hundreds of tanks. Later that ·to conclude an agreement to give "'Brother Colonel" year, Qaddafi signed an addition­ the Soviet Black Sea Fleet Libyan could be of use to al arms agreement for· another harbor facilities. He also. snubbed America. two billion dollars in weapons General Secretary Mikhail Gor­ with the Soviets. The establish· bachev when Qaddafi and his en­ ment of formal diplomatic rela­ tourage (including his contingent cular legal system, these actions tions between Moscow and Tripoli of glamorous, miniskirted and were reported as being a part of followed quickly. By 1975, trade hooded female ) 'tailed his anti-Communist, pro-Moslem agreements had been signed. Qad· to arrive at a banquet at which grand design and created little or dafi was even able to conclude Moscow's foreign diplomatic corps no apprehension outside Libya. a pact under which the Soviet were present. The excuse offered In 1973, however, Western ap­ Union provided nuclear technolo­ to Gorbachev's chief of protocol prehension began to grow when gy for a research reactor and a . was that the motorcade had gone Qaddafi suspended the Libyan le­ nuclear power plant. to the wrong address. gal code, established political edu­ The courtship by the Soviet . Still, while Qaddafi and Gor· cation camps, created a nation· Union had paid off. Libya accept· ' bac~ev may bicker, the Libyan wide network of "Popular Com­ ed the first detachments of sever· : regime knows that it needs the mittees" (which replaced the al thousand military and tech· : Soviet Union to help ward off its former civil service), and armed nical advisers from the Soviet : overthrow (there have been at the entire country. Union, the Warsaw Pact coun· least a half dozen attempts on Now he was supreme, but he tries, and Cuba. . Qaddafi's life in the past two moved cautiously to consolidate By the late 1970s, Qaddafi had years) and to provide the weapon· his power. By 1977, he was ready become a very important Soviet ry and expertise to ful­ to change Libya's official name asset and ally, permitting the So­ fill Qaddafi's great ambitions. For to the Socialist People's Libyan viet Union to preposition tanks their part, the Soviet leaders un­ Arab Jamahiri'IJ(Jh-a word that and other weapons there, serv· derstand perfectly how much means "state of the masses." Un· ing as a refueling site for So­ weaker their position would be der the new governmental struc· viet transports headed for in the Mediterranean, the Middle ture, he remained the de facto Angola, and granting Moscow East, and Africa if they were to lose Libya. head of state-the general secre­ permission to establish electronic tary-and was addressed as the intelligence stations on the Medi· "Brother Colonel." terranean and deep in the desert. The Libyan scripture The direct Soviet relationship It is also obvious that the K.rem· Like many revolutionary vi· with Colonel Qaddafi dates to lin's leaders also have strong re­ sionaries with a utopian and to­ 1972, which was a watershed servations about embracing Qad· talitarian bent, Qaddafi produced year in the Middle East, and in dafi as an ally so closely that they a book outlining his vision. Qad­ da~'s version is less wordy than particular ~or . Qaddafi, .who ap- wou Id be committed to defending his regime absolutely. and is called the

16 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 Green Book. The first of the three Qaddafi persevered and in March Faction of West Germany, to the slim volumes appeared shortly af­ 1977 announced that the official Moro National Liberation Front ter Qaddafi seized power, and as name of the country was the So­ in the Philippines, South Pacific an effort to broaden his support ~a­ Kanak militants from French­ cialist People's Libyan Arab I among the Libyan masses while mahariya. His foreign embassies, ruled New Caledonia, Caribbean he continued to destroy the tra­ as such, were abolished and re­ revolutionary groups, and more ditional leadership. He also pro­ cast as "people's bureaus." recently, the Fatah Revolutionary posed arming the entire Libyan During the past decade, Qad­ Council led by Abu Nidal and the nation and abolishing the regular dafi's name has become inextric­ largely unknown Popular Front army-an indication that dissent , ably linked with international for the Liberation of Niger-a in the RCC worried him. terrorism. His commitment to savage band of nomadic Toureg Non-Libyan Arab critics have supporting terrorism has its un­ tribesmen. dismissed Qaddafi's precepts and derpinnings in Volume III of the It should be noted also that for slogans as "half-baked ideology Green Book. There, heavily influ­ generous applications of Libyan and romantic idealism, containing enced by Marx and Hegel, Qadda­ petrodollars, some notorious seasonings of Italian , Is­ fi set forth his view that all "na­ American mercenaries, including lam, socialism, misapplied sociolo­ tional liberation movements-all ex-CIA operatives like Frank Ter­ gy, and history." The Green Book, ethnic and religious- minorities pil and Edwin P. Wilson, went to -must be supported.agairuit 'co- work for Qaddafi in the 1970s. lonialism.'" · Qaddafi's American and British There, heavily mercenaries smuggled surveil­ influenced by Marx Terrorist spawn lance devices and military equip­ and Hegel, Qaddafi Qaddafi entered the interna­ ment to Tripoli, and became in­ tional terrorism arena through volved in training terrorists and setforth hts view that his support for the Palestinian manufacturing bombs and other .all "national Liberation Organization (PLO) sophisticated devices for Libya's and the individual fedayeen ter­ assassins. Many reports link this liberation rorist organizations that com- Terpil-Wilson network to the "hit­ ·movements-all . prised it. Qaddafi is believed to squads" that were dispatched in have directly financed and sup­ 1981 to kill President Reagan and :ethnic and religious ported some of Al Fatah's Black members of his cabinet. ·minorities-must be September activities, including Their failure did not diminish supporled against the 1972 . When Qaddafi's hatred of the United Yassir Arafat cut back on Black States. Indeed, it led to increased 'colonialism'." September operations, Qaddafi financing for violence-oriented recruited a number of Fatah­ groups in America, such as the Volume I, The Solution of tlui trained terrorists for hit teams Nation of (Black ), Problem of Democracy, attacks operating directly under the Li­ Republic of New Afrika (RNA), "false democracy" (the ones with byans, supervised by Major Jal­ and the American Indian Move­ elected parliaments and constitu­ lud. ment. tions, referenda, competing politi­ There is no doubt that Qaddafi Qaddafi understands that the cal parties, etc.) as "demagogic" initiated and fully supported the Western intelligence and security and asserts that the "most tyr­ December 1975 raid on the OPEC agencies must react to his threats annical dictatorships the world oil ministers meeting in Vienna, whether or not he intends to car­ has known have existed under the !that he paid the Soviet-trained ! ry out an action. His threats and shadow of parliaments." :Venezuelan terrorist Ilich Rami­ ·public statements can force air­ His system is essentially that .rez Sanchez ("Carlos the Jackal") line companies, corporations, and of an absolute dictator controlling :some $2 million for that attack, governments to spend billions for a mob formed into "people's com­ or that he rewarded "Carlos" with security measures. So long as he mittees" and "people's congress­ a villa in Libya. Likewise, Qadda­ occasionally sends out hit teams es." Even Qaddafi acknowledged fi became the primary supporter like those who carried out the that under his system, "the stron­ for 's polyglot kill­ slaughters at Rome and Vienna in ger part of society is the one that ers of the Popular Front for the December, his every word will be rules." The implementation of the Liberation of Palestine, who in­ heard carefully throughout the "people's committees" at every cluded in their ranks Arabs, La­ world. level of Libyan society by Qaddaf­ tin Americans, Japanese, and i's zealots caused enormous dis­ Germans. The Middle Eastern view ruptions. , To date, the record of Qaddafi's While to the West Qaddafi is ' 1 Objections to the revolutionary Ibacking of terrorists ranges from the "godfather of terrorism," to transformation of Libyan society the Irish Republican Army (IRA) most Arab and African leaders, were looked upon as treason. But and PLO, through the Red Army

17 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

and development projects that nuclear weapons with which he Qaddafi understands provide employment. The physical sought to impose his domination living standards of the average over North Africa and the Middle that the Western Libyan have improved dramati­ East, his meeting with nemesis intelligence and cally at the same time that their would be likely to be sudden and traditional Islamic culture has swift.• security agencies come under attack from Qaddafi's must react to his "Green Revolution," and even as threats whether or the restricted political freedoms as they enjoyed under King Idris John Rte& a11d Martha Powtra art arith not he Intends to were eradicated by Qaddafi's to­ Mid-Atla11tit Rrs,.arth AIB0tiatl's, pub· talitarianism. lishl'TB of Early Warning. carry out an action. Recently, a Qaddafi-licensed demonstration in Tripoli ended he has been seen as a consum· with the public burning of money mate and inveterate meddler in -which some believe may lead to their- internal affairs. His repeat· the implementation of l1- "cashless ed calls for the overthrow of these society" as proposed iii the Green leaders have added to the political Book. Furthermore, in Tripoli and uncertainty of Africa (from Al­ eight other cities, land registry geria, , Mali, and Tunisia offices have been attacked by through Niger, Chad, and Egypt, mobs led by the revolutionary .to Nigeria. , Sudan and committees, who burned all files on the Arabian penninsula, Sau­ relating to land ownership and di Arabia and the Gulf states. tenure. But in the recent past, Qad­ Most observers believe that af· . dafi's audacity in confronting the ter 16 years of Qaddafi's rule, Western powers and in challeng· opposition to the abolition of ing the United States has revital· money, land ownership, and ten­ ized Islamic and African unity ure would be uncoordinated and . with the Libyan Jamahiriyah. ineffective. During January, Fez, Mor­ Anti-Qaddafi factions in the occo's traditional center for Is­ military have surfaced several lamic culture, hosted two gather­ times during unsuccessful coup ings of the foreign ministers of attempts. The most recent was in the 35 members of the Organiza­ November 1985, when one of Qad­ tion of Islamic Conference (OIC), dafi's cousins, Colonel Hassan Ish· joined by delegations from ten kal, a highly trusted military aide African states including Nigeria. who commanded the crucial cen· These countries closed ranks with tral region headquartered in the Libya to deliver stinging denun­ coastal town of Sirte, was gunned ciations of the United States for down when he tried to confront the economic embargo against his cousin in his Bab-al Aziziya Libya declared following massa· barracks headquarters. Some say cres by the Abu Nidal group at that Qaddafi himself did the kill­ the international airports in Vien· ing. The mortally wounded Ishkal na and Rome. Abu Nidal's attacks was taken to a hospital where he had been directly subsidized and died. No official notice was taken supported by Libya. of his funeral, although the offi­ This "boomerang effect" of the cial story circulated said he died U.S. sanctions has established a in a traffic accident. Some Libyan basis for the resurgence of pan­ opposition groups have claimed Arabism and pan- which that Ishkal was the leader of has been a Qaddafi goal all of his a pro-U.S. cabal in the Libyan life. army, and linked his death to Qaddafi is generally very popu­ a Washington Post story which lar with Libyans living in their "leaked a reported CIA plot to own country. He has taken pains destabilize Qaddafi's regime." to spend some of his oil wealth on Qaddafi could rule for another scores of housing projects, clinics, 30 years, but should his boyhood elementary and technical schools, home of Sebha become a nest of

18 TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS (Listed by hoet nation I

IJRYA •l-'A1i1i,,,.Camp(tM>Utho!Tripoli) al-Jada'im Camp al·"""hAICampal-Ma'hadCamp al-Mani Campf•ut o!Tobruql al-Sa'iqa Camp al-Shahid M1111arielCamp al-Takbali Camp I in Tripoli I ·al-Tamimi Camp f Eut ol [)p1'11AJ 4ouaou Camp fin nortt..m CMdl April 7Camp(ooolh o!Tripoli) Bir al-Ghan•m Camp Iabout 50 mileo SW o!Tripoli I Ghwmn Camp( at Ghada,,,.. on the ... 1.. n bonl#rl G ... n MountainCampfinCy,..nai<-al ~! ti> J•KhbubCamp(at tho JaralJubO...io """• E11Yptl td Junnan Camp: IA'"" lff'OUP' u u,. lo"'t!Oinc. <\\t). tlJ Khumt1 Camp(at th# Khuma Oii ti,. Tripolitanian .....,.II 0 KulraCamp(at tho Kulnouiain South Ea.I Libya I H

~fa'•arRa'•TalalCamp SOt:THHllO:N ~ Haul MukallAb tlJ Al-Gh•idah t:I Dh•li ·.. H Naquh . 8 Shuqn IH St..ikb Othmaa i.· Ghaida o ~ - '.• I~ z \0 Lah#j Adrn , ; I SYRIA ... Hamon. ., I U:BASON .·.. Tyre VI Damur S.irut q -, El Bada•i ~ Nahrel Bared ··.1·'·"' G"l Baalb#k c IR.\Q ti> Ba1hdad 8 .\Wt:RIA Bi Ida ~ Soumma \0 Bt:U:ARIA (X) Ct:BA ASGOLA °' CH'Rl'S 'llOZA.'llRIQl'E SICAR.\GGA \U."fN.\'11 SORTH KORI':,\ IR.\N h ,\" SORTHYE'llt:N SO\'ll"flNION TMhk•nl Batum OdPsaa B•ku Simloropol Tb. Lrnin ln•lilutolMoocowl Patrice Lumumba Fri#ndiihip Uniftnlity SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 JIHAD: NO EXCUSE FOR TERRORISM TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE . by William F. Willoughby lllAN Ar•y• Az8deg•n ~nt lam, Armed Movement for the Uber•tlon of lr•n s the growing frustrations even in the days of its rapid Ar•b Popular Movement of Arebiet•n over international terror­ expansion out of Arabia and into Baluchistan Uberation Front IBLF) ism continue, particularly Northern Africa and parts of Eu­ Beluchiatan l'lloplea' Oemocr•tic ()rgllniution A IBPOO) · where it is known that Palestini­ .rope and Asia, have really ever Beluch Pnh Merg11 IBeluch ~t- Force) · Black v.dnelday Brigade ans and other Arabs are involved, seen it as pretense for armed Behai Faith it is tempting for the extempor­ coercion against people who did Beluchi Autonomist Movement Bahai Community aneous analyst to attribute this not embrace the beliefs of Islam. Forghlln IKOr•n) kind of terrorism's genesis to the In the Koran (IX, 5), God com­ ForQan HezbOll•h l,..rty ol God) Moslem concept of jihad, or what manded the believer's to !ij)read Liberation Army (llA) Iran Uber•tion Movement (ILM) is too facilely termed a "holy His Word and estab}ish His law talamic Ar•b Front for the Liber•tion of Belu· war."' and justice over the world. Kad­ chistan (IAFLB) •. I . lr•n1an National Front (INF) This is a dangerous mistake duri said that in dealing with peo­ lsl8mic Jihad that could lead to· trouble in ples other than the People of the Kurdish Oemocr•tic ,..ny Ol ll'lln IKDPI) Kurdish Sunni Moslem Movement trying to combat terrorism. Book (Jews, Christians and others Komaleh At an Islamic conference last ·who live by holy scriptures), the Kurdish Junni Mushm Movement Liberation Front ol South Ar•bistan year in Teheran, some Iranian . world was divided into two class­ Nattonal Front (NF) Nation81 Front of the lr8nien People (NFIP) scholars advanced a concept of ' es: the dar al-Islam and the dar National Democratic Front (NOF) jihad, based, wisely, on broad . al-Harb. Nation81 Council ol Resiat•nce for liberty •nd Independence INCR) Moslem teachings rather than the The dar al-Islam is the house National Resistance Movement Shi'ite teachings generally ad­ · of believers where God's law and Nationalist end Revolutionary Front of lr•n Organiution of Marxist Leninist& hered to in Iran, to justify Iran's justice are given practical expres­ 1'9opte'1 Saprificers Paople'e Crusaders war against fellow Moslems in sion in all aspects of life. The dar People's Fighters Iraq. al-Harb, on the other hand, are People's Piny Pers Group Dr. Majid Khadduri of Wash­ people believed by Moslems to be People'a Fed8yeen (Fedayeen-e-Kh81Q) ington, D.C., a much-respected Is­ "in a state of nature," that is, 1'9opte'a Muiahideen ( MujahiO&en-e-K hslQ) (Struggle) lamic scholar connected with the unbelievers. These people were F'Opular Front for the Liber•tion ol Ahvaz (Jeb­ hat Tahrir Ahvaz I Johns Hopkins University Wash­ the objects of jihad. · Razmandegan (Figtoters1 ington Center, said . that when Insofar as Moslems believe Piny of Equality Group ol the Martyr Moslems are involved in terrorist they are under mandate to extend Arab Political and Cuttur•I Organization (APCO) acts, particularly those against God's law and justice to all the · Turkoman Autonomista Tudeh (,..rt)' of the M•aeea1 unarmed, innocent civilians, such earth, every individual Moslem is . Union of.fornmuniats individuals are operating outside ; under this obligation. It differs the sanctions of the Moslem faith. very little in principle or in prac­ wise, the Moslem concept of jihad, Jihad, he said, neither histori­ : tice from the mandate put upon though couched in the language cally nor contemporarily, con­ Christians by Jesus, when, after of war, in modem times, is not dones actions such as those which the Resurrection, He command­ conceived of as engaging in a war killed innocent people at the Vien­ ed the remaining eleven apostles of aggression to accomplish God's na and Rome airports. (Matt. 28:18-20): "All power is will on the earth. They are the acts of individuals · given unto me in heaven and in Yet, like the Christian's evan­ acting contrary to the precepts of 'earth. Go ye therefore, and teach gelical duty, it is a warfare of their religion, he said. all nations, baptizing them in the sorts, but quite different from a Khadduri, in his book TM Is­ name of the Father, and of the physical sense of warfare. In the lamic Conception of Justice, pub­ Son, and of the Holy Ghost Koran (II, 257), Dr. Khadduri lished by the John Hopkins Uni­ -teaching them to observe all stresses, versity Press, says that the jihad, things whatsoever I have com· What happened in expanding a to which many antagonists of the manded you .... " particular Moslem state, howev­ Moslem nations appeal, is indeed Notwithstanding the vicissi­ er, was a different matter, and it "the just war of Islam" which ev­ tudes of Church history, this com­ dealt with administering Pax Is· ery Moslem is obliged to "fight." mand is not ordinarily interpreted lamica, or relations between Mos­ Although it is described in this as one to wage war or even to use lem and non-Moslem communities manner, very few teacher~ of Is- coercion to make converts. Like- so order could be regulated via

20 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

special treaties and agreements rial sense, hence, ruling out ter· By Moslem legal theory, Khad­ based on canon law and stan­ rorism, as much as it means "ex­ duri explained, "the state of war dards of justice of each communi­ ertion," "effort" or "attempt." In between the da.r al·lslam and the ty tolerated by Pax lslamica. This other words, in order to fulfill the da.r al Harb would come to (its) primarily related to the gover­ obligations upon the individual to end when the public order of the nance of personal matters. function as God's emissary in pur­ latter is superseded by the form­ That was the arrangement for suing the path of right and jus­ er." This would mean that jihad's those not out of harmony with the tice, one must not necessarily lit­ objectives would have been ac­ sense of God's law and justice as erally fight, but he must make an complished, hence no need for the .:.;1.,,,1 Moslems viewed it. Such tolerated honest attempt at fulfilling his ,...... ' peoples could hold to their own obligation. The objective was not as easy .creeds and laws of conduct by Pure and simple, as viewed by to attain as was anticipated, and paying a poll tax called the jizya Khadduri, "the jihad may be de­ eventually the believers became to the Moslem state. fined as a religious and legal duty more accustomed to a state of Not so the "world" surrounding . which must be fulfilled by eaeh "dormant jihad" than to a state of da.r al-Islam, namely the da.r al­ believer either by the heart and hostility. Even though a state of Harb. This was considered, under tongue in combatting evil and . war existed and the conditions the doctrine of jihad, "the territo­ spreading the Word of God •. or by could not be fully established, con­ ry of war." the hand and the S)Vord in the tacts between Moslems and non­ This territory of war, Dr. sense of participation in fighting." Moslems, on the personal and of­ . Khadduri said, was the object, not Two early Islamic scholars, . ficial levels, were nonetheless the subject, of Islam. "It was the Abu Hanifa (died 150 A.H.n68 ·conducted by peaceful means. duty of the imam, head of the A.D.) and Shaybani (died 189 Too, there is a curious escape Islamic state, to extend the valid­ A.HJ804 A.D.) stressed that toler­ mechanism concerning jihad from ity of its law and justice to the ance should be shown to unbeliev­ the Koran itself, acknowlediing unbelievers at the earliest possi­ ers, and they advised the imam to the proper use of common sense. ble moment." Numerous accomo­ wage war only when the inhabi· The duty of the jihad was com­ dations were afforded these ob­ tants of da.r al-Harb came into manded by God, Koran ( LXI, jects of Islam. conflict with Islam. 10-13), and assures its martyrs He said the dar al-Islam, or Slightly later, Shafi'i (died 204 instant paradise, but its execution community of believen, "waa in A.H.1820 A.D.) formulated the doc· in the more virulent methods ; theory neither at peace nor neces· trine, according to Khadduri, that was binding only when there waa sarlly in permanent hostility with the jihad had for its intent the streneth enough among the com­ the dar al·Harb, but In a condition waging of war on unbelievers for munity of believen to attempt It which might be described as a their disbelief and not only when Koran (U, 233). 'state of war,' to use modem ter­ they entered into conflict with the Thus, It was the onslaught of minology, because the ultimate Islamic state. Under that concept, the Christian Crusaders and of objective of Islam waa to estab­ the distinction between a defen· the Mongols that allowed the lish peace and justice with com­ sive war and an offensive war jurist-theologian Ibn Taymlya, as munities which acknowledged the became confused. Khaddurl says it, ito make) con· Islamic public order." In ·this evolution (some would cessions to reality by reinterpret­ The instrument, he said, see it as a devolution) of the na· ing the jihad to mean waring a through which Islam sought to ture of the jihad, fighting against defensive war qainst unbelleven achieve Its objectives was the ji­ the unbeliever because of his whenever they threatened Islam." had. Islam, contrary to popular disbelief was enjoined "per­ He said that unbelievers who notions often perpetuated by the manently until the end of time." made no attempt to encroach film industry, prohibited all kinds Another doctrine, that of the upon Islam'a domain were not the of warfare except in the form of authority of the imamate, as well objective of Islam, "nor should the jihad, itself not really a war as tenets of the Shi'ite Moslems, law and religion be imposed upon in the physical sense unless defen­ held that this kind of fighting had them by force." Those same types, sively forced to become that. to be carried out even if the imam however, who consciously took Khadduri said the jihad, were in error. the offensive against dar al­ "though often described as a holy Despite this interpretation, this Islam, "would be in an entirely dif­ war, did not necessarily call for did not always mean that the ferent position." fighting, even though a state faithful went to war. As to the poesibility of some­ of war existed between the two Time and existing reality were one, or some Moslem group, today da.rs ... since Islam's ultimate goals on the side of tempering a belli­ invoking the rubrics of jihad as might be achieved by peaceful as cose application of jihad, although their defense of terrorism, this well as by violent means." there have been regional tenden­ might happen, but it would be Jihad, Islamic scholars explain, cies toward aggressiveness based without the sanction of Moslem does not mean "war" in the mate- on it. leadership,

21 SPECIAL EDITION 5 AUGUST 1986

None of the religious and polit­ his Palestinian people are in a ical leaders, however, can alto­ struggle against that nation, are gether stop individual terrorists another matter, based on politi· or terrorist groups, no matter un­ ·cal, more than religious, consider­ der what pretense they say they ations. are terrorists. In the current As for branding what is going state of affairs in Islam, such on in the Middle East between the terrorists, if they tried to use the PLO and Israel as exactly the modem concept of jihad as their same thing as happened at the portfolio, clearly would be doing a Vienna and Rome airports, it disservice to Islam, and by infer­ hardly seems to fit, even though, ence, to the God whose commands unfortunately, the same results they profess to obey. occur. In fact, no matter what his In the Palestinian situation, re­ actions against Israel, one should ligion °plays no real part in take at face value Palestinian the motivation. The Palestini­ Liberation Organization Presi­ ans, most of them Moslems and dent Yasser Arafat's. condemna­ Christians, do not fight because of tion of all terrorism. This condem­ some religious doctrine. They do nation seems to stem from deeply not keep themselves in a state of held and nearly inviolable Moslem hostility toward Israel because precepts. most Israelis are Jews, but for On November 4 last year in hurts that go deeper than that. Cairo, he reiterated in fact and in The Israelis react accordingly. principle what the PLO declared Both seek to survive honorably, 11 years earlier in the United Na­ but haven't yet found the way to tions, "to condemn all terrorism." do it. In Cairo, with the blessing of Much of international terror· ism seems to be tied to that issue "Reltglon. .. was and between the Palestinians and Is­ stUl Is to be carried rael, ·whether it happens in Tel­ Aviv or Beirut or Rome. out by peaceful It would appear that one might means, as there better read between the lines of what Mr. Arafat has said con· should be no cerning terrorism and take him compulsion In the at his word. It clearly would be -perhaps not in earlier days of spread ofthe Word of Islam-unwise for the American God." government or any other to oper· ate on the notion that the teach· ings of Islam are the instigators the Moslem world's most signif• of terrorism. icant political leader, Egyptian By no means should the Mos· President Hosni Mubarak, Mr. lem teachings on jiJuJd be used as Arafat said, "The PLO denounces the scapegoat. To do ~ would and condemns all terrorist acts, only exacerbate the situation and whether those involving countries further alienate the Moslem na­ or by persons or groups, against tions-unnecessarily. • unarmed·innocent civilians in any place." William F. Willoughbv cover1d the religio· political scene in Washington and around Mr. Arafat's declarations the world /or a quarter of a cent11rv, sert1· against terrorism, whether they ing as Washington burea11 chief of Reli· are clearly from himself or have gious News Sert1iee, religion newa editor been pressed upon him by other and columnist /or The Waahinirton Star, religion news editor and Moslem political and religious columnist /or The Washington Times. Ht leaders, seems to illustrate that currentlv is p11blisher of Religion Today. point. They are consonant with current Moslem teaching. Acts against Israel, insofar as

22 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 CASTRO'S CUBA: CONDUIT TO GLOBAL TERRORISM by L. Francis Bouchey nternational terrorism ranks The Tricontinental Conference ence, for instance, referred to among the biggest news was called not to initiate subver­ American imperialism as the "irh· I stories of this decade. New sive operations but to weave to­ placable enemy of all peoples of accounts of terrorist bombings, gether a network of terrorist and the world" and called for "revolu­ kidnappings, or hijackings fea­ guerrilla groups in order to in­ tionary violence" to oppose it. The ture prominently· in the news crease the level of violence resolution further charged that daily. against the United States and "the United States is behind every Much of the terrorism perpe­ its allies. Significantly,. the reso- aggressive action committed by trated in the world today aims to . lutions adopted at the.conference other imperialists," principally, · support the geopolitical goals of called for collaboratiqn not ·only the nations of Western Europe . the Soviet Union and its allies. . between socialist countries and In short, revolution anywhere .. . The United States and its allies in "national liberation movements" was defined as violence against this hemisphere have been among but also between "democratic the United States and its allies. the principal targets of this inter­ workers and student movements" Fidel Castro did not always national terrorist network. In or· in Western Europe and North show the same degree of subservi­ der to make more effective their America, especially those formed ence to Soviet direction as he does assault on civil order and stability to oppose U.S. involvement in the i today; for that reason, he has in the West, Communist terror . :been an exceptionally effective groups act in concert. The Cuban Thus began the collaboration I. bridge and intermediary between government, acting at the behest and interaction of the orthodox .Moscow and the more innocent of Moscow, has been instrumen· Communists with the eclectic new Iand idealistic Left. tal in forming and sustaining this leftists who typically harbored i In fact, the Cuban Communist terrorist network from its incep­ anti-Soviet sentiments and I Party played no important part tion, twenty years ago, to the viewed themselves as untainted I in his anti-Batista revolution and, present day. by Stalinism. !on occasion, he showed consid­ With this conference, the So­ . erable independence from Soviet A fateful meeting viet Union, which sent the largest policy until 1968. He seized the The new strategy for terrorism delegation, ended its policy of re­ initiative, for instance, in allow­ emerged at a gathering in Hav­ lying on national Communist par­ ing Che Guevara to start guerril­ ana in 1966. During the first two ties around the world and turned la war in Bolivia, from which he weeks of that fateful year, 513 instead to "national liberation hoped to revolutionize all of South delegates representing 83 subver­ movements," that is, to the men America. sive organizations assembled for with the guns. Castro was even inclined to cri­ the First Conference for Afro­ Conveniently disregarding the ticize the Soviets publicly, and he Asian-Latin American People's official Soviet policy of "peaceful took occasion to act against Cu­ Solidarity in order to plan and coexistence," Soviet chief delegate ban Communists who wanted proclaim "a global revolutionary Sharof Rashidov promised "all­ their country to be unreservedly strategy to counter the global around assistance to the unifica­ pro-Soviet. As a consequence, the strategy of American imperi­ tion of the anti-imperialist forces Soviets twice tried to engineer alism." of the three continents in 'order to Castro's overthrow. Then, in the This meeting, which came to be provide greater impetus to our spring of 1968, they cut off the known as the Tricontinental Con· common struggle against imperi­ .flow of Soviet oil to Cuba and ference, heralded all-out guerrilla alism, colonialism, and neocoloni· curtailed shipments of other and terrorist warfare. The plan alism-led by the U.S. capital­ ,goods and materials needed by formulated by the gathering ad­ ists." Cuban industry. With the Soviets vocated a joint strategy of vio- . The greatest success of the Cu­ holding these goods hostage, Cas­ lence by terrorists in the in- · bans and the Russians at the con­ tro was forced to surrender Cu­ dustrialized West coupled with ference was the passage of resolu­ ba's independent foreign policy guerrilla wars in the third world. tions damning the United States stance. The ultimate goal: to surround as the main enemy of Third In 1969, the Cuban General the Free World nations with hos- . World liberation movements. The Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) tile Communist regimes .. · ~ I ·general resolution of the confer- was put under the direct com-

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SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

mand of the Soviet Union, hence­ 'l'ERRORIS'f' GROUPS WORLDWIDE IMZIL 1-u...dl forward to act as the Spanish­ CUM Group1 of Elavtn CGrupoa dt Onza-0-11) Abdllla National LllaratlnQ Action I~ Ubertadora speaking branch of the KGB. Alpha ee oNacioMl-ALNI Anti-Ce•tro Commando Hltional Ubaration eo.i-nc1o (Comando da Having accepted Soviet control, AntK:ommunl•t Colllmando8 ' Utlart~ Nacional-COUNAI Castro refocused Cuba's resources Brigad8 2506 ,,..tlonll Rewalutionary Movement {Movlmanto Condor !Nadonalillt1 RavolucioMrlo-MNRJ to assaulting U.S. interests in a Coor!ltnation of Unll9d Aevolutionary Organiza· f'MMnl LM9Uff {ligal Camponeaa1) fashion totally consistent with the Ilona ICORUJ Popular Action l~o l'l:>pular-AP) Cuba Action ~ry Movement 8 October IMovlman· tricontinental formula. Occasion­ Cuba Action Commando• to RaYOlucionario do Outubr1 8-MR·8) Cuban Anti-<:ommuniat Leegue Ravolutlonuy Popular \langu1rd C\languarcla ally, these assaults took the Cuban C_. Movement Popular ReVOluelonliria-VPR) form of direct subversive efforts Cuban Ubefation Front v.l)rkar1' floliticl lf'blittca Ollar•ril-POLOP) Cuban National Ulleration Front IFLNCI CHiii against the United States. c:uti.n Power Cal PQd8r Cubanol Fathartlnd and Ubarty I Patrill y Ullar1acll In the 1980 Mariel boatlift, Cuban Power 711 MoY-nt ol the Revolutionary Lett IMovlmlan· Cuban ,.._talion In Ellla to de la lrQUiarda Ra¥olucionaria-MIRI for instance, many intelligence Cuban Rftolutionllry Dlractorllta Peoola'• Organillld \languard l\languardia Or­ agents infiltrated the United Cuban Rewalutionllry Organization ganized• del Pueblo-YOPJ Cuban 'l'bulh Group White Guard !Guardia Blanca) States, along with thousands of International Sacral RavoMlonery United Calla ·eOLOMllA hardened criminals, mental pa­ JCN laxpenaion unknownl o\pril 19 Mov•ment {Movimiento 19 Abril Latin American Anti-Communiet Almy -M-191 tients, homosexuals, and legi­ Movement of Cuban Juatice • ""'*' Aavalutionary "-of Colombia CFuar­ MOV811*1t of Iha Sftanth IM·71 za1 ArmaclH ReYOM:ionariH Cle Cotombil timate refugees. He also promot­ National lntegr•tion Front {FIN; tub.n Nation- -FARC) ed direct destabilization of the ahat Fronll · CommuniSt Pllrty of Colombi1 M1rxi8t·lenini1t Omega 7 CPllrticlo Comuniata Cle Colombia Muxi1t1· United States through his plans Pedro Uli8 Balta! Comlll8n Leniniata-PPC-Mll to incite racial violence between l'9clro Ruiz Bolero C-..ndoa GrouP of Revotutlonary CclfnrNncloa--Oparetion PtaQIMti8IH o\rgernlro Gabaldon . blacks and Cuban Americans in Scorpion lal Alacran I lnclapandent Ravotutionary '11br11919' Movement Florida and through his narcotics 5-111 Front of Eacambray I Movimianto Obraro ~ldapanclianta y Ravotu· Sacral Anti-Castro Cut.n Almy cionlrio-MOIRI trafficking schemes. ' secret Cuban~nt lnvlllble Onaa Sacral Hand Organization i Military UIMr1tion Front of Cclombla Moreover, in 1970, the Cuban . 8acrat OrganiZation Zaro Movement of Iha 19th IM·181 government established within 1 'l'ou/lll Cubana ~tional Ubaration Armed Forcn Voutha ol Iha Star National L.lbar1tion Almy IE~ d8 Ubara· the DGI a center for the purpose LAT1•AM81HCA ciOrl Naclon1l-ELN) of planning sabotage and espion­ AllGINTINA Paople'I Ravotution1ry Army•Z1ro Paint Argentine Ant1-communt1t Alllanca IAll1n11 An· l'Opular llbaratlon Army tEl'rclto Plilllullr dt age missions in the United States tlcomuniall Atvantlna-MAI UbaraciOn-EPLI to Aml8d For1:91 of Uberation IF11trbt1' Sall·Dalance Movement IMovimlento Paople'I Guerrlla Almy IEl'rclto Guerrlllaro dll de Aulodelan .. Obrar1-MA01 FBI arrested three such dip­ Plleblo-EGPI 'tlbrlllre', 8tud8nta' Ind P9aaant1' ~t lomats at Cuba's UN mission and Paopfe'I Ra.o!utionary Army 1Ei6fctto Aavolu· 1Mo¥lmilnto cla Obraro1, Elludlant11 y C.mpe­ olonarlo dal ""9bio-ERP) linol-MOECI seized exploeives which the Cu· RICI lrlgadn of W:lrkar Power llrlOldH RojH C08TAltlCA 4111 Podar Obraro-BRPOI Rftolutlonery Com!Mndo1 of lolldarlty bans planned to use for blowin1 IOLIYIA Robtrto S.ntuc:ho RIYOlutionllry Group up sections of New York's subway llollYllln Revdutlonlry '11brtta11' 1'9rty {l'lrtlclo DOMINICAN ll"UILIC Rtvotuclon.,lo cla Trabaj1dorH 8ollvl1no1 Dominican flopul1r M-nt IMovlmtanto ll'llp­ system. The list pa on and on. -PRTBJ , ular Domlnlcano-MPDJ Even before 1970, the DGI pro­ Movamant of 1111 Revolutionary Left I Movlman­ . ~t ol ttlt RtllOlution1ry Lilt (Mo¥1mian· to da la lzquierda RaYOlucionlrl1-MIR) 'lo da 11 llQularda Rtvotucionarla-MIR) vided tralnin1 and support for National liberation Army IEJ'rclto da Ubafl· Rt'IOlutlonary ~vamant I 4 June I Movlmlanto auerrllla operations in places * NICional-ElN) ' R~ario 14d8Junlo-MR·141 IRAZIL ll1nH1riln N1tion11 Liberation Movement {Movl· where Cuba saw no interests of Aml8d RIVOIUtlonary Yanguerd IYanouardl Ar· mlarlto d8 Ubar1c10n Ntclonal de lol Trlnltarloa her own. For instance, Cuban .. madl Ravoluoionaria-VARJ -MLNTJ . lrazllian Ravolutionlry Commun11t 1'9rty I 1'9r­ Twelfth of J1nu1ry llbar1tl0n MDYamant agents have trained auerrlllas of tldo Comunl1ta 8r11llalro Ravoluclon•rio Unltacl Anti·Raaltctlon Command ·-PCBRI HAITI both the IRA and the Front de Cornmunlat ,..rty ol lruN !Partido Comunlata CoalltlOn ol N1tlonal llbar1t1on lrigad8a Liberation Quebecois (FLQ). Al· i do 8ralll-PCdoBI ·Haitian Coahtlon though the FLQ is now quiescent, Cuba continues to maintain sup-. ! failed, due to counterattacks led man combined National Director­ port liaison with the IRA through by the United States. But, in the ate. Cuba provided this new San­ British Communists and DGI per-: mid· 1970&, when President Jim· dinista Front with the · weapons, sonnel in Cuba's embassy in U>n- my Carter began allowing United 1 military advice, and diplomatic don. .. States defense capabilities to de­ support necessary for overthrow· Latin America and Africa are, ' cline, the Tricontinentals unifica­ ing the Somoza regime and cap­ however, more often the objects · tions scored a spectacular suc­ turing control of the Nicaraguan of Castro's attention. In the 1960s - cess. In 1979, Castro succeeded revolution. and early 1970s, Castroite insur- , in unifying the three Nicaraguan The Sandinista leadership had, gencies in these areas .. usually '. Sandinista factions into one nine- of course, been in Havana for 24 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 the Tricontinental Conference 13 talitarianism with all power in compelled to take primary repon­ years before and many times af. the hands of a new elite which sibility for counterinsurgency op­ ter. Since the revolution, the San· would rule in . the name of the erations in 1975. Formerly, this dinista regime has served as a Chilean people. .task had belonged to the police. clearinghouse for Cuban, PLO, Li· One instrument for the imposi· The Arned Kuberatuib Fircesm byan, and Soviet aid to terrorists tion of this socialist totalitarian­ (FAL) was yet another pro-Cuban and guerrillas throughout Latin ism was the Movement of the terrorist organization sowing so­ America. Three thousand Cu­ Revolutionary Left (MIR). Orga­ cial disorder in . Argentina. Al· · ban troops and countless other nized by Chilean Communists in though it is hard to classify ideo­ Eastern-bloc advisors now help to 1965, the MIR supported Allende logically, the F AL was an urban defend and supervise the Sandi· but did not officially form part of guerrilla group with clear Marx­ nista regime against the Nicara· his government after he came to ist tendencies. To the outsider, all guan people. power in 1970. Rather, the Miris· the various factions and sects of tas, who did so much to destabil· communism tend to remain sim· Taking orders from Moscow ize Chilean democracy through. ply Communist. But from the in­ Although Castro might have in· their terrorist activities, served side the nuances appear as impor­ tended the Tricontinental Confer· as his storm troopers his"Marxist· tant differences. ence to be a means for gaining Leninist Brownshirts ' after. he Founded in 1970, the Trot­ international influence independ­ came to power. Havana has al­ skyite People's Revolutionary ent from the Kremlin, by 1968 he ways been a major source of the Army was an important Argen­ had lost all remnants of effective MIR's ideological inspiration, and tine terrorist group with far­ Cuban sovereignty and regional has provided arms and training to flung international connections leadership to the Soviet Union. MIR revolutionaries. -for instance, with the Basque Cuba now follows Soviet direc· ETA. The alliances that the ERP tions; this is a grave threat to Argentina op the brink entered with other pro-Cuba freedom and democracy in Cen­ A number of pro-Cuban Com· groups suggest a picture of Hav­ tral and South America. Indeed, munist groups were active in Ar­ ana and, by extension, Moscow, Cuba and Nicaragua act as gentina immediately before and joining hands with these Argen­ agents provocateurs for their So­ during Juan Peron's return to the tine Trotskyites for revolutionary viet masters throughout the re­ · presidency in 1973, and in the purposes. The ERP worked close­ gion. Castro has declared repeat· period following his death until ly with the Tupamaro movement edly that he will try to overthrow the military took control to stave in Uruguay, and in February 1974 any Latin American government off collapse in early 1976. it allied with the MIR of Chile, the that follows a foreign policy dif· Among the most significant Tupamaros, and the ELN of Boli­ ferent from his own. and dangerous terrorist groups of via, all of which have close ties His foreign policy record de­ the political Left was the Revolu­ with Havana. The joint program monstrates his continual determi­ tionary Armed Forces (FAR), a of these terrorist groups calls for nation to accomplish this. Cuban-oriented body that merged all the peoples of Latin America First, Cuba provided many in late 1973 with the larger and to "join actively in the revolution­ arms and soldiers to Guevara's stronger Montoneros. The FAR· ary struggle against imperialism National Liberation Army (ELN) Montonero alliance attempted that is already taking place in our guerrillas in Bolivia. Ultimately, with mixed success to persuade continent under the flag and ex­ Guevara's plans for the victory of official Peronist youth organiza· ample of Che Guevara." a rural-based guerrilla movement tions of the need for "popular over superior conventional forces war," that is, assassinations, Attacking Uruguay's prosperous failed, partly because the KGB •bombings, and sabotage. democracy torpedoed it. The ELN also lost The Cuban-allied Montonero The terrorist group with which because Guevara and it failed to movement was one of the main Cuba has had the Closest ties is win civilian support and to build factors which contributed to Ar· probably the Tupamaros of Urug­ the urban component that is es­ gentina's instability. It began to uay. In the early 1970s, three sential for any successful guerril-. ·concentrate its attacks on urban thousand Tupamaro rebels suc­ la action. centers in early 1975. Increasing ceeded in destroying the free, Cuba then inspired Cuban Com­ .cooperation between the Montone­ democratic, and socially advanced munist movements in South ros and the Peoples Revolutionary society of Uruguay, one of the America's Southern Cone, notably Army (ERP)-which began as an smallest, but most prosperous of in Chile. Although many analysts urban guerrilla movement but an­ the Latin American nations. classify the "Popular Unity" re­ nounced the formation of rural Uruguayan authorities, in a gime of Salvador Allende as dem· units in June 1974-intensified virtual state of war against these ocratic, it actually sought to the guerrilla threat to Argentina terrorists, extracted from cap­ impose upon Chile a socialist to- to the extent that the army felt tured Tupamaros all possible in·

25 r

SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

formation about the group and its The terrorist "transmission belt" ·er, and like his Russian arms operation. They found that Cuban Since 1969, the Palestine Lib­ suppliers, Qaddafi does not parti· involvement in the rebellion was eration Organization (PLO) has cularly care who he is helping, as extensive and constituted nothing been the world's key terrorist long as they are violent. short of Cuban armed interven· squadron, mostly because it According to reporters from tion in Uruguay's internal affairs. serves as the main "transmission London's Daily Mirror and Mi­ Indeed, the Uruguayan govern· belt" for conveying Soviet aid to lan's Correire Della Sera: ment made just such a charge. other terrorist groups outside of Cuban support of the Tupama· Latin America. It has also trained There are Italian Red Brigad· ros was extensive. A Tupamaro and collaborated with the Nicar· ists tnd Black Brigadists headquarters existed in Cuba, op­ aguan Sandinistas. Moscow uses getting military training erating with the knowledge, sup­ the PLO as a middleman in order shoulder-to-shoulder in the port, advice, and at the initiative . to camouflage its encouragement camps, learning to kill and of the Cuban government as a of violence against Westerners handle arms. Qaddafi makes base for subversive activities in and their interests while publicly no distinction between ex· Uruguay. Moreover, Tupar.taro "seeking detente." treme right and extreme left. leaders took ideological inspira· Starting in the Middle East, He uses these youths to reach tion from Castro, and rebel units the PLO has become active in ter· one of his objectives-the de- received Cuban arms and money. rorism and in occasiQnal conven· stabilization of the Mediter­ In June 1968, the Cubans invit· tional military operations in Af. ranean area. ed the Tupamaros to send one of rica (Angola), Western Europe their leaders to Cuba for meetings (especially Italy), and the North The Italian Red Brigade, which with Cuban officials. Direct ties American mainland via Nicara· murdered former Prime Minister between Havana and the Tupa· gua, in complete symbiosis with Aldo Moro in 1978, and its found­ maros date from this time. Visit the shifting emphases of Soviet ing member, Godfather Giangia­ followed visit as the Tupamaros opportunism. Clearly, the Rus· como Feltrinelli, who died in sought from Cuba arms, money, sians chose well when, in 1969, March 1972 while blowing up an and other assistance. In 1971, they picked the PLO to be their Italian electric pylon, were Cas­ a Tupamaro representative was favorite terrorists for implement· tro's bridge to European and Mid- named to serve as full-time inter· ing the strategy plotted at the mediary between the Tupamaro Tricontinental Conference three The planformulated leadership and the Cubans. Cuban years earlier. trainers instructed Tupamaro sol· by the gathering diers in the preparation and use Libya advocated ajoint of incendiaries and explosives, Libya has become another key firearms, sabotage, and espion· link added to the terrorist chain strategy ofvl.olence age. They put this training to use that was forged with the Tricon­ by terrorists in the during their many operations, in· tinental Conference. Her oil-rich eluding the murder of U.S. State dictator, Colonel Muammar Qad· industrialized West Department employee Dan Mi· dafi, positively crows that he is coupled with trione in 1970. "proud to assert to the whole Castro's success in fomenting world that we provide material, guerrilla wan in the revolution in Uruguay should give moral, and political support to ev· third world. The U.S. officials cause for concern. ery liberation movement in the ultimate goal: to Like the United States, Uruguay world." is not an underdeveloped country. The colonel's swagger is well surround thefree For more than a half century it justified, however. In 1976, he world na,tions with had the most complete welfare used a slush fund of over $580 system outside of Scandinavia. Its million for terrorists from all over hostile communist tradition of democracy was deep­ the world according to his form· ·regimes. seated. Indeed, the principal sup­ er minister of planning, Omar el· porters of the Tupamaro insur· Meheishi. The figure is probably die Eastern terrorism. As heir to gency-middle class citizens and higher by now, but it suggests one of the world's great fortunes, young professionals-had en· how this new Barbary pirate has Feltrinelli was a publisher who joyed, throughout their lives, the managed to finance subversion of hailed from Milan. Working very fruits of that order. That such countries all around the Mediter· closely with Castro, Feltrinelli a society could face a Cuban· ranean and even as far away as helped finance the Tricontinental, supported terrorist onslaught Nicaragua. the organization that fosters sym­ should convince U.S. citizens that Training for foreign terrorists biotic relations between far left we are far from immune to ter· is just as important as Qaddaf· grouplets and official Commun­ rorist attacks. i's bankrolling of them, howev- ist organizations. Feltrinelli also 26 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

founded Europe's first Castroite review, Tricontinental, and set up a Centrale in Switzerland in order to coordinate operations in South America, Portugal, Spain, France, and Germany. Feltrinelli was not content sim- i ply to admire -Castro's revolution; ;he wanted to duplicate it in Eu­ .rope on a grand scale. He had a particular desire to transform .J Sardinia into the Cuba of the Mediterranean. In May 1968, he · made his first contact with Ger­ many's murderous Bader-Meinhof . In more than 20 of Feltrinelli's "safe" apart­ ments in Milan, the ltaHan police subsequently discovered evidence of cash payments routed through Switzerland to the German ter­ rorists. Feltrinelli's role in the founding of the German terrorist movement is crucial. In 1969 he traveled to Jordan where he es­ tablished the first training ar­ rangement with the PLO. By 1972, when the Japanese United Red Army carried out its massa­ cre at Israel's Lydda Airport, it was discovered that their com­ mandos had been trained at camps in Syria and Lebanon, their money came from West Ger­ many, their weapons came from Italy, and they were acting in behalf of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Over the ensuing decade, the Spanish ETA conducted operations in Cen­ tral America, the Irish IRA mur­ dered Queen Elizabeth's uncle, Lord Mountbatten, and the Salva­ doran FMLN gunned down six Americans and seven others at a San Salvador cafe. Twenty years after the event, the Tricontinental Conference is a footnote to history and Fidel Cas­ J tro is reported in failing health. ' But the offspring, tricontinental terrorism, is a very menacing in­ ternational reality. •

L. Fronds Boucht11 is presidmt of lht Council for Inter-American Securit11.

27 -- - SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1906 TERRORISM'$ TENACIOUS ROOTS IN LATIN AMERICA

by Charles Franklin

errorism runs deep in Latin · ran through the country. The tortured victims by the side of the America. Even before Col· guerrillas had banked on it; they road and in garbage heaps. T umbus and the first con· were getting desperate. An un­ Colombia's long-running battles quistadores came from Spain al· spoken divide had been crossed in with Communist M-19 guerrillas, most five centuries ago, Inca, Az· this long-running battle with the who work closely with drug grow­ tee, and other Indian societies authorities. Itchy trigger fingers ers and dealers, exploded in the systematically used terror as a and wild machete blows were one .world's eyes late last year. Ater­ form of coercion, both within thing ·in· Latin America, where rorist band stormed the Palace of their own populations and against machismo and frontier conditions -Justice in Bogota and held the others. often prevailed; torture publicly Supreme Court justices hostage. Since then, revolutionaries revealed and murder of a civilian More than 100 people died, and with an aggregation of causes, figure with no direct connection many were wounded as a bloody bands of the disaffected, the mili· to the fighting was another. counterattack wiped out the M-19 tary, and governments in many The message was clear-no­ captors. guises have done the same. In the body was safe. But government The continuing effort to under· name of liberty, nationalism, var­ forces stepped up their actions, mine democracy in the country, ious forms of sectarianism, and and soon began to prevail. Safe with many accusations that Cuba just plain greed, terrorism has havens in the countryside disap­ and Nicaragua have played sig­ sunk twisting, tenacious roots in peared. For the first time, army nificant roles in providing arms both stony and fertile soil. Hardy, troops occupied Central Universi­ and training, has traumatized a pernicious lianas, often twining ty in Caracas, with loss of .life, number of court justices into leav­ from country to country, have seizing a large cache of arms and . ing their posts. sprung up during the last 25 ammunition in undermining what To the south in Peru, the years. the government called "a terrorist Maoist renegades of Sendero Lu­ base of operations for armed sub­ minoso (Shining Path) have re­ The Venezuelan story version." peatedly bombed, machine­ In the early 1960s, guerrillas Today, in a twist of historic gunned, tortured, and with Communist catechisms took irony, stability is so pronounced killed peasants, politicians, and to the mountains in , that one of the guerrilla master· other targets in the city and and made forays into the cities, minds, Teodoro Petkoff, now is countryside. A new group, Tupac too, killing, kidnapping for ran­ number two of the Movimiento al Amaru Revolutionary Movement, som and political effect, and rob­ Socialismo, the third-ranked polit· named after a famous Inca of bing banks. Newly installed Fidel ical party. He regularly appears centuries ago, has taken credit Castro in Cuba, less than a thou­ on television talk shows in a suit for a series of violent acts, such sand miles to the northwest, and tie and sonorous language to as machine-gunning and bombing vowed to help destabilize the dem· match his most conservative op­ the U.S. Embassy and attacks on ocratic government only recently ponent. U.S. companies in Lima, includ­ wrested from a long reign of dic­ Terrorism remains a harsh fact ing Citibank, IBM, and Texaco. In tatorship. of life, however, in many other the last 20 years, more than 70 But the Robin Hood cum Marx· places. In Central America, in· U.S. diplomats, including six am· tense internal fighting continues ist aura the insurgents sought to bassadors, have been murdered in Nicaragua and El Salvador, foster was definitively rent after abroad for political reasons, they kidnapped a high official of where terrorists last year shot up an outdoor cafe to kill unarmed, where none had been previously. the Instituto de Seguros Sociales The election last year of a -the social security agency. The off-duty U.S. Marine embassy guards and others out for the eve­ radical-liberal president, Alan rebels tortured him brutally, dis­ Garcia, has done nothing to pla· tributed gruesome photos of their ning. Guatemalans draw uneasy breaths with a newly-elected cate the terrorists, although he handiwork to the press, and left has moved vigorously to investi­ president. Death squads on the the man dead in a car abandoned gate and act on charges that the Left and have literally in Caracas. military tortured and killed indis­ dumped thousands of bodies of An almost visible shock- wave criminately in reaction to Sende-

28 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

ro's bloody excesses. i forth with government forces, by he was asked if the military had Elsewhere, there are stirrings: kidnapping Lt. Gen. Pedro Eu­ fought terrorism with terrorist of guerrilla activity in Ecuador genio Aramburu, president in the · methods. and Bolivia, both democracies, 1950s. "Why not?" Camps said. and Chile, a dictatorship. Some He was executed June l, 1970, A few years earlier, the gover­ close to the scene argue that by a "revolutionary court" for al - nor of the entire state of Buenos groups throughout South Ameri­ most 300 alleged "crimes." Aires, home to almost a third of ca are developing closer ties. On The next day, the government Argentina's 30 million population, the other side, reports of state introduced the death penalty for said: "First we will kill the sub­ terrorism to counter the rebels the first time since 1886. versives; then we will kill their are growing. The Montoneros were led ·by collaborators; then ...their sym- · A defector from the Chilean Mario Firmenich, who came from pathizers, then ...those who re- · secret services, Andres Antonio a solid upper-middle class family main indifferent; and finally, we Valenzuela Morales, was inter­ in Buenos Aires, like Che Gue­ will kill the timid." viewed by Cauce, an opposition vara before him, and graduafed publication in Santiago. The in­ from Catholic University. The The greying of terrorists terview was banned, but showed faction was one of several highly Later, the military opened a up later in Diario de Caracas of organized and viol~nt extreme museum in the capital to show Venezuela and Men.saje, a mag­ leftist movements i!l ~ntina, some of the worst acts of the azine published in Chile by the and soon came to the fore, all the ·left-wing terrorists of the 1970s. Catholic Church. while arguing, as did others, that Any indication that thousands of He attested to wi

29 -- SPeCIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

point went undercover at the em· f'ERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE MEXICO ""'*' Communist IMgue (Lig8 Comuni••• Ar· bassy in Paris, returned to infil· NICARAGUA made-LCAI Nicaraguan Annecl ~lionary ForCft (Fuet· Armecl llangu•rcl of th8 Ptoletari8t trate the Mothers of the Plaza de ZH Arm8CIH "8valuci0118riH Cle Nicaragua Loa L8cmncl0nea Mayo, who regularly demonstrat· -FARN) Mexican Pllople'I Revolutionllry Army S.nelinial N•tlon81 Ubtr•tion Front (F18nl• N81ion81 ReYOIUtion8ry Civic Ae1xi8tlon CAI· ed for information about "the dis· S.nCliniat• Cle Ub8r•ci0n Nacionlll-FSL.N) 1ocl•ci6n Civic• N•cionel Revolucionu· appeared," and ended up in 1982 ILIALVADOR ia-ACNR) Annecl Fote.a of N81ion81 Rni8t811C8 (FuefHI Plrty of the Poor (Plrticlo Cle lot f'Obr••l on a mission to set up a military Atm8cla1 Cle R81iet8nei8 "8eion81-FARNI "'1opte'I ArmlCI Command Communilt Plrty of El S.lv8Clor (Partido Comu· P9opit'I Uber•tiOn Army base on South , preprato­ nilt1 Cle El S.lv8cl0r-PCES) l'ltople'I Revolutionllry ArmlCI Forcft (FutrZH ry to the Argentine invasion of Farabunelo M8rti l'qMmr For088 of Lib8r•tlon RtvoludoneriH AtmacSe1 Clef f'Ulblo-FRAP) (FuetHI l'qM8rn Cle Ub8rlM:iOn F•r•bunclO P9opit'I Union (Uniein 11811'118blo) the Falkland/Malvinas Islands .. M8rti-FPL) Revolutionary Action ~I (Mo"'""8nte Cle He captured a small party of. Febru•ry 28 Popul8r lMQIMm (l.P-28) Acckin ReYOlucionerio-MAR) N•tion.I Democrltic Org•nl11tion (Org•nl· Twwity-Thirel of September Communiet IMgue British Marines, was captured in · uciOn Democrlitica ~-oRDEN) (LiQ8 Comuni•t• 23 Septiembr•I turn without a real struggle and ~'I Armed RtYOIUtionary FotcM (FuefZH United Popul8r Lib8r1ti0n Army of Ameriel RtllOluc:ioMrlH AnNClaa del f'Ueblo-FRAP) Zapali8t• Urblln Front (Frent• Urbllna Zep8ti1· returned home after a stay in a P9ople'1 R•votutionary Mfr/ (E,19rcito Rtvoiu· ta-FUZJ cionario del f'lllblo-ERP) • Pi\RAGUAY Britisli- j~1-;88E.iii1aiicI - woii the Popul8r IMQIMm of 28 FlbrU8fY (ligH Popu· Agr•rian Pa1nnt Leagues CLIQH AgruiH war of the South Atlantic and the 18ra1 28 Cle Febrero-LP..28) C.mpe1inH-LAC) Popul8r R•YOIUtion8ry Bloc Clloc!Y! l'qM8r R.. F iral of M8rch OrQ8niUtiOn, •lee> known •• defeated, disgraced ruling junta voiuciOn•rlo-BPR) Pl:llltico·Milit•ry Org1niuti0n (Organiacion 1 felt compelled to call elections. A1¥olutionary Plrty of c.nt,.i ""'8rican Work· Marzo. or OrQ•nizacion Politico-Militu-OPM) era(PRTC) ' Political Military Organization Peace and democracy have re­ United l'qM8r Action FTont CFfJJntl ·cll AcciOn Popul8r Color8CIO Mo-..t (MoPl:JCo, Cliaal· Popul8r UnificllCla-FAPU) Clent f•ction of Color1clo Plrty I turned to Argentina, if with re­ While Fighting UnlOn (UniOn Guerm• Bl811C8 PERU newed outbreaks of subversion -UGBI Armed Natlon•li•t Mo.-nent Org•nization v.btker•' Fl8volutiDNty Plrty of Cen1r11 Amllri· (MANO) and bombings tied to the military, C8 ( Plrtido Re¥Oiuc:ion8rio Cle Treb8J8dorH Condor which .Prompted President Raul Centrc.-ncanc. Front of the Rtwotutian8ry Lett IFrente Cle la GUATEMALA lzqulercll Rtvoluciontril-FIR) Alfonsin to impose a state of siege Gu.t-i1n Anti-Selvedcnn Ub8nlting Action ~t of the Revolutionary L..11 (Movimien· on the eve of congressional elec· Guerrille1 (GALGASI to Cle la lzQUlerCla Revotucion8ri8-MIR) Gu•t-18n Llbout Plrty (PWtido Gu119m8tte· MTR (eJll)llnlion unknown) tions last year. co Clef Tl8b11Jo-PGTI N8tiontl Liber•tion Army (Ejlircito ell Uber•· Gu8t-18n N81ion81itt Comm8nck> ciOn N1cional-ELN) At the same time, the Center Gutrriil8 Army Ol ltw Poor (E.ilirdto Guerrillllro Plruvlan Anti-Gommuniel Alliance (MP) for Defense Research, in a report Cle lol F'Obrel-EGP) 1'9ruvian Communist Plrty • Reel Fl•ll (Plrticlo Nttion•I L.ngum tor IN """9cti0n of Gu8te· Comunilta Pllru1no - Bander• Roja l to the Ministry of the Interior, mal• Revolutiontry l/angu•rel cited possible ties between the N8tion81 Liberation Mowement Shining filth (Senclero Luminoao-SL) Plloples Guerr1b Army of !tie Poor (EGP) Tupac Amaru self·styled People's Revolutionary Rlbll Annecl FuCM (Fuerla• Ann8clas Re· URUGUAY Army (ERP), the Montoneros, b8tclll-FAR) Armed l'qMmr Front (FAP) Revolutionary AnNcl Foro8t ll'veru• AnNClal Nelion81 UberlliOn ~nt (MLN, Tul)8ma­ and Sendero Luminoso, from RevolucionarlH-f'AR) roa) R1¥olutionllry ~ Alej8nclro Cle LtOn 13 OrgmniatiOn of the Popul8r RewlutiOnery-33 Peru. Mario Firmenich, extradit· No-mitr (Movinlento RewducionlriO Al8,18n­ (OPR-33) ed a year ago in October from Clro ell L.O.. 13 Novitlnb1-MR·13) PCU (eJll)llnaion unknownJ fltvolutionllry Orpniutlon of the ~ under Raul Senclic tnterl'l8tional Briglcll to stand trial, called the Arm1 (0rQ8nizlK:iOn Rewalucion81'18 Cle f'lleblo VENEZUELA center's charges a "self-justifying en ArmH-OflP'-) Armed Force• of N8tion81 Liber•tion CFuerzH Slctet Anti-GomnluNlt ktrrr (Ejitcito Secreto Arm8Cla1 Cle Uberacion N•cional-FALN) excuse of oligarchic terrorism for Anticomuni•t•-ESAI Movement ol the Revotutionllry Left ( Movimien­ coup purposes," and in this in· Twelfth of April Rewolutionary Mowenwnt (MOvi• to Cle I• lzqulerela Revolucionaria-MIR) miento Revolucionario 12 Abril) Popular Revolutionary Mov.nent (Movlmlento stance government officials, polit· Twentieth of October Front (Frente 20 Oc:tubre) fbpul•r Revoiucionerio-MPR) ical parties, and human rights White Hind I Movianilnto Cle AcciOI\ Nacion8Na· Reel F18g (S.nelera Roj8) t1 Organiz81111-MANO, herlCI M8no 818nc•I Revolutionary Action Mo-.t (Movimiento ell organizations, worried about de­ GUYANA Acclon Revoiucioneria-MARI P9ople'I T8"1Pi8 Revolutionary Communi8t Party (RCP) stabilization, also criticized the HONDURAS Stuellnl1for1 Democr•tie Society (SOS) report. Cinchonero Pllpul•r Liblr•tion Movement SymbioneM Libef•tiOn Army (SLA) ( Movimiento Cle Ubtraci6n Pbpul8r Cinchonlro \lanceremoa (Wt ShaU Overcome) Firmenich, after traveling to -MPL) Wtathermln Cuba, Mexico, and Europe, settled ~'I Aevoiutlonery ...,.,.._.,, (Movimienlo Zero l'Oint (Pllnto Cero) Rtvalueion8'io Clef l'Uebto-MRP) UNITID STATES in Brazil with his Argentine wife, "9ople'a Revoiution8ry Union (UniOn Revol­ Armed Force1 of N•tionel Liber•tion (Fu8r111 a fellow Montonero, and had a ucionaril Clef 1'118blo-UAP) ArmaClaa cle Liber•cion N1cional-FALN) v.btker1' Revolutionary Party (Plrticlo flevoiu· 818ck Plnther Plrty (BPP) child born there. It was thought ciOnariO ell Tr8bllj8dorM Cle Amliricl Centl81 Boricua Popul8r Army ( E;9reito Popular Cle Borl· this would guard him against ex· -PRTCI cu•-EPB, or Loa Macheteros) tradition, but in a country also newly returned to democratic not be tried in the Aramburu case ,million and return 40 properties rule, the Supreme Federal Court because of an amnesty granted in Ito the Graiver family, accused by granted Argentina's request for 1973.) Ithe previous military junta of his return. A prosecutor has · No action has been reported Ifinancing Marxist subversion in called for a life sentence against aPiitst Astiz, last seen enjoying .the 1970s. More than a hundred Firmenich for a kidnapping in the sun on a private beach in Mar 1people had been arrested and tor· 1974 in which two people died and del Plata. At the end of January , tured in connection with the case, a ransom of $60 million was sup­ this year, however, the Argentine :including Jacobo Timmerman, ed· posed to have been paid. (He. can· government agreed to repay $82 itor of La Opinion, a Graiver·

30 SPECIAL EDITION 5 AUGUST 1986

• owned newspaper, who wrote a based on the novel, Kiss of the book about his experience that Spider Woman, by Argentine focused world attention on Argen­ Manuel Puig. One of the two lead­ tina's "dirty war." ing charaoters, who share. a cell, is a revolutionary, Valentin. The Working from within other is a homosexual hairdresser Just as Teodoro Petkoff has be­ whom officals use to track some come an establishment· figure in of Valentin's cohorts. While the his native Venezuela, in Uruguay, iocation is unstated, it clearly is next door to Argentina, a guerril­ in Latin America and plays like la group no less violent than the Buenos Aires. Montoneros, the Tupamaros, have In the course of the story, Val­ gone legitimate. (They were por­ entin, bitter in his indictment of trayed in the Costa-Gavras film, society, softens. No longer does State of Siege.) Now simply one of terrorism seem to be the answer many small leftist groups in a to correcting ills, nor does the country where democracy also re­ violent overthrow of the existing turned recently, the Tupamaros order. And then, when his cell­ this year were seeking to joint the mate is released, Valentin's rev­ Broad Front, an opposition coa­ olutionary comrac;Ies shoot him, lition which counts Communists suspecting that he led the police •' and Christian Democrats in its to them. lineup. A former rebel leader, In the end, the revolution not Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro, only eats its own children, in the says many ideas resulted from well-worn judgment; it also eats countrymen who had been jailed and spews out many others. • or in exile. At 43, and a former medical student, he was jailed Cha.rlti1 FraUlin ii a WaiAingt011, D.C.· based toritu 111.MN carter nai ipan111d 111- himself for 15 years. l'ignmenti it& tM SoeWt Union, Latin For a final note, jail is the set­ America, and Ev.rOJ>I. ting for a popular film and play,

31 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 UNRAVELING THE SOVIET TERRORIST WEB by Yossef Bodansky and Louis Rees

·Terrorist attacks intensified the infrastructure can be traced kov was to devise a way to win considerably in 1985. They to some extent, it leads almost without unleashing a crushiitg were diversified in the ex­ invariably to the ·Soviet Union nuclear response by the United treme: explosions at NATO in· and its regional clients and surro­ States. Ogarkov convinced the stallations in Europe, the hijack­ gates such as Angola, Bulgaria, Soviet leaders that this could be ing of a ship and aircraft in the Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Ger­ done with a massive, lightning· Mediterranean, the assault on the many, Libya, Nicaragua, North fast, nonnuclear Soviet drive Colombian Supreme Court in Bo­ Korea, and Syria. It is less than without warning into the deep gota, and the year-end attacks . credible that such · infrastruc­ rear of the NATO countries so on passengers in the airports of tures could be consolidated With­ that the allies could not use nu· Vienna and Rome. out the active participation of the clear weapons without destroying Yet, carrying out a successful secret services of these states, their own populations. act of terrorism is a oomplicated under the overall coordination of The success of that sort of of· undertaking, of which the act of the Soviets. fensive obviously depends to a violence is the simplest part. Indeed, the worldwide escala­ great degree on the Soviet To carry out an attack, terror· tion of terrorist activities reflects Union's ability to paralyze and ists rely on a vast, complex and the growing significance of "spe­ confuse the political and military demandinir support system. This cial operations" in the heartlands leadership of the allies, and to system supplies weapons, explo­ of the countries who stand op­ actively deny NATO the chance to sives, false documents, target se­ posed to Soviet irlobal strategy. use European-based nuclear wea­ lection, transportation, in· Terrorism, a relatively cheap, pons by capturing and/or destroy­ country support, operational cost-effective, and aafe (at least ing them in the hours immediate­ intelligence, evacuation, medical for its aponaora) method of coer· ly before the main attack. and legal assistance. cion, has been uaed aince the time The Soviets intend to do this by An effective support network of Lenin by the Soviet Union "special operations" behind ene­ should be able to transport a whenever it.a leaders judired that my lines during what they term group of terrorists from their thia tactic would moat easily and "prewar hostilities," meaning the safe haven to a foreign country, efficiently achieve their objective hours before war is declared or enable them to operate there, and with the least coat to themaelves. before the main components of then evacuate them safely. Often In the late 1960s, the Soviet the Soviet armed forces are com· this happens. If performed cor· Politburo decided that terrorism mitted to battle. Control over rectly, and if atrategy so de­ airainst countries allied with the these operations is in the hands mands, the support net should be United States could be uaeful in of the Glavnot1e Razvecl1111auln011e able to complete these missions undermininir public confidence Upravleni11e (GRU)-the Main In· without being discovered by the and promoting a number of So­ telligence Directorate of the So­ local security forces, even after viet foreign policy roals, includ­ viet General Staff. · the attack. ing the installation of reaimes Under GRU direction, Soviet friendly to Moscow, at the ex· SPETSNAZ (special operations) ·Common facton pense of the United States and its teams would be dropped by para· Despite their diversity, both allies. ·chute, land from minisubmarines geographical and political, the In the Soviet Union's tactical and have penetrated the target terrorist inventory for 1985 had handbook, terrorism is an ele­ countries with false passports in two common denominators. They ment of war, but not necessarily civilian, non-Soviet guise. Some were directed against Western of the prolonged "low-intensity" would assassinate political lead· targets, and' the terrorists could variety that the Western defense ers and top military comman· not have carried them out with· establishments dwell at length on ders; others would go to the out support. counteracting. homes of base commanders and Though ostensibly unrelated, During the 1970s, the Soviet fighter and bomber pilots and many of these acts of terrorism Union revamped its strategy for carry out their assassinations. represent a small, visible fraction fighting and winning a major war Others would sabotage NATO of a massive clandestine infra­ in Europe. The task of strateg­ base facilities, key choke points structure. In the cases in which ists like Marshal Nikolai Ogar- like bridges, and destroy power 32 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 stations, while other units would TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE FllANCE (eeatla... ) 8UllON Hord8go (Je Tien1) attempt to capture and destroy FEDERAL ..EPUBLIC Of' OE ..ltANY tntematlonel Revotutlonery Soliderity Black Cella (Schwarze Zellen) lntematlonel Soliderity nuclear weapons stockpiles in Black Help (Schwarze Hille) lparreterr1k (n- from the North) Western Europe before they German Action Groupe (Deutache AktionlQrup­ Jewilh Self·DlfenM Front pen-DA) MU8d8 Action Ind Dl'9nll Movement could be dispersed. Germen Empire Plrty ( Deutache Reichepartei Movement of Youth-rd Brother• In war of the The SPETSNAZ terror and sa­ -DRP) P91Htinian flWople . German Socillliat Student AAociation (Sozialle­ New Action Front AQU11t 1118 ~IClepende11C11 botage teams would be supported, tileher Deutechef Studentenbunel-SOS) end Autonomy of COnice (Front d'Action Nou­ sometimes directly, by local ter­ Querila DittuM (Guerilla Oiaperlion-GDI velle Contre 11"°'Penctence et l'Autonomle Helger Mein• Comm1nd0 -FRANCIA) rorists. Indeed, in Soviet eyes, the Netional Socieliet Common Action Group New Oroer (Ordr• Nou-) (Akli0nagemein8Chelt Nationeler Sozillhten Orgenizetion Dell• prime objective of their support -ANS) Red Army F•c:tlon of Southern France of terrorism is to establish in P9opla'1 Socialist Movement of Germany/ Revotutlonery Communilt 'Wbuth (JeunHat W:>rkera' Plrty (~ka-aozilllilltiache Bewegung Communltte Mvolutlonnaire-JCR) advance assets for facilitating op­ Deutachlendall'artei dar Arbett-VS80·PdAI Secret Army Or;llliMtion 10rganiMtion e1e rAr· timal conditions for these special Red Army Fection (ROii Ar1M9 Fraktion-RAF) I ,.. Sec:'*l•-OASI Red Help (Rote Hille) • 8th of Merch Group operations. Revolutionary Cella ( Revolutionere Zlllen-RZ) Soliderity R•aiat1nce Front The delivery of strategically Second of June Movement (Bewegung 2. JUlli) Tellon Lew Socialist Empire Plrty (Sozielieti8Che Reiche· T-ty-Secand Merci\ Movement IMou-nt partei-SRP) significant strikes of the kind 22 '"'"' . Socieliet P9tienta· Collactivl .( Sozillliatiectlea WI Mull Do Something called for by the current Soviet Pltientenkollektiv-SPK) Youth Action Group . military theory necessarily re­ Union for the Protection of' the Tyrol ( Tiroler ITALY Schutzbund) • Armed Communiet Formlltion1 quires the development of a diver­ Wllhraportgruppe Hoffmen :J Defence Sporta Armed Ptollterien Nuclei ( Nuelll Annatl Ptoia­ sified support and intelligence in­ Group Hollmen) t•ri-NAP) F ..ANCE Armed Ptollteri1n Pbwer frastructure well in advance of Action for the Rebirth of Coraica (Action pour Ill Armed Rewlutionery NuClai I Nuclei Anna ti RI· hostilities. Moreover, this infra­ R_i.. ance de Ill CorN-ARC) valuZioneri-NAR) Action Front for the Liberation of the Bettie Autonomou1 W:lrkerl Movement structure must be fully tested as Countries Blaell Oroer (Ordine Nero-ON) Andreas Beeder Cornmendo Combetent1 for Communilm to its reliability. Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (Noymux Front Une (Ptim1 UMe-PLI "'1Ma pour fAutonornie l'bpulaire-NAPIU') MuUOtini Action BQuedl (8Quedr9 d'Azionl Aaaociation of Corsican Patriots (Auocio di "9- MullOlini-SAM) Constructing alibis trioti Corai-APC) New Oroer (-ONJ It goes without saying that un­ Autonomous Intervention Collective Againet the October XXll Circle (Circolo XXll Ottobre) Zionist Pt-nee in Frence l'UtlMn Action Groupe (Grupp! d'Azione Plrti· derground activity of such magni­ Ailengera glene-GAP) tude cannot escape some notice B111que Justice (Euzkal ZuzentHuna-EZl Plnnllnent Struggle (Lott• Continue) Breton Fight (Arged Breizh-ABI l'nlllt•rian CommittM of Sub¥wlion for Bellar by the Western intelligence agen­ Breton Liberation Front (Front de LiberetiOn Cle .Jue lice la Bretegne-FLB) Pnlleterilln lntemetionaHem cies. And so it is important to Breton N•tionali1t Re1iatenc:e Movement Ptoteterilln Ju1tice conceal as much of the Soviet (Mouvement de Rti1i1tance Netionaliate Bra­ Pl'oteterien Squed tonne-MRNB) Rid Brigeelel (Brigate Roeae-BR) infrastructure as possible by in­ Cllerlee Martel Club (Club Cherlee Mertel) RldGuerrilll troducing ready-made "excuses" Committee for SociaHat Revolutionary Unity RIVOlutionery Action Group Committee of Coordination Revolution8ry Action Movement (Movimento cr­ to "explain" these activities from Communist Youth Movament. Merxill· Azlonl Rivoluzionarill-MARJ the outset in such a way that the Leninist (Union des Jeuneases Cornmuniet ... , Revolutionery Fe1Ci1t Nuclei (Nuclei Feacllli Ri· M•rxi1te1-Ltininiates-UJC·ML) voluzioneri-NFR) trail leads away from the Soviet Confrontation (Faire Front) · W:>rkar1' Vlnguerd (llwang111rdie ()pereie) Corsican National Liberetion Front (Front de Ill NETHERLANDS Union. Uberetion Nationele de Ill Cor&1-FLNC) FrM South MoiuCClft Youth Org1niMtion (Vrije The activities of terrorist Corllican 1'9aaant Front for Liber•tion (Front . ZuldmolukN Jongeren-VZJ) Payaan CorN de Ubtiretion-FPCL) Rid Brigedtl groups, both locally based and Coraicen RevOlutionary Action (Action RtivoU­ : Rid Help (Rode Hutp-RH) international, serve as the best tionnaire Cor&1-ARC) · Red RHl1t1nce Front (Rood lllrzet1front Diiie -RVFI cover. If given no reason to inves­ Direct Action (Action Direc:te-ADI Rid 'lbuth (Rode Jeugd-RJ) Enbeta Galerne ReYalutionmry fl9oplee RMiatence of the Neth· tigate further, the law enforce­ Eurapeen N•tionaliat Fasces (Feieceeux Ne· .8f11ndl ment bureaucracy rarely looks tioneux Europtien1-FNE) '°"TUGAL Federation for Europeen Netionel Action (Fed· Action Group for Communl1m further than the known problem. tir•tion d'Action Netionele EuropMlw-FANE) •Armed Revolutionlry Action (Aceto Revolu· If a cache of weapons or explo­ French National L.iberetion Front (Front di Lib­ cloNrill Annadll--ARA) eration Nationele Fre~al1e-FLNF) Front for the Uber1t1on of 1118 Az- (Fr9nte de sives is found, if a bomb explodes French Revolutionary Brigedea (Brigedea ~ 'UbertaoAo dfll ~-FLA) along a NATO pipeline, it is rou­ volutionnaire1 Fre~iNl-BRF) Front for the Liberation of the Medllre Archipel­ Group for the Defense of Eurape lllO I Fr9nta dfl UbarteoAo do Arqulptilego di tinely blamed on the local terror­ High Schoo! Action Cornmittae CComitti d'Action Madeire-FLAMA) ist group-especially if some an­ Lyc:tien-CAI.) onymous caller telephones a statement or mails a communique ' drome can account automatically aged that effectively serve to dis­ to a wire service or newspaper. : for all signs of clandestine or tract and strain the resources of The response from the authori­ ! terrorist activity just as the ap­ Western security agencies. Re­ ties becomes, "It must have been ' pearance of a confessed "serial peated demonstrations, for exam­ the .... " which can be filled in Red ! murderer" raises the hopes of ple, near or on key military bases Army Fraction, Direct Action, ; many officers and prosecutors could serve as cover for surveil­ Palestine Liberation Organiza­ 1 seeking to put "solved" to the lance of the movements of mobile tion, or Macheteros, depending on : burden of unsolved crimes. missiles, aircraft, ships, and sub­ the country. The "they-did-ir syn- Other actions can be encour- marines (after all, there has been

33 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

no declaration of war between the ·contacted and sent to collect the hind the front lines just before an NATO allies and the Soviet bloc, · ·materials. In turn, the contact offensive. so legally it is not treason to will distribute it to members of For example, responsibility for collect such data), the testing of the cell. This ensures that even if the conduct of any deep strate­ sabotage techniques, and the con­ one contact ls arrested, he will gic offensive into Western Eu­ ditioning of police and security be unable to give the authorities rope lies with the Soviet combat guards to deal gently with those much information about what is ·command which is called the who penetrate base security. being planned. In addition, the Western Theater of War ( ZTV The activities of local terrorist GRU officer does not make direct are its Russian initials). The com­ groups covertly under Soviet con­ contact with the local terrorists, mander of the the ZTV at present trol can also serve as "false flag" or give any idea as to what the is Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the operations, _obtaining assistance materials are to be used for. strategist responsible for the and cooperation from radical mal­ Thus, even if he should defect, as reorganization of the Soviet mili­ contents who would never direct­ did Serge Bokhan in Greece, the tary strategy and structure, and ly assist the Soviet Union, par­ information that can be provicted who now commands the highest ticularly its "liberation" at the on the terrorists and their plans combat post in the new Soviet hands of Soviet tanks, missiles, is limited. military order he devised and im­ and poison gas. Since the support The ultimate pu11><>se of the plemented. The special operations network should be active to a Soviets in developing terrorist forces are under the command of certain degree, so as to maintain support networks is to employ the supraunits of the Soviet mili­ readiness, its involvement with them against key political and tary structure-the "Theaters of . the terrorists serves as the best military targets far behind Military Operations" (TVDs) and practice and justification. These NATO lines in advance of the their various fronts. networks also are believed to be main Soviet offensive. Soviet mil­ The most important Soviet involved with certain levels of itary doctrine emphasizes that "special operations" groups are the Middle Eastern drug traffic for any special operation (read, the SPETSNAZ formations of the _which finances the network's op­ terrorist support) network to be GRU, the airborne troops (VDV), erations with ample sums of un­ ·effective, it must be centralized and naval infantry (MP). As a traceable cash. and diversified so that it can sup­ rule, the VDV is comprised of The supply of weapons, explo­ port a wide variety of operations airborne divisions (VDDs) and sives, and cash constitutes special with little or no modification, special duty brigades (BONs), technical challenges. Intelligence and, most importantly, with little while the MP is comprised of bri­ sources report that these items or no forewarning. The network gades (MPBs). During peacetime, usually are smuggled into the tar­ must be activated, tested, and the main units for special opera­ get country by diplomatic pouch evaluated periodically to main­ tions of strategic nature are de­ (either Soviet or one of its allies). tain that efficiency. ployed in Vitebsk in the Byelorus­ But if Western counterintellig- The Soviets also attempt to sian Military District and in Tula .make contact and exert influence in the Moscow Military Dis­ Jn the late 1960's, the and control -over local terrorist trict. Each formation includes :groups as they arise. They do not a SPETSNAZ brigade, an air­ ·Soviet Politburo ·want their networks accidentally borne division and their combat .decided that ·exposed by the police or Western support elements. Specifically, :security services in the course these are the 27th SPETSNAZ terrorism against of investigations of uncontrolled Brigade and the 103rd Guards countries tdlied with terrorist acts or other crimes. By Airborne Division of the Belorus­ controlling the entire support sys­ sian Military District; and in the the United States tem in a country or a city, they Moscow Military District, the could be useful. can fores tall a terrorist action 3rd SPETSNAZ Brigade and the if they judge that their network 106th Guards Airborne Division. ence agents successfully trail a would be adversely affected by Strict security is maintained Soviet GRU officer operating un­ the aftermath. by for bidding any Soviet officer der cover as a diplomat or Aero­ ·who might have knowledge of ac­ flot official, they are unlikely to The Terrorist component tual preparations for war from see him handing over a suitcase The key purpose of Soviet sup­ leaving Soviet soil. The threat of full of explosives and guns to a port for the creation of terrorist defection is thereby ruled out. All member of the local terrorist or­ infrastructures and the estab­ that a member of the support net ganization. Instead, he will leave lishment of influence and con­ or a terrorist himself can tell items in several dead drops se­ trol over terrorist organizations an interrogator is the nature of lected at the last minute. worldwide is to develop terrorist training they received and their Then a contact in each cell of "assets" as a powerful "fifth col­ own specific tasks. They know the terrorist organization will be umn" capable of striking far be- 1neither the reason for their as-

34 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 signments, nor the command to event of the imminent outbreak which they belong, nor in many Ogarkov convinced of hostilities plays an important cases that they were working for the Soviet leaders role in the Soviet scenario calling the Soviets. for rapid achievement of total Despite the traditional Russian that this could be victory over and occupation of xenophobia, the GRU and the mil· done with a massive, Western Europe in the initial, itary services of the Soviet al­ nonnuclear phase of war. Isolat· lies do provide diverse types of lightning-fast, ing Europe from American assist· SPETSNAZ terrorist training to ·nonnuclear Soviet ance would ensure Soviet success. reliable foreigners. Most foreign­ Defectors from the Soviet bloc ers are given regular military drive without who have worked at the United training that prepares them for warning Into the Nations in New York say that · simple acts of terrorism. Their there are both KGB and GRU task, and that of the of the orga­ deep rear of the SPETSNAZ officers there work· nizations to which they belong, is NATO countries so ing as "international civil ser· to maintain a certain level of vants" or in technical employee terrorist activity in peacetime that the allies cquld roles. This gives them great free­ and, upon specific activation . not use nuclear dom of movement. Others are at· from Moscow (usually through a , weapons without tached to the Soviet Embassy in commander who may be an Arab, Washington or to the San Fran· a Mexican, a Puerto Rican, or .destroying their own cisco consulate. Their role is to American, but who is also a So­ populations. identify vulnerable choke points viet agent), escalate their cam· in this country, and to devise paign of extreme terrorism methods for their eventual sabo­ against civilian objectives in or· tage. As far back as 1957, for der to create massive panic Western capitals. It is believed example, the GRU surveyed U.S. among the civilian population as that their main task will be to oil refineries for simultaneous sa· well as serve as a diversion for lead SPETSNAZ killer squads to botage in case of war. Other de­ the Soviet SPETSNAZ detach· assassinate political leaders and fectors in the recent past have ments on the eve of the war. sabotage national installations in claimed that SPETSNAZ teams The main elements of the an immediate "prewar" situation. are assigned to Soviet diplomatic GRU's SPETSNAZ forces main· Tight control is maintained missions and would assassinate tain (via the 3rd Directorate of over the GRU's foreign SPETS· political and military leaders in their respective RUs) their own NAZ fighters in a manner similar the event of imminent hostilities. nets of foreign SPETSNAZ fight· to the way the GRU maintains ers. These foreigners are highly control over its spies and agents. Cultural exchange plays role trained and tightly controlled by There is one important differ· In this regard, it should be the GRU. They have two prime ence. In handling ordinary spies noted that the Soviets do their missions. Some operate as com· and agents, the GRU case officer utmost to ensure that as many as manders and instructors of var· often leaves Soviet territory to possible of the commanders of ious local terrorist organizations, meet them in their own or in a SPETSNAZ teams assigned to where they use only a small part third country. Sometimes, a GRU operate in the United States are of their actual training. When officer overseas could be in con· able to examine personally their activated at the outset of war, tact with a leader of a terrorist future target. The Soviets recog· they will lead their unsuspecting organization ignorant of his true nize the great differences be­ followers in specific missions on status as a foreign SPETSNAZ tween life in the Soviet Union and behalf of the Soviet Union. The and that he has another control· the United States and have decid· others, usually the better trained ler in the Soviet Union. In this ed that this necessitates exposing and most reliable, return to their way, the Soviets can maintain SPETSNAZ officers and some countries of origin as "sleepers." supervision of their agent while troops, even if sparingly, to con· Upon activation, they will also ensuring that his true identity ditions in the United States. carry out specific missions; but in and significance will not be be­ To accomplish this, they have many cases, they will act directly 'trayed should the GRU officer worked out some ingenious meth· with Soviet SPETSNAZ detach· abroad defect. ods, such as international athletic ments dropped by parachute or Do these groups of SPETSNAZ competitions. Soviet SPETSNAZ who have otherwise entered their and their related terrorists oper· personnel travel to their target native countries covertly. ate in the United States? We be­ countries mainly in the guise of Intelligence sources estimate lieve they do. being a sports team or delegation. that the Soviets have planted Sabotage and terrorism to be Once in the United States, some dozens of such foreign 11ational carried out by SPETSNAZ units of the "sportsmen" perform "er· SPETSNAZ fighters in many inside the United States in the rands" for the KGB and the GRU 35 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

which might range from the rela­ tively innocent collection of read· ily available background materi· al, to the purchasing of certaifl specific items, especially elec­ tronic gadgets, or the -checking and servicing of dead drops. As Western concern with SPETSNAZ capabilities has grown, there have been some dis­ turbing indications that the cov· ert infrastructure has increased through the insertion of foreign SPETSNAZ via Latin America. It is suspected that one of the tasks of the 60-odd SPETSNAZ troops and the many Cuban intel­ ligence officers in Nicaragua is to train and prepare bogus "refu· gees" for their roles in the cov·ert infrastructure that penetrates America. Clandestine support for terror­ ists in different ports of the world is a small price for the Soviet Union to pay for the concealment of its SPETSNAZ troops. There is ample evidence that this price is being paid.• Yo11tf Boda'Mk11 au Lollil IUta are witlt Mid-Atlantic IUrearcla AHociatea, Jlllb· lilher1 of Early Wamiq.

36 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 TALKING SENSE TO TERRORISTS by David Nissen

is fellow .police officers used to the Third Reich, orchestrated by them, cajoled them, flattered them, to call him "Bring 'Em Out Adolf Hitler. fed them, promised them they HAlive" Bolz. As founder and Bolz points out that at the wouldn't be hurt if they coordinator of the New York Police previous Olympics, in 1968 in surrendered, and calmed them. Department's Host.age Program, Mexico City, two black American "But," he added, "I never lied to Captain Frank Bolz was the chief athletes had raised black.gloved them." negotiator in 285 crisis situations, fists skyward during the National Bolz gave the example of a siege and succeeded in rescuing more Anthem. by "Cat" Olsen at the Bankers than 850 hostages without losing a "The ICO · (International Trust in Greenwich Village, New single one. Committee for the. Olympics) York, in 1975. While Bolz His success rate, he believes, is should have learned at least this responded to the gunman's request partially due to the nature of the much from the Smith-Carlos for beer and sandwiches, but hostage crises he handled. "In the affair," Bolz writes in his book, parried his demands for Patty domestic situation, there's just me Hostage Cop, "in an age of sa~llite Hearst's release from jail, a and the perpetrator. I (as the. communication, the chance to get.away plane to be landed in front negotiator) can look stupid-it reach a billion or more people in a of the bank, and $2 million in cash. doesn't matter. The goal is just to Bingle act of protest would be There is a thin line to be walked save lives, including that of the very tempting for anyone with a on the negotiator's part, between perpetrator." message for the world." not lying and not telling a "But in the international arena," "And of course," he went on, "no potentially dangerous truth, he said, "the rules are different. group posed as obvious a threat as however. If the PLO hijacks an The perception by the world is the assortment of pro-Palestinian American jet and threatens to important. The country can't be terrorist groups that had already kill hostages unless the American made to look foolish. The future demonstrated a predilection for negotiator releases 100 of their safety of our citizens depends upon violent, eye-catching stunts on comrades from another prison, how we are perceived." behalf of their cause." Bolz said, "You don't have Bolz pointed out that "in local The fact that there were no the authority to grant that law enforcement, there is no contingency plans for such an demand-but ·you can't tell him accept.able casualty rate, while in attack, in retrospect, was the that. military operations there is." biggest mistake of all, Bolz said. Never say an absolute "no" to "And international ierrorism is Criticizing what he termed the perpetrator. If you do, you11 a form of warfare," he emphasized. "Israeli intransigence" during that put him in a position of "It is necessary to keep up U.S. tragedy, again for the sake of "how absolute frustration. This leads image and safety in the world." the world will perceive us," he to aggressive behavior-murder, In spite of these differences wrote, "The idea at Munich was not violence, suicide. between local and international to refight biblical wars, it was to "You must keep negotiations considerations, however, Bolz save lives then and there." centered on problem-solving," Bolz found that there are many emphasized. "You must keep all principles of negotiating that can Keep them talking avenues open. As long as the and should be used on the In general, Bolz said, host.age terrorist perceives that they are international scene. · negotiation follows certain open, he keeps his options open." Consider the disastrous universal principles. handling of the terrorist attack The first principle, apparent Bargain wisely at the 1972 Olympic Games at enough, is: Communkate. "A man Never give something for Munich, where West German with a hostage wants to nothing. "You must get something officials "were concerned about communicate," Bolz points out; in return for what you give," Bolz keeping overt security whatever else you do, keep the listed as another basic negotiating arrangements to a minimum" in lines of communication open. technique. order to counterbalance the world In his own experiences Bolz For instance, if the captor community's memory of the last preferred to communicate directly demands that a certain person be Olympic Games in Germany in with the perpetrator. He patiently · brought to the scene, do so, but on 1936, which were a virtaar paean discussed their problems with the condition that one or more

37 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 people be released. In communicating with the ' What to do if you are taken hostage perpetrator, always try to i 1. Don't be a hero. Accept your Memorize things about the l establish a one-on-one human 1 rapport with him. Bolz, in training situation, and be prepared to wait. captors, their description and J negotiators, told them to "put Any drastic action on the part of conversations. What names do yourself in the perpetrator's shoes. the victim might bring immediate they use or how do they refer to !I Convince him the world, as violent action from the captor. one another? What precipitated embodied by one cop doing the 2. The first 15 to 45 minutes the takeover? Where are the : talking, can understand his are the most dangerous. Follow hostages being kept? Has . a ! problems and help him cope." instructions. Do not hesitate. routine been established in terms : In this way, a negotiator can After as little as 10 minutes, the of eating and/or sleeping? Try to l sometimes "attain a remarkable phenomenon of transference, or recall the number and identity or : level of spiritual unity with Stockholm Syndrome, can start to descriptions of the other hostages. : someone who would normally be develop, and under the i.nfiuence 9. Be prepared to answer the i perceived as his total enemy-an of this he is less likely to harm police on the phone. , angry man with a gun." you. You will not be able to avoid 10. Don't be argumentative or 1 One way this is done is the it. It is natural, and it ia what has create agitation with the captors 1 Mgood guy, bad guy" method. If the kept many hostaaes alive. or other hostages. I perpetrator demands something 3. Don't speak unless spoken to 11. Treat the captor like royalty. I fairly easy, the negotiator with and then only when necessary. Don't turn your back on him 1 the better rapport grants it. If 4. Try to r ... witwithout turning unless ordered to do so. But don't ·! it clearly can't be given, then a your back on your captor. stare at him either. A "down the i second negotiator, the "bad guy" is (Sometimes negotiators have had nose" look may bring a violent I called over to refuse it. But the to wake up hostages to release reaction. I main negotiator keeps reassuring them.) There have also been 12. Be patient. the captor, "We're on your side; incidents when the perpetrator 13. If a rescue attempt is taking I we're doing everything we can for fell asleep (physically and place, or you hear a noise or I you." psychologically exhausted), and shooting, hit the floor and stay the hostages just walked out. down. Keep your hands on your 1· Don't lose authority 5. Don't make suggestions. If he head and don't make any fast , One thing Bolz feels a negotiator uses it and it goes wrong, he may moves. If and when you are should never do is to beg. think you planted it and are trying ordered out, follow directions He gives the example of one to trick him. quickly-again with your hands transit policeman who was trying 6. Don't try to escape unless you in the open. Be prepared to be to talk a man into releasing are absolutely sure that you frisked when greeted by the a woman he held hostage at will be successful. If you are police. Their intelligence may be knifepoint on a subway. He had recaptured, the captor might use incomplete or incorrect, and you dropped to his hands and knees, violence to "teach others a lesson." don't want to bring about an , saying: "I'm begging you man, let 7. If anyone, including you, needs erroneous reflex reaction if you j the lady go." any special medical attention, balk. Remember, it's nothing This is the worst thing you can inform your captors. They do not personal. do, according to Bolz. want anyone to die on their hands "What the perpetrator needed to or they would not have taken The above is verbatim from the see in the police who confronted hostages in the first place. appendix of Hostage Cop, him at that moment was cool, 8. Be obeervant. You may be Captain Frank Bolz and Edward subdued authority... He was released or escape and can help Hershey/Rawson(New York: heightening the tension by the police. Try to remember Wade Publishers, 1979) displaying just the opposite-a everything that you see and hear. pp.313-316. lack of control and an abandonment of authority. You urge, cajole, reason, even order Manhattan legal Aid attorney must in negotiating: intelligence on occasion. When you employ who had represented him work behind the scenes. You must emotion, it is under a controlled previously on other charges. find out everything and anything situation, designed to elicit a "TII do what I can ·for you, about the captor and what makes specific reaction. You never beg" (p. Gilberto," the lawyer told him. He him tick, even what are his likes 12.5). thought for a second, nodded, and and dislikes. "If some guy shows up After Bolz arrived at the scene, held the knife out to a transit and says 'I'm that guy's brother he had police check the man's patrolman. and I know I can talk him out record. They brouih? in a This illustrates another absolute of there' .... first find out from the

38 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

guy's wife if maybe he hat.es his t.errorism is theater. Their goal is strengths and weaknesses," Bolz brother!" not to have a lot of people killed, says, "'We have permitted "You have to be able to raise and but to have a lot of people pool reporters to observe the lower his anxiety," Bolz said. "You watching. negotiations in action, but never to have to wear him down physically "In the theater of terrorism, become part of the incident. The and psychologically." the perpetrator is the star, the introduction of television cameras One guideline true for both local hostages are the supporting can sometimes spur antics by and int.emational situations, is: players, and the public is the the perpetrators of the · "Never challenge a t.errorist audience, spotlighted by the media siege-endangering not only the directly. Don't think you can "call which illuminates it. progress of negotiations but the his bluff." '7he role of the media is to safety of the hostages as well." If Qadaffi says he11 send suicide infonn people, to be the watchdog, '''A reporter can be a negotiator's hit teams to Washington, take him and to be an observer. They should ally or, inadvertently, at times his at his word. Even if he backs down, not be participants. If they enemy. someone else might take you up on become participants, they can be "When Bolz can use the presence it-a sympathizer or a "copycat, manipulated by the t.errol'ists." of the media to assure a worried who craves attention." Bolz said that when 'Flight 847 gunman that he will be arrested was hijacked last year,:"the media without being attacked by police Headline drama really lost its head when they made he is thankful for the press. If And make no mistake about it, that phone call to in the police ascertain that someone Bolz said, the goal of any t.errorist an attempt to 'serve the family' of conducting a siege is listening to is attention, and the media is one of the hostages." the radio, they can even use the a large consideration for that "The idea of bringing the media press to help advance negotiations. reason."You must remember that into a hostage incident has They did it to let Cat Olsen know that they understood he had not been trapped in the bank during a routine holdup. And they did it The Stockholm Syndrome again in lm, to tell a band of Croatian nationals who had It is named for the reaction of their captors, to prof.eel them frrrm ! the victims of a six-day siege in the possibk harm by the police! ; invaded the Yugoslav Embassy that U.N. Secretary General Kurt vault of a Swedish bank. Later one of the women said she ; Waldheim had received a copy of A lone gunman, trapped during was in love with the bank robber : their demands. a robbery attempt, herded a man and would wait for his release from ! and three women into the vault prison to marry him. ' wBut when newsmen phone and then demanded and received Psychologically, the captor has : their questions directly to a the release of a former confederate had life and death control over the : perpetrator-or worse, begin to who had been imprisoned. For victim and has allowed the victim : play amateur ~ychologist-while almost a week, under the most to survive, earning a sort of : the police are forced to sit intolerable conditions imaginable, everlasting gratitude, the ultimate helplessly, they are no longer the two men held off police. in transference. Cruelty, it appears, . journalists but participants and quite likely unqualified for' that Without plumbing facilities, all only served to heighten the role." hostages were required to relieve emotional value of those susceptible themselves into wastebaskets. One to it. The pattern has been called On the other hand, Bolz was of the women went through her survival identification. The Dutch, emphatic that the media should menstrual cycle without sanitary who equate most host.age cases with cover terrorist incidents. wlf napkins. Hostages were paraded military actions, call it aggressor hijacking becomes so commonplace into the vault door with a loaded identification, and they note that that it doesn't get media coverage, the perpetrators will simply gun held under their chins. They it is hardly a new phenomenon. were tied to safe deposit boxes with Europeans observed it extensively escalate the scale of violence until the media will have to cover it," metal wire around their necks, so amid the horrors of Nazi Bolz reasoned. . that if authorities bombarded the concentration camps, where some vault with tear gas the hostages victims earned places of honor with You may be surprised to learn, would faint and collapse against their captors by emulating them and Bolz added, that the Soviet Union the wire, choking to death. often outdoing the Nazis themselves . has problems with terrorists wbut · Finally, police drilled through in their cruel treatment of fellow you never hear about it because i they control their media." the vault, shot gas into it, and prisoiier8. I forced everyone out. But at the Meanwhile an open and free end, the four hostages encirckd (From Hostage Cop, Frank Bol.z) I society like America's has ~ I become increasingly vulnerable to

39 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

terrorism both from within and unaccounted-for explosives are from abroad. hidden throughout the country. • Not everyone who purports t.o be Not ideologues willing t.o die for their "noble cause" Bolz sees the "intemal anti-U.S. is actually willing t.o do so, Bolz terrorist" as not as ideologically noted, citing the suicide jeep attack motivated as he is generally on our military compound in perceived t.o be. This "idealism" is Lebanon as one illustration; there especially diminished in "second­ were triggering devices in the jeep and third- generation terrorists," t.o explode the ammunition in case Bolz explained, "whose concern the driver lost his nerve and now is with self-profit. They use jumped out! bankrobbing as a means t.o fund · For the same reason, according themselves. The cau8e is not so · t.o Bolz, the Japanese kamikaze important anymore, but the tactics pilots used t.o takeoff in planes have become a way of life." with no landing gear. Some foreign terrorists in "When these terrorists get away this country realJy are not from the reinforcement of their anti-America. 'They just see this group," he explained, "they are less country as a stage (we)) likely t.o truly believe that by dying illuminated by the media, of for their holy cause they will get an course)." aut.omatic ticket t.o heaven." Very real terrorist threats Bolz said he supports Reagan's are the various Palestinian and ·economic sanctions against Libya. Muslim groups. 'The PW will He added that "we must travel anywhere in the world," understand that an economic Bolz said, "t.o call attention t.o their boycott can take 1 112 years t.o fight against Israel." produce results." He recounted how they once As for stronger retaliation tried t.o put mercury in Haifa against Libya, he advised the oranges. Their hijackings and government not t.o play its hand. airport attacks are aimed at "If we do use military options, don't destroying t.ourism in Israel. say we are, just do it. On the other Here in America, Bolz points out hand, if we say we're going t.o do there exists "an infrastructure of something and then not do it, that's Muslim students (most of whom, even worse." of course, are not terrorists) that He quoted Teddy Roosevelt: provide a PLO terrorist with the "Speak softly but carry a big ability to move easily and invisibly stick." about." He does not favor retaliating Bolz notes that there are also with violence. "We must be "defunct American terrorists" absolutely certain we're retaliating (leftovers from the 1960s groups at the right people. If we retaliate like the ) and kill innocents or send out who will still offer PLO terrorists assassins-then we are the same "safe houses" and weapons as a as terrorists." • payback for former training they David Ni111n ia a frte•lontt tt•rittr from received in Libya! In addition, Bolz Broolrl11n, Nt1l1 York. He 1101 tt•orbd as a warned, substantial amounts of "'""'" 011d tditor of tllt flttlropolita 11 au· lion of The New York City Tribune.

40 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE by Neil C. Livingstone

1 erhaps it is a sign of the ism. Even that episode can be 1 TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE times. The first sentence attributed mse to a fortuitous UNION OP IOVllT IOCIALllT lllPU8UCI October 15 Commando P diagramed in the new Har­ set of circumstances and the I UNITID KINGDON AND llllLAND brace College Handbook is "The hi· .dogged determination of one Na­ Angry Brigade Anti-Hui LMgue jacked plane has safely landed." tional Security Council staffer 9lmck Liberation finrrt I9ritllh ..._,_, Terrorism, it seems, is an all­ than to any particular policy or Fnt ol May Group pervasive feature of modern life, design. Ft98 "*let lllfffy (Mudiael MICICllttyn C>tm· IN-MAC) ' inescapable even in a college More typical is the fact that I lnterNtlonal Mandi! Group (IMO) handbook on style. the hijackers of TWA flight 847 I lrtell frMClom Figh1.,. , lrilh Nallonal Ubaration Anny (INLA) Virtually every news magazine and the planners and state su~ I; lrlah ~n finrrt (IRA) and wire service named terrorism porters of the December Rome : lriall Aepublican Socleliat ...,,,. I IRSP) I'1 ltkera (I.AW) ' Militant epidemic on some lists. has yet to exact retribution· for I I National Front (NF) i j National l'9rty (NP) There is little promise of relief the bombings of the U:S. embas·. I · Peopla'I o.n-racy (PO) in 1986 with respect to interna­ sies in Beirut and Kuwait, the . l ,..oeeat1111tActton~1MF> , PnMaiona1 1r1a11 Republican /inrrt IPIRAI tional terrorism. Libya's erratic kamikaze attack on the U.S. Mar· 11 R9Clic:al StuCIWll Alliance (RSA) strongman, Colonel Muammar ine barracks at the Beirut airport 1 Reel Flag 74 Reel Hanel eon-ne1oa Qaddafi, has publicly declared that left 241 dead, and dozens 8hankhil ~ AMoclatton (8DA) that, if provoked, he will train of other outrages perpetrated by Sinn Fein (analvM Alona) II 8ocialiat .,,._.. l'9rty (SWPJ and equip Arab guerrillas for terrorists over the years. Twtankmy Troopa Out Movement (TOM) "terrorist and suicide missions" Critics contend that the Rea­ Ulltll' Defeflce Aaaocilttlon (UDAI against Israel and the United gan administration came to pow· Ulllar FrwClom Fight.,. (LIFF) Ullter flnltMtant tilrl!Mrl (UPV) States. er with talk about "swift and Ullter~~(UVF) Mohammed Abbas, the accused effective retribution" against Ulltll' .,,._.. Counc1 (UWCI Worl

a lack of Congressional impasse will. tical and prohibitively expensive ' Within the administration p~ The situation in Congress is I but would rank as a classic exam- posala to adopt a strong proactive even worse. Many members dis- pie of attempting to lock the barn policy against international ter- play a nearly total lack of under- door after the cows have already rorism have produced a firestorm standing about terrorism; some gotten out. of controversy replete with pub- go as far as to actually embrace Then there is Senator Dave lie bickering and accusatory late- certain terrorist groups as "free- Durenberger. Durenberger, chair- night phone calls laced with p~ dom fighters." man of the Senate Intelligence fanity between top officials. As an example of the inanities Committee, chided the adminis- Some senior CIA officials have and inconsistencies which abound tration for not consulting wi,th accused proponents of a tougher in Congress, Senator Howard Congress before acting to inter- policy of wanting to transport the Metzenbaum, who recently raised cept the plane bearing the Achille agency back to "the bad old days" the prospect of assassinating ter- Lauro hijackers, maintaining when it was vilified by Congress rorists, is the same legislator that such consultation is required and in the media. They maintain who, last year, blocked passage t>f under the War Powers Act. that a proactive posture would an administration bill designed to Not only can Durenberger's in- involve unacceptable risks and curtail support of foreign terror- terpretation of the War Powers never be fully understood or sup- ist groups by Ameriean citizens. Act be faulted but the kind of ported by the public. Others be- Metzenbaum contended that the consultation he is calling for is a lieve that it would be all right for legislation amounted to an sure formula for paralysis instead some other agency to pursue such abridgement of free speech. of action when the opportunity to a policy, just so long as it is not For pure fatuousness, howev- strike back against international the CIA. er, nothing exceeds Senator Gary terrorism occurs. It is also clear Many in the Pentagon also Hart's gratuitous suggestion in evidence of the degree to which have serious reservations about the wake of the Achille Lauro Congress has degenerated into putting the prestige and power of incident. "I think we ought to in- the role of critic rather than part- the U.S. armed forces on the filtrate terrorist groups," offered ner in the making of U.S. foreign line to combat terrorism. Fight- Hart. "I think we ought to antici- policy. ing terrorism is viewed in many pate these things and head them circles as a sordid and politically off." Response that works charged kind of warfare that will Perhaps a former Hart cam- When all is said and done, the inevitably tarnish military repu- paign aide, Frank Mankiewicz, U.S. response to international ter- tations and destroy careers. was right when he quipped that rorism must be more than solely Defense Secretary Caspar the Colorado senator "has had defensive and reactive; it must Weinberger has picked up this only two new ideas in his life: his also be proactive and preemptive. ' theme, articulating the belief that name and his age." Hart, it also In other words, terrorism will combat forces should be used ex- should be remembered, bears ·never be suppressed until we go ' tremely cautiously and then only more than his share of responsi- on the offensive and turn the with "clearly defined political and bility for the weakened state of hunters into the hunted. Since military objectives." To this end, the American intelligence and de- ·state-sponsored terrorist groups Weinberger has cited six tests fense capabilities needed to con- are eight times as lethal as those that should be met before any tend with international terrorism. lacking such support, the Unit- decision is made to employ force Not to be outdone by Hart as ed States must also find effec- abroad, which for all practical an exemplar of muddled thinking, tive ways to punish nations that purposes would rule out the use of Representative Barbara Mikulski aid and abet terrorist groups and I force in anything less than a gen- and several other members of provide them with safe havens. I eral war or an attack on the Unit- congress recently introduced bills Such efforts do not necessarily I ed States. to require such antiterrorist imply the use of force, although I Weinberger reportedly opposed measures as screening all ship force must surely remain an op- the interdiction of the Achille cargo and baggage, restricting tion. Cooperative measures to iso- Lauro hijackers and has even access to vessels and their car- late and punish states that vio- gone so far as to suggest that go, and various additional secur- late the norms of international I there might be a role for the Unit- ity measures aboard ship. Mikul- behavior, including trade sane- I ed Nations in combatting global ski submitted her legislative pro- I tions and travel boycotts, should terrorism, an organization that posal despite the fact that the be tried before military action. : I only two months ago, after more Achille Lauro incident was the However, European reluctance to than a decade of debate, finally only ship hijacking in more than join in U.S. sanctions against Lib- summoned up the courage to pass two decades. Mikulski's proposed ya only increases the likelihood of a watered-down resolution con- security enhancements, more- a military confrontation since the I demning international terrorism. over, would not only be imprac- failure of peaceful measures will I

42 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

make nonpeaceful measures al· rectly or indirectly, to terrorist· most inevitable. sponsoring states and to or· TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE President Reagan reportedly ganizations like the Palestine IOMAUA · . o.mocr.tiC Front far the Liberation at has given the green light to inten· Liberation Organization (PLO). (DFLS) Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) sified covert actions against ter· 2) Unless they are widely ob­ Somali Ubaration Front rorists and their patrons. This served, trade sanctions have little . Somali National Movement (SNM) Somali Salvation Front ISOSAF) includes stepped-up efforts to impact. Thus, trade, aid, and oth· Soma~ Vtbrkara' l'My (SWP) destabilize and undermine "bad er economic benefits, even most SUDAN · Buth Arab Soclaliat ,..rly actors" like Qaddafi and to en· favored nation status (MFN), Counct! tor tha Unity or Southam Sudan gage in so-called "black work" or should be withheld from countries Democratic Un.ioni1t Party .·-. · · Sudaneta Communist Party "dirty tricks" against individual that do not support U.S. sanc­ Suda- National Front · Sud1na1e Socialist l'apular Front terrorist organizations. American tions against terrorist-sponsoring TUNISIA agents have disrupted terrorist states. At the very minimum, Arab National RaHy (RNA) lalamic l'l"ogresllive Movement (MIP) communications and travel plans trade benefits should be denied to lllamic Trend MovaMnt (MTI) and have even sold them defective opportunistic and predatory nlf· M~t of Socialist Damocret1 (MOS) f\:Jpular Revolutionary Movement I MPR) weapons and bomb material. In tions that moved rapidly to fill fl:Jpular Unity Movement (MUP) . the vacuum left by the United . Prograuive Nationalist Front tor the Liberation one case, terrorists in Lebanon of Tunisia (FNPLT) were provided with ultrasensitive . States when it imposed sanctions Revolutionary Party of the Tunisian People on Libya. The imposition of ·new (PRPT) . bomb detonators that were re­ Tunillilln Armed Rallialllnca I RAT) sponsible for the explosion of a trade restrictions on Japan, West Tunilian Communiat Party (PCT) SOUTH AFRICA terrorist bomb when it was being Germany, and the United King· Alricen National Congr- (ANC) loaded into a vehicle.· dom, to name only a few of the Azanian Paople'a ()rgtiniaation (AZAPO) ~ Alricaniat Congreu (PAC) U.S. actions, nevertheless, re­ culprits, will place pressure on South Alricen Communiat Party I SACP) those governments to take a more ~ta Commando (Wit Kommando) main far short of a general decla· · IMNISH . ration of war against internation· · cooperative and responsible view Mustafa al Wa~ Bayyid Sayed International Bri• gacle al terrorism. In the event that the of the problem. IUl>Nt Reagan administration takes off 3) The Hughes-Ryan Act, Anya Nya . Azania Liberation Front (ALF) the gloves and opts for such a which requires congressional ap­ Sudan African Ubaration Front (SALF) strategy, what form is it likely to proval of all covert actions and Sudan African National Union (SANU) Sudan Communiat Party (SCP) take? Some of the initiatives that the reporting of such activities to Suda.- Sociallat Alpular Front ISSPF) could be considered are as fol· Congress, should be modified to UGANDA . Uganda Freaelom M~t (UFM) exempt operations against for· Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) eign terrorists. While progress Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) Today only a'bout 25 Uganda National Raliatanc:e Movement has been made to limit the num· (UNRM) cents out ofevery 100 ber of individuals consulted in Uganda l'Opular Front (UPF) · Ugandan People'• Movement (UPM) 0t Ugan· Congress, the figure is still too ' din Patriotic Movement dolla.rs ofthe WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO high in view of recent leaks re­ AalOCiation of l'9ople from Sahara (AOSARIO) Pentagon's budget ts garding U.S. antiterrorist activi· People's Front f0t the Liberation of Saguiat al Hamra Ind Rio de Oro (Poliaario) devoted to spedal ties. ZAIRE 4) For the most part, air Counc:il fOt the Liberation of Congo-Kinahaae (Conlllil pour la Ubliration du Congo·Kinahaaa operations, despite strikes and salvos from battle­ -CLC) ships have little real utility in Congo National Uberalion Front (Front de Lib­ thefact that eration Nationale du Congo-FLNC) combatting terrorism and conjure National Movement fOt Union and Reconcilia· low-tntenstty warfare lion in Zaire (Mouvament National pour l'Union up the image of trying to kill a fly at la Reconciliation-MNUR) ts the predominant with a sledgehammer. More sur­ Peoples Army of the Oppraaaact In Zaire gical methods are needed that in· (APOZA) . . warfare ofour ttme. l'9optea Revolutionary !'arty (PRP) volve targeting individual ter· ZIMBABWE African National Cou~ (ANC) rorists and their leadership for Patriotic Front (PF) assassination. This would require Zimbll.bwa African National Union (ZANU) lows: Zimbllbwa African Pllopla'a Union IZAPUl 1) The United States should en· · a change in Executive Order gage in politics and hold 12333, which currently prohibits the Soviet Union, its East-bloc al· the government from engaging in . . _ . should be treated as such. lies, and client states like Libya, assassination. " We were fortunate indeed that Cuba, South Yemen, Nicaragua. In this ~gard, it must be rec· the Achille Lauro hijackers who and Syria responsible for violence , ognized that terrorism is a form ·were intercepted over the Medi· flowing from their support of var· of warfare. Accordingly, our 'ob­ terranean and forced to land in ious terrorist movements. Closer . ject should not be to arrest and Sicily were not brought back to relations with the Soviet Union . try international terrorists but to the United States to stand trial. should be predicated on a signifi· destroy them. Terrorist acts oc· One can only imagine the media cant reduetion in the pre~n t level curring abroad should be regard· circus that would have resulted. · of 1mpJ10rt Moscow prmtidea, di· · ed as acts of war (or piracy) and Moreover, there probably would 43 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 have been 500 ambulance-chasing that Americans are restricted by lawyers eager to offer their free Just asprivateers the U.S. government from travel· services to the terrorists for free ing to Libya while Libyans are in exchange for the publicity that were once granted permitted access to the United the case would surely have gener· licenses by the States. According to the U.S. ated. All, of course, would have Immigration and Naturalization claimed that they were motivated Congress to hunt Service (INS), there are 3,501 solely by high ideals. And think pirates, so too should nonimmigrant Libyans in this what a forum such a trial would country; however, the INS has no have provided for the terrorists generous bounties be idea of the whereabouts of more to heap invective on the United paidfor the death or than a third of them. States .and Israel. forceful delivery to Forty-six percent are students; 5) One intriguing idea might be nevertheless, some of these "stu· to get the private sector involved the United States of dents" are in their mid·30's, have by issuing letters of marque and fugitiveforeign intelligence or military back· reprisal to enterprising counter· grounds, and appear to be living terrorist entrepreneurs, as pro­ terrorists. on incomes of more than $40,000. vided for in Article 8 of the Con· One so-called "student" in Canada stitution. Just as privateers were abortive 1980 mission to rescue turned out to be a Libyan pre­ once granted licenses by the Con· the American hoataies in Iran viously expelled from West Ger· gress to hunt pirates, so too ·serves, at least in part, as a many for terrorist crimes. Two should generous bounties be paid graphic illustration of the prob­ other Libyan "students" were con· for the death or forceful delivery ·!ems affecting this nation's spe­ victed and sentenced to prison to the United States of fugitive cial operations readiness. terms for purchasing weapons foreign terrorists. This would be Today only about 25 cents out and silencers from an FBI under· a marked improvement over the of every 100 dollars of the Penta· cover agent in Philadelphia. present law that simply provides gon's budget is devoted to special At a time when the leader of rewards for information leading operations, despite the fact that Libya threatens to sponsor terror· to the arrest and conviction of low-intensity warfare is the pre­ ist violence in the streets of the certain terrorists. dominant warfare of our time. United States, the presence of a Rewards of several million dol­ Only a handful of our top military large Libyan student population lars or more for the notorious men have any special operations within our borders, not to men· · Abu Nidal and the murderers of experience, and many are unsym· tion those in Canada and Mexico, TWA Flight 847 passenger Rob­ pathetic to the notion of elite is not a comforting thought. ert Stethem could be expected to troops like the U.S. antiterrorist In the final analysis, the worst have a chilling effect on the mas­ Delta unit or even the army's way to address the problem of terminds and gunmen of interna­ Special Forces. Indicative of this ·international terrorism is to pos· tional terrorism, so long accus­ bias, Delta is oriented more to­ ture and make hollow threats, tomed to carrying out their atroc­ ward rescue operations than to­ which, when the United States ities with impunity. It would re­ ward actually striking back at fails to respond forcefully to ter· quire them to spend far greater terrorists. rorist outrages, make us seem energy and resources on their It is time to get serious about like the proverbial "paper tiger.~ own security; energy and re· developing the special operations Moreover, such threats may only sources that otherwise would capabilities needed to successfully goad terrorists into more bitter have gone into the commission of engage terrorists and to prede­ and frequent attacks against U.S. terrorist acts. ploy such units where they can targets. It is time, therefore, for While it has proven very diffi­ be of most use in times of need. the administration to lower its cult to infiltrate terrorist groups, Promotion channels must be rhetoric and to increase its level some success has been achieved opened up to special operations of action, striking back hard in compromising terrorist oper­ specialists so that their views are at terrorists and their patrons ations through the payment of reflected in the decision-making . whenever the opportunity pre· bribes. The availability of large councils at the Pentagon, and sen ts itself. bounties would entice at least more priority must be given to Ultimately, it is hoped that our some terrorists to sell out their expanding, training, and equip­ actions will speak louder than own comrades and confederates. ping special operations forces. words.• 6) The U.S. unconventional 7) It is time to get control of war-fighting capability is cur­ our borders. Not only do we need rently hamstrung by too few to tighten the screws on illegal . Dr. Nril Liri11galunt ia Prraidr11t of tltr resources, interservice rivalries, Crnltr on Trrror~ni and S11b11atio11a/ immigration but visas should be Con/lid in Waslti11gto11, D.C. a11d 011 Ad· and a lack of support at the high­ denied to nationals of states that j1111rl Profriaor in lhr Grurgflow11 U11irrr• est levels of the Pentagon. The upport terrorism. It is ironic Billf Natio11al &ruril'll Sludira program. 44 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986 DIE.FUSING THE RADICAL 1ENTENTE by Evans Joh11so11

ncidents of terror against the · to the United Nations Charles The first working paper on peoples, facilities, and busi­ Lichenstein, who served under state terrorism, prepared QY I nesses of free world nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick. former U.S. Ambassador to Thai­ are not random acts of violence, Lichenstein was known then for land William Kintner and nation­ but part and parcel of a coordi· his sharp tongue and clear under­ al security specialist Col. Richard nated and directed war that the standing of the role the Soviet Lawrence, USAF (ret.), identified West. thus far, has failed to con­ Union has played in polarizing three support-groups of nations front with the same sense of pur­ nations and peoples against each that enable the "radical entente" pose and power that enabled the other since 1945. of Libya, Syria, Iran, North Ko­ Allies to defeat the Axis bloc in He is also a critic of the trend rea, and Cuba to thrive: World War II. in the Reagan administration to • "Some are active sponsors This is the clear conclusion speak loudly but carry a small -the Soviet Union is at the fore­ reached by an assembly of ex­ stick against terrorism. front; perts on terrorism, Soviet foreign "The combination of (Secretary • "Some provide ancillary life­ policy, and NATO military policy, of State) 's wrath . support systems; who met last month in Tel Aviv and that of The New York Times • "Some, by their silence or at a conference on State Terror· (which had recently run an edi­ their attempt to buy off the ter­ ism and the International Situa­ torial about terrorism headlined rorists, lend legitimacy to them tion, sponsored by the Interna· "We're Beginning to Get Angry") and prevent concerted and effec­ tional Security Council (ISC). must be causing fear and trem­ tive international counterterror­ The participants did more than bling throughout the terror cir­ ism." wring their hands and recite the cuit from Damascus and Tripoli "Although individual acts of known list of atrocities that have to Nicaragua and Cuba," Lichen­ terrorism may appear to be ran­ been written in blood on the pages stein quipped. dom because of the opportunistic of the last 15 years. They singled The former ambassador listed nature of each event," the report out a "radical entente" of Soviet what he saw as the three key says, "much of the evidence points client states that provide the sup­ aspects of modern terror: to an alarming degree of coor· port network for most terrorist • Terrorism is war. "We are dination among the perpetrators groups. speaking of a weapons system with·a set of well-defined goals." More importantly, they spelled that is devastatingly effective." Although the Kremlin may not out a plan of action to counter • With very few exceptions, directly controJ groups such as international terrorism, a pro­ all terrorism is state-sponsored, the PLO, ItaJy's Red Brigades, or gram that must be spearheaded state-implemented, or state­ Direct Action in France, Moscow's by the United States. condoned. "guidance and influence can be "The campaign of terror has • "State terrorism, handwring­ found behind almost an acts become a regular form of war­ ers to the contrary notwithstand­ of internationa] terrorism," the fare," the conference's Tel Aviv ing, is controllable." working group concurred. Declaration asserted. During several closed-door "The alarming combination of "It is not deployed in a set bat­ working sessions, retired U.S. five radicaJ nations" cJearJy doc­ tle with a direct confrontation of and Israeli senior military intelli­ umented by Dr. Avigdor HaseJ­ military forces, but is, for all gence officers butted heads and korn, "working in concert ... has that, a blunt and brutal military finally reached agreement. Form· targeted the West, principally instrument, extremely flexible, er ambassadors from Japan, Eu­ and uJtimateJy the United States, adaptable to almost any cir· rope, and the United States, two to drive U.S. presence and pow­ cmmtance, unpredictable in its former heads of state .from Latin er back to the shores of North thrusts.- reads the declaration. America, and serving Israeli mili­ America. ·And. since terror does indeed tary officers specializing in coun· "Their repeated demonstration unify, it tends to paralyze its terterrorism argued about the of the capabiJity to foment well­ targets and victims, and often most dangerous groups and na­ timed terrorist attacks over wide succeeds in draining them of the tions. Finally, they spelled out ranges of the globe clearly show will to fight back ... specific options for quelling the their intent to stretch thin the The declaration was re~d by "rising tide" of international ter­ forces and response capabiJity of former deputy U.S. Ambassador ror. the United St.ates, so as to emas- 45 SPECIAL EDITION -- ,5 AUGUST 1986

culate it as the ultimate defender the broadest range of products NATO programs, nor have they of Western goals and values." associated with terrorism. been willing to consider signifi­ The working group concluded It should be a matter of highest cant sanctions against countries that there is no doubt that Mos­ national priority that the devel­ that.. support or condone terror­ cow is pulling strings behind the opment of appropriate command ism. ecenes, though "it has taken con­ structure be ready to provide ap­ "However," the general director siderable steps to not appear in propriate forces, adequate com­ of the Center for Political Re­ the foreground of terrorist sup- munications, and operational search in Athens said in a paper, planning. It should work to coor­ "The need for common European dinate all government agencies in action against terrorism is becom­ "The campaign of order to achieve the desired goal." ing more and more urgent with • Intelligence-"This mecha­ rising terrorist activity" on the . terror has become a nism should engage in the ex­ continent. regularform of change, collection, analysis, and "What seems to be lacking sharing of intelligence." . more than anything else in Eu­ warfare... terror does • Judicial-"This mechanism rope," Loulis said, "is a common tndeed terrify, it should be prepared to impose will." sanctions, embargoe,s: preemptive Joel Lisker said that Senator tends to paralyze its activities, and other appr-opriate Jeremiah Denton (R-) targets and victims actions." · has already included some of the and often succeeds in • Legislative-"This mecha­ conference proposals in legis­ nism should make recommenda­ lation now before the U.S. Senate. draining them ofthe tions to legislative bodies for sta­ Specifically, Senate bill S. 1941, will tofight back." tutes, laws, and regulations. International Terrorism Deter­ • Psychological-"This mecha­ rence Act, and S. 1942, Military nism should immerse itself in ex­ Installation Security and Antiter­ amining the dimension of thE' vio­ rorism Act of 1985, Lisker said, port." lence inherent in acts of terrorism require the government to desig­ And, the group said, "there is and use the examination of that nate and punish economically and no question that without the ex­ measure of violence and take ap­ politically nations that support tensive support network" of the propriate action." terrorist groups in any way. The radical entente, "the terrorist The working group also sug­ second bill mandates tighter se­ would be, at best, a minor irritant gested the mechanisms work to curity for U.S. military facilities and a short-lived phenomenon." some degree with the media so and stricter control over access to Once identified, once exposed, that the nature and extent of the national security intelligence and the sponsors and the actors on the terror threat can be more widely technology to counter espionage. stage of international terrorism understood, and so that there can Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., must be dealt with. This was the develop more support for what­ USA (ret.), a special adviser to unequivocal conclusion of the Tel ever actions the government may the secretary of state for Latin Aviv conference. take to counter terrorism, includ­ American affairs, drew special The group, headed by Robert ing preemptive raids-a policy attention to "narco-terrorism" in Morris and Capt. Eugene McDan­ hinted at by Secertary of State the Western Hemisphere, and the iel, USN ( ret. ), who was a POW in Shultz on April 3, 1984, but not romantic image some U.S. politi­ Vietnam for six years, and who yet acted upon, at least to the cians paint of the Sandinista re­ now is president of the American public's knowledge. gime in Nicaragua. Defense Foundation, proposed The Tel Aviv Declaration also A singular difficulty in combat­ that a five-part "coordinating urged the Reagan administration ing terrorism via legislation has mechanism" of specialists in six to crack down on any nation, in­ been the handful of members of fields be established on a national cluding U.S. allies, that does not Congress who regularly frater· basis, first in the United States. vigorously combat terrorism, "by ;nize with known Communist and Composed of military, diploma­ bringing to bear alike on nations Soviet bloc front groups, · such as tic, intelligence, psychological, so­ that support, or condone, or toler· the World Peace Council. cial, and economic experts, the ate terrorism, the full weight of But Sumner reserved his wrath mechanism should be "permanent its economic and political lever­ for Jesse Jackson, a presidential in nature and designed to operate age." contender in 1984. continuously." Its primary mecha­ Although some European na­ "Fidel Castro and Daniel Orte­ nisms or tasks would be: tions have developed bilateral po­ ga have developed a special di­ • Strategic-"This mechanism lice and intelligence programs to mension to their institutionalized should establish and monitor, con­ fight terrorism, Dr. John C. Loul­ form of terrorism," Sumner told tinuously, the development of na­ is said that they have not been the conference. "I refer to the tional strategy for copirtg with able to devise p_an·European or drug and narcotic connection 46 SPECIAL EDITION -- S AUGUST 1986 Traveling Despite Terrorism

While foreign terrorists have yet to bring their though it is not the only factor. the appeal of carnage to the shores of the United States, Ameri­ international travel has diminished in the wake of cans traveling abroad are considered prime tar­ recent terrorist assaults. gets. Two out of every five international terrorist High-risk countries in Europe (especially Greece attacks result in American casualties or damage to and Italy), Latin America, and the Middle East, U.S. property. have experienced a definite decline in tourism. The impact of recent threats and attacks has According to the American Society of Travel shaken the travel industry. Americans traveling Agents (ASTA), there is a noticeable change in abroad, either for business or holiday, are question­ American travel plans to countries that have been ing their safety in light of international terrorism. the scene of recent terrorist attacks. In many cases, Americans have decided to alter Air trav4!1 is not the only area affected. Three their plans, or cancel their trips altogether. major cruise lines have altered their Mediterranean The insecurity felt by the American traveler is summer itineraries as a result of the public's con­ reflected in current travel patterns. While total e~ about potential terrorist attacks. Passenger U.S. travel was up 10.6 percent in 1985, travel perceptfon of wlnerability has led to "significant" abroad rose by less than half that amount. Al- reductions in advance bookings, according to ASTA. Norway is even supplying counterterrorist "sea marshals" to sail with one of its major cruise which provides a financial base lines. The Princess Cruise Line has even moved the for the terrorism. Simply stated, "Love Boat" to safer waters. Its new routing will the drugs flow north. and the have it carrying passengers between Seattle and arms and money return south. Alaska. ·1 find it particularly interest­ Americans should continue to travel. If we stay ing and quite depressing to see home out of fear, the terrorists will have won. Jesse Jackson exhorting the Although their targets are often American people youth of our country to reject the and property, terrorists are actually striking at the drug scene. while at the same fundamental values of Western democracies. time he and his wife are enthu· Americans, however, should show prudence siastically and publicly support­ when choosing a destination. While Libya is the ing the very states and their lead­ only country off limits to U.S. travelers because of ers who are are moving drugs terrorism, several government agencies suggest into this country and other coun­ Americans practice caution if they are visiting tries of the free world.· Syria, Turkey, Colombia, Peru, or Guatemala. Two former Israeli diplomats, Americans also are encouraged to avoid Lebanon, Gideon Rafael and Shaul Rama· South Yemen, Angola, Uganda, El Salvador, and ti, suggested that an Alliance to Nicaragua, if possible. Combat Terrorism (ACT) be es­ Choosing a destination can be a difficult decision tablished internationally. for adventurous travelers. In the wake of recent ACT, Ramati said, would coor­ events, common sense should be the guide as to dinate intelligence gathering spe­ where to go. Avoiding countries afflicted by inter· cifically about terrorism by agen· nal strife is not necessarily succumbing to terrorist cies of the member nations. More tactics, but may be a wise decision. pragmatically, it would build an American travelers do have a method for fight· international counterterror par· ing back against international terrorists. The pass· amilitary unit, to strike at terror· port can be an effective tool to put economic pres­ ists and to rescue hostages. sure on countries who support terrorism with their Because the force would not actions or lack of action. Countries whose econo­ belong to one nation, terror mies rely heavily on tourism, for example Greece groups could not hold a specific and Italy, can be affected. By avoiding countries government hostage by kidnap­ that refuse to enforce proper safety measures or ping its leaders to force the re· those that allow captured terrorists to escape jus­ lease of jailed terrorists. • tice, Americans can express their opposition to such indifference to or complicity with internation· BNu Jabaoa u a national securit11 re· Jlfl'ln al 'l1le New York City Tribune, and • /or9n' Jliddu East correspondent spe· rieliriwf i• tn"rorill U8Ut,B, ~

47 SPECIAL EDITION -- 5 AUGUST 1986

al terrorism. Even though the travel ~visory has been lifted, Greece still feels the impact of recent events. . Tr~veling abroad is still • safe and should be enjoyable. Of the 24.7 million Americans who trav­ eled to foreign lands in 1985,·only 161 were injured by terrorists. Statistics for 1985 confirm that the probability of becoming a fatality of terrorism is literally less than one in a million. There is a greater probability of being killed on the way to the airport ·in an auto accident than at the hands of terrorists in an airport attack. . To put the threat into perspective, the probabili­ ty of dying in a fall at home is 276 times greater than in a terrorist attack. For every American who was fatally wounded by terrorists in 1985, 25 Americans drowned in their own home. International terrorism should be a concern for the American traveler. However, with a little com­ mon sense, Americans can continue to travel safe­ ly. By avoiding countries that directly or indirectly give aid to terrorists, Americans can enjoy their travel, defend their democratic integrity, and dem­ onstrate their contempt for unacceptable behav­ ior. -611 John N. Tenuta Joltn N. Tenuta it a rtararch aamlant Jor the Center on Ttrror­ iam and Subnational Conjlid.

48

-bU.I . QOVERNMENT PAINTINQ OFF'ICE:l 9 8 6 "'t 9 0 -9 5 7 I It 0 0 7 7 SAF/AAR,PENTAGON WASHINGTON,DC 20330 - 1Q24

FIRSTCLASS

(NEWSPAPER - EXPEDITE) SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: FRIIYU', 7 NOVEMBER 1986

WASHINGTON POST 7 NOVEMBER 1986 Pg.27

Charles Krauthammer' • polished it off at the aitj>ort)-and a, · Which is why hostage families should. planeload of weapons. ; not make foreign policy. Victims' families Which brings us to the bizarre part; don't decide the punishment of do1Mstic 1 the deal being discussed. In exchange for criminals. Courts do that. Courts were Government helping to "curb terrorism" and release invented so that the general interest (it American hostages held in Lebanon the' is "The People"-not "The Victim's United States helps Iran get spare Parts Fa.mily"-"v. John Doei would replace for its war against Iraq. Now, nothint· private vengeance. Diplomacy was in­ As Rescue would be more destructive to American. ivented. to secure the general safety of · interests in the Persian Gulf than ali' the nation, not the safety of individuals. Iranian victory over Iraq. And nothing• Why has our diplomacy been turned on Squad prevents that outcome more than Iran'' I its head? To a certain extent, all societies ; technological inferiority. The high-tech · are concerned about rescuing individu- • When Lyndon Johnson sent the Ma­ weapons bought by the shah are on thei als. (The ~ge. is particularly compelling, .... rines into the Dominican Republic in shelf for lack of spare parts. Restoring. I and most Justified, when the individuals' 1965, the official justification was to the flow could be a crucial factor iia' · are POWs and others captured in servR::e · safeguard and evacuate endangered helping Iran win the war. ' '' to country.) All the more so in America; Americans. To no one's surprise, our Which is exactly why the mullahs are where individualism is a uniquely powei:~ boys stayed on a bit to put down a swallowing their hatred for the Great ful creed. But these are still insufficient communist threat and install a friendly Satan and offering to deal. (The mullahs, 1 explanations for the rescue fixation oi also desperate for money, are demanding : American foreign policy of the last IS' (and, mind you, a democratic)· govern-' years. ·,,- ment. That is how we used to do things: $500 million in frozen assets and U.S. when for traditional geopolitical reasone help in raising oil prices.) After six years, . The power of ~elevision is, of course;· we needed to intervene, the rescue of they are just sho~ of toppling Iraq. Any 1· one factor. On Video, such abstractions . Americans was a convenient pretext. marginal boost to their war effort could as national interest or collective secu: · Rescue is a pretext no more. It lid be decisive. , ,· I rity have no meaning. They cannot Ile · become an end in i~lf, a primary,~ For the United States, preventing I:t: represented in pictures. A grieving fami~ - sive end of American diplomacy. In tlwl 1amic fanaticism from sweeping througb '. · ly can. ''" process, American foreign policy bas be-. the Persian Gulf is a crucial national' !-fore in:tportant, however, is leadel:'-, come a slave to 00.,tages. From the. interest. And yet, as a ransom for hO!f." I ship, a failure of leadership. It takee . Vietnam POWs to the Maya~ from' tages ~ protection money against ~ · . .courage to. ri_s~ the ~fety of visib~ the Iranian to the TWA hostages, from · ture terrorism, we are considering alter.. , countable md1V1duals m the name oi Nicholas Daniloff to David Jacobsen:' ing our policy, tilting toward Iran aocf I some larger, national purpose. Wartime' · American diplomacy has moved to an" thus jeopardizing that interest. (Anli' leaders-Lincoln and Eisenhower-had astonishing degree from the traditional more than just consideririg. The Post' I precisely that kind of courage. Courage · pursuit of national interest to the rescue . reports that the release of three Ameri-i . IS not to be confused with callousne•. of individuals. We have become an inter-'. can hostages in Lebanon over the past 14: Preferring nation over individual was a national rescue squad. .r.; months followed secret shipments of ~ , decision they made with great agon:Y. · But they made it. .. ,. · And now, with the Mcfarlane ~ · ;i itary cargo to Iran.) Such a capituJatioO. We are unwilling to. And so long as we ~ the individualization of American foreig;i: would constitute an appalling act of dere~ ' .>IJ are'. America will remain hostage, by· policy reaches its apex. Iran has revealed · liction. Easy for me to say, What if I had I choice. In exchange for consideration&·' that, in September, President Reagaa· that include shipments of military equip. : sent Robert Mcfarlane and four othera: loved one being held hostage in Be~ Wouldn't I be screaming for the govern;:· ment to Iran, three American hostages on a bizarre diplomatic mission to T~ . have been released in Lebanon during ran. According to the speaker of t.Jie" ment to do anything necessary to get th~ · hostages back? Of course, I would. Fami: the past 14 months. During the past two Iranian parliament, they came bearing months, three new Americans hostage Irish passports, a Bible, a cake in the · lies are right to use every instrumei1t' they can to force government to capit~ ' have been seized in the streets of Beirut. shape of a key (it never reached ita• This is commerce without end. destination: hungry revolutionary guards late. ' •

:r SUPPID1ENTAL CLIPS: FRU:ll>.Y I 7 NOVEMBER 1986

NEW YORK TIMES 6 NOVEMBER 1986 Pg.l Internal Strife Stirs Iran to Rethink Foreign Policy • II)' ELAINE SCIOLINO McFarlane, the former American Na­ policy." ...,.i • Tiie Hft Yortr ?1- tional Security Adviser. Mr. Hashem!. a protq~ of Ayatollah - "lbe Iranians may have only been Montazeri with followers In the Baal­ UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Nov. 5 - bek area of Lebanon, ran an Isfahan-, 1be war with Iraq and a desperate eco­ trying to get from the Americana the based operation that enjoyed virtual in-1 nomic situation have Intensified the in. arms and spare parts paid for before dependence in its training and prosely·: temal turmoil In Iran, prompting Ira· the revolution that were never de­ Uzlng of Moslem fundamentalists from nlan leaders to rethink some aspects of livered," said Shaul Bakhaah, a profes­ around the world. foreign policy, according to diplomats sor of history at George Mason Univer­ Two members of Parliament and and experts on Iran. sity who writes extensively on Iran. "It other Iranians, including Ahmed Mon· In addltloo, these experts say that certainly doesn't signal a willingness to tazeri, who Is believed to be a distant Improve relations with the United relative of the Ayatollah, were arrested 10me Iranian leaders may be question­ with Mr. Hashem!. Iranian sources ing the wisdom of giving unlimited sup- . States.'' But Iran's Internal situation remains said rumors were untrue that Ayatol· port to radical Islamic groups abroad, lah Montazeri's son was also arrested. that been unclear to outs.Ide political analysts ud a campaign has stepped l'(o Universal Backing up to dllcredit Ayatollah Hussein All with little access Inside the country, Montazeri, the designated successsor and making conclusions about what In addition, Ayatollah Montazeri's to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the happens behind the closed doors of criticism of Government-run industry Ayatollah Khomeini's home In the Te­ his support of private property and hi~ Iranian spiritual leader. Mr. Montazeri 1ppeal for an end to persecution of "lib­ Is a passionate promoter of exporting heran suburbs is a risky business. Experts agree that the various :erals and moderates" does not sit well revolution. moves coincide with an increasingly with younger radicals who favor "Because of very low reserves In public power struggle inside Iran that :Sweeping economic and social changes. hard currency and gold, the regime is has been reflected in recent months In -He has never enjoyed the universal In a tight economic bind," said Shah­ policy decisions, in shifts In personnel :backing of the ruling Council of Ex­ rough Akhavi, professor of government and In official statements. Contllcung ·perts that appointed him as Ayatollah at the University of . statements by Iranian leaders on .Khomeini's successor, and he never re­ "Iran needs arms; It needs to sell its whether Iran would be willing to ne­ "Ceived the backing of the senior so­ gotiate with the United States to help -called grand ayatollahs, who oppose oil, and for these reasons It may be .the idea of one cleric as political head trying to project a better Image free hostages believed held by Shiite extremists In Lebanon Is only the most .Qf state. abroad." recent example. : But no evidence supports rumors in· As evidence of fiexibillty In Iranian Although It Is unlikely that these 1lde Iran that Ayatollah Montazeri had policy, some experts cite several re­ developments put Ayatollah Monta· _submitted his resignation to Ayatollah cent developments. These Include the zert's succession in doubt, it Is becom· .Khomeini, when the elder cleric sum­ arrest last month of the head of the or· Ing more apparent, the experts said, moned him to Teheran after the ganizatlon charged with exporting that he will be unable to govern with Hashemi arrest. Iranian scholars say the same authority as Ayatollah Kho­ ;..\yatollah Montazerl has been deslg­ Iran's revolution, the settlement last •ated the next spiritual leader of Iran week of a dispute Involving a $1 billion meini and may have to share power with other clerics. · and cannot reject it loan to France, and Iran's key role in Similarly, experts on Iran say noth­ August In helping to negotiate an The arrest of Mehdi Hashemi, the brother of Ayatollah Montazeri's son­ Jng substantiates rumors that Ayatol· agreement in the Organization of Pe­ in-law, who headed the powerful Bu­ lab Khomeini suffered a severe heart troleum Exporting Countries. reau for Liberation Movements attack ~ canno~ function in day-to­ In addition, the experts said that If Abroad, and other Montazeri loyalists day poht1cs. Thit said that only the Iran aided In the release of the Amer­ on charges Including murder, kidnap­ Iranian leader could have written re­ ican hostage David P. Jacobsen In ping and illegal possession of weapons, cent letters attributed to him and acted trlth swiftness and authority against . Lebanon on Sunday, u reporta suggest. Is seen by some experts as an attempt to curtail Ayatollah Montazeri's lnfiu­ ~r. Hasheml's group. that might indicate a wtlllqness to ence In foreign policy. • Nowhere has debate over policy been have quiet direct contacts witlf. the more apparent than in determining · United States to facilitate shipments of Advocate of Exporda& Rewludoa Iran's strategy In Its war With Iraq, · arms, and not to Improve relations. While pursuing a moderate policy at ~w In Its seventh year. "This ls a time 1be Reagan Administration said to­ home, Ayatollah Montazeri has advo­ ol extraordinary turmoil and behind : day that It was pursuing through many cated exporting the Iranian revolution. the scenes Infighting Inside Iran," said -channels the release of the Americans He meets regularly with Lebanese Shi· Gary Sick, author of a recent book " All lte leaders during their pilgrimages to ·fall Down," on Iran's revolutlo~ and held in Lebanon. A senior Admlnlstra· Iran and has succeeded in channeling the hostage crisis. "All the signs from lion official confirmed that the United money, weapons ud other support for the outside suggest there is a great States was working with other coun­ various Islamic movements. deal of internal dispute, largely about trieS to try to free the hostages and " These arrests are related to the _ l,be war and how it is to be fought," said refused to rule out that Iran might be running debate over who should control Mr. Sick, who was on the National Se­ one of them. (Page AlO.J Iran's foreign policy," Mr. Bakhash curity Council during the Iranian revo­ 1be experts on Iran warned against said. ."There ls no doubt they discredit lution and the seizure In 1979 of the attributing toO much Importance to the Montazeri's partJcular line and weaken United States Embassy in Teheran. reported visit to Iran by Robert C. him politically, but It Is less a struggle over succession than an argument over THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE ISAF/AA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS ANO BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE. MEANING AND IMPACT OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES ODES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TD THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

Sununer 1986, Vol 64, No. 5 FOREIGN AFFAlll_S Pgs. 901-922 Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

-ah.am D. Sofaer

Terron.m po

II One reason for the law's ineffectiveness is that terrorism, in essence, is criminal activity. In applying law domestically, gov-

Abraham D. Sofaer is Legal Adviser to the Depanment of State. Previ­ ously, he was a federal district judge in New York. This anicle is based on the Sulzbacher Lecture delivered at the Columbia University School of Law, April 5, 1986. Legal citations have not been included to facilitate ease of reading; they are available from the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Depanment of State, Washington •. D.C. 20520.

------Denlae Brown. Editor ------­ Herbert J. Coleman, Chief, News Clipping & Analysis Service (SAF/AA) 695-2884 902 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 903 ernments seek to punish and deter crime as effectively as basis for conflicting arguments as to its purpose. At its worst possible. But they recognize that law cannot eliminate crime. the law has in important ways actually served to legitimize They can expect even less of the law in dealing with interna­ international terror, and to protect terrorists from punishment tional terronsm. The world has no international police force as criminals. These deficiencies are not the product of negli­ or judicial system. gence or mistake. They are intentional. The stock response to complaints about the law's failure to III deal effectively with terrorism is that more laws are needed. That is a misleading answer. Important gaps do exist in the Americans too readily assume that others agree that at least legal structure that governs terrorist acts, and the Reagan certain aspects of international terror are unacceptable. While Administration is working with Congress and with other na­ many fanatics obviously approve of terror, less recognized and tions to dose them. For example, the U.S. government lacks a more significant is the fact that the acceptance of terror is far Cf) domestic legal basis to prosecute the terrorists who killed an more widespread. Indeed, many nations regard terrorism as a tU trj American citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, during the October 1985 legitimate means of warfare. () Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking, or the terrorists who killed The United Nations General Assembly began devoting spe­ H ::t:' four American civilians on a hijacked Trans-World Airlines cial attention to the subject of terrorism after two especially t-1 flight earlier that year. The Senate has passed a statute estab­ heinous actions. On May 30, 1972,Japanese terrorists, working t!j lishing jurisdiction for terrorist murders of Americans, and its with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, attacked t:l adoption by the House would be welcome. Americans must civilian passengers at Lod Airport in Israel with automatic ..,H not deceive themselves, however, that new laws, dosing gaps, weapons, killing 28 and wounding 78. On September 5, 1972, H will overcome the problems that render law ineffective. Recent terrorists from the Black September organization murdered @ N events have demonstrated that, even when laws dearly govern 11 members of the Israeli Olympic Team in Munich. particular conduct, they are often disregarded or otherwise fail On September 8, 1972, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Wald­ to achieve their purpose. heim asked for inclusion in the General Assembly agenda of N The reasons for the law's failure tolerably to control terror­ an item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorism and other N ism go much deeper than the absence of law enforcement forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human ()0 authority or mechanisms. International law and cooperation in lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." He urged "that all 8 less controversial areas have often proved reasonably effective. concerned turn away from senseless and destructive violence," 0 titil In the area of terrorism, however, the law has failed to punish and noted that the world community should continue "to exert ::0 and deter those who use violence to advance their political its utmost influence in seeking peaceful ways" to find solutions ...... goals. "for the problems underlying such acts of terrorism." \0 Civilized nations have tried to control international terrorism The secretary-general's statement evoked angry opposition, co by condemning it, by treating it as piracy, by prosecuting which took the immediate form of protests against considering °' terrorists under the laws of affected states, by creating inter­ terrorism without considering its causes. The secretary-general national norms establishing as criminal certain acts wherever reiterated his request on September 20, but acceded to the committed, and by cooperating through extradition and other pressures by adding that it was no good considering terrorism devices in aiding nations attacked by terrorists. An appraisal of "without at the same time considering the underlying situations these efforts leads to a painful conclusion: the law applicable which give rise to terrorism and violence in many parts of the to terrorism is not merely flawed, it is perverse. The rules and world." He assured the protesters that he did not intend "to declarations seemingly designed to curb terrorism have regu­ affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding larly included provisions that demonstrate the absence of in­ colonial and dependent peoples seeking independence and ternational agreement on the propriety of regulating terrorist liberation." activity. On some issues, the law leaves political violence un­ The two concessions made by Mr. Waldheim may at first regulated. On other issues the law is ambivalent, providing a glance seem innocuous. In the United Nations, however, they 904 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 905 were significant. Attributing acts of terrorism to injustice and And the Algerian representative presented the philosophical frustration obviously tends to excuse, if not justify, those acts. rationale used since time immemorial to justify terror: This is especially so when the causes are all assumed to be sympathetic. The language concerning efforts to seek "inde­ His delegation did not agree with the statement in the Secretariat's report pendence" and "liberation" also implied justification for ter­ that the legitimacy of a cause did not in itself justify recourse to certain rorist acts. These concepts related to the principles adopted in forms of violence; those serving the cause in question should have a choice previous U.N. resolutions supporting "self-determination" and of the means to be used. wars of national liberation, in the pursuit of which oppressed people were authorized to resort to all available means, includ­ These assertions have been repeated in one form or another ing armed struggle. in the years since that first debate. During this period, the A General Committee debate on Waldheim's proposal took General Assembly passed seven resolutions on terrorism and (/) up the question of the causes of terrorism, as well as the its causes. The first, adopted on December 18, 1972, had little "i:1 t'1 concepts of self-determination and wars of national liberation. to say about the type of terrorism which had led to the subject's (") Many nations opposed adding terrorism to the agenda and being placed on the agenda. It expressed "deep concern" over H )::! strongly suggested their support for certain terrorist actions. increased acts of violence that took innocent lives or jeopar­ t"' For example, the representative from said that the dized fundamental freedoms, and invited states to consider !:':I expression "terrorist" can "hardly be held to apply to persons joining relevant conventions. But the resolution was a victory t;I H who were denied the most elementary human rights, dignity, for those who supported the right to use all available measures 1-1 H freedom and independence, and whose countries objected to to advance the ends of self-determination and wars of national 0 foreign occupation." Citing situations in Africa, the Middle liberation. The resolution in fact condemned only one thing: z w East and Asia, he said "such peoples could not be blamed for "the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, committing desperate acts which in themselves were reprehen­ racist and alien regimes." sible; rather, the real culprits were those who were responsible A resolution on terrorism adopted in 1977 added another for causing such desperation." important element. It invited the Ad Hoc Committee on Inter­ "" 0 In the General Assembly the item was amended to include national Terrorism to study first the underlying causes of (') terror, and then to recommend measures to deal with acts of 1-3 Waldheim's language on the causes of terrorism and the matter 0 was referred to the U.N. Sixth Committee, on legal affairs. terrorism. A 1979 resolution for the first time condemned acts Ill t1 There the representative from , among others, very of terror, but it referred to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva !X1 clearly supported the right of national liberation movements Convention, which seek to give groups fighting wars of national I-' "to undertake any type of action to ensure that their countries liberation the protection of the laws of war. Finally, in Decem­ U) OJ attained independence." The Cuban representative rejected ber 1985, after a further series of terrorist acts, the General C'I any proposal of "rules for the purpose of assigning legal limits" Assembly adoFted a resolution that "unequivocally condemns, to revolutionary armed struggle. "The methods of combat as criminal, al acts, methods and practices of terrorism." This used by national liberation movements could not be declared resolution contains several provisions calling for international illegal while the policy of terror unleashed against certain cooperation against terrorism. At the same time, however, it peoples was declared legitimate." The Madagascar represen­ reaffirmed each people's inalienable right to self-determina­ tative could not have been clearer: tion, and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination. The debates preceding and following the adoption of this resolution make Acts of terrorism inspired by base motives of personal gain were to be clear that many states continue to believe that "wars of national .condemned. Acts of political terrorism, on the other hand , undertaken to vindicate hallowed rights recognized by the United Nations, were praise­ liberation" justify or excuse terrorist acts. For example, the worthy. It was, of course, regrettable that certain acts in the latter category Angolan representative, echoing the comments of the delegates affected innocent persons. from Algeria, Bulgaria, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, among others, 906 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 907 made it clear that "acts of terrorism could not be equated, ing the incident (Italy and Yugoslavia). Despite U.S. assertions under any pretext, with the acts of those who were fighting of their treaty obligation to hold Abbas, these states released colonial and racist oppression and for their freedom and inde­ him, Yugoslavia claiming that he was entitled to diplomatic pendence." immunity because he carried an Iraqi diplomatic passport. The wide acceptance of the premise that terrorist acts can Some decisions by U.S. courts are equally disturbing. In be lawful in the pursuit of proper goals is an uneasy first lesson. 1959 a federal court refused to extradite Andrija Artukovic to The United States of course also recognizes that oppressed Yugoslavia for the alleged malicious murders of 200,000 Croa­ people are sometimes justified in resorting to force, but only if tians in concentration camps, after determining that these properly exercised. For example, such uses of force must be murders were "political." Some 2 7 years later the United States consistent with the laws of war and should not be directed at successfully deported Artukovic, and he is currently standing innocent civilians, include hostage-taking, or involve torture. trial in Yugoslavia. In recent cases U.S. courts have refused to en In contrast, the U.N. debates and resolutions relating toter­ extradite four alleged Irish Republican Army gunmen on the tt:t tij rorism do not suggest principled limits on the use of force, or ground that an uprising exists in Northern Ireland, which (') any reasoned, fair-minded basis for determining which peoples makes crimes in furtherance of the revolt "political." H :J:>I are entitled to wage wars of national liberation. The result is a How did the United States get to the point of giving sanc­ t"' clear signal to all that those groups deemed by the majority to tuary to terrorists who kill people in order to get their way in t':1 be oppressed will be free legally to use force, and therefore Cl a democracy such as the United Kingdom? Or to an aHeged H cannot fairly be called terrorists. In other words, acts of ter­ mass murderer? The story is both interesting and instructive. 1-1 H rorism by such groups are not wrong, and the law has no The "political offense" claim as a defense against extradition 0 proper role in punishing or deterring such acts. has noble roots. It developed in the period of the French and z ""' IV American Revolutions, and reflected the value the new democ­ racies placed upon political freedom. Thomas Jefferson com­ ·The legitimacy of political violence is a notion that has also mented, for example, that "unsuccessful strugglers against N worked its way deep into international law enforcement. Most IV tyranny have been the chief martyrs of treason laws in all 0 countries have treaties that obligate them to extradite to other countries." At that time political offenses were associated with () states persons accused of committing, in those states, the crimes t-3 acts against the security of a state, such as treason, espionage 0 associated with terrorism, such as murder, hijacking, bombing, and sedition. ll:I armed assault and robbery. Yet extradition requests are fre­ t:1 The concept was soon expanded, however, to so-called rela­ ~ quently refused, often because the offense is characterized as tive political offenses-ordinary crimes committed in a political ..... "political" conduct which the law exempts from extradition. \0 Some relatively recent decisions, denying extradition on the context or with political motivation. An important early case 00 this point is In Castioni, decided in 1891, in which ground that the charge is a "political offense," illustrate how on rt the °' detrimental the law can be in the battle against terrorism. In English courts denied extradition for a killing that occurred in 1972 five individuals hijacked a plane in the United States, the midst of a demonstration against the government of a Swiss extorted $1 million and flew to Algeria, where they were canton that refused to submit its new constitution to a popular received as political militants. In 1976 they made their way to vote. The shooting served no purpose. But the court found it France, which refused to extradite the five, although they had "political" because it was incidental to and a part of a political presented no evidence of political motivation beyond the·claim disturbance. Even if an act is "cruel and against all reason," that they were escaping racial segregation in America and were the court held, its perpetrator is protected if he acted "for the associated with the "black liberation movement." More re­ purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political rising." cently, the United States failed to obtain the extradition of Castioni was quickly qualified in England, when in 1894 one of Abu Abbas, thought to have masterminded the Achille Lauro the many anarchists of the period, Theodule Meunier, was hijacking, from two countries through which he passed follow- extradited to France for placing bombs in a Parisian cafe and 908 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 909 an army barracks. But it took hold in the United States and men were "taken in the very act of war against this govern­ elsewhere. ment." Similarly, in 1946 France and Belgium agreed to sur­ In 1894, the same year In re Meunier was decided, a U.S. render to each other individuals convicted of war-related court refused to extradite high officials of El Salvador accused crimes committed during World War II. One offender sought of murders in their unsuccessful effort to retain power (In re to defeat a Belgian extradition request by claiming that the Ezeta). Relying on Castioni, the court held that all acts associated spying and assassination with which he was charged were polit­ with an uprising were political offenses. The court accepted ical offenses. The French courts rejected the argument because without discussion the premise that the doctrine was politically France could not be deemed a neutral on the issue: "the offense neutral, and that protection should be given equally to demo­ was committed in time of war both against an ally and against crats and dictators. It also explicitly rejected the notion that France, whose interests were linked." the offender's conduct in killing noncombatants could disqual­ The more recent problem of aircraft hijacking demonstrates how the doctrine can still be applied in accordance with U.S. t/) ify him from the doctrine's protection. During hostilities, said tU national interests. During the 1950s, despite America's strong trj the court, "crimes may have been committed by the contending () forces of the most atrocious and inhuman character, and still opposition to aircraft hijackings, the United States and its H Western allies refused requests from Czechoslovakia, the the perpetrators of such crimes escape punishment as fugitives ~ U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia and other communist regimes for beyond the reach of extradition." t".I The ruling in Ezeta had some support in U.S. and foreign the return of persons who hijacked planes, trains and ships to 0 H practice during the nineteenth century. Granting asylum to escape. But when aircraft hijacking reached epidemic propor­ ~ tions in the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States H revolutionaries and victims of revolutions was seen as enlight­ 0 ened. That was the period during which republican govern­ determined that hijacking of aircraft carrying passengers was z U'I ment first became a widespread reality. But the political-offense too serious a problem and too great a threat to the safety of doctrine has another side. Several incidents, diplomatic deci­ innocent passengers to be tolerated. The United States reex­ amined its policy and "concluded that the hijacker of a com­ IV sions and rulings during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries IV indicate that the United States and other countries have taken mercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire should be returned their particular interests and political ideals into account in regardless of any claim he was fleeing political persecution." ()0 Thus, the United States suggested in 1969, during consid­ 1-3 formulating the doctrine's contours. This has led to certain 0 limitations of the concept of a political offense. eration of the Hague Convention on Hijacking, that the polit­ t:J:j ical-offense exception should be eliminated for that crime. t1 A particularly dramatic instance followed the assassination The ::0 suggestion was rejected and the political-offense exception was of Abraham Lincoln. Despite the political nature of the crime, I-' retained, however, in both the Hague hijacking convention \0 the United States sought and obtained assurances from Great (X) Britain and Italy respectively for the apprehension abroad of and the Montreal sabotage convention. Nations therefore re­ O'I John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, one of Booth's sus­ main authorized (though not required) to refuse, on political pected conspirators. Surratt was actually captured in Egypt and grounds, to extradite suspects in such universally recognized sent back to the United States on an American navy vessel. crimes as hijacking and sabotage. The need to protect heads of state was recognized by other For several years the United States has been prepared to nations as well, and is now a widely accepted qualification to revise its treaties with democratic allies to narrow the political­ the political-offense doctrine. offense exception and make it inapplicable to crimes of violence During the the United States seized in and breaches of antiterrorist conventions. In 1983, for exam­ Morocco, with the acquiescence of the Moorish governor, two ple, the United States signed a revised treaty with Italy that Confederate sailors who had gone ashore to obtain coal: An narrowed the political-offense exception to exclude, in certain objection was raised that the sailors should have been allowed circumstances, offenses covered by a multilateral agreement, to assert the political-offense doctrine. Secretary of State Wil­ such as the hostage-taking or aircraft hijacking conventions. liam Henry Seward rejected the argument, "reasoning that the The United States and its people are opposed to rebellions, 910 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 911 revolutions and political assassination in democracies, since confined themselves to depredations against the country with their political systems offer a peaceful means to seek change. which they were at war. Where individuals engaged in an Thus, revolutionaries should not be encouraged in a democ­ insurgency attacked nonbelligerents, the exclusion did not racy by the treatment of their violent acts as acceptable political apply and the rebels were treated as pirates. conduct. A doctrine born to reflect the United States' belief in The modern law of piracy purports to modify significantly freedom should not be permitted to serve the interests of those these traditional rules. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law seeking to impose undemocratic views through force. of the Sea and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas To advance this objective, the Reagan Administration re­ define piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention or depre­ cently signed a Supplemental Extradition Treaty · with the dation committed against a ship "for private ends." The pri­ United Kingdom, which narrows the political-offense doctrine vate-ends requirement was used deliberately to exclude acts to exclude most violent crimes. Similar treaties with other with public or political motives. The rapporteur for the Inter­ nations are being negotiated. But the proposed treaty with national Law Commission, which drafted the Geneva high seas Cf) '"O Great Britain has run into fierce opposition in the Senate. convention, explained that "he had defined as piracy acts of ti:l (") Intense lobbying and strong, emotional concern about the Irish violence or depredation committed for private ends, thus leav­ H problem may lead the Senate to refuse to ratify this treaty. ing outside the scope of the definition all wrongful acts perpe­ :i:io That would be a grave setback. It would make the United trated for a political purpose." ~ ~ States no better than the other nations that have their favorite The approach of these two conventions would substantially 0 terrorists. If the United States fails to reject absolutely the use contract the reach of the law of piracy. The "private ends" ..,H of force against a democracy that is its closest ally, it will lose requirement, at least as described by the rapporteur, would H credibility in urging other states to cooperate in its own efforts expand the traditional "insurgency" exclusion to cover all z0 O'\ against terrorism. persons claiming to be politically motivated. Moreover, the exclusion's traditional limitation to acts committed against a v country with which the insurgents are at war appears to have N The law against piracy provides another illustration of how been either overlooked or abandoned. As a result, the conven­ N 0 international law has failed adequately to control politically tions arguably place all politically motivated acts outside the (") motivated crimes. The Achille Lauro incident presented the universal jurisdiction of sovereign states. t-3 0 question whether the acts of the hijackers of that vessel consti­ Conceivably, the conventions could be read to cover indis­ t:J:I tuted piracy "under the law nations," and were therefore criminate attacks on civilians, or attacks motivated by race or M of ::0 felonies under U.S. law. The hijackers stole money and jewelry nationality, having no ordinary relationship to an insurgency, I-' from the ship's passengers, but their primary purposes were such as the murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. But the terrorists \0 co political. They were allegedly seeking to commit acts of vio­ involved in the Achille Lauro affair would no doubt claim they C'\ lence in Israel, where the vessel was scheduled to dock, and were acting politically, even in killing Klinghoffer, and hence after taking control they demanded that Israel release certain could not be called pirates under the conventions. terrorists it had imprisoned. Is such an enterprise "piracy"? The "private-ends" requirement undermines some positive The traditional law of piracy could have been one vehicle achievements contained in the two conventions. The piracy for obtaining jurisdiction over terrorists, with fewer loopholes provisions in the conventions were intended to confirm the for political crimes than recent conventions. Piracy law has existence of universal jurisdiction for any nation to capture long been inapplicable to state vessels and recognized bellig­ and punish all persons who committed wrongful acts on the erents when they engaged in lawful acts of war. Those who high seas or in the air, or in any other place where no state has believed that belligerents should not be treated as pirates jurisdiction. In fact, the conventions go further than merely reasoned that they were the enemies only of a particular permitting countries to act. Both contain an article providing government, not of mankind. This recognized exclusion con­ that "all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in tained a ·crucial limitation: it applied only if the insurgents the repression of piracy" and the commentary to the Geneva 912 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 913 Convention on the High Seas states that "any State having an Daddah of Mauritania, urged the conference to recognize opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting "certain values and elementary rights which went beyond the to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international Universal Declaration of Human Rights," because millions law." But by narrowing the definition of piracy, these conven­ were "still under colonial oppression in the African continent, tions exclude from the international duty to repress piracy "to while international had placed the Palestinian popu­ the fullest possible extent" all politically motivated attacks on lation in an impossible situation." He asked the conference to vessels and aircraft. consider, not only effects, but causes as well, and to recognize "there were such things as just wars." Daddah said, "It was VI quite obvious that it was the Zionists who wanted to throw the The exclusion of terrorist acts from the reach of legal pro­ Arabs into the sea .... National liberation movements did not hibitions is not the only means by which law has been employed want to shed blood, only to secure recognition of their rights." en to legitimize terrorism. Another approach has been to secure The Geneva diplomatic conference adopted in its first session 'U l;rj for terrorism a legal status that obscures or denies its funda­ what is now Article 1(4) of Protocol I, with 11 of 99 nations, n mentally criminal nature. The laws of war mark the line be­ including the United States, abstaining, and only Israel dis­ H ~ tween what is criminal and what is an act of combat. A person senting. This article would make the laws of international t"' armed conflict applicable to "armed conflicts in which peoples who kills someone is normally guilty of homicide. If he does it t':I during combat, however, he is a soldier and can only be held are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 0 H as a prisoner of war, and may be punished only if the killing and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self­ 1-j H violates the laws of war. Radical groups responsible for terrorist determination." Never before has the applicability of the laws 0 acts have long sought legitimacy by securing recognition as of war been made to turn on the purported aims of a conflict. z -...J combatants under the laws of war. Moreover, this provision obliterated the traditional distinction The effort of radical groups to acquire legal legitimacy had between international and non-international armed conflict. Any group within a national boundary claiming to be fighting N a significant success in the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on N the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Appli­ against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime cable in Armed Conflict, which met between 1974 and 1977. can now argue that it is protected by the laws of war, and that n0 conference, the auspices the International Com­ its members are entitled to prisoner-of-war status for their 1-3 The under of 0 mittee for the Red Cross (ICRC), was called to improve the laws otherwise criminal acts. Members of radical groups in the tJ:1 1:1 of war set fonh in the Geneva conventions of 1949. It produced United States have already tried to do so in federal couns. :;!:! The ICRC and most Western nations expressed no admiration two additional protocols to the Geneva conventions: Protocol ...... I dealing with international, and Protocol II with non-interna­ for this article. Some contend, however, that as a result of the \0 co tional, armed conflict. The United States participated in the new rule humanitarian law now governs the actions of national °' Geneva conference and signed the protocols, but the President liberation groups. While the PLO and other "freedom fighters" has decided not to seek Senate ratification of Protocol I, and may now claim the benefits of the laws of war, they thereby has decided to seek several reservations and understandings as became bound to obey these rules. This, in some eyes, is seen conditions to the ratification of Protocol II. as an advance for humanitarian law. The ICRC and the conference developed many constructive In fact, radical groups rarely have the resources and facilities ideas to help minimize the suffering of combatants and non­ to provide the protections for prisoners of war required by the combatants in armed conflict. But from the beginnin~of the laws of war. Even if they had the resources, these groups have conference, an effort was made to extend the law of interna­ no inclination to provide such protections, or to abide by the tional armed conflicts to cover activities of the Palestine Lib­ law's limitations on the actions they may take, panicularly eration Organization (PLO) and other radical groups. many of against noncombatants. In fact, the supponers of Anicle 1(4), whom were accorded observer status. no doubt recognizing that the PW and some other "freedom The first substantive address, by then-President Moktar Ould fighters" have concentrated their guns, bombs and rockets on 914 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 915 civilian noncombatants, obtained an additional protection for carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement, these groups. Article 44( 1) provides that, once a group qualifies and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while as a national liberation movement, protected by Article 1(4), he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching no conduct by individual members of the ~oupcan lead to of an attack in which he is to participate." Furthermore, the the loss of its status as a protected organization. The rationale section provides that "acts which comply with the requirements for this rule is that individuals should be punished separately of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious"-for for their conduct. The effect is to preserve the right of such example, feigning protected status prior to a military engage­ organizations to be treated as combatants, even if they routinely ment by using signs, emblems or uniforms of the United engage in acts of terror against civilians. Nations, or nations that are not parties to the conflict. The Geneva diplomatic conference went even further in These changes in traditional rules undermine the notion that accommodating the needs of radical groups, at the expense of the protocol has secured an advantage for humanitarian law (/) the civilian population that humanitarian law is intended to by granting revolutionary groups protection as combatants. 1-i:j protect. A fundamental premise of the Geneva conventions is Under the Geneva conventions, a terrorist could not hide ()tx1 that, to earn the right to protection as military fighters, soldiers among civilians until just before an attack. Under Protocol I, H ):I must distinguish themselves from civilians by wearing uniforms he may do so; he need only carry his arms openly while he is t-t and carrying their weapons openly. Thus, under the 1949 visibly engaged in a deployment or while he is in an actual t:1 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, irregular forces engagement. t:i H achieve c.ombatant (and, if captured, prisoner-of-war) status These changes have more than merely symbolic significance. 1-3 when they (l) are commanded by a person responsible for The radical groups represented at the conference lobbied hard H 0 subordinates, (2) bear a fixed, distinctive insignia recognizable for them and succeeded. After the vote on Protocol I, the PLO's z 00 from a distance, (3) carry weapons openly, and (4) conduct representative "expressed his deep satisfaction at the result of their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of the vote, by which the international community had recon­ war. Fighters who attemet to take advanta~eof civilians by firmed the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples exercising N hiding among them in civilian dress, with the1r weapons out of their right to self-determination." He then specifically cited N view, lose their claim to be treated as soldiers. The law thus Article 1(4) as authority for the PLO's actions in Israel. ()0 attempts to encourage fighters to avoid placing civilians in 1-3 unconscionable jeopardy. VII g t1 The terrorist groups that attended the conference had no ~ intention of modifying their conduct to satisfy these traditional Protocol I's recognition of wars of national liberation re­ rules of engagement. Terrorists are not soldiers. They don't cently received rhetorical and symbolic reinforcement in what ...... wear uniforms. They hide among civilians and, after striking, one would have thought was a most unlikely place: the U.N. "'OJ they try to escape once again into civilian groups. Instead of Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The convention, °' modifying their conduct, therefore, the terrorist groups suc­ adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, makes criminal the ceeded in modifying the law. taking of hostages, requires nations to enact implementing Article 44(3) of Protocol I recognizes that "to promote the legislation, and imposes an extradite-or-prosecute obligation. protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostil­ Nearly 30 countries, including the United States, are currently ities, combatants are obli~edto distinguish themselves from parties to the convention. One extraordinary provision pre­ the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or cludes extradition where the suspect is likely to be unfairly in a military operation preparatory to an attack." But the treated, thus providing a ready excuse for refusing to extradite. provision goes on to state "that there are situations in armed But the obligation to prosecute remains. On the whole, the conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed convention establishes a useful scheme for combating hostage­ combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such situations, taking by terrorists, a goal that the U. N. Security Council "he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided . . . he reaffirmed on December 18, 1985, by the adoption of a reso- 916 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 917 lution condemning unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and ' by its action, "reaffirmed ... that the struggle of the liberation abduction. movements was legal, that it was based on provisions of inter­ A review of the negotiating history of the Convention national law of war and that it could not be confused with the Against the Taking of Hostages, however, reveals the deep criminal activity of irresponsible persons and terrorist groups division over the propriety of terrorist acts. The negotiations and organizations." began in 1977 and were completed in 1979. At the outset, a It is comically bizarre to suggest, as Article 12 requires in number of countries sought to exclude from the convention specified circumstances, that persons like Abu Abbas must be hostage-taking by national liberation movements. Some states, treated as wayward soldiers, rather than as international crim­ including Libya, went further and sought not only to exempt inals. That the laws of war and the laws against hostage-taking such movements, but to define hostage-taking to include the have been structured to permit that result reflects the strength act of subjecting persons to colonialism, racism or foreign of influence terrorist organizations and their supporters now domination. In other words, all the people living in a country wield in international law. tn ·determined to have a racist government would be deemed to tt1 VIII ()ti1 be hostages, and the government to be a hostage-taker. H These radical proposals were eventually rejected during the Not all diplomatic efforts to quell terrorism have been as :x=­ 1979 session. Advocates of political violence did, however, win negative as the foregoing. For example, the 1973 Convention t'-1 t-:l a significant victory. The nations that opposed excluding lib­ on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes A~instInter­ 0 nationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, is H eration movements from the coverage of the convention were 8 required to accept a reference, in Protocol I to the 1949 generally considered a successful negotiation by the West. It is H Geneva conventions, to the treatment of national liberation interesting, however, to examine the manner in which certain ~ l.O fighters as combatants. This reaffirmation took the form of countries, after failing to change the text of this convention, Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention, which provides managed nonetheless to obtain concessions that serve their that, to the extent the 1949 Geneva conventions and the 1977 purpose of circumventing its clear and absolute obligations. additional protocols impose substantively identical obligations In 1973 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the protected "' with regard to an instance of hostage-taking, the hostage-taking persons convention, and over 60 nations are currently parties, ()0 convention will not apply to the armed conflicts ("in which including the United States. The convention defines a class of 1-3 peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien internationally protected persons, and requires governments ~ occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the to make criminal certain violent acts directed against such t1 right of self-determination") specified in Article 1(4) of Pro­ persons or their property, and to extradite or prosecute sus­ !::ti tocol I. pected offenders found in their territory. The convention text I-' is non-polemical, its coverage is relatively ""00 Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention does not, in my and comprehensive­ CTI view, create a legal gap in coverage. All instances of hostage­ not surprising when one realizes that it was drafted, negotiated taking remain subject to an obligation by the state in which a and adopted by its principal beneficiaries: diplomats. hostage-taker is found either to extradite or ·to prosecute. What is surprising, however, is how dose the negotiations Nevertheless, the states that sought this provision succeeded in came to being derailed, and the lack of underlying consensus using the hostage-taking convention to achieve a rhetorical and that the discussions reflect. political victory. They can now argue that the structure and The Sixth Committee of the United Nations began consid­ language of Article 12 represent some measure of acceptance ering the draft version of the protected persons convention on that members of national liberation movements are combat­ October 4, 1973. On November 15, when agreement had been ants, not terrorists, since hostage-taking by such movements reached on the majority of the(rovisions, the delegate from are covered by the laws of war and excluded from the conven­ Mali, on behalf of a group o 36 countries, introduced a tion. The delegate from Yugoslavia, for instance, expressed proposed additional article that caught many other delegations the view that the committee considering the convention had, by surprise. The article would have made the protected persons 918 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 919 convention inapplicable to "peoples struggling against coloni­ IX alism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimina­ tion and in the exercise of their legitimate rights to The law's support for political violence has been manifested self-determination and independence." The Mali delegate, stat­ most recently in the efforts of some nations to establish doc­ ing a theme repeated by others, claimed the article was needed trinal bases for curtailing the use of force against terrorists and to prevent the convention from "serving as a pretext for their supporting states. colonial and racist regimes to intensify the suppression of the International law regulates the use of force by a country in national liberation movements recognized in various United the territories of other states, whether to capture or attack Nations decisions and resolutions." The delegate from Mo­ terrorists or to rescue hostages located there, or against the rocco said his delegation could not favor a convention that states themselves for sponsoring terrorists or conspiring with would protect the governmental agents of certain states them in specific terrorist activities. In general, a nation may Cfl "against all risks." The brutal truth is that, by implication, the not enter upon another's territory without its consent. Simi­ 'ti trj proposed article advocates that the right of self-determination larly, a state may not stop, board, divert or otherwise interfere () include the right to commit violent acts against diplomats. with another's vessels or aircraft without some adequate basis. H This position was unacceptable to the United States as well Finally, the use of force against another country's territorial ::t>' ~ as others. It was eventually rejected after intensive behind-the­ integrity or political independence is prohibited, except in self­ t-1 scenes negotiations between November 15 and December 6, defense, and any use of force must be both necessary and Cl H but on a basis that cast a pall over the exercise. The United proportionate to the threat it addresses. t-j States acquiesced in a Sixth Committee recommendation to the These principles have been respected by the United States. H 0 I-' General Assembly that it adopt, along with the draft conven­ If they were applied, however, in such a manner as to preclude z 0 tion, a resolution recognizing that nothing in the protected any use of force for any purpose, international law would serve persons convention could "in any way prejudice the exercise to insulate the perpetrators of international violence from any of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence control or punishment for their crimes. States could then N ... by peoples struggling against colonization, alien domina­ continue using terrorism to accomplish their objectives with N tion, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid." little cost or interference. ()0 In addition, Paragraph 6 of the resolution declared "that the The principle of territorial sovereignty is not the only prin­ t-3 0 present resolution, whose provisions are related to the ciple of law that must be weighed in considering objections to t1 amended Convention, shall always be published together with against attacks on terrorists, attempts to rescue hostages and ::0 it." While these provisions cannot be considered law, they are actions against countries that sponsor terrorism. States have I-' a clear indication of what many governments believe, and of duties to cooperate in preventing terrorists from using their \0 the muscle those states were able to bring to bear in getting territories in perpetrating criminal acts, and many governments CX> the resolution adopted as part of a package deal. have explicitly undertaken to extradite or prosecute terrorists °' This put the United States on notice that, in the future, guilty of hijacking, sabotage and hostage-taking. These obli­ other governments may rely on the resolution to circumvent gations cannot be disregarded in evaluating the propriety of the absolute obligations of the protected persons convention antiterrorist operations. Furthermore, under the U.N. itself. In fact, 's accession to the convention reserved Charter.just as under customary international law, victims of the right not to apply its terms to national liberation move­ terrorism are not powerless to defend themselves. The charter ments, and Iraq indicated when it acceded that it intended to reaffirms the inherent right to use force in individual or collec­ accord protected status to the representatives of certain na­ tive self-defense against armed attack. tional liberation movements. In short, even so seemingly neu­ Since the days of President James Madison, the United States tral an issue as the protection of diplomats failed to escape the has repeatedly acted against armed bands that attacked Amer­ political divisiveness that pervades the world community on icans and then fled, seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries questions of the appropriate use of violence. unwilling or powerless to prevent or punish their acts. With 920 FOREIGN AFFAIRS TERRORISM AND THE LAW 921 the acquiescence of the harboring state, as in the case of U.S. The U.S. bombing raid launched against Libya on April 14, operations in Mexico against Pancho Villa's terrorist attacks in 1986, illustrated the need nations sometimes have to use force the early part of this century, or without such permission, as in against states that sponsor terrorism. After terrorists from the the case of Andrew Jackson's actions to stop attacks from Abu Nida! group attacked passengers in Rome and Vienna on Spanish Florida, the United States has used its forces to bring December 27, 1985, killing 19 civilians, including five Ameri­ an end to terrorist attacks on American citizens and interests. cans, President Reagan clearly signaled the United States' Other nations, when confronted with terrorist attacks, have intent to rely upon its right of self-defense. He said: defended themselves with force. In the celebrated case of the Caroline, the British pushed over Niagara Falls a ship carrying By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, some members of an armed band of New Yorkers that was in Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under the process of supporting an insurrection in Canada. While the established principles of international law, just as if he [Libyan leader American government thought the British had acted too Muammar al-Qaddafi] had used its own armed forces. t/l "d harshly, both governments agreed on the law: the use of force trj (') in self-defense is appropriate so long as it is necessary and Despite this clear warning, Libya deliberately arranged for H proportional. The International Court of Justice recognized at least two attacks aimed at American noncombatants and this principle in the Corfu Channel case, where Britain had U.S. interests. One plan was to fire automatic rifles and hurl ~ t:1 swept mines from the channel after suffering damage to its grenades at civilians lined up at the U.S. embassy in Paris. 0 ships. In holding Albania liable for the damages, the court French cooperation enabled the United States to thwart this H i-:.l reaffirmed the "well-recognized" principle that every country plan, and several Libyans involved were deported. The United H has an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be States was not so fortunate in West Berlin. Libyans at their ...... ~ ...... used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." people's bureau (embassy) in informed their As Secretary of State George Shultz has said, in the fight home base that a planned attack would take place on April 5. against terrorism as in the struggle to deter aggression: A bomb exploded at a discotheque frequented by U.S. soldiers, N killing Sergeant Kenneth T. Ford and a Turkish woman, and N The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum injuring over 200 persons, including 50 Americans. Shortly g extent [A] state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against .... thereafter, on April 6, the same people's bureau informed 1-3 another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other Tripoli the successful attack, and assured Tripoli that the activities within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such of g bombing could not be traced to Libya. t'l conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state ~ under international law. These communications, following Qaddafi's long history of ...... support for terrorism, and his threats against U.S. citizens, ID Some public officials and international law experts have established overwhelmingly that Libya was responsible for the 00 questioned the premise that harboring and supporting terror­ attack. In addition, the President was faced with strong evi­ °' ists who attack a nation is a form of aggression. Others suggest dence of some 30 possible impending Libyan attacks on U.S. that force may not be used against a government that sponsors facilities and personnel throughout the world. The April 14 terrorist acts. The United States has never accepted such a strikes were to deter these and other planned attacks. paralyzing view of the right to act in self-defense. Strong legal Some governments have condemned the action against Lib­ support exists for the U.S. position on these issues, as reflected ya, claiming to disbelieve U.S. claims that Libya attacked in universally recognized principles of conspiracy and agency American citizens and was planning further attacks. Others law and in several U.N. resolutions, including the Friendly have ignored U.S. claims, and simply characterize Reagan Relations Declaration and the U.N. Definition of Aggression. Administration actions as "criminal" or "brutal." They oppose Here, as in other areas, states and individuals opposed to U.S. the use of force, even in self-defense. But no cogent argument policies, or to the use of force in general, are invoking law as a has been made questioning the legal principles upon which the mask for their political interests. United States has relied. A resolution condemning the United SPECIAL EDITION 22 OCTOBER 1986

9~~ FOREIGN AFFAIRS States was vetoed by the United States, France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council on April 21. Its adoption would have given state-sponsored terronsm its ultimate legal defense, immunizing international aggression against noncom­ batants from the use of force in self-defense. Law can make clear that state-supported terrorism is illicit, and may thus serve to deter it. But terrorist-supponing nations will not surrender seriously held ambitions to expand their power and influence simply because the law is against them. Legal argument alone will not protect law-abiding nations and peoples against Qaddafi or Iran's Khomeini. Nor will the prospect for peaceful settlement of disputes with such regimes be enhanced by U.S. promises to abjure force or by unrealistic limits on its flexibility. If Americans overestimate the limits of their own tolerance, they may allow U.S. adversaries to do so as well, thereby inviting reckles.\ activity. The policeman is apt protection against individual criminals; but national self­ defense is the only protection against the criminal state. x The law, as presently formulated, cannot reasonably be expected effectively to repress international terrorism. Inter­ national terrorism is still supported by many nations as a legitimate means of struggle against regimes deemed by them to be colonial, alien or racist. At the behest of these states, and by the acquiescence of others, international law has been sys­ tematically and intentionally fashioned to give special treatment to, or to leave unregulated, those activities that cause and are the source of most acts of international terror. The failure of international law to control terrorism is a matter of great strategic concern. Ineffective methods for dealing with terrorists through the law will inevitably lead to antiterrorist actions more primitive and dangerous than coop­ eration among sovereign states, including conventional military actions in self-defense, will provide. These dangers are espe­ cially heightened with terrorism that is state-supported. Civilized nations and peoples cannot give up on law, however frustrated they may feel by its shortcomings. In fact, the point of this essay is that law is not presently being used to counter terrorism; it has been placed very much at the service of those who embrace political violence. Our challenge is to create a broader understanding among peoples and governments to bring about a shift in the objects that international law is designed to serve.

12 -LL . ------· ------·-- -~------

How The -Wes!~an Wi~1---/ )'r BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU______-- rJ r ) rf 'rr

The realiz.ation that wild beasts prowl our airways and wa­ somewhere-for the U.S. Sixth Fleet's bloodying of his forces. terways, that they can escape retribution by fleeing to countries Netanyahu. a former soldier, businessman and the editor of that respect, indeed worship, the law of the jungle, has steadily Terrorism, has a strong personal reason/or his concern with the been replacing our older conception of justice, order and ac­ subject. He is the younger brother of Lieut. Colonel Jonathan countability in international affairs. Netanyahu, leader of the daring Israeli commando force that So writes , Israel's Ambassador to the rescued all but three of the more than JOO hostages held United Nations, in a forthcoming book whose assertive title sums captive aboard a skyjacked airliner at Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976. up its argument-Terrorism: How the West Can Win (Farrar, The Israelis lost only one of their men during the raid, but Straus & Giroux; $18.95 ). The book grew out ofa 1984 meeting of that was Jonathan Netanyahu, shot dead at the age of 30 by international officials and experts in Washington that explored an airport guard. Ambassador Netanyahu, who organized the the question: Just what can be Jonathan Institute to fight ter­ done to stop terrorism? rorism, sees in the overall re­ The West's failure to an­ sults of Entebbe a lesson to be swer the question was under­ widely applied today. Though scored once again last week some will surely find his pre­ when a terrorist bomb tore a hole scriptions too tough and will in the/uselageofa TWA 727 en quarrel with his refusal to give route from Rome to Athens. The undue weight to the root causes explosion killed four American of terrorism, the fact remains passengers, who were sucked out · that no Israeli plane has been ofthe plane and fell 15 ,000ft . to seized in the ten years since En­ their death. Libya's Muammar tebbe. What follows is excerpts Gaddafi disclaimed responsi­ from his introduction and essay, bility, but concern remained along with a selection of brief high that he would attempt to quotes/rom other contributors to i Israeli Ambassador Netanyahu exact revenge-sometime, the book. Lieut. Colonel Netanyahu

.! Ii l f I i nternational terrorism is not a sporadic phenomenon born understanding of terrorism, the problem cannot be tackled. ! of social misery and frustration. It is rooted in the political Terrorists habitually describe themselves as "guerrillas," ambitions and designs of expansionist states and the but guerrillas are not terrorists. They are irregular soldiers groups that serve them. Without the support of such states, who wage war on regular military forces. Terrorists choose international terrorism would be impossible. to attack weak and defenseless civilians: old men, women IAccess to the media is also indispensable. First the terror­ and children-anyone in fact except soldiers if terrorists can ists seize our attention by committing a brutal act. Only then avoid it. does the real performance begin: the communiques, the parad­ This indeed is one of terrorism's most pernicious effects: it ing of dazed hostages before the cameras, the endless inter­ blurs the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, views in which the terrorists are respectfully asked to explain the central tenet of the laws of war. It is not only that the ter­ their demands and conditions. Slowly, imperceptibly, the ini­ rorist breaks down this standard but that we begin to accept his tial horror recedes, and in its place comes a readiness to accept standards. With each fresh attack, the public is conditioned­ the terrorist point of view. first by the terrorists, then by their compliant interpreters in We are asked to shed our normal revulsion for murder­ the press-to equate innocent hostages with jailed terrorists ous acts and accept the notion, endlessly repeated, that "one and to accept the notion that the murder of children is a regret­ man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This is table but understandable expression of the terrorists' purported precisely what the terrorist would like us to believe. It is grievances. completely untrue. At the risk ··orbenrboring the point, I · There are those who say that war is war and that any at­ offer a formal definition: Terrorism is the deliberate and tempt to define ethical limits is futile. But short of the rare and systematic murder, maimlng- ana menacing of the inno­ difficult case of total war, such as during World War II, most cent to inspire fear for _political ends. This distinction ·people would agree that there is a significant difference be­ lies atlhe heart of the · matter. For without a clear tween waging war on armed combatants and attacking de-

48 (II 1986 by The Jonathan Institute. From a forthcoming book entitled Terrorism: How the West Can Win, TIME, APRIL 14, 1986 edited by Benjamin Netanyahu, to be published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux SPECIAL SECTION

fenseless civilians. None of the resistance movements in Nazi- supported terrorism on the crucial political level, legitimizing it occupied Europe conducted or even condoned, terrorist attacks and blocking international measures against it. against German noncombatants, such as officers' wives or chil- Why have certain radical states begun to resort to terror­ dren. Without such .distinctions, the concept of war· crimes ~-m? Since theend of World War II and the dawn of the nucle­ loses any meaning. For if everything is permissible, why not ar age, the waging of war has become increasingly expensive gas innocent people or machine-gun children? nd risky. For a superpower like the Soviet Union, a direct con- It is here that the terrorist parts company with humanity. frontation with the West entails the unacceptable risks of He declares a total war on the society he attacks. For him ev- · tom.ic war. For smaller states, conventional war can also esca­ eryone is a legitimate target. A baby is fair game; he may, after late into intolerable conflict or outright defeat. Terrorism is all, grow up to be a soldier. So is the. baby's mother; she gave part of the broader trend toward waging war by proxy. It per­ birth to this future soldier. No one is spared, ordinary citizens mits regimes to engage in aggression while evading responsibil- and leaders alike. ity or retaliation. · Having defined all of society as a field of combat, the ter- As the number of attacks has increased tenfold in the past rorist demands that his activity, which would ordinarily be decade alone, a clear pattern has emerged. The targets ofter­ viewed as gangsterism, be treated with the respect given to le- rorism have been, more and more, Britain and Germany, Spain · gitimate warfare. That is why he often takes on all the trap- and Portugal, France and Italy, Israel and Japan, and, above pings of a soldier; that is why he issues "communiques" instead all, the U.S. (whose nationals accounted for roughly a third of of simple statements and why he insists that his jailed accom- terrorism's victims since 1968)-in short, the West. A network plices, who are in fact danger- -.••••••••••••••••••••••• of professional terrorists seeks ous criminals, be accorded the ,. to weaken and demoralize status of prisoners of war. democratic societies by at- Though terrorism as such tacking their citizens, their is not new in history, or even in leaders, their institutions, this century, today's terrorism thereby disrupting their way differs in its extent and its vio- of life and sapping their politi- lence; it now attacks the terri- cal will. And it is a growing tory and citizens of nearly all threat. Terrorist attacks now the democracies. It began its kill and injure not·one or two rapid growth in the 1960s. It but hundreds at a time. Few was sparked by the early sue- doubt that other, more lethal, cesses of two groups of terror- weapons may be employed in ists: the P.L.0., which intro- the future. duced airline hijacking as an The terrorist's strategy is international weapon, and Eu- premised on the ability to de- ropean radical factions, which liver future blows, no matter carried out increasingly bold _ what. The fear and intim.ida- bombings, kidnapings and as- tion that terrorism thrives on sassinations throughout the are totally dependent on this Continent. Terrorist groups, S threat. The primary task in

seemingly independent from 1 fighting terrorism, then, is to one another, soon proliferated weaken and ultimately de- throughout Europe, Japan, stroy the terrorist's ability to North and South America and launch attacks. This is often the Middle East. But as the ev- presented as a difficult or even l idence piled up, the Arab . impossible task. It is asserted l>.L.O., the Iranian mujahedin, the Armenian A.S.A.L.A., the that the clandestine nature of terrorism and the openness of German Baader-Meinhof gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the Western societies make terrorism against the West nearly im­ J apanese Red Army and others were often found to be linked possible to root out. I would argue the exact opposite. Terrorism lnot only to one another but to the Soviet Union and radical Arab can be stopped. The minute you weaken its ability to deliver re­ regimes. Only after the P.L.0.'s expulsion from Beirut did cap- peated blows, you have broken its back. And it is well within the tured P.L.0. documents reveal the role of its terrorist ministate means of the West to achieve this. in Lebanon as a training center and launching ground for what Consider, for example, the classic terrorist act, the taking had become a kind of terrorist international. of hostages. More than any other act of terrorist violence, it re- This collaboration between Marxist and Muslim radicals is veals two underlying characteristics of terrorism. First, it is an not accidental. Modem terrorism has its roots in two move- unmistakably deliberate assault on the people who are seized, ments that have assumed international prominence in the sec- precisely because they are noncombatants. Second, it affords a ond half of the 20th century, Communist totalitarianism and Is- stage for dramatization and distortion. Hostage taking places a lamic (and Arab) radicalism. These forces have given terrorism government in a terrible dilemma: if it uses force to release the its ideological impetus and much of its material support. Both · hostages, it might end up with more people killed than if it legitimize unbridled violence in the name ofa higher cause, both gives in. If it yields, the terrorists emerge victorious. Sometimes are profoundly hostile to democracy, and both have found inter- the terrorists resolve this dilemma by killing a few hostages and rorism an ideal weapon for waging war against democracy. threatening to murder the rest if their demands are not met. Indeed, international terrorism is overwhelmingly an ex- The government can then argue that since more hostages are tension of warfare sustained and supported by the states built about to be killed, it must take action immediately. on the foundations of Marxism and radical Islam. The Soviet But suppose the terrorists have not started killing hostages. Union, several of its East European satellites, Cuba and North ) Should they not fear a forcible response? The more terrorists be­ Korea, and Middle Eastern states such as Libya, Iran, Syria, lieve that military intervention is likely, the less prone they will Iraq and South Yemen have given terrorists weapons, training be to continue their siege. In the hijacking of both the TWA air­ and money. They have also provided sanctuary, safe passage liner out of Athens last summer and the cruise ship Achille and safe houses-<>ften their very embassies. And they }?Ave Lauro last fall, a principal_reason that the terrorists released

TIME, APRIL 14, 1986 49 ------

TERRORISM

their hostages was their belief the terrorist seeks immunity in imminent intervention­ by planting his bases among retaliation afterward in the civilians). It is also true during case of the airliner and mili- a am m a I the taking of hostages, when tary rescue of the Achille (1 the terrorist even more braz­ Lauro (both American and enly seeks immunity by dar­ Italian forces were poised to ing the authorities to risk the storm the ship on the day the lives of innocent victims by pirates surrendered). taking action. Terrorists have often es­ Terrorists generally do caped retaliation because of\ fear military intervention, the sloppiness of the West's and that fear has a tremen­ thinking about the use of t I dously inhibiting effect on force. America's loss of clarity I,,.' hostage taking. This is best Iin the wake of Viet Nam has demonstrated in the case of I become a general · Western ~I Israel. No other nation suf- 1 malaise. The rules of engage- ~ fered more from this form of ment have become so rigid attack. In the 1970s Israel ex­ that governments often strait- perienced a large number of September 1972: Wflth nine ,fsraelis ftefd hos1age, ~cket themselves in the face hostage takings, including the f unambiguous aggression. .an Arab tell'nlriist surveys Ob-mpnc ViH.age in Munich hijacking of planes and the ut a fundamental principle lseizing of schools. apartments, l ust be recognized: under no hotels and buses. In all these circumstances should a government categorically rule out a cases, the government refused to capitulate to the terrorists' de- military response simply because of the risk of civilian casual­ mands. Soldiers overcame the terrorists and liberated the hos­ ties. There is a practical and a moral basis for this position. In tages. This was by no means an easy course to follow. The gov­ practical terms, an inflexible rule against risking civilian casu­ ernment painfully recognized that its policy made some alties would make any military action virtually impossible. In civilian casualties unavoidable; in 1974 at Ma'alot, 21 school­ lmoral terms, an absolute prohibition on civilian casualties to- children were massacred by the P.L.O. before the terrorists Jday condemns to death or injury many future victims. Terror­ were themselves killed. ism, undeterred, will inevitably increase. But the result of this determined refusal to yield was that Responsible governments seek to minimize civilian casual­ hostage taking gradually became a rarity inside Israel. This ties. But they do not grant immunity to an aggressor simply be­ was not because the P.L.O. was unable to stage such incidents cause their response might endanger civilians. If this is true in but because it finally realized that there would be no surrender normal combat, it is truer still in the case of terrorism. An abso­ and that the terrorists would fail and probably be killed. Con­ lute prohibition on civilian casualties provides the terrorist trary to popular myth, cases of suicidal terrorism are rare; over­ with an invincible shield. This is not only true in cases in which whelmingly, terrorists want to live, to escape unpunished. he fears retaliation following his attacks (for example, when The P.L.O. sought to overcome Israel's resolve by seizing

has passed numerous resolutions asserting For the Democracies, a "Moral Right, its support for the right of'national libera­ tion movements' to 'struggle by all means Indeed Duty, to Defend Themselves" ... to achieve power.' It has consistently condemnecJ countries for attempting to The Washington conference that feli to taken against those who engage jn it. defend themselves against terrorist vio­ the.book Terrorism: How the West Can "Clearly there are complicated moral lence. The distinction between legitimate Win attracted an international galaxy of issues here. But there should be no doubt and illegitimate use of force has not so Cabinet ministers, legislators, military of­ of the democracies' moral right, indeed much been blurred as stood on its head.'' ficers and scholars. Some highlights of duty, to defend themselves." -Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane what they said: -Secretary ofState George Shultz Kirkpatrick

"''A purely passive defense does :not• "The most powerful totalitarian state "Terrorism denies the distinction be­ provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism of our time is also the principal supporter tween state and society, public and pri­ and the states that sponsor it. It is time to and sponsor of international terrorism. In vate, government and individual, the dis­ thlnk long, hard and seriously about more the late 1960s, Soviet theorists began to tinction that lies at the heart of humane active means of defense-defense through emphasize the 'armed road' as the way to belief. For the terrorist, as for the totali­ preventive or pre-emptive actions against achieve power in the western hemisphere. tarian state, there are no innocent by­ terrorist groups before they strike. They have set about supporting terrorist standers, no private citizens. Terrorism "We will need to strengthen our capa­ groups in this hemisphere. These techni­ denies that there is any private sphere, bilities in the areas of intelligence and cians in violence and propaganda are that individuals have any rights or any quick reaction. Intelligence will be par­ called national liberation movements. autonomy separate from or beyond poli­ ticularly important, since our societies "The United Nations' acceptance of tics. There are thus no standards accord­ demand that we know with reasonable so-called national liberation movements ing to which the individual citizen, or clarity just what we are doing and as legitimate is a good indicator of the the threatened society, can attempt to against whom we are acting. Experience moral confusion that has come to sur­ come to terms with the totalitarian ter­ has taught us that one of the best' round this view of violence as the pre­ rorist. There is no way to satisfy his deterrents to terrorism is the certainty ferred method of political action. Since demands." . ·· that swift and sure measures will be the 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly • -Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

50 TIME, APRIL 14, 1986 SPECIAL SECTION

Israeli planes or hostages out­ if military intervention truly side Israel. But these attempts does endanger the lives of were defeated as well. In the most or all of the hostages? most celebrated example, the This is not quite as frequent as case ofEntebbe, Israeli troops might at first appear. Many flew more than 2,000 miles, governments have specialized liberated the hostages and forces trained to overcome killed their captors. For a dec­ terrorists before they kill most ade afterward, not a single Is­ of their hostages. ·raeli or Israel-bowl.d plane Rescuing hostages re­ was hijacked, and virtually no quires impressing on military attempts were made to seize forces the importance of mini­ Israeli hostages abroad. mizing firepower. In storming The refusal to capitulate a building, the normal military and the decision to apply force • procedure is to shoot first and were adopted in several im­ look later. But in rescuing hos-1 portant instances by other tages, the soldiers' job is exact­ governments. The German ly the opposite: they must look government forcibly liberated first and shoot later, and even German hostages on the hi­ April 1984: Lomfo111 Constable Yvonne Fletchiet- Hes then only when it is absolutelyf jacked Lufthansa airplane in i!fying after a gunman fires from libyan embassy necessary. Sometimes they Mogadishu in 1977, the Dutch fail, as in last year's Egyptian 1 successfully stormed a train rescue attempt in Malta. But hijacked by the South Moluccans (1977), and the British freed as the experience oflsrael, West Germany, Britain and Holland the occupied Iranian embassy in London (1980). For some time shows, more often than not such specially trained units succeed. afterward, these countries experienced no further hostage tak­ Suppose the terrorists have not merely seized hostages but ings. Far from engendering a cycle of increased violence, the have hidden them? Perhaps the most celebrated case is the application of military force or the prospect of such application kidnaping of Italy's former Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the inhibits terrorist violence. Red Brigades. Italy refused to capitulate, and Aldo Moro was The only sensible policy for attacked governments, then, is murdered. As tragic and painful as the decision was, it was the a refusal to yield and a readiness to apply force. This is a policy right one, as was the firm Italian policy in the immediate af­ that says to the terrorist, I will not accept your demands. I de­ termath of the Moro kidnaping. Unlike the weakness it later mand that you release the hostages. If you do not do so peace­ showed during the Achille Lauro affair, the Italian govern­ fully, I am prepared to use force. I am proposing a simple ex­ ment mounted a vigorous effort to hunt down the Red Bri­ change: your life for the lives of the hostages. The only "deal" I gades and improve the effectiveness of its security forces. am willing to make with you is that if you surrender peacefully, · By the time of the next major kidnaping, that of General I will not kill you. James Dozier, it was able to apprehend the terrorists and Obviously, there can be complicating circumstances. What liberate their hostage. Whether or not such rescue is pos-

"If there are no 'good' terrorists, it fol­ not only one of internal law-and-order. It nium-producing reactor. He has offered lows that civilized states must act collec­ is irrelevant to ask whether we endanger Pakistan cash and uranium in a nuclear tively against all of them. We have to democracy if we fight terrorism with ap­ trade. He has tried to buy nuclear weap­ grasp the fact that to hurt one terrorist propriate means. Second, our defense has ons from China. At the very least, he is movement is to hurt them all. So, on the to be collective, coordinated by all demo­ building the intellectual resources in military level, I would like to see a coordi­ cratic countries. Third, we must stop Libya to help make weapons of his own. nated, well-financed, informal and secret making exceptions for terrorists, whatev­ Libya's Tajura Nuclear Research Center effort by the major civilized powers to dis­ er the causes they claim to espouse. offers use of highly enriched weapons­ cover and exchange information about Fourth, we must understand that terror­ grade uranium. The leaders of the West movements, routes, identities, weapons ism is not an isolated phenomenon. It is must face up to the ultimate terrorist stocks, methods, plans, codes, safe houses part of the Soviet Union's program of threat." and bases of all terrorists everywhere. We global domination, a program that in­ -Senator Alan Cranston must be prepared to devise and carry cludes among its interim objectives the through concerted operations. The hydra achievement of military superiority, the "Is there some compensating advan­ is less likely to survive if struck simulta­ promotion of one-sided doctrines of non­ tage that justifies television interviews . neously in several places. All the democ­ interference, the domination of the So­ with terrorists? I do not believe there is . racies must have trained antiterrorist cialist International and the nonaligned The justification commonly advanced is .units, and they must be accustomed to movement, and the waging of systematic that "we need to know what these people acting in concert. disinformation." think." But that is nonsense. To begin i . "For the terrori$t, there can be no hid­ -Author Jean-Fran'°is Revel with, we invariably know what they think ing places. The terrorist must never be al­ (Without Marx or Jesus) long before they appear on television to lowed to feel safe anywhere in the world. tell us. Second, what they say on television A terrorist kept constantly on the defen­ "Little imagination is needed to un­ is not necessarily what they think (which sive is an ineffective terrorist." derstand the.dangers to the world if ter­ is much more accurately conveyed by -Author Paul Johnson rorist regimes and groups were ever to what they do-kneecapping, amputa­ (Modem Times) acquire nuclear weapons. Libya's Colo­ tions, point-blank murder and the like). It nel Gaddafi has for years tried tci ac­ is sugared propaganda." "We must realize that fighting terror­ quire nuclear weapons. He has pressed -John O'Sullivan, associate editor, ism poses a problem of external defense, the Soviets to supply him with a pluto- of London

TIME. APRIL 14, 1986 51 ,,......

TERRORISM

sible, governments must persist in refusing to capitulate. crimes, this is not a minor threat. In the severance of diplomat- Perhaps the most complicated case of hostage taking is that ic relations, an added penalty is the shutting down of embas­ in which the terrorists find refuge in the territory of a country sies. Terrorists simply cannot sustain a concerted campaign of hostile to the West. Short of declaring war, what can be done? attacks in most Western countries without sanctuary or invio­ lt is often difficult, though by no means impossible, to launch a lable means of passing funds, arms and intelligence. limited military operation to rescue the hostages. In any case, The embassies and diplomatic pouches of Syria, Iraq, Iran, the principle remains the same-:-the refusal to yield and the Libya, South Yemen and other Middle Eastern states, as well threat of intervention or retaliation. Retaliation can take sever- · as Soviet bloc embassies, have turned parts of Western Europe al forms, against the terrorists themselves and the governments \ into a veritable playground of terrorists. Weapons, passports, that shelter them. The main point is that both the terrorists and money, safe houses have all been made available to terrorists their governmental patrons must believe that they will eventu- by people hiding behind diplomatic immunity. Without em­ ally be punished (preferably sooner rather than later). bassies, the effectiveness of terrorism in the West would be What is true of hostage taking is true of other forms ofter- sharply diminished. rorism. The terrorist always considers, and fears, a forceful re­ sponse from his victims' government. To the extent that he be­ ECONOMIC PRESSURE. Most of these countries desperately lieves he will be tracked down and punished, he will curb them. need Western goods, weapons or credit. There are certain so­ Deterrence works on terrorists just as it does on anyone else. phisticated products, including advanced weapons, that only the Terrorists may at first respond to a government's policy of West can supply. If the democracies used but a fraction of their firmness with an acceleration enormous economic clout, of violence, but they usually they could cause regimes sup­ cannot withstand a sustained - -~, porting terrorism to rethink and resolute policy of resis­ ·If'-·~ some of their activities. tance and active pursuit. Re­ Economic pressure could taliation and pre-emption be a combination of boycott against terrorism are thus acts and embargo. In the case of of self-defense. Denying the ne­ Libya, a prime offender, the cessity for such self-defense, U.S. has willingly forfeited and blurring the moral basis for hundreds of millions of dollars it, is dangerous. It undermines of trade to send an unmistak­ a basic principle on which gov­ able and economically painful ernment authority is based. A message to that regime. An-

government's first obligation is 1 other potent sanction that can to protect its citizens. Confu­ be readily applied is the denial sion or vacillation fools no one, of landing rights in major least of all terrorists. Western capitals to the com­ One point is central: inter­ mercial planes of terrorist f national terrorism as we know states. The same could apply it would simply not be possi­ to docking rights for the ships \ ble without the collaboration $. of offending states. \of governments that have used 'terrorism to wage hidden war \ MILITARY ACTION. This can- pgainst their adversaries, es- June 1985: Armed Arab hijacker with John Testrake, not be ruled out, nor should JPCC:ially the West. After the pitiot of TWA flight 847 , dUJl!'ing long siege mBeirut · we be bashful about discussing / "!~~i/le Lauro piracy, Abul it. When we talk about using \ Abbas, its mastermind, skit- military force, we must first tered from Egypt to Italy to Yugoslavia to Iraq to South Ye- consider unilateral action, one state's taking action against ter­ men, where he finally found his most suitable haven. Without rorists or a state that shelters them. Obviously, if a terrorist ac­ the collusion or acquiescence of friendly or passive govern- tion occurs on a government's own soil, it will take action to ments, he would have been caught and brought to trial. The protect its own citizens and foil the terrorists. support of friendly regimes and the passivity of others are b But what about a terrorist attack on a country's citizens the crucial assumptions under which international terrorism \ abroad, in embassies, businesses or airlines? In the case of a hi­ operates. jacking, piracy or other hostage taking, the responsibility of se- ti Just as hostile governments have caused the international- curing the release of the hostages is that of the government on l ization of terror, they are also the key to its end. For states are whosesoil(orshiporplane) the incident takes place. One would no less susceptible than the terrorists they support to a sober hope such governments would adopt a firm policy against the calculation of costs and benefits. The very reason certain re- terrorists, butifagovernmentcannotorwillnotundertakeforc­ gimes rely on terrorists is to be able to wage war without the ibly to end a hostage crisis, it forfeits a certain measure of juris­ risks that war entails. As long as they are successful in denying diction. The country whose nationals (or plane or ship) are held complicity or involvement, they will easily escape retribution. hostage has the right to act when the host country refuses to do Once this is understood, the democracies can begin to act so:TakethecaseofEntebbe. Ugandahadanobligationtointer- effectively in·three broad areas against offending states. vene and end the hijacking. When it refused to do so, the right to act passed to Israel and France (most of the passengers were Is­ POLITICAL PRESSURES. These could range from internation­ raeli; the plane was French). Since France was not considering al condemnation to cutting off diplomatic relations (as the U.S. anymilitarymove(althoughithelpedingatheringintelligence), and Britain did with Libya). Political pressures signal to the Israel had a perfect right to act. terrorist state that the victim not only is unwilling to yield but is This is at odds with a widely held view that national sover­ prepared to expose the offender to public censure. This could eignty is absolute and cannot be violated. But of course it is force other states to take a position against the offender, or at not absolute. Countries do not have the right to do anything least to curb their support for it. Since many states sponsoring within their borders. They risk the intervention of other states terrorism depend on the ability to deny complicity in terrorist if they fail to live up to. elementary international obligations.

52 TIME, APRIL 14, 1986 ~-

SPECIAL SECTION

· Sovereignty does not in any way preclude a government quer. Governments have made separate deals with terrorists, from allowing another government to assist in or carry out a allowing them, for example, freedom of movement in exchange rescue operation, as, for example, the did when they for promises of immunity. But terrorists, who by their very na­ approved the intervention of West Germany's antiterrorist unit ture ridicule the notion oflaw ana treaties, always violate their in the Mogadishu incident. In most cases, therefore, even weak l agreements. The Western countries must face up to a simple or hesitant governments have a choice. Bluntly put, they can truth: no deals are possible with terrorists. The success ofter­ either do it themselves or let someone else do it. \ rorism in one part of the world encourages terrorists every­ What about the use of force in circumstances other than \\Where. Terrorism is an indivisible problem, and the fight hostage taking? Western governments already possess ample ~lgainst terrorism must be indivisible as well. intelligence evidence (such as satellite photos of training 11 This means that you cannot "understand" terrorism when camps, interception of communications, reports from agents in directed against someone else while opposing it when directed the field) of continuous support for terrorists from certain against yourself. Terrorism threatens the foundation of lawful governments. Such a record of complicity is more than strong and humane existence everywhere. And it thrives on weak­ enough to justify punitive action against these criminal states. ness. It is naive to think that the I.RA. does not take note of Plenty of military or strategic targets can be struck to inflict periodic British courting of the P.L.O. The same applies to the severe damage, · while avoiding excessive, if any, civilian ed Brigades vis-a-vis the Italian government's dealings with casualties. iArab terrorists, and so on. · · Two objections are frequently raised. First, the prospect of What is required is a basic realignment of international reprisals. Libya's Muammar · attitudes toward terrorism. Gaddafi, who clearly harbored •••••••••••••••••••••••• While all governments offer the Palestinian terrorist Abu rhetorical opposition to terror­ Nidal prior to his attacks on ism, including the adoption of Americans and others in Eu­ a U.N. resolution condemning ropean airports last December, terrorism in 1985, in practice promised to retaliate if the they fall into one of three cate­ 1 U.S. took any action against gories: .a few governments ac­ him. He went so far as to tually oppose terrorism, and promise to set the Mediterra­ do so consistently; others ac­ nean ablaze and even to pre­ tively support terrorists; but cipitate global war. Such blus- ' most fall into a third broad ter should be viewed category, the neutrals. They realistically. It emanates from either acquiesce in terrorism fear. It also at times may be or refuse to actively oppose it. partly realized. We should rec­ The measures against ognize that a successful war on states that support terrorism terrorists will involve a succes­ 2 are essential, but we must also sion of blows and counter­ '" do away with the middle blows, and some unavoidable ; ground of neutrality. Govern- casualties along the way. What : ments must be made to under-i is required is a commitment to st.and that if they acquiesce in a continuous campaign against terrorism, they are in practice its sponsors, not just erratic re­ October 1985: Marilyn Klinghoffer, whose husband supporting it. The provision of sponses to individual terrorist wa:s slam on tho Achitle uuro, holds fllag from Iris coffin safe passage to foreign terror­ acts. There are no "one-shot" I ists, such as Egypt offered to solutions. A forceful response 1 the hijackers of the Achille against aggression may very well elicit reprisals initially. But Lauro, should be considered an act of simple collusion. It is over the long run, it is the only way to make governments stop tantamount to offering a foreign army passage through your 1 · launching terrorist killers. They need to know, they must know, · territory in time of war. Similarly, accepting a hijacked air- . that the West will not sit back and take it. plane or ship without accepting the concomitant responsibil­ The second objection raised to military action against ities of preventing the escape of the terrorists is also an act of states sponsoring terrorism is that it will induce political conse­ allusion; so is the refusal to extradite or punish terrorists. quences unfavorable to the West, such as the weakening or col­ / The provision of sanctuary for terrorists is also an act of lapse of friendly regimes in the Middle East. Actually, these 1 collusion. I am not talking about taking in war refugees who very regimes, despite their public pronouncements, would se­ have laid down their arms (as France did after the Spanish Civ­ cretly welcome such action; after all, they too are frequently il War). I am talking about permitting armed bands to wage victims of the terrorist war. Still, what about unfavorable politi­ terrorist war against a neighboring state from one's own terri­ cal developments? In many regions of the world, especially the tory. This is not one of the privileges of sovereignty. Itis a clear Middle East, anger precedes respect. There may be a lashing act of aggression. It can and should be treated as such by the out at Western or pro-Western targets following a military ac­ attacked state, which has every right to take action against the tion, but there is a concomitant, if grudging, assessment by the terrorists or the government that shelters them. It may do so ei­ terrorists of new limits. A posture of weakness, a repeated re­ ther in hot pursuit, in retaliation or even in pre-emptive action. fusal to confront and punish the regimes behind the terrorists, The right of self-defense takes precedence over sovereignty. not only invites further aggression but ultimately weakens the When a state deliberately employs terrorists, the distinc­ West's position, and consequently the position of its allies, in tion between striking back at the terrorists themselves or at the these regions and throughout the world. governments that shelter them is one of practical consider­ ation, not of principle. There is certainly no moral imperative Terrorists and the states that support them are seri~us ad-1 to confine the retaliation to the actual perpetrators; the terror­ versa.ties. They are devious, ruthless and persistent. But the' ists, after all, are merely servants of the government. In war, West has worsened the problem by its own disunity. For too limiting a counterattack to exactly those soldiers who fired at long terrorists have succeeded in the strategy of divide and con- you would be absurd.

TIME.APRIL 14, 1986 57 ------.------SPECIAL SECTION

Lesser forms of tolerating terrorism, like lax security safe­ that they would show in the case of covering organized crime guards in airports, should be considered a tacit form of collu­ and its l;>osses. The proven power of a thorough press investiga­ sion with terrorists. It allows them to penetrate air routes and tion to expose and to repudiate such corruption-indeed, to gal­ attack civilians from all countries. Offending governments vanize public opposition against it-is exactly the power that should be told that their airports will be cut off from the inter­ can be harnessed against terrorism. A thoughtful press can tum national aviation system until they improve security. terrorism's greatest weapon against the terrorists themselves. The broad assortment of"neutral" states that repeatedly, or This is the responsibility of the West's press. It is second only as a matter of policy, facilitate the operations of terrorists must be to the responsibility of its political leadership. For only a deter­ told that they risk being subjected to some or all of the sanctions mined leadership can make the West overcome the impediments that outright supporters of terrorists invite upon themselves. of greed, cowardice and moral confusion. . A policy of firmness will make it clear that individual ter­ Which leadership? It can come only from the U.S., which rorists will be pursued, caught and punished; that the organiza­ alone has the capacity to align the West's resistance, alone can tions that launch them will be subject to attack; that the gov­ credibly threaten the offenders and alone can impel the neutrals ernments that shelter them will face political, economic and, to shed their neutrality. The U.S. appears to be moving in this di­ ultimately, military retaliation; that other governments that rection, albeit sometimes at an uncertain pace. The more the U.S. collude less brazenly will also be held accountable. · resorts to action, like punishing terrorists and their backers, the What, then, has inhibited the widespread adoption of this pol­ greater the number of states that will join the American effort to icy by the West? I believe it is the persistent effects of three vices. combat terrorism. Allies and adversaries alike, the entire world is One is greed, or a heedless pro­ waiting to see the depth of the motion of economic self-inter­ American resolve. est, whatever the political or The West can win the war moral consequences. A second against terrorism, and fairly is political cowardice, which rapidly. But it must first win means sitting it out while your the war against its own inner . ally is attacked, or responds to weakness. That will require an attack, so as not to invoke courage. First, government the wrath of the terrorists. Both leaders must have the political factors played a part in the im­ courage to present the truth, mediate rejection by several however unpleasant, to their governments of the American people. They must be prepared initiative for sanctions against to make difficult decisions, to Llbya following the attacks on take measures that may in­ the Rome and Vienna airports. volve great risks, that may Neither cowardice nor greed even end in failure and subject will easily disappear. If, howev­ ; them to public criticism. er, the U.S. persists in its firm : Second, the soldiers who stance, I believe that it will f may actually be called upon to eventually succeed in pressur­ ~ combat terrorists will need to ing, even shaming, other West­ : show military courage. It will ern states into compliance. I be up to them to decide But there is a third, even whether they can or cannot more pernicious impediment December 1985: After the mas.sacre at Rome's undertake a particular opera­ that needs to be overcome: a Da Wnci Airport, victims are tagged for idellltlficartlon tion that a government is con- confusion that is both moral sidering. In the special units of and intellectual. We in the the Israeli army, for example, West believe in the capacity of politics to mitigate, and resolve, no one has ever simply been told by the political leadership all conflict. We automatically tend to endow an adversary with that he must accept a perilous assignment. The commanders . the same assumptions. These could not be more misplaced ·are always asked: Is it possible? Do you think you can do it? than in the case of terrorists, who use political language to de­ And if they ever said it could not be done, or even if they ex- stroy the concept of politics altogether. And even when we pressed doubts, that would have been the end of the matter. catch a glimpse of this truth, we fail to grasp its essence. For the But there is also a third kind of courage: the civic valor that West is in awe of fanaticism. It is confused before a supposed must be shown by an entire people. All citizens in a democracy willingness to die for a cause, believing that such readiness threatened by terrorism must see themselves, in a certain sense, must be based on a cause that is at least partially just. Even a as soldiers in a common battle. They must not pressure their cursory reading of history tells us how dangerous a notion that government to capitulate or to surrender to terrorism. This is is. No people were more prepared to sacrifice their lives for a especially true of public pressure on government by families of cause than the Hitler Youth. hostages. Such pressure can only be called a dereliction of civic But our present notions of terrorism are informed not by duty. Ifwe seriously want to win the war against terrorism, we history but in large measure by the media. This is why terror­ must be prepared to endure sacrifice and even, should there be ists, in their war against the West, devote so much of their strat­ the loss of loved ones, immeasurable pain. egy and their effort to capturing the Western press and l!Sing it . Terrorism is a phenomenon that tries to evoke one feeling: for their own purposes. But this need not succeed. Terrorism's fear. It is understandable that the one virtue most necessary to reliance on the press and television of the democracies gives defeat terrorism is therefore the antithesis of fear: courage. . the media tremendous power not only to amplify terrorism's Courage, said the Romans, is not the only virtue, but it is message but also to snuff it out. They can and should refuse to the single virtue without which all the others are meaningless. broadcast indiscriminately interviews with terrorists. They can The terrorist challenge must be answered. The choice is be­ and should expose the sham of terrorists' claims. They can and tween a free society based on law and compassion and a ram­ should expose their grisly acts for what they are. pant barbarism in the service of brute force and tyranny. Con­ What the public has a right to demand of journalists is the fusion and vacillation facilitated the rise of terrorism. Clarity same scrupulousness and professionalism, no more and no less, and courage will ensure its defeat. •

TIME. APRIL 14, 1986 59 J rrrbrJ..:.. October 1986

ATTACK NEAR JERUSALEM'S TEMPLE MOUNT PART OF "ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ZIONIST CANCER THROUGHOUT OUR PALESTINIAN SOIL" (PLO-Arafat)

One Civilian Killed, 32 Civilians Injured in Attack

On the evening of October 15, 1986, PLO terrorists hurled two hand gr~nade~a group of Israeli soldiers and their families con~~near the Temple Mount, in the qld City of Jerusalem. -::ii1'i'C?"--'Pemp1e Meunt- -i-G-- -t-he -sit:e o-f ewo- --Mo-slem holy places -- the -­ Al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock Mosques -- as ·well as of the Jewish people's most highly revered holy place and the historic focus of its aspiration for national redemption and independence, the Western Wall.

One civilian was killed in the resulting explosions, and, among the 66 persons injured, which included some Arabs, 32 were civilians, amongst them 13 women and 7 children.

Responsibility for the atta~k was assumed by the "military spokesman" of the PLO. In an announcement issued the same evening by the Palestinian Center in Cairo, the spokesman also said:

"This heroic act confirms the decision on escalation adopted by the Palestinian leadership at its last meeting, when it undertook to continue the policy of the armed struggle against the Zionist and colonialist l cancer throughout our Palestinian soil." The PLO representative in Cairo, Tayeb Abd ar-Rahim, told the French News Agency on October 15 that the decision under which the Jerusalem attack was carried out was taken by the Supreme Military Co__uncil o_f___t.he_EalPc:::tinici.Il-Center -in-Baghdad, ten days ago.

Notably, the attack took place in the midst of the Jewish Holiday season, when large numbers of people congregate in the vicinity of the holy places. (The attack came, incidentally, after many months of quiet in Jerusalem.) -

. Previous PLO attacks against civilians congregated in various holy places include bombings or shootings at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in October 1968 (45 injured) and in November 1968 (6 injured), near the Western Wall in October 1971 (16 injured), a synagogue in in ·August 1975 (3 injured), on the Via Dolorosa in Jerusalem in August 1981 (1 killed), near Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem in August 1982 (1 injured), near the Cremisan Monastery, Beth Jallah, in October 1984 (2 killed) and near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in November 1985 (1 injured). -2-

Palestinian terrorist attacks on Jewish religious targets abroad include the bombings .of synagogues in a number of European cities: Paris in October 1980 (3 killed, 20 injured), Vienna in August 1981 (2 killed, 19 injured), Antwerp in October 1981 (2 killed, 90 injured}, Rome in October 1982 (1 infant killed, 34 persons injured) and Istanbul in September 1986 (23 killed, 3 injured}.

The outrage near the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on October 15th follows a long chain of threats by the PLO leaders, from Arafat down, the last two of which were uttered only a few days ago (October 4th and 9th). Thus:

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Kuwait, reported by ~.. obbeerr_ 9, 1986: ""'' ·.~ -...... · -~~- -- - :::-.... .,.._ "Ara f at vowed his revolution will not drop the armed struggle against Israel •.. "

\- Secretary of Fatah Revolutionary Council Sahr Abu Nizar in an interview for the Arabic Weekly Al-A'alam, London, October 4, 1986: \ "Our struggle and liberation are strategy and not tactics. There is no way to stop the struggle except through the realization of the objectives of the . Palestinian people~ which are: return, liberation, and the establishment of an independent state throughout the national Pal~stinian soil."

The language of the PLO announcements points up that organization's objective, the establishment of a PLO-run Palestinian Arab state to be used as a springboard for the annihilation of Israel. In the pursuit of that end, all means are fair, in the PLO's book. That is why the PLO will not shrink from carrying out the most brutal random assaults anywhere (even in the hallowed Old City of Jerusalem, within meters of Moslem and .Jewish holy places) and against any kind of human target. Ostensibly, this time the targe~ was a grciup cf soldierc; but, even in this case, half of the victims were civilians. Ultimately, the PLO has targeted peace negotiations for attack.

In the wake of this new bloody manifestation of the PLO doctrine, Israel feels entitled to demand of those countries that permit the operation of PLO offices in their territories that these offices be closed down forthwith and their personnel expelled from those countries. October 1986

SYRIAN AND IRANIAN-BACKED TERRORISM: PARIS AND LEBANON

The organization behind the recent spate of bombings in Paris is LARF, the "Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction." It was founded in Lebanon in 1980 by the Abdullah brothers, who, despite their Orthodox Christian background, are pro-Syrian Marxists.

In the past, various attacks on American and Israeli targets in Europe have been attributed to LARF. Georges Ibrahim Abdullah is now serving a four-year term in a French prison for his terrorist activities, including involvement in the murders of Israeli diplomat Yaakov Barsimantov and American military attache Charles Ray.

Through the current round of terrorist violence, LARF, acting under Syrian influence, is seeking to free its imprisoned comrades from French (and Italian) jails. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Syria itself instigated the Paris bombings, Syria could have prevented such terrorism had it chosen to do so. LARF'~ a~>rainlng camps, and those of some other terror groups active in Europe, are located in tightly-controlled Syrian-occupied Lebanon and in Damascus itself.

LARF has for ed ties wi violent French terrorist organization known as "Direct Action; A_5ALA the ecret Army for the Libera- tion of Armenia;" and .remnants of _!_he Wad:illaddad faction of the PLO, the PLO' s George Haba~h_ and the PLO' s Ahme

Indeed, on September 30, the French Minister of Cooperation, Michel Aurillac, implicated that the t:erroi ists responsible for the Paris attacks who __left France were "eililtrated" l>~'professional secret agents" from Syria. Another senior French official stated that "the Syrian angle is virtually a certainty. Everything, including the indications we are getting from other Arab countries, indicates that the key to this is in Damascus."

The terrorist acts being perpetrated against the South. Lebanese Army (SLA) and UNIFIL soldiers in southern Lebanon are the work of Hezbollah, the so-called "Party of God," which is backed by Iran and assisted, at least indirectly, by Syria. Hezbollah's goal is to force a collapse of Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon in order to establish a radical Khomeini­ style regime, reach Israel's border, and instigate terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians in the Galilee. While Syria does not wish to see the Hezbollah strengthened at the expense of the Shi'ite Amal militia, the free hand that the Syrians have given to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon relieves Syria of pressure in the Beka'a Valley and in Beirut, where it is currently seeking to impose its own authority. Syri~~~§l:.ance to Hezbollah and its Iranian ~v~k~ includes free movement thr9ugh Syrian lines.

Coordinated activity of this sort between the Syrian and Iranian govern­ ments has been preceeded by discussions between the foreign ministers of those two countries, who, together with the foreign minister of Libya, have met on several recent occasions, the latest of which was on August 24th.