National Security Council of Pakistan BACKGROUND GUIDE CHAIR: Joe Reed Coy Sanchez-Sponsler Dear Honorable Delegates, I have enjoyed being a part of the Model United Nations team at Stanford, always intrigued in anything concerning politics and power dynamics and regularly deprived of it as a chemical engineering student. Less academically speaking, I pursue string and vocal music as a cellist and bass and spend as much time as I can in the making of useful and/or beautiful things. As your Chair this conference and on the behalf of the rest of the PacMUN community and staff, I would like to extend a warm welcome to PacMUN 2017. This year in particular, with a global joint-crisis format and intricate recent events to develop, we look forward to vibrant debate and conversation on the political world. Functioning as prominent contemporary political figures engaging in diplomacy and negotiations, you will have the opportunity to jointly craft the policy of the National Security Council of Pakistan, a highly influential institution welding the heavyweights of Pakistan’s military and civil government leadership. Introduction to Committee The National Security Council of Pakistan (NSC) has had a tumultuous history as an agency since its conception under General Yahya Khan in 1969. Originally a part of the office of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, in 1984 the NSC’s first legal mainstay, article 152A, was proposed as part of the Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO) to provide for military influence of the civil government. A large departure from the Pakistani military’s previously apolitical stance, General Zia-ul-Haq’s move drew criticism from major political factions, the NSC having been sharply curtailed in 1972 after Bhutto’s civilian rise to power in 1971. 152A was later withdrawn to pass the rest of the RCO due to opposition. January 1997 saw the government of President Farooq Khan Leghari and Prime Minister Meraj Khalid found the Council for Defense and National Security, a 10-member organization similar to the NSC in function and form but eventually put to rest in 2007 under Nawaz Sharif’s government. The NSC itself, however, was revived in October 1999 by the Musharraf government, and provided consultancy and input on a wide range of issues. After two restructurings, Musharraf moved to implant a constitutional framework for its continuation through the Legal Framework Order (LFO). Again, major political parties including the PPPP, PML-N, MMA, etc… voiced strong opposition and succeeded in preventing its introduction into the constitution, instead routing it through regular legislation, where it passed in 2004. The committee simulated is that outlined in the 2004 National Security Act (cited below under Suggested Resources), with several modifications to reflect de-facto and/or useful changes taken place. Responsibilities and Powers According to The National Security Council Act, 2004, “There shall be established a National Security Council to serve as a forum for consultation on matters of national security including the sovereignty, integrity, defense, security of the State and crisis management…. The Council shall formulate and make recommendations to the President and the Government…” In practice, the NSC also serves as a platform for intercommunication between civilian and military agencies, providing for political stability as well as the opportunity to create effective recommendations able to be swiftly implemented in times of crisis. According to the former article 152A, crises may be interpreted to include “…strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-Provincial harmony.” Sociopolitical Context The National Security Council remains unpopular today, resented by leading political parties and liberal politicians pointing to the fact that the NSC primarily takes on the oligarchic structure of high-ranking military retirees and elite civilian officials close to the military. Orations have done little to calm their fears that the council only provides legal cover for the continued expansion of military influence in civilian spheres. The NSC itself faces an internal threat of replacement by the Defense Committee of Cabinet (DCC) as parliament continues to favor increased influence and role of the DCC over the NSC. Consequently, tensions have grown between civilian and military sectors of government as the military resurged in mid-2017 after once again becoming dissatisfied with the civilian government’s handling of varying issues such as the IS flag unfurling, increased firing across the Kashmir Border, a lack of security around the Line of Control, and concerning ties between Afghanistan and Indian intelligence forces. Since the disqualification of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif this July and the subsequent nomination of Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, the council has met twice to discuss progressing relations with Afghanistan, Operations Raddul Fasaad and Zarb e Azb, cease-fire violations at the Line of Control, and the successful completion of Operation Khyber-4. Topics in Committee Kashmir and the Line of Control The Kashmir Conflict stands as one of the most prominent yet numerous sociopolitical wounds to reflect post-colonial struggles shadowing the scythe of British imperialism in Southern Asia. Tensions between Pakistan and India over Kashmir first originated when the (then) Hindu prince of Kashmir hesitated over joining one of the two newly formed governments following the British empire’s retreat from the region in 1947. After three years of fighting and the Hindu Prince’s protection from Kashmir’s primarily Muslim population by the Indian government, the region was divided into both a western and (the larger of the two) an eastern segment along the Line of Control (LOC). Major conflicts again broke out in 1965 and 1999 along the LOC due to anti-Indian protests in Kashmir, and clashes escalated again in late 2016 following the death of popular social media figure and anti-Indian rebel Burhan Wani. Pakistan has a full and rightful claim to Kashmir, the intention and verbiage of the receding British empire having been to delegate regions not under direct British control to either Pakistan or India according to religion. India, however, continues to verbally assert their own capability to handle their Muslim minority’s demographic conflicts domestically despite the mass discrimination towards and dissatisfaction of Kashmir Muslims. Polls show from 73-95% of inhabitants either desire Pakistani rule or the right to self-determination as promised in 1947. As recent violence and historical records show, India has proved incompetent at handling such a religious divide in an already divided country; Pakistan continues to ask for international involvement to aid peacekeeping efforts and facilitate the most obvious solution: the integration of Kashmir under Pakistani control. In the immediate timeline, Pakistan continues to bring deadly Indian violations of ceasefire agreements to international awareness, but grows frustrated at its lack of audience. India, meanwhile, continues to fabricate its own such stories to no greater acclaim. Operations Raddul Fasaad and Rajgal; International Terrorism Developed after an intense wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan early last February, Operation Raddul Fasaad continues as an ongoing military sweep designed to eliminate all dormant and/or live terrorist threats across the country. It remains an ongoing effort despite over 200 raids and 600 suspects taken in the Punjab region alone. Operation Rajgal, better known as Khyber-IV, was recently declared a success, having destroyed at least two major terrorist strongholds in the Rajgal valley alone and suffered only two fatal casualties. (Pakistani high intelligence has kept state-sponsored anti-Indian militant sects well informed of planned Army activities; they remain, and have been advised to maintain low profile through mid-November to avoid international speculation.) As discussed in this August’s NSC meeting, the United States’ new administration has shifted face, mounting verbal pressure on Pakistan to address terrorism more effectively on domestic and international scales and ignoring the enormous contributions already made by its military and people. (Given the fragile political state of the United States’ federal executive, Pakistani leadership sees fit to continue with surface-level anti- terrorist operations in the region, aggressively engaging Afghanistan in hopes of collaboration while refusing to acknowledge the harboring of pro- Pakistani militant factions by ISI.) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization With Pakistan and India both having recently gained membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an economic and security collaborative group in eastern eurasia, the international sphere waits to see if the facet will facilitate seeds of harmony or amplify cries of strife. Both countries have historically taken advantage of international stages to appeal their personal disputes. India’s entrance appeared as a power move early this June by the Russian government, China opening the door to their long-time friend Pakistan to balance the act. Suggested Resources Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. National Security Council -- A debate on institutions and processes for decision-making on security issues. PDF. Pakistan Institute of Legal Development And Transparency - PILDAT, April 2012. "THe NATIONAL