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Home , John Kotelawala, Ponnambalam Arunachalam, Sinhala Only Act

The Evolution of Ethnic Conflict in Arul S. Aruliah and Anusha Aruliah

Wecan chart ourfuture clearly and wisely The British provided the Ceylonese context. At the time, the British gover- only when we know the path which has led with an infrastructure that was quite nors enforced a policy of state neutrality. to the present. modem. But unification, in a traditional Buddhism was slowly and convertly - Adlai Stevenson. nationalist sense (that is, identification supported, especially after the Kotahena Introduction with the nation as opposed to ethnic or riots of 1883 (a Buddhist-Catholic con- regional identification), was noticeably flict), with small monetary donations for Ethnic conflict in the world today is a absent. Prior to the arrival of the British, the repair of a dagold and a gift of lamps. familiar situation. History is integral to the northem regions of Sri Lanka were The incremental growth of -Bud- understanding the ethnopolitics of any not integrated with the south. In fact, dhist nationalism ensured that elitist nation. Such is the case in Sri Lanka. Sri there were three independentkingdoms. Christian Sinhala leaders, unlike their Lanka is an island nation located off the "Out of what once were the two Tamil brethren, would conform to na- southern tip of India's coastline. Its his- Sinhalese kingdoms of and Kotte tionalist principles if they wanted to lead tory has been as varied as the many and the Tamil kingdom of Jaffna, in 1802, that community. Communal conflicts names it has had, among them the British created their first crown were religion-based at the turn of the Tamaraparani, Taprobane, Lanka, Ilam, colony, Ceylon" (U.S. Committee for century; as the end of the twentieth cen- Serendib, Ceylon and, in 1972, Sri Lanka. Refugees 1991,4). tury draws near, Sri Lanka is being rav- The Sinhalese (mostly Buddhist) consti- English education was beginning to aged by a civil war that has its basis in an tute approximately 74 percent of the be the norm for the higher castes of both ethno-cultural perspective. "Ethniciden- population; the (mostly Hindu) the Sinhalese (the goyigad) and their tity has taken over from religious iden- are approximately 18 percent (1981 cen- Tamil counterparts, the vellalas. The an- tity" (Stirrat 1984 197).In fact, in the 1983 sus); and Tamil-speaking Muslims con- glicized schooling that prevailed was riots that devastated , the Sri stitute 7 percent of the population. Other taught at missionary schools in the late Lankan capital, both Sinhalese Catholics minorities includeBurghers1 and Malays. nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies. and Buddhists camed out attacks on Islam was introduced to Ceylon by Arab For many new Christians, motives for Tamil Catholics (Stirrat 1984). The traders around the eighth century A.D. conversion were more practical than re- change in the nature and size of the con- The Portuguese introduced Catholicism ligious. They became entitled to free flict in Sri Lanka has ramifications be- in 1505. In 1638, the Portuguese were schooling. Introduction of the North- yond the tiny nation itself, especially for replaced by the Dutch, who were subse- South railway system facilitated the countries at the receiving end of the quently overthrownby the British (1796) southward migration of English-edu- steady stream of refugees from Sri Lanka. in their quest to expand the British Em- cated Tamils. And, as a result, "during The ethnic struggle used to have po- pire. The British were a different type of the first two decades of Sri Lankan inde- litical beneficiaries; now there can be no invader. Their policies left a lasting im- pendence, Ceylon Tamils, who consti- beneficiaries until the war is over. The pact on Sri Lanka in a way that had never tutedonly12%of theisland'spopulation, evolution and escalation of the conflict occurred before. Historian D.C. Mendis held 40% of public sector employment" took place over a number of years with suggested that: (Perera 1992). There was a feeling in the the tacit acknowledgment and later di- [the] Portuguese [had] left behind the majority community that the minority rect intervention of the state. There were Roman Catholic Church, and the community had a disproportionate hold many indications of where the conflict Dutch their system of law. The British on public service positions. would lead-the type of government administrative system, helped by the Furthermore, during the colonial pe- and its problems after independence and great changes brought about by the riod, there was growing discontent the communal riots that plagued the modem industrial civilization, helped within the Sinhala-Buddhist community country are examples. After 1983, the Ceylon to be unified and the people to on the secondary position of Buddhism very nature of the conflict changed. But progress once more (Mendis 1932,8). in the country. "The Buddhist revival of the progress of the conflict was left un- the second half of the nineteenth century checked. Painfully tragic results have was the first phase in the recovery of changed the way of life for a nation. national pride in the island, the first step Arul S. Aruliah is the managing editor of Refuge Stirrings of Discontent and guest edited this sped issue on Sri Lanka. in along process which culminated in the Anusha Aruliah is a student of political science and growth of nationalism in the twentieth The religious conflicts that occurred in philosophy at the University of Toronto. century" (De Silva 1981,343).The truth the early 1900s were the Sinhalese and of this becomes obvious when placed in Tamils' responses to the emerging sense

Refuge, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) 3 of animosityagainst an alien culture with smaller racial groups. The situation But the Tamil leaders did not get what all its trappings. One element of the alien changed findamentallyafter 1922 [the they demanded. Sri Lanka was unique at culture was the Catholic church. There time of the Donoughmore Constitu- that stage. It was a full twenty years were a series of violent encounters be- tion] when .. . there was one majority ahead of its African and Asian counter- community - the Sinhalese- the Tamils parts in the or Common- tween Catholics and Buddhists: now regarding themselves increas- Ambalangoda in 1890, Wadduwa in ingly as a minority community. It has wealth with its universal suffrage. In 1891, in 1897 and remained so ever since (DeSilva 1981, 1931, 1936 and 1947, legislatures were Anuradhapura in 1903; and between 387). elected by means of universal suffrage Catholics and Hindus Negombo in 1899 and the Sinhalese majority began to get and Neervali in 1902. According to K.M.De Silva, this more and more power because of their The elite class of Sri Lankan society promising time inSriLankanhistorywas numbers. did not have well defined "racial" unparalleled. However, there were Disenfranchisement and the Issue boundaries at the time. They were sirn- stirrings of trouble from the outset. It is ply Ceylonese. A combination of wealth true that these were not of ethnic lean- of Colonization and English education elevated them to ings, but were instead due to the fact that When Sri Lanka became an independent that position. They were mobilizing the was the nation in 1948, replete with Westrnin- among themselves to become a viable bastion of the elite, none of whom shared ster-style democracy, Britain and the political force. Their motives were quite the same political outlook. When the Ceylonese overlooked a fundamental clear-cut. They were being barred from party was formed, there were two iden- flaw. By ignoring the fact that, although the highest echelons of the land, no mat- tifiable factions: the constitutional elite, Tamils constituted a minority of the gen- ter how qualified or how capable. In an who proposed a political goal of respon- eral population, they constituted a very extreme example, a Whitehall (British sible self-government for Ceylon as a definite majority in certain areas of Sri government)official tolda prominent Sri member of the British Empire. The other Lanka - the northern and, to a slightly Lankan lawyer that the man chosen to be sector was radical; they favoured force- lesser degree, eastern parts of the coun- attorney- "must be a good law- ful opposition to British rule in the tradi- try - Sri Lanka was left in a state that yer and ought to be pure white.. ." (De tion of the Indian model. could easily have led to disarray and Silva 1981,322) . In 1919, Sir William Manning, the eventually did so. Political representation under the new British governor, amved. He did Colonization was and remains an British was in the form of the Legislative not approve of the Ceylon National Con- important issue of conflict. It was the Council. The ratio for the council, whose gress (CNC) and he used his consider- government-sponsored colonization purpose was to elicit information about able power to hasten the path of schemes of predominantly Tamil areas local conditions, was fixed, by conven- self-destruction that the CNC appeared that caused a problem. "Tamils see it as a tion, at three Europeans and one from to be taking. By the late 1920~~after the deliberate attempt to deprive their areas each Ceylonese community: Sinhalese, deliberations over the Donoughmore of continuity and thus decrease their Tamil and Burgher. However, the effec- Constitution, the shift towards ethnocen- communal bargaining power. They tiveness of the representation was tric perspectives began. "Whilst the point out that hardly any Tamils have greatly limited by the fact that the succes- Sinhalese leaders favoured the 'one man, been settled under official auspices in sive Sri Lankan members of the council one vote' system, Tamil leaders objected Sinhalese areas" (Schwarz 1988,lO). The all tended to come from the same fami- to this on the grounds that it would give colonization schemesbegan in the 1930s. lies. Finally the Ceylon National Con- the Sinhalese majority total control over One of the largest of the pre-1953 projects gress was formed in 1917; it was a the country, and so they demanded some was the one at Gal Oya in the Amparai multiracial, multidenominational party sort of communal representation to safe- District, which was initially a predomi- whose common links were elitist in na- guard their position" (Stirrat 1984,198). nantly Tamil area. ture. Until 1921, its leader was Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, a Tamil, whose prestige was so great that it subse- quently made his post prestigious: Table 1: Population Change in Selected Districts What distinguished elite politics in Tamils Sinhalese Ceylon in the first two decades of the 1953 1971 % Change 1953 1971 % Change twentieth century from succeeding decades was the harmony that pre- Jaffna 477,304 673,043 41 6,183 20,402 230 vailed between the Sinhalese and 130,381 246,582 89 31,174 94,150 202 Tamil leaderships. In the political jar- Trincomalee 37,517 73,255 95 15,296 55,308 262 gon of the day there were two majority 9,010 30,994 244 31,587 309,298 879 communities, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and the minorities were the Data adapted from Schwarz 1988,lO

4 wge, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) The settlement of large numbers of blame can be connected to the elite poli- lieved, the dhanna would be spread Sinhalese peasants in the Gal Oya ticians who formulated the political throughout the world and would pm Basin made it feasible for the govern- structure. On a very simplistic level it duce an unprecedented spiritual ment to create a separate electoral dis- could be argued that because of their awakening. In Lanka, Jayanthi had an trict for the Sinhalese and increase even greater significance, making the Sinhalese representation in the parlia- Anglicization, they could not see the completion of 2,500 years of Bud- ment. Indeed, the Amparai Electoral necessity of takingintoaccount the needs dhism, the life of the Sinhalese race, District is represented by a Sinhalese of the thasses. However, it is more likely and the length of recorded history and member of parliament (Manogaran that they chose to ignore the social real- continuous political institutions, a 1987,93). ity, naively assuming that the 5 to 6 per- threefold event of great mystical cent English-speaking population power in the Sinhalese mind Such colonization has long been rec- would remain in power after successive (McGowan 1992,150-1). ognized as a part of Tamil grievances elections. By not acknowledging these because of the loss of power to Tamil realities, the elitists orchestrated their The Buddha Jayanthiwasinstrumen- representation. However, the schemes own downfall. tal in bringingreligion into the fray of the have been amplified as shown in Table 1. language and culture wars. With The prime minister of the newly-in- Emergence of the Language Issue Bandaranaike denouncing" the invisible dependent Sri Lanka, D.S. Senanayake, The man who would eventually destroy yoke of evil, unenlightened teachings, assured G.G. Ponnambalam and his the elitist stranglehold on power came practices, habits, customs, and views fos- Tamil Congress that Tamil rights would from that social stratum. Solomon West tered by the British" (McGowan 1992, be protected under the direction of the Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, originally El),the bhikkhus (Buddhist monks) were (UNP). He con- a Christian, was a member of a wealthy, encouraging many Sinhalese to vote for vinced Ponnambalam and others, to prominent Sinhalese family. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. cross the flwr and join the UNP. Among Bandaranaike's father was an Anglo- At the time of independence, Sri those who remained in Opposition were phile who named his son for the British Lanka was left with two parties S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a Tamil Chris- governor, James West Ridgeway. Al- and some smaller exclusively Tamil par- tian, and his retinue, who vehemently thoughBandaranaikewas very well edu- ties. The ruling UNP was technically a opposed the disenfranchisement of In- cated in English (he attended Oxford), he non-ethnic party. In reality, its members dian Tamils who were rendered stateless was illiterate in Sinhala4;he was also the were "committed to Sinhalese national- by D.S. Senanayake's government in man who was swept into power under ism" (Obeyesekere 1984, 156); but the 1949. "The legislation denying citizen- the auspices of the "Sinhala Only" Act. UNP was also committed to unity, or ship and voting rights to most Indian There was a growing sense of alienation more realistically, committed to allaying Tamils was passed by a Sinhalese-domi- with the realization that although Eng- the fears of either community: " .. .[Sir nated parliament to satisfy the Kandyan lish was spokenby a very smallminority, John] Kotelawala [then prime minister] Sinhalese, who were resentful [because] it was the language of the state: the assured the , during a .. . the agriculturalland and employment courts, police, parliamentary debates, visit to Jaffna in late 1954, that appropri- opportunities for the indigenous popu- government administration, banking atelegislationwouldbe adopted to make lation were limited (Manogaran 1987, and university instruction. "Initially, the both Sinhala and Tamil the official lan- 19). But the underlying fear of Sinhalese Sinhala-languagemovement was purely guages of the country" (Manogaran politicians was that the Tamil popula- anti-Western, but later it began to de- 1987, 43). This action dismayed many tion, Indian and Sri Lankan, would unite velop anti-Tamil overtones as well" Sinhalese. Bandaranaike capitalized on against the Sinhalese. (McGowan 1992, 155). Both Sinhalese their fears. The ease with which the laws were and Tamil nationalists denounced Eng- The UNP reversed its position in 1955 passed distressed Chelvanayakam who lish as an official language. Instead, they by declaring that Sinhala should be the then founded the Federal Party (FP).His advocated a return to suxlbasha,5 which official language, but it was a futile ac- view was that within a unitary form of would provide equal rights for both tion. To vote for the UNP, the bhikkhus government, minority rights were not Tamil and Sinhalese languages. Soon, assured the populace, would be cultural protected and indeed were in consider- however, Bandaranaike was exploiting suicide. The reversal of theUNP position ablejeopardy. He said, " [today],justiceis the explosive language issue for his own on language deprived them of whatever being denied to Indian Tamils. Some day political purposes. The election year was popular supwrtthey had from the Tamil in the future, when language becomes 1956, which fortunately for population. It was no surprise then that the issue, the same [will] befall the Bandaranaike, was also the year of the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Ceylon Tamils" (Ram 1989,37). The dis- Buddha Jayanthi: Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) coa- enfranchisement of the Indian Tamils Jayanthi was the 2,500 year anniver- lition6 won a landslide victory in the became a contentious issue that demon- sary of the Buddha's enlightenment, April 1956 election. Bandaranaike had strated how much was lacking in the the very epicenter of his 5,000 year said that the Official Language Act government structure. Much of the teaching. A that point, Buddhists be- would have a provision for what he

Wge,Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) 5 called "reasonable use cif Tamil." How- demands of regional autonomy. In fact, nation or state is incomprehensible to ever, once in power, any attempt he in 1926 Bandaranaike promoted the the popular mind. The emphasis on made to include Tamil in the Official federal state structure, within the exist- the sense of uniqueness of the Language Act was greeted with derision, ing unitary state framework to appease Sinhalese past, and the focus on Sri Lanka and the Opposition accused the prime the Kandyan Sinhalese, who were de- as the land of the Sinhalese and the country in which Buddhism stood minister of conceding the rights of the manding autonomy. The EC Pact was forthin its purest form, carried memo- Sinhalese to the Tamils. The Federal considered "one of the few statesman- tional appeal compared with which a Party (led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam) or- likecompromises.. .ever tobeattempted multi-dal policwas a meaningless ganized peaceful mass demonstrations in Sri Lanka" (Ponnambalam 1983,112). abstraction (De Silva 1981,512). against the "Sinhala Only" Act. Infuri- It was abandoned when Sinhalese Bud- While the Sinhalese government was trying to implement its policies, the There was a growing cnuareness among Tamil leaders that their Tamil politiaans were attempting to Sinhalese companiots, with whom they had agitaed for make clear the distinction between Sinhalese nationalism and Ceylonese independencejivm the British, were quite willing to subjugate nationalism, which were being equated TMif it was politically advantageous. at the time. Even in 1951, the Federal Party was setting out the configurations for Tamil ated Sinhalese mobs beat the Tamil dhist extremists and the Opposition nationalism centred around the protesters; "[this] violense was accom- voiced their protests in a multitude of language, history and distinctiveness of panied by an anti-Tamil riot, resulting in ways. One of the most famous, by J.R. the culture. In 1958, after satyagraha the killing of more than one hundred Jayewardeneof the UNP (whowasorigi- went into effect, the country was aflame Tanlils at the government-sponsored nally a Christian), was the October 4, with riots and four days passed without GalOya colonization schemeinAmparai 1957 march to Kandy to invoke divine the declaration of a state of emergency. District" (Manogaran 19$7,48). blessings for the campaign against the B- Hundreds of innocent civilians were There was a growing awareness CPact.Jayewardene, who would lead Sri murdered. People were tortured, beaten amongTamil leaders that their Sinhalese Lanka after 1977, then said: "[the] time and shot simply for not being able to compatriots, with whom they had a@- has come for the whole Sinhalese race, pronounce certain words correctly; a tated for independence from the British, which has existed for 2,500 years jeal- number of goondass killed their own peo- were quite willing to subjugate Tamils if ously safeguardingits language and reli- ple who were too frightened to pro- it was politically advantageous. The gion, to fight without giving any quarter nounce words correctly. The Tamil leaders, too, had their motives for to save its birthright" (McGowan 1992, government's lack of response would their political strategies; however, much 161).It was said that the B-CPact would prove to be the rule instead of the excep of their energieswere devbted to fighting have reasonably assuaged Tamil fears of tion, and Tamils, moderates and extrem- the openly disaiminatory policies that domination, but when it was abrogated ists, were infuriated (Vittachi 1958). the MEP coalition had introduced. By 1957, the Federal Party threatened Bandaranaike with a campaign of The Tamil leaders, too, had their motives for their political satyugraha7 unless their demands-par- ity between Sinhalese and Tamil as two strategies; however, much of their energies were devoted to offidal languages, an end to the planned fighting the openly discriminatory policies that the MEP Sinhalesecolonization of predominantly coalition had introduced. Tamil areas, the granting of citizenship rights to "Indian Tamils", and most im- portantly, regional autonDmy were met. in April 1958, the threatened campaign Bandaranaike also had to deal with .the Bandaranaike" .. . wasconvinced that of satyagraha was enforced. Sri Lanka many and often bitter conflicts within his the Tamils were determined to defend succumbed to a wave of nationalist ten- coalition government. On September 26, their legitimate rights and, in order to dencies as KM. De Silva explains: 1959, he was assassinated by a bhikku avert a major ethnic conflict, he agreed to who belonged to a radical right-wing negotiates political settlement to the con- [one] of the immediate consequences faction of the coalition. Bandaranaike's of the transformation of nationalism flict in July 1957" (Manogaran 1987,49). was that the concept of a multi-racial wife, Sirima, immediately assumed The settlement was known as the polity was no longer politically viable. power. Many Sinhalese and Tamil lead- Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) In Sinhalese the words for nation, race ers had two very different ideologies as Pact. Both leaders agreed on a devolu- and people are practically synonymous to where Sri Lanka should head in the tion of powers in order to meet the and a multi-racial or multicommunal latter half of the twentieth century, This

R4r(ge1 Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) difkrence of opinion would wentually for the armed struggle that ensued in the ~owwer,this goal was not necessar- lead to disaster. following decades. ily achieved: The politics of the 1%0s were essen- Mrs. Bandaranaike's party stayed in tially under the control of Mrs. Sirima power until 1965 when Dudley Sena- [Standardizqtion] did not lead to bet- Bandaranaike, the leader of the Sri hdca nayake (son of former prime minister, ter chances for schools in backward and ruralareasasis sometimes alleged. Freedom Party (SLFP), who was re- D.S. Senanayake), returned to the office In fact provincial distributionof places turned topowerinJuly1960.Theworld's of Prime Minister, which he held briefly remained almost unaltered except for first female prime minister was "not re- in 195253. came a fall in the share of science admissions luctant to take on two inflammable is- when Sri Lanka's literacy (excluding the from the Northern province. It is in the sues at the same time" (De Silva 1981, 0-4 age group) was almost 85 percent. ethnicbreakdownthat the real impact 512). She passed the provisions of the "[As] a result of its long standing can be seen. The percentage of Tamil 'Sinhala Only' bill into effect which commitment to free education (in the medium students entering courses in stated that Sinhala should be the lan- sense of free tuition) at all levels- engineering fell from 40.8%in 197011 to24.496 in 197314 (De SilvainSchwarz guage of administration by 1961. "The primary, secondary and tertiary-% 1988,9). Tamil people must accept the fact that Lanka in the 1960s became an outstand- the Sinhala majority will no longer per- ing example of the growing global phe- The corresponding period saw the mit themselves to be cheated of their nomenon of educated unemployed" (De emergence of med militancy among rights" (McGowan 1992, 161), she ex- Silva 1981, 538). Dudley Senanayake's Tamil students. Tamil moderate leaders plained. This was despite the unofficial government devised a program of agri- became increasingly discredited in the eyes of the Tamil people because of is- sues like standardization but what fi- The problem has changed in mature. Initially, the c& was nally reduced their political clout was a their inability to protect the Tamil popu- constitutional one involving the protection of basic minority lation from violence. Mrs. Bandara- righ& that were subject to political exploitation. In more recent naike's governmentclamped down hard on Tamils who supported secession, and years, increased militancy has rendered the concept of Tamils living in predominantly polih'cal victors inconceivable. Sinhalese areas began to feel the brunt of the repression. Those who lived in the North also faced repression in many electoral promises she had made to the cultural activities designed to incorpo- quarters, and they reacted:

FP. The Federal Party, in turn, initiated rate the ranks of the unemployed, but the ' civil disobedience, which led, for the first educated were not interested in those The result was a spreading militancy and the growth of a martial spirit in a time, to military suppression of the Tamil types of jobs. The educated unemployed people who had long been known for disobedience in the north and east. Mrs. became very receptive to the criticisms passiveness.... But a generation of Bandaranaike also implemented state made by the Opposition. Tamil youth, raised in &I almost per- control over all state-aided secondary Mrs. Bandaranaike came back into petual state okonflictwith the govem- schools. The powerful Roman Catholic power in 1970 after combining the SLFP -boycotts of schools, picketingof minority was incensed and fought with the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and government offices, the performance against it. However, they, too, were the Communist Party under the banner of satyagraha, and the hoisting of black forced to acquiesce. of the United Front (UF). Mrs. flags to protest government action+ In 1962, the armed forces (consisting Bandaranaike introduced ethnic quotas had been radicalized (McGowan 1992, mainly of Sinhalese Christians and at universities in response to a general In). Burghers) attempted a coup $&at that Sinhalese feeling that Tamils were some- These radicalized youth, determined was put down. The acceptance of how being favoured in admissions. The and fuelled by the conduct of the state "Sinhala Only" by the major parties gave system of quotas, known as "standardi- police force, were the beginnings of the rise to an exodus of disillusioned intelli- zation," was implemented in 1972. It was Liberation Tigers of Tamil mili- gentsia from all communitieswho left Sri a system "in which marks obtained by tant group. In 1975, their leader, Lanka to go to England, Canada, Aus- candidates for university admission Velupillai Prabhakeran, led a small tralia and New Zealand. Many Tamils [were]weighted by giving advantage to group w~d-responsibilityforthe also went to "Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia certain linguistic groups and/or certain killing o pro-government mayor of and other emergent countries of Africa districts" (Schwarz 1988,9).The govern- Jaffna. In retabtion, the police and the which wanted their learning, skills and ment ostensibly sought to help the less army detained and tortured over one expertise" (Po~ambalam1983, 112). proficient areas of Sri Lanka - in par- hundred Tamil students for a year. None These wealthy expatriates would ulti- ticular, Kandy and the upcountry were ever formally charged, "establish- mately serve as a financial support base Sinhalese. ing a pattern of collective punishment for

Refkge, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) 7 acts committedagainstSinhaleseauthor- consequences of the daily battles being 7. Satyapha: Civil disobedience movement ity" (McGowan 1992, 177). After each fought in the north and east. Post-1983 along the Gandhian pattern. communal riot, one of the most violent has been a traumatic time for Sri Lanka. 8. Goonda: Hoodlum, unemployable occurring in 1977, Tamils increasingly The Sinhala-Tamil conflict, which could vagabond viewed the conflicts as struggles for per- have been averted with some fore- References sonal and cultural survival instead of a thought and a strong stance against po- confrontation over constitutional rights. litical exploitation, appears to be De Siva, KM. 1981. A History of Sri kmh. The escalation was visible and Mrs. uncontrollable in its present state. The London: C. Hurst and Company. Bandaranaike's government was instru- problem has changed in nature. Initially, Farmer, B.H. 1%3. Ceylon: A Divided Nation. mental in using the police and armed the crisis was a constitutional one involv- London: . Manogaran, Chelvaduai. 1987. Ethnic Confiict forces as weapons of the state against its ingthe protection of basicminority rights and Reconciliation in Sri kmkn. Honolulu: own indigenous population. that were subject to politicalexploitation. University of Hawaii Press. In 1977, J.R. Jayewatdene and the Inmore recent years, inaeasedmilitancy McGowan, William. 1992. Only Mm? Is Vile: The UNP came to power. It was a year of has rendered the concept of political vic- Tragedy of Sri Lanka. New York Farrar, reckoning for Sri Ladca. During the elec- tors inconceivable. The survival of Sri Straus and Girow. tion campaign "[the] people's hatred of Lankan society is now threatened, and Mendis, G.C. 1932. The Early History of Gylon. the long queues for essential foodstuffs, the composition of minorities in the so- Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House. of injustices .. had been exploited with cial fabric has been tom asunder. Inflam- Obeyesekere, Gananath. 1984. "The Origins . and Institutionalization of Political skill. At the same time wery reactionary matory statements are the norm now for Violence." In Sri Lanka: In Changeand Crisis, tendency, too, had been made use of" both the Sinhalese and Tamils. Sri Lanka edited by James Manor. London: Croom (Piyadasa 1984,%). In the same election, is undergoing a most difficult time in its Helm Ltd. a majority of Tamils supported the Tamil history. It remains to be seen whether a Perera, Jayantha.1992. "PoliticalDevelopment United Liberation Front (TULF) position solution [see Manogaran in this issue ] or and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka." lournu1 of as enunciated in the Vaddukoddai reso- solutions can be found to the complex Rejugt~Studies 5,2,136-48. lution: and convoluted questions that make up Piyadasa, L. 1984. Sri Lanka: The Hdmaust and the conflict. After. London: Marrarn Books. The convention resolvesthat the resto- Ponnambalam, Satchi. 1983. Sri Lanka: The ration and recowtitution of the Free, National Question and the Tamil Liberation Sovereign, Secular Socialist State of Notes Struggle. London: Zed Books Ltd. based on the right of Ram, Mohan. 1989. Sri Lanka: The Fractured self determination inherent to every Island. New Delhi: Penguin Books. nation has become inevitable in order Burghers: The Eurasian descendants of Schwarz, Walter. 1988. The Tamils of Sri hka. to safeguard the very exbtence of the Dutch colonists. Fourth edition. London: The Minority Tamil nation in this country (TULF in Goyigama: the highest of the major Rights Group. Perera 1992). Sinhalese castes; there are subcastes within Stirrat, R.L. 1984. "The Riots and Roman the caste of the goyigama. Literally "agri- Jayewardene had made electoral Catholic Church in HistoricalPerspective." culturalist" (Vellala:the Tarnilequivalent of In Sri Lunka: In Change and Crisis, edited by promises tothe Tamils specifically about goyigama). The parallel caste systems of James Manor. London: Cmom Helm Ltd their employment and education griev- both Sinhalese and Tamils indicates the U.S. Committee for Refugees. 1991. Sn' Lanka: ances. But like many other Sinhalese similarity between the two groups. "[It] lsland of Refugees. Prepared by Court leaders, these were more platitudes than may wellbe that SinhaleseandTamilshave Robinson. Washington: U.S. Committee for 197% much in common genetically, their separa- Refugees. promises. By the Tigers were carry- tion being, like so many similar cleavages ing out more attacks on people and struc- Vittachi, Tarzie. 1958. ~mer~en&'58: The Story the world over, primarily a linguistic and Race Andm tures that had government links. In July cultural one" (Farmer 1%3,8). In much of of the Ceylon Riots. London: of that same year, Jayewardene gave the the literature concerning this subject, Deutsch Limited. "race" and "ethnicity" have been used in- Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. 1979. Politics in Sri the army a mandate to enforce the Pre- Lanka, 1947-1979.London: The McMillan vention of Terrorism Act, which cur- terchangeably. [see Ramchandran in this is- sue on the role of culture in the ethnic amfiict] Press Ltd. tailed civil liberties and enforced what Dagoba: A Buddhist relic mound. could essentially be called military rule Selected Readings The language is Sinhala. The people and in the northern and eastern provinces. In culture are Siese. 1979. 1981, there was spate of mti-Tamil vio- Swrrbasha: Indigenous languages-Siala Gunawardana,RA.L.I-L,ed. TheSribnka lence in response to attado by the Tamil and Tamil ]ournu1 ofthe Humanities, volume 5, numbers Tigers, but the communal riots of 1983 I 6 2. Peradeniya: University of Mahajana Eksath Peramuna was formed Peradeniya. by Bandaranaike's party, the Sri Lanka were the catalysts for full-fledged avil 1988. Freedom Party, the Viplavakari Hyndman, Patricia. Sri hka:Sermdipity war. under Siege. Nottingham: RussellPrew Ltd At present, Sri Lanka is a country in [~evolutionar~]~~anka ~ama ~akaja party, the Basha Peramuna (Language Front) and Weaver, Mary Anne. March 21, 1988."A dire straits. Refugees stream out of the independents. Reporter at Large: The Gods and the Stars." country in record numbers to escape the The New Yorker.

8 1 we,VoL 13, No. 3 (June 1993)