1. 9002 2. Adore 3. Agobot 4. Alina 5. Allaple 6. Alureon 7. Andromeda 8

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1. 9002 2. Adore 3. Agobot 4. Alina 5. Allaple 6. Alureon 7. Andromeda 8 LISTA DE CÓDIGO MALICIOSO PARA EL EJERCICIO 2 OJO: En algunos casos los nombres hacen referencia al resultado de la ejecución del código malicioso o la aplicación a la que afecta, además de al código malicioso en sí (por ejemplo, hacen referencia a un troyano y a la botnet creada con él o al programa que instala). 1. 9002 44. Bytverify 86. Gaobot 2. Adore 45. Carberp 87. Gapz 3. Agobot 46. ChePro 88. Geinimi 4. Alina 47. Chernobyl 89. Gh0st 5. Allaple 48. Citadel 90. Ghostball 6. Alureon 49. Citifraud 91. Gingermaster 7. Andromeda 50. Clippo 92. Gozi 8. Animal 51. CodeRed 93. Graybird 9. Anna-Kournikova 52. Commwarrior 94. Happy99 11. Arcom 53. Conficker 95. HellRaiser 12. Ardamax 54. Cookies 96. Hikit 13. Asprox 55. Coswid 97. Hiloti 14. Avatar 56. Creeper 98. HOIC 15. Back Orifice 57. Cryptolocker 99. Horst 16. Badtrans 58. Cutwail 100. Hotbar 17. Bagle 59. CyberGate 101. Hupigon 18. Bamital 60. Dalbot 102. Ikee 19. Banbra 61. DarkComet 103. ILoveYou 20. Bandook 62. Darkmegi 104. Imaut 21. BaneChant 63. DaVinci 105. IXESHE 22. Banload 64. Daws 106. JBOSS 23. Barrotes 65. Depyot 107. Joshi 24. Beast 66. Destory 108. Kak 25. Beebone 67. Dexter 109. Karagany 26. Beebus 68. DirDel 110. Kelihos 27. Benjamin 69. DirtJumper 111. Kenzero 28. Bifrose 70. Distrack 112. Klez 29. Bitcoinminer 71. DNSChanger 113. Koobface 30. Blaster 72. Dokstormac 114. Krbanker 31. Blazebot 73. Dozer 115. Krotten 32. Bohmini 74. Droiddream 116. Kuluoz 33. Bohu 75. BlackPOS 117. Laroux 34. Bolgimo 76. Duqu 118. Leap 35. Boran 77. ElkCloner 119. Leouncia 36. Botvoice 78. Enfal 120. Letsgo 37. Brain 79. Ezula 121. Likseput 38. Bredolab 80. FakeAlert. 122. Lovgate 39. Briba 81. Festi 123. LowZones 40. BRKBL 82. Fokirtor 124. Luckycat 41. Brontok 83. Friday13 125. LURK 42. Bubble-boy 84. Fuclip 126. Macmag 43. Bugbear 85. Gamarue 127. Madi 128. Magic 176. Puce 224. TDL-4 129. Magistr 177. Qhost 225. Tequila 130. Mariposa 178. Quarian 226. Theoloa 131. Matsnu 179. Ramnit 227. Tibet 132. Mebromi 180. Ranbyus 228. Tijcont 133. Medfos 181. RARSTONE 229. Tinba 134. Melissa 182. RedOctober 230. Torpig 135. Michelangelo 183. Redyms 231. Tristate 136. MiniASP 184. Reedum 232. Tsunami 137. Miniduke 185. Refyes 233. Urausy 138. Miniflame 186. RTL 234. USteal 139. Mirage 187. Rustock 235. VBMania 140. Mitglieder 188. Sadmind 236. Vidgrab 141. Mocmex 189. Sality 237. Vienna 142. Morris 190. Samal 238. Vinself 143. Morto 191. Samy 239. Vobfus 144. Mspub 192. Santy 240. vSkimmer 145. Multibanker 193. Sasser 241. Vundo 146. Murcy 194. Scar 242. Waledac 147. Mutopy 195. Sdbot 243. Walker 148. MyDoom 196. Secret Crush 244. Welchia 149. Mylife 197. ShareFun 245. Wimad 150. Mytob 198. Shiz 246. Witty 151. Naplik. 199. Simile 247. Xpaj 152. netBus 200. Sircam 248. Xtreme 153. Netsky 201. Smeg 249. Yaludle 154. Nettraveler 202. Sober 250. Yayih 155. NfLog 203. Sobig 251. Yisou 156. NIght Dragon 204. Sofacy 252. Zafi 157. Nimda 205. Sohanat 253. ZeroAccess 158. Nitedrem 206. Spitmo 254. Zeus 159. Nuwar 207. Spy Banker 255. Zlob 160. Nyxem 208. SpyEye 256. Zotob 161. Oddjob 209. SQLSlammer 257. Zwangi 162. OpenConnection 210. Srizbi 163. Optix 211. Stabuniq 164. Pacex 212. StalTrak 165. PassAlert 213. Stoned 166. Ping pong 214. Storm 167. Pitty Tiger 215. Stration 168. Plugx 216. Stuxnet 169. Poison Ivy 217. Sub7 170. Pony 218. Surtr 171. PrettyPark 219. Swizzor 172. ProRat 220. Sykipot 173. Protux 221. Taidoor 174. Protux 222. Taleret 175. Psyme 223. Tapaoux .
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