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Expanded Number S-0870-0001 -14-00001

Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - - correspondence with the United Kingdom

Date Created 11/01/1964

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0870-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: Cyprus

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit h: To appoint a£Representative to act as a United Nations Observer in Cyprus with the function of observing the progress of the peacekeeping operation, and reporting on it to the Secretary-General.

1L P.e. i)- V- ^^ UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK.N.Y.

January 11, 1964

Your Excellency, I understand that Your Excellency has now received from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus confirmation of his Government's acceptance of the proposal that you should appoint a Personal Representative to observe the progress of the peace-making operation and to report on it to you. In this connexion I am pleased to confirm that Her Majesty's Government agree that the Observer should have access to the British High Commissioner in Cyprus and to the British Commander of the peace-making force. I can assure Your Excellency that ray Government will be happy to assist the Observer in any way possible for them in the discharge of his functions, in particular in regard to his freedom of movement and communication, his personal security, and that of his staff. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration,

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, N.Y. UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK.N.Y. January II)., 1961)-.

Your Excellency,

I have been instructed to convey the following message to you from the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Turkey and : Begins. "We the undersigned Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey meeting in London have learned with deep regret that Your Excellency feels unable to proceed with the immediate despatch of a representative to Cyprus as requested by our three Governments. We greatly hope that you will agree to reconsider this decision and to nominate a representative to proceed to Cyprus forthwith on the basis already agreed. T.Ve are confident that such a step on Your Excellency1 s part would contribute materially towards the restoration of peaceful conditions in Cyprus, which it is also the purpose of the conference due to meet here in London tomorrow to promote. Signed: R.A. Butler, F.C. Erkin, X. Palamas." Ends. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 16

Sir, t&e feoao^r to sekmcwl®%@ receipt of jour letter of 11 -Jamary 19^4> stating Your Esosllenoy* 's QovsrBffiezit's position is respect of tha request of the Government of Cyprus to appoint a Personal Representative to observe the peace-isakiBg operations in Is you are ftwar®, upos the receipt of yc«ir Gaversiaent * s GRctersing the Representatives mission, as well as the assurances of the eth@? interested. Governments, I advised you that* taking into consideration the urgency expressed t>j the Qovernfflent of Cyprus i» their request, "bixt taklzsg into acco?wit as well tfee necessity of ensttricg to the greatest extent possible tfes success of the tasfe assigaefi to tbe Sbeervar, 1 had is misd to dssigiaate LieutsB^it General P*S« ^ra»i as ta.y Speeial Hepresentative to y tlie SovQEns^ats of Grebes, Turkey and. the tl&ited Kingdom. Arrajagsseats were made to fesve Meufeaaat General ^yaai depart for Cyprus on 14 Ja&aaryj as soon as tfe© Government of Cyprus had approved these plass* ^ letter dated 13 Jamaajsr 11?64* liossver, the Representative of Cyprus, acstisig on instruction of feia Soversfijeat, renewed its for the earliest dispatch of a Personal lepreaeatativ© for without the delay ?M«&, i» feis opinion, the preliminary mission would ereate. On 14 «Fa£c&axgr» I was also informed that the Foreign liBieters of Greece s farke^r and the United Kingdota were urging tae to reconsider ray intentions as stated above, araJ to nominate a Sepreseatative to proceed to Cjprus, forthwith, on the the request of th© Oovsnasent of Gyprus.

Sis Sir Permafleat S&presentative- of tlte Haite€ to tfee Ifeitact Batione $45 fhird AV6»as» lOtfe 'Sfew tork, Hsvl'ttg giveis due consideration to the renewed and insistent request of the Qoverrajjeist of Cyprus, and to the urgent appeal of your Government? I have decided to designate Lieutenant General P.S* Gysfti as asy Personal Representative and to send him to Cyprus to observe the progress of the peace-making operation for an initial period exteadiiag to the end of February 1964. Within this period, Lisutesact Osneral Gyand will report to me on how the United latioas Observer oould function and b© most effective in fulfill lag the task as outlined in the re^uast made by tte G^reriaaent of Gyprue sad agreed to by tlie Goveriuaemts of Greece9 Turkey asii the Halted fhe ag3^aa0at &f the QoverBseat of Cyprus to the above was given to me t>y a oomssu^ioation of 16 ,Tanuai$> and I have therefore iastrueted Lieuteeant Oeasral Qyaai to depart for Cyprus on 1? Jamiary Aeoept, Sir, tha assaranoes of isgr highest consideration.

cc* S.G. Mr. Sarasimhan Mr. HolK-lennett Dr. Bunche UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK.N.Y. January 17, 1964.

Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of January 16 setting out the course of events leading to your decision to send Lieutenant General Gyani as your Personal Representative to Cyprus to observe the progress of the peace- making operation. I can assure Your Excellency that my Government are most grateful for the action you have taken in this matter. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 1964

Bear Sir Patri

U f haat

His Sir Patrick Dean, S.Cjf.* Perffiaaent Bepreseatative &f the Sfiited Ringdcsa of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to tfee Salted Kations ifewlork, K*J. cc: Mr. Bunche ' ' Mr. Rolz-Bennett UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. January 17, 1964.

Your Excellency, I have been instructed to convey the following message to Your Excellency from Mr. R. A. Butler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:- "I should like to send you ray warmest thanks for all the help you have been giving us over Cyprus. We are very pleased that General Gyani is going to the Island and I am most grateful to you for sending Mr. Rolz-Bennett to London. I have just had a long talk with him and I am sure that his visit here .will prove most helpful. I fully realise all the difficulties which you have been up against and your decision to proceed In the way you have has encouraged us all." I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, N.Y

f 1 i£ - /"7~ . j? /-J i '"-1 -"^ ^-^ UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y.

January 20, 1964.

Thank you for your letter of January 18. I have conveyed your message to Mr. Butler, who will, I am sure, be most encouraged by your personal interest and desire to be of assistance in finding a solution in Cyprus.

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, N.Y. «,* CONFIDENTIAL

Alternative Proposals for Discussion (without commitment) Alternative A

1. There should be a Unitary State and administration. 2. There should be no transfer of population.

3. There should be a parliamentary system and responsible Cabinet Government.

1}.. Communal rights to be confined to religion, education and cultural matters. Alternative B

1. The administrative and political structure should be based on the concept of two geographically separated communities. 2. There should be a movement of population, the object of which would be to concentrate all or most of the Turkish population in one or possibly two large areas and the Greek population in the remainder of the island. (it is estimated that this solution would involve the compulsory movement of about 35,000 Greeks and about 45,000 Turks).

Alternative C

1. The Cyprus Civil Police Porce and Gendarmerie, composed of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot personnel, should be reconstituted and should be responsible for the prevention of crime and other normal police duties. In order to restore confidence, an independent Police Service Commission should be established with expatriate participation. For a transitional period some expatriates should be appointed to perform certain advisory and supervisory functions. 2. There should be an international peace-keeping force responsible for the prevention of inter-communal violence. This force should be composed of two elements: (a) A moderate sized contingent comprising elements from other countries to be stationed in Cyprus; and (b) Reinforcements to be provided from outside in the event of need. The International Force Commander should be empowered without further authority to take all appropriate action to maintain the peace. 3. A scheme to assist the voluntary movement of population should be organised with the object of eliminating as far as practicable mixed villages. (It is estimated that the number of Turks living as minorities in mixed villages is about 1U,000 and that the number of Greeks living as minorities in mixed villages is about U,700). 4. Greek villages should be grouped together and Turkish villages should be grouped together for the purpose of loc?l administration and police duties. 5. A parliamentary system should be adopted in place of the Presidential system, with a Cabinet answerable to the Legislature (subject to special safeguards). In this connexion consideration /should

CONFIDENTIAL '*• , CONFIDENTIAL

should "be given to the adoption of an electoral system designed to give an advantage to candidates who can attract support from both communal rolls. 6. The present 70:30 ratio for parliamentary representation and other matters should be maintained. 7. Consideration should be given to methods of improving the functioning of the Constitutional Court and to the desirability of merging it with the High Court. 8. There should be a right of final appeal to a Court outside Cyprus on constitutional questions. 9. There should be a general amnesty covering all acts connected with the recent troubles. 10. There should be a scheme of reasonable compensation for those who have suffered loss or injury during the disorders, to be financed from general revenue. 11. Methods should be devised to ensure that communal rights and safeguards are effective.

CONFIDENTIAL ^ '.%&-.$&' telegram under reference show- no "

2o Situation is somewhat .bet't^i ftreek side continue to show that they. positively do sot w^nt sr recurrence of fighting at the moment; , ' Wi:th ^iseussions' taking place in London or pending at United- Nations renewed fighting cannot improve their case. Nor have the IDurks anything to g.-^in at this moment from fighting. -Thsre seem© therefore less inaaecliate risk of isolated incidents escalatingo It remains of oourse true that both sides could deploy their fighters TBry quickly if need arose,, 3 , Traffic of 'froth "communities is using certain of the main roads (e.g. ?amagusta^Nicosia-?aphos»Limassol~Nicosia) . But main Hicosia-Kyrenia toad, is not used "by Greek traffic (Turkish police and auxiliaries control it throughout from Kyrenia gate to summit of Kyrenia pass*) No Greek dares to travel on it although. Turks maintain they are free to do so. Inside Nicosia there is 220 Gypriot movement from sector to sector, with sole exception of occasional Turkish lorries which collect from Paphos gate area supplies bought off Greek wholesalers. Greek area of town is relatively free of police and presents outwardly normal .- appearance "but Turks nevertheless will not contemplate journeys into area (Turkish parents will not for instance allow their children to go to junior school and English school both well inside Greek area despite assurances of school authorities), Turkish sector is closely guarded and patroled by Turkish police, two English residents (one admittedly married to a Greek doctor) have been firmly warmed by Turkish police against entering Turkish sector again? any Greek who entered it would receive very short shrift (Turkish Representative on Liaison Committee has now admitted). U« Vi 1 lags mi gr a 11 _o_n.,_ Trend continues. There is increasing evidence of deliberate organisation by Turkish authorities. 5, Relatively little progress by international Red Cross, / Increasing. . , COKPIDENTIAL Increasing fears are expressed that persona originally known to have been'detained and who have not yet been released may be or may have been quietly murdered. This seenn particularly likely in cases where authorities on either side are still r3solutely denying ajiy knowledge. 6. Turkish Cypriot attitude. Turkish position continues to harden. Turkish .community are more 'and more committed to their separate organisations. Turks now have separate hospitals organised in Famagusta, Larnaca; Limassol and Paphos, k radio stations in'different parts of the island and a Turkish, fire service in addition to services mentioned in paragraph 8 of my telegram under-reference.: Turkish police whose numbers are rapidly increasing now wear new red and silver cap badges. Intense bitterness is f,elt at revelations of Ayios Vassilios (Ayios Vassilios murders) ®^ 3^h&^)-< Pull propaganda use is being made of these as -ell as burnings and lootings of Turkish houses in Ormophita and Chaglayavi quarters of Nicosia, the large numbers of Turks dead or still missing and the odd incidents still occurring (e.g. armed search of Turkish truck with Red Crescent foodstuffs on January 17 and damaging of its loads). Entire Turkish community is aware of the grim facts.'";' 1, Turkish inability-to sustain an independent economy has not yet become a factor* Red Crescent shipments (U30 tons last week and a similar consignment being unloaded today) are ^robably adequate to sustain Turks for a little time to come and we suppose that in any case Turkish Government intend to keep up these shipments. It of course helps the Turkish cause to be able to make out they are having to survive on relief. So far there is no evidence of real economic hardship; suffering is mainly due to spell of exceptionally cold weather which Cypriots are not accustomed to, 8, Turkish propaganda effort is intense* V/e are sending by bag copies Turkish Communal Chamber daily news bulletin, Articles entitled "We cannot live with the Greeks, We want to be rid of them", in January 18 number and"Cyprus is already partitioned" in January 19 number well demonstrate the implacable Turkish hostility to the Greeks. 9- Greek Cypriot attitude. Greeks at large continue to be intensly angered by the Turkish progress towards partition, Turkish disregard of lawful government, and their own inability to do anything about this, Th^y are torn between a policy of extreme rigidity (e.g. if they cannot suppress the rebels and rebel organisation at least have no truck with them and make life as unpleasant as they can by administrative and economic devises) and a need to try to prove to the world that Turks can live peaceably with Greeks and have nothing to foar from them. Greek Cypriots are looking now at the case they may have to make before the United Nations (there seems little confidence that at the London Conference they will be able' to make headway against the Turks). They will wish to prove the possibility of a normal relationship existing between Greek and Turk? but their leaders seem to be beginning to realise that their ' ' / failure...

CONPIDMTIAL -If ^ ." " - • ". _ "_ i1' ; '.•;•''; /.>:..

failure to check village migration and the- actions of the Greek fighters may have destroyed the credibility of this. 10,, In such a situation there is a distinct risk that Greek extremist elements may lose patience with the lack of achievement of the present government. The Greek population as a whole has no conception Of the underlying facts (the number of Turkish deadj Greek atrocities, etc,) they hear only of Turkish plans to exterminate Greeks, Turkish atrocities, Turkish determination to enforce partition, Turkish abductions of Greeks, etc, iny coup by extremists (particularly if backed by Grivas) determined on a more agressive anti-Turk policy could well have extensive support among younger militant Greek Cypriots and might not be difficult to engineer.

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED PER ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984

AIDE MEMOIRE

The attached joint proposal "by the United Kingdom and United States is to be communicated to the Greek and Turkish Governments at 10.00 GMT this morning. The United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors to the United Nations are informing the Acting Secretary General in New York. It is not intended that the joint proposal shall "be published.

BRITISH EMBASSY, RABAT January 31» 196*4-. CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED PER ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 By

Mr. Kyprianou this afternoon handed to Mr. Sandys, Archbishop Makarios' reply to the joint British-U.S. proposal. The American Ambassador was also present. The following is the text of the reply: "The joint proposal "by the British and U.S. governments has "been carefully considered. It is regretted however that the proposal cannot "be accepted for the following reasons: (a) As the proposal stands it requests acceptance of a force to "be stationed in Cyprus without at the same time giving precise definition of the task and status of the force. This matter is left to "be considered at a later stage presumably after the stationing of the force in Cyprus. (b) The Commander of the force will receive "political guidance" from an inter-Governmental Committee sitting in London in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus will not "be represented. (c) No explanation or definition is given of what is meant by "political guidance" and whether the Committee in London is intended to take over any of the functions of the Government of the Republic. The fact therefore that it is asked to agree in advance to such a force to be stationed in Cyprus without knowing the terms of reference of the force and without knowing the exact functions of the inter- Governmental Committee to be established in London make it impossible to consider favourably the proposal and leads to the conclusion that it is intended thet the Committee will assume the functions of the Government of the Republic. (d) Paragraph 2 of the proposal re-asserts Article l± of the Treaty of Guarantee the effect of which is disputed. (e) The proposal is drawn up on the basis that the force will not be under the Security Council.

"It is necessary that any force to be stationed in Cyprus should be under the Security Council which is the only prudent organ created for and entrusted with the preservation of pesce. "It must be pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations provides under Article 33 that member countries should resolve their disputes by negotiation and this procedure was followed by the setting up of the London Conference for the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus.

/The CONPIDSNTIAE

— 2 *-

The same Charter provides in Article 37 that in the event of failure to reach an agreement the parties concerned shall apply to the Security Council. It is therefore pertinent to bear in mind that there should be (?) consistency towards the course which has'so far been followed, i.e. compliance with Article 33 of the Charter, the logical sequence of which is to follow the procedure set out in Articles 35 and 37 of th& Charter. The Security Council therefore should not be ignored and such an international force should be under its authority. "The proposal that a neutral mediator be appointed for the purpose of assisting in finding a solution to the political problem is rather vague and requires further clarification. In short, the position may be summed up as follows; (a) The principle that an international force should be created and stationed in Cyprus is accepted. (b) Such a force should be under the Security Council - (its composition may be agreed on in advance); (c) In such a force there should be no participation of Crreek or Turkish forces; (d) The terms of reference of the force should include the protection of the territorial integrity of the Republic and assisting in restoring normal conditions." Joint Proposal by Britain and United States. A* Outline of Proposal !• A Peace-Keeping Force shall "be established in Cyprus, drawn from N»A.T.O» countries* Such a force shall remain in Cyprus for shortest possible period necessary to accomplish this mission* The countries concerned will commit themselves to retain in Cyprus force which they contribute for a period of not more than three months* 2* Governments of Btpeece, Turkey, Britain and. United States will support establishment of force* 3* Governments of Greece and Turkey undertake not to exercise their rights of unilateral intervention under Article of Treaty of Guarantee for three months on understanding that Peace-Keeping Force will be in place during this period, k+ Governments of Greece and Turkey undertake to use their utmost efforts to restrain Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Cyprus* 5* Three-guarantor powers and United States shall seek from Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutch.uk: a. Agreement to establishment of force; b. Assurances that they will do their utmost to restrain their respective communities in Cyprus* 6* Parties concerned agree to accept mediation of their differences in a spirit of mutual accommodation, 7, A mediator shall be chosen by agreement amongst guarantor powers, and, with the consent of Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, from a IT.A.T.O. country other than the United States or one of the three guarantor powers,

/B.

CONFIDENTIAL B. Understanding with respect to Peace-Keeping Force* 1 • Force will be drawn from N.A.T.O. countries but its establishment and operation will not be under U.A.T.O. control* 2. Force will augment British Forces engaged in keeping law and order on the island in accordance with proposal of guarantor powers accepted "by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk on the 26th of December 1963. It will operate under British Command, 3. Commander of the force will receive political guidance from a committee of Ambassadors of participating nations sitting in London, k» Total force must be adequate to mission for which it is conceived and not less than 10,000 men. 5» Greek and Turkish contingents now on island shall be part of Peace-Keeping Force, Neither contingent shall be augmented. 6. Participation in Peace-Keeping Force shall be sought from as many other N.A,T,0, countries as possible.

British Embassy, Rabat* January 30, 196iu BRITISH EMBASSY, ALGIERS. February 3, 1964,

I have been instructed to inform you of the following developments in the Cyprus question. The Greek and Turkish Governments accepted on February 1 the joint United Kingdom/United States proposals for the establishment of a peace-keeping force in Cyrpus. These proposals were formally put to Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk on February 2. Their considered replies are still awaited. Dr. Kutchuk has, however, already indicated orally that he agrees in principle.

,H.M. Ambassador)

His Excellency Mr. U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations Organisation, cc: - Secretary-General Mr. Bunche Fir. Narasimhan Mr.' Suslov Mr. Kola-Bennett Mr. Stavropoulos JliB/md

February 1964

Sir, • I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a message addressed, to-day by the Secretary-General to the President of Cyprus and the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

Acceptf Sir, tlie assurances of my highest consideration.

JosS Eols-Beaaett Dejsuty Clief de Cabinet

His Ixcslleaey Sir Patrick Dean, G.C.M^G, Ambassador lairaordijiary and Plenipotentiary Penasaent Representative of the Uriitecl Kingtiom of Great Britain an& Iflortliem Ireland to the Unite4 Nations 845 "Siird Avenue, 10th Floor {few fork 22^ M.X, CYPRUS

UK General Young The British Ministry of Defence have announced that a formation of an international force would require the presence of a Divisional EQ. As the principle HQ of the UZ Strategic Reserve is HQ 3 Infantry Division under Major General R.P.M. Carver, it was the obvious choice for Cyprus. It is organised and equipped for the sort of task that has now arisen in Cyprus, whether or not an international force is eventually set up. General Young remains General Officer Commanding Cyprus district which includes the sovereign "bases in Cyprus. He has reverted to his original command and duties. Incidentally, the British Commander in Chief in Cyprus, i.e. the seniormost officer responsible for all British military units, personnel and installations is Air Chief Marshal Sir Denis Barnett. The decision to evacuate civilians and dependents from Cyprus was made "by the Air Marshal and not General Young.

-ISJR 19 February 1964

SG RJB CVtt JRB C106S6/079/64}, February 20 1954

* four Excellency, 1 h. .ve the honour to convey to Your • Excellency the following message from Her Ivl&,,]d3tyf s Secretary of State for Foreign Al x uli'S» t • • - - "The Ooi?unonweiilth Secretary ajid -I vvoul like you to Know now greatly ^a Value thy fir*e vvcr^-c //hich Osnertil Gyanl hcts oeen uci ir. Cyprus. In adaition to his primary t-^ of seeping you informed, he lias been Activ IB bringing a calming influence to bear en the two co.iiiijunities* We feel sure tiiat ail tills has abunaantly justified your decision to sem. a personal representative ?f to-the island, at this'difficult time8 /If •

His-Excellency U Ttumt. If you wish to publish this message 0c\rernnien-t will have no objection. • They foi* their p.ar't, however, will take no initiative in doing so. £ avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency "the assurance of cqy highest "consideration.

* fV t- CVH/st

9 March

PERSQHAL. Bear Sir Patrick, I acknowledge with many thanks your Mud letter dated 6 March. I am most grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his cordial message. X agree with him that our common task on the question of Cyprus has only just begun and we shall have many problems to solve in the days to cose. In my efforts to fulfil the mandate of the Security Council, I shall count very heavily OH the co-operation of the Foreign Secretary and of Her Majesty* s dovernmeat and, needless to say, of yourself. I Should he grateful if you would convey these sentiments to the Foreign Secretary. With kindest regards, Yours sincerely,

His Excellency Sir Patrick Dean, G.CLM.G. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Bermanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Hations £&5 fMrd Avenue, 10th Floor Hew York, B.Y. UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. March 6, 1964. 6. The Foreign Secretary has asked me to convey to you personally his recognition of the crucial part you played in securing the passage of the resolution of the Security Council on Cyprus. Mr. Butler knows that your task has only just begun; but before the predictable difficulties begin to mount up, he wants you to know how much he values your contribution to bringing about the resolution.

His Excellency U Thant, United Nations, New York. . - i'lif'rgiafd^'"s racdnt

in n st^t'i verging iiis«^^ a to rentore 5|feS»s*=>''i^/ciI'>;<'!'^^)»-^;M«it;''S''^|^ •••>•• ••' '-''1 ^ in o

is a. limit to the

of Ihe ' •-(•'•• c'*'i";:''.,.,:'* .:•'', ;' • er carry this burden

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|gi^5o^;;:|r-ew attention to the "v'-:'v" * - ;of the 4th of March, 1964 'which you appealed to Her and as generous a for a voluntary contritm-

ijf Her Majesty's Governmest to afford you all possible 'a Government are prepar^dd of the British contingeQt voluntary contribution of /SI fcountrles will Message from Mr. Jackling, UK Mission, on 8 April.

Sir Peter Agnew: Would my Rt. Hon. friend agree that as well as there being terms of reference, it is necessary that the United Nations troops should teave definite orders about what they are allowed to do and what they are trying to achieve? Therefore would my Rt. Hon friend arrange for a copy of the orders to the United Nations Commander of the Forces to be placed in the library as soon as they are known?

Mr. Sandys; I think that I must distinguish between terms of reference which are so to speak a continuing instruction and orders which may be issued from time to time. When it comes to the terms of reference I will see that they are placed in the library as my Hon. friend requests.

Hansard reference: Monday.16 March Column 993 .\

GONFIDMTIAL

AIDE JWflOIRE

Cyprus The Secretary-General1s Aide Memoire of March 11 makes it clear that the mediator will mainly be expected to deal with the long term problem and specifically states in paragraph 12 that "the activities of the mediator are separate and distinct undertakings and will be kept so". Paragraph 9 of the Aide Memoire nevertheless refers to the possibility of the mediator's having to deal with such matters as arranging with community leaders for the surrender of arms "as an unavoidable prelude to his discussion of long range solutions". 2. Her Majesty's Government consider it most important that the mediator's role should be confined to the question of the long term solution and that any short terms negotia- tions between the communities which may be necessary should be recognised and dealt with as an entirely separate matter. Since the establishment of the existing joint peace-making machinery the Chairman of the Political Liaison Committee in Nicosia (who has been the British High Commissioner) has been performing a number of day to day duties of a diplomatic and liaison nature designed to improve the existing situation. These activities have been additional and supplementary to the task of the peace-keeping force as such in interposing itself between the two communities. 3. In the general state of anarchy prevailing in Cyprus there are two types of functions under this general head which need to be performed and which the British High /Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Commissioner has hitherto been performing: a) Arrangements between the two communities on matters such as terms of truces, conditions for reopening of communications and exchanges of hostages, etc. b) Functions stemming from the partial breakdown of normal civil life and administration. Por example, no Turkish Cypriot civil servants, police, doctors and others have received any pay since Christmas. There is widespread unemployment, there is great need for relief both on the Turkish and Greek Cypriot side, there is in Nicosia the problem of ensuring the con- tinuance of services such as electricity, telephones and posts. All these problems need to be dealt with if normal conditions are to be restored. This can only be ashiev.ed if the leaders of both communities can be brought to agree on specific measures, but their relations have been and continue "to be so strained that they can only be persuaded by the inter- vention of a benevolent and impartial third party. 4. The functions described in paragraph 3(a) above can be performed by the military and our own peace-keeping force's have been progressively acting as go-between in these kinds of situation. It is the functions in 3(b) above which have placed the greatest strain on the energies of the British High Commissioner, but once the United Nations force is established it will no longer be appropriate for him to continue to perform these tasks. If the mediator himself is not to become bogged in such day to day matters we think it will be essential for someone to be specially designated to carry them out.

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YOEKr March 19, 1964.

^

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION PERSONAL TO THE UNITED NATIOXf 84S THIRD AVENUE V , N.Y.

March 19, 1964.

Or**. A->7 - Wh»m I called oa y*u yesterday evsRlog I told you »f t!i« PriK* MiBi»t*r's tauwwr to a questiaa pat * t«l«vi»i©ft ifltervitw at I*»ft<3ora. for Africa yesterday* T«u perkapa like to fcav» tk« tezt ef the queatioa a ad which ware aa

Africa^ air, «&! turning to Cyprus* what are your reactions te U fhtttt's statement l«at might that ht himself will ceatrol tk« Uaited Hatioaa paace-fceepia* ferca in. the

"He i» the SecretarjHfoaeral »f th* *ad the later national ?eroe is a Ufiited Netiea*

2zeellen.ey tJ Tiiamt,

Hatieas.

'..".>• rt-^:; 99 «f course the Secretary-General ceatrola it. He is making goed progress, I think, and we are very grateful te him for the progress he is asking because the Swedes, Pinna, the Canadians and the Irish have all promised contingents, so we hepe they will get there as so en as they can." 19 March 1964

S-G Subj e ct: General Carver's points Colonel Collins, British Army Liaison Officer, called on me this morning to clarify certain points which had been sent by General Carver, 1. Q - What did the UN intend to do with the Greek and Turkish Contingents. A - Informed him that the matter was under negotiation now and we were attempting to have them placed under the command of the Force Commander. 2. Q - What will be the functions of the Greek and Turkish contingents on the island. A - As soon as they are placed under command of UNFICYP they will be required to return to their barracks. 3. Q - What limitations would be placed on Greek and Turkish contingents. A - This requires detailed consideration in Nicosia before this can be fully answered. However it should be apparent that it is not intended to use them operationally. It may, however, be advantageous to use some officers and men to assist UN forces in establishing liaison with the communities. Apparently, this practice has already been established by the Joint Peace Force. 4. Q - What if the Turkish and Greek contingents do not accept these limitations. A - Let us wait for the bridge before we try and cross it. The key to the whole question depends on solution to para 1. 5. Q - What is the UN's interpretation of the Cyprus Government's responsibilities for law and order. A - This requires very detailed consideration and consultations with the Force Commander. Furthermore, an attempt to explain it at this stage -would be impractical as there are aspects which can be foreseen and some solutions suggested. There are, however, unforeseen aspects, the answers to which can only be found when we are confronted with the problem. There are excellent communica- tions between New York and Nicosia, and it would be possible for the Force to refer such questions for advice.

•••/•* - 2 -

6. Q - What is the UN's general attitude towards Cyprus security forces, absorption ofv^egular forca in the Government security forces, disarming of irregulars, etc. A - These are matters of detail, some of which have already been answered in the Aide Memoirs. It would be unwise to attempt at this stage to find all the answers. 7. Q - What does the UN intend to do about liaison and political liaison committees. A - Indeed the UN would set up an organization in Nicosia and in the districts for liaison. Details are being worked out and after consultation with the Force Commander arrangements will be finalized.

We never got to the eighth point. I believe Colonel Collins was sufficiently convinced that most of these points need careful handling and do not have ready solutions. It was appreciated that once the Force Commander assumes command, suitable directives would be issued after mutual consultation which would help in clarification. It would appear that the U.K. Mission only wanted these points conveyed to you since they had been raised by General Carver and they did not intend these to be taken as points submitted by some of the other countries on the highest political level to the Secretary-General. UNITED KINGDOM MISSION

VILLA LA FENETRE, ROUTE DE PREGNY

GE NEVA

TELEPHONE 33 23 85 2223/6/6^ n*. ., . March 2k,

Your Excellency, I am directed Toy Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you, in reply to your recent enquiry, that Her Majesty's Government now understand that Mr. Sakari Tuomioja is acceptable as mediator in Cyprus to all the other Governments concerned and is, therefore, entirely acceptable also to Her Majesty's Government. I have the honour to "be, with the highest consideration, Your Excellency'^ obedient Servant,

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, Geneva, ive

27 March 1964

Dear Sir Patrick, Thank you very much for your letter of 19 March 1964« It was very thoughtful of you to send jse the text of your Prime Minister's recent statement xclth regard to the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus* With kindest regards, lours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency Sir -P&t

March 19, 1964.

When I called on you yesterday evening I told you ©f the Prime Minister's answer to a question put to him at a television interview at London Airport before leaving for Africa yesterday. You may perhaps like to have the text of the question and answer which were as follows:- Question "Leaving Africa, sir, and turning to Cyprus, what are your reactions to U Thant's statement last night that he himself will control the United Nations peace-keeping force in the island?" Answer "He is the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the International Force is a United Nations force,

/so His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Hations. so of course the Secretary-General controls it. He is making good progress, I think, and we are very grateful to him for the progress he is making because the Swedes, Finns, the Canadians and the Irish have all promised contingents, so we hope they will get there as soon as they can." tb® &«»K«ir to iaftes 7©s that pssrsasafe to Seearlt^ resol&ttos S/5575 o£ & *%*«& &f ^s4s sad In ag»«s«mt with th® of €^f>pis *ja

I an s«fi«i©8fe tMij. ia th® «aBe.rcsio» of itea fea«tl©^«f entiuated t© hiss fejf ¥irte,© of tfee ®f©«isald »&dtitio% ths? IMlat^r aad his staff tbe full seo|©3?atioa of tfe© Oowimmais ai!M ill© egffisraitiss and, in paie%isti1a.r# will bs aceessilsHS, lu 0oafbfrf.tj witfe i05 of tfe® ^^arfc^r^ all pslTil^gas aad Swsssltiss a®c®ssajy

It is T^ ©Qgs«Msra^ ^piEfea t!sa.ts its iriUw of ths «stnr© of the Vhieh fee h$i^ ©a Ixslialf of this Orgieais!st.i®s asd of the to bl It wuM b® nasessiasy for the his staff, eja^tey fehs p?i^ileges afJd teEsottitiss^ ezs«^tiea.B sad facilities

the feasasirj thtr^feir®^ t® ©ags^ess to fear F^ellssnej' tfee TO;re»mt wI31 fe§ good. BS«mgli to agra® t© astsnd to Mr, feis staff tb» pritifege® sa«l ^smBsitle% este^tlisas asad faeilliiss tfest the app'S^^fet® lesfctiepttif «• fe© aotif fe

Iton. B« A* of State

JRB/ive

The S^i^as^&nex&l has &sk®4 rae io £os^ar4 to the eonjTMaatiaX iafd?^xti®a of */ow Ckrtr«iT£®@nt>, til© attached of th© letter adtiroaa^i on ? j^X'Il 19^4 to His feifcarieSj Pr«sidi««it ^f the R^>ublis ©f

Lt. Qta^s'al P.$, %Bni? Owaaan&sr of IliFSGIP,

Ctof 4e Cfabinst

' ana

5 l£«h *&

cc: Secretary-General (Letter to Sis Bsatit«d« Arefefoishop Kakari©ss Frastido&i of th® HepiaKile o* Cyprus, £i*eaa P.S. %ani? C0!OTanelr of UNFICIP)

I have tbe boaour to i«vit© yetse tirgeant attention t© the following ittei&ftiis tsh-aa members of the thiitad ftatlona F

1, Oa fereii 30# i9649 near Halev^j a patrol of $ soldiers an sffieer, all tearing blws Ifnited Rations berets oame and pdpolenged fire at a raiag® of about 400 jayda frosi position near the village. It was later eeesi that binoculars available to feh« g»a 'who wer* firing. At 11:30 P^? ©n 4 April, 1964* ^raefc C^riets attacked from 'Jfurkish Cjpylot® a, hill overlookirig the tfillage of wheys a detsetesat of %it@d Katiens trsops h&d besn ©ver stose tho fores was established. ]Krem this hill sacldnc gua and rifle fire was Iheaa directed onto the artsa the tlnitfei Sati©as dotaeteeat was. IB spite of the fact that they dr&w attention to their pres®ac« b^ switching on th@ir vehiels heacili^ifes? ibs fir© eeatiaiiefi. It only finality ceased when, is self defasse, th« Haited Natioaa Force detaetoeat r^tanied th 3. At 12*30 ?& «?n ii^ril 5* If 64, &t Kate two supply vdbiel®s of th© Uaited Katiaws force, props^ly and sark^si with United f>!aiieas identlfisatiofts, vs^re $n x-heir to rsgupplj' datashsiasais furtber wast 'rfhsn ttey were stopped ia the village bj a large erowd of a.bout fifty ai®sd Greek CJyp^ots. a f«st^' of wh«ia were la some kiad of tmifoi^a. Tli© persormel in these vdd,elss.r"O3r eaf©» fea attest was H&de to disarm soldi eH threats w©re jsade to wetajd sth^i's aa«i it was stated that ttierf would not be ral^astsd «fil«ss British Djiit©4 Katioas tyossps wsspe replaced by these of another nationality. Th® alleged reasoiK far this was .,«»/ &n entirely iiMouactad aeeuaaiioa that firing fey United Matioas troops th^'. t . &&raing feas be«n the cause of wauading three Greek It vsas not taatil 3*45 F&t an ia0ur er usewf® after the CSSiassaEi&sr had" ssads ooataet. viith th# head, of the F-5r, Antonieu, that tliej ware released, Yo«r apprasiat® that in all these inoidents Uniisd Kafcions in wtiferffi and urearigig the _tinitad Katleas blue bes-et and is the jsost s^ious ineMent which oeewrred on 5 %>ril 1964 thsre could possibly "b«s ao c|aastite agreeisjeat «n the status of th® TereSj w«!er witi«i» th« Govesnaasat has aasiared to aeiabers of the jf«re« ^oj^X^te freedom of mo'tfegisat is the discshaFg^ of fajscti«i^.- JEaeidents stash as tfeese;, if permitted, to c

G-saaaander ?il &£ Id© i-he 1hsmm®$& H^pyesmtattvs of Borthsgm jErelsEjst to fcfte Hjedi«d Italians aai ha® the ta to tte Ilsi Fores la fte® S of tft» l^ifesfsd latl&ss F*r«e iaa

is a Keedi for Probst Stolts ts

be

is

tfeis to tfes S^werasaafe of £&& Its aas-isteiie© to tfe©

14 &p*& If ^4 Her Majesty *'3 Goverinaent would be t^ntaful if cir*.rifloa1;i©ji could "be giv-jn to the following points r-3lntla& to the operations Of tlio tteitsc! Nations Psacelfeapinrc Foro© in Cyprus» i) 0©uld fujftJier details "be giv©K about tlie princAplj:.; oji '.aioli the BeaoekeeriU'™ duties of the Fores rtra br.sod? il) Under srhat circumatrinces will contrln ;-:v!:t: of tlxe r^::.^eke3^is^ Parce be able to use force? ill) If the Peacekeeping Force nai.a to ^?srj fire, win* oriiiclplos will 136 olsssrved? iv) Wiat steps will "be taken t© pravids r^-otss^ion u-r.^ins-l; attack from individuals or erg-ABised groupo? v) How will the contirigsnts in the Porce atts-^t to -irr^-j.Te \ cease-fire s,g

URITLD KIHGBOl;! MI&iilOF TO

April 10. 2?ha Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of tins United Nations and has the honour to refer to hi.a Kote $o. 1 of the 3th of April .-which he addressed to tho Secretary- General about tho provision of police officers and polioeraarr for the United Nations-Force in- Cyprus, * . , As the Secretary-Seneral will be aware, Her Majesty's Government1 have been giving further careful consideratlor. to this jaattor in the light of the importance wliieh the Secre- tariat of the United Rations attach to the ^stabHshraent cf this police fqree. 2fh& Psrsanent JBspresent~tiye of the Uuited Kingdom has, hop/ever, 'been instructed to Inform the Secretary*- Several that, in spit® of this further consideration, Ilor r^jerty'o 3-overnr.ent have come to tho corjc' >.K,-; .n :,l',£,t they :j.rc un^blG to contribute to the proposed r^l-^, :'or.:e.. iliis i? not because-Her Majesty8 s Government arr- i r- r.y ,'ay opposed to t:ic- idea of setting up such a force, bu" .. i vuoc _•:, balance. :-:or Majef-ti'^s Jovernaent believe that they are alro.'.dj do '.is much for, ajid in connection with* the Io:ute3 r'-iti^ns 2s as seeaas proper for any single couatry to do, The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain arid HortliejoaIreland avails hiiaself of ~his opportunity to renew to 'the Seoretsiy-G-eneral tho a^.s of his highest consideration..

.£ » « -T-^ i

*

UNITED KINSDOM MLSSXCK

April 20, 1964 .goa$iJ3^e»tv to 938? IGYP In the light o.f the latest information provided by the Secretary -General alxmt t&<@ proposed strength :f -ther national contingents to T3HHCTB, Her Ha,1sety!.; jov propose to withdraw certain units, while lsr;v-*.n^ ?•• of about 2jjOOO out of ths total force of 7^0. DC for ,e rcat of the t&ree month period laid down by the 3c-:.rl *v vo-.mcil Her Majesty as Q-07ernm©nt plan to leave in the -'or tlires major uaits» air support and the British, atafj5 -r ' ion to force headqiuarters* Har Majesty's Go v errant continue to provide coutsaimi cations arid aclrl ^ ' sj r 2* Ksr Majesty' a Qovermsmt propose that t^e ^r military authorities in Cyprus should no-,v tr;.V;^ ar opportunity of discussing with General Gyant t;hf this' reduction ia the British, 'contingent* 3« If any further reduction of the British ::ontirr-en-: is eontemplateds whether as a result of an tnnre^~? jr. the sis i of those contingorits which ar® already- rnr'-t ">f "r!;'7TOv't! or through a request to other countries to cent rr>.u; -lie *:r the force? Her Majesty* s Spverruaeat would like to ':r :><- at the earliest possible moment sts that their plararins can bs reviewed.

KING-DOM MTSSIOW. 20 TEES tJSITB YQBE. April 27 1 1944 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

27, 1

•* .*ij«u w« that you-would wish- to 'for your own& private information,• the, addition to- the "reports of tive'po-ssil- "of heavy armassants' by-'"tfta Oyprtot Ojv about which X spoke to Ralph Bunche !; 'absence, another matter which IBS j;iv: Ker Majestyfs Government concern is i: that the Government of Cyprus' are Int a Bill Iinn the House off Representative!;~ . . . . : provide for' eoiapulsory ruliit-ary servic Tills Her Majesty's aovcfjlment consider ... matter which can dQly"b" e instituted agreement of both the President nriu U « President of the Rerjublic in eccordanc: : Article 129 of the Gyorua Constitution

i - „ * ., #» •vf»«#H* I ara enclosing the _„.s W A .V ,_ - the British High Gosimissloner in . . been Ins trueted to deliver" to the a^ Government.' "This action lias been C upon after consultations with both t ;£: Governments of Greece an.d Turkey ar; other Guarantor Powers.

Excellency U Secre tary-0en eralf 5 * Unitea Nations, New Yorfc. ; i-^.,Rbut4al1-1 r "T>L'*t'*\1t1'J fl %i A"it ¥ COKFI33EMTIAL ------""' ..... — •— -

J •- l .^S?^^^^'^^i^Sv^J;Sf ^fr/-* .r^r\^-'., H,'.W***"', "' t° ' -,i *it The British Government have b.een concerned at reports that the' Qoveraaient of Cyprus intend to introduce a Bill is .'the Cyprus .House of Representatives to provide for the Introduction fconulsory mtljtf ;*urtfu , Article 129 of t&e Oyprus Oonstitution requires that compulsory military service si •11 not be instituted except toy common agreement, of the President imd Yic&~Prei3,4eiit of the Republic. Article 129 is a basic..-arti&Ls in UIB terms- of Article 182, anfl by_ Article if,-of the Treaty of Guarantee .the Briti'sfc'Qoverpffifciit, as a Guarantor •Power, recognise and 'guarantee the state of affairs established by th© basic articles of the Constitution. • The British Government' would welcome an ;: : assurance from the Government of Cyprus that these reports are without foundation. In their view the introductloa of aomuuisory military service without t*h© agreeaianl of the vice-/resident- would be in breach of a .ba^io article of the Oonstitution, and In addillon would not be In conformity with paragraph'! Of the Resolution adopted in the Security Oounc.il of the United nations on 4th fercht Iff4*' ' r t ^--r';;- -.•. . -' ' ,. •• -v- • " •.-' :-;' 7;".. •^.•:-;- ,. :-^^;^^;v;^,';v,-^.^^rtv.^^ ^.. ^ ^gp^.;, v. ; '< -. ; 1 ; ; ; tiV-'"^ -1:C* ' ^- -. .-•'".•,-''" "V" - • '• '? ' '">'-:; ',f t •^ 'V;-^.'V'"v7^'^^j>^^^ •!'>J^ ,'j-^i"t''^ s^SJ"'!'- ='^fe Lji ' i 's ". *". -^ .- ~ ' *• ; ;

B5fv:Tftgt4S 5stl

;-.• -.; - .-.;•••..• •• ^^'^H'^mem&^K^^M^^m^&iiif &

Following is text of communique' issued today at the conclusion of the Prime Minister's talks with the Prime Minister of Turkey . The Prime Ministers of Turkey and of Great Britain taken the opportunity of M. Inonu's visit to London as the guest of Her Majesty's Government to have a full and frank exchange of views on the question of Cyprus. Basing themselves on the continuing validity of the existing Treaties and the Constitution and having regard to the responsibilities of the two Governments under the Treaty of Guarantee, the two Prime Ministers agreed on the urgent necessity for the attainment of a lasting solution tc the problems of Cyprus. They discussed ways in which the present difficulties might be resolved by negotiation and agreement. The two Prime Ministers also considered ways of strengthening the efforts of the United Nations to provide for the safety and security of the communities in Cyprus and for the maintenance of law and order in accordance with the Constitution. The two Prime Ministers are convinced that their exchanges have served to strengthen the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United Kingdom.

DISTRIBUTION Q Mission

Utr. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General DATE: 31 August 1964

REFERENCE:

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: Balph J, Bunche

SUBJECT: OBJET:

Mr. Jackling informed me late afternoon of 31st that the UK is now prepared to guarantee one-third of any deficit incurred by UNFICYP, to a maximum of $400,000, provided that the remaining two-thirds is met by other pledges. In this context, the deficit is to be interpreted as the difference between the amount pledged as of August 21st and the actual amount required to be paid in cash for the period ending 26 September. Mr, Jackling is seeking authorization from London for this to be used in seeking new or increased pledges. Until further word from him, it is to be treated as confidential. cc-4Ir. Turner Mr. Rolz-Bennett CONFIDENTIAL

2223/7U3/&1- August 31,

\l

Since I saw you on Saturday there is a matter which I iiaye been instructed to take up with you. It appears that the Turkish agreement to postpone the rotation of part of their contingent is dependent upon the solution of the difficulties which the Turkish contingent have been encountering over their supplies of petrol. The Turkish Government have requested the assistance of Her Majesty's Government, and I believe also of the Greek Government, in persuading the Greek Cypriots to allow the resumption of normal supplies of petrol to the Turkish contingent. Instructions have been sent to the British.High Commissioner in Nicosia to speak to the Greek Cypriot authorities, and Her Majesty's Ambassador in Athens will

/also

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Palais dee Nations, Geneva. CONFIDENTIAL

also be urging the Greek Government to do all they can to persuade the Greek Cypriot authorities to permit this. Mr. Butler hopes very much that you will be ready to inetruct the United Nations authorities in Cyprus to put pressure on the Greek Cypriot authorities to allow the resumption of these supplies.

>*•?W <%^ JM . . ' <•" !,4rf^

( I

V "k

CONFIDENTIAL £ the Bjaite^ Satisa© presents his tbe PeuaaB^nt Ssprsu'entativ-e of tto Saitei e£ One*sa% Britain

Bie Force Sc^sa^B^ear' has rees^seEMte^ that be atd©t3 to ffilTjMFI'Cf? aaa it has beta swggeated tfeat the Iteited Sisijgd^i b

Foi*0'e •CoBaasKier faas aiDs-o r*eossm^ided that each Son© or Msifiet should fcav6 te its &eMq«a3?t«rs oa@ officer and one tlerk to G0®riiast:e th© assf^taase given bj uIFIGli- in the ecssssjaU field * e &WF?®J of supplier, ©ie« It that tfee Bsltidfe Q^atitsgeat tes ia a position to defcach Major or 0a|jts43n aad @ne islerk t® assist, t&e Gcjaajamier of feids g viafees to earsflyjs tfae by th« 3«ar«tai«iat for ens Major to fclra tasMsh it If

tiii^

&f ; far iis The 3ecawfcasy-GeH©ral of the United Nations his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the United King4oia of Great Bapitsdr. and Northern Ireland to the United Matians and has the honour to refer to 'the Pensanent Representative f s Mote iferbsle dated 29 September 1964» After consultation with the Force Coiamanaer, the Secretat^r-Uoneral is pleased to advis© that the procedure proposed fcgr the PeHaesierat Repres©at4tiT$ in the second of tae atoov«-juewtioried Mote Verbale is fully

Tft© 3eeretas7-G'©ncral weloomes this opportunity to once again his appreciation to t-ho Government of the United Kifigdora of Sreat Britain and fteythem Ireland for its assi^tauce to the United Nations Peeee in C/prus.

3 Oofcober 19e»4 ROTATION OP THE SWEDISH CONTINGENT.

H.E. might speak to the Secretary-General on the following lines. The Secretary-General will understand that it is not very easy to meet a request of the kind put to us at such short notice. However, by cancelling or transferring to charter flights a number of our own trooping flights, R.A.F. Transport Command could meet the requirements for rotating the Swedish contingent, and we are of course anxious to do all we can to help the United Nations in matters of this kind. As regards the question of costs, we do feel that we already carry more than our fair share of the burden of peacekeeping for Cyprus. There is our own financial cash contribution? we meet the full cost of our own contingent; we also pay for its rotation. We do not think, therefore, that we can fairly be expected to pay the additional costs of rotating the Swedish contingent and that these should be met from the funds for UNFICYP»as a whole. In order to avoid any delay, however, we can make the aircraft available and would add the cost to the charges of the other logistical expenses which we would deduct from the #1,000,000 which we have subscribed for the i£ir@fc period. A rough estimate of the cost is in the order of £50,000. 2. Certain preliminary preparations have already been made for carrying out the rotation and we have been in touch with the Swedes in London. Details of the plans can be given to the Secretary- General's Military Advisory Staff. 3. We understand that the Secretariat have also agproached the Italians and that the latter are able to meet the requirement also. If another country is able to take it on.we are content to stand aside. It is, therefore, for the Secretary-General to decide whether to accept the Italian offer or our own . It is, however, extremely important that we should know by this afternoon what decision the Secretariat reach, since the R.A.P. are standing by and. will need to be told with the shortest possible delay if they are not required to take on the commitment.

OCTOBER 9. 1964.

^*J Q Of > r

(10626A/1050/64)

The Permanent Bepresentative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations presents hie compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, in reply to his Note of- the 29th of October, 1964, to inform the Secretary-Guneral that Her Majesty's Government can agree to second to UN7TCYP a small bomb disposal team, on such occasions as their services may be required, without cost to the United M?it,ions* This agreement is on the understanding that neither Her Majesty's Government nor the members of the team individually accept responsibility for any claims by third parties relating to death, injury and damage to property arising out of any actions by members of the t4am in the course of their operational duties under United Nations command. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom has been instructed to request confirmation that the "nited Nations accept responsibility for, or will make other arrange- ments for dealing with, such claims* Her 'Majesty*s Governraent wish to express their aprrecia- tion of the Secretary-General's message to Kajor Eaaterby, which has been passed on to him* The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretcry- General the assurances of his highest consideration,,

KINGDOM MISSION B KATKKS,

t 1964. The SeGrstsr^-Cteasral of tha United Maticas presents his iSsents to the Perssa&eat Representative of the United Hlagdcaa of Great Britain aod Mert&ern Ireland to the United Nations mid hss tho honour to ackn&t&edge the receipt of his not© {1062&A/ 1G5W645 of 7 S

# whenever Ife aaay fe« required, vdt&mt cost to the United

It is aeeepted by the Qjilted latloiis that neither Her Majesty *s Goveynssnt aor siesAssys of this teas Individually scespt for asy elates by t3aird paarties relating to aad daisagQ to property arising out of aa^- actions 'b response to his request for of ubieh the dosmancler of U1F1GIP has be^ informed.

12 Sovesaber 1964 13 Hovember 1964

Dear lord Caradoa, I would "be grateful If you would kindly convey to your Government my warm appreciation of their prompt and generous response to my request for assistance In providing air transport for the rotation of the Banish contingent of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. As you know, the financial aspect of the United Nations Operation in (Cyprus has "been a cause for continual anxiety and has, on occasion, even threatened to have serious effects upon the morale of the troops serving there. Your Government's assistance on this occasion has been most timely and I am most grateful for the help which has "been given. Yours sincerely,

U Shant

His Excellency l!he Rt. Hon. IiOrd Caradon Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 8^5 Third Avenue Hew York, Hew York Waited Mations his eoK^lisssats to t&o Per^umest Kepreaeatative of the 0'rsit^d Kingdom of ui'e&t Brltaia aad Moa-them Ir&laad to the United Wat loss sad has: tfe© i'*0nou£ to refer to the notv da.feed 12 iOT^sjfetr eouee^iisg the bomb <3i§pos&l ie«m whiefa «o generousiy fes foeea ®®fie available fees th@ Uaited Nations Fore© IB

lia Ssere%a3^i'*^eri©i*ai wishes to Go-nJ1 irsa tkat th© vfossi 3^osb1! aa iss&l In the Hot a will b® tak^in. fcs Hean as:j|r" object the • dlepossl of Tsfeleh. tfes team Is ihstructe^ to by S

The 3sos'$iiaii>j«G®)aesriaul takes this oppOFttjuaifey to again his appysciefeidn" '%o the Gevesrasaisat of tfee of Orest Bpitala ®M Borthera IrsiaM for its aasis- feo the Uait«-d. Mafcloag Foyese is Cyprus.

If 64 CVW/nt

2? May

Bear

2&ia& regret haviag beea uaa'ble to reply earlier to year letter of S2 J$p?il 19^ on your efforts concerning

It TO&S ve$y fciaS of you to gen4 jae a copy of yoar to BelsK IHaS,ste»s ^rgupiu 'ajjd tilsoa ana to Mr. St@^^ty, Seereta-iy of State fb^ Foreign j&^fairs. I iiave B&ted that you liaro xiaSertaken tlieae efforts on an entirely persc^iai Isasis, aaicl I aa very grateful for yoar offer to keep aie iutfo^iaecl about jrotar future acti-vltles In this regsrd. Siace Ms ratus-a to Bfew Yorfe^ Sr. HarasiE&aa laas jie yoir? letter to Mm Sated 18

sincerely,.

I?

GC - Mr'. Harasiwihfln Mr. Rolz-Bennett Mr. Galo Plaza Mr. Lemieux «l,-j ... i 4IV6 la*

D,ear Mr. Narasimhan, 'W-«~

1. I attach for your private and personal information copies of letters

I ventured to send to the Secretary General with my confidential letter to

him of 22nd April. These are a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr.

Urguplu, and one to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart, dated ICth

and 17th March respectively.

2. Since I wrote to the S.G., I have again visited Cyprus at the

invitation of Arshbishop Macarios, and have had two long personal discussions

with him as well as talks with Mr. Bernardez and General Thimmaya. I

discussed with the Archbishop matters arising from my conversations with the

Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.

3. Qn my return to London, I received a personal message from the

Turkish Prime Minister acknowledging recept of my letter of IGth March and

asking me to visit him again in Ankara.

4. Last week, I saw the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Costopoulos who

told me about his talks here with his Turkish colleague at the North Atlantic

Council meeting.

5. I am replying to the Turkish Prime Minister that I can come to Ankara

on June 3rd (when our Whitsun Parliamentary Recess begins) or earlier if he

wishes; and I have arranged to see the Greek Prime Minister in Athens on my

way. The purpose of the journey will be to prepare for a direct exchange of

views between the two Prime Ministers,

G. I believe, very strongly, that such an exchange is by far the best way

(probably the only effective \vay) to seek a settlement of Cyprus, and of all

other outstanding Turkish-Greek problems - provided, of course, that no attempt C.--1 -^OH3X ! is made to by-pass Archbishop Macarios (which is why I went to Cyprus to

see him).

7. I also believe that it is imperative to get a final settlement

quickly and that there is a real chance of doing so before the Turkish

elections in October.

8. I have made the arrangements described in paragraph 5 with the

knowledge and personal approval of our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart.

But I should make it quite clear to you, as I have to him, that I am not

to be regarded in any v/ay as an emissary of the British Government. Indeed

my chief value as an intermediary, if I have any, is that I am acting entirely

on my own responsibility from motives of good will towards the parties concerned

and because I happen to be on terms of personal friendship with them.

9. It is therefore important that I do not cross any wires with official

channels, or even with the U.N. But I should greatly value any advice you or

the Secretary General or any other member of his staff might care to give me.

I look forward very much to hearing from you.

With kindest regards,

Yours very sincerely,

Mr.. C. V. Karaeimhan, Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary General of the United Nations. ' \

Private and Confidential

22nd April. 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

1. My Father Mr. Philip Noel-Baker has encouraged me to write to you personally atout Cyprus. 2. I am further encouraged to do this "because I have been studying the problem, and visiting Cyprus frequently, since February 195& when the then Prime Minister, Eden, asked me to act as a sort of independent mediator between Field Marshal Harding and Archbishop Macarios.

3. I have remained on friendly personal terms with the Archbishop since, and am also friendly with the Greek Prime Minister Mr. Papandreou, the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Urgupluv and many other key people concerned with Cyprus, including U.IT, military and officials.

4. Among the latter were Ambassador Tuomioja and Mr. Galo Plaza. It was Mr. Galo Plaza who urged me to visit Ankara last month where I had a long private talk.with Mr. Urguplu followed by one in Athens with Mr. Papandreou. I venture to enclose copies of my private file of papers about these talks, for your own personal information.

5. " The papers include my letter to Mr. Urguplu dated 16th March (a'copy of which I sent to Mr. Papandreou), my letter to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart dated 17th March, and my letter to the Prime Minister Mr. Wilson dated 31st March. I also enclose an article I published in the London "Guardian" on 25th February, because Mr. Urguplu and his Foreign Minister had already read it before he invited me to Ankara - a fact which is significant.

6. Since these papers were written, I have again been in Athens where I saw Mr.: Papandreou and also the new Turkish Ambassador Mr. Tuluy who is a close confidant of Mr. Urguplu. I have also seen the King of Greece who could, I believe, be extremely helpful in certain circumstances. — 2 —

22nd April, 1965

7. I now venture to write to you because I firmly believe that there is, at present, a real opportunity for a settlement of all outstanding Greek-Turkish problems, including Cyprus, which should not be missed. , I also believe that the new Turkish Prime Minister sincerely desires such a settlement. And that the opinions of Archbishop Macarios (which I think I understand and which I find reasonable) about how Enosis should be implemented can be reconciled with such a settlement.

8. As you will see from the enclosed Betters, Mr. Urguplu told me that he was most anxious to meet Mr. Papandreou personally for private discussions. The Turkish Ambassador in Athens repeated this to me '' with emphasis a few days ago.

9. Mr. Papandreou told me that he thought that there should be some preliminary preparation for such a meeting, that this should be under- taken unofficially and not through the normal diplomatic channels, and he thought that I was a "suitable person".

10. I am now awaiting a further message from Ankara, and will be going • to Cyprus next week at the invitation of the Archbishop, and then back to London. But I would very much welcome the opportunity of calling on you in New York and discussing Cyprus with you or your officials, if you think this would be useful.

11. I ought to emphasise that I have been acting in an entirely private capacity and that I am in no sense an official emissary of the British or any other Government. (indeed I suspect that some diplomats have mixed feelings about initiatives like mine. ) But my recent journeys have been undertaken with the knowledge and personal approval of our Foreign Secretary, with whom I have had a series of private conversations.

12. There is, of course a great deal more I could write about the possible course of events and the eventual solution. But may I wait until I hear from you before going into my further details?

Yours sincerely,

Francis Noel-Baker M.P. i His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York. HTM/nw cc: Mr. Harasimhan, Mr. Lemieuxi

27

Bssar *&** vary mwsii for Hie letter wbieh •wrote to sae ftaraa Calais <^i 15 Jiasttary 29^S alKait tfee sltuatioa ia iistursily p3^a»e5 to lears of your good «f ota? work IB CJ?prua. flha real proof of .j, of eo««3«, ^^t «cii@£t tba allow its to "ftitMm? tlie peace fores, and X 3boyld. Hte to aasure you of sgr concern wMcfe I have expressed on saveral oecasions, that progrsss should be aiacle to^mrds a political 1 sffl eoutxaait^ eonrnjltations to that H hasre sttuli«4l -Kltfe interest year Tfie^s as to tise approaeb to a settlaasnt^ a»a I sea grateful for offer of aeslstaas^e sbo»ld the nsafi for it arise.

Yours

Hr« William Mambar of Parliamsnt fiouas of (X From: William Yates, M.P.

Cairo

15 January, 1966. *M THE UNITED NATIONS lOLB IN CYPRUS You will remember that last year I asked if I may be permitted to see the work of the United Nations in Cyprus after all the upset and confusion of December 1963. When I flew to Cyprus following the visit of the Minister of State, the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys, M.P. I endeavoured to persuade Dr. Fazil Kutchuk and his political associates that the restoration of normal relations would be of great benefit to his own community. In an interview with Dr. Bernares your personal representative in the Island, I expressed a view that it would be very much wiser if more United Nations policemen could be seen on duty and fewer soldiers. I have just paid another visit to your personal representative your force commander, also to Dr. Kutchuk, Mr. Glaufcos Clerides and Sir David Hunt, the British High Commissioner. My first feeling was that of joy and at the same time of admiration for the work of the United Nations role in Cyprus. Secretary General, I cannot find the right

( words in which to describe the success that your mssion has had. The changed political attitude in Cyprus is clear for anyone to see who understands the country. Having lived there and seen the time of Sir John Harding, Sir Hugh Foot and the disruption in December 1963, I do. However, in my mind the time for fresh initiative has - 2 -

arrived "but from whom? With my experience and following my discussions I have a suggestion to make. Firstly, I recommend that the Zurich Guaranteeing Powers now place their Traaty of Guarantee under the United Nations trust. Secondly, that the national contingents in the Island, Turkish, Greek and British as were permitted under the agreement should pass under the command of the United Nations. Thirdly United Nations now charged as the trusteeof the agreement should set up a commission for t.'-.e Reconciliation; a commissioned, possibly neutral and representatives from the communities and others whom it is found necessary to attach to the commission. Fourth the terms of reference of this commission should be as wide and as generally vague as is pssible but to include terms such as the restoration of normal communal relations in the Island and an ultimate objective of finding a permanent settlement. I have only discussed these main principles with the interested parties in Cyprus and although none of them were in a position to express an opinion, may I assure you that no jpne of them rejected my conception out of hand. Indeed I suggest they are a fmiitful basis for discussion. With respect I think you would be wise Sir to drop the word mediation for it is impossivle to mediate between the irreconcilable and the intransigent. I can only affirm again that a great chance exists for reconciliation and if there is any way in which you think I - 3 -

personally could assist you or the Zurich Powers, you will know from past experience that I am willing and ready to help.

Best wishes, CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

7 November 1967

Sir Leslie Glass, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, came to see me today and stated that upon instructions from his Government he wished to dispel any mis- apprehension arising from a remark on Cyprus made by Foreign Secretary Brown at the dinner given by the Secretary-General on 26 September 1967. The UK Government wished the Secretary- General to know that Her Majesty's Government was not opposed to the Secretary-General taking an initiative to seek a solution to the Cyprus question. Indeed, HMG welcomed the initiatives by the Secretary-General in this direction and Lord Caradon would request to see the Secretary-General shortly in order to discuss this matter*

Jose" Rolz-Bennett WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. FRANCIS NOEL-BAKER, M.P. From Francis Noel-naker,M.P. 1st draft. May 19()H

- NOT FOTl

CYP1UIS - Al'HTL

(This private report was written for ray own personal records. It must not be published or quoted without my written permission. I had the conversations which it describes, and wrote thia report entirely on my own initiative.)

1. On the evening of March 29th, I flew from Athens to Nicosia where I stayed until the morning of the following Monday, April 1st. I had two long private conversations with the Archbishop, the first lasting some three hours ( the Archbishop has! for several years been a close personal friend ). T also saw Dr. Kutchuk, the Vice President; Mr. Glavcos derides, the Speaker and President Makarios1 Deputy; Mr.Georkadgis, the Minister of the Interior; Mrs. Souiiotou, the Minister of Justice; Mr. Osorio Tafall, TJ Thant's Representative; the Chief of Staff and other Officers of UNFICYP; Sir Norman Costar, the British High Commissioner; the Israeli Ambassador; the Commander of the National Guard, Lt. Gen. Mor_oois; Zekia Bey, the former Chief Justice; and other Cypriot and foreign friends. The Archbishop kindly provided with a police car which greatly facilitated my movements.

2. I was at once struck by the greatly improved atmosphere since my previous visit last June, which is, to a great extent the result of the withdrawal of Greek political intervention, and of Greek military personnel, particularly General GriYaa_. (l wrote in a memorandum on 2?th July 196? , which Mr. Papadopoulos saw, that Gen. Grivaa. "despite his excellent work in 1964 in ... creating a discipline (Greek) force ... has now become a major obstacle to good relations," I added "Political^ difficult though it would be, I hope the new Greek Government may be better placed than ita predecessors to change the military command in Cyprus." That command was changed last November, but only after a massacre of Cypriot Turks and a major Greek-Turkish crisis provoked by General Griyaa^, supported if not instigated by Lt.Gen.Spantidakis, who was then King Constantine's nominee as Vice Premier of Greece.) Page 2

TYPHUS

3. The result of that crisis was the formal and practical recognition of one of the basic facts of the Cyprus situation; that Nicosia is only about 160 miles from the nearest Turkish airfield (Adana), but 520 miles from the nearest Greek one (Crete - the Dodecanese are demilitarised), and that Turkey is militarily much more powerful than Greece. Consequently, unless Greece receives massive foreign support Turkey is likely to get her way, temporarily at least, in any "show down". In this case there was no visible support of any kind for Greece during the November crisis while Turkish aircraft daily overflew Nicosia without interferance. The Greek CyprioWj only ultimate military sanction is the extermination of the Greek-Cypriot minority which could probably be achieved even in the face of a Turkish invasion from the mainland. But obviously this would only be done if the Greek-Cypriots were desparate.

k. Another basic fact of the Cyprus situation has yet to find similar formal recognition. On the assumption that other powers will not^ in the last resort, permit a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, it is more important than strategic considerations. It is that about 4/5ths of the Cypriot population is Greek and only about l/5th Turkish. In general development and as an economic element, the Turkish minority is even less important than these numbers would imply. No artificial political obstacles can effectively obscure this fundamental reality - as the fate of the British-imposed I960 Constitution shows. The only hope of ending inter-communal strife in Cyprus, of restoring friendly co-operation between Greeks and Turks, and of protecting Turkish rights, is formal recognition that the Turkish Cypriots are a minority which will respect and accept the rights of the majority. They can then, in turn, receive the most generous minority rights, guaranteed and supervised by the United Nations. But it is this minority status for the Cypriot Turks that Ankara has steadfastly refused to accept. Until she does, there will be no long-term solution to the Cyprus problem.

5. While I was in Cyprus, preparations were proceeding for talks between Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides; Mr. Denktash having been accepted as the Turkish negotiator by the Greek side on the reasonable^ grounds that if a man of his relatively extreme views accepted a settlement, that settlement would be unlikely to be criticised by other Turks. But there WEB a dispute about the venue for the talks; the Turkish

Government preferred Geneva, the Cyprus Government Nicosia. On my return to London (from Paris) on April 3rd, I saw the Turkish Ambassador Mr. Bayulkfen, who had himself been the Turkish negotiator during the

•••%.. -•-.., .• n ' ..; •"ttS-if&xff'&SHgi *.;^, •••-;-'7>- :j'*:i-:'-/:.'". ti

CYl'ltUS fe

Greek-Turkish dialogue of 1966/7) and explained why I believed that Nicosia would in fact be preferable, and why I thought tha-t the Archbishop was sincere in proposing it. Mr. Bayulkin said that he would send a telegram to Ankara following our conversation,

and I so informed the Archbishop. Unfortunately, I understand *• }e • that the dispute about the venue continues.

6. Mr. derides made an excellent impression and I am sure that he will handle these difficult talks with discretion and moderation, if they get started. They could well pave the way for a settlement of some duration. In reality any future agreement will be between the Governments of Cyprus and of Turkey, even if Ankara uses Cypriot-Turkish leaders as its spokesmen. The Greek-Cypriot side has never been fully dependant on Athens and is now virtually independent of it. But the Turkish Cypriote have always been amenable to control from Ankara and still are.

7v I found Dr. Kutchuk in much better spirits than previously. "Enosis is sleeping" he said - the phrase was well-chosen. His potential rival Mr. Justice Zekia (who withdrew from the Turkish Vice-Presidential elections last March, under pressure from Ankara it was said) was also in good spirits. He is a most moderate and kindly man and may have an important role to play in re-establishing friendly co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. I visited him in his home in Platanissos - the first time, I believe, that (Greek) Officers of the Cyprus Police (my driver and escort) had entered that Turkish village since the troubles. (My driver was also the first Greek to cross the "Green Line" to fetch me from the Vice-President's Residence in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, where he greeted Dr.Kfltchuk warmly) I was very glad to hear from the U.N. that the recent "rotation" of the Turkish contingent had been completed without incident some four hours earlier than on previous occasions.

8. At the time of my visit, the President's pacification measureshad led to the -withdrawal of the 'Cyprus Police and National Guard posts from the Green Line in Nicosia and from most other positions of confrontation round the Turkish ^enclaves - although there were some exceptions, notably the Artemis Road and the Tekke Mosque/Larnaca. Economic restrictions - for example on the sending of cement in "---.--- to-?the Turkish sectors - had also been lifted. But there had been no response yet from the Turkish side where police and military posts were still fully manned. The result was that large numbers of Turks were leaving and re-entering the T rkish P:, sectors without interfereance by the Greeks but that there was no

corresponding movement of Greeks into the Turkish sector. Nevertheless, • \ F \

I strongly urped the Archbishop to complete the withdrawal of Greek outposts from the remaining lines of confrontation which were still manned even in the absence of any corresponding Turkish withdrawal. The Turkish sentries would be left, rather ridiculous, facing no enemy and threatening no-one expect perhaps their own compatriots. Dr.Kutchuk had given a written guarantee that Turks would not move into positinns evacuated by Greeks. I am sure (as I wrote last June) that the Greek side has no need of long static lines of defence, nor of large numbers of men. A small, highly mobile force which need rarely be seen would be far more effective in meeting the Eepublic's real security and ;'v ;y? • ,'• defence needs - and far more economical. %V:3"

9. Lt.Gen.Moronis, General Srivas1' successor, is a professional soldier |•; •':sv free of the heroic and political associations of his predecessor. He ;'--. should therefore find it much easier to take and carry out military orders and to refrain from personal initiatives - although his task is still complicatedriby the fact that he, and some hundreds of other

Greek regular Officers (l could not check the exact number)5 are serving two masters; the Greek as well as the Cyprus Government. Some of these Officers are paid direct by Cyprus, some by Greece to whom Cyprus then refunds. I was sorry to hear from Gen. Moronis that he had spent 18 months behind British wire in detention in the Sudan during the War.

10. I was also sorry to see, only one week after Greek Independence Day, preparations for a grandiose military celebration of EOKA Day on April 1st. - the 12th Anniversary of the first anti-British bomb explosions. My own well-known views on the folly of British-Colonial policy during the Cyprus emergency do not prevent my regretting this primitive display of militaristic nationalism at a time when Cyprus urgently needs peace and co-operation. Nor do I believe that there is any significant body of public opinion (:• ax -IOCA fighters or others) on the island which needs to be placated in this way. I am sure several Ministers of the Republic share this view.

11. On the other hand, I was pleased to see the start of what promises to be a reasonably good tourist season - given the fright administered to potential tourists by last winter's crisis. If the whole of the 1968 season remains undisturbed by incidents, there is no doubt that 1969 will be an excellent year for tourism in Cyprus. .Meanwhile, there is continuing economic progress and very S^tlh use is made of international and foreign experts in all fields. The administration is of a high standard among Eastern Mediterranean countries - as are the standards of education and of living.

/ End. From: Francis Noel-Baker,M.P. ,_lst draft. \T~May, 1968.

SECRET - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

GREECE SINCE THE REVOLUTION

1. I first met Colonel Papadopoulos, Brigadier Pattakos and Colonsl Makarezos,(who are now Prime Minister, Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, andMinister of Economic Co-ordination respectively) early in May 196? r shortly after they seized power. At that time I also met King Constantine, Mr. Kollias and Lt.Gen. Spandidakis (the latter two were then Prime Minister and Deputy Premier, nominees of the King).

2. During the 19&7 whitsun recess, I had further talks with Mr. Papadopoulos, Col. Makarezos and other Ministers; and in August, when threa British M.P's - Will Ilamling, Gilbert Longden and Jeremy Thorpe - were staying with us at Achnetaga, Messrs. Pattakos and Makarezos arrived "by helicopter to spend the day. (Jeremy refused to meet them and feigned illness because, he said, of possible trouble at the forthcoming Liberal Asseab£r ).

3. On December 14th, the day the King fled to Rome after his abortive coup, I made a flying visit to Euboea (where my father was convalescing) and then saw the three 'Generals' in Athens. Meanwhile, I had started wg^t a friendly, informal correspondence with Brigadier Pattakos into which ny 9-year-old son Philip (who admired the helicopter) was also drawn. I had further talks with Mr. Pattakos and Mr. Papadol,poulos in January (they were civilians by then); and saw thea both again and also Mr. Makarezos in March| First separately, and then together at a small private lunch-partyH j I 1 ;. j On May 3rd, I saw Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Pattakos once more in Athens with the Duke of St.Albans,

Lord Rga (the formal Liberal leader in the Lords) and Bill Elliott the Tory Whip (who had visited Rhodes with me on an Olympic Airways Inaugural Flight), and also had brief private talks with both Greek Ministers. GREECE SINCE TITE REVOLUTION

page 2

better, 4. As I got to knovr these three 'Colonels'/I was able to speak to them with increasing frankness, sometimes bordering on impertinence. They are very ready to listen and appear s-inceidy to welcome advice and criticsm. My original impression that they are inexperienced but sincere, nodest and well-intentioned men has been greatly re-inforced.

5. In Decenber and January I made a particularly point of pressing the release of detainees and prisoners, and in particular of Andrew Papandreau, whose father I had visited at Castri, when he was under guard, and of the Communist Musician Theodorakis. In the case of Papandreau I argued (at a private meeting with all three "Colonels ") that he would be/lesse/Q. r problem to the • Government abroad than in a Greek jail. The-Prime Minister subsequently told me that my appeal (made at a time when there were no diplomatic contacts with his Government) had been a major factor in the decision to release Andrew Papandreau and to declare an Amnesty. In the case of Theodorakis, Mr. Pattakos telephoned to the Minister of Public Order in my presence and discussed the technicalities of his release. He was freed a week later.

6. In this context, I. was much disturbed by allegations of torture in the first Amnesty International report which received wide pxiblicity in Britain and elsewhere. inTtUiUiirb; and I asked Mr. Marrecco, one of its two authors, to call on me shortly before my March visit to Athens. He then told me that he was convinced " that 90$ at least " of that report was true.

7. With some difficulty, I persuaded Mr. Pattakos to see Mr.Marrecco (the Minister agreed only on condition that I came with him), and \ Marrecco arrived in Athens in response to my cable. Me saw Mr. Pattakos together at the Ministry-of the Interior on March 29th and had a lengthy discussion. Marrecco was introduced to Inspector LainbrGu (named fey Cedric Thcmlserry in as the"Chief

Torturer") and other police officers5and to the Minister of Public Order. I went with him to the Athens Central Police Station but did not attend his interview with a prisoner there or with the other prisoners he met. GREECE..SINCE TIIE REVOLUTION

page 3

8. I will not repeat the short speech I made in the Jlouse on March llth ^when I was prevented by time from refuting Marrecco's allegations in greater detail) nor a letter I sent to the Guardian. But far froni retracting anything I said then, I renain convinced that Marrecco's two reports were wildly inaccurate and grossly exaggerated, t^at he is violently biased himself, and that he vas consistently and often deliberately mislead. I did not at all like the look of his assistant/interpreter I&VMS G&oqkegai^ who had been working illegally in Greece in contravention of the ordinary immigration and labour laws - in a manner which would not have been tolerated in England.

9« It is my firm belief, that whereas some prisoners undoubtedly

; were roughly handled, bullied and threatened, no new methods of systematic torture have been introduced since the Revolution, nor has any brutality taken place with the knowledge and approval of the new Government. On the contrary, I belisve that they excercise more supervision over police and prison officers than previous Governments. I do not believe that Inspector Lanbrou of the Special Branch (who comes from Euboea and to whom I have talked in detail) is a professional torturer, nor that his and his colleagues methods of interrogation have changed since they worked under Mr. Papandreau and other previous Governments. I do believe that the Communists and other opponents of the Tlegime fully realise the propoganda value of atrocity stories and have not hesitated to exploit foreign gullibility. (A report is not necessarily true because it is written in small writing and smuggled out of Greece).

10. lire stories of torture are widely exaggerated, so is the picture in some foreign newspapers of an oppressive dictatorship holding down a reluctant populaefe by terror. There are, of course, many opponents of the regimeJ in particular five groups of vocal discontents, who happen to include most of the people a visiting journalist - or even ray good friend Leslie Finer - are likely to . -meet. These five groups are mainly concentratedin Athens. They are:- GREECE SINCE THE REVOLUTION

page 4

(1) The 'smart1 (Colonaki) set and many of the intelligentzia and aesthetes who, among other sentiments, also feel contempt for the 'peasant1 Colonels. (My own sympathies were always strongly vith the peasants).

(2) The former politicians and .their clients.

(3) The Communists and fellow—travellers

(4) YCivil servants and officials from **« State-controlled organisations dismissed by the Government

(5) The Courtiers, and Palace set - a small group.

11. These five groups have little in comnon with the mass of working people of whom the rural population(still over half the population) is, in my belief, not merely passively satisfied but actively in favour of the Government - particularly since debts to the Agricultural Bank were written off. My contacts with the urban proletariat are less close but I believe that a majority of them, like the great majority of the lower bourgeoisie, are also in favour.

12. There are still about ^,500 opponents of ta« regime in detention or exiled to islands. The great majority are hard-core Communist Activists. The general population, with memories of Civil War atrocities, has little sympathy for these people whose" numbers are being gradually reduced. Of course, not all the detainees or exiled persons are communists. On Tilos in the Dodecanese, I chanced to meet Major Caram;b£i«\$j Mr. George Papandreau's personal bodyguard^ who has recently been exiled to that island. lie greeted me waraly and publicly and later, in the presence of a number of onlookers, explained in a loud voice that he had been refused permission to communi&tte with me and wished yfcQ.;fee• intervene in Athens for his release. I later mentioned the case to the Prime Minister. GREECE SINCE THE REVOLUTION

page 5

13. The press censorship is likewise much less offensive to the general population than to foreign opinion, and some sections of sophisticated Athens opinion. Ttfe is because of the remarkable irresponsibility of most Greek newspapers before the revolution, only one of which (Estia) was really independent of hidden financial 'pressures, and some of which attempted to blackmail Ministers and Governments - and sometimes succeeded. On the other hand, Government control of the radio (which is nothing new), continues to produce some remarkably boring and long-winded stuff in its news prograranes. Aad the newspapers (with the same exception 'Estia') are also remarkably dull.

i 14. The 'colonels1 continue emphatically to insist that they will keep their promise to introduce healthy parlimantary government:- at a tine after the Plebescite on the Constitution on September to be announced before then. So far, they have kept to their promised timetable with a slight delay which (with some reason) they ascribed to the attempted coup by King Constantine. I believe them to be sincere in their desire to return Greece to a more representative forai of Government, and I believe that the great majority of the electorate agrees with them in not wanting to return to the status quo ante. I do not think that there is any great pressure of Greek opinion, at present, which favours hastening the holding of elections. I share the opinion that a radical "clean up" of public life and of administration is necessary and I believe that it will take some time.

15. Last susimer, I was taken to task by Mr. Kollias, then Prime Minister, because in my letter of 15th June (196?) to George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, (part of which I showed to Mr. Kollias) I wrote (page 2 paragraph x) "The King's pssition seems to be weaker than I had at first imagined ...... he is isolated and does not seem to have much personal following. Even in the array, I do not ttiink he will have much support, - at least as long as the Government is popular." My opinion was amply borne out by the pathetic failure of the King's attempted coup which vas planned and executed with astounding clumsiness. A sxxasg feature was the absence of any response whatsoever from the civilian population. King Constantine even less support in Greece today. GREECE SINCE THE REVOLUTION

page 6

16. It is however, still the intention of the Governnent to restore the King as Head of State in a 'crowned democracy1 provided that "he keeps quiet meanwhile and does not get involved in politics" (to quote Mr. Papadopoulos) and provided that he is content to act in future as a constitutional monarch with rigidly restricted powers. It cannot be taken forkranted that he will accept either condition^ It is certain, however, that the Queen Mother (my son Allan's godmother) would "be wise to withdraw to her estate in Austria for some time. Justly or unjustly, she is generally believed in Greece (and elsewhere) to have a reactionary influence on the King. Meanwhile, the King would not harm his own prospects by taking the advice of several of his Ministers that he should avail himself of the present opportunity

17. The failure of the coup had a positive result in freeing the Government from obstacles imposed on it by the King himself and by Ministers who were his nominees, particularly Lt.Gen.Spandidakis as well as Mr. Kollias. The former was directly responsible for General Grie^as1 fatal operations against the Turks in Cyprus in November 19&7• In ^ne event, the removal of the General and the Greek Government^ conciliatory attitude tp Turkey, followed by President Makarios' local pacification measures have helped greatly to relax the tension on lie island and have paved the way for conversations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots which £ould . start a new era on the island. (l visited Cyprus in March and am writing a separate account of my stay there).

18. But the King's coup also had the negative result of causing the Government to heed more carefully the advice of the Security Services. ('If you burn yourself on hot stew, you blow on cold yoghurt" is a rough translation of ao popular saying quoted to me last week by Mr. Pattakos). This advice is not always correct and many mistakes have been ;aade In dismissals and appointments, as Ministers themselves freely admit. But I do not agree with the opinion that Col. Ladas or other "submerged" officers, including Captains and Majors, now threaten the authority of the Government. On the contrary, I accept that the army is "back in barracks" and that, as Mr, Papadopulous claims, Ije and his Ministerial colleagues are now in full control. GREECE SINCE Tl

page 7 . .

19. Among the factors which hamper eff ecttfespposition, is the deep fear of another Civil War, as in Spain? but the Greek Civil War -was even more bitter and widespread and it is ten years closer, in time. Memories of the atrocities of those days are still .a fundamental factor in Greek politics. So are more recent memori-es of instabilitLr ^ , strikes and riots during the years preceding the Revolution.

20,

21. •was all-powerful at present, administrative control alone is not a sufficient basis for a continuing regime and that the present administration Flacked social and political content". I repeated this remark to Mr. Papadop oulos at lunch, his replies persuaded

me thatf by the time of the elections (when I expect him to be a leading candidate) he will have developed an ide3>logica.l platform. Meanwhile, I was interested in his analogy thaf'Greece was like an aircraft breaking the sound-barrier which needed a firm hand to pass through the resulting turbulence in a controlled and safe manner". "Greece" he said, "is now breaking the development barrier",

/

22. This report emphasises! the positive aspects of the present Greek regime, for two reasons, first because most foreign comment hai"c- gone too far in emphasising "its negative aspects. And second, because I maintain the view, expressed in ray letter to George Brown last June, that there are only two alternative attitudes that a foreigner or a foreign government can take towards it? GREECE SINCE THE.REVOLUTION

page 8

Either it can be attacked and its active opponents! among whom Conmunists and fellow- . encotiraged to overthrow it - in which case there is a risk of violence, civil strife and foreign intervention^

8r it can be .urged, helped and encouraged to adhere to its declared programme and to evolve gradually to a more liberal, representative, parliamentary regime.

I have decided to XASo, such influence as I have to promote the second alterna-tive. •

23. Meanwhile, I repeat ray opinion that the Government is developing an ideological content which has important progressive aspects. (Sfttft>rt for the rural and industrial . proletariat, a real interest in the small man, and more effective control over vested interests, tax evasion etc). Nor do I exclude the possibility that, despite their (in my opinion) out-of-date, negative, anti-cosmunisn - understandable though it is in the light of the Civil War and more recent subversion - the present Ministers will also evolve a foreign policy less dependant on the United States, and establish better relations vith the USSR and 'e»fchertfsocialist countries.

24. I had, and have, good personal friends in all the former Greek political parties (including some in the Coinmunist controlled E.D.A.) some of whom are now under hosse-arrest, in detention, or in exile. Not long ago, I talked at length with Mr.George Papaadreou and Mr. Carananlis among others. But I have a duty, as a British Member of Parliament as well as a member of a family that settled in Euboea 136 years ago, to give an honest

account of the situation as I see it, even when, to my sorrow; I disagree with political friends in Greece and other countries. ;f>4; fe" The Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom » * of Great Britain and Northern Ireland presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's Note of the 26th of May 1971 requesting the Government of the United Kingdom, having regard to the Security Council1 Resolution No. 293 (1971) of the 26th of May 1971j to maintain its contingent in the United Nations Peace- « keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period ending the 15th of Decembe-r 1971. The Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom is j*. pleased to confirm that the United Kingdom Government will con- tinue to maintain its contingent in the Cyprus Peacekeeping Force, . for the period in question. As he stated in the Security Council on the 26th of May 1971? the United Kingdom will make a financial I contribution in support of the Force up to a total figure of £875,000 sterling for the period of the renewed mandate. This figure will include both the extra costs of the British contingent . ,and, as before, a cash element which will not exceed the previous

level of £625,000 sterling. t The Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom •'•'', . • . • avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary- ''.' • . General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest con- ' , sideration. ••-. '••.''-.

-.!:' UNITED KINGDOM MISSION I TO THE UNITED NATIONS, • NEW YORK. ees Omee of S~S—-"

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