The Hugo Valentin Centre
Master Thesis in Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Making Room for the Holocaust?
Entangled Memory Regimes and Polarized Contestation about the Greek 1940s in Thessaloniki
Student: Dimitrios Tziogkas Term and year: Spring 2021 Credits: 45 Supervisor: Tomislav Dulić Word count: 31.011 Contents
Abstract ...... 2
Acknowledgements ...... 3
Introduction ...... 4
Research Overview ...... 5
Research Design...... 14
Theory ...... 14
Research Questions ...... 24
Method ...... 25
Empirical Analysis ...... 31
Renaming the Chrysochoou Street...... 31
Left-Right Cleavage and Political Polarization ...... 36
Tropes and Narratives of the “National Repertoire” ...... 52
Memory Layering ...... 71
Conclusions ...... 77
Literature and Sources ...... 82
Appendix ...... 97
Abstract
The present thesis offers a new perspective on Holocaust memory in Greece by examining the ways in which divergent mnemonic representations about the Greek 1940s, as evidenced in polarized public contestation, influence the position of Holocaust in contemporary Greek collective memory. Adopting a micro-level case- study approach, the thesis focuses on the process of renaming a street in Salonika (or Thessaloniki), by examining public discourses around the issue. On the basis of theoretical elaborations in the area of collective memory, and through an application of Kubik and Bernhard's conceptualization of the politics of memory, a qualitative evaluation of Holocaust memory in Salonika is presented by attempting to categorize the memory regime emerging. It is assessed that the memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust is affected by the salience of pre-established memory regimes, occupies a secondary status in the wider mnemonic field and, what is more, is not unified. In such context, a problematic tendency to actually distort the historical record of the Holocaust, in the form of downplaying the complicity of local elites in the implementation of the Nazi genocidal policy, is also detected and explained as a repercussion of the specific dynamics at play whenever political actors engage in discussions about the Greek 1940s. All things considered, the study demonstrates that the official institutionalization of Holocaust memory on a commemorative level, a phenomenon observed during the past twenty years, should not be equated to the emergence of a cosmopolitan Holocaust memory in the country.
Keywords: Holocaust in Salonika, Greek 1940s, National Resistance, Greek Civil War, Collaboration, Second World War, Collective memory, Memory regime, Mnemonic field, Holocaust distortion
2
Acknowledgements
I will always feel grateful to those who were directly and indirectly involved in the process of writing this master thesis. It would be impossible to undertake this project without their support, advice, and active engagement. I am especially thankful to my supervisor, Tomislav Dulić, Associate Professor in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and Director of the Hugo Valentin Centre, Department of History, Uppsala University, for his patience and invaluable guidance during each phase of this work. His challenging comments were a source of continuous reflection for me and fundamentally improved every aspect of the present study. I also wish to thank Associate Professor Roland Kostić at the Hugo Valentin Centre, Department of History, Uppsala University. I am grateful for his constant encouragement, while his intriguing suggestions provided me with a basic sense of orientation, especially in the earlier stages of this process. On a rather personal note, I want to express my gratitude to my family for supporting me in so many different ways. Their understanding and encouragement made it all possible.
Dimitrios Tziogkas Uppsala, May 2021
3 Introduction
The Second World War was the context in which the genocide of the European Jews was perpetrated and, as a result, memory of the Holocaust has, throughout the decades, been embedded in national narratives which represent attempts to assess in a holistic way the war years. In the case of Greece, memory of the Holocaust cannot be adequately examined without reference to those, official or unofficial, narratives which have shaped the way political elites and society view the events of the “Greek 1940s”. In this connection, and as illuminated in the research overview section that follows, the establishment of specific narratives focused on the German occupation, the Resistance, and the Civil War, and the historical and political context in which the state and different political groups endorsed the one or the other hermeneutic representation of the past, both before and after 1974, have been quite aptly analyzed (Mazower 2000a; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009; Apostolou 2011; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017; Avgeridis 2017; Voglis 2007; Tzoukas 2012). What is missing is an analytical focus on an aspect of the whole issue that is of crucial importance in the context of any insightful assessment of Holocaust memory in contemporary Greece: An in-depth problematization and a systematic empirical examination of the ways in which these existing narratives of the Greek 1940s, which tend to dominate both academic debates and public political discourses, actually affect the status of Holocaust memory today in Greece are needed. Such a “below the surface” investigation of Holocaust memory is attempted by the present thesis, in a year in which Greece assumes the presidency of IHRA and commemorates the 200th anniversary of its “War of Independence”. Accordingly, the study aims at evaluating whether the official institutionalization of Holocaust memory, in line with international standards formulated in the context of the process of Europeanization of Holocaust memory, and the growing public awareness with regard to the Holocaust, phenomena observed in Greece during the last twenty years, have come along with a parallel development of a “negative memory” of the Holocaust, that is, of mnemonic representations that, in our case, acknowledge and examine the Greek national collective's complicity in the genocide of the Greek Jews. As pointed out, to examine Holocaust memory in such an insightful way, and in any national context, one should
4 focus on the narratives surfacing in the museums, monuments, commemorations, and public discourses pertaining to the Holocaust (Radonić 2017, 270-271). Furthermore, what is also necessitated is a serious consideration of the potential effect politicized debates about the 1940s, especially those focused on the issue of collaboration, may have on Holocaust memory. More specifically, an objective of the present thesis is to investigate whether the recurrent polarization between Left-Right whenever the Greek 1940s are discussed poses impediments to the development of self-reflective memory, enables the adoption of defensive strategies on the part of some mnemonic actors, and is at the background of the articulation of problematic positions which are tantamount to Holocaust distortion. The study's “point of entry” into the investigation of the aforementioned complex issues is the renaming of Chrysochoou Street in the city of Salonika. The renaming proposal, which was framed in a way that reflected a high symbolism in the area of Holocaust memory, gave rise to an intense debate, centered around important events of the 1940s, inside the municipal council but also among representatives of the local society and in the press. Taking into consideration the general absence of micro-level empirical studies of the specific dynamics which shape political discourses about the Greek 1940s, the main contribution of the present thesis is to demonstrate that public debates on the course of which different actors choose distinct strategies, articulate different historical representations, and made use of preexisting narratives and features of the national repertoire, may provide an ideal basis of analysis for any attempt to shed light into interesting peculiarities of Holocaust memory in Greece.
Research Overview
On a general note, while delving into relevant research focused on Holocaust memory in Greece, one can find mostly empirical studies, as the issue is not systematically elaborated under analytical approaches based on precisely delineated theoretical foundations. In this context, the theoretically informed approach attempted here may be viewed as an important contribution of the present thesis. Needless to say, the study will offer a unique perspective on Holocaust remembrance in Greece, as Holocaust memory in the country has not yet been examined under the specific
5 theoretical framework proposed here. What is more, an attempt is made to cover an important lacuna in the relevant literature, the one demonstrated by the absence of any extensive problematization and sufficient empirical examination of the ways in which the prevalent mnemonic representations pertaining to the Greek 1940s crucially affect the status of Holocaust memory in contemporary Greek memoryscape. Equally important, the study aims at addressing another conspicuous lacuna in previous research on Holocaust memory in Greece, by investigating the emergence of Holocaust distortion in Greek political discourses. Relevant research has brought attention to the fact that Holocaust commemoration on an official level was practically nonexistent for decades in Greece, as Holocaust memory has been tentatively incorporated in public discourses only from the late 1990s (Mavroskoufis 2012, 57-59; Droumpouki 2016, 200-207; Papamichos Chronakis 2018, 178-179; Varon-Vassard 2007, 83-92). In this respect, as it has been quite poignantly observed, many parallels can be drawn between Greece and the post- communist states (Droumpouki 2016, 200). Previous research of relevance has specifically touched upon the effects the post- 1982 hegemonic narrative about the period of German occupation has had on contemporary historical representations (Mazower 2000a, 225-226; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 321-324; Avgeridis 2017, 10; Voglis 2007, 453-454; Tzoukas 2012, 405-406). Officially endorsed by the newly elected socialist government of PASOK (Pan-hellenic Socialist Movement), this fixed understanding was embodied in the “Law for the Recognition of the Resistance of the Greek People against the Occupation Troops, 1941– 44”, which was voted in 1982 and officially recognized all resistance groups, EAM (National Liberation Front, the main, left-wing, Greek resistance organization) included. The wording of the law's title itself is indicative of the new approach, reflecting a logic directed towards defining the resistance of the “whole Greek people” against the German occupation forces as one of the two main focal points of a new foundational myth, the other point being the commitment to preserve the democratic form of government after the demise of the military regime (Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 321; Voglis 2007, 453; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566). As it has been observed, in this way, the phenomenon of Greek resistance was “conveniently” remembered, narrated in nationalist undertones, and viewed through a “patriotic” lens. In effect, it was “nationalized” and officially incorporated into the continuum of national history. Resistance was elevated as the basis upon which the
6 new democratic regime was legitimized and it was viewed as a historical precedent which powerfully symbolized the, much wanted after 1974, “national unity” between all Greeks and reconciliation between the Left and Right. The whole of the Greek nation participated in the resistance against the Nazis, with the exception of a small number of collaborators, viewed as insignificant aberrations. As a consequence, resistance was depoliticized, in the context of an “inclusive” narrative which systematically downplayed and obscured the important political - ideological differences and conflicts between various resistance groups, the resistance's social and even revolutionary dimensions, and the Communist Party's hegemonic influence over EAM (Mazower 2000a, 226-227; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 569; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 321-322; Voglis 2007, 440-441, 453-454; Tzoukas 2012, 405-406). Equally important, memory of the divisive 1946-1949 Civil War was not at the forefront of the newly constructed official memory of the 1940s (Voglis 2007, 456; Tzoukas 2012, 406). Of special significance for the present study is the assessment that this redefinition of resistance could not encompass minority narratives regarding the actions and suffering of “non-Greek”, that is, not Christian, segments of the population during the German occupation. As a consequence, the memory of the Holocaust has never been incorporated into this narrative. What is more, and in this connection, this narrative has silenced the study of potentially divisive and perplexed issues which can tarnish this “glorious and heroic past”, such as those of collaboration with the Nazis and of Greek complicity in the Holocaust contested (Mazower 2000a, 227-229; Apostolou 2011, 138-139; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 321-322; Voglis 2007, 453-454; Tzoukas 2012, 405-406). Discussion of these aspects of Greek 1940s has been suppressed in the past and, as it will be shown, even today, such issues are highly. It is also important to note that this specific framing of national memory, while officiated by the government of PASOK, gradually came to be embraced by the whole spectrum of the main political forces. As pointed out, after the state endorsed a depoliticized image of resistance, and resistance became “National Resistance”, all other political forces, besides the Left, could easily appropriate this important historical phenomenon, using it, on a symbolic level, to strengthen their political legitimization and to further their own political agendas (Mazower 2000a, 226-227, 228-229; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 568-570; Voglis 2007, 454). On another note, and interestingly enough, as far as potential implications on Holocaust memory in the post-authoritarian context are concerned, some researchers have also
7 illuminated the continuities of antisemitic approaches on an official, bureaucratic and judicial, level during the post-war period, the military dictatorship era, and into the years of democratic transition (Blümel 2017; Mavroskoufis 2012, 57; Droumpouki 2016, 211-213). Whereas it is true that the narrative analyzed previously has been prevalent on a political and social level since 1982, as it represents a general hermeneutic schema used by most political actors in public discourses, one can also detect the parallel existence of other unofficial narratives pertaining to events of the 1940s. These constitute alternative readings of important historical events, such as the Resistance or the Civil War, which do not enjoy a mass appeal on a social level and are disseminated by, for example, some non-EAM veterans' groups or the Communist Party. In the former case, the narrative may be viewed as a remnant of the pre-1974 official anticommunist narration of the events, while in the latter it has been established by the Greek communist Left after 1989 as a means to draw a connection with a “revolutionary” past, construct a distinct political identity, and reinforce a radicalized rhetoric (Voglis 2007, 450-451, 453-456; Tzoukas 2012, 403-405, 406- 407). Most importantly, different actors often make use of them in the context of debates about the Greek 1940s. Thus, historical representations of this kind are also of interest in the context of the present thesis. Some interesting studies of particular relevance for the present thesis have demonstrated that in the city of Salonika there was evidenced administrative collaboration on the part of various high and mid-level Greek officials in the implementation of the Final Solution, and mass indifference of the civilian non- Jewish population and most professional associations to the fate of the Greek Jews (Apostolou 2011, 139-142; Apostolou 2000, 169-175, 176-181, 185-186; Saltiel 2019, 197-209; Saltiel 2015, 232-248; Saltiel 2014). Furthermore, the use of different “strategies of evasion” to silence discussion about, and even deny, these important historical facts has also been illuminated (Apostolou 2011, 139, 142-148). As it will be stressed, the post-1982 officially endorsed fixed understanding of the Nazi occupation period has only facilitated the perpetuation, on both a state and social level, of such strategies. What is of special interest is that this logic of evasion, a legacy of the past regime of “feeble democracy”, was accepted by post-authoritarian Greece and has been a pattern of behavior reinvigorated by its new narrative of the wartime period (Apostolou 2011, 139, 146-148, 149-151, 154- 156). Overall, one can
8 argue that in Greece there has been developed a “screen memory” of the Holocaust (Freeman, Nienass, and Melamed 2013, 1-2). The phenomenon may be understood as the development of a selective and one-dimensional memory of the occupation events that blocks the most inconvenient memories of local attitudes to be articulated and discussed, serving the goal of preserving a positive self-image, and represents the way Holocaust memory has been shaped in others countries as well (Assmann 2007, 15- 16; Subotić 2015, 190). The present study holds that, as far as Holocaust remembrance is concerned, post- authoritarian Greece has a strong resemblance to post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Generally speaking, it can be assessed that the Holocaust is not the central event that shapes and dominates Greek collective memory of the twentieth century. This lack of centrality for Holocaust memory is similar, albeit under a different context, to the situation in the memoryscape of post-communist states (Subotić 2018, 299-300). Consequently, previous research focused on analyzing Holocaust remembrance in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe offers valuable insights which are of special relevance if one aims to examine the case of Greece. Taking into consideration the argumentation presented in previous research focused on the post-communist states, the present thesis acknowledges that attempts to designate the Holocaust as a central event in the context of Greek collective memory may lead to increased ontological insecurity, as “undesirable” questions may be raised concerning the Greek national autobiography and constructed identity, built largely on a basis of a self-assuring ethnic homogeneity, itself a repercussion, among others, of the implementation of the Final Solution in Greece, and especially in the city of Salonika (Subotić 2018, 300). Most importantly, as far as post-communist states and Greece are concerned, the “European” Holocaust remembrance paradigm, which is victim-centered and is premised on a commitment on the part of states to adopt a self-interrogating approach about their past, can generate profound state ontological insecurity as it leads to an undesirable examination and reassessment of national and local forms of collaboration with the Nazis in the perpetuation of the Final Solution, and of the Christian majority's indifference to the fate of the Jews. What is more, part of such discussions has to be the material and financial benefits generated from the appropriation of Jewish property and assets by the local Christian population, before and in the aftermath of the deportations (Subotić 2018, 300; Himka 2008, 361-362,
9 367-372; Mavroskoufis 2012, 57). This aspect of the whole issue is of special importance as far as Salonika is concerned. Different studies have contended that, in the aforementioned context, attempts to introduce a cosmopolitan, “European” memory of the Holocaust into the post- communist countries, and the present study supports that the same holds for Greece, may actually generate anxiety in both state and society, as they challenge main aspects of the national autobiography, undermine the state's positive view of self and its international reputation as a benevolent actor in its relations with its significant others, leading to ontological insecurity (Subotić 2018, 298-299; Assmann 2014, 553; Assmann 2007, 15-16). Moreover, some researchers have argued that such ontological stress is further exacerbated by an internalized sense of inferiority on the part of Eastern European states, and Greece, towards the West, a feeling that makes these countries obsessed with constantly displaying their European credentials and trying to secure their identity as “truly” European in the eyes of their Western counterparts in the European Union (Zarakol 2010, 3-4, 8-9, 9-12, 19-20; Subotić 2018, 298; Ejdus 2018, 888-889). Relevant research focused on the dynamics of ontological security in periods of transition, allows us to hypothesize that in Greece, during the post-1974 transitional period towards democracy, there was a need to create a new biographical narrative, securing a continuous in time and positive self- perception, and to foster new relations on an international level, as the old political order had collapsed, its master narrative was completely delegitimized, and routinized relationships of decades were destabilized (Evans 2003, 9; Rumelili 2018, 287-288; Ejdus 2018, 888-893). This context of political and ideological transition must have generated a profound ontological insecurity for Greece, at a time when the country was entering into negotiations for its accession to the European Communities (Rumelili 2018, 282, 287-288). Against this transitional background, one has to presume that the highly contested memory of the Holocaust must have created additional anxiety in the newly established democratic state (Subotić 2018, 300-301; Rumelili 2018, 282, 287-288). Quite informative analyses focused on the linkages between ontological security and the phenomenon of mnemonical securitization, in the context of the Eastern European field of collective memory, should also be taken into consideration (Mälksoo 2015, 222-223, 226-230; Rumelili 2018, 289, 290-291). Mnemonical securitization is perceived as the process of setting a fixed understanding of the
10 historical past which reinforces an actor’s stable sense of self, and of defending it against internally and externally generated alternative narratives (Mälksoo 2015, 222). Accordingly, in the background of the analysis of the present thesis is the perception that in post-authoritarian Greece, especially from 1982, what has taken place is an, officially endorsed, securitization of historical memory of the Second World War, aimed at promoting political reconciliation between the victors and the defeated of the Greek Civil War and at stabilizing the nascent, fragile democratic institutions. Here, the process of securitizing memory politics is understood as the establishment, propagation, and dissemination, at an official level, of a unifying and heroic understanding of the past. This fixed and monolithic understanding of the Greek 1940s, centered on the phenomenon of Greek resistance, has shaped collective memory representations since the 1980s and enabled what could be described as a problematic long silence with respect to both the issue of Greek collaboration with the Nazis and the related issue of Greek complicity in the Holocaust. In this sense, the case of Greece shares similarities with those of other European states, which, as previous research has showed, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, constructed self-serving, identity-enhancing, and “patriotic” national memories of the war (Assmann 2014, 553; Mälksoo 2009, 663; Judt 2005, 805-809, 814-815; Himka 2008, 362-363; Assmann 2007, 14-16; Chirot 2015, 48-49, 51, 62, 67; Berger 2010, 122-123; Stokholm Banke 2010, 166-167, 170, 172). On another note, the prominent place Holocaust remembrance has gained in the West and the process of the Europeanization of Holocaust memory have been examined quite thoroughly and extensively in previous research. As highlighted, with respect to the European Union, the centrality of Holocaust memory is of fundamental importance as it constitutes the foundational narrative of the community, serving as a basis for promoting democracy and the protection of human rights. It has been supported that, especially after the end of the Cold War, Holocaust memory has gained a normative character and has been institutionalized as a cosmopolitan memory of profound moral value, further consolidating its central position in the European memoryscape. This development is even more obvious after the Stockholm Forum and the Stockholm Declaration of 2000 (Della Sala 2018, 269-271; Assmann 2014, 548-549, 552; Levy 2010, 18-19; Assmann 2010a, 101-103, 105-109, 109-114; Levy and Sznaider 2002, 95-97, 100-102; Judt 2005, 803; Subotić 2018, 299, 301- 302, 303-304; Himka 2008, 367; Rumelili 2018, 290; Assmann 2007, 13-14;
11 Stokholm Banke 2010, 163-164, 171-172, 173). It has even been argued that the Stockholm Declaration and the framework of international cooperation it established perceive post-1989 Holocaust remembrance as a “civil religion”, at least as far as Western European memory politics are concerned (Allwork 2015). The present thesis is built upon a central argument, specifically formulated with reference to the Eastern European member-states of the European Union, that the case of Greece should also be analyzed as one of those in which the foundational narrative of the Union creates ontological insecurity in a member-state, by questioning the state's biographical continuity (Della Sala 2018, 269, 272, 276). It has to be stressed that demonstrating forms of Holocaust distortion, as these may be found in different political actors’ public interventions, constitutes one stated aim of the present study. In this regard, it is of interest to note the absence of specialized studies focused on phenomena of Holocaust denial and distortion in Greece. On the other hand, these issues have been analyzed in depth by previous research which attempted to systematically investigate phenomena of Holocaust denial and distortion in multiple settings, especially in the post-communist countries. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) formulated a, legally non-binding, Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion in 2013, and adopted it as a working tool (IHRA 2013; Bauer 2020, 209-210; Whine 2020, 59-60). Interestingly enough, Greece is the only member-state of IHRA that has officially adopted IHRA's Working Definition on Holocaust Denial and Distortion, a decision presented as having a highly symbolic value (Whine 2020, 62). At the same time, this formal endorsement on the part of the Greek state should be regarded as indicating that the IHRA's Working Definition has now also gained a special significance in terms of its normative status. Previous research has pointed out that, today, as far as Europe is concerned, outright Holocaust denial is not as widespread and common as multiple forms of Holocaust distortion (Whine 2020, 60, 62, 63; Gerstenfeld 2007, 35-36; Shafir 2002, 21; Bauer 2020, 210, 213; Rozett 2012, 54). The division in contemporary European societies between the actors who, especially during the last decades, deal openly and in a self-reflective way with national memory of the Holocaust and those who distort the record of the Holocaust has also been highlighted (Rozett 2019, 24). It has also been observed that Holocaust distortion is often the result of the instrumentalization of Holocaust memory in the context of national or regional political conflicts (Shafir
12 2002, 2-3; Rozett 2019, 24; Rozett 2012, 54; Gerstenfeld 2007, 36, 51). Following Michael Shafir’s analysis, a distinction can be made between three different general forms of Holocaust denialism: outright negation, deflective negationism, and selective negationism. He also outlined the basic aspects of Holocaust “comparative trivialization” in post-communist Eastern Europe (Shafir 2002, 3). Holocaust distortion, as understood in the analytical framework of the present thesis, is the deflective negationism described by Shafir. It is also worth mentioning what relevant research has emphatically demonstrated and which is of particular importance in the context of the present study: In contemporary European democratic polities, while outright Holocaust denial is almost always a marginal phenomenon, communicated by anti-Semitic groups of neo-Nazis, extreme right-wingers, and populists, Holocaust distortion is a much more insidious and widespread form of negationism, often detected among mainstream political parties of the whole political spectrum (Shafir 2002, 10-11; Bauer 2020, 214; Rozett 2012, 54; Gerstenfeld 2007, 51). Shafir's insightful analysis of deflective negationism has demonstrated the different tactics used by those who distort Holocaust memory. It is illuminated that deflective negationism constitutes a special form of the "externalization of guilt" syndrome, a phenomenon examined in the context of clinical and social psychology (Shafir 2002, 21-22; Gerstenfeld 2007, 41-42). Furthermore, Shafir delineates three different sub-types of deflective negationism (Shafir 2002, 22). One popular form of deflective negationism is the transfer of the entire guilt for the perpetration of the Holocaust exclusively to the “Germans” or the “Nazis”. In this context, this strategy represents a denial of the fact that the Holocaust, in all its enormity and in the way it was implemented, was also made possible by the criminal activity of various officials in Nazi-allied countries and by that of indigenous fascist political formations. It was also the result of the actions and decisions of local collaborators with the Germans, which enabled and facilitated the persecution of the Jews and the implementation of the “Final Solution”, especially in those countries, like Greece, which were occupied by the Nazis. The mass indifference and apathy of the plurality of the non-Jewish populations to the fate of the Jews also made the implementation of the Holocaust much easier (Shafir 2002, 22-33; Rozett 2019, 27- 29; Bauer 2020, 225; Gerstenfeld 2007, 41). A second sub-type is the restrictive deflection of guilt on some individuals who supposedly represent marginal “aberrations” in the general attitude of the national collective. It is obvious that this
13 type of deflective negationism involves the acknowledgment of the participation of some members of the national collective in Holocaust crimes, but perceives these actors to have been on the “fringe”, that is, that they should be regarded as insignificant “aberrations” in the national collective's allegedly positive stance towards the Jews and in a national history of harmonic Christian-Jewish coexistence (Shafir 2002, 22, 33-38; Rozett 2019, 24-27, 28; Bauer 2020, 222; Gerstenfeld 2007, 41, 51). Often, this type of deflective negationism appears as explicitly “personalized”, when the guilt for crimes is attributed exclusively to specific politicians or government officials (Shafir 2002, 37-38). Deflecting the guilt for the Holocaust to the Jews is a third form of deflective negationism (Shafir 2002, 22, 38- 47). Finally, Shafir has defined the “comparative trivialization” of the Holocaust as another form of willful Holocaust distortion. Comparative trivialization involves attempts to minimize the effect of Holocaust's perpetration on a local level through comparing it to other crimes perpetrated by the Germans. It also refers to all those comparisons made, with the aim to minimize Holocaust's record, between the Holocaust as a historical event and others instances of mass violence (Shafir 2002, 55-69; Rozett 2019, 33-34; Whine 2020, 62-63; Rozett 2012, 54; Gerstenfeld 2007, 42-46, 50).
Research Design
Theory
First and foremost, the study's central argumentation is based upon theoretical approaches crystallized in previous research focused on collective memory. On the other hand, my analysis makes use of Kubik and Bernhard's theory of the politics of memory and their theoretical framework, specifically formed to analyze the emergence of different types of mnemonic regimes. The notion of “collective memory” figures prominently in the present study, and, thus, it is of relevance to make a reference to concepts and distinctions of terminology
14 which will navigate the analysis. Relevant research has stressed that, although considered by some a “spurious” notion (Assmann 2010b, 35-37), collective memory is highly useful as an analytical tool (Assmann and Shortt 2012, 8-10; Bottici 2010, 340-343; Assmann 2016, 16-17, 43). Numerous different definitions of the term have been presented. It can be argued that what all the given definitions have in common is a basic understanding of collective memory as a type of memory that is shared by members of a group (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 318). Relevant to discussions of terminology is the distinction drawn between the term “collective remembering/remembrance” and “collective memory”. As argued, the former denotes the continuous and dynamic renegotiation and reformulation of representations of the past, while the latter gives the impression of a static mnemonic situation as far as representations are concerned (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 319- 320). Collective memory (or remembering) is closely related to processes of identity- formation for different groups. It is formulated with the aim to serve the construction of a distinct and specific identity which differentiates the members of one group from those of others (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 320). In this sense, collective memory narrates a historical past that is linked interpretatively to the present. It has to be noted that representations in the area of collective memory are constantly related to main features of contemporary cultural discourse and identity. The past is re-framed, reinvented, and reformulated in order to address vital needs of the present (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 320-321). The relationship between individual and collective memory is also a highly debated issue and different approaches have been articulated. The common denominator of these various approaches is a perception that the agents of remembering are the “socially situated individuals”. If one wants to comprehend this notion one has to focus on the ‘‘cultural tools’’ individuals use in order to remember, in the course of a process that is strongly influenced by the socio-cultural setting in which individuals live. The relationship between individual and collective remembering can best be understood by establishing that members of a group share the same set of cultural tools (‘‘cultural tool kit’’) and they employ it in order to remember. Individuals, as agents of remembering, and the cultural tools they use, in order to remember, may be viewed as integral components of a memory system (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 321-322). At the level of collective memory, an
15 important feature of this ‘‘cultural tool kit’’ are narrative forms. “National narratives”, as a form of cultural memory, present ‘‘a coherent ordering of events along a strict narrative line, serving as an intellectual and emotional backbone of national identity’’ (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 323-324). Thus, national narratives aim to establish a meaningful representation of the historical past which binds together specific events, historical figures, and motivations (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 323-324). In this respect, research in the area of collective memory is especially focused on explaining the various ways in which the social, cultural, or political context of the individuals influence the narratives which are used. Members of a given group share the same narrative tools. As far as collective memory representations are concerned, one can observe the employment of narratives that are already embedded into the aforementioned ‘‘cultural tool-kit’’, making use of a limited and specific ‘‘stock of stories’’, in an effort to make sense of the past (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, 324). As argued in relevant research, no analysis of collective memory can be initiated without a simultaneous examination of the social and political frame(s) that shape such memory (Assmann 2010b, 37-38; 49-50; Assmann and Shortt 2012, 4-5; Bottici 2010, 340; Assmann 2016, 13, 16). Although there have been delineated different, insightful and useful, categorizations of collective memory or collective remembrance (Bottici 2010, 343-347), quite relevant for my analysis will be the theoretical distinction between three different, but quite often overlapping, formats of collective memory, as outlined by Assmann. She draws an interesting distinction between social, political, and cultural memory. Accordingly, social memory is “bottom-up”, related to the past as it has been experienced, communicated, or even ignored within a given society. It is closely related to “generational memory”, and what is of particular importance is that social memory is never stable, as it continuously evolves together with the generational shifts that take place in the society (Assmann 2010b, 40-42; Assmann 2016, 14-16, 21). Political (or national) memory is “top-down” and institutionalized, representing the state's attempt to establish a trans-generational, permanent, selective, and homogeneous memory of the past through the formation of a fixed narrative and the creation of a normative framework of official commemoration (monuments, official ceremonies etc). Political memory plays a particularly important role in the formation of national identity. In this connection, nations tend to select specific historical events
16 as the basis for the construction of national myths and establish specific ways in which the past is to be interpreted. Mythologizing the past should be understood as an attempt to affectively view historical past through the lens of identity. Thus, in this way, the past is used both to make sense of the present and, equally important, to address a constant, basic need for orientation for the future (Assmann 2010b, 42-43; Assmann 2016, 22-28). Cultural memory also aims at creating permanent, trans-generational, and temporally limitless representations of the past, but is more complex than political memory, as it does not necessitate a homogeneous view of the past. It calls for more personal and intellectual forms of participation in the construction of such representations, which invite some form of critical thinking. Cultural memory involves the “active memory of the canon” (also called functional memory), that is, those information consciously selected by society to be collectively remembered due to their importance. It also is relevant to the “archival memory” (also called storage memory) which incorporates all information and items which are preserved but are forgotten and sidelined, being accessible only by professional specialists, historians etc (Assmann 2010b, 43-44; Assmann 2016, 21, 35-42). Of course, the content of these three formats of collective memory is not stable and is constantly renegotiated. As already stressed, contemporary collective memory of the Holocaust in Salonika will be evaluated by adopting a specific theoretical framework for the examination of the politics of memory, and testing some of its basic assumptions, the one outlined by Kubik and Bernhard. They developed this theoretical schema in order to thoroughly examine and qualitatively assess the commemoration of the 1989 fall of state socialism, as emerged in post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe in 2009. It has to be underlined that their theoretical conceptualization of the politics of memory has some specific context-related aspects and makes use of motifs that are unique to the political environment of post-communist Europe. At the same time, basic tenets of their theoretical operationalization and relevant delineated typologies can be applied with respect to other mnemonic issues as well and in settings different than the post-communist. Actually, they have the potential to provide an analytical toolbox highly useful for anyone who aims at presenting a comprehensive anatomy of politicized memory conflicts as they emerge today in modern democratic polities. Here, reference will be made to those hypotheses of their theoretical framework that
17 are deemed to be highly relevant in the context of an examination of Holocaust commemoration. Their conceptualization of the politics of memory focuses mainly on official memory, understood as representations of the past endorsed by the state and by political, and other collective, actors in the public space, and cultural memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 8). The approach employed is described as “instrumentalist,” centered on the development of subjective perceptions about the historical past on the part of political actors. The focus here is on forms of political manipulation and instrumentalization of history (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 9). Under this theoretical perspective, the concepts of “memory actor” and “mnemonic regime” are of central importance. This conceptualization may enable an all- encompassing analysis of the diverse political, social, and cultural mechanisms that affect the formation and transmission of collective memory in a given society. The authors refer to four ideal-types of mnemonic actors which may be individuals, political parties, groups, organizations, etc.: mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralists, mnemonic abnegators, and mnemonic prospectives. Each type has different characteristics (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 10-11). Mnemonic warriors vividly distinguish between themselves, the guardians of the historical “truth”, and other political actors who “falsify” and distort the historical record. They paint their opponents in the field of political memory as agents of “obfuscation” and “opportunism”. Thus, alternative views of the past, false by default, are completely delegitimized. They usually endorse monolithic and mythologized views of the past. In such a context, past “glorious times” of the nation or its past defeats come to the forefront and provide the sole basis for interpretations of the present (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 12-13). Mnemonic pluralists believe that, besides them, other actors too have an inalienable right to maintain their own views of the historical past. While pluralists may not agree with alternative views of the past, they believe that what has to take place is a dialogue between divergent historical representations. The objective of this process should be the identification of commonalities between the alternative views of the past, and the demonstration of common mnemonic features. It is illuminated that mnemonic pluralists can more adequately grasp multiple notions of historical time. Thus, they can more readily acknowledge that self-reflection and recognition of one's violent past may be necessitated at a certain point in time, even if such a strategy
18 could not be implemented under pragmatic considerations at a previous point in time. The pluralists' main concern is to participate in the formation of a field of memory politics which can incorporate competing views and promote dialogue. They believe in the construction of a pillarized memory regime (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 13). Mnemonic abnegators tend to avoid participating in memory politics. Usually, mnemonic abnegators believe that a unified and dominant view of the historical past exists in the state, one shared by the vast majority of political actors and the public. Thus, they strongly support that mnemonic issues are, and should stay, depoliticized, and actually the discussion of alternative views of the past would only be divisive and harmful. Sometimes, a political actor decides to avoid engaging in the field of memory politics, or in discussions of a specific memory regime, irrespective of what are the choices of other actors. In general, mnemonic abnegators project a “technocratic” (even apolitical), “pragmatic” approach, focus on present practical societal needs, and try to refrain from participating in mnemonic debates and contestations in the area of collective memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 14). Actually, some mnemonic abnegators may engage in the politics of memory, albeit in a distinct way. They may pursue a strategy of “convenient or purposive forgetting”, aimed at removing discussions pertaining to collective memory off the political arena and further some vision of “reconciliation”. It is noted that such a tactic is usually adopted by a set of specific political actors, those who could be held indirectly responsible for past historical crimes and social traumas, due to their political ancestors' complicity and participation in them (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 14). For example, a political party whose political or ideological predecessor-formation had embraced persons accused of criminal behavior may defensively adopt such a stance of abnegation and place a need for oblivion at the center of their mnemonic strategy. Mnemonic prospectives seem to represent a category specifically outlined by the authors to capture the strategy of political groups which share an utopian vision for the future and belong to the neo-communist revolutionary Left. I presume that this type of mnemonic actor has no analytic relevance in the examination of mnemonic regimes pertaining to the Holocaust. For this reason, the characteristics of mnemonic prospectives will not be analyzed here (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 14). Different actors emerge as warriors, pluralists etc. on a specific memory issue. The interaction, that is, conflict or coexistence, of different mnemonic actors defines the type of the memory regime emerging in a society. The authors define the memory
19 regime as: “a set of cultural and institutional practices that are designed to publicly commemorate and/or remember a single event, a relatively clearly delineated and interrelated set of events, or a distinguishable past process” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 14-16). The focus is on official memory regimes, that is, memory regimes which are constructed through the engagement of official institutions, state authorities and political parties. Memory regimes are generated through mnemonic contestations developing in the public sphere. The notion of official “field of memory” (or “mnemonic field”) includes all the official memory regimes existing in a given country at a certain point in time (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 16-17). A typology of memory regimes is also constructed, distinguishing between fractured regimes, pillarized regimes, and unified regimes. Fractured memory regimes emerge when there is at least one mnemonic warrior takes part in a mnemonic debate on a particular issue and develops his argumentation at the discursive level (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17). A memory regime in which there are not mnemonic warriors can be either pillarized or unified. In such cases, the regime's specific type, pillarized of unified, will be dependent on the exact mix of abnegators and/or pluralists. Pillarized memory regimes usually involve pluralists and abnegators. In pillarized memory regimes, divergent views of the past coexist, and there is a degree of toleration of contending interpretations (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17). At last, memory regimes are unified when there is general agreement how the historical past is viewed and there are no mnemonic conflicts. It is stressed that in unified regimes all mnemonic actors are de facto abnegators. This depoliticization of collective memory may be the result of actual political agreement on the representations of the past. But, in unified regimes, the vast majority of actors may also instrumentally chose a strategy of abnegation, because they are aware that politicizing memory issues would be costly and not politically advantageous. It is important to stress that one may detect all types of mnemonic actors in mnemonic conflicts emerging in the context of modern democratic memory politics (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17-18). Under the examined theoretical perspective, each mnemonic entrepreneur selects a particular strategy in order to address a mnemonic issue, while taking into consideration the effect this choice may have on his/her position in the political sphere. It is outlined that, in this context, actors actually have to make cautious calculations on two levels, on a positional (political) and a cultural (semiotic) level. Plainly stated, before an actor chooses a strategy, he/she examines the impact such
20 choice might have on the level of support he/she enjoys from the electorate and, at the same time, the other actors' potential reaction to this choice. A particular mnemonic strategy may seriously affect this level of political support. The semiotic calculation pertains to the potential cultural impact of a chosen strategy, leading actors to think about how their actions may be interpreted, mainly by the public. Against this background, Kubik and Bernhard's outline three factors that affect political actors when they choose a specific mnemonic strategy: (a) Cultural constraints. These can be found in the features, values, and identities incorporated in the public discourse (for example, in the form of narratives). Political actors are aware of them and may make use of them; (b) Cultural choices. These are the choices actors make within the existing cultural constraints. Such choices are, for example, the invocation of specific political/cultural identities, the employment of specific ideological themes and features, or the use of a specific narrative about the past; and (c) Structural- institutional constraints. These are the limitations imposed by the political environment in which actors operate (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 11-12). The structural constraints limit the actors' freedom of choice and weigh heavily in decision making processes. Kubik and Bernhard present various structural constraints that are context-specific and unique to post-communist Europe (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 19-21). In the present thesis, the structural constraint taken into account is one that is deemed specifically relevant for actors engaging in political debates about the Greek 1940s. The two authors argue that the equilibrium of power, degree of polarization, and the state of affairs between the main political forces at the time of a mnemonic debate (or commemoration) posit a serious structural constraint on actors' choices. Especially, the existence of a polarized political climate in which the Left- Right cleavage is of great salience is considered as quite conducive to the politicization of memory issues and the development of mnemonic conflicts (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 22). Cultural constraints also crucially affect the political actors' strategies. Here, reference has to be made to those historical/cultural factors that shape the actors' interpretation of the past and, thus, constrain their choices. The authors denote all these factors as belonging to a “national repertoire” of specific cultural forms, themes, codes, or tropes. At this point, it may be essential to clarify that Kubik and Bernhard do not support that there exists a “national character or consciousness”, genetically ingrained in a population or mystically passed down from one generation to the next.
21 What they support, and the present study fully endorses this thesis, is that, in any national context, there exist “official” narratives about the historical past, constructed by the political elites and disseminated through official institutions and the system of public education. Also, there may be numerous “unofficial” narratives, formed and endorsed by various social and political groups, which represent a view of the past that is not in full accordance with official narratives. In this connection, it is important to stress that the authors perceive the “culture” of a group as a set of common “points of concern”, and not necessarily as a set of “shared values” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 22). A mnemonic actor's political genealogy poses important cultural constraints on the actor's choices. Here, an issue of credibility lies in the background. Political actors with a specific identity and links to problematic political formations of the past (or the ancient regime) face serious cultural constraints while designing their mnemonic strategy (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 23-24). All things considered, mnemonic actors are always constrained by the available cultural repertoire. In the context of mnemonic debates, an actor who initiate an alternative interpretation of the past, which is not based on any of the features of the existing national repertoire, will have difficulties in attracting support from the public (or the electorate) and may end up a cultural pariah (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 24). In any case, mnemonic warriors, pluralists, and abnegators choose a specific cultural strategy. Choosing a cultural strategy means selecting specific features from within the existing toolbox of narratives about the past, that belong to a highly salient national repertoire. This argument is made on the basis that there exists a stable, highly resistant, and accumulated over time, historical repertoire of themes and tropes, which constitutes a semiotic (cultural) set that members of a group (of a nation) are socialized and educated to acknowledge as “theirs” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 24-25). These choices may have a major political effect, as they establish an actor’s credibility and legitimacy in the area of mnemonic contestation. What has to be stressed is that a mnemonic actor may always attempt to reinforce or attenuate a dominant narrative’s central position in a national culture (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 25). An interesting cultural choice made by actors focuses on whether remembrance of a particular event is perceived as an issue worthy of being discussed on its own or its commemoration is affected by remembrance of other events and issues. Many times,
22 mnemonic debates about a specific event are rich in references and invocations of memories of other events. In this way, different memory regimes are connected. Kubik and Bernhard define this phenomenon as “memory layering”. Memory layering can either weaken or reinforce the significance attributed to the remembrance of a historical event. In extreme cases, it may serve to neutralize or minimize the status of a historical event in the context of collective memory. Memory layering may also be considered as a cultural constraint, when, for example, one can detect the existence of a tradition of memory layering (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 28). Kubik and Berhnard, on the basis of a comparative analysis of the case-studies presented in their book, made an important general assessment with respect to the cultural content of mnemonic debates and commemorations. They observed that the cultural tone of commemorations was in all cases affected by a dominant feature (for example, a narrative) of the national repertoire or influenced by a major cleavage situated at the heart of the country's “national culture” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 285). The authors admit that the notion of “national culture” is conceptually spurious. What is denoted here by “national culture” is not a stable set of patterns demonstrated in the behavior of people from a given country, but a wide discursive field in which competing views of the nation are constantly re-negotiated. In this context, the nation is constructed as “a compelling symbolic configuration”. As already noted, culture diffuses not so much values to be shared but “points of concern to be debated”. Whereas some mnemonic actors simply make use of available discourses to strengthen their position in debates focused exactly on such “points of concern”, other actors may disseminate counter-hegemonic features and themes in an attempt to question the dominant narratives. State authorities, political parties, schools, religious institutions, families, museums etc., systematically reproduce central themes (heroes, myths of origin, narratives, etc.), that are considered an inherent part of the “national culture”, and scripts. These themes and scripts constitute what is called (a subjective version of) the “national character.” What is more, such themes and scripts (for example, “heroism”, “victimhood” etc.) are highly resistant to change. As a result, one may get the impression of an immutable “national culture” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 285-286). Considering the aforementioned basic features of Kubik and Bernhard's conceptualization, three central hypotheses are formulated in the context of the present thesis: 1) Mnemonic contestation regarding the Greek 1940s is influenced by
23 a salient and persistent Left-Right political cleavage. Political polarization influences political actors’ strategic choices; 2) Mnemonic actors formulate their strategy by using available themes and features that belong to the “national repertoire”. Here, special attention should be paid on potential invocations of the dominant narrative about the occupation years; 3) Memory layering is a common phenomenon in the context of mnemonical contestation pertaining to the Holocaust. It has to be examined whether memory of the Holocaust is layered with memories of other events and periods, such as the Greek Civil War, the resistance etc. Empirically testing these hypotheses will help me detect and demonstrate which line of argumentation and specific cultural choices distinguish those mnemonic actors who adopt a defensive stance from others who endorse the development of self-reflective memory.
Research Questions
Altogether, the study's research questions are focused on the following points: a) What is the position of Holocaust memory in the context of public elite-level contestation about the Greek 1940s? ; b) How could contemporary Holocaust memory in Salonika be qualitatively evaluated, and what is the type of the memory regime with regard to the Holocaust? Are there perceptions on the part of political actors which represent forms of Holocaust distortion? The overarching aim of the present thesis is to assess whether Holocaust remembrance in Greece has gained an upgraded status and is qualitatively transformed after important recent developments, such as the country’s participation as a full member in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance from 2005, and the gradual establishment of an official framework of Holocaust commemoration during the past twenty years. One could presume that these developments have generated a progressive reconfiguration of national Holocaust memory that should have led the country closer to the cosmopolitan Holocaust memory paradigm. A systematic, theoretically-informed, and all-encompassing problematization of the whole issue is attempted, focused on analyzing peculiarities of the wider Greek mnemonic field and exploring the effect pre-existing memory regimes pertaining to other events of the 1940s have on contemporary Holocaust memory in the country.
24 Method
This section presents an analysis of the main methodological approaches employed in the study.
Case Study I chose to concentrate the study's analytical focus on Salonika, taking into account the fact that the city is the second biggest in Greece, was for centuries the major Jewish metropolis in the Balkans, and the main site of Holocaust perpetration in Greece. Thus, it has to be stated that the choice of Salonika is premised on a basic empirical assumption: it is mainly on a local level, specifically in Salonika, that important aspects of the Holocaust as it was perpetrated in Greece have the potential to generate contestation between different mnemonic actors and, thus, an in-depth examination of mnemonic debates arising on this local level may most adequately shed light into the problematic nature of the incorporation of Holocaust in the memoryscape of contemporary Greece. Consequently, considering that developments in Salonika constituted the major and most important chapter of Holocaust history in Greece, an analysis of the state of Holocaust memory in the city can offer interesting findings concerning Holocaust remembrance in Greece, in an attempt to investigate why the country is such a latecomer in official Holocaust commemoration. In this context, Salonika is selected as a “critical case” for the examination of Holocaust memory in Greece. Salonika is chosen as the unit of investigation of the case study taking into consideration this case's particular typology (Titscher et al. 2000, 45). Against this background, it is obvious that I decided to adopt a single case study approach (Titscher et al. 2000, 45-46). The empirical data of case studies can be collected through various methodological techniques (Berg 2001, 225, 226, 227; Titscher et al. 2000, 45, 46). My case study examines “a specific phenomenon using one object of investigation in its real context”, that is, Holocaust memory in Greece with a special analytical focus on Salonika (Titscher et al. 2000, 45).
Source Material The source material of the study mainly consists of unique data collected with the purpose to examine the public discourse concerning the renaming of Chrysochoou
25 Street. The renaming proposal was debated and approved by the Municipal Council of Thessaloniki on the 26 March of 2018, and the official transcript of the minutes from this session is used as the basis upon which the empirical analysis expands. The empirical part of the thesis is further supplemented with the analysis of documents originating from other implicated official organs and institutions, like the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory and the Thessaloniki History Center. What is more, newspaper articles and blog postings concerning the renaming of the street constitute an important part of the data used. In this connection, some other newspaper articles helped me clarify important aspects of the local political context. Semi-structured interviews with local politicians were also conducted. I attempted to approach the councilors who participated in the aforementioned session. Most of the data material described above fall within the category of primary sources. Generally speaking, primary sources are documents authored by persons who have participated in, or witnessed, the events described (Dulić 2011, 36). While assessing whether a certain material constitutes a primary or secondary source, one has to take into consideration the, so called, “proximity criterion” (Dulić 2011, 36- 37). On most occasions, newspaper articles constitute secondary sources (Dulić 2011, 37). But one has to keep in mind that the distinction between primary and secondary sources is not a strict one and mainly depends on the researcher's approach to the source material and the outlined research question(s). In the context of the present thesis, the focus is not so much on assessing specific historical facts. In other words, my aim is not to empirically establish that some events actually happened. My interest is on narratives and the subjectivity of different perceptions about the historical past. In the case of the mnemonic contestation analyzed here, newspapers played their own important role in disseminating different narratives in public discourses and, thus, they should be approached as distinct actors with their own subjective perceptions. Consequently, here, newspaper articles, at least those in which the author's opinion is communicated, can be considered primary sources (Dulić 2011, 36-37). The internal evaluation of sources includes reflecting on potential bias in the information contained. Assessing bias is especially important with respect to newspaper reports and articles (Dulić 2011, 42). As a matter of fact, many of the newspaper articles used in the present study may be considered politically biased. One has also to seriously consider the issue of biases when assessing the content of interviews, in which the interviewees present their perceptions about specific events.
26 Thus, one should always be cautious with respect to generalizations and rationalizations made by interviewees (Dulić 2011, 43). The biases of my study's source material have to be acknowledged and highlighted in order to present a general overview of important peculiarities of the collected data. The politically biased character and subjectivity of most sources comprising the empirical material of the study can be assessed quite easily. What has to be underlined is that, in the context of the present thesis, such elements do not really constitute defects or problematic aspects of the source material. On the contrary, it is exactly this pluralism of interpretations and perceptions of the historical past that renders the specific material so valuable and useful for a research project focused on narrative construction and the articulation of divergent, highly subjective, views on the part of actors involved in contemporary political memory discourses.
Interviews As already noted, in-depth interviews at the elite level were conducted in the context of the present research. This particular method was deemed most appropriate and useful as it may permit to comprehend and capture the dynamics that interplay in complex political processes and the involved actors' different perspectives (Brounéus 2011, 130-131; Berg 2001, 72-73). In this connection, in-depth interviewing can profoundly help researchers to vividly demonstrate the connections between theory and actual developments on the ground. In the present thesis, representatives of the political elite are understood as “those persons who are elected into office by others to lead and govern, and who are in a position to view themselves in that way” (Scruton 1996, 161). An attempt was made to interview municipal councilors representing the whole spectrum of political factions on a local level, reflecting the political dynamics on a municipal level in 2018. The ideological positioning of each political group is specified on a “Left to Right” spectrum. The aim was to formulate a dataset that would have been representative of all different opinions. All in all, in line with recommendations made in relevant literature (Brounéus 2011, 133), my initial plan was to conduct more than ten interviews, with an anticipated time-length of one hour for each interview (Berg 2001, 80-82). Although I got in touch with almost all members of the municipal council who participated in the 2018 discussion of the renaming proposal, eventually I was able to
27 conduct seven interviews. I consider the exceptional circumstances created by the pandemic and the unwillingness to discuss the specific issue on the part of a substantial number of councilors, explicitly expressed by some on the course of contacting potential respondents, as the main dynamics resulting in this rather modest number of interviews. In this connection, a stance of noncooperation was conspicuously most prevalent among political representatives of the Right. One conservative former councilor eventually agreed to be interviewed and, thus, only one of the seven interviews conducted reflects the argumentation of this side of the political spectrum. As a consequence, my set of interviews is not adequately representative of all ideological factions. Had I extensively based my empirical analysis on this dataset, this parameter would have crucially affected the validity of my findings, and that is why I decided to make just a limited use of this interview material. Accordingly, reference to interview data is made only when the rest of the source material cannot help me to sufficiently illustrate divergent understandings between the Left and Right of a specific notion under investigation. It should be clear by now that the choice of participants in the interviews, as described above, reflected an attempt to fulfill the criterion of credibility. Thus, I approached persons whose interviewing had the potential to establish and strengthen the validity and reliability of the study's results and conclusions. In the same connection, I was aware that the selected interviewees were “experienced” in the issues I aimed to investigate, as they are politicians who became involved in the mnemonic debate under examination. It is obvious that the selection of interviewees was conducted with a specific purpose (purposeful sampling). Purposeful sampling is quite common in qualitative social research and is dictated by the aim of each study and the research question(s). Consequently, I selected as interviewees those persons whose perceptions could aid me at capturing the different dynamics that interplay in the construction of political memory (Brounéus 2011, 134). A semi-structured procedure of interviewing was used. Thus, a set of core, essential questions was designed. These questions were posed to all interviewees, using the same wording and in the same order, in order to ensure systematic data gathering (Brounéus 2011, 130, 132, 139, 140; Berg 2001, 70-71, 74, 75-77). Carefully worded (Berg 2001, 78-79), open-ended questions were formulated with the aim to be relevant to, and illuminate, some broad categories.
28 The interviews were largely focused on sensitive topics of collective memory. What is more, and as highlighted in the empirical analysis of the present thesis, the descendants of General Chrysochoou have pressed charges against three implicated persons, on the grounds of “defamation of a deceased person”. With these in mind, I decided to keep the identity of the interviewees undisclosed. All interviews were recorded, the recorded material was transcribed verbatim and then translated into English.
Content Analysis The method of qualitative content analysis was selected in order to analyze the source material. The theoretical foundations of content analysis were first established by Harold D. Lasswell's model of mass communication (Titscher et al. 2000, 56). Considering that the present study is mainly focused on the perceptions and attitudes of political elites, my main intention was to analyze “who is saying what” in the transcript of minutes, interviews, and other documents (Berg 2001, 103). Formulating a system of categories and designing a coding process are inherent aspects of content analysis. Categories are more general components of meaning. Each unit of analysis must be coded, that is, distributed to one or more categories. All categories should be explicitly stated and their content demonstrated in an unambiguous way. Categories serve the purpose of specifying and operationalizing a given research question, or its variables, for the needs of content analysis. Thus, it is evident that the study's theoretical framework, research question(s), and hypotheses determine the specific formulation of a system of categories (Titscher et al. 2000, 58- 61; Berg 2001, 103-105). With respect to qualitative content analysis, Mayring has further proposed three analytical processes that can be used separately or in combination: summary, explication, and structuring. The summary procedure represents an effort to reduce the collected source material into a manageable set of data, while ensuring that highly important data is protected and that the eventual data-set adequately reflects the original source material. In this context, the text can be paraphrased, generalized, or reduced. The explication process is about explaining the source material. The most important part of explication is the opportunity to conduct (narrow and broad) context analysis. Of particular importance is the broad context analysis, which means that the researcher can discuss in-depth the actors and the sociopolitical setting. The
29 structuring process is basically the classic content analysis procedure, described in the previous paragraph. The aim here is to designate a formal structure from the material (structuring according to content). First the units of analysis are identified. Then, the research question(s) and the theoretical assumptions of the study guide the researcher in his/her attempt to form and decide upon a system of categories. The rules of the coding process are stipulated and the coding process starts. The schema of categories can be re-assessed and reformulated even after the coding process has begun. But in such a case a new coding process must start after the revision of the categories. Finally, the processing of the results takes place (Titscher et al. 2000, 62-64). In the present study, all three analytical techniques of qualitative content analysis are used. Taking into consideration the delineated research questions and hypotheses, a system of categories was designed. Overall, the coding process of the empirical data was guided by the following categories: a. “Political dynamics and Left/Right antagonism in the area of memory politics”. In effect, all statements made by actors, concerning the alleged political motives of their mnemonic adversaries were included in this category. Coding took place by using codes such as “Left's alleged motives” and “Right's alleged motives”. b. “Use of a specific narrative/theme of the national repertoire”. All explicit and implicit references to narratives, themes, and tropes, fell within this category. Invocation of the hegemonic narrative about the Greek resistance was denoted by the code “National Resistance of the whole Greek people”, while other codes, such as “Left’s narrative about the Civil War” and “Right’s narrative about the Civil War”, signified the use of different narratives about other events of the 1940s on the part on political actors. c. “Perception on local complicity in the Holocaust of Salonikan Jews”. The category pertains to all statements made on this issue. d. “Memory Layering”. All excerpts in which memory of the Holocaust is layered with some other historical event were coded under this category.
30 Empirical Analysis
Renaming the Chrysochoou Street
The renaming of streets which bear names of controversial figures of the 1940s, remnants of the name-giving policy implemented by the military dictatorship between 1967 and 1974, has been widely debated in Thessaloniki, especially during the past ten years. The case of Chrysochoou Street is unique in the sense that it is the only street of this kind that has actually been renamed, although political associations and civil society groups have proposed the renaming of at least two other streets of the city. Furthermore, what makes the Chrysochoou Street case so interesting and analytically relevant in the context of the present study is that the street’s renaming was explicitly connected to a need to pursue a symbolical restitution of Holocaust victims and to pay tribute to the Jewish Sephardic community of Salonika. The renaming of Chrysochoou Street, a road connecting Queen Olga's and Delfon avenues in east-central Thessaloniki, was first discussed in the municipal council's responsible organ, the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory, in 2016. The Commission was established in 2015, after Yiannis Boutaris' electoral victory in the 2014 municipal elections, with the aim to examine issues concerning the preservation of the city's collective memory and, in this context, among its jurisdictions were the designation of the citizens and institutions of the city that were to be honored with awards, the preparation of official commemorations on a municipal level, and the historical evaluation of the streets' names and preparation of specific proposals, to the Municipal Council, concerning potential renamings (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2015; Lykesas 2020a). Prominent leftist, SYRIZA member of Parliament at the time, and member of the Association of Imprisoned and Exiled Resistance-Fighters (1967-1974), Triantafillos Mitafidis, also a member of the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory, proposed to give Alberto Nar's name to the Chrysochoou Street during the Commission's meeting on the 23rd of August 2016 (Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory 2016, 3). The Commission unanimously endorsed the proposal (Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory 2016, 10-11). Following the next step in the stipulated formal process, the Commission's proposal was then
31 introduced to the council of the fifth municipal district (Municipality of Thessaloniki is divided in six municipal districts, each having its own president and council), in which the street is located, and this council voted in favor of renaming the street according to the Commission's proposal. In 2017, the decision of the fifth municipal district was submitted to the Special Committee for Naming and Renaming Streets and Squares, an organ of the Decentralized Administration of Macedonia and Thrace, which has an advisory role on such issues. This special committee opined that additional historical documentation supporting the rationale of the renaming had to be presented, before it could assess whether the renaming of Chrysochoou Street to Nar was a necessity. This advisory opinion was forwarded to the fifth municipal district, whose President asked the preparation of a historical report from the Thessaloniki History Center, the Municipality's main scientific department dealing with historical research. The Thessaloniki History Center prepared a report of historical documentation, largely focused on General Chrysochoou's career and activity. Accordingly, on January 2018, the council of the fifth municipal district discussed again the issue of the street's renaming and, taking into consideration the aforementioned historical report, decided, for a second time, the renaming of the Chrysochoou Street. The district council's decision was then submitted to the previously mentioned special committee of the Decentralized Administration of Macedonia and Thrace, which, this time, advised in favor of renaming the Chrysochoou Street (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1112-1113; Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018b, 2-4). The Municipal Council of Thessaloniki had, of course, the last say in the formal process of renaming the street, and discussed the issue on the 26th of March 2018. Political formations of a wide ideological spectrum were represented in the council and its composition reflected, to a large extent, the dynamics of local and national party politics. Mayor Yiannis Boutaris' “Protovoulia gia tin Thessaloniki” (“Initiative for Thessaloniki”, hereafter: Protovoulia) had a strong majority of twenty-eight councilors. Boutaris, a successful entrepreneur who has been quite vocal and involved in cultural and social affairs, with strong progressive credentials but without having links to any major political party, was first elected mayor of the city in 2010 as an independent with no official party affiliation. This notwithstanding, his candidacy was endorsed by PASOK, the then ruling social democratic party of Greece, and the small center-left party of the “Democratic Left”. His coalition was quite diverse, including
32 leftists, social democrats, centrists, and even some liberals. His win was hailed by progressives as it put an end to an uninterrupted, twenty five year – long, right wing rule in the municipality, and he was reelected in 2014. The biggest group of the opposition was “Entaxei” (in Greek, “entaxei” means “ok” and, also, “in order”), represented by ten councilors, which was officially supported by Greece's main conservative, center-right party, New Democracy. Two councilors belonged to “Thessaloniki – Anoichti Poli” (“Thessaloniki – Open City”, hereafter: Anoichti Poli), endorsed by left-wing SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), while “Laiki Syspeirosi” (“People's Rally”, hereafter: Laiki Syspeirosi), the municipal formation representing the Communist Party of Greece, had also two councilors. Two councilors belonged to “Elliniki Avgi gia tin Thessaloniki” (“Greek Dawn for Thessaloniki”, hereafter: Elliniki Avgi), affiliated with the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party.
TABLE 1. Schematic Presentation of the Political Groups represented in the Municipal Council of Thessaloniki in 2018 Ideological Greek Name Name in English Positioning
Laiki Syspeirosi People's Rally Left-wing
Thessaloniki – Anoichti Poli Thessaloniki – Open City Left-wing
Protovoulia gia tin Initiative for Thessaloniki Center-left Thessaloniki
Entaxei Ok/In order Center-right
Elliniki Avgi gia tin Greek Dawn for Far-right Thessaloniki Thessaloniki
Councilors of Protovoulia, Anoichti Poli, and Laiki Syspeirosi, all voted in favor of renaming the Chrysochoou street. On the other hand, three members of Entaxei, the leader of the group included, were not present in the discussion. All seven councilors of Entaxei who participated in the session gave a blank vote on the issue. While the councilor representing Elliniki Avgi was present in the debate and made an
33 intervention, he chose to leave before a vote was called (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1159; Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018b, 7-8). The motion passed and the municipal council gave its approval to the renaming of Chrysochoou Street. In August 2018, new street signs bearing the name of Alberto Nar replaced the old ones (Fotopoulos 2018). But the municipal council's decision did not mark the end of the two year – long debate over the renaming of Chrysochoou Street. A writ of annulment was brought before the Council of State, the supreme administrative court of Greece, through which the descendants of Chrysochoou requested the annulment of the decision of the municipal council (Makedonia 2020). The Council of State deemed that the specific case is under the jurisdiction of the lower regional Administrative Court of Appeals, in which it remitted the writ of annulment (Lykesas 2020b). At the same time, Chrysochoou's children have also launched a lawsuit against Triantafillos Mitafidis and two other members of the Association of Imprisoned and Exiled Resistance-Fighters, Alexandros Gribas and Spyros Sakettas, alleging that their public interventions concerning the renaming of the street caused a defamation of their deceased father (Avgi 2018a; Ethnos 2018; Typos tis Thessalonikis 2018a). The lawsuit generated a wave of public support for the three defendants, and numerous historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and academics, from Greece and abroad, signed jointly a declaration of support with the telling title “History cannot be put on trial” (Proto Thema 2019; Tipos tis Thessalonikis 2019). The Multimember Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki has postponed passing a judgment on the lawsuit, awaiting the verdict of the Administrative Court of Appeals on the writ of annulment (Lykesas 2019). While a comprehensive historical assessment of Chrysochoou's case is beyond the scope and aims of the present study, it is important to refer to the evaluation of his role as found in relevant research, and, more specifically, as far as his alleged involvement in the Holocaust of the Salonikan Jews is concerned. Athanassios Chrysochoou, a colonel of the Greek army, assumed the high-level position of Inspector General of the Prefectures of Macedonia after the German invasion and is viewed by most as a key collaborator of the Germans. During the occupation, he was also appointed Chief Commandant of Thessaloniki and, approximately one month before the departure of the German troops from the city, he became Governor General of Macedonia (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 5). Furthermore, most researchers
34 who have dealt with the local dimensions of the Holocaust in Salonika corroborate the claim that it was after Chrysochoou's plea that the German military administration in Salonika implemented one of the first antisemitic measures in the city, namely, the mobilization of the Jews for forced labor during the “Black Sabbath” of 11 July 1942. That day, more than 8.000 Jewish men aged 18–45, forcibly assembled in Liberty Square, were forced to execute humiliating gymnastics under the tantalizing summer sun and were subjected to the German soldiers' torturous behavior. It is important to note that this was not a measure ordered from Berlin or Eichmann's department, but was initiated by the German military administration of the city. Until that time, conscription for forced labor targeted all men, irrespective of race and religion. Historians further conclude that the measure should have been first recommended by a senior member of the Greek local administration. Consequently, most researchers support that it was Chrysochoou who proposed the forced conscription of Jews arguing that, supposedly, Christian Greeks were affected disproportionately by the measure compared to the Jews. These writers, quite cognizant of the local context and the peculiar dynamics of the German occupation in the city, acknowledge that this was Chrysochoou's involvement and base their argumentation mainly on Hagen Fleischer's findings, who first made the claim after extensive research in the German archives (Saltiel 2014, 4-6; Saltiel 2019, 199-200; Apostolou 2000, 177-179; Apostolou 2011, 147; Karabot 2011, 270-271; Droumpouki 2014, 247-248; Kavala 2015, 63-67; Hassid 2002, 4). It is important to note that the previously mentioned historical report of the Thessaloniki History Center, which had been distributed to all members of the municipal council before the renaming of the street was debated, contained a special section citing Hagen Fleischer's evaluation of Chrysochoou, in which Chrysochoou's alleged involvement in the events of “Black Sabbath” is specifically mentioned (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 24). Another aspect of Chrysochoou's role with particular relevance as far as the Holocaust is concerned is his testimony as a witness for the prosecution in the 1959 trial of Maximilian Merten, who had been the Kriegverwaltungsrat (civil administrator who counseled the German military command of northern Greece and the Aegean) between 1942 and 1944 (Hassid 2002; Spiliotis 2000; Archer 2016; Apostolou 2011, 150-151). The focus of the trial was on Merten's central role in the extermination of Salonika's Jews, and Chrysochoou, by that time fully rehabilitated (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 19-20), gave a testimony that, at the time, was viewed by many as full of
35 contradictions and significantly exculpatory of Merten's involvement in the destruction of the Jewish community of Salonika (Kouzinopoulos 2021; Kouzinopoulos 2018; Kostopoulos 2018; Lykesas 2018a; Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 21-22). Referring to the destruction of the Jewish cemetery, in which Merten had played a major role, Chrysochoou described it merely as a measure implementing the Christian population's years-long demand for the cemetery's relocation (Saltiel 2014, 22). In 1971, the Junta-appointed municipal council decided to name an, until then unnamed, street in east-central Thessaloniki after General Chrysochoou (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 24-25). In 2018, the Municipal Council of Thessaloniki decided to rename the street after Alberto Nar, a symbolic gesture of special significance in the context of Holocaust memory. Nar was an important intellectual from Thessaloniki, whose parents were Holocaust survivors. He was the head of the Center of Historical Studies on Judaism of Thessaloniki and wrote numerous articles for the historical journal of the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece and, also, in the newspapers “Thessaloniki” and “Makedonia”. His work also includes several books and studies focused on the Sephardic culture of Thessaloniki (Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory 2016, 3, 10-11; Toulas 2018). The following sections of this chapter present a thorough review of the mnemonic contestation concerning the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, by empirically testing the three central hypotheses outlined in the Research Design chapter and derived from the proposed theoretical framework. As stressed, the cultural content of every mnemonic debate or commemoration is idiosyncratic and highly country-specific (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 273), and its evaluation necessitates an in-depth investigation into the relevant public discourses. Such an investigation actually captures a substantial part of the empirical analysis.
Left-Right Cleavage and Political Polarization
Everyone cognizant of modern Greek history and the country's contemporary political context would agree that the Greek 1940s, the whole period which includes the occupation years, the resistance, and the Civil War, constitute a “thorny” area of study. Public discussion of these issues is almost always accompanied by intense
36 debates which take place not only on an academic level but also permeate political discourse. In such public debates one can observe a high degree of political polarization, even among professional historians and political scientists, indicating that collective memory of the 1940s remains significantly fractured. In this context, a strong Left-Right cleavage is emerging, while accusations stressing the other side's alleged anticommunist or procommunist biases or blasting what is perceived as an attempt to normalize and excuse phenomena of collaboration with the Germans are abundant (Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 316-318, 324-328, 333; Avgeridis 2017, 8-9, 28-34; Voglis 2007, 439, 441-445, 451-456; Tzoukas 2012, 408-413). It can be assessed that the Holocaust of the Greek Jews - an, until recently, under-researched aspect of the Greek 1940s - has not been at the forefront of most of these debates. This lack of centrality does not necessarily mean that representations in the area of Holocaust memory remain totally unaffected by the repercussions of such polarization. As analyzed previously, the theoretical conceptualization endorsed by the present thesis stresses that an important structural constraint which affects political actors' selection of a particular mnemonic strategy is posed by the specific characteristics of the political context in which mnemonic issues arise. A deeply polarized political environment and a salient chasm between the Left and Right crucially affect the mnemonic actors’ choices and may lead to highly politicized contestations in the area of collective memory. One of the key hypotheses of this thesis is that a climate of polarization between the Left and Right strongly influences public dialogue about the Greek 1940s. As far as the renaming of Chrysochoou Street is concerned, signs of a significantly politicized mnemonic contestation and the issue’s potential to reveal divergent historical representations between the Left and Right became evident at an early point in the whole process. When, in 2017, the Special Committee for Naming and Renaming Streets and Squares, of the Decentralized Administration of Macedonia and Thrace, gave its first advisory opinion against the renaming of the street with the argument that additional historical documentation was needed, a news report stressed that a member of the aforementioned committee, had said, apparently referring to Mitafidis who had made the renaming proposal, that:
37 The Left raises issues about persons who may have had a positive role during the occupation years (Lykesas 2017).
Mitafidis was present at the municipal council’s session of March 2018, as a member of the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory, and, before referring to aspects of Chrysochoou’s role during the occupation, addressed the members of the conservative opposition, who were against the renaming, and, also, a grandson of Chrysochoou who was also present at the meeting. He directly confronted accusations that this was a proposal based on political motivations:
…You think that we wrongly accuse him (Chrysochoou), that we are driven by revanchism, and, unfortunately, you have reached to the point of threatening the Thessaloniki History Center and, as I was informed, intimidating phone calls have also been made to members of the municipal council, telling them that you will sue them, because we have shown disrespect to this venerable son of the city (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1115).
Specifically discussing the doubts raised, mainly, by Chrysochoou’s descendants about the impartiality of the report submitted by the Thessaloniki History Center, he further emphasized:
This evidence does not originate from us, it does not come from the cursed Left. There is no revanchism on our part, it is a matter of respect to the history of this city (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1117).
At the same time, Mitafidis acknowledged that changes in the framework of local commemoration effectuated during the previous period were closely connected to political developments on both a local and national level, denoting that there actually exist divergent perceptions of important historical events between the Left and Right which affect choices made in the area of official memory. More precisely, he explicitly linked the 2016 decision that designated the 30th of October as the day of official commemoration of the city’s liberation from the Nazis to progressives’ rise to power, that is, to both Boutaris’ election as mayor in 2010 and SYRIZA’s victory in the general elections of 2015 (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1117). On the other hand, Chrysochoou’s grandson, a lawyer representing also the whole family, argued that stripping the street of its specific name represented not just a blatant injustice towards the memory of his late grandfather but also an expression of
38 the hate and divisiveness which transpire the interventions of some members of the Left in the area of memory politics (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1119). What is more, in his view, the historical report of the Thessaloniki History Center was a partisan and biased study, prepared with the sole aim to further entrench the historical evaluation upon which the renaming proposal was based (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1120, 1156). In a quite revealing excerpt of his address to the Council, he presented the renaming proposal as indicative of an ideological and political battle between the Left and Right that began during the occupation period and has never ended:
The target (of those supporting the removal of Chrysochoou’s name from the street) is Chrysochoou as an ideological and political opponent and, for this reason, the Thessaloniki History Center had to contribute in this direction. Something the Center actually did, by omitting evidence which proves Chrysochoou’s patriotic activity….because the last Civil War, a curse over Greeks, which started in the midst of the occupation, continues to this day (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1120-1121).
In this context, Chrysochoou’s grandson perceived the issue of the renaming as being derived from, what he described as, a permanent political struggle between Left and Right and its repercussions in the sphere of collective memory. His deceased grandfather was “put on trial” in 2018 merely because he was a staunch anticommunist during the 1940s, and, thus, the calls for removing his name from the street had an ideological foundation, at the core of which was a peculiar sense of political correctness, an anti-anticommunism (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1124). According to this reading, the renaming of the street would be a partisan political act (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1125). For the representative of Elliniki Avgi, Chrysochoou was being condemned by the Left just because the ideology he represented is not acceptable by today’s standards. Not surprisingly, using strong anticommunist rhetoric and a narrative quite popular among the far-Right’s electorate, he argued that the Left hated, and still hates, all those who maintained a “patriotic” stance during the 1940s and opposed the secession of Greek Macedonia into Bulgaria or the autonomy of Greek Macedonia (these were, supposedly, the plans of EAM and the Left). He further stressed that proposals for the renaming of streets constitute a form of “cheap antifascism” on the part of leftists,
39 especially those connected to SYRIZA. All in all, the renaming of streets promote the Left’s ideological agenda, which aims at marginalizing all political opponents, imposing its own version of history, and silencing the discussion of the historical mistakes and crimes of the Communist Party in the 1940s (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1131-1133). The declared position of Entaxei was that Alberto Nar should be honored and his name should be given to a street of the city, albeit not to the specific street. Trying to avoid being involved in the polarized and highly politicized debate, and using a strategy of mnemonic abnegation, the group supported that an adjournment of the Council’s meeting had to take place and any decision on the issue should be postponed until a more thorough historical examination containing additional available evidence on Chrysochoou’s life could be presented before the Municipal Council (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018b, 5; Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139-1140, 1141-1142, 1144, 1146, 1148-1149, 1152 - 1153). At the same time, members of the group argued that some of the leftists’ public interventions concerning the issue were motivated by political expediency, revanchism, ideological obsession, and a divisive partisan spirit (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139, 1141-1142, 1144, 1146, 1148, 1153). One Entaxei councilor, addressing Mitafidis, encapsulated the way in which the conservative opposition viewed the specific proposal of renaming:
Now, in a very divisive way, you - let’s not forget that you are a SYRIZA member of Parliament as well – are trying to establish a people’s court in here, and I got to tell you, even though I am much younger than you, that this is very divisive (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1146).
At this point, it has to be clarified that the conservatives’ allusion to “people’s courts” should not be simply perceived as a generic figure of speech. In the context of public discourses about the 1940s, it rather reveals a specific, historically-informed, way in which the Right perceives the interventions of leftists aimed at critically reassessing the tenure of non-leftists during the German occupation and the Civil War. A reference of this kind, featuring prominently in the remarks of most conservative councilors, alludes to forms of political justice established by the EAM/ELAS resistance in the areas under its control during the occupation period. These represented the left-wing resistance’s attempt to impose laokratia, a version of
40 “people’s rule”, and targeted real collaborators, but, also, its political and ideological opponents (Mazower 2000b, 24, 27-29, 38-39). The administration of “popular justice” through the formation of “People’s Courts” and “ELAS Courts Martial” constituted a part of this process (Mazower 2000b, 29-32). By using the trope of “people’s courts”, representatives of the Right drag up the most radical aspects of the EAM/ELAS resistance activity, in an attempt to identify today’s leftwing activism with the “revolutionary justice” of the 1940s. Needless to say, such talk of “people’s courts” is only indicative of the deeply polarized climate in which the renaming proposal was debated. In an excerpt of his remarks revelatory of the polarized general context in which the discussion was unfolding, the same councilor emphasized that the issue under consideration could not be assessed independently from current political developments which were at that time in the limelight, namely, the ongoing negotiations between Greece and North Macedonia for the resolution of the decades- long dispute over the latter’s name, a process which would eventually lead to the signing of the Prespa agreement in June of that year:
And don’t forget that you (Mitafidis) represent a government that, at this time, has put on the bargaining table the name of Macedonia and, still, you consider yourself as the most righteous of us all (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1146).
In his remarks, Mayor Boutaris reiterated Protovoulia’s general position, stressing that the names streets bear should reflect a respect to the history and culture of the city and, additionally, that it was also an issue of aesthetics, while he defended the formal process that had been followed (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1129- 1130, 1156-1158). He also captured, and deplored, the recriminatory tone of the whole discussion:
…This whole story must come to an end at some point. Which story? That you are the bad guys and we the good ones and all this stuff. This story has to end… (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1130).
Deputy Mayor responsible for cultural affairs, Elli Chrysidou, a member of Protovoulia, defended the credibility and scientific status of the Thessaloniki History Center, which, as we saw, were heavily attacked by Chrysochoou’s grandson and implicitly questioned by most members of Entaxei. In this connection, she highlighted
41 that it was fundamentally wrong to debase the professional historians working in the Center, and to present the Center’s important research activity as biased, supposedly, being conducted under someone’s “orders” or serving political goals. The Center’s report had simply cited historical evidence found in the archives, using both primary and secondary sources. How this evidence would be assessed by each side and each councilor was a subjective matter (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1125- 1126, 1150-1151). She further also decried the highly polarized climate in which the discussion was being waged, and dismissed the accusations of revanchism expressed by the Right:
There is no people’s court in here. Some may aim at creating this impression. And these are neither the researchers of Thessaloniki History Center, nor the administration of the municipality…You should not use this story to create the impression that we are the ones who want to set up a people’s court. The opposite is happening and we should condemn it (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1150-1151).
The interventions of other members of Protovoulia had a similar tone (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1154-1155, 1143). One councilor of the group spoke out against the attacks on the Thessaloniki History Center and, after referring to parts of its report concerning Chrysochoou’s position as a senior member of the Greek local administration during the entire occupation period and his testimony in the Merten trial, addressed the proposal about the meeting’s adjournment as made by Entaxei:
Irrespective of how many times the municipal council may postpone making a decision on this issue, these facts do not change. These are historical facts which cannot change (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1143).
Another member of Protovoulia vividly illuminated the dynamics which are at the background of conflicting perceptions of historical events between the Left and Right, as these were articulated in the meeting:
Whether we like it or not, there exist many readings of history, of the historical events. As we observe here today, each side may perceive and evaluate events differently, and the defeated have different perceptions than the winners. The same applies for us here in the municipal council…each one of us, on the basis of his/her ideological orientation and his/her views on that period, will assess whether
42 Chrysochoou was a collaborator or not, whether he served the country or not (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1151).
In an excerpt of the remarks made by the president of the municipal council, a member of Protovoulia, one may detect the grouping’s positioning as a mnemonic pluralist who accepts democratic dialogue in the area of memory politics, considers polarized fragmentation in mnemonic issues undesirable, and believes in the coexistence of alternative views about the historical past:
The joy of democracy we experience is that we have been talking these past hours about an issue…that all different opinions are heard… I do not think that this could so easily happen in previous times. Thus, it is a great joy that we can discuss this issue today and, what is more, that we have the luxury of time so that everyone can have the floor to express his/her position, both those from the one side and the other. This is the joy of democracy. But, at some point, some decision has to be made. Of course, this decision can be contested and appealed, Chrysochoou’s descendants know that. If they disagree with the decision…if you disagree with a decision, there are stipulated processes that permit you to appeal against a decision you don’t agree with (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1153-1154).
In a similar manner, Mayor Boutaris indicated that the historical representation endorsed by Protovoulia, which was on the basis of the renaming proposal, was in no way nonnegotiable or absolute:
I repeat it again, I encouraged them (Chrysochoou family): “Go to the courts. Try to stand up for your ancestor at the courts.” The official process has been concluded, as far as the municipality is concerned. There is nothing more we can do (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1130).
It has to be noted that Protovoulia attached great significance and symbolic value to the decision the council was about to make. The president of the municipal council described the renaming as “one of the most important issues that have been discussed in this municipal council” (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1154). Likewise, another member of Protovoulia called for an open voting and explained:
The issue is one of the most important that we have discussed in the municipal council during the past years, we are all politicians in here, we represent the citizens of this city. Because we all have an opinion on the specific periods of the Junta and
43 the Occupation, and we know how political offices were awarded during those times, I propose that an open ballot should be held. Who voted what should be reflected in the final voting result, because this will be a landmark decision of the municipal council. As we refer to older decisions, the next generations will similarly refer to today’s decision (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1158).
The two councilors representing Anoichti Poli chose not to confront in an extensive way the Right’s claim that revanchism and ideological obsession lied beneath the Left’s insistence on the need to rename Chrysochoou street. As analyzed in the next two sections, their strategy was mainly to provide their representations about those historical events and periods which emerged as central in the context of the discussion and to present their argumentation that Chrysochoou was a collaborator. This notwithstanding, Anoichti Poli denied that the municipal council was acting like a people’s court, and criticized the stance of abnegation employed by the conservative opposition, stressing that Entaxei chose a tactic of evasion in order to avoid presenting a comprehensive position on the issue. The post-war rehabilitation of many collaborators was addressed as a phenomenon that still has repercussions in Greek society and perplexes political and social dialogue (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1147-1148). Moreover, a member of the formation, referring to the report of the Thessaloniki History Center, emphasized that the Center’s researcher had carried out his duties in a professional way and had used sources originating also from the Right. He also pointed out that one can detect a sense of shame on the part of the conservatives when issues of wartime collaboration are openly discussed (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1149). The head of Laiki Syspeirosi argued that the attacks against the Thessaloniki History Center were unacceptable. Its report was a credible scientific examination of Chrysochoou’s role and the renaming of the street should be decided on the basis of this documentation. Most importantly, it was not a coincidence that Elliniki Avgi defended Chrysochoou’s actions. Reacting to the aggressive intervention of Elliniki Avgi’s representative, the communist councilor demonstrated what, in his view, is the basic feature connecting collaborators of the past to present-day neo-Nazis: a fathomless anticommunism (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1145). Public interventions by non-politicians and institutions of the local society, as well as the way in which the press engaged in the debate, may provide the complete image of a highly politicized public discussion, in which ideological fragmentation and
44 divergent views of the past were conspicuously salient. A former lieutenant general, also a member of the board of the influential Society for Macedonian Studies, discussed the issue of the renaming in numerous blog postings. Assessing the motives behind the renaming proposal made by Mitafidis, and endorsed by Boutaris and the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory, he stated:
His proposal may be summarized, as it is proven, as a step by step demolition of every element that reminds of the patriotic-national contribution of distinguished persons to the city of Thessaloniki and the region of Macedonia, and a distortion of historical facts (Tsitsibikos 2018a).
In an argumentation similar to that of the conservative opposition inside the municipal council, he further maintained that hate on the part of the Left was on the background of the proposal, while he stressed that this and similar proposals’ ultimate goal was the “genocide of the memory” of Greek people. After praising Chrysochoou for struggling to preserve the Greek character of Macedonia at a time in which the “communist insurgency” aimed at its Bulgarization, and while drawing a connection to recent developments concerning the name dispute with North Macedonia, he exclaimed:
But what could one expect of the leftists? They neither learn from their mistakes nor forget (Tsitsibikos 2018a).
In his second intervention on the issue, with the telling title “Campaign of purging all those who provided patriotic and national services to the motherland”, Boutaris and Mitafidis are presented as an inseparable duet which wages this ideological and unpatriotic war (Tsitsibikos 2018b). He also highlighted:
Closing, I believe that they attempt to bring this city and this country back to the Civil War situations of the past, and this is a very dangerous venture. Why all this hate? What do they strive for? They should know that history keeps record of the heroes but, also, of the traitors… (Tsitsibikos 2018b).
Characterizing the decision of the renaming “vengeful”, he wrote about the discussion of the issue by the municipal council:
45 It was an infertile discussion, the decision was predetermined, and generalizations on related issues were made with the aim to sustain a political confrontation (Tsitsibikos 2018c).
Commenting upon the decision of the renaming, he illuminated its ideological background:
Chrysochoou’s mission and activity were, because of his position, completely antithetical to the aims and goals of EAM and the Communist Party. Thus, they were adversaries in the period 1941-1944, and the hate and vindictiveness persist to this day (Tsitsibikos 2018c).
The Epirotic Society of Thessaloniki - Chrysochoou was among its founders - has also been quite vocal in the debate concerning the renaming. In an open letter, circulated some days before the discussion in the municipal council, the Epirotic Society called for the postponement of the debate and characterized those supporting the renaming as “grave robbers”. It also mentioned that, in any case, the councilors should consider the underlying motives of those proposing the renaming. The Society was in favor of giving Nar’s name to a street of the city, but against removing Chrysochoou’s name from the specific street, as was the position of Entaxei. Reservations were also expressed about the makeup of the Commission for the Promotion of Historical Memory and its impartiality and nonpartisanship (Ipirotiki Estia 2018). In an article on the leftwing Efimerida ton Syntakton, focused on the discussion as it took place in the municipal council, Lykesas wrote about the opposition to the renaming and detected specific political dynamics at play:
Using lacking arguments and historical babbling, and hoping for some kind of support from the Right, Chrysochoou’s descendants must have realized that they did not have any room to maneuver when their objections were fully appropriated by the municipal councilors of the Golden Dawn, who, of course, did not have anything to say about the essence of the issue but only expressed their anticommunism and post- Civil War “ethnikofrosyni” (national-mindedness) (Lykesas 2018b).
The interventions of Entaxei councilors were characterized as awkward, suggesting the group’s discomfort, while he emphatically mentioned that the head of the group was absent from the discussion (Lykesas 2018b).
46 Another lengthy article in the same newspaper dealt in an extensive way with the issue of the renaming, analyzing the procedural obstacles the 2016 proposal faced, and shed light on aspects of Chrysochoou’s role during the occupation, on the basis of the documentation provided by the Thessaloniki History Center. The author also attempted to address the accusations of both Chrysochoou’s descendants and the Epirotic Society about a biased use of sources in the Center’s report. It was argued that such objection was baseless, as the Thessaloniki History Center had also more than adequately used secondary sources that “attempt an unconcealed political rehabilitation of both administrative and armed collaborationism, presenting its agents as well-intentioned nationalists who just opposed the rule of EAM” (Kostopoulos 2018). Some other newspaper articles and blogs postings delved into the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, mainly through citing historical documentation that illuminated the general’s role during the occupation period and his testimony in the Merten trial (Avgi 2017; Plika 2020; Kouzinopoulos 2018; Kouzinopoulos 2021; Kostopoulos 2018; Lykesas 2018a). The politicization of the whole discussion across a Left-Right division was also reflected in Internet news portal comments, which contained remarks like the following:
But the descendants, biological and “ideological”, of the communist slaughterers of the Interwar years, the German occupation, and the bandit-war, are outraged because they can’t accept that the scum of society who, under the guise of the “resistance”, slaughtered the Greek people, did not achieve its goal, due to – in a large part- Athanasios Chrysochoou’s activity (“Athanasios Chrysochoou was a hero,” March 17, 2019, on the Proto Thema news portal).
The new name in honor of a writer of Jewish descent was decided in order to provoke even more the Right/far-Right of the city and, mainly, of the municipal council (“Resident of Chrysochoou street,” March 16, 2019, on the Proto Thema news portal).
They have surrendered Macedonia and they try with diversions to save face and change the agenda (“Petrogiannis,” March 16, 2019, on the Proto Thema news portal).
As expected, the renaming of Chrysochoou Street also caught the attention of the fringe far-Right press. The racist and anti-Semitic Eleftheri Ora devoted its front page
47 of January 8, 2019 on the issue. The photographs of Chrysochoou and Mitafidis were accompanied by the revealing headline “Removal of General Chrysochoou’s name by the Judeo-Bolsheviks”. Not surprisingly for a paper which cherishes the propagation of conspiracy theories, the subhead stated that the decision of renaming was somehow connected to the Prespa agreement and the transformation of Thessaloniki into a “capital of the Balkans” (Eleftheri Ora 2019). Whereas, as is readily understood, the renaming of Chrysochoou Street was a matter of concern mainly in the context of local memory politics, politicians of the central scene became also involved. In February 2020, Katerina Notopoulou, a SYRIZA Member of Parliament, whose candidacy for mayor of Thessaloniki the party had supported in the May 2019 local elections, attended the session of the Council of State in which the court was to adjudicate the writ of annulment of Chrysochoou’s descendants. She stated:
The decision of the municipal council has a manifest symbolism, as the city finally looks directly at its wounds and, after many decades, recognizes the victims of wanton hate…History cannot be put on trial, but is preserved in people’s collective memory. The city will not return to the silence and the division of the past, it marches forward, looking the past in the eyes and defending the historical truth (Avgi 2020; Lykesas 2020b).
Then Minister of State, Christoforos Vernardakis made a post on Facebook about the renaming, and underlined that “Thessaloniki honors its history and eradicates the last remnants of Nazism” (Typos tis Thessalonikis 2018b). Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras also had a meeting with Mitafidis, Gribas, and Sakettas, the three defendants of the lawsuit pressed by the Chrysochoou family (EcoLeft 2018). The Association of Imprisoned and Exiled Resistance-Fighters 1967-1974 is another institution that has been deeply involved in the debate, supporting its three members sued by Chrysochoou’s descendants. The three stressed in a common statement:
Their lawsuit may be rightly characterized as an attempt to exonerate the collaborators of the occupation authorities and abuse the historical memory, in the context of a general international climate οf historical revisionism concerning the antifascist victory: the equalization of Nazism and communism, the presentation of the perpetrators as victims – at a moment in which our country has raised claims for
48 the payoff of the German debts and reparations to the victims of Nazism – and the crush of all those done and envisaged by the Left (Left.gr 2018).
The Jewish Community of Thessaloniki and the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece welcomed the decision of the renaming and posted on their sites a related short piece from the newspaper Avgi with the title “Thessaloniki honors its History” (Jewish Community of Thessaloniki 2018; Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece 2018). What were the specific dynamics in the background of such a politicized public debate and those features which may have fostered the emergence of such a salient cleavage between the Left and Right in the area of memory politics? The question cannot be adequately answered without reference to some special parameters of the national and local political context. As pointed out, in Greece, after 2008 and the onset of the economic crisis, one can observe a “sense of immediacy regarding the past” (Kornetis 2014, 109). In such context, surging polarization, a tendency, on the part of different political and social actors, to highlight real or supposed continuities between the historical past, mainly the Civil War period and the seven-year military dictatorship, and the present, and the articulation of conflicting narratives about this past, constitute new phenomena (Kornetis 2014, 109-110; Kornetis 2019, 79-80; Mylonas 2014, 440; Kornetis 2010). As a consequence, today, the past is re-appropriated in different ways and with a sense of great urgency. Divergent historical representations are diffused with the aim to provide a sense of orientation in a country ridden not just with a grave economic crisis but also a crisis of political representation. This is an important factor that, to a certain extent, may explain polarized contestations in the area of the politics of memory. The reconfiguration of the Greek party system after 2012 is also another relevant new parameter. SYRIZA’s electoral rise in the two general elections of 2012, in which the party emerged as the second strongest political formation, marked the beginning of a drastic reformulation of the whole political landscape (Spyropoulou 2013, 4-13; Mylonas 2014, 437). The party won the two general elections of 2015, and formed a government which ruled uninterruptedly until 2019. SYRIZA was defeated in 2019, but consolidated its position as the leading force inside the progressive political space. While, until 2015, the basic cleavage of political life in Greece of crisis had been between pro-Memorandum and anti-Memorandum political forces - that is, those
49 supporting the austerity measures designed by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and those opposing them-, cutting across the traditional Left/Right dichotomy (Spyropoulou 2013, 3-4; Mylonas 2014, 438), when that year the government of SYRIZA finally acquiesced that some form of normalization of relations with the EU and the IMF was necessary, the dichotomy in the political sphere between the Left and the Right recovered its salience. While the Left/Right polarization was dominant after 1974 and until the emergence of the financial crisis, its one pole had been the social democratic PASOK, a party whose genealogy could not be traced back into the Greek communist movement (Spyropoulou 2013, 22-23; Kornetis 2019, 73-74; Mylonas 2014, 437). Although PASOK successfully appropriated and instrumentalized EAM’s resistance in the 1940s and the history of the leftist movement’s struggles during the post-war period (Kornetis 2019, 74-75), the party had no historic organic links with the traditional Left. After 2012 and PASOK’s electoral collapse, the progressive pole in the dichotomy of the political spectrum is occupied by SYRIZA, a party of the radical Left with genealogical roots to the communist-led resistance movement of the 1940s, the traditions of Greek Eurocommunism, and the post-1989 new social movements in the hard Left political area (Spyropoulou 2013, 13, 16). Thus, after 2012 and, especially, from 2015 on, the traditional dichotomy between the Left and Right has resurfaced and, more importantly, has become more acute and clear-cut than even before in post-authoritarian Greece. In this radically reformulated political setting, the dominant force in the conservative camp, New Democracy, and its allies, are now on guard to confront the “red threat” identified with SYRIZA (Spyropoulou 2013, 8). In this connection, SYRIZA’s consolidation as a party of power has only reinforced and sharpen preexisting perceptions on the part of segments of the conservative political elite, which also resonate quite well with the rightwing electorate, that a “revanche of the defeated” of the Civil War has been unleashed after 1974, and shapes all aspects of political and social life in post-1974 Greece. The, so called, “cultural hegemony of the Left” has been a quite popular trope used by the Right to denote the alleged dominance of leftist ideology, and the imposition of a leftwing political correctness in the public sphere, after Metapolitefsi (the term means “regime change” and, in political discourses, it may denote both the transitional period from dictatorship to democracy and the Third Hellenic Republic itself) and during the Third Hellenic Republic (Avgeridis 2017, 33; Tzoukas 2012, 405, 411). Consequently, it is especially
50 after 2012 that initiatives of the, now also politically powerful, Left in the area of memory politics, an area of the wider “cultural” field, are viewed with renewed animosity and suspicion by the Right and are linked to an alleged implementation of the Left’s general cultural project. As was highlighted in the analysis presented in this section, that was exactly the way in which most conservatives perceived the proposal for the renaming of Chrysochoou Street. Turning to the local political context in Thessaloniki, it was illustrated how the issue of the renaming was connected, especially by the conservatives, to political developments on a national level which had a special significance for the city of Thessaloniki and the region of Macedonia, namely, the negotiations underway for the resolution of the name dispute with North Macedonia. New Democracy had fully opposed the approach adopted by the SYRIZA government in the negotiations, and, later, the party also came out against the signing of the Prespa Agreement. Not surprisingly, the whole issue had been the focus of heated discussion in two successive sessions of the municipal council in February 2018. Mayor Boutaris’ endorsement of the Greek government’s negotiating strategy and acceptance of the basic principle upon which it was based, that some form of the term “Macedonia” should be incorporated in the official name of the neighboring country, outraged the conservative opposition and contributed to the emergence of a highly polarized local political atmosphere (Kathimerini 2018; Eleftheros Typos 2018). One should also keep in mind that the issue of the renaming was discussed in the municipal council the year before local elections were to be held. Consequently, each actor’s selected strategy must have been influenced by electoral calculation and was, to a significant extent, directed towards satisfying respective constituencies. In this connection, the group of Entaxei had expressed for some time their concern about what they viewed as a convergence between Boutaris and SYRIZA, perceived as a prelude of the party’s official support to Boutaris’ potential bid for a third term in 2019 (Flash,gr 2018). Actually, on May 2018, then Prime Minister Tsipras met with Boutaris, expressing his support to the mayor after he was physically attacked by neofascists, and declared that, in the local elections of 2019, SYRIZA would endorse the formation of a “broad democratic front” headed by Boutaris, with the aim to defend the city’s democratic tradition and uphold the progressive track his tenure had initiated (Avgi 2018b). Eventually, Boutaris chose not to be a candidate in the 2019 local elections. Initiatives as the one discussed in this thesis must have only reinforced the Right’s general
51 distrust and this held perception that Boutaris was a “fellow traveler” of the Left, especially as far as mnemonic issues and the wider field of cultural representations are concerned. As highlighted, many conservatives seized upon the fact that Protovoulia endorsed the renaming proposal to present Boutaris and Mitafidis as allies in a common front advocating the promotion of a leftwing cultural agenda in the area of mnemonic representations about the city’s historical past.
Tropes and Narratives of the “National Repertoire”
As established in the theoretical section of the present thesis, there are also cultural constraints that strongly influence mnemonic actors when they formulate their position on a specific mnemonic issue. The notion of “cultural constraints” may be better understood as a cultural frame defined by those features, values, and identities dispersed in public discourses. Political actors always make their cultural choices within this established frame. These choices, in the area of collective memory, may include the use of specific pre-established identities, themes, tropes, or narratives about the historical past. The frame described previously strongly influences how actors perceive the past. The cultural constraints in a specific national setting reveal the existence of a “national repertoire”, which involves cultural themes, codes, and tropes. This repertoire limits the cultural choices political actors can make. In this context, the existence of official and unofficial narratives about the historical past is of special importance. Most of the times, it is through the usage of such tropes and narratives that mnemonic actors will construct their representations about the past. An important cultural constraint is also imposed by the actors’ political genealogy. In the sphere of mnemonic contestation, each actor selects a cultural strategy, that is, they choose among features contained in a pre-established toolbox of narratives about the past. In the context of mnemonic debates and commemorations, some narrative(s) may emerge as more influential than others. The second hypothesis of this thesis holds that the different strategies pursued by mnemonic entrepreneurs involved in the debate regarding the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, made use of specific themes and narratives of the “national repertoire”. Thus, the focus now turns to an examination of the cultural content of the
52 public debate, by tracing exactly the presence, on a discursive level, of such themes, tropes, and narratives. The extent and nature of Greek collaboration with the Nazis during the German occupation was one of the central issues discussed on the course of the mnemonic contestation regarding the renaming of Chrysochoou Street. One can detect the articulation of significantly divergent narratives focused on this phenomenon. Mitafidis presented his own perception of Greek collaborationism in Thessaloniki, arguing that it was a much more widespread and pervasive phenomenon than most believe. In his remarks we recognize the emergence of a specific narrative about the national collective’s collaboration with the Germans, which echoes representations originating in the Greek Left (Tzoukas 2012, 402-403). This narrative, although in no way the dominant on a social and political level, is informed and amplified by scientific research on the issue, which has sprouted during, especially, the past two decades:
The authorities of this city, on a large scale…there were no military authorities back then of course… but the police etc., everyone collaborated with the occupation forces. But some chose not to…And I would like to say, referring to reneger Chrysochoou, that one thousand and five hundred officers of the regular army joined the ELAS forces and fought against the occupiers. Others escaped to the Middle East… (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1115).
Councilors of Anoichti Poli, further conveying how the phenomenon is perceived by the Left, argued that all those who served in senior positions during the German occupation represented the essence of Greek collaborationism, irrespective of potential positive dimensions in their overall activity:
Is it disputed that he (Chrysochoou) served as Inspector General of the Prefectures of Macedonia and Chief Commandant between 1941 and 1945, based in Thessaloniki? Even if there is evidence which proves that he was good on a personal level, that he had charitable activity, that he protected widows and orphans, his cooperation with the Germans is not disputed…I understand that his descendants, out of their affection for their ancestor, want to defend him, arguing that he was not as bad as he is being described, but, in any case, he was a collaborator of the Germans during that period, and we do not honor collaborators, irrespective of how many extenuating factors or positive aspects one would recognize (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1147).
53 Elaborating further on this central tenet of the Left’s narrative on the issue of local collaborationism, another member of Anoichti Poli drew a distinction between influential high-level public officials who remained in their positions after the German invasion and the mass of ordinary civil servants who did the same, vividly illuminating that the former were undeniably collaborators. In the context of this historical representation, career advancement is perceived as a factor that should also be taken into account:
Chrysochoou was appointed Inspector General of the Prefectures and Chief Commandant. We all know what these positions were all about. My grandfather, a supporter of Ioannis Metaxas, who had been a principal of a high school in Messenia, did not become inspector of mid-level education (meaning that he was not promoted in the hierarchy), but he was relegated to being a simple teacher during the reign of the collaborationist governments of the occupation. I think that this may reveal something…about the persons designated as Chief Commandants and Inspector Generals…It has been supported by Chrysochoou’s descendants that all those who staffed state bureaucracy were ordered to remain in their positions and continue serving under the new situation. What kind of civil servants are we talking about? Is our focus on the street cleaners of the Municipality of Thessaloniki who remained in their positions and on others who were employed in positions pertinent to the citizens’ every-day life? Because Chief Commandants were not dealing with citizens’ every-day life, my dear colleagues…Papathanasiou, who had been an army major and the founder of PAO, an armed group that has never been recognized as part of the resistance, wrote: “Mr. Chycochoou served uninterruptedly as Inspector General of the Prefectures until he was promoted to the position of Governor General of Macedonia by the Germans, living under secure conditions”. My grandfather, a supporter of Metaxas, was demoted…I want to emphasize this fact (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1149-1150).
Equally important, the Left presented a specific view of Chrysochoou’ role as Governor General of Macedonia during the period that followed the German troops’ withdrawal from Thessaloniki. It was not Chyscochoou’s general command of the situation that prevented a showdown between ELAS and the numerous collaborationist armed units concentrated in the city, but other specific dynamics shaped the bloodless transition. At the same time, one can ascertain that, as far as the Left’s narration of events is concerned, the major cleavage in the context of occupied
54 Greece had been one between resistance forces, on the one hand, and the Germans and their collaborators, on the other:
(They say that) Chrysochoou prevented a situation of anarchy and helped ten thousand nationalists to leave the city. We are ashamed to admit that these nationalists were actually Chites (members of the collaborationist and anticommunist Organization X), Germanotsoliades (a derogatory term used to refer to members of collaborationist armed groups), and members of the Security Battalions. All these left the city because they knew what would happen to them had they stayed here. The same happened in all the capitals of the country’s regional units. It has been documented in the historical record. All these were not in need of Chrysochoou’s aid in order to depart, they simply were aware about what would happen to them (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1149).
In a similar manner, for members of Protovoulia, persons who had occupied high- level positions and saw their careers advanced during the occupation period were acting as agents of the quisling government and the Germans and, thus, engaged in deliberate collaboration (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1143). That was the perspective endorsed by a number of articles, editorials, and blog postings that focused exactly on Chrysochoou’s career from 1941 to 1944, highlighted aspects of his activity under the positions he held, and sketched the profile of a high level collaborator (Kouzinopoulos 2017; Kostopoulos 2018; Avgi 2017; Lykesas 2018a; Michani tou Chronou 2018). A similar perspective on the phenomenon of collaboration with the Germans was also presented in the declaration “History cannot be put on trial”, signed by numerous academics in support of the three defendants of the Chrysochoou family lawsuit:
The plaintiffs deliberately do not mention a series of decisions of the collaborationist governments under which Athanassios Chrysochoou was appointed, from July 1941 and during the entire occupation period, in senior positions. This fact, combined with the decisions he made and his general activity, place him in the group of those who collaborated with the occupiers, as these were defined by the Constitutional Act 1 “On the imposition of penal sanctions on those who have collaborated with the enemy”, and those that followed (Tipos tis Thessalonikis 2019).
55 A councilor of Protovoulia presented, in a quite analytic way, his own take on the phenomenon of local collaboration. He drew some interesting distinctions, while highlighting the fact that the position of some was in a state of constant flux and conflicting loyalties could easily succeed one another:
There was a gray zone, that’s the truth. There were people who consciously collaborated with the Germans, because they either believed in the victory of the Axis powers or to enrich themselves, and they become involved … they committed crimes and they turned a lot of people to the Germans. And there was a gray zone comprised of people who pretended to be members of the resistance…afterwards organizations of this type started collaborating with the Germans. Some of them, after becoming collaborators, started again cooperating with the resistance and so forth. There was another, azure zone of people who wanted to preserve their dignity and neither cooperated with the enemy nor became involved in the movement of EAM. And there was also the EAM movement which, because it gave voice to real popular demands of that period, succeeded in concentrating the majority of the people in its ranks. This did not happen only in Greece. The same was in all those countries that were under German occupation (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1137- 1138).
For representatives of Laiki Syspeirosi there was no doubt whatsoever that senior officials appointed by the collaborationist governments were themselves collaborators of the Germans (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1145). In the interventions of communist councilors one can detect the articulation of a specific narrative on the phenomenon of Greek collaborationism (Tzoukas 2012, 406-407) which, almost exclusively, stresses the ideological background of collaborators’ choices. This narrative, which perceives the Greek 1940s as a decade of intensified class struggle, is inspired by well-known Marxist analyses pertaining to the strategies the bourgeoisie and the local political elites employed when faced with the imposition of fascist rule, and showcases the Communist Party’s pioneering role during that period:
What was Chrysochoou’s main virtue? His unfathomable anticommunism, of course. At that time, this was the most important qualification one should have in order to be trusted by Nazism and its associates in Greece and to be charged with administrative duties … Certainly, collaborationism, to be completely frank, constituted one of the choices the Greek bourgeoisie made during that period…Perhaps the largest part of the bourgeoisie chose to leave the country, snatching whatever there was in the treasury and the gold reserves, while another significant part opted in favor of
56 crouching and waiting. It was then that the Communist Party of Greece assumed the historic responsibility for the founding of EAM-ELAS, preserving the honor of the Greek people (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1145).
The conservative opposition’s perception of the issue of local collaboration was much more complex. Some councilors conveyed their confusion by explicitly asking if a list of known and proved collaborators could be provided to them in order to have a better overview of the issue (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1118, 1149). On the other hand, Chrysochoou’s descendants had a very precise and restrictive view on the issue of collaboration:
The term “collaborator” is a legal category. The persons identified as collaborators were described in the relevant legislation, and the courts determined who the actual collaborators were, these are not the historiophiles’ job. Chrysochoou was not a collaborator. He was tried and acquitted (Voria 2019).
Chrysochoou's grandson, attempting to present a general assessment of his grandfather’s activity during the Nazi occupation, further supported that the role of Greek high-level officials who served under the quisling government of Athens and the German military administration should be viewed in all its complexity, and by taking into consideration the extraordinary circumstances of that period. In such context, some of them were actually patriots who served the Greek interests:
Chrysochoou put his life repeatedly in danger in order to defend the national interests, as these were perceived by the senior army officers of his time. He served the Allied cause as a spy of the British, risking his life again. He assumed the grave responsibility of overseeing the transitional period from the German occupation to the assumption of power by EAM, relieving Thessaloniki from the bloodshed that would have erupted between the anticommunist armed groups and ELAS…I didn’t want to focus, because of the present situation, on Chrysochoou’s activity in the Bulgarian zone of occupation in Eastern Macedonia, and his fight against the Bulgarian propaganda and the attempts to bulgarize the populations of that region (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1123-1124).
What is also very interesting in this excerpt is his presentation of the Security Battalions and other collaborationist armed formations merely as “anticommunist armed groups”. It seems that this understanding is a manifestation of the tendency, quite widespread in conservative discourses, to designate the cleavage between
57 communists and anticommunists as the most salient of the occupation period, at least from 1943 on, and to downplay the importance of that between the forces of resistance and the occupiers (and their allies). Members of Entaxei and other conservatives stressed that being a high level official during the German occupation should not be automatically perceived as tantamount to being a Nazi collaborator. Endorsing an approach of historical over- contextualization, they argued that a more holistic assessment of a person’s role is needed, one in which his service and activity before the occupation, and his potential contribution in domains beyond his official duties are, somehow, of paramount importance (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139, 1153; Tsitsibikos 2018b). As it was argued:
No one referred to the man’s history. Chrysochoou participated in the Balkan Wars, and the Asia Minor campaign. What is more, during the occupation period, he developed a very important activity of charity…During the Greco-Italian war, that is, the Epic of 1940-1941, he was Chief of Staff of the Third Hellenic Army Corps (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139).
The clash between patriot anticommunists who defended the territorial integrity of the Greek state and the agents of international communism who fought for the establishment of a Soviet regime and the partition of Greek Macedonia represented the overarching divide in German occupied Greece according to the representative of Elliniki Avgi, and the lens through which cases of alleged collaboration should be viewed (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1131, 1133-1134). The narrative here, founded on anticommunism and the notion of ethnikofrosyni (national mindedness), is the one officially endorsed by the Greek state before 1974, which demonized EAM, presenting it as front organization of the Communist Party and a façade of resistance whose aim was the sovietization of Greek society, and praised the activity of all those who, at some point during the occupation, had opposed it (Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 318-319, 321; Voglis 2007, 443, 452-453; Tzoukas 2012, 400- 402, 403-405). The trials of the collaborators which were held at Special Courts after 1945 emerged as another issue that was at the forefront of the discussion in the municipal council. That the proceedings against General Chrysochoou were finally dropped and he was acquitted of all charges of collaborationism, after a prolonged judicial process,
58 in 1948 (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 1-14) featured as a fact of particular significance in the argumentation of most members of the conservative opposition. Research focused on these Special Collaborators’ Courts has vividly illuminated some quite problematic features of the proceedings. First of all, one cannot ignore the bureaucratic problems of administering justice after 1945 in an economically devastated country (Haidia 2000, 45, 46-47, 48; Mazower 2000b, 37-38). Equally important, the existence of a general climate in which witnesses were discouraged to testify either through bribery or outright intimidation has also been stressed (Haidia 2000, 47-48, 57). What is more, in Greece, a small number of collaborators were actually tried and sentenced, compared to the numbers of those convicted in other countries of postwar Europe (Apostolou 2011, 147; Mazower 2000a, 213 ;Mazower 2000b, 38). There was also widespread suspicion that, in many cases, the courts showed great leniency, and the impartiality of the judicial authorities has also been extensively questioned (Haidia 2000, 54-55, 56, 57; Mazower 2000b, 38). Perhaps most importantly, the outbreak of the Civil War made the issue of the collaborators’ prosecution of secondary importance for the political elites and the judicial authorities (Haidia 2000, 42, 55; Mazower 2000b, 34-37). The anticommunist fervor of state authorities fundamentally affected the course of collaborators’ trials. In such a climate, numerous convicted collaborators were released from prison or had their sentences reduced, and most of them were gradually rehabilitated into Greek society (Haidia 2000, 55, 57-58; Mazower 2000b, 38). By that time, the courts were mainly dealing with prosecuting and trying communists (Haidia 2000, 57-58; Mazower 2000b, 33, 39). As stated, this political context and the previously mentioned peculiarities of these judicial proceedings demonstrate that a cautious approach should be adopted with respect to the verdicts passed by these Special Courts (Haidia 2000, 57). Overtly divergent assessments of these trials were articulated in the debate inside the municipal council. Perhaps on no other issue one may detect such a clear-cut dichotomy between representations held by the Left and Right. At the same time, differentiated perceptions on the collaborators’ trials should be interpreted against a backdrop of equally contesting narratives pertaining to both the Greek Civil War and the character of the postwar Greek state. Mitafidis, expressing the Left’s total rejection of these courts’ verdicts, stated:
59 They (Chrysoochoou’s descendants) have made a lot of different claims…and I can address every single one of them. They have even invoked the acquittals pronounced by those courts of expediency, during the Civil War (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1117).
A member of Protovoulia provided an overview of the power dynamics that shaped the violent confrontation between the Left and Right during the Civil War. A central tenet upon which this narrative is based is the official authorities’ tacit toleration and politically expedient rehabilitation of collaborators in the aftermath of Dekemvriana, the December 1944 EAM/ELAS uprising in Athens, and on the course of the civil conflict that followed. This development turned collaborationism into a major social and political problem in postwar Greece. Taking into consideration the extremely polarized context of the Civil War, the verdicts passed by the Special Collaborators’ Courts after 1945 are put into question. This narrative, in which the postwar Greek state is perceived as an authoritarian regime that represented only the winners of the Civil War, is prevalent in the public discourses of the Left and, also, among the center-Left and the progressives:
Greece’s peculiarity was that the bourgeoisie, afraid of being overthrown, was forced to cooperate with the gray zone (of collaborators who tried to maintain some form of communication with the Allies during the occupation) in order to preserve its hold on power. This happened with the aid of the English, as this gray zone supported the English during the December 1944 confrontation. The content of some of these English certificates, which confirm one’s participation in the resistance, corresponded to the truth, but some of them were issued after a request from the Greek government had been made, a government representing the winners of the civil conflict…these English certificates served the aim of legitimizing and rehabilitating many of the government’s allies. Consequently, in my opinion, certificates of this type, even if they invoke them, cannot reinforce their argumentation … The second peculiarity of Greece is that only a very small number of people were tried and convicted for their collaboration with the Germans. Some estimate the number of those executed as collaborators between 15 and 20 persons, other support they were 25. In a country of ten million inhabitants, only 25 were executed. We have to stress that in France after the end of the occupation, as there the bourgeoisie’s postwar hold on power had some legitimacy and enjoyed a higher degree of popular approval, there were 25.000 executions, other estimate them between 15.000 and 20.000. Ladies and gentlemen, these were not lynched by people’s courts, no, the official authorities put them on trial, convicted them, and executed them. In contrast, during the Civil War, while the
60 Greek state convicted a very small number of collaborators, 3.000 real or imaginary members of EAM were executed for crimes allegedly committed from 1940 to 1944. This situation created a tremendous problem in Greek society, which we should overcome (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1138).
The interventions of members of Anoichti Poli also reproduced the central points of this narrative (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1148). Similarly, communist councilors strongly rebuffed the argument that the verdicts of the collaborators’ courts should be seriously considered, highlighting the postwar state’s embrace of collaborators and the fact that the adoption of anticommunism as a state ideology in post-1945 Greece defined the course and character these judicial proceedings took:
We have to do with a person who was acquitted by the Boards of Appeals of the Civil War period, in 1946, 1947 etc. These were judicial bodies that sent thousands of people to the firing squad … We do not put anyone on trial here. Unfortunately, former Nazi collaborators, who manned the state bureaucracy after the war, were those who held trials and passed sentences. Thousands of people were murdered, sent into exile, and saw their lives destroyed, although they had fought against the Germans, although the National Resistance was born out of them. These are our ancestors (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1141).
Correspondingly, the declaration “History cannot be put on trial” presented a negative evaluation of the collaborators’ trials:
The political calculations that prevailed during the postwar period overrode the process of prosecuting the collaborators of the occupation forces…The case of colonel Athanassios Chrysochoou constitutes another characteristic incidence of collaborators’ rehabilitation, like that of those who had served in the Special Security Department of Athens, into the ranks of upstanding citizens. In this case, the Chief Commandant of Thessaloniki, appointed by the Germans, was awarded, after the war, even with the vice-presidency of the Greek Red Cross. Historical research has now substantiated the systematic exoneration and acquittal of persons whose activity during the occupation viciously defied any sense of justice (Tipos tis Thessalonikis 2019).
Overall, the Left holds that the postwar administration of justice was mainly directed towards “laundering” persons tainted with collaborationism and persecuting leftists, complying with the dynamics of a new balance of power created in the context of the
61 Civil War (Plika 2020; Kostopoulos 2018; EPrologos 2019). This reading of the official process of punishing the collaborators constitutes a basic aspect of the narrative about the Greek Civil War endorsed by different strands of the Left (Voglis 2007, 443, 453; Tzoukas 2012, 403, 407). On the other hand, Chrysochoou’s grandson made a detailed presentation of the judicial process which led to his grandfather’s acquittal in 1948. He highlighted the testimonies of witnesses for the defense which, as he stressed, proved the general’s patriotic role and participation in the resistance effort, as a member of the spy network ZEUS. Special mention was made to a certificate of the Middle East Command, issued in 1945, in which the British affirmed that Chrysochoou had worked for the Allied cause, from December 1942 to October 1944, and “through his services, had contributed to the liberation of Europe” (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1121-1122). All in all, Chryscochoou’s judicial acquittal of all charges of collaboration was illuminated as powerful evidence of his benevolent and heroic role during the occupation, and had to be taken into serious consideration. Opposite to the Left’s perception of the collaborators’ trials, one of the main points of the conservative opposition’s argumentation also placed great emphasis on the fact that a judicial process had cleared Chrysochoou of all charges of collaboration. Entaxei held the proceedings of the Special Collaborators’ Courts in high regard, while the validity and legitimacy of their verdicts was deemed undisputable:
We listened to Mr. Mitafidis using the word “collaborator” at least ten times. I would like to inform you that a ruling of the Board of Appeals which was issued on the 13th of June 1946 acquitted Chrysochoou of charges of collaboration with the German occupiers (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139).
In a similar tone, other members of Entaxei further emphasized that casting doubt on these courts’ verdicts was a divisive endeavor, implying that the preservation of a climate of “national reconciliation”, a major post-1974 achievement, necessitates some form of purposeful forgetting as far as the Civil War years are concerned (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1142, 1146, 1153). As a councilor characteristically argued:
I cannot accept the narrative that says “these are verdicts of courts of the Civil War period, do not take them into consideration”, because it opens up a wide and
62 dangerous loophole. We are supposed to leave behind the divisions of the past, and focus solely on whether Chrysochoou was a collaborator or not. Today, taking into account the historical evidence contained in the report of the Thessaloniki History Center, we cannot conclude that he was. Everything else said is just reflecting of our personal opinions…You are fully aware that we should not set up a court in here, another court. In Law School, we used to hold mock trials with the aim to acquit someone who had been convicted, not to convict someone already acquitted. And, closing, I listened to Mr. Mitafidis saying: “I am not concerned about these courts of the Civil War period and whatever happened after the occupation.” There is nothing more divisive one can say in 2018 - it is like saying: “I do not recognize anyone who was not on my side but was on the opposite side” - in Greece, and, still, we heard it inside the municipal council… (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1142).
The tone of the conservative opposition’s stance in the debate of the street’s renaming was shaped by a central argument according to which the proposal itself and its further discussion had a dangerous divisive potential, as both would inevitably lead to a strongly polarized public contestation about the Greek 1940s. Such understanding on their part is conspicuously in line with the group’s positioning as a mnemonic abnegator who sought to avoid engagement in what was perceived as a counterproductive politicized mnemonic conflict. Entaxei’s proposal for the meeting’s adjournment and the postponement of any decision on the issue manifested their thesis that a state of oblivion regarding sensitive aspects of the occupation period and the Civil War should be preserved and not disrupted. As remarked, issues of political genealogy may be at the core of such an approach of purposive forgetting. At this point, it has to be noted that, in the general elections of 1958 Chrysochoou was a candidate of ERE, the main rightwing force of the 1950s and 1960s and the political and ideological predecessor-party of New Democracy, in Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 20). The fact that the Right had embraced General Chrysochoou in the past opened up the possibility that today’s conservatives would be indirectly identified with him by their opponents. This parameter constrained the conservatives’ choices. It led them to adopt a defensive stance and pursue a strategy of mnemonic abnegation, in which the need for oblivion was central. Accordingly, in the background of such argumentation is a theme widely used in elite political discourse after 1974, that of “national reconciliation”. Ethniki symfiliosi, national reconciliation, between the Left and Right is commonly regarded as one of the main features of post-1974 democratic Greece (Droumpouki
63 2014, 37). A process of reconciliation was gradually put into motion after the fall of the Junta, in spite of the articulation of divergent narratives about the civil war. This became possible mainly due to the fact that, after 1974, violence has been rejected as a political tool by both the Left and the Right (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566, 572). The fall of the dictatorship in 1974 led to a radical reconfiguration of the normative framework under which political antagonism was to develop, while a general consensus emerged that political violence is not acceptable and contestation about the historical past should abide by the principles of democratic dialogue (Siani- Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566). Since then, the theme of reconciliation has been strategically used by different political actors and in the service of various political projects. In this connection, one has to consider that the term “national reconciliation” has different meanings for different actors (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 568- 572). All the major actors in both Left and Right have used the trope of national reconciliation in their discourses, albeit with different connotations attached to it. In any case, the extensive use of the theme by all political forces has rendered national reconciliation an overarching trope in the Third Hellenic Republic. The notion of national reconciliation was the basis upon which the dominant narrative of National Resistance during the German occupation was founded (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 568-569; Mazower 2000a, 229; Droumpouki 2014, 37; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 321-322). As a consequence, no mnemonic conflict can easily arise in the area of this memory regime, which is dominated by a heroic and unifying narrative. Mnemonic contestation largely pertains, as already indicated, to the period of the Greek Civil War (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 562-563). After 1981 and PASOK’s rise to power, the theme of national reconciliation assumed a central position in national political discourse. As already illuminated, the law recognizing the National Resistance incorporated the struggle of EAM/ ELAS in the continuum of national history (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 569; Mazower 2000a, 226; Tzoukas 2012, 406). In the context of efforts promoting national reconciliation, as the notion was perceived by the government of PASOK, official acknowledgment of the Left’s indispensable contribution in the fight against the Axis powers and restitution of the leftists who had been persecuted during and after the Civil War were historical necessities (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 569; Mazower 2000a, 226). The Greek Right, although quite hostile in the beginning, gradually came to accept and employ the trope of national reconciliation in its discourse too (Siani-Davies and Katsikas
64 2009, 569, 570; Mazower 2000a, 226-227). National reconciliation was also at the background of the “Law on the consequences of the Greek Civil War”, which was voted in 1989. Under its provisions, the term symmoritopolemos (“bandit war”) was dropped out of official use and the conflict between 1944 and 1949 was formally characterized as a “civil war” (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 570-571; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 323-324). Pension rights were also extended to former members of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the Communist Party’s guerrilla army from 1946 to 1949 (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 571). All things considered, reconciliation, in the case of Greece, is not manifested by the emergence of a single monolithic narrative regarding the historical past. Although various understandings of “national reconciliation” exist on a social and political level, the common denominator of all different perceptions of the notion seems to be a consensus that some degree of leniency towards the past is necessitated and that violent means should not be employed in the sphere of political antagonism. Divergent narratives regarding the civil war are freely articulated and coexist in the context of pluralistic democratic dialogue, as mnemonic issues are no longer perceived as existential by mnemonic agents (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566, 572). The interventions of those opposing the renaming of Chrysochoou Street conveyed their thesis that national reconciliation is threatened by the public discussion of highly sensitive aspects of the Greek 1940s. Such discussion could only generate division and revive the climate of acute polarization of that turbulent decade:
…The city of Thessaloniki should and must honor Alberto Nar by giving his name to a street. But we believe that this must not be done through the defamation of the deceased Chrysochoou or through the revival of the recrimination and the hate that prevailed during the period we are talking about today, seventy five years later…We, as a society, must get valuable lessons from past mistakes and the municipality’s mission is to unite the citizens and not to spread division among them (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1119).
Oblivion and purposeful forgetting feature prominently in this understanding of national reconciliation:
A potential renaming of Chrysochoou street will represent a partisan political act, it will not only be insulting for this deceased person, but it will revive in an acute way
65 the recrimination and hatred that oblivion has covered for so long (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1125).
After Mitafidis and Chrysochoou’s grandson had concluded their remarks, a specific proposal was made to stop any further discussion and postpone making a decision on the issue. It was rather recommended that, at a next session of the municipal council, a secret ballot should be held, without debating the renaming at all. The proposal was voted down (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1127-1128). Such proposition indicates that the discussion of the whole issue was viewed by some as a deeply divisive process, in which an unbridgeable chasm between conflicting historical representations would emphatically emerge. As was characteristically stated:
A really huge problem has surfaced before us. We have been trying for the last forty or fifty years to forget all these issues, are we now going to drag them up from our memory? (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1139).
Members of Entaxei stressed that the specific renaming proposal contributed to a climate of polarized factionalism:
We have to make clear that the municipal council should always make its decisions by avoiding yelling, and ideological obsessions, and that it should not comply with tendencies and demands that lead to disunity and division (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1141).
Conservative councilors emphasized that the council should not start digging into the past, and positioned forgetting and a spirit of leniency at the core of a precious climate of reconciliation that had to be preserved at any price and by all different actors (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1144-1145, 1146, 1148). As stated:
Neither side has justice on its side, neither side has the right to touch upon such divisive issues and intervene in a revanchist manner, especially at such difficult times, when we are threatened by numerous enemies, seventy five years from the beginning of the Civil War and almost seventy years from its end. We should rather treat with a spirit of oblivion and clemency a period that was really turbulent, really painful and traumatic, and I believe that we, the younger generation, should try to heal all these wounds ...We should consider the whole issue with great leniency and equanimity, and we must not open up old wounds and bring back the mistakes of the
66 past, which were made by both sides (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1144-1145).
Along the same line, another conservative councilor, addressing an older member of Protovoulia, wondered:
You have several times supported that we should be very careful when we are discussing the occupation period and that of the Civil War that followed. You have also added that we should stay away from the murky waters that reproduce the divisive memories and messages of those difficult days and years. Do you believe that this position of yours was promoted by the process which led to the proposal we today address in the Municipal Council? (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1152).
In contemporary conservative political discourse, national reconciliation between the Left and the Right is presented mostly as a product of the official recognition of the “National Resistance” by the Greek state in 1982. The heroic, self-satisfying, and unifying narrative of the 1940s which was at the background of this important piece of legislation, and which the law further entrenched on a political and social level, is today eagerly appropriated by the Greek Right, although the narrative’s origins are traced in the progressive political area (Voglis 2007, 456) and the party of New Democracy was originally hostile to this alternative understanding of the occupation period (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 569). This is not so surprising, as narratives emerging in modern democratic polities should be best understood as constructs with a dynamic of their own and a high degree of independence from their framers and their political projects. More precisely, a narrative’s pool of potential adherents cannot always be safely predicted, as political parties’ strategic use of narratives and themes is always intrinsically linked to their permanent search for changing sources of legitimacy in a volatile political environment. After 1985, the Right has adopted a new, inclusive, approach according to which the 1982 official recognition of the resistance of “the whole Greek people” was nothing more than the formal endorsement on the part of the state of a historically accurate hermeneutic schema, in which both the Left and Right participated in the same patriotic effort against the Germans (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 570). What is more, and most importantly, today, conservative argumentation holds that this hegemonic narrative sets the tone and provides the appropriate frame for all potential discussions of the Greek 1940s.
67 Thus, these should be focused on the common struggle of both sides against the foreign occupiers and purposefully avoid touching upon potentially divisive issues, such as those of collaboration with the Nazis or the Civil War:
The passion and apparent hatred emanating from Mr. Mitafidis’ speech are unprecedented for a discussion at the level of the municipal council. The municipal council’s main goal must be the cooperation and the convergence between different opinions and views, the forging of unity and consensus, and not to nurture a confrontation about historical periods which exacted such a heavy toll for the country, in terms of casualties and material destruction. Democracy resolved such issues and overcame divisions of the past when the N.1285/82 “Law for the Recognition of the Resistance of the Greek People against the Occupation Troops, 1941– 44” was passed, according to which standard religious services and wreath laying ceremonies take place at memorial sites and monuments honoring the resistance. Why all this hate and vindictiveness? What do you, members of the municipality’s leadership, strive for? Your interventions were focused on issues irrelevant to the subject matter, insulting most viciously the memory of deceased Chrysochoou. The hatred and malice you conveyed brought back painful images and memories to all those who experienced the tragic events of the 1940s but, also, to the rest who have observed the recent civil wars in neighboring countries … Hatred and vindictiveness are kept alive to this day. Seventy four years have passed and, in spite of the fact that the state has officially recognized the National Resistance and created a framework for its commemoration, the sought-after unity and reconciliation have not been forged. Factionalism and divisiveness have survived in the soul of a few people who now have the power… The Municipality of Thessaloniki has been promoting this despicable action for years, as it does not have the courage and prudence needed in order to foster a climate of brotherliness, unity, and solidarity between the different social classes and all citizens, and to unite us all into one common front, making us productive in the service of the city (Tsitsibikos 2018c).
On the other hand, representatives of the Left and center-Left attribute a different meaning to the notion of national reconciliation. As manifested, this central, widely used, theme in post-1974 political discourse constitutes an area of semantic contestation, a point of concern to be debated. For the Left, the trope of national reconciliation cannot be perceived as a smokescreen abetting the convenient silencing of discussions pertaining to the most traumatic moments of Greek history, and is not incompatible with attempts to critically re-examine the national collective’s past. As a former member of Anoichti Poli explains:
68 Preserving national reconciliation does not mean that we have to forget our history. It cannot possibly mean that we have to forget that 50.000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz and other camps, and only around 2.000 returned alive. It does not mean that we erase from our memory the fact that some people turned their neighbors, their relatives, to the Germans, mainly in order to benefit themselves financially. We cannot and should not forget all this. In this sense, remembering is our duty towards History and democracy ... National reconciliation, of course, implies that persecution of political opponents and violent methods are unacceptable today. But, as far as the historical past is concerned, national reconciliation cannot be equated to oblivion. It should not be understood as tantamount to erasing the historical memory. As we remember our nation’s heroic moments, likewise we should remember History’s darkest pages. And we ought to remember them in order not to repeat the same mistakes. Such issues have nothing to do with the safeguarding of national reconciliation. It has to be stressed that we do not delve into the historical past for the sake of plain discussion. When we touch upon such difficult issues it is done in the context of a general evaluation of the city’s commemorative framework. And in such context, we just argue that some historical figures should not be officially honored today (N/N 2021, 17:35-20:46).
National reconciliation is similarly understood by the center-Left. A progressive perception of the notion holds that reconciliation is not a vague and value-neutral theme, but a set of specific democratic principles constitutes its foundation. In this context, capitalizing on the need to preserve and foster reconciliation with the intent to exonerate or rehabilitate the perpetrators of past crimes is viewed as an outright abusive appropriation of the theme. A former member of Protovoulia illuminated:
Everyone is talking about national reconciliation, but each one of us does so from a different perspective. For me, national reconciliation is based on democratic principles. It is unacceptable that some, in the name of national reconciliation, attempt to promote interpretations of the past and positions that challenge our sense of respect for human rights and the basic values of each democratic polity. You cannot call on the need for national reconciliation in order to exonerate persons, and I am not talking only about Chrysochoou, whose past was dark. You cannot invoke the theme with the aim to excuse or rationalize traumatic historical events, like the persecution and destruction of Thessaloniki’s Jews. A lot of Christian Salonikans were deeply involved in this story…These persons should never be historically rehabilitated and exonerated…National reconciliation does not entail ignoring History and accepting a state of amnesia. National reconciliation has to be understood on a different basis…Everything can, and should, be discussed, and each one of us
69 may freely express his views, in the context of pluralistic democratic dialogue (L/L 2021, 16:05-19:26).
Discussing a special section in the report submitted by the Thessaloniki History Center, the one focused on General Chrysochoou’s involvement with the spy network ZEUS (Thessaloniki History Center 2018, 15-19), political representatives also presented their views on the phenomenon of Greek resistance during the German occupation. As expected, no divergent interpretations of this issue were articulated, as all sides participated in a discourse about the resistance that reproduced the basic features of the dominant narrative. Accordingly, the heroic “National Resistance” represented the patriotic struggle of the vast majority of Greeks against Nazi occupation. Resistance was also presented as a national liberation effort in which both the Left and Right had participated. Representatives of the Left (Laiki Syspeirosi and Anoichti Poli), while highlighting EAM’s mass appeal and leading role in the fight against the Germans, explicitly acknowledged and praised the input of smaller resistance organizations of the Right and the Center (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1140-1141, 1145, 1147, 1149). Conservative councilors also recognized EAM’s pivotal role in the liberation struggle (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1140, 1148-1149). The single exception in this uniform approach was the councilor representing Elliniki Avgi, who, as already noted, painted the Left’s role during the occupation period as treacherous (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1131, 1133-1134). The only points of contestation in this mnemonic area were context-specific, focused on what was ZEUS’s actual contribution to the resistance effort and whether Chrysochoou had an active role in this spy organization (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1122-1123, 1137-1138, 1141, 1146; Kostopoulos 2018). It seems that for a substantial number of council members a potential presentation of powerful evidence documenting and verifying Chrysochoou’s instrumental role as a member of the resistance would be enough to absolve him from all accusations made against him. That Chrysochoou’s portrayal as a participant in the resistance effort weighed so heavily with almost all councilors is indicative of the central position a unified Resistance-centered memory regime has assumed in the mnemonic field of contemporary Greece.
70 Memory Layering
As pointed out previously, different memory regimes may be interlinked in the area of mnemonic contestation. In the context of official commemorations and mnemonic debates, memories of different historical events or periods may coexist in representations dispersed by political representatives, as these may be found on the discursive level. In this way, a particular historical event is not remembered in isolation but is rather embedded into mnemonic contestation about other events, a phenomenon that crucially influences the position of the memory regime under concern into the national mnemonic field. Accordingly, in this context, the status conferred upon the remembrance of a specific event in a given national context may be either elevated or downgraded. The phenomenon, termed as “memory layering”, signifies a distinct cultural choice on the part of mnemonic entrepreneurs. It actually constitutes a cultural constraint of a national setting when a pervasive and highly resistant pattern of memory layering manifests itself in public discourses. According to the third hypothesis of this thesis, it is presumed that Holocaust memory in Greece must be layered with memories of other events. In essence, it is hypothesized that memory layering surfaces as a prevalent phenomenon whenever political actors discuss the Greek 1940s. Although the act of removing the name of a Greek official who had served in numerous high-level positions during the German occupation from a street, and renaming it after an Greek Jew intellectual whose parents had survived the Holocaust, had self-evident connotations on a symbolic level, it has to be underlined that the proposal of the renaming was also originally framed in explicit reference to the memory of the Holocaust. In a common statement issued by Mitafidis, Gribas, and Sakettas when the Council of State was about to consider the writ of annulment of Chrysochoou’s descendants, they emphasized:
In the context of fostering the cathartic emergence of the city’s social memory, the Municipal Council of Thessaloniki decided to remove the name of Athanassios Chrysochoou - Chief Commandant and Governor General of Macedonia, whose tenure was tainted with the extermination of almost fifty thousand fellow co-citizens of Jewish descent in the Nazi crematoria – from the street and rename it after Alberto Nar – a writer, and guardian of the multicultural historical identity of our city – as an act of recognition of the Jewish community’s contribution to the city of Thessaloniki (Left.gr 2020).
71 Similarly, Mitafidis clarified that his proposal and the municipal council’s decision should not be viewed in isolation but the renaming constituted part of a wider set of official initiatives and activities, on the part of the Municipality of Thessaloniki, the state, and civil society groups, aimed at giving prominence to memory of the Holocaust in the city. As he noted:
Most importantly, the main objective was to shed light on the city’s “neglected history” and honoring the sacrifice of our Jewish compatriots, through the illumination of the crimes of fascism and Nazism in the city…The reprehensible activity of Chrysochoou during the occupation period and, especially, his role in the enslavement of our fellow Jewish co-citizens, provide the important and extraordinary grounds on which the renaming of the street under consideration is based, in the context of the aforementioned set of institutional initiatives (Mitafidis 2018).
The particular symbolism of the renaming proposal, as far as Holocaust memory is concerned, was fully acknowledged by all sides. As Chrysochoou’s grandson pointed out:
...This decision was made (the decision of the Special Committee for Naming and Renaming Streets and Squares, of the Decentralized Administration of Macedonia and Thrace), and we were informed about it from Mr. Mitafidis’ comments in the press that noon, on Friday 16th of February. He stated that the name of a Nazi collaborator who had testified in favor of Max Merten, the coordinator of the destruction of Thessaloniki’s Jews, would be removed and replaced by the name of an offspring of Holocaust victims. Thus, there is a specific connotation according to which the collaborator of the Germans is condemned and the child of Holocaust victims is honored… (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1120).
Anyone not cognizant of the specific dynamics that define the character of any public contestation about the Greek 1940s, could anticipate that this powerful central symbolism would have fundamentally shaped the discussion around the renaming of Chrysochoou Street. What is more, that Chrysochoou’s alleged involvement in the persecution of Salonika’s Jews, as described mainly by Fleischer, was referred to in the Thessaloniki History Center’s report could also have influenced the tone of the debate, engaging different actors in what would have been a highly enlightening, and quite rare, public discussion of the Christian elites’ stance and attitudes during the
72 Holocaust in Thessaloniki. But, as highlighted in the two previous sections of this chapter, the discussion inside the municipal council was mainly focused on other aspects of the 1940s. Divergent understandings on the issue of local collaboration with the Germans were articulated but were neither Holocaust-centered nor explicitly assessed the issue of local Christian complicity in the persecution of Greek Jews. Fractured representations on the Civil War, presented while discussing the postwar collaborators’ trials, also monopolized the interventions of most councilors, while almost all actors were involved in a discussion of the National Resistance which illuminated the dominant status the post-1982 official narrative still enjoys in contemporary political discourses. The issue of the destruction of Salonikan Jews was only indirectly touched upon by those councilors who evaluated Chrysochoou’s role as a witness in the Merten trial. But all of them confined themselves to simply condemning what they perceived as an exonerating or neutral testimony and denouncing Merten’s central role in the genocide of the city’s Jewish community (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1142, 1143, 1149-1150). Chrysochoou’s grandson also referred to the Merten trial, and attempted to present his grandfather’s testimony in more positive terms, pointing out to the fact that, while his grandfather was a witness for the prosecution, there were other influential Christian Greeks who had testified as witnesses for the defense (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1120). As far as the discussion in the municipal council is concerned, a precise reference to the complicity of local political elites in the implementation of the Final Solution may be found in Mitafidis’ remarks:
Today’s discussion is taking place on a very important date. On the 26th of March 1943, eleven days after the first train had departed for Auschwitz, then mayor of Thessaloniki, Georgios Seremetis, ordered the removal of all Jewish names from the streets of the city…and I want to tell you that this criminal behavior continued; a few days later, the dwellings of the Jewish neighborhood located in the Martiou area were completely demolished and the materials were sold, after a decision of the municipal council. According to the minutes of the municipality’s financial committee, Seremetis rejoiced in the fact that the materials were sold to the municipality’s financial benefit (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1115).
A number of councilors made brief references to the Holocaust. Some of them acknowledged that the specific renaming should be viewed as an act of symbolic
73 restitution of the city’s almost 50.000 Holocaust victims (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1143, 1147), while others just stated that Holocaust should be remembered and the Jewish community honored (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1140, 1144, 1152). But the local dimensions of the Final Solution as it was perpetrated in Thessaloniki were not discussed in the municipal council’s session under consideration. All things considered, the political discourse around the renaming of Chrysochoou Street reveals a pervasive layering of Holocaust memory with memories of other historical events or periods, mainly the National Resistance and the Greek Civil War. How the existence and intensity of such memory layering are to be understood and what are the effects of this phenomenon on Holocaust memory? To shed light on these issues one has to analytically focus on the relationship between the memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust and the wider mnemonic field in contemporary Greece. As already pointed out, the country’s mnemonic field is so powerfully constructed around a unified memory regime about the National Resistance that it is hard for memory regimes of other events and, most importantly, of a different tone to be smoothly incorporated into the national field of memory. Additionally, the situation is further complicated, as far as memory of the Holocaust is concerned, by the fact that a fractured memory regime of the Civil War often surfaces when the Greek 1940s are publicly debated, and divergent, self-satisfying representations are articulated by the Left and Right on issues like Greek collaboration with the Nazis. In such cases, as was illuminated previously, an acute polarization quickly appears which, having an explosive dynamic of its own, implicates all actors in a highly politicized contestation with recriminating undertones. When this occurs, the fractured memory regime of the Civil War takes the center stage of the mnemonic field and, in effect, has a strong displacing effect on all other memory regimes. In effect, even today, the Civil War easily becomes the lens through which different actors assess both the phenomenon of the resistance and the whole period of the German occupation (Voglis 2007, 439, 456; Voglis and Nioutsikos 2017, 320). These two memory regimes, the unified Resistance-centered and the fractured pertaining to the Civil War, have emerged as the two most salient parts of the post-1974 Greek mnemonic field. It may be useful at this point to restate that the memory regime of the National Resistance has been officially institutionalized, reproduces a unifying hegemonic narrative that has been endorsed
74 by the state since 1982, and constitutes one pole of the Third Hellenic Republic’s foundational myth (Voglis 2007, 453). As a consequence, it is not easy for memory regimes that put into question the basic tenets of this Resistance-centered regime to attract mass appeal and become consolidated in the broader mnemonic field. A memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust would, of course, be based on critical reflection on the national collective’s stance during the persecution of the Greek Jews and presupposes a candid assessment of the phenomenon of local collaboration with the Nazis, endeavors that challenge the hermeneutic schema according to which resistance against the Nazis represented the prevalent course of action chosen by the vast majority of Greeks during the German occupation. All in all, what one can safely conclude by considering the in-depth examination of the debate surrounding the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, as presented in this thesis, is that the hegemonic position a unified, heroic/patriotic Resistance-centered memory regime still occupies in the Greek field of memory prevents a self-reflective memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust from becoming more salient. This dominance has so much shaped the entire mnemonic field that the articulation of less heroic representations about the historical past, and especially about the 1940s, is seriously constrained. As evidenced in the previous section, this unified memory regime is perceived by many as intrinsically linked to the widely used theme of “national reconciliation” and as the basis of a specific “political correctness”, which sets the appropriate frame for all discussions of the 1940s. In this context, political actors are generally quite reluctant to choose mnemonic strategies that disregard this frame. This unified memory regime determines, to a large extent, what other memory regimes can gain significance in the context of the country’s collective memory. Thus, although during the past twenty years Holocaust memory in Greece has become institutionalized by the establishment of an advanced commemorative framework, in accordance with basic principles of the cosmopolitan Holocaust memory paradigm, preexisting memory regimes of the National Resistance and the Civil War pose serious impediments to the introduction of critical self-reflection on the national collective’s complicity in the Holocaust and the full-fledged incorporation of a memory regime of the Holocaust into the wider field of memory in Greece. It is under this perspective that phenomena of memory layering in public contestation about the 1940s should be understood, and these were the dynamics which may explain why memory of the Holocaust was layered with memories of
75 other events in the public debate examined in this thesis. It has to be stressed that memory layering in this case did not completely displace memory of the Holocaust, as the renaming proposal had a self-evident symbolism in the area of Holocaust memory which could not be completely ignored by the actors involved. But the emergence of a persistent memory layering shaped the way in which different mnemonic entrepreneurs referred to the Holocaust and determined the limited scope of Holocaust-centered comments in their interventions. The potential of a memory regime of the Holocaust to challenge basic elements of the official Resistance-centered memory regime is particularly great when the Holocaust in Salonika is discussed. A councilor of Anoichti Poli emphasized:
They support that Chrysochoou contributed to the fight against the Bulgarian expansionist plans in Macedonia. In this respect, I suppose that his descendants ignore the most important fact…the mass rally of four hundred thousand young people in Athens, in which eighteen members of EPON were killed. It was after this demonstration that the collaborationist government backtracked (and the plans for the extension of the Bulgarian zone of occupation in Central Macedonia were not materialized) (Municipal Council of Thessaloniki 2018a, 1149).
To statements like this, when a political representative talks about the mass demonstrations and protests organized by EAM and EPON (the youth wing of EAM) in Athens and Thessaloniki in the spring and summer of 1943 - against the measure of conscription of adult Greek men for forced labor and, later, against the plans for the expansion of the Bulgarian zone of occupation in Central Macedonia – and, rightly so, praises the heroism of all those regular citizens who participated, it is quite easy to reply that this courage served specific national priorities, as these were perceived by the Christian majority population, and to stress the fact that the deportations of Salonikan Jews, that were taking place during that same period, were not even mentioned in the patriotic public speeches delivered in those demonstrations, neither a mass mobilization of this kind was initiated to protest against the implementation of the anti-Semitic measures and the deportation of the Jews. Of course, EAM’s significant contribution in the rescue of numerous Jews is quite well documented (Karabot 2011, 274-275, 284). Also, in January 1943, before any anti-Jewish measures were put in place in Salonika, ΕΑΜ, in a public announcement, had warned about their imminent imposition and called for protests, the formation of citizens’
76 committees, and mass mobilization in order to forestall the planned systematic persecution of the Jews (Karabot 2011, 281-283).
Conclusions
The present thesis was an attempt to offer an analytic overview of the peculiar dynamics shaping public contestation about the Greek 1940s, which, almost always, involves the articulation of divergent representations of the historical past and entangled memories of different historical events. That memory of the Holocaust occupies a marginal position in most of these discussions was also vividly evidenced. Given the scarcity of full-fledged elite-level discussions focused on the 1940s, the focus on a debate concerning a street-renaming proposal with highly symbolic connotations as far as memory of the Holocaust is concerned, and on the course of which political representatives presented in an elaborate manner different understandings of the historical past, provided an ideal basis to closely observe the aforementioned dynamics. The three central hypotheses outlined were empirically tested and, assessing the data, one may conclude that political contestation about the Greek 1940s is dominated by a pervasive Left-Right political cleavage, involves mnemonic strategies which make use of themes and narratives belonging to the preexisting national repertoire, while memory layering emerges as a persistent phenomenon. As already pointed out, while the emergence of memory layering on the course of the debate regarding the renaming of Chrysochoou Street had as a result a markedly limited discussion of the Holocaust as was perpetrated in Salonika, Holocaust memory was not completely displaced. Two features of the whole process should be considered at this point: First, the renaming proposal was explicitly framed as an act of symbolic restitution of Salonika’s Holocaust victims; Second, documentation of Chrysochoou’s alleged anti- Semitic activity was part of the historical material the councilors had to assess before the municipal council’s session. The fact that each side’s assessment of both the symbolism and the issue of Greek complicity in the “Black Sabbath” is reflected in the final vote tally permits us to conclude that a specific form of memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust surfaces.
77 Of course, an evaluation of the specific type of this memory regime is dependent on the categories of mnemonic actors detected. As already illuminated, the conservative opposition employed a strategy of mnemonic abnegation, attempting to avoid its involvement in a polarized mnemonic contestation. The group of Entaxei communicated a “pragmatic”, evasive, approach, stressing that the municipal council should never start digging into the historical past. Entaxei’s proposal for the session’s adjournment was voted down, and the group was eventually forced to enter the debate and present its understanding of different historical issues. As stressed in the theoretical section, when mnemonic abnegators feel compelled to participate in the politics of memory, they usually do so by projecting a thesis according to which some form of “convenient forgetting” is necessary if one wants to preserve the depoliticization of mnemonic issues. This was exactly the tactic endorsed by Entaxei, who attempted to further entrench this position by adding in the mix the salient theme of “national reconciliation”. On the other hand, detecting under which category of mnemonic actors fall the political formations of the Left and center-Left that were in favor of the renaming may prove to be more complicated. As previously assessed, while looking into the tone of the interventions of those supporting the renaming, one may trace a pluralistic logic, under which political dialogue in the area of memory politics is welcomed, even if pluralists disagree with different historical understandings of the past. That led me to the conclusion that the Left and center-Left intervened as mnemonic pluralists, who, although believed that other actors can defend their distinct perceptions on the historical past, their strategy was to promote self-reflection with regard to the city’s traumatic past and the local implementation of the Final Solution. Consequently, the described coexistence of abnegators and pluralists denotes the emergence of a pillarized memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust, and this view is endorsed by the present thesis. But an alternative reading of the dynamics at play is possible. David Art used the theoretical framework of Kubik and Bernhard to explain the evolution of the mnemonic field in Germany and, in this context, applied its categorizations to evaluate the characteristics of the memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust in this country. Discussing the “historians’ debate” and the memory politics during the 1980s, he noticed that the promoters of the culture of contrition may be viewed as mnemonic warriors, in the sense that they advocated the diffusion of a set of non- negotiable representations about the Nazi past, among them, Holocaust’s singularity,
78 that Nazi capitulation was Germany’s liberation, that German suffering was a direct consequence of German aggression, and that Nazi past should never be “normalized” (Art 2014, 200). Following the same logic, one could argue that, on the course of the debate concerning the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, the Left and center-Left emerged as mnemonic warriors who, similarly to the German advocates of the culture of contrition, held historical interpretations that illuminate the national collective’s guilt, promoted honest engagement with local Holocaust history, and aimed at the institutionalization of these interpretations on an official level, revealing that they actually regarded them as non-negotiable. Of course, that would mean that Salonika ended up with a fractured memory regime of the Holocaust. In any case, anything other than a unified memory regime pertaining to the Holocaust implies that differentiated historical perceptions on this immensely important historical event exist in a given national or local setting. While pillarization may be a desirable outcome as far as memory regimes of other events are concerned, the parallel, and even non-confrontational, articulation of divergent understandings of the Holocaust in the political sphere should direct our attention to the potential emergence of distorting approaches among them. In this connection, IHRA, in its Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion, has stressed that excusing or minimizing the role of local collaborators of the Nazis constitutes one form of Holocaust distortion (IHRA 2013; IHRA 2021, 17). The fact that, while debating the renaming of Chrysochoou Street, a set of political actors from the Right chose to disregard evidence documenting the role played by a Greek Christian senior official in the persecution of Salonika’s Jews, should be perceived as a quite alarming sign pointing to the direction of Holocaust distortion. What is more, and more specifically, IHRA has, quite recently, pointed out at a number of additional forms of Holocaust distortion, one of which is of particular relevance for the debate examined in this thesis:
Trivializing or honoring the historical legacies of persons or organizations that were complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust. Attempts by states and/or local municipalities to generate particular forms of national identities are often accompanied by efforts to rehabilitate the reputations of persons, organizations, or ideologies associated with Holocaust-era crimes. Such actions not only distort history, they can also be seen as acts that glorify collaboration with the Nazis or as an effort to legitimize Nazi ideology (IHRA 2021, 19).
79 As previously illuminated, the Right employed an approach of historical over- contextualization with regard to Chrysochoou’s role, focusing on his successful career as a military officer before the occupation, his supposed fight against the Bulgarian propaganda in occupied Macedonia, his involvement with a spy organization, his acquittal of charges of collaboration from the postwar collaborators’ courts and, even, his charitable activity. The conservative opposition also, in effect, supported the continued existence of his name on the specific street. To the extent that the former attitude can be perceived as tantamount to trivializing, and the latter to honoring, the legacy of a person whose complicity in Holocaust crimes the conservatives were well aware of, one may detect an overall strategy that, at the end of the day, distorts Holocaust. It has been argued that contemporary phenomena of Holocaust distortion are closely linked to the surge of forces representing illiberalism, or anti-liberalism, and nationalistic populism in Europe and other parts of the world, a trend of the past two decades. This tendency renders traditional distinctions between Left and Right largely irrelevant and reformulates the political landscape on the basis of a liberal-illiberal dichotomy (Bauer 2020, 214-215; Rozett 2019, 34-35). According to the findings of the present thesis, and as far as Salonika is concerned, a tendency towards Holocaust distortion on an elite level is best understood by reference to context-specific dynamics, such as: a salient Left-Right political cleavage, the cultural content of political contestation about the 1940s, and the surfacing of entangled memory regimes in the context of a persistent memory layering. The streets of a city constitute a peculiar type of lieux de mémoire (sites of memory). As physical spaces of the public domain in which the citizens' everyday life perpetually unfolds, their significance in the area of collective memory may not be instantly noticed. But streets’ names affect representations in the area of national and local collective memory in the same way as statues, monuments, and memorials dedicated to important historical events or anonymous and eponymous heroes (Koulouris 1998). Ιnitiatives concerning the renaming of streets which bear names of historical figures with a record widely regarded as controversial, especially as far as actors with an important role during the 1940s are concerned, represent an attempt on the part of contemporary democratic societies to address a basic question of collective identity and historical conscience, similar to that posed vividly by Israel Singer, then
80 secretary general of the World Jewish Congress, in the midst of the Waldheim controversy, thirty four years ago:
His (Waldheim's) picture hangs in the United Nations, along with some of the greatest men and the greatest fighters for human rights. The question is: Should he hang together with Trygve Lie? Should he hang there together with people like Dag Hammarskjöld, who fought for human rights and who fought against the horrors that occurred during World War II? Should he symbolize the United Nations forever, for ten years, for twenty five percent of the United Nations' history, or should he not?1
In general, one may conclude, on the basis of the analysis offered by the present thesis, that, in contemporary Greece, the Holocaust is commemorated, on the level of official rituals of memory, but not necessarily remembered. Further research on mnemonic contestation about the Greek 1940s, as it actually develops on an elite level, may provide additional valuable insights into the issue. Also, considering that streets bearing “problematic” names still exist in Salonika, a special focus on future public discourses around such streets’ renaming may also reveal whether the phenomena detected in this study persist and are highly resistant to change. I wish to conclude this thesis with the words of Salonikan Jew Robby Varsano, a Holocaust survivor. The man with the number 115365 indelibly written in his hand sent a letter to the Mayor of Thessaloniki, two days after the renaming of the street was decided and just four days before he died at the age of 93, in which he declared:
I would not like to refer to General Chrysochoou … We, and a lot of patriots, know him well. But I will refer to Alberto, the writer, the child whose parents were fiercely persecuted by Max Merten, the coordinator of the “Final Solution” in our city…Now the municipality took the decision to remove something fraudulent in order to demonstrate the historical truth. I am so old that I don’t even know what will happen tomorrow. But I feel so strong as to call upon everyone: Restore the truth. Honor those who contributed in our city. Leave behind divisiveness. Rewrite history on the basis of truth. Not my truth, but the truth of mankind (Lykesas 2018c).
1 A quite comprehensive picture of the public interventions of the World Jewish Congress in the controversy is presented in the excellent 2018 documentary of Ruth Beckermann “Waldheims Walzer” (“The Waldheim Waltz”).
81 Literature and Sources
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Municipal Council of Thessaloniki. 2018a. Official Record of the Minutes of the Council’s Session on the 26 of March 2018. March 26, 2018. Thessaloniki.
Municipal Council of Thessaloniki. 2018b. Decision of the Renaming of Chrysochoou Street on the 26 of March 2018. March 26, 2018. Thessaloniki.
Thessaloniki History Center. 2018. Additional Historical Documentation on General Athanassios Chrysochoou. March 14, 2018. Thessaloniki.
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96 Appendix
Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations
DSE Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados Democratic Army of Greece EAM Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo National Liberation Front ELAS Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos Greek People’s Liberation Army EPON Eniaia Panelladiki Organosi Neon United Panhellenic Organization of Youth ERE Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis National Radical Union PAO Panellinios Apeleftherotiki Organosis Panhellenic Liberation Organization PASOK Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Glossary of Terms
Dekemvriana December events (December 1944)
Ethniki symfiliosi National reconciliation
Ethnikofrosyni National-mindedness
Germanotsoliades Members of collaborationist armed groups
Laokratia People’s rule (EAM/ELAS slogan)
97
Metapolitefsi Regime change (1974)
Security Battalions Greek collaborationist military units founded in 1943
Symmoritopolemos Bandit war
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