DOCSLIB.ORG

Transcendental Idealism and the Organism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Transcendental Idealism and the Organism TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THE ORGANISM ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 26 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THE ORGANISM ESSAYS ON KANT Marcel Quarfood ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL STOCKHOLM Doctoral Dissertation Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm ABSTRACT The notion of the organism has a somewhat ambiguous status in Kant’s philosophy. On the one hand it belongs to natural science, on the other hand it is based on an analogy with the structure of reason. Biology therefore has a peculiar place among the sciences according to Kant: it is constituted by the use of a regulative maxim. The present study places Kant’s views on biological teleology in the larger context of transcendental idealism. It consists of five essays. The first one treats the notions of things in themselves and appearances, arguing for an interpretation in terms of two aspects or perspectives rather than two worlds. The importance of the discursivity of our cognitive capacity is stressed, as well as the need to separate Kant’s various reflective perspectives. In the second essay this interpretation is applied to the third section of the Groundwork, arguing that this text does not belong to theoretical metaphysics, but rather to the articulation of a specifically practical perspective. The third essay discusses similarities and differences between Kant’s a priori conditions for cognition and conceptions of innate ideas in the rationalist tradition. Kant’s comparison of the system of categories with the biological theory of epigenesis is considered in connection to eighteenth century theories of generation. The comparison is viewed as an analogy rather than as a naturalistic theory of the a priori. In the fourth essay Kant’s account of functional attribution in biology is expli- cated in the context of the present day debate of the issue. It is claimed that Kant’s neo-Aristotelian approach avoids some of the difficulties in the dominant naturalistic accounts of today. Kant’s view differs from the Aristotelian in that it involves a distinction of levels, making it possible to take functional attributions on the one hand as objective from the standpoint of biology but on the other hand as having a merely regulative status from a philosophical point of view. In the fifth essay an interpretation of the antinomy of teleological judgment in the Critique of Judgment is offered. The antinomy is taken to consist in the dialectical tendency to treat the regulative maxims of teleology and mechanism as constitutive principles. The difference between the discursivity of the human understanding and the idea of a non-discursive understanding, an important theme in Kant’s solution of the antinomy, puts the question of biological teleology in relation to central tenets of transcendental idealism. Key words: Kant, things in themselves, transcendental idealism, perspective, intelligible world, epigenesis, acquisitio originaria, biological functions, teleology, organism, antinomy, regulative maxim, discursivity. © Marcel Quarfood 2004 ISBN 91-22-02099-3 Printed by Akademitryck AB, Edsbruk 2004 ISSN 0491-0877 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ...................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................9 THE THING IN ITSELF: METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OR METAPHYSICAL ENTITY? ........................................................16 1. Transcendental Idealism and the Thing in Itself: Two Worlds or Two Aspects?............................................................................17 2. Metaphysical and Methodological Views ....................................34 3. Things in Themselves in Perspective ...........................................37 4. Critique of Metaphysical Interpretations......................................45 5. Concluding Remarks: Ethical Dimensions...................................61 KANT’S PRACTICAL DEDUCTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION IN GROUNDWORK III.........................................................................66 1. Negative and Positive Freedom ....................................................67 2. Acting Under the Idea of Freedom ...............................................68 3. The Circle and the Two Standpoints ............................................69 4. The Theoretical Dimension...........................................................73 5. Some Final Considerations ...........................................................74 ACQUISITIO ORIGINARIA AND EPIGENESIS: METAPHORS FOR THE A PRIORI .............................................................................77 1. Innatism and Acquisitio Originaria..............................................80 2. The Epigenesis of Pure Reason.....................................................89 3. A Biological Interpretation of the A Priori ................................102 4. Concluding Remarks: Reason and the Organism.......................115 BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS IN A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE.....118 1. Etiological Functions...................................................................119 2. Causal Role Functions.................................................................128 3. Restricting Causal Role Functions to Biological Systems.........133 5 Table of contents 4. The Normal, the Good, and Aristotelian Function ....................139 5. Kant’s Notion of the Organism ..................................................145 6. Normative Function as Regulative Maxim................................148 7. Conclusion: Kant after Darwin...................................................157 THE ANTINOMY OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT.................160 1. Presentation of the Antinomy.....................................................161 2. Programme for an Interpretation ................................................166 3. The Dogmatic Systems: §§ 72–73..............................................172 4. The Concept of Natural Purpose Is Not Objective: §§ 74–75...175 5. The Peculiarity of the Human Understanding: §§ 76–77..........177 6. Unification of the Principles: § 78 .............................................191 7. Mechanism and the Inexplicability of Organisms.....................196 8. A Final Problem..........................................................................205 WORKS CITED..................................................................................209 6 Acknowledgments It has taken a surprisingly long time to complete the present thesis. Among all those to whom I am indebted for encouragment of various kinds while composing it, I wish in particular to mention the following. Dugald Murdoch, who as supervisor had the unenviable task of going through the fragmentary drafts of these essays, has given me good advice on philosophical matters as well as on questions of language and style. The final result has been much improved thanks to his efforts; needless to say, I am the one responsible for all remaining shortcomings. I am grateful to Gunnar Svensson, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy in Stockholm, and Dag Prawitz for making arrangements that made it possible for me to bring the work to a conclusion. I don’t remember whether it was Gunnar or Dag who first proposed that I should present the thesis in the form of a set of essays rather than as a monograph. In any case, this turned out to be a good idea. My interest in Kant was originally awakened in the Kant seminars conducted by Alexander Orlowski, who also was my supervisor at the beginning of this project. With Markku Leppäkoski I have had many stimulating discussions on all things Kantian over the years. He has also commented on parts of the manuscript. Others who have read one or another part and given valuable advice are Helen Belcastro, Robert Callergård, Sören Hägg- qvist, Mikael Janvid, and Paul Needham. In March 2000 I attended the IX International Kant Congress in Berlin, supported by a travel stipend from Wallenbergsstiftelsen. There I presented what is now the second essay of this thesis, “Kant’s Practical Deduction of Moral Obligation in Groundwork III.” Dieter Schönecker offered some good criticism on that occasion. The essay was published in the proceedings of the congress (Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, vol. 3, ed. by V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and 7 Acknowledgments R. Schumacher, Berlin: de Gruyter 2001), and is reprinted here with permission from Walter de Gruyter Gmbh & Co. Finally I thank my wife Clara Lindberg and our daughters Joanna and Merete, who have had to put up with much during this time. 8 Introduction The original aim of the present study was to offer a comprehensive exposition of the role of teleology in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. There are two important themes for such an investigation, one local and one global. Locally, teleology has a place in Kant’s account of natural science. First and foremost, biology seems to require (or at least to make free use of) a teleological notion of the organism, which Kant explicates in the concept of a “natural purpose” (Naturzweck). But also general methodological maxims (such as the principle of parsimony) are thematized in teleological terms, as aspects of a “purposiveness of nature.” Now, this more general invocation of purposiveness leads over to the second, global theme: the place of teleology in the articulation of Kant’s system of philosophy. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the purposiveness of nature is assigned
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hume's Objects After Deleuze
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School March 2021 Hume's Objects After Deleuze Michael P. Harter Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Harter, Michael P., "Hume's Objects After Deleuze" (2021). LSU Master's Theses. 5305. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/5305 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUME’S OBJECTS AFTER DELEUZE A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies by Michael Patrick Harter B.A., California State University, Fresno, 2018 May 2021 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Human beings are wholly dependent creatures. In our becoming, we are affected by an incredible number of beings who aid and foster our growth. It would be impossible to devise a list of all such individuals. However, those who played imperative roles in the creation of this work deserve their due recognition. First, I would like to thank my partner, Leena, and our pets Merleau and the late Kiki. Throughout the ebbs and flows of my academic career, you have remained sources of love, joy, encouragement, and calm.
    [Show full text]
  • Ghost of Isaac Newton Vandalizes Rival's Wikipedia
    HARVARD SATYRICAL PRESS ISSUE 17 - SPRING 2009 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Ghost of Isaac Newton Vandalizes Rival’s Wikipedia Article THE INTERNETS — One of the greatest academic rivalries of Additional text edits made to both the English and Latin all time, long thought ended, has been reignited as the ghost Wikipedia articles on Leibniz by TrinityLad43 include: of British natural philosopher Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) has somehow gained access to the internet and made several 1. Replacing all mentions of the title of Leibniz’s book unfavorable edits to the Wikipedia entry of his German “Theodicy” with “The Idiocy”. contemporary Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). 2. Adding “[citationem necitatae]” after almost every According to the Wikipedia archive dated 7 sentence related to Leibniz’s March, while they were alive, Newton and work on calculus. Leibniz disputed over scientific matters 3. Changing “List of Publications” to like whether Leibniz’s calculus was “List of Plagiarizations”. discovered independently of Newton’s, the meaning of the theory of universal 4. Replacing “mathematician” with gravitation, and the philosophical tenet “imbecilic wretch” and “philosopher” of hylozoism. According to the Wikipedia with “addle-pated bvffoon”. archive dated 16 March, their dispute centered largely around Leibniz’s body 5. Adding an entire section on lewd odor, his sexual impotence, and whether jokes about Leibniz’s mother, he would have been better described supposedly popular during the 1710s. as a “pompous horfe’s ass” or a “right pompous horfe’s ass”. TrinityLad43’s only other edits have involved augmenting the article The distinctive changes were not noticed “Isaac Newton in Popular Culture”, until after they had been copied and and adding details on the care and pasted into 2,783 high school physics grooming of Powdered Wigs, essays throughout the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Hegel's Criticism
    U.Ü. FEN-EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ Yıl: 2, Sayı: 2, 2000-2001 KANT’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND HEGEL’S CRITICISM A. Kadir ÇÜÇEN* ABSTRACT Kant inquires into the possibility, sources, conditions and limits of knowledge in the tradition of modern philosophy. Before knowing God, being and reality, Kant, who aims to question what knowledge is, explains the content of pure reason. He formalates a theory of knowledge but his theory is neither a rationalist nor an empiricist theory of knowledge. He investigates the structure of knowledge, the possible conditions of experience and a priori concepts and categories of pure reason; so he makes a revolution like that of Copernicus . Hegel, who is one of proponents of the German idealism, criticizes the Kantian theory of knowledge for “wanting to know before one knows”. For Hegel, Kant’s a priori concepts and categories are meaningless and empty. He claims that the unity of subject and object has been explained in that of the “Absolute”. Therefore, the theory of knowledge goes beyond the dogmatism of the “thing-in- itself” and the foundations of mathematics and natural sciences; and reaches the domain of absolute knowledge. Hegel’s criticism of Kantian theory of knowledge opens new possibilities for the theory of knowledge in our age. ÖZET Kant’ın Bilgi Kuramı ve Hegel’in Eleştirisi Modern felsefe geleneği çerçevesinde Kant, bilginin imkânını, kaynağını, kapsamını ve ölçütlerini ele alarak, doğru bilginin sınırlarını irdelemiştir. Tanrı’yı, varlığı ve gerçekliği bilmeden önce, bilginin neliğini sorgulamayı kendine amaç edinen Kant, saf aklın içeriğini incelemiştir. Saf aklın a priori kavram ve kategorilerini, deneyin görüsünü ve bilgi yapısını veren, fakat ne usçu ne de deneyci * Uludag University, Faculty of Sciences and Letters, Dept.
    [Show full text]
  • SAGP SSIPS 2016 Abstracts
    Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 10-2016 SAGP SSIPS 2016 Abstracts Anthony Preus Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Preus, Anthony, "SAGP SSIPS 2016 Abstracts" (2016). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 434. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/434 This Announcement is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. The 34th annual joint meeting of The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) with The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS) Abstracts Collection October 28-30, 2016 Fordham University, Lincoln Center, New York 113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023 Corner of Columbus (9th) Avenue and West 60th Street Sponsored by Fordham University The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS) 2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Program, page 2 Claas Lattman, CAU Kiel, [email protected] 1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “The Art of Land-Measuring. Diagrammatical Knowledge Between Egypt and Greece” Thales brought geometry from Egypt to Greece. Therefore he was the first Greek mathematician, wasn’t he? At least some of the ancients tell us so.
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig c02.tex V1 - June 4, 2009 11:16am Page 17 2 Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism Daniel Howard-Snyder Many arguments from evil at least tacitly rely on something like the following line of thought: The Inference. On sustained reflection, we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world; ¹ FN:1 therefore, there is no reason that would justify God. The conclusion is frequently more nuanced: ‘‘it is very likely that there is no such reason’’ or ‘‘more likely than not’’ or ‘‘more likely than it otherwise would be’’. Some critics reject the premise: we do see how some reason would justify God. These are the theodicists. Others accept the premise but reject the conclusion: the evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence is much better than the evidence for no justifying reason. These are the natural theologians and Reformed epistemologists. Some critics, however, insist that even if the premise is true and even if there isn’t better evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence, we should For comments on previous drafts, I thank Michael Almeida, Nick Beckstead, Michael Bergmann, Rebecca Copenhaver, Trent Dougherty, Robert Epperson, Frances Howard- Snyder, Hud Hudson, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Christian Lee, Wes Morriston, Michael Murray, Robert Pasnau, Alexander Pruss, Michael Rea, John Schellenberg, Michael Tooley, Ryan Wasserman, Dennis Whitcomb, and three anonymous referees. ¹ Three notes in one. (1) The theistic God is the God in question here. At a minimum, this God has enough power and knowledge to prevent evil, and is unsurpassable in moral goodness.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter
    Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter Daniel Rothbart, Irmgard Scherer Abstract: Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle relationships between the experimental scientist, the modern instrument, and nature’s atomic particles. The principle of purposive- ness which governs judgment has also a role in implicitly guiding modern experimental science. In Part 1 we explore Kant’s philosophy of science as he shows how knowledge of material nature and unobservable entities is possible. In Part 2 we examine the way in which Kant’s treatment of judgment, with its operating principle of purposiveness, enters into his critical project and under- lies the possibility of rational science. In Part 3 we show that the centrality given to judgment in Kant’s conception of science provides philosophical in- sight into the investigation of atomic substances in modern chemistry. Keywords : Kant , judgment , purposiveness , experimentation , investigation of matter . Introduction Kant’s philosophy of science centers on the problem of how it is possible to acquire genuine knowledge of unobservable entities, such as atoms and molecules. “What and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?” ( CPuR , Axvii). This raises the question of the role of experiments in the knowability ( Erkennbarkeit ) and the experientiality (Erfahrbarkeit ) of nature. Kant’s insights into the character of scientific experimentation are not given the hearing they deserve. We argue that Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle inter- actions between the experimental chemist, the modern chemical instrument, and molecular substance.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction: Towards a Reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03257-6 - New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism Edited by Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti Excerpt More information Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti In the summer of 1914, T. S. Eliot arrived in Marburg from Harvard University to attend a summer course in philosophy before taking up residency at Merton College, Oxford, for a year of study with Harold Joachim, F. H. Bradley’s successor. At the University of Marburg, Eliot met Paul Natorp, who assisted him in finding affordable accommodation and lectured in his course on philosophy. The outbreak of the First World War would cut short Eliot’s stay in Marburg, but not before he had the chance to sketch a portrait of the venerable Neo-Kantian Professor. Natorp strikes a professorial pose, one arm tucked behind his back, the other slung across his waist. With elven ears and bald cranium, the philosopher appears endearing in his otherworldliness. Natorp’s face is hidden behind oval glasses, so large that they seem to constitute a hindrance rather than an aid to seeing reality. Eliot’s sketch can be seen as a visual epitome for how Neo-Kantianism appeared to a younger generation of intellectuals and philosophers who would come of age in the aftermath of a Europe laid waste through the cataclysm of the Great War. Eliot’s amusing sketch is an apt illustration for what Hans-Georg Gadamer, who wrote his PhD dissertation on Plato under Natorp in 1922, characterized as the Neo-Kantian “calm and 1 confident aloofness” engrossed in “complacent system-building.” With slightly more bite, Hannah Arendt charged Neo-Kantianism with drown- ing philosophy “in a sea of boredom,” thereby offering a softer version of the same hostility that spirited Martin Heidegger’s confrontation with 2 Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929.
    [Show full text]
  • Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy
    NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy FALL 2019 VOLUME 19 | NUMBER 1 FROM THE EDITORS ARTICLES Carlos A. Sánchez and Lori Gallegos Omar Rivera de Castillo Approaching Racial Embodiment, CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS Aesthetics, and Liberation in José Carlos Maríategui’s Seven Essays SPECIAL CLUSTER Alejandro Vallega Stephanie Rivera Berruz América Tropical, On the Force of Latinx Philosophy Conference Latino/a/x Thought Allison Wolf Sergio Rodrigo Lomelí Gamboa Dying in Detention as an Example of Oppression The Marxism of José Revueltas: A Struggle Against Orthodoxy Alan Chavoya Arturo Aguirre Moreno A Negative Path Towards Anti-Racist Immigration Policy Thinking about Exile: Community, Violence, and Law Jorge M. Valadez Susana Nuccetelli Immigration and International Justice Book Excerpt: Marx on Bolívar Eric Bayruns Garcia BOOK REVIEW Are Our Racial Concepts Necessarily Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive Nature? Linda Martín Alcoff: Rape and Resistance Reviewed by Juan J. Colomina-Alminana Damían Bravo Zamora CONTRIBUTORS Epistemic Humility Now! VOLUME 19 | NUMBER 1 FALL 2019 © 2019 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy CARLOS A. SÁNCHEZ AND LORI GALLEGOS DE CASTILLO, CO-EDITORS VOLUME 19 | NUMBER 1 | FALL 2019 Sergio Lomeli Gamboa’s “Jose Revueltas’ Marxism: A FROM THE EDITORS Struggle Against Orthodoxy” is an excellent introduction into the thought of this brilliant Mexican thinker. Known Carlos Alberto Sánchez mostly for his fictional writing, Revueltas is also one of SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY Marx’s most original readers and a fierce critic of “Orthodox Marxism.” Gamboa’s reading here seeks not only to locate Lori Gallegos de Castillo Revueltas in the center of Mexico’s philosophical landscape TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY of the last century, but also at the center of Mexico’s cultural and political life.
    [Show full text]
  • WISDOM (Tlwma) and Pffllosophy (FALSAFA)
    WISDOM (tLWMA) AND PfflLOSOPHY (FALSAFA) IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (as a framework for inquiry) By: Mehmet ONAL This thcsis is submitted ror the Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Wales - Lampeter 1998 b"9tr In this study the following two hypothesisare researched: 1. "WisdotW' is the fundamental aspect of Islamic thought on which Islamic civilisation was established through Islamic law (,Sharfa), theology (Ldi-M), philosophy (falsafq) and mysticism (Surism). 2. "Due to the first hypothesis Islamic philosophy is not only a commentary on the Greek philosophy or a new form of Ncoplatonism but a native Islamic wisdom understandingon the form of theoretical study". The present thesis consists of ten chaptersdealing with the concept of practical wisdom (Pikmq) and theoretical wisdom (philosophy or falsafa). At the end there arc a gcncral conclusion,glossary and bibliography. In the introduction (Chapter One) the definition of wisdom and philosophy is establishedas a conceptualground for the above two hypothesis. In the following chapter (Chapter Two) I focused on the historical background of these two concepts by giving a brief history of ancient wisdom and Greek philosophy as sourcesof Islamic thought. In the following two chapters (Chapter Three and Four) I tried to bring out a possibledefinition of Islamic wisdom in the Qur'5n and Sunna on which Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), theology (A-alim), philosophy (falsafq) and mysticism (Sufism) consistedof. As a result of the above conceptual approaching,I tried to reach a new definition for wisdom (PiLma) as a method that helps in the establishmentof a new Islamic way of life and civilisation for our life.
    [Show full text]
  • Teachers' Conceptions About the Genetic Determinism of Human
    Teachers’ Conceptions About the Genetic Determinism of Human Behaviour: A Survey in 23 Countries Jérémy Castéra, Pierre Clément To cite this version: Jérémy Castéra, Pierre Clément. Teachers’ Conceptions About the Genetic Determinism of Human Be- haviour: A Survey in 23 Countries. Science & Education, 2014, 23 (2), pp.417 - 443. 10.1007/s11191- 012-9494-0. hal-01024280 HAL Id: hal-01024280 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01024280 Submitted on 21 Jul 2014 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Castéra J. & Clément P., 2014 - Teachers’ conceptions about genetic determinism of human behaviour: a survey in 23 Countries. Science & Education, 23 (2), 417-443. (2012 DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9494-0) Teachers’ Conceptions about the Genetic Determinism of Human Behaviour: A Survey in 23 Countries (Preprint, before corrections) Main topic: Genetic determinism/Genetics education JÉRÉMY CASTÉRA*, ** & PIERRE CLÉMENT** * Science Education Centre, University of Tartu, Estonia. E-mail: [email protected] ** S2HEP, Université Lyon 1, France. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract: This work analyses the answers to a questionnaire from 8,285 in-service and pre-service teachers from 23 countries, elaborated by the Biohead-Citizen research project, to investigate teachers’ conceptions related to the genetic determinism of human behaviour.
    [Show full text]
  • Knowledge Innatism
    © Michael Lacewing Knowledge innatism Knowledge innatism argues that there is at least some innate knowledge. Exactly what ‘innate’ means in this context is disputed. But the claim is that some knowledge is part of the mind, already ‘in’ the mind from birth, rather than gained from experience. If there is any innate knowledge, it cannot be a posteriori, but must be a priori. In this handout, we briefly consider Locke’s objection to innate knowledge, and a general response. For an in-depth discussion of Locke, and the response from Leibniz, see the handout on ‘Locke and Leibniz on innate knowledge’. LOCKE’S ARGUMENT AGAINST INNATE KNOWLEDGE In brief, Locke’s argument against innate knowledge is this: 1. If there is innate knowledge, it is universal. 2. For an idea to be part of the mind, Locke says, the mind (the person) must know or be conscious of it: ‘it seems to me nearly a contradiction to say that there are truths imprinted on the soul that it doesn’t perceive or understand. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it has never known or been conscious of.’ 3. Therefore, innate knowledge is knowledge that every human being is or has been conscious of. 4. Children and ‘idiots’ do not know theorems in geometry or ‘It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be’. (They do not know these claims, because they do not understand them.) (By ‘idiots’, Locke means people with severe learning disabilities.) 5. Therefore, these claims are not innate.
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification
    EPISTEMIC TRUST AND LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION Definitive version published in The Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2012): 179-199 Michael Fuerstein Saint Olaf College Department of Philosophy [email protected] 1. Introduction Reason-giving has arguably become the central concern of liberalism.1 A vast portion of contemporary liberal theorists endorse some version of the view that our political arrangements and uses of power must be justifiable to all citizens by good reasons.2 Call this the liberal principle of justification (LPJ). The motivation for LPJ has normally been given in moral terms. The obligation to provide good reasons to a universal audience – or at any rate to have good reasons available in principle – derives from an equal respect for the autonomy of all persons as rational beings. Reason-giving is seen as an essential route to securing free consent, and free 1 For valuable feedback I am grateful to Akeel Bilgrami, Alvin Goldman, Philip Kitcher, Joseph Raz, Daniel Viehoff, and several anonymous reviewers. I also benefited from an audience at the 2009 Workshop on the Epistemic Benefits of Free Speech and Openness at the University of Copenhagen, the members of Alvin Goldman’s Social Epistemology Seminar at Rutgers University, and an audience of my colleagues at Saint Olaf College. Portions of this paper, and especially Section Four, draw on Chapter Three of my Ph.D. thesis, “The Scientific Public: Inquiry in Democratic Society” (Columbia University, 2009). 2 Some prominent variations on the theme are Cohen 1989, Habermas 1996, Larmore 1987, Rawls 1993, Waldron 1987. 1 Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification consent is understood to be essential to the legitimacy of state action.3 That is a crude sketch, at any rate, of how the argument goes.
    [Show full text]