TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THE ORGANISM ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 26 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THE ORGANISM ESSAYS ON KANT Marcel Quarfood ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL STOCKHOLM Doctoral Dissertation Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm ABSTRACT The notion of the organism has a somewhat ambiguous status in Kant’s philosophy. On the one hand it belongs to natural science, on the other hand it is based on an analogy with the structure of reason. Biology therefore has a peculiar place among the sciences according to Kant: it is constituted by the use of a regulative maxim. The present study places Kant’s views on biological teleology in the larger context of transcendental idealism. It consists of five essays. The first one treats the notions of things in themselves and appearances, arguing for an interpretation in terms of two aspects or perspectives rather than two worlds. The importance of the discursivity of our cognitive capacity is stressed, as well as the need to separate Kant’s various reflective perspectives. In the second essay this interpretation is applied to the third section of the Groundwork, arguing that this text does not belong to theoretical metaphysics, but rather to the articulation of a specifically practical perspective. The third essay discusses similarities and differences between Kant’s a priori conditions for cognition and conceptions of innate ideas in the rationalist tradition. Kant’s comparison of the system of categories with the biological theory of epigenesis is considered in connection to eighteenth century theories of generation. The comparison is viewed as an analogy rather than as a naturalistic theory of the a priori. In the fourth essay Kant’s account of functional attribution in biology is expli- cated in the context of the present day debate of the issue. It is claimed that Kant’s neo-Aristotelian approach avoids some of the difficulties in the dominant naturalistic accounts of today. Kant’s view differs from the Aristotelian in that it involves a distinction of levels, making it possible to take functional attributions on the one hand as objective from the standpoint of biology but on the other hand as having a merely regulative status from a philosophical point of view. In the fifth essay an interpretation of the antinomy of teleological judgment in the Critique of Judgment is offered. The antinomy is taken to consist in the dialectical tendency to treat the regulative maxims of teleology and mechanism as constitutive principles. The difference between the discursivity of the human understanding and the idea of a non-discursive understanding, an important theme in Kant’s solution of the antinomy, puts the question of biological teleology in relation to central tenets of transcendental idealism. Key words: Kant, things in themselves, transcendental idealism, perspective, intelligible world, epigenesis, acquisitio originaria, biological functions, teleology, organism, antinomy, regulative maxim, discursivity. © Marcel Quarfood 2004 ISBN 91-22-02099-3 Printed by Akademitryck AB, Edsbruk 2004 ISSN 0491-0877 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ...................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................9 THE THING IN ITSELF: METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OR METAPHYSICAL ENTITY? ........................................................16 1. Transcendental Idealism and the Thing in Itself: Two Worlds or Two Aspects?............................................................................17 2. Metaphysical and Methodological Views ....................................34 3. Things in Themselves in Perspective ...........................................37 4. Critique of Metaphysical Interpretations......................................45 5. Concluding Remarks: Ethical Dimensions...................................61 KANT’S PRACTICAL DEDUCTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION IN GROUNDWORK III.........................................................................66 1. Negative and Positive Freedom ....................................................67 2. Acting Under the Idea of Freedom ...............................................68 3. The Circle and the Two Standpoints ............................................69 4. The Theoretical Dimension...........................................................73 5. Some Final Considerations ...........................................................74 ACQUISITIO ORIGINARIA AND EPIGENESIS: METAPHORS FOR THE A PRIORI .............................................................................77 1. Innatism and Acquisitio Originaria..............................................80 2. The Epigenesis of Pure Reason.....................................................89 3. A Biological Interpretation of the A Priori ................................102 4. Concluding Remarks: Reason and the Organism.......................115 BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS IN A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE.....118 1. Etiological Functions...................................................................119 2. Causal Role Functions.................................................................128 3. Restricting Causal Role Functions to Biological Systems.........133 5 Table of contents 4. The Normal, the Good, and Aristotelian Function ....................139 5. Kant’s Notion of the Organism ..................................................145 6. Normative Function as Regulative Maxim................................148 7. Conclusion: Kant after Darwin...................................................157 THE ANTINOMY OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT.................160 1. Presentation of the Antinomy.....................................................161 2. Programme for an Interpretation ................................................166 3. The Dogmatic Systems: §§ 72–73..............................................172 4. The Concept of Natural Purpose Is Not Objective: §§ 74–75...175 5. The Peculiarity of the Human Understanding: §§ 76–77..........177 6. Unification of the Principles: § 78 .............................................191 7. Mechanism and the Inexplicability of Organisms.....................196 8. A Final Problem..........................................................................205 WORKS CITED..................................................................................209 6 Acknowledgments It has taken a surprisingly long time to complete the present thesis. Among all those to whom I am indebted for encouragment of various kinds while composing it, I wish in particular to mention the following. Dugald Murdoch, who as supervisor had the unenviable task of going through the fragmentary drafts of these essays, has given me good advice on philosophical matters as well as on questions of language and style. The final result has been much improved thanks to his efforts; needless to say, I am the one responsible for all remaining shortcomings. I am grateful to Gunnar Svensson, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy in Stockholm, and Dag Prawitz for making arrangements that made it possible for me to bring the work to a conclusion. I don’t remember whether it was Gunnar or Dag who first proposed that I should present the thesis in the form of a set of essays rather than as a monograph. In any case, this turned out to be a good idea. My interest in Kant was originally awakened in the Kant seminars conducted by Alexander Orlowski, who also was my supervisor at the beginning of this project. With Markku Leppäkoski I have had many stimulating discussions on all things Kantian over the years. He has also commented on parts of the manuscript. Others who have read one or another part and given valuable advice are Helen Belcastro, Robert Callergård, Sören Hägg- qvist, Mikael Janvid, and Paul Needham. In March 2000 I attended the IX International Kant Congress in Berlin, supported by a travel stipend from Wallenbergsstiftelsen. There I presented what is now the second essay of this thesis, “Kant’s Practical Deduction of Moral Obligation in Groundwork III.” Dieter Schönecker offered some good criticism on that occasion. The essay was published in the proceedings of the congress (Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, vol. 3, ed. by V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and 7 Acknowledgments R. Schumacher, Berlin: de Gruyter 2001), and is reprinted here with permission from Walter de Gruyter Gmbh & Co. Finally I thank my wife Clara Lindberg and our daughters Joanna and Merete, who have had to put up with much during this time. 8 Introduction The original aim of the present study was to offer a comprehensive exposition of the role of teleology in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. There are two important themes for such an investigation, one local and one global. Locally, teleology has a place in Kant’s account of natural science. First and foremost, biology seems to require (or at least to make free use of) a teleological notion of the organism, which Kant explicates in the concept of a “natural purpose” (Naturzweck). But also general methodological maxims (such as the principle of parsimony) are thematized in teleological terms, as aspects of a “purposiveness of nature.” Now, this more general invocation of purposiveness leads over to the second, global theme: the place of teleology in the articulation of Kant’s system of philosophy. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the purposiveness of nature is assigned