CHAPTER 8 “No Strength To Stand”: Defeat at Panium, the Macedonian Class, and Ptolemaic Decline

Paul Johstono

Introduction

In the summer of 200 BCE, Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies fought at the foot of Mount Hermon in northern Israel. The battle, fought at Panium (later Caesarea Philippi), was the most decisive of any in the Syrian Wars, and assured the Seleucid conquest of the Ptolemaic Levant. Because no comprehensive ac- count of the battle survives, the severe Ptolemaic defeat has customarily been considered only for its geopolitical ramifications.1 The battle and the Fifth Syrian War (202–197) secured Antiochus III’s southern flank prior to his con- flict with Rome, inaugurated Seleucid rule in Judea, and signaled the decline of the Ptolemaic kingdom from great power status.2 Ancient testimonies and doc- umentary evidence from Egypt suggest it was a bloody defeat with a profound and lasting, but unrecognized, impact on the Ptolemaic army. The Ptolemaic defeat fell hardest on the infantry phalanx. Although it did not bear primary blame for the defeat, institutional and domestic forces led the Ptolemies to abandon the Macedonian infantry phalanx in the years after Panium. Armed in the Macedonian style, infantry phalanxes were essential to the military operations and Successor identity of the great Hellenistic kingdoms, whose legitimacy derived, in part, from their ability to appropriate the legacy

1 On the Fifth Syrian War and the battle of Panium, see Holleaux (1942) 317–35; Will (1967) II.108–12, 118–20; Huss (2001) 489–501; Hölbl (2001) 136–37; Eckstein (2006) 292–94; Grainger (2010) 245–71. Gera (1987) 63 described a “decisive victory” for the Seleucids; Bar-Kochva (1976) 146–57 is the only reconstruction; according to others the Ptolemaic army was “badly defeated” (Jouguet (1996) 186), even “virtually annihilated” (Errington (2008) 196). Panium is hardly mentioned in Fischer-Bovet’s recent study (2014) of the Ptolemaic army. In what fol- lows, abbreviations to collections of papyri follow Oates et al. (2017) (with reference website). All dates BCE. 2 Bar-Kochva (1976) 236: “persistent Ptolemaic weakness since Panium”; Eckstein (2006) 112: a state “on the point of military and political collapse.”

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004355774_009 DEFEAT AT PANIUM AND PTOLEMAIC DECLINE 163 of Alexander through military victories and Macedonian trappings.3 In the last quarter of the third century, at the battle of Raphia, the Ptolemies fielded a core phalanx of 25,000 Macedonians. Their Macedonian identity reflected military status more than actual descent, but the ethnic fiction built class cohesion. Most of them were members of the triakontarouroi Makedones, the “thirty- arouras Macedonians.” As cleruchs (military-settlers), they held approximately thirty arouras (about twenty acres of land) in return for military service. The first four kings of the Ptolemaic dynasty had cultivated their “Macedonians” as a war-winning infantry class, a major component of the cleruchic agricultural-military system, and a political hedge against the court aristocracy. Grainger described the Ptolemaic phalanx as “a vital mainstay” buttressing the “power and authority of the Ptolemaic government.”4 The Macedonians performed admirably prior to Panium: in battle at Raphia in 217, where they slugged out the victory against the vaunted Seleucid argyraspides and settler phalanx, in domestic affairs during Agathocles’ attempted coup in 203, and as a force of economic stability in Egypt. At Panium, the Macedonians bore the brunt of the defeat. As important as the Macedonians corps was to the fortunes and integrity of the Ptolemaic state, it proved fragile and hollow in defeat. As a result, the years after Panium were a dark time for Ptolemaic Egypt. Domestic revolts hampered recovery, and in time, circumstances compelled the Ptolemies to redefine much about both the recruitment and organization of their army and the structure and ideology of the monarchy. When an army suffers defeat it may at least require the time to make good its losses, but may also revisit its organization, strategy, and tactics.5 The defeat demonstrated the capability of the Seleucids’ cataphract cavalry and Indian elephants, but did not automatically indicate the inferiority of the Ptolemaic phalanx to the Seleucid one. A strong Macedonian phalanx was still, after Panium, the best option for asserting Successor identity and achieving battle- field success. And yet, given the severe losses that my reconstruction of the

3 Billows (1995) 15–18: the Macedonians were “a powerful people-in-arms capable of dominat- ing the world” but also exercising “political consciousness.” On Macedonians, victories, and kingship, see also Austin (1986); Anson (1991) 230–47; Hamilton (1999) 168–80; Ducrey (2002) 59–60; Bosworth (2005) 246–77; Chaniotis (2005) 57–65; Eckstein (2006) 87–88; Roisman (2012) 90–106, 232. Hyland (this volume) further explores the implications for recruits within the former Persian empire. Ward (this volume) examines the Roman Principate’s interac- tions with the legions. 4 Grainger (2010) 259–60. 5 At Rome during the Hannibalic War the standardization of velites (Livy 26.4) and the adop- tion of the heavier scutum (first depicted on the Minerva Tower at Tarraco) reflect similar concerns; see Gabba (1976) 5–6; Keppie (2002) 18; Daly (2002) 70–73.