The Semantic Significance of Donnellan's
ReferentiaVAttri butive Distinction
Andrew John Hunter
A Thesis Submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy. in the University of Toronto
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Abstract
In " Reference and Definite Descriptions", Keith Donnellan introduces the notion of refere>üiul and umihurivr uses of definite descriptions -- phrases such as "the author of Waverly". Here and in subsequent papen he argues that Russell's Theory of Descriptions is inadequate as a semantic analysis for al1 uses of definite descnptions. According to
Russell's theory. definite descriptions are quantifier phrases. not singular terms. Donnellan's arguments suggest that definite descriptions are ambiguous. When they are used attnbutively. definite descriptions should be read as quantifier phrases. When they are used referentially. they should be reed as genuine singular tems.
1 argue that it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Following Donnellan. I argue that whether a description is used referentially or attributively depends on the inrrntions of the speaker conceming the truth-conditions of the proposition he wishes to express. This provides us with a precise way to determine whether a definite description is used referentially or attributively.
1 tum next to the question: Does Donnellan's referentiai/attributivedistinction show that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous? 1 distinguish two positions which have emerged in the literature. What 1 cal1 The S~rnngRrferenriul Theris maintains that definite descriptions are singular terms, when they are used referentially. On this account. definite descriptions are semantically am biguous. What 1 call The Weuk Refmntiuf Thesis maintains that defini te descriptions, when used referentially, are properly analyzed according to Russell's Theory of Descriptions. This thesis maintains that in referential cases. a speaker's utterance semantically expresses one proposition, but he may succeed in communicating some other proposition. This account attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the apparent counterexarnples offered by Donnellan and others.
1 present two arguments in support of The Strong Referenfial Thesis. First. t argue that The Weuk Referentiul Thesi.$ resutts in the ascription of contradictory beliefs to speakers. 1 call this The Argumentfiom rhr Principleof Chariv. Second. 1 argue that The Weuk Referrntiul Thesis cannot, in al1 cases, explain how speakers may succeed in communicating a deteminate proposition other than that which their utterances semantically express. Acknow ledgments
First. 1 would like to thank my supervisor. Prof. Bernard Katz. for his encouragement. sound advice. and patience. His attentions to clanty of presentation and closeness of argumentation provide a mode1 of how philosophy should be done. I consider myself very fortunate to have benefited from such excellent supervision. Likewise. I would like to thank my thesis advisor. Prof. Peter Apostoli. for his advice. interest, and encouragement. His enthusiasm for the issues discussed in this dissertation was infectious, and invaluable to the completion of this project.
I am grateful to the Department of Philosophy at Ryerson Polytechnic University for providing the stimulatinp and collepial environment in which much of this dissertation was written. Financial support for this dissertation was provided by an Ontario Graduate
Scholarship and by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Fellowship.
And finally, 1 wish to thank my wife, Janet. for her tremendous patience, support, and love throughout my studies. TABLE OF CONTENTS
A bstract
Acknowledgments
Chapter One: Introduction
(i) Rus.srf1's Throry of Descriptions (ii) Srrawson's Objections ro Ri~ssell'sTheon* (iii) Orgciniuion of Chupters
Chapter Two: Referential and Attributive Uses of Definite Descriptions
Chapter Three: Refemng and Denoting
( il Referenticil and Artrib ut ive Uses: Thrir Pre.wpposiriom or rlrnplic~rions ( ii) Denoring und Referring (iii) The Debute Between Donnellun und MücKuy (iv) The Difierence Brrwern Referring und Denoting (v) Summury
Chapter Four: Speaker Reference and Referential Use
Chapter Five: Searle On the Referential-AttributiveDistinction
(i) Huving Sameone in Mid f ii) Seurle1.\.4lrermtive Account of the Referenriul-Artriburive Disrinc-tion (iii) Two Objection.\ ro Seurlr '., Accounr (iv) Summury
Chapter Six: Cricean Responses to the Referential Challenge (i) The Strnng and Weuk Referenriai Thesa ( ii) Clussificution of Uses of Definite Descrip f ims
Chapter Seven: An Argument For the Strong Referential-Attributive Thesis 118 (il The Argumenr From rhe Principfr of chu ri^ (ii) A Defme of Prrmisr Onr (iii) A Defense of Prernise Two (ir) A Defense of Prrmise Three v Chapter Eight: The Argument From Anaphora
(i1 DonnellunlsArgmenr Frmn Anuphnru (ii) Donne 1fun ls Argument Wirhour Indef nilr De.sc*ription.s (iiil Srrmrnuy
Chapter Nine: Soarnes' Objection to the Argument From Anaphora
(il An Argumrnr Aguimr the Strong Rrfrrenriul Thrsic (ii) The Smpe of Soumes' Argumenr (iiil The Premisrs of Snarnes' Argument (iv) Objections tu f remises Orte und Two ofsoames' Argument
Chapter Ten: The Pragmatic Explanation of Referential Use 1%
References Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of "On Denoting". one of the main debates in the philosophy of language has concemed the semantic analysis of sentences containing
definite descriptions such as " the author of Waveriey". Bertrand Russell propounded. in a number of places. a theory of definite descnptions. Three of the places in which he presents his theory are "On Denotinp". Inrroducrinn rn Marhematicul Philosop&. and Principiu Muthematiccl. According to Russell's theory of descnptions, an English sentence having a definite description as grammatical subject is deceptive in tems of its logicu[form. For example. a sentence like
( I ) The man with a rnartini is happy, seems to resernble, in ternis of its grummaticalform, sentences like (2) John Smith is happy. (3) That man is happy.
(4) He is happy.
(3 1 am happy. Each of these sentences is. gramrnatically, of the subject-predicate fom. The subject phrase in each appears to refer to some person. The predicate phrase in each mentions the property of happiness. Given this similarity, one might expeci that the logical form of these sentences would be the same. Russell's theory of descriptions denies this claim. Sentence ( 1). he argues, is only superficially like sentences (2) - (5). While the subject phrases in the latter sentences are al1 refemng expressions. the subject phrase in the first sentence is no? a refemng expression.
One can see this by considering the different manners in which sentences ( 1) - (5) would. according to Russell's theory of descnptions. be represented in logicai notation. If "u" is a singular terni and "G" is a one-place predicate that abbreviates the predicate phrase "is happy", then the logical form of (2) - (5)would be represented as
(6) Ga. The propositions that would be expressed by utterances of these sentences are ubout some person who is referred to by the use. in a particular context. of the subject phrase.
Sentence ( 1 ). according to Russell's theory, is not about anybody. As David Kaplan emphasizes in "What is Russell's Theory of Descriptions". its logical form reveals this. The proposition expressed by an utterance of the fint sentence, Russell argues. is the same as that which would be expressed by an utterance of
(7) There exists exactly one man with a martini, and whoever has a rnartini is happy -
If "F' abbreviates the predicate phrase "is a man with a martini", and " G" abbreviates the predicate phrase "is happy". then the logical form of sentence ( I ) can be represented as
The difference between ( 1 ) and (2) - (5)is thus made fully perspicuous when we consider the distinct mannes in which their logical form is represented. While (6) contains a singular tem. the symbolic counterpart of a referring expression. (8)does not contain any singular tems at ail. Russell's theory has been challenped by numerous authors. They contend that. for one reason or another. the theory of descnptions fails to provide an adequate analysis of al1 English sentences of the form "The Fis G". Peter Strawson. in "On Refemng", argues that Russell's account of descriptions is fundamentally incorrect. He defends the clairn that definite descnptions are genuine refemng expressions. Keith Donnellan. in "Reference and Definite Descriptions", "Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again". and "Speaker Reference. Descriptions. and Anaphora" develops a very interesting challenge to Russell's theory. He argues that there are at least two distinct manners in which definite descriptions can be used in English. Russell's theory is adequate for only one of these uses. There are. he argues, uses of definite descriptions in which they do function as refemng expressions. Thus. if we take sentence ( 1) as an exarnple, Donnellan argues that on some occasions (8) represents the logical form of the sentence. while on other occasions (6) does. This suggests that defioiie descriptions are semanricuiiy ambiguous. Sometimes they receive the kind of semantic analysis which Russell proposed. On other occasions, they do not. Donnellan calls the uses of descriptions for which Russell's analysis is correct unributive uses. Those uses of descriptions which. he feels. should not be viewed as Russell proposed he cdls referential uses.
In this dissertation. I will explore the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. There are two central goals of this dissertation. The first is to provide a clear account of the difference between referential and attributive uses. Although the distinction seems intuitively correct. it is surprisingly difficult to articulate how. precisely. referential and attributive uses differ. The second goal is to examine a variety of arguments for the conclusion that descriptions are semantically ambiguous in the sense considered above. There are two conclusions which 1 wish to defend regarding the referentiallattributive distinction. The first is that there ix a clear and precise way of demarcating these two ways in which descriptions are used. The second is that the distinction provides pood reason for thinking that phrases of the form
"the F " admit of rwo quite distinct kinds of semantic analyses. 1 will try to provide reason for accepting the claim that referential uses of definite descnptions should be viewed as refemng expressions. while attributive uses should be viewed. as they are in Russell's account. as quantifier phrases. In section one of this chapter. I will provide an account of Russell's defense of his theory of descriptions. In section two. 1 will present some of the objections which Peter Strawson. in "On Refemng". offered against Russell's theory. In section three. 1 will present a bnef outline of the subsequent chapters. (i) Russell's Theon of Descriptions
The locus classicus of Russell's theory is his article '-On Denoting". The theory, as he propounds it there. is meant to answer certain puzzles which anse when one considers sentences containing definite descriptions. The fact that this theory can solve these puzzles provides, Russell argues. evidence for the theory. These puzzles anse when definite descriptions are viewed as genuine refemng expressions. As we have seen. Russe1;'s view is that phrases of the form "the F' are only superficially like genuine refemng expressions. When properly understood. he argues. such phrases do not stand for anything in the same way that. for example. "Plato" stands for a particular man. "Plato" has meaning even when it does not occur in the context of a sentence - it stands for Plato. In this sense. we might Say that "Plato" has meaning in isolation from the context of any sentence. "The teacher of Aristotle". by contrast. does not, Russell argues. stand for anything. it has no meaning in isolation. He calls such expressions incomplete sybols. He wntes that an incomplete symbol. '-is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts" Whitehead and
Russell 1927: 66). A definite description like "the teacher of Aristotle" as it occurs in the sentence "The teacher of Anstotle was wise". does not, according to Russell. have any meaning on its own. When the sentence is fully analyzed. we can see how this is so. As we saw. when one represents the lugical. as opposed to grammarical, fom of this sentence. there does not occur any singular term corresponding to the phrase "the teacher of Aristotle". What we see instead is a concatenation of three sentence: "At ieast one person taught Aristotle": "At most one penon taught Anstotle": "Whoever taught
Aristotle was wise." The proposition expressed by an utterance of "The teacher of
Anstotle was wise" is what would be expressed by an utterance of the conjunction of these three sentences. The first puzzle apainst which Russell tests this theory concems identity staternents. Consider the following statement of identity: (9) Plato is the teacher of Aristotle. If the description "the teacher of Aristotle" is a genuine refemng expression. then we face difficulties explaining how (9)can be informative. or why anyone would wonder whether (9) expresses a true proposition. Suppose that "the teacher of Aristotle" is a refemng expression. To what does it refer? The answer. according to Russell. must be
Plato. Since "Plato" also refers to Plato. then it seems that we ought to be able to suhstiture "Plato" for "the teacher of Aristotle" in (9). It should be clear, however, that the result of such a substitution does not appear to be the sarne statement. While "Plato is
Plato" is trivially me, (9)is not trivially me. The problem is apparent when one recopnizes that the following is a valid inference schema:
(a) Fu (h) a=b Therefore. (c) Fb In general. one can substitute a referring expression within a sentence for some co- refemng expressions without changing the truth-value of the sentence. If we view descriptions as names. then the following argument would appear to be vaiid: (a) Ralph wishes to know whether Plato is the teacher of Aristotle. (h) Plato = the teacher of Aristotle Therefore, (c) Ralph wishes to know whether Plato is Plato. Russell argues that this consequence is clearly unacceptable. The view that descriptions are refemng expressions suggests that anv true identity statement involving definite descriptions is nivially tnie. and hence uninformative. However. identity statements of the form "a is the F' (where "a" is a name) are often very informative. Ralph might. for example. genuinely wonder whether Plato is the teacher of Aristotle. If someone tells him that Plato is the teacher of Aristotle. this would seern neither trivial nor
uninformative - at least to Ralph.
This first puzzle conceming identity statements is solved, Russell argues. by adopting his theory of descriptions. Since, according to this theory. descriptions are not refemng expressions at all, we cannot view "the teacher of Aristotle" as being a singular
term for which we may substitute a CO-refemngexpression. When applied to
( 10) Ralph wishes to know whether Plato was the teacher of Aristotle. Russell's theory of descriptions gives us the following two possible analyses:
( 11) Ralph wishes to know whether exactly one person taught Aristotle and Plato was that person:
( 12) Exactly one person taught Aristotle and Ralph wishes to know wheiher Plato was that person.
According to Russell. (1 1) corresponds to the most natural understanding of (10). Suppose that Ralph has heard of Plato and Aristotle. and wonders whether the former was the teacher of the latter. In such a case, ( 1 1) would be the natural way to analyze ( 10) according to Russell's theory. We mipht offer (12) as an analysis of ( 10) if. for example. Ralph had spotted. but did not recognize. Plato at a party and asked whether that penon was Plato (Cf. Russell 1905: 52). ( 1 1) is the correct analysis when the definite description has what Russell calls a secodary occurrence in (10). (12) is correct when the description has what he calls a primary occurrence in ( 10). This distinction between the narrow and wide scopes which descriptions may have within sentences in which they occur is not immediately relevant. For the present purposes. it is sufficient to note that Russell's proposal provides a means of explaining how identity statements in which definite descriptions figure can be both non-trivially true and informative. The second puzzle against which Russell tests his theory involves the Law of
Excluded Middle. He presents this puzzle as follows:
By the law of excluded middle, either 'Ais B' or 'Ais not B' must be true. Hence either 'the present King of France is bald' or 'the present King of France is not bald' must be true. Yet if we enurnerate the things that are bald. and then the things that are not bald. we should not find the present King of France in either list (Russell 1905: 48).
This problem for the view that descriptions are refemng expressions concems what to Say about sentences containing descriptions which do not refer to anything. We might cal1 this The Problm of Non-Referring Descriptions: If descriptions are singular tems. then what are we to say about the truth-value of sentences in which non-refemng descriptions occur? Russell's theory of descriptions provides a plausible. and elegant. solution to this puzzle. Consider the following sentences:
(13) The present King of France is bald.
( 14) The present King of France is not Md. According to the Law of Excluded Middle, exactly one of these sentences must be true.
According to the theory of descriptions, ( 13) should be analyzed as
( 13a) There exists exactly one King of France and whoever is King of France is bald.
This sentence is false. since there does not exist anyone who is currently the King of
France. Sentence (14) is. according to Russell. ambiguous. There are two possible readings for it, dependinp upon whether the description has wide or narrow scope. If it is given wide scope. the analysis would be
( 14a) There exists exactly one King of France and whoever is King of France is not bald.
Like ( 13a) this sentence is false since there is no curent King of France. If, however. the description has narrow scope, then ( 14) should be analyzed as
( 14b) 1t is not the case that there exists exact1y one King of France and whoever is King of France is bald.
On this reading, ( 14) is true. Thus, Russell's account explains how exactly one of ( 13) and ( 14) is true. While ( 14a) is false regardless of whether ( 13) is true or false. ( 14b) is false if and only if (13a) is true. Thus. when (13) and (14) are analyzed as (13a) and (14b) respectively. it becomes clear how exactly one of them is true. This is funher evidence in support of Russeli's theory of descriptions. The third puzzle which Russell considen. in "On Denoting". concems negative existentials - sentences of the forrn "The F does not exist*'. For the view that descriptions are refemng expressions. such statements prcsent a problem. On this view. the meaning of a description is simply that object for which it stands. If the description does not stand for anything. then it would seem that the statement in which it occurs is meaningless. If the description dws stand for something. then it would seem that the statement must be false. Thus. on the view that descriptions are singular ternis. we are led to the conclusion that sentences like
( 15) The Golden Mountain does not exist are either meaningless or are obviously false. Neither option seems plausible. Russell's theory of descriptions offers. apain. an attractive solution to this problem. Sentences like ( 15) can be seen as meaningful and true when they are parsed according io this theory. ( 15) becomes
(16) It is not the case that there exists exactly one Golden Mountain. What is common to al1 of these solutions is that the definite descriptions are. in a sense, "analyzed away." Once it is seen that descriptions are not refemng expressions at all. but are instead complicated quantifier phrases. the problems are readily answered. At this point it is worth noting that the problerns which Russell considen also anse when we focus attention on genuine referring expressions. The puzzles just considered anse with. for example. proper names. Where an individual has more than one name. the puzzle of how identity statements can be informative and non-trivially true arises. Frege, in "On Sense and Meaning", considers the example of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" - both names for the same planet. If they name the same planet. then how could anyone sincerely wonder whether Hesperus is Phosphorus? Nobody. after all. wonders whether Hesperus is Hesperus. Frege's solution. unlike Russell's. appeals to a distinction between a name's reference and its sense. The sense of a name is. very loosely, some description under which the name's referent is represented to a speaker. For example, the sense of "Hesperus" rnight be expressed by "the first star in the evening". while the sense of "Phosphorus" might be expressed by "the first star in the morning". The two names of Venus mentioned above have the same reference. but they differ in tems of how the planet is represented to a speaker. Someone might genuinely wonder whether the first star in the morninp is the same celestial body as the first star which appears at night.
The second puzzle also arises with proper names. It seems that. according to the Law of Excluded Middle. either "Hamlet was bald is true or "Hamlet was not bald" is true. Since Hamlet does not exist. his name wiil not appear. as Russell rnight Say. in a list of those individuals who are baid. Nor will it appear in a list of those who are not bald. The same problern anses here as arose with definite descnptions. The problem of negative existentials also arises with proper names. "Hamlet does not exist" is both meaningful and true. If the narne has no referent. however. we seem to need some explanation of how the sentence can be both meaningful and true. Russell's view was that the class of penuine proper names does not contain '-Hamiet". or most other examples which we rnipht offer of a proper name. His view was that most names are actually disguised or ahbreviated descnptions. and hence are eliminated when the sentences in which they occur are pmperly analyzed. He remarks:
When the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist without rendenng the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name. i.e. not a name directly representing some object. Thus in al1 such cases, the proposition must be capable of being so anaiysed that what was the grammatical su~jectshall have disappeared (Whitehead and Russell 1927: 66). Russell's view regarding proper names seems implausible in the extreme. Saul Kripke. in "Identity and Necessity" and Naming and Necessity, Keith Donnellan, in "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions". and others have argued very persuasively for the conclusion that proper names are not in fact disguised or abbreviated descriptions.
The arguments are familiar and it is not my purpose to explore them at this point. What 1 do want to emphasize is that the puzzles considered by Russell are not specific to definite descriptions. but arise quite generally when we consider genuine refemng expressioris.
One last example will be enough to illustrate the generality of these puzzles. Consider the case of demonstratives like "this" and "that". An identity statement such as "This is the same as that" can, it seems be both non-trivially true and informative. John Perry. in "Frege On Demonstratives". offers an example which can be used to illustrate this. Suppose that a large boat is anchored in a harbour. Suppose the stem is clearly visible. as is the bow. The view of the rniddle, however. is blocked by several large buildings. A speaker might, pointing at the bow and then the stem. ask. "1s this the same as that?'The identity statement, "This is the same as that". in this context. does not seem to be trivially true. If someone knowledgeable about this matter were to Say. in this context, "7;his (pointing to the stem) is the same as th& (pointing to the bow)". his remark would be neither trivially tme nor uninformative. Hence. the problem of identity statements arises with such refemng expressions. The puzzle conceming the Law of Excluded Middle also seems io anse with demonstratives. Suppose a speaker is hallucinating and believes that there is a dagger before him. It would seem that either "This is covered with blood" must be tme or "This is not covered with blood" must be true. The problem will, it seems. anse of w hat to Say if there is nothing to which the speaker's use of "this" refers. A catalogue of things which are covered with blood would not include the speaker's intended referent. Nor would a catalogue of things which are not covered with blood. Finally. the speaker. in this example, may assert, '"This does not exist." Thus, it seems that the puzzle about negative existentials anses here as well. The foregoing dernonsirates that these three puzzles are not specific to uses of definire descriprions. As with proper names. it is very implausible to view demonstratives as disguised or abbreviated definite descriptions. David Kaplan. in "Dernonstratives". argues penuasively for this view. Demonstratives and indexicals are best considered, from the semantic point of view. as being what Kaplan calls direcr- referring expressions. Their reference is not mediated by any descriptive content. Instead. they refer directly. On Kaplan's account. the contribution which they make to the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence in which they occur is simply their referent (detemined in the context of utterance) - they are genuine singular terms. It seems that these puzzles anse with descriptions. names, and demonstratives. Thus. Russell's proposed solution to these puzzles provides an answer to only a subset of the cases in which they anse. This last point is important. The issue to be explored in the following chapten concems the sernantic function of definite descriptions. The proposal which 1 will try to defend is that descriptions have two distinct semantic functions. In some cases they are simply quantifier phrases. on a par with "Every man", "Some men." and "Most men". In other cases. they are genuine referring expressions on a par with proper names. demonstratives. and indexicals. This proposa1 is not falsified by noting that the three puzzles discussed above anse when definite descriptions are viewed as genuine refemng expressions. The fact that these puzzles arise when we consider descnptions. and that Russell's theory seems to solve them, should not be taken as conclusive evidence that descriptions are not genuine refemng expressions. As we have seen. these puzzles anse inrlependen- of uses of descriptions. A laquage which was like English except that it lacked the definite article would still generate these kinds of puzzles. Since Russell's proposed solution does not seem to provide an answer for these puzzles as they anse with other refemng expressions. some orher solution to them must be provided. There is. on the face of it. no reason to think that this same solution would not also be applicable to certain referential uses of definite descnptions. In presenting his theory of descriptions. Russell notes a very important datum
which dors seem to support his theory that descriptions are not genuine refemng expressions. This concerns the matter of scope distinctions. As is well known. quantifier phrases do allow for distinctions of scope. "Every girl loves a sailor". for example. is ambiguous. The distinct readings which might be offered tum on which of the quantifier phrases has wide scope. There do seem to be such scope distinctions when we consider the case of definite descriptions. Russell's example of "The present King of France is not baid" illustrates this nicely. There does seem to he one readinp of this sentence accordinp to which it is true. and one according to which it is false. This fact provides reason for thinking that descriptions are nor genuine singular terms. The latter do not generate such scope distinctions. There are not. for example. two readings of "Bill Clinton is not bald."
This evidence is compelling, however. only if scope distinctions anse with al1 uses of sentences of the form "The Fis not G". If there are uses of such sentences where these scope distinctions do not arise. then the fact that they arise in rome cases cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that definite descriptions should afwaw be read as quantifier phrases. and nrver as genuine singular terms. 1 will try to show that there are uses of descriptions for which Russell's analysis is inadequate. In these referential cases.
1 will argue. definite descriptions do function as genuine singular terms. Thus. these uses of descriptions. if my argument is sound. do not admit of the same scope distinctions which Russell noted.
(ii)Struwson'3 Ohjecrions to Russell's Theop
Strawson defends the daim that definite descriptions are genuine refemng expressions. He argues. in "On Referring", that Russell's account of descriptions involves certain fundamental mistakes. He remarks: 1 think it is true to Say that Russell's Theory of Descriptions. which is concerned with the last of the four classes of expressions I mentioned above (Le. with expressions of the fom 'the so-and-so'). is still widely accepted by logicians as giving a correct account of the use of such expressions in ordinasr language. 1 want to show in the first place. that this theory. so regarded, embodies some fundamental mistakes (Strawson 1950: 148). The central objection Strawson offers concerns Russell's daim chat sentences of the form "The F is G" iwiy that there exists a unique object which satisfies the description "the F'.
To focus our discussion, consider the sentence
( 17) The King of France is wise.
Strawson argues that we need to distinguish between the senience ( 17) and particular uses of the sentence. Similarly, we need to distinguish between the expression 'The King of
France" and uces of the expression. Someoae uttenng (17) on one occasion might.
Strawson notes correctly, be saying something different from what a speaker says who uses it on another occasion. For example.
if one man uttered it in the reign of Louis XIV and another man uttered it in the reign of Louis XV. it would be natural to say (to assume) that they were respectively talking about different people; and it miet be held that the first man, in using the sentence, made a tnie assertion. while the second man. in using the same sentence. made a false assertion. If on the other hand two different men simul taneousl y uttered the sentence... during the reign of Louis XIV, it would be natural to Say (assume) that that they were both talkinp about the same person. and in that case. in usinp the sentence, they must either both have made a tme assertion or both have made a false assertion (Strawson 1950: 153).
What this shows. Strawson argues. is that we cannot talk about the sentence ( 17) itself being either true or false. Rather it is uses of (17) that will be true or false. Similarly. the description "The King of France" does not refer, or fail to refer. to some person. Rather, uses of it refer or fail to refer. He remarks: 'Mentioning', or 'refemng', is not something which an expression does: it is something that someone can use an expression to do. Mentioning. or refemng to, something is a characteristic of a use of an expression, just as 'being about' something, and truth-or-falsity. are characteristics of a use of a sentence (Strawson 1950: 154)- These distinctions are. according to Strawson. conflated in Russell's discussion of denotinp. Russell's view that the meaning of a refemng expression. for example. must be its referent, illustrates. according to Strawson. the son of confusion which he has in mind. Recall that Russell was concerned about how sentences like (17) could be meaningful if there does not exist anything to which the description refers. His solution was. of course. to argue that descriptions are not refemng expressions at al1 - they are quantifier phrases. Against Russell. Strawson maintains that the refcent of an expression is not at al1 the same as the meaning of that expression: the meaning of an expression is not the set of things or the single thing it may correctly be used to refer to: the meaning is the set of des. habits. conventions for its use in referring (Strawson 19%: 156). Strawson's central objections to Russell's view of definite descriptions concerns Russell's claims that a speaker who utters (17) would. in al1 cases, be saying something which is either true or false, and that he wouid be merring that. at the time of his utterance. there exists one and only one King of France.
Suppose. Strawson argues. that someone today uttered (17). 1s it clear that he would have said. in uttering (17). something which is either true or false? Russell's answer is that he would have certainly said something false - since there is no person who is the unique King of France. Strawson rejects this conclusion. "Suppose," he
someone were in fact to Say to you with a perfectly serious air: 'The king of France is wise'. Would you Say, 'That's untrue'? 1 think it is quite certain that you would not. But suppose he went on to ack you whether you thought that what he had just said was true, or was false... 1 think you would be inclined. with sorne hesitation. to Say that you did not do either: that the question of whether his statement was true or false simply did nor mise, because there was no such person as the king of France (Strawson 1950: 157). U tterances of sentence w hich con tain non-refemng descriptions are, according to Strawson. neither true nor false. They do not express any determinate propositiw. Thus sentences like ( 17) may be meaningful, in spite of the fact that particular utterances of them lack a truth-value. Strawson argues that Russell was wrong to daim that a sentence. like (17). containing a definite description, logicalîy irnplies that there exists some unique object which satisfies the descnption. Furthemore. he argues that speakers who utter sentences like ( 17) do not arsett that there exists some unique object which satisfies the description.
Rather. speakers who use expression like "the king of France" usually are signaling their intention to pick out, or refer to, some penon. He remarks:
When a man uses la definite descnptionl, he does not men. nor does what he says enfail, a uniquely existential proposition. But one of the conventional function of the definite article is to act as a signal that a unique reference is being made - a signal, not a disguised assertion. When we begin a sentence with 'the-such-and-such' the use of 'the' shows. but does not state. that we are. or intend to be. refemng to one particular individual of the species 'such-and-such' (Strawson 1950: 159). Speakers in such cases presuppose that there is sornething which uniquely fits the descnption uttered. If this presupposition is false, Strawson argues, the assertion made is neither true nor false.
It is not my purpose to adjudicate the dispute between Russell and Strawson. Strawson's views have been very infiuential. and 1 mention them because in the subsequent chapters there will be occasions in which i refer to them. The central focus of the following chapters is on the alleged counterexamples to Russell's analysis which
Keith Donnellan has developed. As we will see in Chapter Two, his account is quite different from that offered by Strawson.
In the first five chapters. 1 deveiop an account of Keith Donnellan's referentiailattnbutive distinction. Chapter Two considers and rejects five different manners according to which the distinction might be drawn. Each involves conditions which might be viewed as necessary or sufficient for a use of a definite description to be counted as being referential or attnbutive. None of the conditions discussed provides a precise rneans of distinguishing referential from attributive uses. In Chapter Three. 1 will explore some of the ways in which. according to Donnellan, referential uses differ from attributive uses. Chapter Four presents an account of the distinction which appeals to the intentions of speakers conceming the truth-conditions of the proposition which they wish to communicate. Such an account provides. 1 argue. a clear means of distinguishing referential from attnbutive uses. Chapter Five addresses an account of the referentiallattnbutive distinction offered by John Searle. He argues that the distinction is much less significant than many have thought. He offers. in "Referential and Attributive", an alternative to the account offered in Chapter Four. 1 argue that his account does not succeed in adequately explainine referential uses of descriptions. Chapter Six marks a change of emphasis. The preceding chapters address the question. "How do referential uses of descriptions differ from attnbutive uses?" The focus is not on the issue of the sernantic analysis of definite descriptions, but sirnply on whether there really are two different manners in which speakers may use descriptions.
In Chapter Six. 1 address the question. "What is the semanzic significance of the referentiaVattnbutive distinction?" 1 contrast two general answers to this question which have emerged in the literature. The first claims that there is a difference between referential and attributive uses of descriptions, but that this is not reflected at the level of semantic analysis. The second claims that this distinction is important for the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. A central difference between the two answers to this question concems the distinction between sernantic and pragmatic features of lanpuage. The first answer to the question concerning the semantic significance of the referentiaVattributive distinction urges that the phenornenon of referential use is fully explained by appeal to pragmatic features of language-use. There is no need. according to this answer. to complicate the semantics of English in order to explain referential uses. Sentences in which definite descriptions occur are adequately anaiyzed. at the semantic level, by appeai to Russell's theory of descriptions. The second answer defends the view that Russell's theory may be adequate for some. but not all, uses of definite descnptions. The remaining chaptes explore the question of the semantic significance of the referentiallattnbutive distinction. In Chapter Seven. 1 provide an argument for the conclusion that the difference between referential and attributive uses should be reflected at the semantic level. This argument appeals to several plausible principles goveming the ascriptions of beliefs, and other propositional attitudes, to speakers. Chapter Eight is largely exegetical. My concem in this chapter is to present an argument offered by Donnellan. in "Speaker Reference, Descriptions. and Anaphora". for the conclusion that referential uses of descnptions function, at the semantic level. as genuine singular terms. His argument involves considerations to do with anaphoric occurrences of definite descriptions. Chapter Nine presents an important objection to the argument discussed in Chapter Eight. Scott Soames. in "Donnellan's ReferentiallAttributive Distinction". argues that there are powerful semantic intuitions which tell against viewing referential uses of descnptions which are anaphoric to other expression as being genuine singular tems. Soames' argument would, if it were sound. provide excellent reason for denying that definite descnptions ever function as singular tems. 1 explain how the scope of his conclusion can be extended to cases in which descriptions are used referentially but in which there is no anaphora. 1 argue that this argument does not succeed. and that it depends upon an implausible view about the nature of semantics. In Chapter Ten, I address two issues. First, 1 argue that attempts to explain referential uses by appeal to pragmatic features of language face serious objections.
Second. 1 explore the problem which so-cailed incornpiete uses of descriptions - descriptions. like "the table", which are not satisfied by some unique object - pose for Russell's theory of definite descnptions. 1 argue that the central problem for Russell's account which anses with incomplete descnptions also coufronts the general strategy of providing pragmatic explanations of referential usage. This probiem concems the fact that speakers who use descriptions referentially may sncceed in communicating dererminu~epropositions. RusseIlian accounts of incomplete descnptions have great difficulty accounting for this fact. 1 argue that the same fact also raises serious objections to the pragmatic explanations of referential use. Chapter Two
REFERENTIAL AND ATTRIBUTIVE USES OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
In "Reference and Definite Descriptions". Keith Donnellan argued that definite descriptions can be used in two distinct ways. On some occasions. they are used referentiaily. On other occasions they are used attriburiveiy. He argues that. a speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion says something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion. on the other hand. uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states sornething about that penon or thing (Donnellan 1966: 285). According to Donnellan, it is noi definite descriptions themselves. considered as
linguisric expressions. that are referential or attributive. He argues that we cannot ask how a descnption functions in some sentence independently of a particular occasion upon which it is used. According to Donnellan. both Russell and Strawson assume that "we
can ask how a definite description functions in some sentence independently of a
particular occasion upon which it is used" (Donnellan 1%: 282). One of his goals in
this paper is to show that this assumption is a mistaken one. He argues it is uses of descriptions that are either referential or attributive.
Donnellan provides two examples to illustrate how the same definite descnption
can be used both referentially and attributively. Suppose that Ralph. upon seeing the
brutally murdered body of Smith, utters,
( 1 ) The murderer of Smith is insane.
If there is no particular person such that Ralph intends to Say that he is insane. then his use of the definite description "the murderer of Smith" is auributive. Suppose, on the other hand, that Ralph observes the erratic behaviour of Jones dunng Jones's trial for Smith's murder. If. on the basis of his observations of Jones, he utters (1). then the description "the murderer of Smith" is being used referentia-. When a particular use of a description is descnbed in sufficient detail, we usually have no trouble detennining whether it is referential or attributive. Unless. however, we can specify clearly the necessary and sufficient conditions for referential and attributive uses, it is doubdul that the distinction should play a significant role when we are discussing the semansic contribution of definite descriptions to the propositions expressed by utterances of sentences in which they occur. Donneilan's accounts of the referentiallattnbutive distinction have developed since the publication of -*Referenceand Definite Descriptions". The explanations of the distinction offered in this paper. as well as later papers, are not always as clear as one would like. Indeed. some of Donnellan's remarks about the different uses of descriptions can lead to misunderstandings. It will be useful to examine one such misunderstanding in some detail. Martin Davies, in Meaning. Quunti'caiion. Necessi- argues that Donnellan's distinction. as presented in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". yields a classification that is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. He argues that there are uses of definite descriptions which. according to Donnellan's account. are neither attributive nor referential. Hence the distinction is not exhaustive. Furthemore, there are uses of definite descriptions which are, according to Donnellan's account. both attributive and referential. Thus the distinction is not exclusive. He concludes that, "A distinction which yields a classification which is neither exhaustive nor exclusive is not a good starting point for an argument that definite descriptions are ambiguous" (Davies 1981: 155). It will be useful to consider Davies' reasons for thinking that Donnellan's classification is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Seeing how this interpretation of the referentiaVattributive distinction can anse will provide some motivation for examining. in considerable detail, what. precisely. the differences are between referential and attributive uses. In introducing Donnellan's distinction, Davies writes that, The first thing to notice is that Donnellan's positive accounts of attributive and referential uses are, in a certain sense. incommensurable. His positive account of attributive uses is in terms of the speaker's reason or grounds for his assertion: 'Suppose fint that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world. we might exclaim, "Smith's murderer is insane"' (Donnellan 1966. p.288). But his positive account of referential uses is in terms of the speaker's intentions in making his utterance (Davies 1981: 154f). In defense of this account of the referential uses, Davies cites Donnellan's remark that, The contrast with such a use of the sentence [an attributive use] is one of those situations in which we expect and intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind when we speak of Smith's murderer and. most importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we are poing to Say something f Donnellan 1966: 2%). On this interpretation of the referentiavattributive distinction, a particular use of a description is attributive just in case the grounds or reasons which the speaker has for making his statement do not involve beliefs about any particular individual. A speaker's use of a description is referential just in case he intends, in making the statement. that his audience should come to believe that the person or thing which he has in mind has the property or properties which he is attn buting to it. Davies observes, correcti y. that this classification is not exhaustive:
The classification is not exhaustive since it is possible that a speaker's grounds for an assertion that the Fis G rnay be fumished by his beliefs conceming some particular object that it is uniquely F and that it is G. even though the speaker has no intentions that his audience should come to believe concerning that object that it is G (Davies 1981: 155).
To see that this is correct, consider the following example. Suppase that Ralph knows that his friend Yun is the strongest man in the world. and that he has seen him lift over 450 Ibs. In uttering, "The strongest man can lift over 450 lbs.". he may intend only that his audience should come to have the belief that the strongest man, whoever he happens to be. can lift over 450 Ibs. In such a situation. he neither expects nor intends that his audience cornes to believe that Yuri can lift over 450 lbs. If we classify uses of definite descriptions according to the criteria mentioned above, then Ralph's use of the description "the strongest man" will not be attributive since the prounds for his assertion do involve beliefs about a particular individual. Nor will it be referential since he neither expects nor intends that his audience should come to believe that Yun can lift over 450 ibs. Given the criteria mentioned above, Davies points out that the classification of referential and attributive uses is not even exclusive: The classification is not exclusive since it may be common knowledge between a speaker and his audience that each believes concerning, Say. : that it is uniquely F, and the speaker rnay trade upon this common knowledge in order to s-mean l conceming :that it is G, even though his beliefs conceming z did not furnish the prounds for his assertion (Davies 1981: 155). To see that this is correct, consider the following variation of the example described in the previous paragraph. Suppose that Ralph leams. in his class on human physiology. that. given the limits of human strength, the strongest man can surely lift 4% lbs. Suppose also that Ralph and the penon to whom he is speaking believe (and believe that the other believes) that Yuri is the strongest man. In uttering, "The strongest man can lift more than 450 Ibs.". Ralph may well expect and intend. given his beliefs about his audience's beliefs, that the audience will come to believe that Yuri can Iift more than 450 Ibs. According to the cntena mentioned above, his use of the definite description "the strongest man" will be referential. However, according to these same critena. his use will also be amiburive since his prounds for the assertion he made do not concem beliefs about anyone in particular: rather they concern the general facts about the limits of human strength which he leamed in his physiology class.
Davies offen the following. Gncean. account of s-rneaning: A speaker S s-means concerning an object z that it is thus and so. by his utterance (token) x directed at audience A. just in case ( 1) S intends concerning z that it will pmduce in A an (activated) belief conceming it (2)that it is thus and so...( Davies 1981: 153). Davies is. 1 think, quite right to cornplain that Donnellan's classification. if il is made uccording ro the criteria menrioned above, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
This conclusion is somewhat surprising since, at first sight, it seems that Donnellan's classification should be exclusive. 1 think, however, that Davies has misunderstood the difference between referential and attributive uses. Careful reading of Donnellan's articles on this topic show, 1 believe, that the criteria for referential and attributive uses which Davies singles out are not central to distinguishing the two uses of definite descriptions which Donnellan has isolated. One of the goals of the next three chapters is to present criteria for referential and attributive uses which do imply that this
~Iassificationis at least exclusive.
In this chapter, 1 will examine five conditions which rnight be taken to be either necessary or sufficient conditions for referential use. Each is suggested. at some point. by Donnellan's discussion of the referentiauattributive distinction. 1 will argue that there are problems with each. None provides a test which can allow us to detemine that a description is being used referentially rather than attributively. In Chapter Three, 1 will consider some of the consequenees that, according to Donnellan. follow from the distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions. 1 will ex plain and defend his daim that the difference between referential uses and attributive uses shows that referring and knoting are distinct relations between speakers and objects- In
Chapter Four. 1 will present Donnellan's account of the referentiallattnbutive distinction in terms of the speaker's infentions with respect to the truth-conditions of the statement that he is making. 1 will argue that. with certain refinements, this account of the conditions which must obtain in order for a description to be used referentially is acceptable. (i)Five Tests for Referenrial Use
Donnellan claims that what stands in contrast to a situation in which the description "the murderer of Smith" is beinp used attributively. is one of those situations in which we expect and intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind when we speak of Smith's murderer and. rnost importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we are going to Say something (Donnellan 1%6: B5f.). This seems to suggest that whether a descnption is being used referentially is a function of the intentions which the speaker has when he uses the description. According to this test. when a speaker uses a description referentially his intention is to allow his audience to pick out. or at least think of, the penon or object about whom. or about which. he wants to Say something. Thus. it seems that a distinguishing feature of referential uses is that the speaker hasomrone or something in mind, and he intends that his audience should attend to this object. Since referential uses are rneant to enable the audience to pick out something which the speaker has in mind, it is a necessary condition for referential use that the speaker have in mind some particular thing to which he wishes to draw his audience's attention. In addition, that a speaker has in mind something panlcular to which he wants to draw his audience's attention might be thought to be a sufficient condition for referential uses of definite descriptions. 1 will cal1 this 7he Parzicularin Condition.
The Particufari~Condition: A use, u, of a definite description. d. by a speaker. S. is referential if and only if S has some particular entity. e. in mind about which he wants to Say something, and S's intention in using d is to single out e. I think that this condition will not succeed at distinguishing referential from attributive uses of descriptions. In the case. described above. where the descnption is being used attributively. it seems that the speaker does, in a sense, have some penon in mind. He has in mind the person, whoever he or she is. who rnurdered Smith.?
2 Kent Bach explains the difficulty in the following manner: Furthermore. ii seems that the speaker expects and intends that his audience will realize that this is the person be means to be talking about by using the description "the murderer of Smith". We need an account of what is involved in having somenne in mind.3 What we need. if the Particularïty Condition is going to be useful. is some account of the notion of havinp someone in mind that is true of al1 and only the referential uses of definite descriptions. 1 will not attempt to offer such an account. My hope is that we can find necessary and sufficient conditions for referential uses of definite descriptions that do not rnake essential use of this notion. A natural way to try to distinguish these two uses of definite descriptions is to Say that in the referential cases there is some object such that the speaker believes that it uniquely satisfies the description he used. 1 will cal1 this The Beiief Condition. Thus. one might think that the difference between the referential and attributive uses of ( 1) is that in the case where the description is used referenria- the speaker believes that Jones is the unique person who fi& the description "the murderer of Smith". and uses this description in order to get his hearer to think of Jones. while when the description is used orrriburive& this is not the case. In the latter case the speaker has no idea who uniquely satisfies the description. Instead. he believes only that someone murdered Smith and that whoever did is insane. Thus, it might be thought ihat if there is no object which the speaker believes uniquely satisfies the definiie description he used, then his use cannot be referential. In addition. it might be thought that if there is some object which the speaker believes uniquely satisfies that definite description he used. then his use must be
.------The problem is that a speaker who uses "Smith's murderer" attributively and has no beliefs about wbo Smith's murderer is could still be said to have Smith's murderer in mind. ai beit only under the description 'Smith's murderer" (Bach 198 1: 18). 3 David Kaplan. in "Dthat", remarks that one of the things he finds "maddening" about Donnellan's article is the fact that the notion of having someone in mind is used but not defined. 1 share this frustration. The goal of Chapter Four is to try to account for referential uses of descriptions in a way that does not make essential appeal to this notion of huving snmenne in minci. referential. Thus. the Belief Condirion rnight be taken to be both necessary and sufficient for referential uses of definite descnptions. The Belief Condition: A use. u. of a definite description. d. by a speaker. S. is referential if and only if there exists some object. o. such that S believes that o uniquely satisfies d.
A further condition is suggested by the passage. quoted above, where Donnellan writes that. "A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion says somethinp about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so" (Donnellan 1966: 285). This suggests that a way to determine that a description is being used attributively is to see whether we can insert "whoever he is" or "whatever it is" after the description. If inserting a "whoeverl'-clause after the description does not change what the speaker said. in some sense of said. then the definite description was being used attributively. If it does change what was said, then the description was beinp used referentially. Kripke remarks. along these lines. that if we consider Donnellan's two cases where the definite description "the murderer of Smith" is used, the attributive case is distinguished by the fact that we can insert. parenthetically. the comment "whoever he is." "In the first case."
Knpke writes. "we may Say, "Smith's murderer. whoever he is. is insane." but not in the second" (Kripke 1977: 8). We can cal1 this the "Whoever Condition":
The Whoever Condirion : A panicular use. u. of a definite description. d. is atmibu~iveif and only if a 'whoeverl-clause or 'whateverl-clause can be added after d without changing what is said in u.
This condition seems plausible when considered in conjunction with the Belief Condifion. If al1 referential uses of definite descnptions necessarily involve the speaker having beliefs about what uniquely satisfies the definite description used in his utterance. then it would seem to be. at best. very misleading for a speaker to intend to use. for exarnple. "the murderer of Smith" referentially in an utterance of
(2) The murderer of Smith. whoever he is, is insane.
4 In .*Referential and Attributive". Searle calls this the '*WhoeverTest". The introduction of "whoever he is" will naturalty suggest to the audience that the speaker has no beliefs concerning who murdered Smith. The audience would naturally assume that the speaker is ignorant of the murderer's identity. and consequently would assume that he was using the description attributively rather than referentially. Thus we seem to have two tests for distinguishing referential from attributive uses. The first tells us that a speaker is using a description referentially if and only if he believes of some object that it uniquely fits the description he is using. The second tells us that a use of a definite description is attributive if and only if we can add a 'whoevef- clause without changing what was said.
Unfortunately, neither test will provide sufficient reason for thinking that a description is being used one way rather than the other. The Belief Condition fails since. as Donnellan argues. whether a description is being used referentially or attributively is not detemined by beliefs which the speaker or his audience may have concerning whether something uniquely satisfies the descnption he used. He remarks:
It is possible for a definite description to be used attributively even though the speaker (and his audience) believes that a certain person or thing fits the description. And it is possible for a definite description to be used referentially where the speaker believes that nothing fits the description (Donnellan 1966: 290).
A speaker can use a definite description attributively even though there is some object such that he believes that it uniquely satisfies the descnption used. In "Reference and Definite Descriptions", Donnellan offers an example of the following sort. Suppose. again. that Jones is on trial for the murder of Smith. Suppose that Ralph believes that Jones is guilty of the murder. If a speaker utten (1) and offers as his reason for making this assertion his belief that anyone who would murder Smith must be insane. then. according to Donnellan. his use of the description "the murderer of Smith" is attributive.
In this case, the ground for the belief he is asserting has nothing to do with Jones. Rather. his belief is grounded on considerations that take into account no one other than Smith. Donnellan, in "Speaker Reference. Descriptions. and Anaphora", provides another example which illustrates this point. Suppose that a speaker believes. due to considerations about the general limits of human strenpth, that the strongest man in the world can lift more than 450 pounds. Suppose that he says.
(3) The stronpst man in the world can lift more than 450 pounds. In this case, the speaker's use of the description is attributive. Furthemore, this use would be attributive even if the speaker happened to believe of Vladimir that he was the strongest man in the worid. provided that his grounds for assertinp the proposition that he is expressing do not depend on facts about any particular individual.
It is important to note that on Donnellan's account of the referentiallattributive
distinction. the grounds that the speaker has for asserting the proposition that would be
expressed by an utterance of (3)do not, bv themselves, detennine whether the description
is being used referentially rather than attnbutively. Suppose that in the case of the
speaker's utterance of (3) his grounds for making the statement concem a particular
individual. Vladimir. whom he believes to be the strongest man. Donnellan argues that this would stili not be sufficient for the use of the description to count as referential.
Without an rqwcrcuion that the audience will be able to recognize that the speaker is attempting to assert something about Vladimir, Donnellan argues that the speaker's use of the description would not. ordinarily, be referential. He writes: Suppose. though. that my grounds for my statement are that I believe of Vladimir that he is the strongest and I believe he can lift 450 Ibs. Still. those are my grounûs and if 1 do not expect nor intend that my audience shall recognize that 1 want to talk about Vladimir and to become informed about his strength. we have no reason to Say that I referred to Vladimir. What 1 have been describing, of course, is a case of what I would cal1 an attributive use of a definite description (Donnellan 1978: 30). Although Donnellan does not consider this case to be a referential use of a definite description. he remarks that the connection between referential uses of description and speakers's expectations with respect to the audience is not quite as straightfonvard as this quotation would suggest. Indeed. his considered view is that As stated this is somewhat misleading. As will be seen ..., 1 take a speaker's intention towards his audience to be only a sufficient. not a necessary. condition for speaker reference (Donnellan 1978: 433.5).
I will discuss this point further when I consider what 1 will cal1 the Conversatio~l Condition for referential uses of definiie descriptions.
If there are, as Donnellan claims. two ways of using definite descriptions. it would certainly be odd if a speaker could not use a description attributively once there is an object such that she believes that it uniquely satisfies the description. Stephen Neale argues that if the Beiief Condition were correct.
The referentialist would be committed to the fantastic view that whenever S knows (or thinks he or she knows) who or what satisfies some descnption or other. S can no longer use that description nonreferentially (Neaie 1990: 84). To see that this would indeed be an odd consequence. consider the following example. Suppose that, on Monday. Jane says.
(4) The man who painted The School of Athem was a great painter, while having no beliefs about who satisfies the description "the painter of The School of Afhens". In this case. the use of the description is clearly attributive. Suppose that, on
Tuesday, she cornes to believe that Da Vinci was the man who painted The School of Aihem and utters (4) with the intention of saying something about Da Vinci. Now her use of the descnption would be referential; she is using the description with the intention of petting her audience to think of Da Vinci. Suppose that. on Wednesday. Jack tells her he thinks that Raphael painted The School of Athens, and that he thinks it is a bad painting. Imagine that while Jane continues to believe that Da Vinci is the unique person who fits the description, she responds to Jack by saying,
(5) Well, whoever it was. the man who painted The Schoot of Athens was a great painter. In uttenng (5). it seems clear that she is using the description attnbutively. despite the fact that she believes that Da Vinci is the unique person who satisfies "the painter of The
School of Afhem". Thus. on both Monday and Wednesday Jane is using the descnption attributively. It would certainly be odd if the (false) belief acquired on Tuesday could prevent her from using the description attributively on Wednesday. As Neale claims. it would be odd if acquiring more beliefs, true or false. could determine how a speaker can use a detinite description. We have seen examples which illustrate that the Belief Condition is not a suflcienr condition for referential use. Donnellan argues that it is also possible to use a definite description referentially without there being mzy object which the speaker believes uniquely satisfies the descnption (Donnellan 1966: 290). Thus, the Belief Condition does not provide a necessant condition for referential use. To see that this is correct. consider the following example. Suppose that Ralphts university department currently lacks a chair and that Ralph believes this. Suppose that one of his collûagues is overly arnbitious and frequently tells his fellow faculty members how the department should be oqanized. Imagine that one day Ralph says,
(6) The chair of this department needs a holiday.
Donnellan claims that. in such a case, the speaker would be using the definite description referentially. despite his belief that there is no person who uniquely fits the description. Furthemore, Donnellan claims that a speaker may use a description referentially even if both he and his audience believe that nothing satisfies the description. Even if Ralph and his audience believe that their department is currently without a chair, he may still be using the descriptior: referentially in unering (6).
These examples show that for a definite description to be used referentially it is neither necessary nor suficien? that the speaker (or his audience) possess beliefs as to what. if anything, uniquely fits the descnption. We must conclude, therefore, that the Belief Condition will not serve to distinpuish referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions.
The Whoever Condition also fails to provide a sufficient condition for attributive uses of definite descriptions. In "Referential and Attributive", Searle argues that a description can be used referentiallys in the utterance of some sentence even if we can
insert a "whoever" or "whatever" clause afier the description without changing what was said. Suppose. for example, that Ralph is new to the department and has not yet met al1 the faculty memben. Suppose he has not yet been introduced to the professor who is acting as though he were the chair, but has witnessed his colleague's annoying behaviour.
Imagine that he also believes that tbe depanment has no current chair. If, pointing to the person in question, he were to utter, (7) The chair of this department. whoever he is. needs a holiday. his use of the descnption would be referential. Thus, the Whoever Condirion does not provide mfficient reason for concluding that a use of a descnption is attributive rather than referen tial . Satisfying the Whoever Condition may be a necessuq condition for attributive use. It seems very likely that we will be able to insert a "whoevern or "whatever" clause in any report of an utterance of a sentence in which a definite description is being used attributive1 y without altering the content of what the speaker said. What is important for the current discussion is that we still have no clear criteria for demarcatinp referential from attributive uses of descriptions.
Donnellan argues that. "The two uses can be thought of as corresponding to two possible purposes a speaker may have in using a definite description"(Donnellan 1%8:
204. The emphasis is mine.). He writes: The distinguishing characteristic of the referential use is the existence of an entity the speaker wants to talk about and in relation to which he chooses a description as a rneans of refening to it (Donnellan 1%8: 205). This suggests two conditions for referential use. The first is sirnilar to what 1 have called the Purticularity Condition. It is. however. different in an important respect. This condition requires not only that the speaker have something or someone in min4 it also
Searle does not think that really are two fundarnentally distinct uses of defini te descnption. I will examine his account of the distinction in Chapter Five. requires that what he has in mind exists. We could view this condition as just a strong version of the Particulari~Condition. However, in order to distinguish it from this, 1 w i Il cd1 i t the Eristence Condition. The Eristence Condition: A use of a definite description d by a speaker S is referential if and only if there exists some entity e such that S wants to talk about e and chooses d as a means of getting his audience to think of e. On the following page, Donnellan claims that in the case of referential uses
we wan~to say something about an entity and try to identify it for our audience via a description of it... At other times [where the definite description is being used attributively] we want to talk about whatever fits a certain description (uniquely) (Donnellan 1968: 206). Since this suggestion, as well as the one mentioned in the previous paragraph. appears to locate the distinguishing feature of referential uses of definite descriptions in the purposes and erpectarions of the speaker with respect to his audience. 1 will cal1 it the
Conversationui Condition. The condition concems the conversational purposes w hich a speaker has in using a description referentially. In "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora", Donnellan develops this view of the referentiaUattributive distinction. He argues that a speaker's erpectarions and intentimr. with respect to how his audience will interpret what he has said. play an important role in detemining how a definite description is being used. He wrhes: what 1 am saying cornes to this. that the referentiaVattributive distinction and the presence or absence of speaker reference should be thought of as based on such speaker intentions towards his audience or the lack of hem - not on whether the speaker believes or not about someone or something that he or it fits the description (Donnellan 1978: 30).
It mipht seem plausible to think that the Conversa~ionalCondirion is both sufficient and necessary for referential use.
The Conversarionni Condition: A definite description, d, by a speaker. S. is used referentially if and only if S wants to Say something about an entity. e, and inred.~that his audience identify e via his use of d. These two conditions are still not adequate. Consider the Conversatioml Condition first. In the attributive use of "the murderer of Smith", discussed above, the speaker surely wants to Say something about an entity, and tries to identify it for his audience by means of the description. In both referential and attributive cases the speaker rnay try to identify some entity for his audience via a description. It seems that. described this way, the intentions and expectations a speaker has when using a descnption referentially are the sarne as those a speaker has when he uses it attnbutively. Thus the Conversarional Condirion is not a rufJicient condition for referential use.
Donnellan. in "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora", qualifies the remark, quoted above, concerning the connection between a speaker's intentions with respect to his audience and the referentiaVattributive distinction. As 1 mentioned in the discussion of the Belief Condition. Donneilan is careful to point out that such expectaiions and intentions are only sufficient, not necessary. for a definite description's being used referentially. As 1 have argued. however. even this weaker claim is problematic. What is needed is a clearer description of the kind of intentions and expectations of speakers that determine whether their use of a definite descnption counts as referential rather than attributive. The Conversatio~lCondition also fails to provide a necessap condition for referential use. The reasons for this are worth pursuing for a moment because DonneIIan's views on this question seem to have changed between 1968 and 1978. In "Putting Humpty Durnpty Back Together Again". Donnellan suggests that a necessary condition for a use of a definite description being referential is that the speaker helieves that his audience will be able to identify the object he wants to talk about by means of the description he used. and that he inrends that they will recognize the thing he is talking about. He remarks:
the intention to refer to sornething in using a definite description is a complex intention involving expectations regarding one's audience. When a speaker uses a definite description referentially he intends his audience to take the descnption as characterizhg what he wants to talk about. In so doing he hopes that they will successfully recognize what that is (Donnellan 1968: 2 14). Although it may often be the case that speakers use descriptions referentially with the intention of getiing the audience to recognize or identify the object the speaker has mind, this is not alway the case. A speaker's use of a description can be referential. even when he does not intend that his audience should recognize his intended referent. Hence. the conversational condition is not a necessary condition for referential use. Donnellan. in "Speaker Reference. Descriptions, and Anaphora", seems to recopnize this point. This is demonstrated by his discussion of the following example. Suppose. he argues. that Woodward and Bernstein. in recounting their meetings with a certain informant from the White House , had said, (8) We decided to give the man the code name "Deep Throat." As Donnellan remarks. the reporters never intended the general public to recogni ze the penon to whom they were refeming. Yet it seems clear that their use of the description "the man" is referential. That Donnellan recopnizes this is evident from the following discussion: Suppose that the man that Woodward and Bernstein had in mind when writing the passage was not ever referred to by them as "Deep Throat," but that in fact they gave this code name to a second informant who entered into their investigations. So someone did possess the property attributed to "the man" ... . Still, I believe it is clear that would not Save the sentence from expressing a falsehood. The second informant was not being referred to here (Donnellan 1978: 39. The emphasis is mine.).
The statement made. by their utterance of (8).would be false. given the assumption Donnellan is considering, because the person to whom they were refemng was not referred to. by them. as "Deep Throat*'. In this case, Woodward and Bemstein would have been using the definite description "the man" referentially with no intention or expectation that their audience be able to identify the individual to whom they were refemng.
Thus it seems clear that speakers may use descriptions referentially even when they do not intend that their audience recognize the entity to which they intend to refer.
Given Donnellan's discussion of the Watergate example. 1 think :hat this reflects his considered opinion. Two other examples might help to illustrate this point. Suppose that Ralph is playing a game of "Twenty Questions" with one of his colleagues. He does not want his colleague to guess whom he is thinking of. nor does he intend this. Imagine that his partner knows only that the man Ralph is thinking of was an astronaut. Suppose that. as a hint, Ralph says, (9) The astronaut once played golf professionally.
In this case. Ralph's utterance of the definite description "the astronaut" is referential despite the fact that he does not intend that his audience recognize the person to whom he is refemng.
A second example can be constructed around Donnellan's case. described earlier. in which Smith is found murdered. Suppose that the police arrest a man who is not the rnurderer, but an accomplice. Suppose that the accomplice wants neither to reveal the identity of his fnend nor to appear to be uncooperative with the police. Imagine that as a reply to police questioning, he says,
( 10) The murderer of Smith drives a Ford.
It seems clear that in such a case the description is being used referentially. It is also clear, however. that the speaker does not intenù that his audience recognize the man to whom he is referring. Examples of this son show that a definite description can be used referentially without the speaker intending that his audience recognize the person to whom he is refemng. Thus we have seen that the Conversarional Condition is neither necessap nor suflcient for referential use.
The Existence Condition will also not work. Donnellan's characterization of referential uses in this way seems quite careless. As Donnellan himself points out. the existence of an entity that the speaker wants to talk about is mr a necessary condition for a referential use of a definite description. He wntes:
It should be noted that 1 allow here (and stnctly should throughout) for the possibility of a referential use without a referent. This would occur when no entity can correctly be identified as "what the speaker meant to be talking about," although the speaker intended that there should be ( Donnellan 1968: 2%). Donnellan. in "Reference and Defini te Descriptions", descri bes a situation in w hich a speaker uses a descnption referentially and yet there is nothing that could correctly be called "what the speaker meant to be talking about" (Donnellan 1%6: 2%). An example that illustrates this is the following: Suppose that Ralph thinks he sees. in the distance. a man wearing a fez hat. Suppose that he utten
( 1 1) The man wearing a fez is chair of my department. Imagine that Ralph has suffered an hallucination and that there is nothing at al1 where he thought he saw a man wearing a fez. In this case, Ralph may have used the definite description "the man wearing a fez" referentially despite the fact that what he meant to be talking about does not exist. Thus, it cannot be a necessary condition for a description's being used referentially that there exist some object about which the speaker wants to Say ~omething.~ That the Existence Condition is not a suflcieni condition for referential use is easy to see. The reason was already discussed when we considered the Particularin
Condirion. Consider the fint example which we examineci. If Ralph utten (1) and uses the description attributively, there is still a sense in which there is something he wants to talk about - the murderer. whoever i t happens to be, of Smith. Ralph uses "the murderer of Smith" as a means of getting his audience to think of this person. The use of the description is attributive even if there exists a unique person who murdered Smith. Thus. the kistence Condition is not a necessary condition for referential use.
6 In Descriptions. Stephen Neale characterizes the referential use of a definite descnption as follows: "A speaker S uses a definite description 'the F referentially in an utterance u of 'the F is G' iff there i.1 some object b such that S means by u that h is the F and that h is G" (Neale 1990: 85). The foregoing considerations show. 1 believe. that this definition is inadequate. We have considered five conditions which might be thought to provide means for distinguishing referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions. Four purport to
outline conditions which are necessary and sufficient for the use of a definite description
being referential. The other - the Whoever Condition - is a condition which might be thought to be both necessary and sufficient for attributive use. All, 1 think, are suggested by Donnellan's own accounts of the distinction. Some, like the Belief Condition and the
Existence Condition, are suggested by some of Donnellan's characterizations of the distinction. but are explicitly rejected by him. The following table provides an overview of the conditions considered and the main problems they face:
TABLE 1 Condition Description Probiem The A use, u, of a definite When a description is used Particularity Condition description. d, by a speaker, attributive&, the re i s a S. is referential if and on1y sense in which the speaker if S has some particulai has a particular entity in entity. e, in mind aboui mind about which he wants which he wants to Say to Say something. Thus. it something. and S's is not a sufficient condition. intention in using d is tc singIe out e. The Belief Condition A use, u, of a definite A speaker can use a description, d, by a speaker, description referen tial ly S. is referential if and only when he believes that if there exists some objeci, nothing fits it. Also. a o. such that S believes that o speaker can use a cuniquely satisfies d. description attributively when he believes of some objeci that it uniquely fiis the description used. Thus. it is neither necessary nor sufficient. The Whoever Condition A particular use. u, of a A speaker's use of a definite description. d, is description can be attributive if and only if a referential even though we 'whoeverl-clause or may insert a 'whoever- 'whateverl-clause can be cIausel after it. Hence, it ic added after d without not a sufficient condition. changing what is said in u. The A definite description, d, by A speaker using a Conversational Condition a speaker. S, is used de s c ri p t i O n atrrihutive!y referentially if and only if S intends that his audience wants to Say something identify, in u sensr, the about an entity. e. and object he wants to talk inrends that his audience about. Also, a speaker may identify e via his use of d. use a description referentially when he does not intend that his audience identify or recognize the thing he wants to talk about. Thus, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition: The Existence Condition A use of a definite A speaker can use a description d by a speaker S desciiption referentially is referential if and only if even when there exists cthere exists some entity e norhing which could such that S wants to talk comectly be descnbed as about e and chooses d as a what the speaker meanr to means of getting his be referring to. Also. a audience to think of e. speaker may use a description attri butively when there exists an object that he wants to taIk about. Thus, it is neither necessary nor sufficient. Chapter Three
REFERRING AND DENOTING
In this chapter I will present some of the central ways in which. according to Donnellan, referential uses of definite descriptions differ from attributive uses. The focus in this chapter will not be on the semantic contribution made by definite descriptions when they are used referentially or attributively. 1 will tum to this topic in Chapten Six and Seven. Before addressing this issue, 1 want to isolate some of the ways in which referential uses differ from attributive uses. The focus will be on the nature of the presuppositions or implicarions which are generated by such uses.
(il Rrferential and Artributive Uses: Their Presuppositionr or Implications
It will be useful. in order to develop an account of the differences between these two uses of definite descriptions, to note three assumptions about descriptions which. according to Donnellan, both Russell and Strawson share. As we have seen. Russell and
Strawson disagree on the question of the linguistic function which definite descriptions serve. For Russell. they are not genuine refemng expressions. Instead. they function as quantifier phraes. For Strawson, descriptions are genuine refemng expressions.
Despite this fundamental disagreement. Russell and Strawson. according to Donnellan. share the following basic assumptions:
(1) We can identify the linguistic role a description is playing idependently of some context in which it is being used.
(II) Speakers who use descriptions presuppose or imp- that something fi ts the description. (III) There is one correct account to be given of how the truth value of what the speaker has said is affected when this presupposition or implication is false. 1 noted in the previous chapter that Donnellan rejects the first assumption. One of the central points he emphasizes in his account of referential and attnbutive uses of descriptions is that one cannot ask. independent- of ri pnrticular occasion of use. how a definite description is functioning. Russell and Strawson, according to Donnellan. make a common assumption ...about the question of how definite descriptions function: that we can ask how a definite description functions in some sentence independently of a particular occasion upon which it is used. This assumption is not really rejected in Strawson's arsuments apainst Russell ...Just as we can speak of a function of a tool that 1s not at the moment performing-its function, Strawson's view, 1 believe. allows us to speak of the referentlal function of a definite description in a sentence even when it is not being used. This. 1 hope to show. is a mistake (DonneIlan 1966: 283). Donnellan's view is that descriptions can be used to perform two distinct linguistic functions. They can be used to refer to something or they can be used merely to denote something. He argues that there are two uses of definite descriptions. The definition of denotation given by Russell is applicable to both. but in one of these the definite description senies to do something more. 1 shall Say that in this use the speaker uses the definite description to refer to something. and cal1 this use the "referential use" of a definite description. Thus. if I am right. referrine is not the same as denotinp and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognized on Russell's view (Donnellan 1%6: 28 10. This idea. that the relations of denoting and referring are not the same. seems intuitively correct. It is not. however. easy to articulate. One of the goals of this chapter will be to explore some of the differences between them. Although attention to contexts of use is central. on Donnellan's account. to determininp whether a description is being used referentialiy or attributively. he does acknowledge that there are some sentence-types where the descriptions occumnp within them could not be used in either a referential or an attnbutive manner. Seeing why this is so permits us to see how a certain presupposition or implication anses with both referential and attnbutive uses of descriptions.
Donnellan daims that there are some sentences containing descriptions about which we mn make assertions. independently of a context of use. conceming how the descriptions function. There are some cases, he argues. in which utterances of sentence- types containing definite descriptions would faif to generate any assumption, on the part of the audience, that there exists something that fits the description used. In such cases. we can know that the descriptions are not performing either of the functions with which he is concemed. He writes that There are some uses of definite descriptions which cany neither any hint of a referential use nor any presupposition or implication that something fits the description. In general. if seems thrhese are recogni:ablefrorn the sentenceframe in which the descriprion occrcrs. These will not interest us. but it is necessary to point them out if only to set them aside (Donnellan 1966: 284. The emphasis is mine.). The sons of sentence-types which he has in mind are illustrated by the following examples (Donnellan 1%6: 284):
(1 ) The present king of France does not exist. (2) 1s de Gaulle the king of France? Sentences like these would not be used by a speaker who is trying to refer to something which fits the description used, nor by a speaker who wishes to anribute some property to the object which satisfies the description. Hence. according to Donnellan. we can be sure that the descriptions occumng within thern would not be used to perform either a referential or attributive function. This feature of Donnellan's account brings out one of the common aspects of referential and attributive uses: When descriptions are used to perfonn either of these functions. they carry a presupposition or implication of existence. In each of these cases. a speaker's audience will naturally assume that there exists. or at least that the speaker helieves that there exists. something which fits the description. Let us cal1 this The Existence Presumpt ion: The Eririence Presumption: When a speaker S uses a descnption d in either a referential or an attributive fashion, S's audience will naturally presume that S believes that there, exists some entity e that satisfies d.
One qualification should be noted before we proceed further. The Exisrence Presurnprion needs to be distinguished from The Existence Condition discussed in the previous chapter. The latter, recalt. claiins that a necessary condition for referential use is
that there exists something to which the speaker wishes to refer: The Erirtence Condition: A description is used referentially if and only if there erists an object which the speaker wants to talk about and uses the description as a means of gtting his audience to think about this object. The fisrence Preswnption is not rneant as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for referential or attnbutive uses. Rather, it daims that. in the usual course of a conversation, if a speaker uses a definite description in either of these fashions, his audience will
assume that the speaker believes that something satisfies the descnption used. As we have seen in Chapter Two, there will be cases where it is clear that, although a descnption is being used referentially, the audience does not make such a presumption.
Nomally. however. this presumption will be made. Donnellan states this explicitly about refemnp uses of descriptions. He wntes that, "Many times ...the use of a definite description does cary a presupposition or
implication that something fits the description. If definite descriptions do have a
refemng role. it will be here" (Donnellan 1966: 285). The Erisrence Presumption, however. applies equally to attnbutive uses of descriptions. He argues that by attending
to the nature of the presuppositions or implications camed by referential uses, and those
camed by attributive uses. we can better see how the two uses are distinct. It will be
worthwhile to explore this point in some detail. Donnellan argues that both attributive and referential uses of descnptions carry
with them the presupposition or implication I that there is something which satisfies the
description used in the utterance. However, according to his account, "the rasons for the existence of the presupposition or implication are different in the two cases" (Donnellan
1966: 291). When a description is used referentially it is normally the case that the
1 Donnellan uses this disjunction intentionally throughout "Reference and Definite Descriptions" in order to avoid takinp a stand on one of the central questions in the debate between Russell and Strawson: Does a speaker who uses a definite descnption imply that there is exactly one object that satisfies the description (is this part of what he has said) or does he simply presuppose that there is such a unique object? speaker wishes to draw the attention of his audience towards some particuiar object. The description. used referentially. is one of the linguistic resources which are available for accomplishing this. Often, another description. a name. a demonstrative expression. or even a non-linguistic device like pointinp. will serve the speaker's purpose. Donnellan remarks: in the referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a person or thinp - and in general any other device for doing the same job. another description or a name. would do as well (Donnellan 1966: 285). Since a speaker's usual purpose. in this sort of case, is to get his audience to identify something, it is natural to presume that he will choose the most eficient means to this end. Clearly, usinp a description which fits the intended referent will be a more effective means to this goal. in the majority of cases, than using a description which is not true of the referent. As Donnellan explains. Because the purpose of using the description is to get the audience to pick out or think of the right thing or penon, one would normally choose a description that he believes the thinp or penon fits. Normally a misdescnption of that to which one wants to refer would mislead the audience. Hence. there is a presumption that the speaker believes something fits the description - namely. that to which he refers ( Donnellan 1966: 29 1 ).
As noted in the previous chapter. there will be exceptions to this conversational principle. In certain circurnstances, usually where the audience is misinfomed about things. the most efficient means of drawing attention to something may involve using a description which is not true of that thing. In the normal case. however. speakers will try to use definite descriptions they believe are satisfied by the item to which they wish to refer.
The case is somewhat different with attributive uses. In these cases, there is the presumption' that something fits the description. However. "there is not the same possi bili ty of misdescription" (Donnellan 1966: 29 1 ). Since the speaker intends to talk
2 Tresumption" is meant to stnke a neutral balance between the options defended by Strawson and Russell. about whatever satisfies the description he has chosen, there is a natural presumption. on the part of his audience, that something or other must fit the description used. As Donnellan notes,
The presupposition or implication is borne by a definite description used attributively because if nothing fits the description rhe finguisric purpose of rhe speech ucr will be rhworted. That is. the speaker will not succeed in saying something true, if he makes an assertion; he will not succeed in asking a question that can be answered, if he has asked a question; he will not succeed in issuing an order that can be obeyed, if he has issued an order (Donnellan 1%6: 29 1f. The emphasis is mine.). To see this. consider an exarnple offered by Donnellan. Suppose that a speaker is told that someone put a book on his pnzed antique table. He has no idea which book this might be. or who placed it there. Suppose that. upon learning of this state of affairs. he utters
(3) Bring me the book on the table. In this case. it is natural to understand the speaker as having used the description
(4) The book on the table attributively. Suppose, finally, that the speaker has been misinformed. and that there is no book on his prized table. Donnellan claims that in such a circurnstance. Not only is there no book about which an order was issued. if there is no book on the table, but the order itself cannot be obeyed. When a definite description is used attnbutively in a command or question and nothing fits the description, the command cannot be obeyed and the question cannot be answered. This suggests some analogous consequences for assertions containing definite descriptions used attnbutively. Perhaps the analogous result is that the assertion is neither true nor false...( Donnellan 1966: 288). The case is different when w e consider descriptions used referentiall y. Suppose that the exarnple above were changed in the following fashion: The speaker is sitting in a dim room and sees a book which he thinks is lying on his table. He is unable to retrieve the book himself. but desires to read it. Suppose that he utters (3) with the intention that his hearer should bnng him the book. Finally. suppose that there is nothing on the table. but the book in question is lying on a footstool adjacent to the table. The speaker. in this case. has mistaken the footstool for the table. As in the previous case. there is nothing which satisfies the speaker's utterance of (4). however, the implication of this is not the same. 1t is plausible to think that. in spite of the misdescription. the speaker has issued an order. and that it is perfectly possible for this order to be fulfilled. To sum up. we have seen that a central difference between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions concerns the rearom underlying the presumptions in each case that something or other fits the description used. The assumption (11). made by both Russell and Strawson. is thus conect. Neither notices. however. that the rearnns underlying the presupposition or implication of existence will not be the same for all uses of definite descriptions. Furthemore, we have seen that a central difference between these uses arises when this existence presumption should tum out to be false. As we have seen. on Russell's theory of defini te descriptions, if nothing satisfies the descnption. then the staternent is false. On Strawsonfs account. if nothing satisfies the descnption then the statement is neither true nor false. Despite this difference. Russell and Strawson both make the assumption that only one account is needed of how the falsity of the presupposition or implication of existence affects the tnith-value of what the speaker has said. Donnellan argues that this is mistaken. The fact that the reasons underlying the existence presumptions for referential and attributive uses of descriptions are not the same suggests that how a speaker's utterance is affected by the falsity of this presurnption will not be the same for each kind of use. He remarks:
if there are two uses of definite descriptions. it may be that the truth value is affected differently in each case by the falsity of the presupposition or implication. This is what 1 shall in fact argue (Donnellan 1%6: 283).
As we have seen. in the case of referential uses the speaker rnay still succeed in his conversational purpose of getting the audience to attend to some object. despite the falsity of the existence presumption. He may succeed in making an assertion3 about his
3 Note that this does not imply that the speaker's utterance itself will express the proposition which he wishes to assert. This issue of the propositional content of intended referent. asking a question about it. or issuing an order concerning it. In the case of attributive uses, this is not so. The reason for this difference between these uses of descriptions can be seen when we consider how we "identify some entity as what the speaker was talking about in using the descnption" (Donnellan 1968: 206). When a speaker has used a description "the F' atrributivefy, the only entity that could qualify as what he was talking about would be something that satisfies the description uniquely.
When a speaker uses a descnption referenriuffy.on the other hand. something can be identified correctly as what he was talking about even when it does nor satisfy the description uniquely. The above differences are explained by a couple of remarks which Donnellan offen. Regardinp attributive uses, he notes that the definite description might be said to occur essentially. for the speaker wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits that description: but in the referential use the description is merely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a penon or thing - and in general any other device for doing the same job. another descnption or a narne4. would do as well. In the attributive use, the attribute of beinp the so-and-so is al1 important. while it is not in the referential use (Donnellan 1966: 285).
Regarding referential uses. he remarks: many of the things said about proper names by Russell can. 1 think. be said about the referential use of definite descriptions without straining senses unduly. Thus the gulf Russell thought he saw between names and definite descnptions is narrower than he thought (Donnellan 1966: 282).
Genuine names. for Russell, serve as linguistic pointing devices to enable speakers to draw the attention of their audiences to objects in the world. Descriptions can. according to Donnellan, serve this end when they are used referentially; more generally.
- referential uses of definite descnptions will be addressed in Chapten Six and Seven. What seems clear at this point. however, is that here is good reason for thinking that when a speaker uses a description referentially and there is nothinp which fits the description used. he may still succeed in communication a thought about his intended referen t. In fact. the types of expressions which could serve this function include more than just these. Demonstratives would also, in the appropriate context, serve the same purpose. Even non-linguistic acts. like pointing, could. in the appropriate situation, serve the same end. names, demonstratives. and referential uses of definite descriptions often serve the same conversational purpose of getting an audience to attend to something or otherS5 Donnellan, in "htting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again". offers a more developed account of some consequenees that follow from referential, but not of attributive. uses of descriptions He writes: If a speaker S uses a definite description, "the 0,"referentially there will be some entity e (or, at least, the speaker will intend that there should be) about which the following will be true ... ( 1) S will have referred to e whether or not e is in fact 0. (2) S will have said something true or falsr about e whether or not e is in fact 0 (provided that everything else is in order conceming the remainder of the speech act). (3) S, in using "the 0"to refer to e, will have presupposed or implied that e is 0. (4) In reporting Ys speech act, it will be correct to Say that he stated something about e and in reporting this to use expressions to refer to e other than "the 0"or synonyms of it (Donnellan 1%8: 206). To illustrate these features. it is convenient to use one of Donnellan's examples of a referential use of a description6 (Donnellan 1966: 287). Suppose that a speaker at a party spots an interesting-looking man and says
(5) The man drinking a martini is happy tonight. Donnellan claims that. in this case. the speaker has used the description
(6) The man drinking a martini to refer to the person he sees. Furthermore. he has succeeded in referring to that man even if the man has only water in his glass. What the speaker said, in a loose sense of
"said. will be rue if and only if the person to whom he referred is happy tonight. It is not necessary that the man refered to is actually drinking a martini. What he said will be true if the man is dnnking only water, provided, of course. that he is happy. In uttering
(S), the speaker, in some sense, presupposes or implies that the person to whom he is
5 The fact that referential uses of descriptions can often be used with the intention of pointing out some object to an audience is not a necessary condition for referential usage. as we saw in the previous chapter, the Conversational Condition does not serve as a necessary condition for referential use. 6 1 have altered his example so that the speaker is making an assertion. In Donnellan's example, the speaker is asking a question. refemng is drinking a martini. However. if this presupposition is false. it does not follow
that he has not referred to, or said something true of, the man he wants to Say something about. Finally. if we were to report his assertion. we could fi11 the blank in
(7) He said that is happy tonight
in a number of ways. Provided that the expression which we use refers. in the context in
which we use it, to the man to whom the speaker referred, we can use any expression we choose. If, for example, we know that the man to whom he was refemng is not dnnking a martini. we would not ordinarily use the description (6). As Donneilan remarks. to do
so would be to suggesi that we too believe that the man is drinking a martini (Donnellan
1966: 291). lnstead we might use a demonstrative such as "that man", or another definite description. or a proper name. What this shows. Donnellan argues. is that when speakers use descriptions
referentially. they may be reported as having said something of some object - their intended referent. He remarks:
when a definite description is used referentially. a speaker can be reported as having said something of something. And in reporting what it was of which he said sornething we are not restncted to the description he used, or synonyrns of it: we may ourselves refer to it using any descriptions. names and so forth, that will do the job. Now this seems to give a sense in which we are concemed with the thing itself and not just the thing under a certain description, when we report the linguistic act of a speaker using a definite description referentially (Donnellan 1%6: 303). Contrast this case with one in which the description (6) is being used attnbuiively. Suppose that the Chair of the local Teetotalen Union has been told that some man is
dnnking a martini on the premises (Donnellan 1%6: 287). Suppose he says
(8) The man drinking a martini is suspended. Here, Donnellan argues. the speaker has not referred to anything. In addition. if nothing fits the descriptions. then the speaker has certainly not said anythinp tme? Provided that there is exactly one man who is drinking a martini, he has denoted, but not referred to.
-- - 7 He leaves open the question as to whether the speaker has said something false. someone. In the next section. 1 want to consider some of the ways in which, according to Donnellan. refemng and denoting differ.
(ii)Denoring adRe feving
A central claim of Donnellan's "Reference and Definite Descriptions" is that denoting is not the same relation as refemng. Russell. in "On Denoting", explained denoting as follows:
if 'Cl is a denoting phrase. it may happen that there is one entity x (there cannot be more than one) for which the proposition 'xis identical with C' is tme ...We may then Say that the entity x is the denotation of the phrase Thus Scott is the denotation of 'the author of Waverley' (Russell 1905: 51).
Following Russell. Donnellan claims that a definite description 'the F denotes an object o just in case O is F and nothing else is F (Donnellan 1966: 293). This way of defining denotation implies that both referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions may have denotations. Donnellan remarks: Russell's definition of denoting (a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely) is clearly applicable to either use of definite descriptions. Thus whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attnbutively. it may have a denotation. Hence. denoting and refemng. as 1 have explicated the latter notion. are distinct. and Russell's view recognizes only the former (Donnellan 1%6: 293). Consider the example discussed in the previous section. The speaker. in using the description (6) referentially. refers to the man whom he sees holding a martini glass. If he is the only person dnnking a martini. then the description used also denotes him. Suppose. however. that while he has only water in his glass, there is exactly one man. at the pany who is drinking a martini. In this case. the speaker's use of the description (6) refers to the first man, but denotes the second. In the second example mentioned above, the chair of the Teetotalers Union has d-nnred the one person. if there is exactly one. who is dnnking a martini. He has not. according to Donnellan. referred to anyone. Donnellan claims that there are good reasons for making a sharp distinction between referring and denoting. He argues that If one tried to maintain that the? are the same notion. one resrrlt wortld br that a speaker might be referring to something without knowing it. If someone said. for example, in 1960 before he had any idea that Mr. Goldwater would be the Republican nominee in 1%4, "The Republican candidate for president in 1964 will be a conservative," ... the definite description here would denote Mr. Goldwater. But would we wish to Say that the speaker had referred to, or mentioned, or talked about Mr. Goldwater? I feel these tems would be out of place ....On my view. however, while the definite description used did denute Mr. Goldwater (using Russell's definition), the speaker used it amiburively and did not refer to Mr. Goldwater (Donnellan 1%6: 293. The emphasis is mine.). In this example. Donnellan asks us to imagine that the speaker bases his belief about the future candidate on generally known facts about trends within the party. This example sugpests an intuitive distinction between refemng and denoting. There seems to be a use of "refemng" accordinp to which the following principle seems plausible:
The Intention Requirement: If a speaker S is refemng to some object o. then S intends to be refemng to o. This requirernent for speaker reference is central to Donnellan's account of the referentiallattributive distinction. In the next chapter, we will consider the sorts of intentions which are involved in this concept of speaker reference. Other examples can be given which support Donnellan's claim that denoting and refemng are distinct relations. Consider the following example. Suppose that Al and Bob are discussing Canadian poli tics and they share the belief that either the Li beral party or the Conservative party will fonn the govemment of Ontario in 1999. Suppose that Al believes (on the basis of his analysis of trends within al1 Canadian political parties) that the next Premier will be a woman. Given this, the following dialogue seems plausible:
(Al) The goveming party of Ontario in 1999 will be led by a woman. (Bob) Are you refemng to the LiberaIs or the Conservati ves? (Al) Neither. I'm just saying that the next governing party. whichever one it is, will be led by a woman. Let's assume that in this example. the description used denotes one of the parties. If this dialogue makes sense. it seems that we have a use for the tems "denoting" and
"refemng" according to which it makes perfectly good sense to say that a use of the definite description "the governing party of Ontario in 1999 denotes somethinp, yet a speaker may use it without referring to anything. Both Donnellan's example and this last example, which is just a variation of Donnellan's. suggest that refemng and denoting are distinct relations. To characterize these two relations more precisely, it is instructive to consider both referential and attributive cases in which there is nothing which satisfies the definite descriptions uttered by the speaker. Cases where the speaker's intended referent fails to fit the description used, but something else does, also serve this purpose. These sorts of examples are often offered in Donnellan's explications of the referentiaVattributive distinction. This focus has been taken, by many commentaton, to suggest that Donnellan is defending the daim that speakers may chunge the semantic reference or denotation of expressions. Many of the things he says does suggest this. 1 think. however, that
Donnellan's emphasis on such cases is best seen in another way. In the following. 1 want to explore some of the manners in which these sorts of examples have been interpreted. I will argue that. despite what Donnellan sometimes suggests. these examples are best understood as demonstratinp the distinction between denoting and refemng. and not as attempts to show that speakers rnay change the conventional semantic reference of expressions. Numerous commentators on Donnellan's distinction have focused on this aspect of his presentation. They argue. correctly I believe. that such examples do not. by themselves. show that definite descriptions are semantically ambipuous. In the literature on Donnellan's distinction. much of the debate centres on whether a speaker who utters a sentence of the form "The F is G" can succeed in expressing a proposition about some entity even rhorigh the description used is not true of this entiîy. Consider the example involving a referential use the description "the murderer of Smith". Suppose a speaker. observing the accused in the dock, utten (9) The murderer of Smith is insane.
In this example, the speaker sees a particular man. Jones. whom he believes to be Smith's murderer and, based on Jones's erratic behaviour, he utters (9). Donnellan notes that he
speaking about Jones even thouph he is not in fact Smith's rnurderer and. in the circumstances imagined, it was his behaviour (the speaker wasf commenting upon. Jones might, for example, accuse (hirn) of saying false things about him in calling him insane and it would be no defense. 1 should think. that (his) description, "the murderer of Smith." failed to fit him (DonneIlan 1966: 2%). Comrnents like this naturally leave the impression that Donnellan is claiming that descriptions used referentially may have as their semantic refereni something which does not satisfy the description. Donnellan wntes that in "Reference and Definite Descriptions".
1 suggested that when a speaker uses a definite description, "the v." referentially to refer to something. e. he may have said something true about e even if e is not I/J or even if nothing is q. In contrast, 1 thought, if the definite description is used attnbutively. then if nothing is y. the speaker cannot have said something true (1 left it open whether he would then have said something false) (Donnellan 1%8: 209). Once again. this way of characterizing the significance of the referential/attributive distinction suggests that Donnellan is claiming that it shows that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. Furthemore. it suggests that Donnellan believes that such cases of referential uses, where the intended referent does not fit the description uttered. show that descriptions are ambiguous. If a speaker who uses a description referentially may sa> something true about some item which does not satisfy the description. but the same does not hold for a speaker who uses the same description attnbutively. then this implies that what they sq is not the same. Thus. remarks like the last one could be interpreted as claiming that definite descriptions have two kinds of sernantic functions.
1 think that this interpretation is unfortunate, and that a charitable reading of
Donnellan's early papers on this topic would not lead to this conclusion. In other passages, he is quite explicit about the question of the ambiguity of definite descriptions. He writes that, The grammatical structure of the sentence seems to me to be the same whether the description is used referentially or attributively: that is. it is not syntactically ambiguous. Not dues N seem ot all attractive ro suppose an arnbiguity in the meaning of the words; ir does not appear to be semanticaffyambiguous (Donnellan 1%6: 297. The emphasis is mine.). Donnellan suggests, tentatively. that the ambiguity might be a pragmatic
ambiguity. As I have already noted in Chapter Two, he does not explain what might be involved in the idea of a pragmatic arnbiguity. What is clear, however. is that in these early papers, he does not seem to be arguing that the referentiallattributive distinction shows that descriptions are semantically ambiguous. Michael Lockwood, in "On Predicating Proper Names*', argues that with respect
to examples where a description is used referentially to pick out something which it does not satisfy, The question As whether a name or description is required actually to apply to an individual in order to serve as a means of making that individual a subject of assertion. Donnellan holds that it is not - that a speaker can be said to have made a statement about the object he has in mind. in uttenng a refemng expression. even if it fails to qualify as what Kripke calls the "semantic referent" of the term in question. But it seerns to me that Donnellan is here quite unnecessarily riding roughshod over the commonsense distinction between what a speaker means, and what he actually succeeds in saying. Genuine assertion (as opposed, Say. to successful communication) calls. it seems to me, for a convergence between words and intention which, in the sort of case we are considenng, is ex hvpothesi lacking (Lockwood 1975: 486; quoted in Wettstein 1981: 37). This interpretation of Donnellan's argument is. as 1 have indicated, fairly common. The focus on cases where a description is being used to refer to somethinp that does not satisfy it can, 1 think, be seen in another light. One interpretation. as we have seen, is to Say that this focus is meant to show something about the semanric functioning of descriptions when used referentially. This has been the common interpretation. 1
agee with commentators like Kripke, in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference". Lockwood, in "On Predicating Proper Names", and Wettstein. in "Demonstrative
Reference and Definite Descriptions" that such cases, by rhernselves. do not show that definite descriptions must be given two distinct semantic analyses. As I have tried to
show, 1 think that Donnellan himself would accept this claim.
There is, however, a second interpretation of this focus. On this interpretation, the purpose of an emphasis on such cases is to demonsirate how the relations of referring and denoring are distinct. In order to explore this issue, it will be useful io consider the debate between Donnellan and Alfred MacKay. This will involve a bit of a digression. but aftenvards we will be in a better position to undentand Donnellan's clah that refemng and denoting are distinct relations, and the reason for the emphasis he places on examples where definite descriptions are used referentially to single out objects which do not satisfy the descriptions used.
(iii)The Dehare Between Donnellan and MacKuv
In "Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Refemng". MacKay challenges one of the central daims made by Donnellan. He denies that speakers may succeed in referring to something by using a description which does not satisfy it. He argues that referring is simply one means we have for making knowable to an audience those items about which we wish to talk. There are many devices we can use to accornplish this end. Only some of these. according to MacKay. are properly seen as beinp instances of refening. He argues that. "making knowable what we are talking about is the gem of which referring is only one among many species" (MacKay 1968: 197). According to
MacKay. there are other species of making knowable what we are talking about than just refemng. What is required are some concrete examples. Any of Mr. Keith Donnellan's examples of what he cal1 referential uses of definite descriptions ...will do (MacKay 1%8: 1W). MacKay presents the conclusion of his argument as follows: In summary, refemng to an object is one way of making it knowable what we are talking about. In cases wbich involve the use of definite descriptions, the feature which distinguishes referring as a way of making it knowable, from other ways, is that we accornplish our aim by way of using an expression which fits the object. Failure of fit is failure to refer. and faihre to refer nomally ensures that we do not accomplish our aim. But this need not be the case. We may fail to refer and still (somehow) manage to make knowable what we are talking about. As in Donnellan's examples. the definite description used may be such a near miss that our audience is still able to get (understand, single out. pick out) which object we have in mind (MacKay 1968: 201). His position regarding Donnellan's examples, thus, seems to be characterized by the following three claims:
(i) A definite description d may be used to refer to an object o if and only if o satisfies d. (ii ) A speaker rnay use a definite description d to draw the attention of his audience to some object O even when o does not satisfy d. (iii) That a speaker S has succeeded in drawing the attention of his audience to some object O does not entail that S has referred to o. MacKay argues that there is good reason for not accepting Donnellan's claim that speakers can succeed in refemng by means of definite descriptions which are not true of the intended referent. According to MacKay. Donnellan's is a version of what he calls the "Humpty Dumpty Account of Referring." This theory claims that speakers' intentions are sufficient. by rhernselves. to determine the reference of an\' linguistic expression. Since this theory of referring, according to MacKay. ignores the conventional linguistic meaning of expressions entirely. it is not acceptable as an account of refemng. He remarks: in tryinp to give an account of refemng we are up against a problem that pervades the philosophy of language generally - namely, that of adjudicating between the competing claims of the intentions of the speaker on the one hand and the rather intractable independence of language on the other (MacKay 1968: 199). The Humpty Dumpty Account. he claims. fails in this regard. It ignores the important distinction between linpuistic conventions and speakers's particular intentions . Thus. he concludes. we have grounds for rejecting Donnellan's account of referential uses of definite descriptions. We can present MacKay's argument as follows:
(1) If Donnellan's account is correct. then a speaker can succeed in referring to an object o by using a definite description which is not true of o. (ii) If a speaker can succeed in referring to an object o by using a description which is not true of O,then he can succeed in refemng to O by using aq refemng expression at all. (iii) If any referring expression can be used successfully to refer to some object. then the Humpty Dumpty Account of referring is correct. (N) Therefore, if Donnellan's account is correct, so is the Humpty Dumpty Accoun t. (v) However. the Humpty Dumpty Account is not correct. (vif Therefore. Donnellan's account of referential descriptions is not correct. Clearly. the central premise in this argument is (ii). Why does MacKay think that it is true? 1 will quote. at length, the passage where he defends (ii):
Suppose there are both a rock and a book on the table. Further. suppose that someone, intending to refer to the book. says. "Bring me the rock on the table." Does he really refer to the book? Presumably we would Say that he does not. But how, on Donnellan's account, can we disallow this example? After ail. the description used need not fit the object. Nonetheless. it might be objected, the use of the (referring expression) "the rock on the table" does not make it knowable which object the speaker has in mind. But suppose he uses some nonverbal supplementary device - a gesture. a glance. and so forth, in the proper direction - which does enable his audience to know what object he is talking about. 1 see no way Donnellan can avoid admitting that the speaker has. in this case, referred to the book. But clearly. this is the Humpty Dumpty account of refemng ... if one can refer to a book by using "the rock." then one can refer to a book by using an? (refemng expression). and so the actual (refemng expression) used becomes irrelevant. Refemng is collapsed into the speaker's intending to refer. and the audience's (somehow) being able to get what he means (MacKay 1968: 200 0. Donnellan. in "Puttinp Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again", addresses MacKay's argument at length. He argues that MacKay's discussion presupposes the very distinction that Donnellan was trying to articulate in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". This suggests that understanding the debate between them will illuminate the distinction which Donnellan proposes. MacKay accepts that there are case where speakers may succeed in drawing the attention of their audience to some item by using a definite description which is not true of this thing. His chief daim, regarding such uses. is that they should not, properly speaking, be called instances of refemng. Instead, he claims that these are cases where speakers succeed in identifyinp something for their audience by means orher than referring. To this extent, MacKay seems to accept that there is a referential use of descriptions. As we have seen. Donnellan also tried to show. in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". that there are cases where speakers may use definite descriptions in a different fashion. These are cases where there is not the same possibility of drawing an audience's attention to something by means of a description which is not true of this thing. These were the amiburive cases discussed by Donnellan. So far. then, there does not seem to be much disagreement between MacKay and Donnellan. Donnellan remarks: To state his view about reference and definite descriptions, MacKay employed a notion of "what the speaker was talkinp about" that is extensional and aliows for the possibility that what the speaker is talking about is an entity that fails to fit the description he used. But this notion is applicable only to some uses of definite descriptions and these would have to be distinguished from those to which it does not apply. Working out this distinction, however would only give us another way of petting at the difference between the "referential" and the "attributive" use of definite descriptions (Donnellan 1968: 208). Nothing MacKay has said implies that there are not cases in which definite descriptions are used to perfom what Donnellan calls the "attributive use." Thus, there is, as yet. no reason for thinking that MacKay and Donnellan are at odds over the use of descriptions.
If this were al1 there was to the difference between the two positions, it would not be a substantial disagreement. Instead. as Donnellan notes, it would be at best a question of a verbal dispute (Donnellan 1%8: 210): They agree on the phenornenon in question. but disagree on whether the tem "refemng" is properly used to apply to it. The dispute does not. however. have the flavour of a mere disagreement over words. As we have seen, MacKay argues that Donnellan's account of definite descriptions would commit us to, what he considen, an unacceptable pneral account of reference - the Humpty Dumpty view. Donnellan's response is that his view does not entail. and neither does the so-called Humpty Dumpty Account of referring. tbat speakers* intentions, bv themselves. are sufficient to detemine what the referent of an expression is. He daims that. the route MacKay's reasoning takes is the following. In the speech acts we are considenng, it is the speaker's intention to refer to something. If he can accomplish this when he uses a definite description for Chat purpose repardless of the content of the description. then the content cannot matter to him ... He might as well use one description as another so long as he uses them with the right intention. And this result is absurd. This is where the analogy with Humpty Dumpty enters ...1 think this line of reasoning con tains a rnistake. No such consequence rea- follows from rny way of talking about referring or even from Humpe Dumpv 's rheon, of rneaning. whafeverother defects there mqv be Nt thar (Donnellan 1%8: 210f. The emphasis is mine.).
Thus, what Donnellan denies is the second premise in MacKay's argument, as 1 have presented it above. The core of Donnellan's response rests on a daim about the nature of intentions in generai. There are, he argues, good reasons for thinking that whai an agent can intend. in general. is limited by the agent's remonable expectations. The pnnciple to which Donnellan appeals seems to be the following: (INT) If an agent intends to perfonn sorne action a. or to achieve some effect e. then it must be the case that he hrlieves that it is possible for him to perform a or achieve e. He argues that intentions are essentially connected with expectations. Ask someone to flap his arms with the intention of flying. In response he can certainly wave his arms up and down ... But this is not to do with the intention of flying. Nor does it seem to me that a normal adult in normal circumstances can flap his arms and in doing so really have that intention. Perhaps one can, by a stretch of the imagination. conceive of someone ...doing this. But such a person ... would have expectations not shared w ith us (Donnellan 1968: 212). Applying this principle to linguistic intentions. and referentiui intentions in particular, Donnellan argues that formiog the intention to use an expression in a certain manner. to perform a certain speech act or to achieve a certain effect. is not as simple as MacKay supgests. MacKay, in criticizing both the Humpty Dumpty Account of refemng and
DonneIlan's account of referential usage, seems to think that speakers can. independenth of reasonable expectarions about their audience's abil* to understand them. utter expressions with whatever intention they choose. Thus. MacKay accepts as being obviously correct that Humpty Dumpty. addressing Alice. can utter (10) There's glory for you with the intention of ineaning what
( 1 1) There's a nice knockdown argument for you would express in the same context. MacKay finds nothing amiss with this idea that speakers can fom whatever meaning intentions they wish concerning their use of linpuistic expressions. Such intentions must. according to Donnellan, be grounded in a speaker's reasonable expectations about his audience's ability to undentand his utterance the way he intends it to be understood. Since Humpty Dumpty can have no reasonable ground for expecting that Alice will understand his utterance of ( 10) to mean what ( 1 1) would have expressed. he cannot really be intending to use (10) in the fashion described. He writes that What is strange about Humpty Dumpty's conversation may not be so rnuch the theory of meaning that he seems to have. but rather his wanting us to believe that. without any assumption that Alice mipht understand him. he really did have the intention about the word "glory." I cannot credit a seeminply rational adult with that intention any more than Icould credit a seemingly rational adult with the intention to fly when I see him fiapping his arms up and down (Donnellan 1968: 213). The implication of this view about meaning intentions for Donnellan's referential uses of definite descriptions is straightforward. A speaker can. for example. use the expression
( 12) The rock to refer to a book only if he expects that his audience will be able to undentand him in the way he intends. Ordinanly a speaker will not be able to form such an expectation. There are circumstances we can imagine in which such an expectation is reasonable. but these will be rare. Suppose. for example. that Jones and Smith both consider Word and Objecr to be the basis for al1 serious philosophical writings since its publication. They may view its central arguments as being so unassailable that they are the bedrock for al1 subsequent philosophy. In such a context, it rnight be reasonable for Jones to uner
( 13) Bring me the rock to Smith with the intention that Smith should understand him as having intended to refer to the copy of Word and Object on his desk. Other examples can. of course be constructed, where such an expectation on the part of a speaker seems reasonable. They will. in general. be rather contrived. Donnellan argues that given the way I talked about the referential use of definite descriptions. one can imagine circumstances in which someone refers to a book by using the words "the rock." But it does not follow that, for example, 1 can now refer to a book by saying to the next person to come into the room. "Please bring me the rock." To think that it does involves the view just now discussed, that there is not difficulty in forrning any intention whatever. The reason that 1 cannot Say that to the next person 1 see and refer to a book is [thatj ... 1 do not have the right expectations about my audience (Donnellan 1968: 2 13). Refemng intentions must, on his account, be constrained by reasonable expectation about an audience's ability to understand what is the intended referent. What follows from this is that premise (ii) of MacKay's argument is false. That a speaker may succeed in refemng to sornething by means of a description which does not fit the intended referent does not imply that he may use an?' expression at al1 to so refer. Thus. Donnellan has shown that MacKay's argument is not sound.
It is important to note that Donnellan is not claiming that speakers can. with the
ri@ referring intentions and the right expectations about their audience. chungr the conventional meaning of words and expressions. He is not claiming. for exampie, that the phrase (12) The rock
.sernunticufly refers to Word adObject in the case discussed above. His claim is simply
that. in the right context, it is possible for a speaker to refer to this book by means of ( 12). The claim is no! that a speaker's idiosyncratic use of a refemng expression affects the
conventional semantic reference of the expression. The expression still srmcrnficuiiy
refers to whatever its conventional referent might be. The speaker. however. uses it to
draw his audience's attention to something else. What we have seen in this digression is that DonneIIan's account of referential uses of definite descnptions is importantly connected with views about the referring intentions of speakers. and the sorts of reasonable expectations they may îorm regarding
the abilities of their audience. Furthemore. we have noted that Donnellan's frequent use of examples where a definite description is being used to draw the attention of an audience to some item that does not satisfy the description need not be taken to suggest that he believes speakers may. with the right intentions, change the literal. semantic reference of words.
( iv) The Differtincr Betwrrn Referring uncl Denoting
Returning to the topic of refemng and denoring. we are now in a position to Say more about how these two relations are, according to Donnellan. distinct. As 1 noted above. I believe that a focus on cases where descnptions are used to refer to things which do not satisfy them is the easiest way to see the difference between refemng and denoting. 1 think that Donnellan's emphasis on such examples is primarily meant to illustrate this distinction, and should not be taken as an attempt to show that speaken rnay, with the right sort of intentions, change the literal, sernantic meaning, or reference. of expressions. Finally, his focus on such examples should not be seen as cornmitting Donnellan to the clairn that a speaker may use ayexpression whatever to refer to some intended referent. Following Russell, in "On Denoting", let us Say that a speaker's utterance of a definite description denotes some penon or object if and only if the object satisfies that description, and nothing else satisfies the description. Furthemore, let us Say that a speaker's utterance of a definite description refers to some object or person if and only if the speaker. in uttering the description, intends to pick out some object or person, and expects that his audience will be able to identify that person or object by means of their recognition of the speaker's intention.
This last point needs some clarification. As we saw in Chapter Two, the Conversarional Condition does not serve as a necessary condition for referential use. lt rnay be the case that a speaker uses a description referentially although he does not wmt his audience to identify that to which he is refemng. What Donnellan's exchange with
MacKay shows, 1 believe, is mi that speakers using descriptions referentiaily must desire or want that their audience should identify their intended referent. What it de5 show is the weaker requirernent that speaken using descriptions in this fashion must expect that it is at least possible for their audience to identify their intended referent. Thus, this requirement for a speaker's using a definite description to refer is consistent with the denial of the Conversationni Condition discussed in Chapter Two. Given these definitions, let us apply them to Donnellan's referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. On Donnellan's account, a speaker's attributive use of a definite description may dpnote some object or penon, but does not refer. A referential use may. but need not, denote something. but he also may refer to something. In such cases, the object or penon denoted by his use of the description may. but need not, be identical to the object or person referred to. In using a description attributively. it is not necessary that a speaker expects that his audience will be able to pick out or identify the thing that his description denotes. In using a description referentially, on the other hand. speakers must expect that their audience is at least able to identify the thing to which he wishes to refer. Nomally, with both attributive and referential uses, it will be correct to Say that the proposition which the speaker wants to communicate is about some object or person. In the attributive cases it will be about whatever happens to be the denotation of the description uttered. In the referential cases, it will be about the speaker's intended referent. How one identifies this object, however, is not the same when the description is used referentially as when it is used attributively. Here we can see one of the central differences between referential and attributive uses. In the latter case, the right object is whatever satisfies the definite description uniquely. Something's being the nght abject or person. in this sense, is a function of its fitting the description used. With the referential cases. however, this is not the case. Here. as we have seen. the descriptive content of the definite description uttered is noi central to identifying the speaker's referent. A speaker may refer to somethinp by means of a description even though it fails to fit this description. As Donnellan claims. in the referential use as opposed to the attributive, there is a righr thing to be picked out by the audience and its being the right thing is not simply a function of its fitting the descnption (Donnellan 196û: 304). In this sense, then. the description used is inessenfial to identifying the speaker's intended referent when the description is uses referentially. Suppose two speakers, Alfred and Bert, utter
( 14) The Chair of the Rat Earth Society failed geography. Alfred uses the descnption ( 15) The Chair of the Rat Eanh Society attnbutively. Bert. suppose, uses it referentially. Suppose, in both cases, there is no such society, and hence nothing which satisfies ( 15). Consider the implication of this for the utterances made by Alfred and Bert. Since there is nothing that satisfies (15).and since Alfred's goal was simply to denore some penon and then attribute some property to this penon. there is no right thing for his audience to pick out. In this sense. his utterance has failed in its purpose. Alfred has not succeeded in denoting anything, and has thus failed to attribute a property to anything. There is no sense in which what he has said is true. Furthemore. there is no sense in which. in reporting his utterance, we can amend it in order to make clear to someone else who it was that Alfred was talkinp about. No such amendment is possible because Alfred does not intend to be talking about anyone orher than the person who satisfies (15). This feature of his utterance demonstrates why the description used is essential to attributive uses.
Consider next the case of Bert's utterance of (14). His use of (15) is, we are supposing. referential. Suppose that at a party he had been introduced. by his mischievous host, to sorne man whom he was toid was The Chair of the Hat Earth Society. From his conversation with this man Bert learns that he failed his geography courses at university. In recounting this to his friends, he utters (14). Like Alfred, the description he uses fails to denote anything. Unlike with Alfred's case. however. there is a temptation to Say that although Bert used an expression that refers to nothing, he may still have succeeded in communicating something true about the man to whom he was introduced. Finally, in reporting Bert's utterance of (14). we may amend what he said by choosing another expression which does properly refer to the man in question. For example. we could correctly report his utterance by say
( 16) The man Bert was introduced to at that party failed pography. Such amended statements serve at least IWO functions. On the one hand, they allow us to rrpon the utterances of speakers in cases where we do not believe that the definite description used by a speaker denotes anything. We would not ordinarily use the
same expression, since this might leave our audience with the impression that we believe there is something or someone that satisfies the description. On the other hand, such amended statements allow us to assess the tmth or falsity of the proposition that the speaker was trying to communicate. Suppose that Charles was with Bert when Bert was introduced to the man at the Party. Unlike Bert, however,
Charles knows that the man they were introduced to is not the Chair of the Rat Earth Society. Suppose Charles, in response to Bert's utterance, says
( 17) There is no Rat Earth Society. But you're right. the man to whom we were both introduced did fail geography. Charles acknowledges that Bert has said something true. To determine the truth-value of what Bert wanted to communicate. Charles appeals to the amended statement
( 18) The man to whom we were both introduced failed peography. Thus, such amendments are useful in relation to reporthg what was said by a speaker. and in relation to assessing the truth value of what was said by a speaker. This idea of providing an alternative, amended statement in order to assess the tmth value of what a speaker has said offers one further way of distinguishing denoting from refemng. In the case of referential uses where the speaker's description does not fit anything, or does not fit his intended referent, an amended statement rnighi well assist us in determining the truth value of what he said. There will. of course. be many ways in which we can amend the speaker's utterance. ln general, any expression which refen to the speaker's intended referent will suffice. Thus there will be a set of such amended statements. {S,. S,. S,,.... Sn), any one of which would serve to assess the tmth value of what the speaker has said. None of these amended statements, however. has any special daim to be "what the speaker ream wanted to say." This suggests that the idea of a suitably amended statement is actually otiose when we want to determine the truth value of what the speaker has said. If we are able to amve at some set of suitabie amendments, then we must already be able to identify the speaker's intended referent. If this is the case, the intermediate step of constructing amended statements is not performing any useful function. In cases where speakers have used descriptions referentially but there is nothing that fits the description, the rnost direct method for assessinp the truth value of what the speaker has said is simply to identify the intended referent and determine whether it has the property which the speaker ascnbed to it.
Donnellan presents this argument as follows: there is no bar to the "amended" statement containing any descnption that does correctly pick out what the speaker intended to refer to ... But this means that there is no unique "arnended" statement to be assessed for tmth value. And. in fact, it should now be clear that the notion of the amended statement really plays no role anyway. For if we can arrive at the amended statement only by first knowing to what the speaker intended to refer. we can assess the truth of what he said simply by deciding whether what he intended to refer to has the properties he ascribed to it (Donnellan 1966: 294 n. 10). This shows. once again, that with referential uses of descriptions. where the speaker has referred. not just denoted something, it is the objecf itself that concems us.
How it is described is irrelevant when we are interested in figuring out the truth value of what the speaker said. This is not the case, as we have seen, when a speaker has used a description attributively. In such cases. the description used is essentiai. The reason for this is that the speaker's intention, in such cases. is merely to denote some entity - not to refer to anything. When the intention is to refer, the descnption uttered becornes inessential in the sense just considered. This point, as 1 have tried to argue, is best brought out by considering cases where speakers use definite descriptions referentially and there is nothing which fits the description used. The import of Donnellan's emphasis on such cases is. 1 believe. to mark this distinction between referring uses and denotinp uses of definite descriptions. In this chapter we have considered a nurnber of ways in which referential uses of definite descriptions differ from attributive uses. We saw that although in both cases there is a presupposition or implication that sornething fits the description used. the reusons for this presupposition or implication are different in the two cases.
Furthemore, we saw that the consequences that ensue from the falsity of this presupposition or implication are not the same for the two cases. The falsity of this presumption will affect how we understand what the speaker has said in different ways, depending upn how the description is used. In considering the debate between MacKay and Donnellan, we have seen, in greater detail, what sorts of intentions and expectations are required for a speaker's use of a definite description to count as being referential.
Finally. we have seen how denoting and refemng are distinct. In the next chapter. 1 will tum to the account of referential usage which Donnellan offers in a later paper on this topic. Chapter Four
SPEAER REFERENCE AND REFERENTIAL USE
In "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora". Donnellan argues that when a definite description is used referentially the speuker is refemng to some object. In these cases the speaker's use of a definite description is accornpanied by what he calls speuker reference. This notion is meant to mark a distinction between what linguistic expression conventionally refer to, and what speakers use linguistic expressions to refer to. Kripke. in "Speaker Reference and Semaniic Reference", calls this the distinction between semantic reference and speaker's reference. Geach. in Reference and
Generuli~,notes this use of "reference". but claims that it is of no significance for logic. He remarks:
Personal reference - i.e. reference corresponding to the verb "refer*' as predicated of persons rather than expressions - is of negligible importance for logic: and I mention it only to get it out of the way. Let me take an exarnple: Smith says indignantly to his wife, "The fat old humbug we saw yesterday has just been made a full professor!" His wife may know whom he refers to, and will consider herself misinformed if and only if that person has not been made a full professor. But the actual expression "the fat old humbug we saw yesierday" will refer to somebody only if Mr. and Mrs. Smith did meet sorneone rightly describable as a fat old humbug on the day before Smith's indignant remark: if this is not so, then Smith's actual words will not have conveyed true information. even if what Mrs. Smith gathered from them was true (Geach 1%2: 3 1. Quoted in Donnelian 1978: 29).
In this chapter. 1 will argue that a notion of speaker reference can serve a useful role in distinguishing referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions. Donnellan, in "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora", disputes Geach's claim that the notion of speaker reference has no significance for logic or semantics. 1 ihink that Donnellan is right about this matter. In Chapter Seven. 1 will present an argument which shows, 1 believe. that speaker reference is of significance when we consider the semantic functioning of definite descriptions. In this chapter. I will, following Donnellan. appeal to the notion of personal or speaker reference in order to explicate the idea of referential uses of descriptions. Donnellan does not define "speaker reference". He tells us. however, that the distinction between speaker reference (loosely, what the speaker wants to be talking about) and sernanric reference (what the wordr that the speaker used refer to in the context in which they were uttered) is fairly crucial for what significance should be attached to a distinction I proposed some time back between what 1 called two uses of definite descriptions, the referential and the attributive ...precisely because it apparently showed the necessity of bringing in speaker reference for an explanation of the semantic reference of certain expressions (Donnellan 1978: 28). Donnellan argues that the referential-attributive distinction irnplies more tha. that there are two possible uses of definite descriptions. He argues that this distinction shows that definite descriptions are semanticdly arnbiguous. 1 will examine diis argument in a later chapter. For the present purposes. DonneIlan's clairn that there is a connection between the \prc (RU) A definite description is used referentially if and only if it is accornpanied by speaker reference. 1 Saul Kripke. in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference". discusses the distinction between speaker's and semantic reference. He argues that it is simply a special case of Paul Grice's distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning. Gnce has shown that we need to distinguish between what the wordî used by a speaker Donnellan introduces the notion of a "referential context". He wntes " Let us say that a definite description is uttered in a " referential context" when speaker reference exists relative to it" (Donnellan 1978: 32). In order to avoid introducing the notion of a referential context 1 prefer to stipulate that a description is used referentially if it is accompanied by speaker's reference. I don? think that this alten the point that Donnellan is making. mean, and what the speaker himself means in uttering those words. Two examples will heIp to illustrate ths. Suppose that a pair of burglars have just committed a robbery and one says to the other ( 1 ) The cops are around the corner. The sentence uttered rneans that the police are around the corner. The speaker. however. might have intended to communicate something other than this. In uttering (1). the speaker might have meant to communicate something like (2) It's time to get out of this place. In addition to cases Iike this. metaphorical uses of lanpuage provide examples where speakers intend to cornmunicate something which the sentence they utter, in the context in which it is uttered, does not literally express. Consider Kripke's example apain. If one of the burglars says to the other (3) Our goose is cooked. it is obvious that he means something other than the Iiteral meaninp of the sentence. Indeed. the proposition literally expressed by his utterance of (3) might well be false while what the speaker meant (the proposition which he intended to communicate) is These sons of examples show that without attending to Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, we have good grounds for making a distinction between what a speaker rneans by his words and what his words literally mean. Knpke argues that there are good reasons for extending this distinction to designaton - linguistic expression which are used to refer. He writes that If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect. certain conventions of his idiolect (given various facts about the world) detennine the referent in the idiolect: that 1 cal1 the sernantic referent of the designator (Kripke 1977: 14). Kripke illustrates the distinction between speukerls reference and sernanric reference with the following example. Suppose that two people see Smith raking leaves and mistake him for Jones. If one remarks to the other, (4) Jones is raking his leaves again. the semantic referent of the name "Jones" is Jones. Yet it seems clear that the speaker has referred to Smith; the man they spy in the distance. Funhennore, it is natural to think that the speaker's audience will understand hirn as having referred to Smith. However, what was said. in a strict sense of "said", is true if and only if Jones is raking the leaves. Smith, not Jones. is the speaker's referent in this case. Situations in which the speaker's reference is not the same as semantic reference occur most comrnonly when the speaker or audience is confused. The following passage provides an account of what is going on when speaker's reference diverges from semantic reference: Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of a designator, "d ." Then. wishing to Say sornething about a . he uses "d " to speak about a; Say. he says "~(d)." Then. he said of a . on that occasion. that it @Id:in the appropriate Gricean sense .... he meant that a old. This is tnie even if a is not really the semantic referent of "d," If it is not, then th^ a 0's is included in what he meant (on that occasion), but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion) (Kripke 1977: 15). In general, the speaker's referent. on a particular occasion. is the object that the speaker referred to by using the designator. Kripke claims that we may tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator (Kripke 1977: 15). Knpke's tentative definition is not quite correct since a speaker can refer to some object O even when he believes that o is not the semantic referent of the expression he uses. Suppose that Ralph uses the name "Jones" noi because he is mistaken, but because he believes that his audience is mistaken about whom "Jones" refers to (or rnistaken about whom they are seeing). Suppose that Ralph believes that using the name "Jones*' is the most eficient means of getting his audience to identify his intended referent. In such a case, the speaker's referent is not the same as the semantic referent, but the speaker is not confused or misinformed. Thus, in order for an object O to be the speaker's referent of some use of a designator d, it is not necessary that the speaker believes that o is the semantic referent of 6.2 Speaker reference is commoo to both cases in which what the speaker wants to talk about is the same as the semantic referent of the designator he uses and cases in which it is not. Knpke remarks: In a given idiolect, the sernantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The speaker's referent is given by a specific intention. on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object (Knpke 1977: 15). ln the most common cases, the speaker believes that the object that he wants to refer to satisfies the condition for being the semantic referent of the term he uses. It is only in rare cases. like that mentioned above, that the speaker uses an expression to refer to something which he knows is not the semantic referent of the expression. Kripke daims that the speaker may believe that his specific intention coincides with his general intention for one of two reasons: His specific intention may be to refer to whatever happens to be the semantic referent For example, suppose that a speaker 2. It is plausible to think that this also applies to cases in which speaker meaning diverges from semantic meaning . For a speaker S to mean x by an utterance of u it is. in general, not required that S believe that u's semantic meaning is x. An exaniple supplied by Stephen Schiffer illustrates this nicely: Ys wife. a present-day Mrs. Malaprop, confuses the words 'erotic' and 'erratic' so that she believes that 'erotic' means "erratic" and that 'erratic' means "erotic". S would like to tell his wife not to order his buttermilk from the rnilkman. because the rnilkman is too erratic. Rather than begin a futile explanation or use several words instead of one, S takes the easy way out and utters the sentence. 'Dear, please dont order my buttermilk from he milkman; he's too erotic' (Schiffer 1972: 29). Examples like this one and the one discussed in the main text demonstrate that speaker's meaning or reference can differ from semantic reference or meaning in spite of the fact that the speaker does not believe that his intended meaning or intended reference is the same as the seman tic meaning or semantic reference of the expressions he has uttered. overhears a conversation between philosophers about David Kaplan - a person he ha5 never heard of before. He might, at a later time, Say (5) David Kaplan is interested in demonstratives. In this case, his specific intention in using the name "David Kaplan" will be to refer to whoever happens to be the semantic referent of the name. In other cases. the speaker's specific intention might be to refer to some object which he believes is the semantic referent. For example, suppose that a speaker believes that the person he is talking to is David Kaplan. Suppose that later, reporting his conversation with this man, he says (6) David Kaplan is interested in radical interpretation. In this case, the speaker's specific intention in using "David Kaplan" is to refer to the person with whom he was speaking. It is only in cases of this second sort, Kripke argues. that the speaker's referent may fail to coincide with the semantic referent of the expression he uses. In the exarnple just considered, if the speaker was actually speaking with Donald Davidson, then Davidson. not Kaplan. is the person picked out by his specific intention: Davidson. not Kaplan, is the speaker's referent. The speaker's general intention, on the other hand, is to refer to David Kaplan: Kaplan. not Davidson. is the semantic referent of the speaker's use of "David Kaplan". Although Donnellan does not define what he means by "speaker reference". he does offer some suggestions as to the conditions which must obtain in order for a speaker's utterance to be accompanied by speaker reference. He notes that in most cases. when the use of an expression is accompanied by speaker reference the speaker intends to refer to something and intends that his audience recognize the object to which he is refemng. Donnellan claims that a use of a definite description will be referential when there is speaker reference relative to it. and that this means "that the speaker intends to refer to something and intends his audience to recognize his reference in part through his having used that definite description" (Donnellan 19'78: 32). Although these may be a speaker's intentions in most cases, 1 do not think that it will do as an account of the necessary conditions for a use of a description to be accompanied by speaker reference. We have seen the reasons for this already. 7he Conversaîionul Condition. discussed in Chapter Two, fails because it seems that a speaker can use a definite description referentially. hence its use can be accompanied by speaker reference. even when the speaker does mt intend that his audience should recognize the entity he wants to talk about. As we saw in the previous chapter, the speaker must expect that his audience is at least able to discern the item to which he is referring. Expecting or intending that they should be able to identify a referent is not. however. the same as intending that they should identify the referent. Donnellan provides a second account of the conditions which must obtain in order that a speaker's utterance be accornpanied by speaker reference. He attempts to demarcate cases of this sort from cases where there is no speaker reference by appealing to "what the speaker intends conceming the trurh conditions of his urrerance" (Donnellan 1978: 38). Taking the notion of having somethinp in mind as basic, Donnellan argues that we can Say more precisely what is involved in speaker reference. He daims that an utterance of a definite description is accompanied by speaker reference when the speaker intends that the tmth or falsity of what he says "shall be a function. in part. of the properties of the person or thing he has in mind" (DonneIIan 1978: 38). This approach seems to be promising. I will argue that. with certain qualifications. the notion of speaker reference cm be explained by appeal to the speaker's intentions concerning the tmth conditions of what he said. The first qualification concems the entities towards which the speaker is said to have these intentions. Rather than speak of the tnith-conditions of utterances. or of 'what the speaker said'. 1 prefer to speak about the truth-conditions of the proposiîion which the speaker w ishes to communicate. Given this qualification, whether a speaker's utterance is accompanied by speaker reference is a function of what he intends concerning the truth conditions of the proposition which he wishes to cornmunicate. The second qualification I will make to this approach is to avoid using the unanalyzed notion of having someone in mind. If we take the notion of having romeone in mind as basic, as Donnellan seems to, then we could Say that a speaker's utterance is accompanied by speaker reference pmvided that he intends that the tmth conditions of the proposition which he wishes to communicate are detennined by how things stand with respect to the object that he has in mind. 1 think that considerations raised in Chapter Two show that this account will not work. In particular, the failure of the Particulari~Condirion implies that this account of speaker reference will not work. The problem with this account is that the concept of having someone in mind does not, as we have seen, adequately distinguish cases in which a description is being used referenfiallv from those in which it is being used a~ributive[v. On the present analysis of referential uses of definite descriptions, however, it is the presence of speaker reference which is supposed to be what distinguishes referential from attributive uses. The problem can be seen as follows. There seem to be two theses which Donnellan wants to hold in this later account of referential use: (T-1) A use u of a definite description by a speaker S is referential if and only if u is accornpanied by speaker's reference. (T-2) A use u of a definite description by a speaker S is accompanied by speaker's reference if and only if S has some particular object o in mind in making u and S intends that the tmth conditions of the proposition which he wishes to communicate are determined by how things stand with respect to o. Now (T- 1 ) and (T-2) imply (T-3)A use u of a definite description by a speaker S is referential if and only if S has some particular object o in mind in making u and intends that the tmth conditions of the proposition which he wishes to communicate are determined by how things stand with respect to o. But, as we have already seen, (T-3)is false. at least on one reading of the expression "having someone in miod". Suppose a speaker S says, "The murderer of Smith is insane" using the description attnbutively. It would be true to Say that there is someone whom S has in mind; narnely Smith's murderer, whoever he happens to be. Furthemore, it would surely be true that S intends that the tnith conditions of the proposition which he wishes to communicate are determined by how things are with respect to this peson. That is. S intends that what he said is true if and only if the person who murdered Smith. who he "has in mind", is insane. Thus, as we have seen, the notion of havinp someone in mind does not help us demarcate referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions. If we wish to pursue Donnellan's later attempt at explicating the referentiaVattributive distinction. we will need to give up one of these two theses. I propose that we give up (T-2) and look for another means of defining speaker's reference. If our goal is to demarcate clearly referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions, I think that Donnellan's appeal to what the speaker intends concerning the tmth conditions of the proposition he wishes to cornmunicate is on the nght track. 1 will define the basic notion of speaker reference as follows: (SR) A speaker's utterance u of a sentence of the form 'h ir G' (where "b" is a refemng expression and "is G" is a predicate phrase) is accompanied by speaker reference (with respect to 'b9 IFF the speaker ( 11 believes that there exists an entity e. and (N) he is claiming that e has the property G. (iii) intends to communicate a proposition 0 which is true iff e exists and has the property G. and (iv) 0 is true in a counterfactual circumstance c iff e has the property G in c. I will Say something in defense of each of these clauses: The first point to note is that (i) excludes cases in which speakers believe themselves to be refemnp to non-existent objects. This may be seen by some as a drawback to rny account of speaker reference. The question of what to Say about speakers who believe themselves to be refemng to non-existent objects is complicated and 1 prefer to leave discussion of it for another occasion. 1 will simply stipulate that for a speaker's utterance to be accompanied by speaker reference. it mut be the case that the speaker believes himself to be referring to some existing object. As we have seen, Donnellan allows for the possibility of referential use where. although the speaker thinkr that there exists some object which he is refemng to, there is nothing that can correctly be identified as what the speaker was talkinp about. Similarly. the use of a name can be accompanied by speaker reference even when there is no referent. To see this, consider again Kripke's example. Suppose a speaker believes that he is seeing Jones raking the leaves in the distance and utten "Jones must be raking his leaves." If he is suffering an hallucination. it is still the case that his use of "Jones" is accompanied by speaker reference. The account of speaker reference offered above requires that the speaker believe that he is refemng to something. It does not, however, require that there exist something to which he is referring. Finally, (9 allows for cases where a speaker believes that there exists something to which he is referring, but does not believe that it has the property which he is claiming it does have. Once again, consider Knpke's example. Suppose that a speaker sees something in the distance which he believes to be Jones. imagine that he believes that Jones is actually reading under a tree, but he wants his audience to believe that Jones is raking the leaves. Suppose he says, "Jones must be raking the leaves again." Regardless of whether there is anything that can correctly be described as what the speaker meant to be talking about. his use of "Jones" is accompanied by speaker's reference. Similar cases can be constructed for referential uses of definite descriptions. The third clause is meant to avoid begging any questions about whether speaker's reference can determine semantic reference. At this point, my concern is not to look at arguments which purport to show that descriptions used referentially function semantically like genuine referring expressions. The account of speaker reference offered above is neutral with respect to this question. More generally, this account is neutral with respect to the question of whether the semantic reference of -\. designator is determined by the speaker's reference. It is essential to distinguish between the proposition which a speaker actually expresses in uttering a given sentence and the proposition which a speaker means to communicate by means of uttering a given sentence. To see how speaker reference and semantic reference may diverge. consider the example where a speaker meets the philosopher Donald Davidson, but believes that he is speaking with the philosopher David Kaplan. If, later on, the speaker says, "David Kaplan is very interested in radical interpretation", it is plausible to think that the proposition his utterance expresses is true if and only if David Kaplan is very interested in radical interpretation. It is clear, however. that what he meant to Say is true if and only if Donald Davidson is very interested in radical interpretation. That Davidson is the speaker's referent of his use of "David Kaplan" does not imply that he is the semantic reference of "David Kaplan". The situation with definite descriptions used referentially is similar. On the account of referential use which 1 am offering, a descnption is used referentially if and only if it is accompanied by speaker reference. If Ralph says, "The murderer of Smith is insane," and is using the description referentially, then the use of the descnption must be accompanied by speaker reference. Suppose that Jones is the speaker referent of his use of "the murderer of Smith". Clause (ii) implies that the proposition which the speaker wishes to comrnunicate is true if and only if Jones is insane, and this seems to agree with our intuitions about such cases. Again. it is important to note that this account of speaker reference does not imply that the proposition which the speaker's utterance actually expresses is true if and only if Jones is insane. It is compatible with my account of speaker's reference, and hence with my account of referential use, that the proposition actually expressed is the same proposition that would have been expressed by an utterance of "Exactly one person murdered Smith and that person is insane". Before addressing arguments which purport to show that descriptions are semantically ambiguous, i t is important to have an account of the referential-attn butive distinction that does not presuppose a semantic ambiguity. Clauses (iii) and (iv) together are meant to capture the idea that when the use of a designator is accompanied by speaker reference. what the speaker intends to Say is tnie if and only if his intended referent has the property which he ascribed to it, and would have been me, in counterfactual circumstances, if and only if his intended referent had the relevant property. A correct undentanding of the proposition which a speaker intends to communicate when his utterance is accornpanied by speaker reference requires understanding both the conditions under which it is in fact true as well as those under which it would be true. Kripke makes this point in his account of the truth conditions of statements in which proper names occur. He wtites, A proper understanding of [such a statement] involves an understanding both of the (extensionatly correct) conditions under which it is in fact tme. wul of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in some respects but not in othen, would be correctly (partially) descnbed by [ii J (Knpke 1980: 6). To make this point clear. it will be useful to have an account of two kinds of propositions. Following Stephen Neale's account in Descriptions, 1 will cal1 these object- dependent and object-independent propositions? The difference between proposition of these two kinds is seen by considering their respective truth-conditions. When we evaluate the truth-value of an object- dependent proposition @ in actual or counterfactual circumstances, there is some object such that 0 is true in either actual or counterfactual circumstances if and only if that object has the property that is being attributed to it. The case with object-independent propositions is different. When we evaluate an object-independent proposition Y in actual or counterfactual circurnstances, it is not the case that there is some object such that V is j David Kaplan, in "Dthat", distinguishes singular and general propositions. This distinction is, 1 beiieve, the same as that which Neale introduces. true in either the actual or counterfactual circumstances if and only if it has the rzlevant property. The object which is relevant for deteminhg the truth-value of Y in the actual world need not be the same object which is relevant for determining the truth-value of Y in sorne counterfactual circumstance. Some examples will make this distinction clearer. Suppose that Ralph points at a man and says (7) That man has new sunglasses. The proposition, $, which he has expressed is true if and only if the man to whom he has pointed is has new sunglasses. Furthermore, for any counterfactual circumstance cl # is true in c if and only if he has new sunglasses in c. Since the truth-conditions for specify that $ is true in possible world w just in case that man has new sunglasses in W. it is an object-dependent proposition. Suppose that Ralph believes that it is very probable that some men are now weanng sunglasses somewhere. He has no idea who these men may bel but does have the general belief that there is at least one man weanng sunglasses somewhere. Suppose that he says (8) Some men are weanng new sunglasses. The proposition. $. which he has expressed is true just in case there is at least one man wearing new sunglasses. Furthermore. for any counterfactual circumstance c @ is true in c if and only if there is at least one man wearing new sunglasses in c. Unlike the previous case. however. the tnith-conditions for # do not specify that there is some set, T,of men {ml.m2. mj..... mn) such that @ is true in the actual or any counterfactual circumstance if and only if the members of f are weaiing new sunplasses. In his discussion of the semantic content of utterances. Stephen Neale makes the following observations: The meaning of an expression is simply that entity for which it stands. In the case of an utterance of a sentence $ this entity is a proposition. In the case of an utterance of a genuine referrinp expression, it is the expression's referent. An utterance of a sentence ' b is G",where ' b' is a refemog expression and '- is G' is a monadic predicate phrase, expresses an object-depenaén~(or singuhr) proposition. the identity of which is dependent upon the identity of b. And this proposition is rrue if and only if h is G (Neale 1990: 15). Developing this account, let's stipulate that (OD) an utterance u of a sentence of the fonn 'b is G' (where '6' is a referring expression and '- is G' is a predicate phrase) expresses an object-dependent proposition @ IFF there is a set of objects rsuch that 'b' refers to the members of r. and for any actual or counterfactual circumstance c, @ is true in c iff the members of r exist in c and have the property G. When an utterance is accompanied by speaker reference, the speaker intends to express an object-dependent proposition about his intended referent. For example. suppose the chair of the local Teetotalers Union spots a man in the corner holding a martini glass. If, intending to refer to this man, the chair says (9) The man drinking a martini over there is suspended, then he has intended to express an object-dependent proposition # which is true in the actual, as well as any counterfactual. circumstances if and only if th& man is suspended. Thus, the each of the following is true about # (i) $ is true if the man to whom the chair referred is not drinking a martini. provided that he is suspended. (ii) # is true even if the man to whom the chair referred is not drinking a martini. but he is suspended, and there is someone eke 'over there' who is drinking a martini, but he is not suspended. (iii) For any possible world W. # is true in w iff the man to whom the chair referred is suspended. When an utterance of a definite description in a sentence of the fom "The F is G" is no1 accompanied by speaker reference, the speaker intends to express an object- independent proposition. Thos, when the description "the man drinking a martini over there" is used attributively in an utterance of (9). the speaker intends to express a proposition about which none of (i) - (iii) above is tme. In such a case. the speaker intends to express a proposition which is necessarily equivalent to the proposition that would have been expressed by an utterance. in the same context. of ( 10) Exactly one penon is dnnking a martini over there and everyone who is dnnking a martini over there is suspended. In this chapter. 1 have done the following: (1) 1 have presented Donnellan's views conceming the connection between referential uses of definite descriptions and the phenornenon of speaker reference. (N) I have argued that Donnellan's account of referential use in terms of the speaker's intentions with respect to the truth-conditions of the proposition which he wishes to express is a useful way of demarcating referential uses from attributive uses. (iii) An account of speaker reference was provided. and 1 argued that a speaker's use of a definite description is referential iff it is accompanied by speaker reference. ( iv) 1 argued that this account does not presuppose that definite descriptions are srmr»lticuliy ambiguous. The difference between referential and attributive uses concems the proposition which the speaker intends to comrnunicate. (v) Object- dependent and object-independent propositions were distinguished, and it was argued that in referential cases the speaker intends to express an object-dependent proposition. In attributive cases. on the other hand. the speaker intends to express an object-independent proposition. So far. 1 have said nothing about the sort of proposition a speaker acrually expresses when he utten a sentence in which a definite description is used referentially. Chapter Five SEARLE ON THE REFERENTIAL-ATTRIBUTIVEDISTINCTION John Searle. in "Referential and Attributive". argues that there is no substantial distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. He daims that Donnellan's examples. which purport to show such a distinction, can be accounted for as instances of the general distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning: botE alleged uses are referential in the sense that they are cases of referring to objects. the only difference is in the degree to which the speaker makes his intentions fully explicit in his utterance (Searle 1979: 137). 1 aqued. following Donnellan, that there is a distinction between denoting and refemng. and that a speaker who uses a description "the F' attributively may be said to be denoting some entity. but that he is not refemng. Thus, 1 think that there are two distinct uses of descriptions: one use is to refer. the other is to merely denote some entity. In the last chapter. 1 have provided some account of the conditions which must obtain in order that a speaker's use of a description can correctly be said to be referential. In this chapter 1 will examine Searle's reasons for denying that there is a distinction between these uses of descriptions. (i)Huving Sorneone In Mid Searle offers an alternative to Donnellan's account of referentia1 uses of definite descriptions. His central daim is that in the referential cases. a speaker has more than one means of identifying the entity which he has in mind, whereas in the attributive cases. the speaker has only one way of identifying the entity which he hm in mid. We saw above that the notion of having someone in mind will not serve, without some qualifications. as a means of distinguishing referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions. It will be useful to distinguish two senses in which we can be said to have something in mind. To this end, let us Say that a speaker has something o in nùridR provided that he has several (non-synonymous) ways of identifying o. Let us Say that a speaker has something O in mid4provided that he has only one way of identifying o. Soine exaniples will help to illustrate this distinction. Suppose that Ralph believes that there is exactly one penon who is a spy and is shorter thaii al1 other spies. His ground for this belief is just the reasonable assumptioii that since there are spies, there is one ainong them who is shorter than the others. Let us cal1 tliis shortest spy "Al". Suppose that he has no further beliefs about Al. In this case. Ralph can truly be said to have sonleone in mind if he wonders whether the shortest spy plays golf; it would be true to Say of Al tliat Ralph wonders whether he plays golf. The only way. however. that Ralph can identify (either to himself or to others) this person is by using the descriptioii "the shortest spy" or synonynious expressions such as "the spy whose height is less than the height of al1 other spies". In cases like this we caii Say tliat the believer has soineone in ~iiind.~. Suppose. again. that Al is the shortest spy. Suppose that Ralph knows this fact about Al. and also knows a great deal iii addition about AI. He kiiows. in particular. tliat Al is Iiis roommate and has joiried the local golf club. If Ralph wonders whether the shortest spy plays golf. it would crrtairily be true to Say that he has sonieone iii mind. In this case. however. Ralph Iias iriaiiy (riori-syiioriynious) ways of characterizhg the person lie lias iii iiiiiid. Iri addition to usirig the expression "the shortest spy". he could identify the persori he Iias iri iiiiiid by usirig the expressioris "niy rooiiiiiiate" or (poiiitiiig) "tliat iiiaii". Iii cases of this sort wr caii Say that the believer has sonieone in mind,. Searle argues that the referential-attributive distinction is not a distiiictioii betwrrri two uses of defitiiir descriptions. He argues that in both attributive and referential cases. the speaker caii correctly be descnbed as refemiig to soiiie entity which lie lias in iiiind. The differeiicr between the cases is. pcrcr Donnellan, not due to the fact that the speaker is refemng in the referential cases and merely denoting in the attributive cases. On Searle's account. the difference is due to the wqin which the speaker has his intended referent in rnind. (ii) Searle's Alternarive Account of the Referenriul/Aitribirrive Distinction On Searle's account. a speaker succeeds in refemng by, in part. using a linguistic expression. Normally these will be narnes, demonstratives, or definite descriptions. Such linguistic devices express what Searle calls the aspect under which the referent is being represenied. On his account of reference. ail reference is made under some aspect: We can Say that whenever a speaker refen he must have some linguistic representation of the object - a proper name, a definite description, etc. - and this representation will represent the object referred to under some aspect or other (Searle 1979: 142). For example, when a speaker utters ( 1 ) The winner of the Indy 500 drove a turbine-powered car. he is refemng to some individual under the aspect of being the winner of the indy 500. When a speaker utters (2) Mario Andretti drove a turbine-powered car. he is refemng to some individual under the aspect of being Mario Andretti. The notion of refemng to ihings under an aspecr is the fint element in Searle's alternative account. The second element involves the distinction between what a speuker means in utterinp a sentence and what the sentence literally means. Although the examples offered in the previoiis chapter al1 involved speakers making assertions. a similar distinction occurs with other &in& of illocutionary acts. Searle argues that we must disting ui sh. generally. between prinuq and secondwy illocuriomzry acts . To clarify this distinction. suppose. for example. that a speaker utten (3) You are standing on my foot. In the normal case. his intention will not be to simply make a statement. His intention in uttering (3) will be to request that his hearer get off his foot. In the normal case. a speaker will. in uttering (3). perform wo illocutionary acts. His primary illocutionary act will be requesting that the hearer get off his foot. His secondary illocutionary act will be asserring that the speaker is standing on his foot. In such a case. The primary illocutionary act is performed only indirectly by way of performing the secondary illocutionary act... 1 such cases one performs two speech acts in one utterance, because the primary illocutionary act is performed by indirectly by way of performing the secondary illocutionary act of stating that he is on my foot (Searle 1979: 144). Searle argues that a similar phenornenon occun when speakers refer. Often a speaker will, in the sense defined above. have something in rnind.. In these cases he will be able. if required, to faIl back on some other means of representing his intended referent. If his audience should fail to ideniify the object about which he wishes to talk. he may switch to another linguistic device that will serve the same purpose. In cases where a speaker has something in mind,, Searle calls the expression which the speaker actually utters the seconda? aspecr under which the referent is represented. He claims that in al1 such cases, there will be some basic aspect under which the speaker could have referred to the entity. He calls this the prima- uspect under which the referent is rrpre-tented. If something other than that to which the speaker wanted to refer satisfies the secondary aspect under which the object is represented, he can always reson to the primary aspect. For exarnple. suppose a speaker utters ( 1 ) intendinp to refer to some penon who he has in mindR. If it is pointed out to him that the winner of the Indy 500 did not drive a turbo-powered car. the speaker may reply, "1 meant the driver who was at our club the other night." or "I was talkinp about the man I saw dancing with your friend." or "I meant thaf (pointing) man." In ihis case, the speaker will, Searle claims, eventually express the primary aspect under which he is representing the man. If there is nothing which fits the primary aspect under which the referent is represented. then the speaker has said something which cannot be true. On Searle's account of the referential cases, though the expression used may be false of the object referred to and thus the object does not satisfy the aspect under which it is referred to. there must always be some other aspect under which the speaker could have referred to the object and which is satisfied by the object. Furthemore. this aspect is such that if nothinp satisfies it the statement cannot be true (Searie 1!379: 144). He claims that, "if some one thing satisfies it (the primary aspect) the statement will be true or false depending on whether the thing that satisfies it has the property ascnbed to it" (Searle 1979: 145). On this account, the primary, but not the secondary, aspect is said to "figure in the tmth conditions of the statement that (the speaker) is attempting to make" (Searle 1979: 146): The secondary aspect does not figure in the tmth conditions (except insofar as it includes the pnmary aspect). the primary aspect does figure in the tmth conditions: if nothing satisfies the (primary aspect) the statement cannot be true (SearIe 1979: 146). On this account of referential uses, the content of the utterance. what is said by the speaker in making the utterance. is not expressed by the secondary aspect. That is. the content is not expressed by the expression that the speaker actually uses. Rather. the content is given by the primary aspect under which the speaker is referring to his intended referent. Searle claims that The specification of the statement being made - as opposed to the specification of the sentence uttered - will have to specifv that aspect under which referrnce ic mu& rhat actualiy counrs Ni the truth conditions of the srcitement (Searie. 1979: 147. The emphasis is mine.). On Searle's account. the attributive uses of definite descriptions are simply those cases in which the speaker utters an expression which expresses the primary aspect under which he is refemng to his intended referent. Finally. Searle claims that whether a description is being used as a primary aspect or a secondary aspect. "depends on the intentions of the speaker: that is. it is a matter of the statement he is making and not of the sentence he utters" (Searle 1979: 150). Searle contrasts his own account with that offered by Donnellan in the following On his account ihere are two distinct uses of definite descriptions only one of which is a use to refer. Definite descriptions thus have an ambiguity. though he allows that it may be a "pragmatic" and not a "semanticn ambiguity. On my account there is no such ambiguity. According to me al1 of his cases are cases where the definite description is used to refer. The onlv diflerence is that in the so-called referential cases rhe reference is made under u secomaspect. and in the so-called attributive cares it is made under u primury aspect. Since every statement containing a reference must have a prirnary aspect, in the "referential" use the speaker may still have referred to something that satisfies the prirnary aspect even though the expression uttered. which expresses a secondary aspect, is not true of the object and rnay not be true of anything (Searle 1979: 150. The emphasis is mine.). Searle is correct to point out that speakers may use definite descriptions while having something in mindl or while having something in mindR. This distinction helps. 1 think. to explain a point that Donnellan makes concerning the difference between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. As we saw in Chapter Three, Donnellan, in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". remarks that when a definite description "the F' is used attnbutively it might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits that description; but in the referential use the definite description is rnerely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a person or thing - and in general any other device for doing the same job, another description or a name. would do as well. In the attributive use. rhe artrihure of heing the so-and-sn is ull importani. while it is not in the referential use (Donnellan 1966: 285. The emphasis is mine.). This passage may mislead. Donnellan might be taken to mean that a definite description is used attributively just in case the speaker has something in mind (as we have defined this notion). Furthermore. he might be taken to mean that a description is used referentially just in case the speaker has something in mind, 1 think that each of these interpretations would be mistaken. As we have seen in Chapter Four. the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions concems the sort of proposition which the speaker intends to communicate. It does not. directly. concern the rneans which the speaker possesses to identify some entity. When a description "the F' is used referentially. the speaker's utterance is accompanied by speaker reference. He intends to comrnunicate an objeci-dependent proposition (in the sense defined above). When a description is used attributively. on the other hand. the speaker's utterance is not accompanied by speaker reference (with respect to the definite description used). He intends to communicate an object- i ndependent proposition. What, then, is the connection between the referential-attributive distinction and the two sense of huving someone in mind that we have distinguished above? A speaker may use a description attributively even when he has something in mindRthat uniquely satisfies the description. Consider Donnellan's example of the trial of Smith's murderer. We saw that a speaker may believe of Jones, the man behavinp erratically in the dock. that he is Smith's murderer and still use 'the murderer of Smith' attnbutively. In such a case. the speaker has someone in mind,. Thus. having something in mindR is not a sufficient condition for referential uses of descriptions. Examples of this son show. in addition. that having something in mind-4is not a necessary condition for attributive uses of definite descriptions. 1s having something in mind, a necessary condition for referential use? It seems plausible to think that it is. To see this. recall that in using a description referentially a speaker intends to communicate an object-dependent proposition. For a speaker to intend to communicate an object-dependent proposition $. it is plausible to think that he must undentand not only the circumstances that in fact make g true, but also the counterfactual circumstances that would have made @ true. 1 Consider. again. Donnellan's example of the trial of Smith's murderer. If a speaker says. "The murderer of Smith is insane." and intends to communicate the 1 For a speaker to intend to communicate a proposition #, it is necessary that he understands @. As we have seen in Chapter Four, in order that a speaker can be correctly described as understanding a proposition. it is necessary that he undentands both the actual conditions that make it true or false, and the counterfactual circumstances that wauld huve made i t true or false. proposition that Jones is insane. then he is using the description "the murderer of Smith" referentially. The proposition which he intends to cornmunicate, is true in a possible world w just in case Jones exists in that world and is insane. Thus it will be true in worlds in which Jones is not Smith's murderer. In order for the speaker to understand this proposition. and hence in order for him to be able to intend to communicate it. he rnust be able to recognize those counterfactual circumstances in which it is true even though someone else, or no one, murdered Smith in those counterfactual circumstances. For the speaker to be able to do this, it seems that he must have means of identifying Jones other thm as the unique person who satisfies the definite description "the murderer of Smith". Thus. it is plausible to think that a speaker, in using a description referentially. must have something in mind,. He must, that is. be able to offer other. non-synonymous. ways of identifying the entity about which he wishes to speak. Considerations of this sort show that having something in mind* is a sufficient condition for attributive uses of definite descriptions. If a speaker uses a description and mereh has something in mindA,then his use is aitributive. It is important to note that the requirement for having someone in mind,, does not preclude speakers deferring to the identifying knowledge possessed by orher speakers. Suppose. for example. that Al hears Ralph say, "The murderer is insane." where the description was used referentially. Ralph, thus. must have more than one means available for identifying his intended referent. Al might corne to believe what Ralph said. He might assert. "The murderer is insane", even though be might possess no direci means of identifying this person other than "the person who committed the murder." He does. however. possess indirect means of identifying the penon whom Ralph had in mind,. He could. for exampie. offer. "The person whom Ralph had in mind," as another means of identifying the person in question. This possibility of deferring to the referential intentions of othen is quite common when we consider the case of proper names. As Kripke. Donnellan. and others have argued. it is very implausible to think that speakers must possess identifyinp knowledge of a name's referent in order to use the name as a name. The causal-histoncal view of naminp relies on the fact that speakers may defer to the knowledge and referential intentions possessed by others. The same phenomenon applies, I believe, to the notion of having someone in mind,. 1 will retum to this important point in Chapter Nine. The relations between the two senses in which a speaker can be said to have sornething in mind and the referential-attributive distinction is illustrated by the following table: TABLE 2 1 1 For referential use 1 For attributive use 1 1s. .. sufficient condition not a necessary condition Having something in mindR a necessary condition but neither a necessary nor a 1 not a sufficient condition 1 sufficient condition 1 (iii) Two Objections to Searle T Accounr Given the above clarification. we are in a position to see how Searle's account of the referentiallattnbutive distinction is inadequate. Searle is correct to point out that every referential use of a description requires that the speaker have somethinp in rnind,.. That is. he is ripht to note that in such cases the speaker possesses more than one way of identifying the entity about w hich he wishes to Say something. What is false is his clairn that with al1 referential uses there must be some prima- uspecr, some primary means of identifying the object to which he wishes to refer, such that it "figures in the tmth-conditions" of the staternent he wants to make. On Searle's account, "if nothing satisfies the [primary J aspect... the statement cannot be truen (Searle 1979: 146). The primary aspect figures, for Searle, among the truth conditions of what is said by the speaker. We have seen, however. that in referential cases the speaker intends to communicate a proposition about an entity e that is true in either actual or counterfactual circumstances just in case e has the relevant property. What figures in the truth-conditions of the proposition intended in such cases is nor sorne descriptive content. An example will help to illustrate this point. Consider. once again, Donnellan's example of the trial of Smith's murderer. Suppose that Ralph witnesses Jones's unusual behaviour in the dock and, based on what he has seen, utters (4) The murderer of Smith is insane. In this case. Searle is nght to note that Ralph will possess other ways of identifying the person to whom he is refemng. He may have at his disposal numerous descriptions which he could use to ideniify Jones: "the man in the dock", "the man on trial for Smith's murder". "the man 1 am pointing to now". "the man over there in the blue jersey". etc. . Suppose that r is the set of identifying descriptions {d,. d,. 4. ...) which Ralph could offer as means of picking out Jones. On Searle's account. one member of ris such that if nothing satisfies it uniquely, then the proposition which Ralph intended to communicate could not be true. But this does not seem to be plausible as an account of referential usage. In this example, Ralph intends to communicate a proposition which is true in a possible world w just in case the man Jones is insane in W. For any member of T. it is possible that there is a counterfactual circurnstance such that that description is uniquely satisfied by an entity e (where r is not insane), and yet the proposition which Ralph intended to express is true nonetheless. The speaker, in such cases. intends to communicate an object-dependent proposition. Propositions of this sort are true or false. when evaluated in some possible world. dependinp on the properties that the relevant objecr possesses. That an object in some counterfactual circumstance satisfies certain descriptions is not relevant to determining whether it is the relevant object.' A second objection facing Searle's account concerns reports of utterances in which descriptions are used referentially, and beliefs which an audience may fom on the basis of having heard utterances in which descriptions are used referentially. Donnellan, in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". remarks on the similarity between the sernantic function of Russellian proper names and referential uses of definite descriptions. Both refer without asctibing any properties to their referenis. That there is this similarity can be seen. Donnellan argues. when we consider reports of utterances in which descriptions are used referentially. Consider the example of Ralph's utterance of (4). As we saw in section two, we could correctly report this utterance in numerous distinct ways. There are many correct replacements for the blank in (5) Ralph said that is insane. Any expression that refen to Jones may be used in reporting Ralph's utterance. Donnellan explains this point as follows: when a definite description is used referentially. a speaker cm be reported as having said something of something. And in reporting what it was of which he said something we are not restricted to the description he used, or synonyms of it; we may ourselves refer to it using any descriptions. names. and so forth, that will do the job. Now this seems to give a sense in which we are concemed with the thing itself and not just the thing under a certain description, when we report the linguistic act of a speaker using a defini te description referentially . That is. such a defini te description comes closer to performing the function of Russell's proper names than certainly he supposed (Donnellan, 1966: 303). Searle's proposa1 seems unable to account for this feature of referential uses. On his account, the speaker must represent the object to which he is refeming under some 2 This point requires some qualification. Obviously the object must satisfy somr definite descriptions. Consider the case of Ralph's referential use where the speaker's referent is Jones. When evaluating the proposition which Ralph intended to communicate in counterfactual circumstances, the relevant object will be that one which uniquely satisfies the definite description "the individual identical to Jones". What is important is that the relevant individual need not satisfy any of the descriptions that Ralph might ordinarily be expected to offer as means of identifying his intended referent. primary uspecr such that if nothing satisfies it, the statement made cannot be true. Suppose that this is correct as an account of referential usage. To see that this leads to problems with respect to reports of utterances in which descriptions are used referentially, consider Ralph's utterance of (4). Suppose that dl is the prirnary aspect under which Ralph is refemng to Jones. Whatever dl is, the content of Ralph's utterance is, according to Searle's proposal, what would have been expressed by an utterance. in the same context, of (6) d,isinsane. Now suppose that Al hem Ralph's utterance of (4) and utters, by way of a report, (7) Ralph said that the murderer of Smith is insane. For this report to be correct, the 'thatt-clause uttered by Al must express the same content as Ralph's utterance. Now, on Searle's account, Al will also be referring to the man in the dock under some pnmary aspect 4. Either d, will be the same as d, or it won't. Assuming that they are the same. Al's report of Ralph's utterance will be correct. However. there does not seem to be any reason why they should be the same; indeed. it would be quite remarkable if they were the same. If they are not the same, then the content of Al's 'that'-clause is not the same as the content of Ralph's utterance. In such circumstances, Al's report would not be correct. To see that it would be incorrect, it is sufficient to recall that understanding a proposition requires undentanding, among other things. the countedactual circumstances under which it would have been true. Two utterances have the same content. or express the same proposition, only if they are true in al1 the sarne counterfactual circumstances. Note, however, that if the phary aspects dl and d, are not the same, then it will be easy to imagine counterfactual circumstances in which distinct objects would have satisfied them; even if, as a matter of fact. the same object actuall y satisfies both. Thus, i t is possible to imagine counterfactual circumstances in which the proposition expressed by an utterance of (6) is &mewhile the proposition expressed by an utterance of (8) ci, is insane is false. Therefore. if ci, and d, are mt the same primary aspect, then the proposition expressed by Ralph's utterance of (4) is not the same as the proposition expressed by the 'thatl-clause of Al's utterance of (7). But if this is the case, then what sense can there be in saying that Al correctly reports what Ralph said in uttering (4)? None whatsoever. Thus Searle's account makes the fact that we frequently make correct reports of utterances in which descriptions are used referentially seem utterly fantastic. No explanation is provided of how it often happens that the primary aspects under which both speaker and reporter refer to their intended referents are identical. The problem becomes even more pressing when we consider that Al, if he believes Ralph, should be able to believe the content of what he said. The content of Ralph's belief, however, will be determined by the primary aspect under which he is refemng to the person in question. The problem is that, once again, it seems perfectly possible for the primary aspects under which they refer to this person to differ. If they do differ, then the propositions believed are not the same. The general problem seems to be the following: If a hearer H believes the proposition which a speaker S expressed in uttering an expression in which a description is used referentially, then the primary aspect under which H refers must be the same as S's. However, there seem to be no reason why this need be the case. These implications of Searle's account seem contrary to our intuitions about such cases. As Donnellan claims, in cases of referential use. it is the object itself that we are concerned with. not the object as it falls under some description or other. Intuition suggests that Al's report will be correct just on condition that he succeeds in refemng to Jones, the man to whom Ralph was refemng, and attnbutes to that man the same property that Ralph did in uttering (4). The primary aspects under which Ralph and Al are referring to Jones do not seem to be relevant when we are interested in detemining the tmth of Al's report. Mat is important is that the proposition expressed by Al's 'thatl- clause is the same as the proposition which Ralph expressed in uttenng (4). In order to correctly report Ra1 ph's utterance, Al's 'that1-clause must express the same object- dependent proposition as that expressed by Ralph. Thus, Searle's account of the referential uses of definite descriptions seems inadequate for two reasons. It denies the semantic intuition that utterances in which descriptions are used referentially are meant to communicate object-dependent propositions. Because of this, it does not seem to be able to provide a plausible account of how speakers can report what was said when a description has been used referentially. A related worry is that it does not provide a plausible account of how audiences can helieve the content expressed by such utterances. How strongly one takes these objections depends, of course. on one's semantic intuitions about the referential cases. 1 have argued above that there are good reasons for thinking that with referen tial uses. the speaker intends to communicate some object- dependent proposition. Lf these considerations are nght. then Searle's account must be rejected. Even if these arguments are not completely persuasive. there is the senous problem of how Searle's account can provide an explanation of the fact that we usually are correct in our reports of utterances in which definite descriptions are used referentially. In this section 1 have considered Searle's alternative account of the referential- attributive distinction. 1 have argued that it should not be preferred to the account developed in the earlier sections of this chapter. In explaining Searle's account, 1 also distinguished two senses in which speakers can be said to have something in mind. 1 argued that this distinction does not coincide exactly with the referential-attributive distinction. Chapter Six GRICEAN RESPONSES TO THE REFERENTIAL CHALLENGE In the previous chapters 1 provided an account of referenriul uses of definite descriptions. 1 offered an account of the notion of speaker reference and argued that a use of a definite description is referential just in case it is accompanied by speaker reference. Having introduced the distinction between what Stephen Neale. in Descriptions, calis ohject-dependent and object-independent propositions. 1 argued that a speaker's use of an expression is accompanied by speaker reference just on the condition that his intention is to express an object-dependent proposition about the item to which he intends to refer. Referential and attributive uses of descriptions are thus distinguished by the speaker's intentions that accompany the use of the utterance in which the description figures. In this chapter 1 want to do two things. First, 1 will develop a preliminary account of what 1 wiil cal1 The Weak Referenrial Thesis and The Strong Referentiul Thesis. The former is the thesis. defended by Stephen Neale, in Descripfions. Saul Kripke, in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference". Paul Grice. in "Vacuous Names". Scott Soarnes, in "Donnellan's ReferentialJAttnbutive Distinction", and others, that the sort of phenornena involving uses of definite descriptions which Donnellan discusses do nor provide sufficient reason for thinking that definite descriptions can be used to perforrn two different semcmriC functions. The claim defended by such authors is that Donnellan's referentiallattributive distinction. while it may reveal interesting facts about standard types of communication between speakers and audiences, is not semünfica& significant. The Weak Referential Thesis daims that the distinction is important for pragrnatic. but not for srmunfic. accounts of language and communication. The Strong Referential Thesis. defended by Donnellan. in "Speaker Reference. Descriptions, and Anaphora". Wettstein, in "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions". Kaplan. in "Dthat". Devitt . in "Donnellan's Distinction". and others. claims that the distinction pointed out by Donnellan does provide good reason for thinking that definite descriptions can be used to perform two different semantic functions. This view proposes that definite descriptions. when used referentially. require a different semantic analysis from that which they receive when they are used attnbutively. One of its central claims is that while Russell's theory of descriptions may be adequate for attributive uses of defini te descriptions, it is not adequate as a semantic account of referential uses of descriptions. The second part of the chapter w il1 provide a more fine-grained classification of the ways in which definite descriptions can be used than that provided in the earlier chapters. It will be useful to have an understanding of the many ways in which definite descriptions can be used. The referentiallattributive distinction. by irsrlf, is too coane- grained to capture some of the differences in use which will be important. For example. in many of the examples of referential use discussed by Donnellan and othen. the definite description used is not true of the object to which the speaker is refemng (often it is true of something else). This might lead some to think that there is an important connection between referential uses of descriptions and referring ro something by means of a definite description which is not true of the intended referent. I do not think that there is any interesting connection among such uses. The fact that many arguments for the Strong Referential Thesis seem to involve examples where the intended referent is being misdescribed is unfortunate. and leads. 1 believe. to a misunderstanding of the significance of the distinction. A good argument can be offered in defense of the stronger interpretation of Donnellan's distinction which makes no appeal to cases in which speakers use definite descriptions to talk about items which do not satisfy their descriptive content. 1 will present this argument in Chapter Seven. Chapten Eight and Ten will examine two popular arguments which have been offered in defense of The Weak Referential Thesis. My conclusion will be that neither of these arguments succeeds. I will argue that there is pood reason for thinking that the stronper interpretation of Donnellan's distinction is the correct one. (i)The Srrong ~lndWeuk Referentiul Theses As 1 arpued in the previous chapter, defending the claim that there are both referential and attributive uses of definite descnptions does nnr corne to the same thing as. or even entail, defending the clairn that descriptions are semanfica& ambiguous. Since the publication of Donnellan's paper "Reference and Defini te Descriptions" opinion on the question of the correct semantic analysis of referential uses of descnptions has been divided. Sorne have argued that the referential-attributive distinction provides good reason for thinking that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. 1 have cal Ied this The Strong Referential Thesis. Stephen Neale presents the central claim of this thesis as foltows : If a speaker S uses a definite description 'the F referentially in an utterance u of 'the F is G'. then 'the F functions as a refemng expression and the proposition expressed by u is object-dependent (rather than object- independent) (Neale 1990: 83 ). The thesis clairns. in addition, that descriptions used attributively do not function like genuine singular terms. Instead, they function like quantifiers; the truth-conditions of utterances in which they occur are those given by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. In this section. it will be useful to survey how four different authors have presented the central clairns of the Weak Referential Thesis. 1 will examine the accounts of this thesis offered by Paul Grice. Sad Kripke. Stephen Neale. and Scott Soames. This survey will assist us in clarifying the differences which exist between the Stronp and Weak Referential Theses. Grice 's Account of Referenrial Uses Paul Grice, in "Vacuous Names", has argued that referential 1 uses of descriptions are best accounted for wirhour positing a semantic arnbiguity amonp definite descriptions. To illustrate Donnellan's distinction. Grice asks us to imagine two differeni utterances in which the descriptive phrase "Jones' butler" occurs (Grice 1969: 141 ). In the firsr example, the speaker does not believe of anyone that he was Jones' butler. Instead. the speaker. who believes that Jones lived extravapantly. infers that he must have had a household staff which included a butler. On hearing that Jones has recently died, he utters (1) Well, Jones' butler will be seeking a new position. This use is meant to illustrate what Donnellan has called an attributive use of a definite description. In the second example. the speaker meets a dignified person whom he heard Jones address as "Old Boy". Upon discovering that the hats and coats of Jones' guests have been mixed up. he utters (2) Jones' butler got the hats and coats mixed up. This use is meant to illustrate a referential use of a description. On Donnellan's account of the referentiallattributive distinction, the speaker in example two may have spoken mtly even if Jones does not have a butler. provided that the person he had in mind did in fact rnix up the coats and hats. Grice claims that in such a case the speaker has nnt spoken truly: If in a type (2) case the speaker has used a descriptive phrase (e.3 "Jones' butler") which in fact has no application, then what the speaker has said will. strictly speaking. be faise; the truth-conditions for a type (2) statement. no less than for a type (1) statement, can be thought of as being given by a Russellian account of definite descriptions (with suitable 1 Grice does not use Donnellan's terrns to mark this distinction. Instead, he uses "identificatory" and "non-identificatory" to mark the two uses that are marked by Donnellan's "referential" and "attributive" respectively. provision for unexpressed restrictions to cover cases in which. for example. someone uses the phrase "the table" meaning thereby "the table in this room"). But though what, in such a case. the speaker has suid may be false, what he rneant may be true (for example. that a certain particular individual [who is in fact Jones' gardenerl mixed up the hats and coats) (Grice 1969: 142). Gnce does not provide an explanation of how it is thai a speaker can succeed in communicating a proposition other than the proposition that his utterance Iiterally expressed. His point is to provide an exarnple OF a case in which a speaker. who uses a descriptive phrase in an utterance. intends to cornmunicate something other than what he. strictly speaking. says. He claims that. contrary to those who hold to the ambiguity thesis. "descriptive phrases have no relevant systematic duplicity of meaning; their meaning is given by a Russellian account" (Grice 1969: 143). Although Gnce's account does not offer an explanation of how it is that speakers succeed in communicating object-dependent propositions when their utterances express on1 y object-independent propositions. his theory of conversatio~limplicature has been taken by some authors to provide an adequate account of this phenornenon. 1 will examine this prugmuric account of the referentiaVattnbutive distinction in Chapter Ten. Kripkr '3 Accnunt of Rrferrnriul Uses In "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference", Kripke presents a senes of arguments against the ambiguity thesis. One of the most influential of these arguments is similar to that sketched by Grice in "Vacuous Names". In addition. it appeals to the sort of pragmatic features of communication which Grice has examined in his account of conversational implicatures in order to explain how successful communication is possible wi th referential uses of descriptions. Knpke argues that in the case of referential uses of definite descriptions. the simple fact that the speaker has succeeded in communicating a singular proposition about some entity does not imply that the expression uttered, in the given context. sernantically expresses that proposition. His argument attempts to show that we do not need to appeal to a two semantic analyses of definite descriptions to account for the facts that in utterances of the fom "The F is Gu.a speaker may succeed in cornmunicating object-dependent propositions by using the definite descriptions referentially. Central to this argument is the daim that there are independent grounds motivating a distinction between what Kripke calls spruker reference and srmantic reference. This distinction is meant to be an extension of Grice's distinction between what a speaker meam to Say and what he literdly says (what he sqs,in a strict sense of "says"). Kripke argues that there are good reasons for extending this distinction to designaton - linguistic expression which are used to refer. Kripke daims that If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect (given vanous facts about the world) determine the referent in the idiolect: that I cal1 the semantic refererzl of the designator (Kripke lm: 14). He illustrates the distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference with the following example. Suppose two people see Smith raking leaves and mistake him for Jones. If one remarks to the other (3) Jones is raking his leaves again. the srmclntic refere~of the name "Jones" is Jones. Yet it seems clear that the speaker has. in a sense, referred to Smith - the man he spies in the distance. However. what was said, in a strict sense of "said", is true if and only if Jones is raking the leaves. While Smith is the speaker's referent of "Jonest' in this case. Jones is the semantic referent of "Jones". Situations in which speaker's reference is not the same as semantic reference occur most commonly when the speaker. or his audience, is confused. The following passage provides an account of what is going on when speaker's reference diverges from seman tic reference: Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of a designator. "d ." Then, wishing to Say something about a. he uses "d " to speak about a: say, he says "a(d )." Then. he said of a, on that occasion, that it @Id;in the appropriate Gricean sense .... he rneunr that u a'd. This is true even if a is not really the sernantic referent of "d." If it is not, then ihai a e's is included in what he meant (on that occasion). but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion) (Kripke 1977: 140. In general. the speaker's referent, on a particular occasion, is the object that the speaker referred to by using the designator. Kripke daims that we may tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator (Kripke lm: 15). This tentative definition is not quite correct since a speaker can refer to some object o even when he believes that o is not the semantic referent of the expression he uses. Suppose that Ralph, in the example above. uses the name "Jones" not because he is mistaken. but because he believes that his audience is mistaken about the penon to whom the name "Jones" refen (or mistaken about the person whorn they are seeing). Suppose that Ralph believes that using the name "Jones" is the most efficient means of getting his audience to attend to his intended referent. In such a case, the speaker's referent is not the same as the semantic referent. but there is no confusion on the speaker's part about the person to whom the name properly refers. Thus. in order for an object O to be the speaker's referent of some use of a designator d. it is not necessary that the speaker helieves that o is the semantic referent of d. Donnellan offers a similar example involving referential uses of Jefnirr descripiions : Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers as fimly believe that he is the king. Suppose 1 wish to see this man, I might say to his minions, "1s the king in his countinghouse?" 1 succeeded in refemng to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he fits the description. It is not necessary. moreover. to suppose that his followers believe him to be the king. If they are cynical enough about the whole thinp, know he is not the king, 1 may still succeed in referring to the man 1 wish to refer to. Similarly, neither 1 nor the people 1 speak to may suppose that -ne is the king, and finally. each pany rnay know that the other does not so suppose and yet the reference rnay through (Donnellan 1%6: 29m. Examples like this show that what Kripke calls speaker reference rnay occur regardless of the beliefs which the speaker, or audience, rnay happen to have conceming the entity to which reference is being made. Beliefs about whether or not some item is the sernantic referent of a designator are not central to the phenornenon of speaker reference. The account offered in Chapter Four of speaker reference does not appeal to such beliefs. Instead, it appeals to speakers' irtlentionr regarding the truth conditions of the statements which they are rnaking. Since this account does not explain the notion of speaker reference in tems of the speaker's beliefs conceming what fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of a term. it is preferable to that given by Kripke. According to Krip ke's account, speaker reference is common to both cases in which what the speaker wants to talk about is the sarne as the semantic referent of the designator he uses and cases in which it is not. Kripke wntes that In a given idiolect. the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The speaker's referent is given by a specific intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object (Kripke 1977: 15). In the most common cases, the speaker believes that the object that he wants to refer to satisfies the condition for being the semantic referent of the tem he uses. It is only in rare cases. like those mentioned above. that the speaker uses an expression to refer to something which he hwsis not the semantic referent of the expression. Knpke daims that the speaker rnay believe that his specific intention (to refer to some entity) coincides with his general intention (to refer to the object which the designator he uses normally refers to) for one of two reasons: (11 His specific intention rnay be to refer to whaiever happens to be the semantic referent. For example. suppose that a speaker overhears a conversation between philosophers about David Kaplan - a person he has never heard of before and whom he has never met. He might. at a later time. Say (4) David Kaplan is interested in demonstratives. In this case. his specific intention in usinp the narne "David Kaplan" will be to refer to whnever happens to be the semantic referent of the name. (ii) His specific intention might be to refer to someone whom he believes is the semantic referent. For example. suppose that a speaker believes that the person he b ralking ro is David Kaplan. Suppose that later. reportinp the conversation he had with this man, he says (5) David Kaplan is interested in radical interpretation. In this case, the speaker's specific intention in using "David Kaplan" is to refer to the person with whom he was speaking. It is only in cases of this second son. Knpke argues. that the speaker's referent may fail to coincide with the semantic referent of the expression he uses. In the example just considered, if the speaker was actually speaking with Donald Davidson, for example, then Davidson, not Kaplan. is the person picked out by his specific intention; Davidson. not Kaplan, is the speaker's referent. The speaker's general intention. on the other hand, is to refer to David Kaplan since Kaplan, noi Davidson. is the semantic referent of the speaker's use of "David Kaplan". Given this distinction between speaker reference and seman tic reference. Knpke argues that we do not need to posit semantic ambiguities to account for Donnellan's referential and attributive uses of descriptions. Instead. appeals to general pragmatic rules or principles governing conversation can explain the phenornenon adequately. Kripke's hypothesis is that Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction should be generalized in this light. For the speaker. on a given occasion. may believe that his specific intention coincides with his general intention for one of two reasons. In one case. (the "simple" case). his specific intention is simply to refer to the semantic referent .... Alternatively - the "cornplex" case - he has a specific intention, which is distinct from his general intention, but which he believes, as a rnatter of fact, to detennine the same object as the one determined by his general intention. (For example, he wishes to refer to the man "over there" but believes that he is Jones.) In the "simple" case. the speaker's referent is. by definition, the semantic referent. In the "cornplex" case, they may coincide, if the speaker's belief is correct, but they need not. (The man "over there" may be Smith and not Jones.) To anticipate. my hypothesis will be that Donnellan's "attributiven use is nothing but the "simple" case, specialized to definite descriptions, and that the "referential" use is, sirnilarly. the "complex" case. If such a conjecture is correct. it would be wrong to take Donnellan's "referential" use. as he does, to be a use of a description as if it were a -proper - name. For the distinction of simple and complex cases "il1 apply to proper narnes just as much as to definhe descriptions (Kripke 1977: 15). Kripke does not offer an account of how it is that speakers are able to communicate successfully object-dependent propositions w hen the sentences w hich the they utter express object-inclependenz propositions. Speakers are, as Donnellan notes. able to understand referential uses of sentences of the form "The Fis G" as expressing object-dependent or singular propositions. Kripke's conjecture. however, is that Donnellan's examples of referential cases do not pmvide good reason for thinking that uses of definite descriptions express anything other than the object-independent propositions expressed by utterances of sentences of the form "There is a unique F, and everything which is F is G." This conjecture, as presented by Kripke, turns on the intuitively plausible notion that there is a distinction to be made between what he has called speaker reference and semantic reference. It seems, however. that in order to prove or establish this conjecture, some account must given of the "mechanisrns" by means of which speakers who use descriptions referentially are able to communicate singular. or object-independent. propositions. In Chapter Ten, 1 will argue that there are serious problems facing such accounts Nrale's Accounr of Referen fial Uses Stephen Neale presents the Weak Referential Thesis as follows: (1) Russell's analysis gives a (more or less) correct account of the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing a description. even when the description is used referentially; and (ii) the fact that we may communicate object-dependent propositions by using description-containing sentences is to be accounted for by a theory of communication, speaker's meaning, or speech acts. not by a semantical theory (Neale 1990: 9). Neale argues that this account appeals to shared knowledge about the grounds that a speaker may have for making an utterance. general features of the context of utterance. background assumptions. shared inferential abilities. and Gricean principles goveming rational discourse to provide a quite general explanation of how it is that we manage to convey object- dependent propositions using quantificational sentences. including. of course. sentences containing descriptions (Neale 1990: 89). Neale's defense of the Weak Referential Thesis provides a fairly detailed account of how these Gricean principles governing rational discourse provide such an explanation. As 1 mentioned earlier, 1 will examine this account in Chapter Ten. Soames ' Account of Referen tiai Uses Scott Soames, in "Donnellan's ReferentialIAttnbutive Distinction". argues that this weak account of the referentiallattributive distinction is to be preferred over the stronger thesis. His defense of the Weak Referential Thesis is notable for both its clarity and for his argument rigainsr the stronger thesis. 1 will end this section with an explication of Soarnes' characterization of the Weak Referential Thesis. According to Soames, A referential use of a description the F in a sentence The F is G is one in which a speaker has an individual O in mind about whom he wishes to make an assertion; the speaker uses the description to identify or pick out o. and the speaker intends his remark to be taken as asserting a singular. Russellian proposition about O to the effect that o is G. Since the speaker's pnmary purpose is to Say of O that O is G,this purpose need not be defeated even if the description, the F, does not correctly describe o (Soames 1994: 150). According to Soames' reading of Donnellan's distinction. when descriptions are used referentially. the descriptive content serves to assist the audience in picking out the item about which the speaker intends to Say something. This descriptive content. however. does not figure in the proposition which the speaker intends to communkate. Soames wntes that Once we have the object, the descriptive information falls away, and the object itself becomes a constituent of the proposition. The reason we know that the descriptive information does not get into the proposition is that the proposition may be true even if the description used referentially in asserting i t does not apply to the object (Soames 1994: 153). As should be clear from the discussion in Chapter Four, 1 agree with this way of characterizhg referential uses of descriptions. After having characterized the communicative intentions of speakers who use description referentially, as well as the son of proposition which they wish their audience to entertain, Soames points out that Throughout this discussion, 1 have not said anything about whether the singular proposition asserted by a speaker who uses a description referentially should be regarded as semantidy expressed by the sentence used by the speaker, relative to the context of utterance. Much has been written about this, often under the puise of another question -- namely. whether the semantic referent of a description relative to a context of utterance in which it is used referentially is just the object that the speaker uses it to refer to (Soames 1994: 153). As 1 have tried to argue, this is the fundamental question about which the Weak and Strong Referen rial Theses disagree. Soames defends the weak thesis. He argues that Donnellan's distinction is not a distinction within semantics. "but rather is a prapmatic distinction about the uses speakers make of certain pieces of ianguage" (Soames 1994: 153). The thesis which he defends daims that although a speaker who uses a definite description referentially may intend to communicate. and may succeed in communicating, a singular or object-dependent proposition about some item, "that proposition is not semantically expressed by the speaker's sentence relative to the context of utterance" (Soames 1994: 154). Soames offers four reasons in defense of the weak thesis. First. as Kripke argues. given a standard quantificational treatment of descriptions, we can typically explain referential uses of definite descriptions by appealing to that semantics together with independently needed Gricean conversational principles (Soames 1994: 154). This is the view which 1 will be considenng in Chapter Ten. Second. as Kripke. in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference", and Neale, in Descriptiom, argue. something similar to a referentiaVattributive distinction occurs with uses of proper names. as well as with unerances of sentences which have, in subject position, quantifier phrases like "All Fk". "Some F's ".and "Most F's ". Kripke's example of Smith raking his leaves. discussed above, gives an illustration of referential uses of proper names. Referential uses of quantifier phrases can be illustrated with the following example. Suppose that Mary is Jones's only graduate student, and that this is known by both Alfred and Bert. Suppose further that Alfred and Ben each knows that the other knows this fact about Jones. Finally. suppose that Bert asks Alfred about who was invited to Jones' Party. AIfred may reply by uttering (6) Well. 1 know that al1 of Jones' graduate students were there, intending that Bert should undentand him to be saying that Mary was there. in this example, it is plausible to view Alfred's use of (7) AI1 Jones' graduate students as beinp referential. His intention was to communicate an object-dependent proposition about that person who is Jones' only student. Thus. even though he is uttering a quantifier phrase, his intention is to cornmunicate the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance, in the same context. of (8) Mary was there. Examples like this. as Neale. in Descrip~ionr.argues, show that the phenomenon of referential usage seems to be quite general; it concems not only definite descriptions. but also names and quantifier phrases. This apparent generality of the phenomenon of referential use has been taken by some as reason for rejecting the stronger interpretation of the referentiallattnbutive distinction. As Soames notes, It would seem to be a strange and unexplained coincidence. as well as a needless complication, if we had to posit parallel sernantic ambiguities for al1 these cases ( Soames 1994: 1 a). Third, in cases where a definite description of the form "The F' is used to pick out, or refer to. something o which is not F. and to Say that it is G. the natural thing to Say about the utterance. if the iniended referent happens to be G. is not simplv that the speaker said something which is tme. Rather. the natural thing to Say (assuming the unique F-er not to be G) is that although the speaker has said something that is literally false. namely that the Fis G.he has also said something true, namely that the individual O is G. This natural description of the case is precisely what one would expect if the proposition semantically associated with the speaker's sentence is the familiar ~neralone, while the additional assertion of the singular proposition anses from general conversational principles plus special facts about the context (Soames 1994 154). This natural description of what occurs with referential uses w here the description is not true of the speaker's intended referent would. Soames argues. be unavailable if the Strong Referential Thesis were true. This thesis would provide us with no ready explanation of the semantic intuition that, in such cases of misdescription. the speaker has hoth said something true and something false. The reason for this should be clear. If the strong thesis is correct. then the proposition literally expressed by an utterance of a sentence of the form "The Fis G" is simply the singular. or object-dependent. proposition whose constituents include the object O and the property expressed by the utterance of "Gu.As mentioned earlier. according to this thesis. the descriptive content or information which the speaker has used to pick out or refer to his intended referent does not form any part of the content of the proposition which is expressed by his utterance of the sentence. Given this. there is Iittle room to explain the fact that in cases where the description used is false of the intended referent, the speaker hm said something w hich is false. Fourth. Soames claims that the whole phenornenon of true assertion despite misdescription invites a pragrnatic account. It is part of the very nature of semantic niles that they apply generally to expressions whaiever and wherever they occur. The idea that these rules might routinely be inapplicable, and that the interpretation of particular occurrences of expressions in particular contexts must depend on factors idiosyncratic to those contexts. is foreign to what semantics is, and is an indication that we have stepped outside its proper domain (Soames 1994: 154f). The last two points made by Soames tum on the issue of how to interpret cases where referential uses of definite descnptions are intended to refer to entities which do not satisfy the descriptive content. These cases of misdescription are, 1 believe. incidenrd to the debate between the Strong and Weak Referential Theses. In the nexi chapter 1 will present an argument which. I believe, provides good reason for thinking that the stronger thesis is tnie. This argument does nor depend on the phenornenon of misdescnption. 1 will argue that. even if we completely ignore such controversial cases. there are still good reasons to be offered in defense of this thesis. In order to assess the Weak Referential Thesis adequately. what is needed is some detaiied account of how it is that speakers can succeed in communicating object- dependent propositions in spire of rhe fact that the expressions uttered literaily express only object-independent propositions. I will examine Neale's account of this in Chapter Ten. To anticipate. my daim will be that such accounts fail to provide adequate explanations of successful communication where definite descriptions are used referen tial l y. ( ii) Clusijku~ionof Uses of Definire Descriptions Before presenting my arguments for the strong thesis. it will be useful to mark three further distinctions, besides the referential-attributive distinction, conceming how definite descriptions may be used. Like Grice's type-2 situation. described above. many of the examples offered, by Donneilan and others, in support of the claims that there are two uses of definite descriptions and that descriptions are semantically arnbipuous share one or both of the following properties. Many of the examples are cases in which the object about which the speaker intends to Say something does not satisfy the description that was unered. but something else does. Other examples commonly offered in support of these claims involve cases where nothing, or more than one thing, satisfies the description uttered by the speaker. It is important to distinguish clearly these distinct kinds of ways in which descriptions rnay be used. As we will see. these different sorts of use are taken by some to provide arguments for the strong thesis. Uses of definite description can be categorized by appealing to four different distinctions. We have al ready considered the referenrial-attributive distinction. 1n addition to being referential or attributive, a use of a definite descnption may be either complere or incomplete, apr or inapr, proper or improper. In this section. 1 will explain how Iwill use each of these sets of terms. as well as the distinctions that they are meant to pick out. (1) Com~lete-Incom~lete: A use of a definite description is complete just in case there is exactly one object that fits the descnption used. A use of a description is incomplete just in case there is nothing that satisfies the description. or there is more than one thinp that satisfies it. In conjunction with the referential-attributive distinction, this distinction allows us to distinguish four kinds of use of definite descriptions. To illustrate these. it will be convenient to appeal to the two cases. discussed above. in which the description "Jones' butler" is used. Consider the first case. (a) Suppose that the speaker is correct in his belief that Jones had exactly one butler. In such a case. his utterance of ( 1) would involve an attributive-complere use of "Jones' butler*'. (6) If the speaker's belief is incorrect because Jones has either no buder or several. then his utterance of ( 1 ) would involve an uttriburive-incomplrte use of "Jones' butler". Consideration of the second case. discussed above, will illustrate two other uses of the description "Jones' butler". (c) Suppose that the speaker is correct in his belief that the distinguished man that he saw is Jones' only butler. In such a case. the speaker's utterance of (2) would involve a referential-complefe use of the description. (d) If the speaker is incorrect in his belief that the distinguished man is Jones' butler because no one, or someone else, is his butfer, then his utterance of (2) would involve a referential-incomplete use of "Jones' butIerT'. Incomplete uses of definite descriptions have been taken by some authors as good reason for thinking that the Russellian account is inadequate. Strawson. in "On Refemop", and Wettstein. in "Demonstrative Reference and Defini te Descriptions", argue that such cornmon uses of descriptions suggest that definite descriptions do not always function as the Russellian account would have us believe. I will examine their arguments more closely in subsequent chapters. for now it will be useful to have a loose characterization of the problem incomplete uses of definite descriptions are supposed to pose for Russell's Theory of Descriptions. What Neal e. in Descriptions, calls The Argument jiom Incompleteness. begi ns with the observation that speakers can, and very frequently do. use expressions of the form "The F is G" when it is not the case that there is some object which uniquely satisfies the description "The F'. In fact, speakers often use such expression when it is ohvious to them that there is nothing which uniquely satisfies the description uttered. Consider the following example. Suppose that Jones is complaining about the lacb of reading material in Smith's apartment. Suppose that, by way of reply. Smith utters (9) The table is covered with books intending that Jones recognizes that he is talking about a particular table which is in his apartment. That is. Smith uses the description "the table" in (9) referentially. Here his use is both referential and incomplete. Clearly Smith would not be taken by Jones to have asserted that there is exactly one table in the universe. In addition. it seems obvious that Jones need not take Smith to be asserting that there is exactly one table in the whole apartment. Finally, in a case like (9). it is unlikely that the audience will take the speaker to be saying anythinp which implies that there is exactly one table. Observations of this sort seem to provide prima facie reason for thinking that the Russellian account of definite descriptions is inadequate. As Neale daims. a theory that postulates a semantically distinct referential interpretation of descriptions seems to provide a natural account of what is going on in (1): the description function as a referring expression (Neale 1990: 94). According to Russell's theory. Smith, in this example. would be making an assertion which is undoubtedly false. This mns counter to the fairly uncontroversial semantic intuition that Smith has said something true. assuming that the table to which he has referred is in fact covered with books. Indeed. examples Iike this seem to invite an interpretation of the descnption under which it functions very much like a dernonsrrarive. That is. there is, among competent speakers of English, a tendency to 'hear' an utterance like (9)as expressing the same proposition as an utterance of ( 10) That table is covered with books, where the contexts of utterance are the same. Since there are good reasons for thinking that a speaker who utters ( 10) would be expressing, not merely communicaring, a sinpular proposition. it might be thought that a speaker who utten (9) also would be expressing. not rnerely communicating, a singular proposition. 1 will examine this argument for the Stronp Referential Thesis in Chapter Ten. (II) Apt-Ina~t: A use of a definite description that is referential may be either apt or inapt. A use of a description is what 1 cal1 apt if and only if the object to which the speaker is refemng fits the description uttered. A use of a description is inczp? if and only if the descnption used does not fit the object to which the speaker has referred. Since, as 1 have argued in the previous chapter, attributive uses of descriptions do not refer. although they rnay denote. the apt-inapt distinction applies to on!\' referential uses. Case two. discussed above. will be useful in illustrating this distinction and how it differs from the complete-incomplete distinction discussed in (1): Suppose that the speaker is correct in his belief that the man who took his coat was Jones' butler. In this case, his utterance of (2) would involve an apt use of the description "Jones' butler". If the man is Jones' only butler. the use of the description in (2) would be both apt and cornplere. If. on the other hand. the man is only one of Jones' butlen. then the speaker's use of "Jones' butler*' would be upt but incornplete. Suppose that the speaker in case two is wrong and the man to whom he is refemng is not Jones' butler. In this case, his utterance of (2) would involve an hpt use of the description. If. despite the speaker's error, Jones does have exactly one butler, then the speaker's use of the description would be iwpr and cornpiete. If. on the other hand. Jones has no butler or several, the speaker's utterance of (2) would involve an impt and incompletr use of the description. The foregoing shows that the complete-incomplete distinction. when applied to referential uses. does not coincide exactly with the apt-inapt distinction. As with the case of incomplete uses of definite descriptions. inapt uses have provided grkt for the referentialist's mill; they provided further reason for thinking that the Strong Referential Thesis is correct. The rasons for this are not hard to see. and, as with the case of incomplete descriptions. it will be worth spending a bit of time presenting the outlines of the argument. What Neale. in Descripions. calls The Argument from Misdescription begins wi th the observation that a speaker who uses a description referentially may be intending to express a proposition about some object that does not satisfy the description uttered. Consider the case which Donnellan. in "Reference and Defini te Descriptions", discusses. Suppose that Jones believes that the man in the dock is the unique murderer of Smith. Suppose that this man has been behaving wildly during the trial. and on the basis of this behaviour Jones utters ( 1 1) The murderer of Smith is insane. Suppose that the man to whom he is refemng is insane, but is not guilty of Smith's murder. Finally. suppose that the unique penon who murdered Smith is not insane. In a case such as this. semantic intuitions differ greatly. Some argue that what Jones said is obviously true. since the person he was talking about is insane. In such a case, it is argued. the Russellian gets things wrong, since, according to Russell's account of descriptions, what Jones has said is false. The argument from misdescription might be put in the followinp fashion: (a) If Russell's Theory of Descriptions is correct. then what Jones said in uttering ( 1 1) is false. (b) But what Jones said in uttenng (11) is not false. (c) Therefore, Russell's theory must be incorrect, at lest for such uses of descnpti ons. (III) Prowr-Improper: Like the apt-inapt distinction, this distinction applies only to referential uses of definite descriptions. A use of a description is proper just in case it is both complere and apt. A use of a description is improper just in case it is either incomplete or hpt. In the example that we have been considering, the speaker's utterance of (2) involves a proper use of the description "Jones' butler" just in case the penon to whorn he is refening is Jones' only butler: otherwise it will be improper. The following table illustrates sorne of the connections among the various distinction which we have considered: Referential Use: A use u of a definite Attributive Use: A use u of a definitt description d is referential just in case u is descriptiond is attributive just in case it i! accompanied by speaker's reference. not accompanied by speaker's reference. Corndete: A use u of a definite Incomplete: A use u of a definite description d is complete just in case there description d is incomplete just in case is exactly one object that satisfies d. u there is either nothing which satisfies d oi may be either referential and complete or several objects satisfy d. u may be eithei attributive and complete. but not both. referential and incomplete or attributive and incomplete, but not both. &: A referential use u,by a speaker s, of Inapt: A referential use u, by a speaker S. a definite description d is apt just in case of a definite description d is inapt just in the object to which s intends to refer in case the object to which s intends to refer making u satisfies d. u rnay be either apt in making u does not satisfy d. u may be and complete or apt and incomplete, but either inapt and complete or inapt and not both. incomplete, but not both. hm: A referential use u of a definite Impro~er: A referential use u of a definite description is proper just in case u is both description is improper just in case u is complete and apt. either incomplete or inapt. Chapter Seven AN ARGUMENT FOR THE STRONG REFERENTMUATTRIBUTIVETHESIS In this chapter, I will present an argument which provides reason for thinking that the Strong Referential Thesis is the correct way to understand Donnellan's referentiaVattributive distinction. This argument does not depend on referential uses of definite descriptions which are either incomplete or inapt. The fact that it depends only upon what I called proper uses of definite descriptions is a reason for prefemng it to arguments for the Strong Referential Thesis which turn on semantic intuitions about what a speaker has said. as well as the truth-conditions of what he has said. when the uses of the descriptions are eitherincomplete or inapr. A focus on these sorts of cases, what 1 calleci improper uses of definite descnptions. provides a distortion of the genuine significance of the referentidattributive distinction. Such uses are, 1 hope to show, en tirely peripheral to deciding about the semantic significance of the referentialjattributive distinction. The best way to decide about the semantic significance of this distinction is by focusing on uses of descnptions in which the speaker's intended referent sarisfie..r the descriptive content of the definite descnption which the speaker uses, and it is the on& object which satisfies this descriptive content. As Scott Soames, in "Donnellan's ReferentiaVAttributive Distinction". has agued, in cases where a definite description of the form "The F' is used to pick out. or refer to, something O which is not F and the speaker wishes to Say that it is G, the natural thing to say about the utterance. if the intended referent happens to be G. is not simpiy that the speaker said something which is true. Rather, as Soames argues, the natural thing to Say (assuming the unique F-er not to be G) is that although the speaker has said something that is literally false, namely that the F is G. he has also said something true, namely that the individual o is G. This naturai description of the case is prezisely what one would expect if the proposition semantically associated wi th the speaker's sentence is the familiar pneral one, while the additional assertion of the singular proposition anses from general conversational principles plus special facts about the context (Soames 1994: 154). 1 think that this is a natural and well-motivated response. My focus. in this chapter. will be on uses of definite descriptions in which the speaker's intended referent is the unique satisfier of the description which he uses. If arguments can be developed to show that such uses of definite descriptions are best interpreted, semantically. as singular terms. then 1 think that a good case will have been made in defense of the Strong Referential Thesis. The argument 1 will present concems the attribution of beliefs to speakers. 1 will argue that there are two, highly plausible. principles conceming the ascnption of propositional contents to speaken which, together. provide good reason for thinking that descriptions used referentially should be interpreted as genuine singular terms. The first is a pnnciple which Kripke calls The DisquotafionalPrinciple (DP). Knpke presents both a strong and weak version of this principle. For my purposes. 1 will appeal only to the weaker of these. This pnnciple claims that (DP)"If a nonnal English speaker, on reflection. sincerely assents to 'p.. then he believes thatp" (Kripke 1979: 1 12 f) .' The second principle concerning the ascriptions of beliefs to speakers that 1 will appeal to is The Principle of Chari" (CP). There are. of course. numerous accounts of what the principle of charity might be. The version to which 1 will appeal is, 1 trust. relatively uncontroversial. It simply clairns that, if there are two possible wzys of ascribing beliefs to a speaker, S. and the first of these ascribes contradictory beliefs to S while the second does not, then the second is to be preferred over the first. This pnnciple of interpretation enjoins us to interpret speakers' utterances. insofar as it is possible, in such a way that we are not ascribing contradictory beliefs to them. Thus. I The stronger version of the disquotational pnnciple is the following biconditional: "A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to 'p' if and only if he believes that p" (Knpke 1979: 1 13). 1 think that this strong version is also correct, however 1 will be appealing only to the weaker version of the (DP). (CP) Given two possible ascnptions of beliefs. A, and A,. to a speaker. S. if A, ascribes contradictory beliefs to S and A, does not, ihen A, should be prefemed over A,. 1 will discuss these principles in greater detail, and will argue that, given certain refinements. they are highly plausible, and, taken topther. provide reason for prefemng the Strong over the Weak Referentid Thesis. The argument depends only on the tmth of the (CP) and the (DP). as well as the intuitively plausible thesis that an agent believes the obvious logical consequences of his beiiefs. 1 will assume that if a speaker believes, for example, that Regina is the capital of Saskatchewan and is south of Saskatoon, then he believes that Regina is the capital of Saskatchewan. That is, 1 will assume what 1 will cal1 The Principle of Conjunction Elimination regarding the contents of speakers' beliefs: (CE) If a speaker, S. believes that P and Q, then S also believes that P. The conclusion which 1 wish to defend is that the weak interpretation of the referential/attributivedistinction would lead us to ascribe connadcto~beliefs to speakers, whereas the stronger interpretation of this distinction does not have this consequence. Given this conclusion, and the (CP), 1 think that we have pood reason for rejecting the weak version in favour of the stronger one. The argument cmbe presented as follows: (il The Argument From The Principle of Charin (a) Ei ther the strong or the weak interpretation of the referentiaVattn butive distinction is correct. (h) If the Weak Referentiai Thesis is true, then at Ieast one of the (CP) or the (DP) must not be a requirement governing the ascription of beliefs to speakers. (c) But the (CP) and (DP) ae requirements goveming the ascription of beliefs to speakers. (4 Therefore, the Weak Referential Thesis is false. (r) Therefore. the Stmng Referential Thesis is correct. The argument is. of course, a valid one. so, if the weak referentialiattributive thesis is to be maintained, at least one of (a),(h), or (c)must be denied. 1 will examine these premises in order. (ii) A Deferne of Premisr One The first premise would not, it rnust be admitted, constitute a likely target for a defender of the Weak Referential Thesis. The defenders of this account of the referentialfattnbutive distinction have traditionally contrasted their account with the stronger one. As others have done, 1 will assume that ei ther Donnellan 's referentid/att.i butive distinction shows that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. or DonneIlan's distinction shows, at most. that speakers may succeed in collylulnicuting singular, or object-dependent. propositions by uttering expressions w hich. strict1y speaking. sernantically express only general. or object-independent, propositions. Thus, 1 will assume what premise one asserts. It may in fact be the case the disjunction in ((11 is not exhaustive of al1 possible interpretations of the significance of the referential/attributive distinction.' In the absence of other plausible accounts of this distinction, however. I will assume that it is exhaustive. François Recanati, in "ReferentiaI/Attributive: A Contextualist Proposal", argues that referential uses of definite descriptions do semantically express singular, object-dependent. propositions, however he denies that this shows that descriptions are semantically ambiguous. 1 agree with Stephen Neale's assessrnent of Recanati's view. He notes that, On Recanati 's proposal, not only may different utterances of 'the F is G' express different ohject-&prnde~propositions, but other utterances of this same sentence may express the object-idependent proposition that whatever is uniquely Fis G. It dl depends on whether the description is used referentially or attributively... Since two utteriy distinct qpes of proposition may be expressed, 1 fail to see how a theory with such Even if it is not exhaustive. it is unlikely that a defender of the weak thrsis would challenge the fint prernise of this argument. [t is hard to see how denying both of the disjuncts in (a) could conceivable advance the case for the Weak ReferentiaVAttributive Thesis. given that the second disjunct is the weak interpretation. (iii) A Defense of Premise Two The core of my defense of The Argument From Chmip consists in showing how the weak interpretation of the referentid/attributive/ distinction is incompatible with the (CP) and the (DP).considered jointly. The point is not, I think. that hard to see, but it will be wonh spelling out in detail the nature of the incornpatibility. Consider the following example. Suppose that Jones and Smith. both comptent English speakers. have been introduced to a man whom they are toid has recently won the latest provincial lottery. Based on this man's rather sullen demeanor. Jones is disposed to assent to ( 1 ) The winner of the latest lottery is unhappy. Suppose that Jones and Smith are arguing about the fate of lottery winners in general. Smith argues that lottery winnings are. in general. to be desired. Jones. to make the contrary case. utters ( 1 ). In uttennp ( 1 ). his intention is to Say something about the man to whom they were introduced. His use of the definite description (2) The winner of the latest lottery is thus accompanied by xpeaker refrence. Given the account of referential use offered in Chapter Four. we can Say that Jones has used the description (2) referentially. His intention. in uttenng ( 1) is to communicate an object-dependent proposition about the man to whom he and Smith were introduced. Mat he wishes to communicate is thus a flexibility can fail to be a theory that is postulatinp a semantical ambiguity (Neaie 1990: 1 12). proposition which is true just in case thar man is unhappy . Furthemore, the proposition which he wishes to communicate is one which is true in counterfactual circumstances just in case thut man is unhappy. Suppose Jones, like many othen, believes that more than one peoon coufd have won the latest provincial lottery. Suppose also that Jones, having observed numerous recent lotteries in which there were multiple winners. believes of the latest lottery that there were several winners. Thus. Jones is disposed to assent to (3) It is false that exactly one person won the latest lottery. Suppose. finally, that Jones is wrong about this last matter, and that the latest lottery was in fact won by just one penon - namely, the man to whom he and Smith were introduced. To bepin with. note that Jones' use of the definite description (2) in his utterance of ( 1 ) is what 1 have called a proper use. That is, his use of the definite description (2) is refrenhi. as well as being both complete and qt. If it cm be shown that such uses of descnptions provide prima facie reason for thinking that the weak interpretation of the referential/attributivedistinctionis incorrect, then 1 think we have good reason for thinkinp that this interpretation is incorrect in oll cases in which descriptions are used referentially. whether or not the uses of the description are proper. To see the problem that examples like this pose for the Weak Referential Thesis, consider the position of Smith. who must interpret Jones' sincere utterance of ( I ). cviJ ascribe beliefs to Jones on the basis of the (CP), the (DP), and the principle of conjunction elirnination as it applies to beliefs. To make the problem even clearer. and to present the differences between the weak and strong interpretations of the referentidattributive distinction. consider the task of interpreting Jones as it faces two interpreten, Smith,, and Smith,,,,,. Srni$, is an interpreter who believes that the Weak Referential Thesis is correct. Smith,,,,,, on the other hand, is a proponent of the Strong Referential Thesis. Thus. Smith,, believes the following: (11 There are two distinct ways in which speakers can use definite descnptions. These are the attributive and referential uses which were discussed earlier. (ii) Definite descriptions are nor semantically ambiguous. They have only one correct semantic analysis. This analysis is provided by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. (iii) Speakers who use definite descriptions referentially intend to communicate a singular. or object dependent. proposition about their intended referent. Often they may succeed in cornmunicatingsuch a proposition. The proposition which their utterance semantcaIIv expresses, however. is a general, or object-independent. proposition. (iv) His ascriptions of beliefs. and other propositional attitudes, to speakers must be constrained by the (DP), the (CP).and the principle of (CE). Smith,,,,,,, let us suppose, is indistinguishable from Smith,, except for the fact that he believes the assumptions which characterize the strong version of the referential/attributive thesis. That is, Smith,,,,, believes the following: (11 There are referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. (ii) Russell's analysis of descriptions is correct as a semantic account of attributive uses. but not of referential ones. Descriptions admit of two quite different semantic analyses, depending upon how they are used. (iii) Speakers who use a description referentially intend to communicate a sinpular proposition about their intended referent. In addition, this proposition is properly understood as the semantic content of what they have sai d. Smith,,,,,, believes that when a speaker, S. uses a description. cl, referentially, there is some singular proposition # w hich his utterance literally expresses. Final1 y, ( iv) his ascriptions of beliefs. and other pmpositional attitudes, to speakers must be constrained by the (DP), the (CP), and the principle of (CE). Consider the task of interpreting Jones' utterance of ( 1) which faces Smith,,. Suppose that he knows the following facts about Jones: (13 Jones, has asserted sincerely that ( 1 ): (ii) Jones' intention was to communicate the sinpular proposition about the man to whom he was in troduced; (iii)Jones believes that i t is false that exact1y one person won the latest lottery; (iv)Jones is a cornpetent English speaker. The problem confronting Smith,, should, by now. seem obvious. Knowing that Jones has sincerely assented to ( 1 ), and that the (DP) govems belief ascriptions which are made on the basis of sincere and reflective utterances of sentences. Smith,, infers that Jones believes that the winner of the Iatest lottery is unhappy. Smith,, infers this because an application of the (DP) to this case tells him that (4) If Jones, a normal English speaker, on refiection, sincerely assenrs to 'The winner of the latest lottery is unhappy". then Jones believes that the winner of the latest lottery is unhappy. As a Russellian about definite descriptions. however. Smith,,, believes that the contenr of Jones' utterance of ( 1 ), the proposition expressed by his utterance of ( 1 ), is the same as the proposition which would have been expressed, in the sarne circumstances. by an utterance of (5) Exact1y one penon won the latest lottery, and everyone who won the latest lottery is unhappy. Since. according to Srni%&. the proposition expressed by (1) is nothing other than the proposition expressed by (5). he infen that Jones helieves that (5). Since an obvious lopical consequence of (5) is (6) Exactly one person won the latest lottery. Smith,, infers. frorn the principle of (CE). that Jones believes that exactly one person won the latest lottery. Smith,,,, has no reason to doubt that Jones believes the ohviorrs logical consequences of his beliefs. Smith,,'~ ascription of beliefs to Jones is problernatic, aven his commitment to The Principle of Chari.. Based on his assumption about the correct semantic anal ysis of definite descriptions. as well as his commitrnent to The Disquot~io~iPrinciple, he believes that Jones believes both (3) and (6). These are, however, contradictories. Thus. based on hi s assumption about the correct interpretation of the referentiallattri butive distinction. and hi s cornmitment to the (DP).Smith,, has attributed contradictory beliefs to Jones. But this is not compatible with his commitment to the (CP) which reguires that, if possible, contradictory beliefs are not to be ascnbed to a speaker. It seems. therefore. that in this case. Smith,, cannot interpret Jones's utterance in such a way that he satiçftes each of the (CP). the (DP), the principle of (CE), and the assurnptions of the weak version of the referentiaUatûibutive thesis. Now, stnctly speaking, this last move is a bit hasty. since the (CP). according to the weak reading which 1 have given it, requires that an interpreter not ascribe contradictory bel iefs to a speaker when therr is morher civailahle inrerprerution of rhe speuker 's rtrterancesunderwhich he is norrrscribrdconrrodicro~beliefs. The defender of the weak interpretation of the referential/attributive distinction might maintain that his interpretation of Jones' utterance is indeed the on!\. one available. This is not an effective reply. In addition to sr ni th,,'^ interpretation of Jones, we also have to consider the interpretation which would have been provided by Smith,,,,,. If the interpretation of Jones which Smiths,,,, would amve at does not ascribe contradictory beliefs to Jones, then it seems clear that Smith,& interpretation does violate The Principleof Chari?. Consider, then, how things stand with respect to Smith,,,,. Like Smith,,. he also recognizes. as constraints on belief ascnptions. the (DP) and the (CP). Knowing that Jones has uttered. sincerely and upon reflection. ( L ), Smith,,,,, infers that Jones believes that (1). {Jnlike Smith,,,. however. Smith,,,, does not assume that the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of ( 1 ) is the same as the proposition which would have been expressed, in the same context. by an utteranceof (5). Hence, he does not ascribe to Jones the belief that (5). Therefore. Smiths,,,, does not infer that Jones believes (6). Applying the (DP). Smith,,,,, reasons that since Jones has sincerely and upon reflection asserted ( 1 ). he musc believe ( 1 ). Recognizing that Jones's utterance of ( I ) was referential. Smith,,,,, ascnbes to Jones a belief in the singuim. or objecr-tkprrulenr. proposition about the person to whom they were both intmduced. That is. the content of the belief which he ascribes to Jones is about that inàividual to whom they were intmduced. This belief which Smith,,,, ascribes to Jones does not entail that exactly one penon won the latest lottery. Indeed. the belief which Smith,,,, ascnbes to Jones is perfectly compatible with (3). Thus. Smith,,,,, is able to interpret Jones's utterance in such a way that he satisfies both the (CP) and the (DP). What this shows. of course. is that there are at least two possible interpretations of Jones's utterance available: let us cal1 these, respectively, Il and 1,. Il is obtained by adherinp to the weak interpretation of the referentiaVatvibutive distinction. the (DP).and the principle of (CE). 1, is obiained by adhering to the stronger interpretation of the referentialJattnbutive distinction and the (DP). Given that I, ascribes contradictory beliefs to Jones. but I, does not, Smithw,, if he wishes to maintain his interpretation of the significance of the referentiallattributive distinction, must abandon the (CP). Once it is seen that I, is available, Smith, cannot maintain his cornmitment to al1 three of (13 the Weak Referential Thesis, (ü) the (DP), and (iii) the (CP). Smith,,,,,, on the other hand. does not appear to have any difficulties in holding the (DP) and the (CP) along with the Strong Referential Thesis. It will be worth considering two preliminary objections which rnight be made apinst The Argument Frm Chiuiy. The example considered above is rather contrived. and may leave the impression that any inconsistencies between the weak interpretation of the referentialJattributive distinction and the (CP) and the (DP) would occur, if at all, only rare&. Hence. the objection might mn. the inconsistency which this argument points out is best accounted for by simpl y accepting that in such rare circurnstances. i t is appropnate to ascri be inconsistent or contradictory beliefs to a competent speaker. That is, in response to cases such as the one described, the best reply is simply to acknowledge that there are exceptions to The Principfe of Che. These exceptions, i t might be claimed, will be sufficiently rare. There is, thus. no need to worry that this weakened fom of the (CP) would licensefrequent anri butions of contradictory beliefs to speakers. As a possible objection. this ought not appear very plausible. There are many instances in which speakers sincerely and upon reflection utter sentences of the form 'The F is G" where they believe that there is more than one thing which satisfies the description. or where they are at least willing to allow for the possibility that more than one thing satisfies the description. That such utterances are frequent. suggests that the problem regarding the incompatibility between the weak interpretation of the referentiallattributive distinction and the (CP) is much more significant than this objection would allow. The weak version of the referentiavattnbutive thesis, in conjunction with a weakened (CP), would commit us to attributing. on a regular bais. inconsistent or contradictory beliefs to competentspeakers of English. If this is correct. the argument from charity must be seen as a significant problem for this interpretation of the referentiaVattributivedistinction. Another objection that might be raised against The Argumenr From Chihis that Jones. and speakers like him, are either not competent speaken of English. or do not sincerely and upon reflection make assertions like ( 1 ) when they do nor helievr rhar aac.f(~ one thing satisfirs rhe relevanr defnifedescription. As with the previous objection, 1 doubt that this tells significantly against The Argument From Chari?. In fact. such an objection might well seem disingenuous. The suggestion that speakers such as Jones are not competent speakers of English seems entirely unwarranted. Unless. indeed, one has strong intuitions, prior to the discussion of the alleged incompatibility between the weak interpretation of the referentiallattributive distinction and the (CP).that speakers such as Jones are incompetent speakers of English. such a response seems adhoc. Whether or not a speaker is comptent surely turns on whether his use of linguistic expressions conforms to certain established noms within the relevant linguistic community. It stnkes me as extremely counterintuitive to Say that speakers who use. sincerely and upon reflection, expressions of the fonn 'The F is G" while believing that there may be more than one item which is F are not competent English speakers. The noms or conventions regulating speakers' use of such expressions do not seem to require that speaken utter them on- if they believe there to be exactly one thing which satisfies their descriptive content. There are, to be sure, some referential uses of descriptions in which it is a requirement. in sorne sense, that the speaker believes that there is exactly one thinp which satisfies the description. Suppose, for example, that in the case we considered above, Jones does believe that the man to whom he and Smith were introduced was the unique winner of the latest lottery. Suppose that Jones is arguing, against Smith, for the proposition that dl lottery winners are unhappy. Suppose that Smith, in response to Jones' utterance of ( 1 ), says (7) But perhaps there are orher winnen of the latest lonery who me happy. Jones. given his belief that the man to whom they were introduced is the unique winner of the lottery, rnay well respond, ( 1 ') The winner of the latest lottery is unhappy. Here Jones is again intending to express an object-dependent proposition about the penon to whom they were introduced. It would. however, be misleading for Jones to say ( 1 ') without believing that there is a unique person who satisfies the descriptive content. Smith would be justified in infemng. from the emphasis which Jones placed on the definite article. that he believes that there was only one winner of the latest lottery. If a speaker wishes to avoid mic-leding his audience. then there is, in this sense, a requirement for certain uses of descnptions that he believes that exactly one thing satisfies the description uttered. These uses, however. are not the nom. It seems that. in the most common case, speaken may use expressions of the fom "the F' referentially without believing that exactly one thing satisfies the description. The example discussed above is rather specialized in the sense that it is what 1 have called a proper use of a definite description. Many uses of definite descriptions, however. are improper. in the sense discussed in Chapter Six. Many. if not most, uses of definite descnptions are incomplete. It frequently occurs that such uses of descriptions are sincerely, and upon refiection. made by speakers. For exarnple. it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a comptent speaker might sincerely and upon reflection utter each of the following sentences: (8) The book is on the table. (9) The man drinkinp a martini is happy tonight. ( 10) The woodpile buot into flames. ( 1 1) Smith's uncle is coming to town. ( 12) The bail flew out of the park. It would be inappropriate. in such cases, to ascribe to the speaker the belief that exactly one thing satisfies the definite description uttered. Yet it is hard to see how one can maintain both the Weak Referential Thesis and the disquotational principle without attributing such beliefs to the speaker. To see this, consider that the following instance of the (DP), "customized" for utterances of sentences in which definite descriptions occur in subject position: (DPD) If a speaker sincerely and upon reflection utten an expression of the fom "The F is G". then he believes that the F is G . Applying the (DPD) to the case of (8)above, for example. gives us, ( 13) If a speaker sincerely, and upon reflection. utters 'The book is on the table", then he believes that the book is on the table. The defender of the weak interpreiationof the referentiallattributivedistinction must. as we saw in the case of ( 1 ), attribute to the speaker a belief whose content is identical to the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance. in the same context. of ( 14) There is exactly one book. and every book is on the table. Clearly. this proposition logically implies that there is exactly one book. Hence, the defender of the weak interpretation of the referentialiattributivedistinction seems comrnitted io attributing to such a speaker the belief that there is exactly one book. But this belief attribution is certain1y counterintuitive. Similar arguments could be offered to show that. in each of the cases (8)- ( 13), the weak referentiaVattnbutivethesis attributes to the speakers beliefs that. intuitively, they need not possess. 1 believe that such uses of descriptions are perfectly correct. My grounds for saying this is that they confom with the noms or conventions which povern our use of the definite article. A competent interpreter of English would find. 1 contend. nothing amiss or improper with such uses. The suggestion, canvassed above. that speakers who use definite descriptions in the manner exemplified by (8) - ( 13) are not making sincere or considered assertions also stnkes me as also entirely unwarranted. My reason for thinking this is related to the view that such uses confom with established conventions for using definite descriptions. Given that expressions like those in (8) - (13) are unobjectionable in the sense of confoming to established conventions of English usage, 1 see no reason to think that speakers cannot assert them sincerely and upon reflection. It seems that the burden of proof. with respect to these objections to The Argument From Chariy, rests entirely with the defender of the weak version of the referential/attributive distinction. The onus is on him to prov ide convincing reason for thinking that speakers who use descriptions without believing that exactly one thing satisfies it are either incompetent English speakers, or are not speaking sincerely and upon reflection. (iv) A Defensr of Premisr Three 1 want to consider the plausibility of the two principles to which The Argument From Chmin, appeals.' Obviously. the defender of the weak version of the referential/attributivedistinction does not need to accept either The Principle of Ch* or ' 1 will not discuss the principle which asserts that if a speaker believes a conjunction. then he believes each of the conjuncts. The Disquonrürion Anciple If these are. in fact, not properly understood as requirements goveming the attribution of beliefs to speakers, then The Argumenr From Chari" is not sound. 1 will try to provide reason for thinking that these cive properly seen as requirements goveming belief ascriptions to speakers. There are intuitive connections between utterances which speakers make and the beliefs which they hold. In the ordinary practice of ascribing beliefs and other propositional attitudes to speakers, we make the assumption that if a speaker gives sincere assent to some sentence, then he believes whatever that sentence means. "Sincete assent", as Knpke claims. "is meant to exclude mendacity, acting, irony, and the like" (Knpke 1979: 1 13). Although there is a use of "sincere" according to which we can Say that a speaker sincerely assents to sentences like ( 15) You're a real card, ( 16) Our goose is cooked, 1 want to reserve the terni for cases in which a speaker does not intend to be undentood as speaking ironicui[v or mrraphoricalfy. It is. of course, natural to think that there should be a very close connection between belief and linguistic meaninp according to which we attribute beliefs to speakers on the basis of their sincere assent to sentences. Akeel Bilgrarni, in Belief and Meaning, presents this idea of a close connection between belief and meaning as follows: The idea of this close relation is not intended to convey the obvious falsehood that the meanings of the sentences which an a~ntuners alwps express the contents of his beliefs. Utterances which are lres or metaphors. for instance, spoil the pneraiity of that relation. Rather, the relation is conveyed by the fact that a sincere, non-self-deceived, utterance of (or assent to) a sentence by an agent is an utterance of something whose literal meaning gives the content of the belief that is expressed by that utterance. The fact that sentences are often not uttered this way does not spoil the connection between belief and meaning, though it obviously makes it necessary to produce an appropriately nuanced formulation of the connection for those utterances. The underlying effect of acknowledging the connection. of course, is to make the study of an agent's mind intemgal to the study of his meanings, and vice versa (Bileontmi 1994: 1 ). It is sufficient. for our purposes. to take the (DP), as fomulated earlier, as being "*an appropriately nuanced", in Bilborami's sense, account of the connection between beliefs and the meaning of linguistic expressions which competent speakers utter. This intuitive connections between the meaning of linguistic utterances and the attributions of beIief is, 1 believe, well-founded. To see this, suppose that The Dirquotdomf PrimipIe were false. Thus, if a speaker, S. assents sincerely, and upon reflection. to a sentence p. ihen it is not universally tme that S believes that p. It is not difficult to see why this denial of the (DP) is highly counterintuitive. Suppose. for exampie. that Jones assents to ( 17) Madison is the capital of Wisconsin, and, at the sarne time, assents to ( 18) 1 don't believe that Madison is the capital of Wisconsin. A natural response to such a tum of affairs would be to think that Jones either is lyinp about one of his assertions. or he is not a competent English speaker. The Disquo~ationPrincipk, as presented by Kripke, is related to considerations raised in Moore's Paradox. G. E. Moore's discussion concerns the apparent absurdity of asserting a sentence like ( 19) 1 don? believe that it's raining, but in fact it is. The examples he is interested in are not cases in which a speaker asserts one thing. but then changes his mind, or cases where one of his assertions is a lie, or cases where a speaker asserts something to someone. but then assens its opposite to another penon. Moore claims that the sort of examples he is concemed with, 'I don't believe it's raining, but as a matter of fact it is' or 'Thouph I don't believe it's raininp, yet as a matter of fact it is' shew thai we are not considenng a case where one of the two thinps is said to one penon and the other in an aside to another; not yet a case of change of mind. Nobody would express a change of mind in this way (Moore 1993: 208). As Moore illustrates in his discussion, there are subtleties involved in such examples. 1t will be wonh considenng some of these in order to pain a greater appreciation of the significance of The Dirquototion Pnnciple and why denying it seems countenn tui ti ve. Moore is interested in why it would seem to be absurd to Say sornething like ( 19). On the face of i t. this absurdity i.s odd since, as Moore notes. there is nothing absurd in saying something such as (20) 1 didn 't believe that it is raining. but as a matter of fact it was. That utterances like ( 19) shouid seern absurd. but not utterances like (20) is odd because. as Moore claims, it seems to be generally tnte that if it is not absurd to Say sornething of the form "It was p", then it is also not absurd to say something of the fom "It is p". But ( 19) and (20) differ only in respect of their tenses. Since (20) makes perfect sense, it seems that ( 19) should as well. The fact that it does not, is. as Moore claims. sornewhat paradoxical. The fact that (19) sounds absurd is also paradoxical when we consider that someone ebe can express exactiy the same proposition as that which a speaker would express by uttering (19), however what this second person says is na absurd. Moore illustrates this in the following way: Suppose thai Jones utters (19). We can agree ~at what he has said is odd. and has the air of absurdity about it. Suppose that Smith. reporting what Jones said. says (21 ) Jones believes that it is raining. but it isn't. Clearly, he has not said anything absurd. The proposition which Smith expresses is. however. exactly the same as that which Jones has expressed. This is paradoxical, Moore argues, because, as a rule. if it's not absurd for another person to Say assertively a sentence expressing a given proposition to me or to a third party, it isn't absurd for me to Say assertively a sentence expressing the same proposition (Moore 1993: 2080. The fact that Smith's utterance is not absurd shows, according to Moore, that what is memû. the proposition which is expressed, when someone says something like ( 19) may well be true; the proposition is not itself absurd or contradictory. That this is tme follows from the fact that Smith. in reporting Jones, may Say something which is perfectly conect. Moore remarks that it is a paradox that it should be perfectly absurd to utterarsertively words of which the meaning is something which rnay quite well be true - is not a contradiction (Moore 1993: 209). Moore's explanation of this paradox appeals to what speakers imply when they make assertions. The observations he makes in this comection provide reason, 1 believe, for thinking that the disquotational principle is correct. He argues that there is a difference between what 1 irnpl-v by uttering assertively the words 'it's raining' and what you impiy by uttenng the sarne words at the same time in the same place. Namely 1 imply that 1 believe it's raininp and not that you do; you imply that you do and not that 1 do (Moore 1993: 2090. The use of "imply" here requires some explanation since, obviously. the propositim (22) It's raining, does not impl y the proposition (23) 1 believe that it's raining. Similarly, the f~ that someone asserts (22) does not, by itself. imply that the speaker believes (22). As Moore notes, the speaker may be lying, or unering (22) under some pretence. From the fact. for example. that an actor has spoken the words in (22) on the stage, we would not infer that he believes (22). According to Moore, speakers who assert sentences are ordinarily assumed to believe them. In this sense. then, it is correct to Say that if a speaker asserts p. then we can infer that he believes p. Moore writes that it seems to me it's quite in accordance with ordinary language to Say that by uttering these words [Y believe it's raining" 1 1 do impiy that 1 believe it (Moore 1993: 210). The sense of "irnply" in question then is not a relation that holds between propositions. It concems. instead. speakers. Speakers who assert sentences are ordinanly taken to have implied that they believe what these sentences mean. Why this should be the case is. according to Moore. a function of our linguistic practice. He writes that the question may be raised: What's meant by saying that I imply [that 1 believe what I've assertedj? The only answer 1 can see to this is that it is something which follows from the following empirical fact: viz. that in the immense majonty of cases in which a penon says a thing assertively. he does believe the proposition which his words express (Moore 1993: 2 10). This empirical fact. 1 believe is largely what prounds our intuition that The Dispotution fiinciple is correct. Unless a speaker is being insincere. is lying. or speaking ironically or metaphorically, we take him to believe the content of the proposition which he has expressed. A partial explanation of this, according to Moore (Moore 1993: 21 I), is that when a speaker asserts a sentence, we ordinarily assume that what he has said is something which he knows. Speakers who make direct assertions about things imply, in the sense of "imply" discussed above. that what they are saying is something they know to be true. Frorn this it follows that they irnply, in this sarne sense, that they helieve what it is they are assening. Thus. I think there are very good reasons for thinking that The Disquntaiion PrinC@k is correctly viewed as a principle governing belief ascriptions to speakers. Indeed. when we consider the al~ernafivesto this principle of belief ascnption. they al1 appear to be completely unacceptable. There are. it seems. just three alternatives available if we choose to deny the principle that if a speaker, S. sincerely. and upon ~flection. assents to p. then he believes that p. Supposing S has given sincere and reflective assent to a sentencep. these alternatives are the following: Either (11 S believes thatp is not the case. or (ii) it is not the case that S believes that p. but he believes something else. or (iii) S believes nothing at all. It will be worth examining these alternatives briefly. The first option is clearly unacceptable. It would be patently absurd to Say that someone sincere- assents to a sentence. but believes the proposition expressed by its negation. It is hard to see what the poinr of assenting to sentences would be if it were not our practice to assent sincerely to only those sentences which believe to be tnie. The point of a practice among speakers of assenting to only those sentences which they believe to express falsehoods would be utteriy baffiing. Whatever ends it served, we would hardly recognize i t as being remotel y similar to our own linguistic practice of sincere assent. The second option is not quite as absurd. but will not stand close scrutiny. If a speaker who sincerely assents top does not believe thatp, one might wonder what it is that he does believe. Presumably he must believe something since it is surely our intention when assenting to sentences that Our audience understand something which we believe. The point of assertion is clearly to communicate to hearers propositions which we believe. This fact disposes. I believe. of the third alternative to the (DP). But what of the second al temative? According to the hypothesis which we are now considering speakers typicaily do not believe the propositions which their utterances literdly express. but believe something else. One might elaborate this account by saying that (DP' ) If a speaker. S. sincerely and upon reflection assents to "p". then there is some proposition q, such that q # p. and S believes that q. A defense of this account might appeal to certain practices in which we Say one thing, but mean to communicate sornething else. With ironical or rnetaphorical uses of language. it is certainly tme that we Say one thing, but intend to communicate something else. If one crook says to another (24) The pigs are on their way. w hat he wil1 typicall y be taken to believe is something other than what his utterance literally means. Similarly, if Jones says (25) Y ou're a real Mother Theresa to his vain and worldly friend, it is unlikely that he will be taken to believe what his words express. Such uses of language do not. however provide good reason for rejecting the original formulation of The Disquotafion Princip&. As 1 mentioned above, the point of focusinp on sincere and reflective assent which speakers give to sentences is. in part, that we wish to exclude precisely such nonliteral uses of language. The Disquotution Principle is obviously inadequateas a principle goveminp belief ascription when we are dealing with such uses of languape. It should be noted, however, that such uses, while frequent, are certain1y not the nom. In Chapter Six. 1 discussed some aspects of a view which Grice. Kripke, and others have defended. According to this view, speakers frequently say one thing, but intend to communicate sornething else. even when they are not speaking metaphorically or ironically. As I mentioned. this view is crucial to the defense of the Weak Referential Thesis. It might be taken by some as reason for favouring the (DP') over the simple (DP). 1 think that this would be mistaken. Consider an example discussed by Grice in "Logic and Conversation". Suppose that Jones says, (26) Charles doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. Suppose that Smith replies. (27) He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. Grice argues. very plausibly, that in this case Smith will nomally be taken to believe that (28) Charles has a girlfriend in New York is true. Smith's utterance of (27). in the absence of such a belief, and the intention to communicate this belief. would seem completely iretevant to the dierutterance of Jones. In Grice's tenninology. Smith can be said to have conversutionai& irnplicated that (28) is something which he believes to be tme. In Chapter Ten I will discuss Grice's notion of conversational implicatures in more detail. For now it is enouph to note that in cases like the one we are considering, it is not correct to Say on& that speakers believe what it is that they are conversationally implicating. A more accurate account is that speakers imply, in such cases. that they believe hoth what they have conversationally implicated and what their utterance literally expresses. In our example. Smith has implied. and Jones will ordinarily infer. that he believes both that Charles has been spending a lot of time in New York and that Charles likely has a girlfriend in New York. In general. when we are considering conversational irnplicatures where the utterance is not meant to be undersrood metaphoricallyor ironically, the speaker implies that he believes the proposition which he has implicatedd the proposition which his utterance Iiterally expresses. Thus. appealing to these sorts of cases does not provide good reason for rejecting the disquotational principle. The conclusion which should be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the (DP) is properly regarded as a requirement goveming the attribution of beliefs to speakers. Two reasons have been offered in defense of this principle: ( 1) The alternatives to the (DP) which we have considered have little to recornrnend them. (2)Moore's discussion of utterances of the fom, "I don't believe that p. but p" has provided us with a plausible explanation of why the (DP) is a principle governing belief ascriptions to speakers. The burden of proof should now rest with the defender of the weak interpretation of the referential/attributivedistinction to provide non-ad hoc reasons for rejecting this pnnciple. The second principle appealed to in The Argument From Chari~is the principle of charity. 1 have stated this principle in a very weak form. All the same. someone may choose to challenge the soundness of this argument on the grounds that the (CP) is not properly regarded as a principle regulating belief ascriptions to speakers. Such an objection has. 1 believe. very little to recommend it. The (CP) does not imply that speakers cannot hold false or even contradictory beliefs. It requires only that when we are interpreting speakers. we should do so in such a way that we make the best possible sense of their utterances. ''The best possible sense" should be taken in a very loose way. The (CP), as I have fomulated it. does not require that we not attribute obviously false or absurd beliefs to speaken. It merely enjoins us to minimize speakers' unintelligibility in the following sense: If there are two ways of interpreting or understanding a speaker's utterances and the first of these. but not the second, involves attributing contradictory beliefs to the speaker. then we should favour the second interpretation. This rule for attributing beliefs to speakers strikes me as obviously correct. and seems to fit well with our ordinary practices of interpreting agents. Unless compelling reasons can be given for rejecting i t. 1 will assume that i t is correct. The Argumenf Fmrn Charity , therefore, seems to provide reason for rejecting the weak interpretation of the referential/attributive distinction. If we acknowledge that there are referential uses of definite descriptions. then it seems that we have good reason for thinking that in such uses. descriptions are best understood as functioning like pnuine singular terms. The argument for this conclusion has appealed to what are, 1 hope to have shown, very plausible pnnciples conceming belief attributions to speakers. There is. thus. good reason for thinking that definite descriptions do admit of rwo distinct semantic analyses. Chapter Eight THE ARGUMENT FROM ANAPHORA In the previous chapter we have seen one argument for the claim that the strong referential thesis is to be preferred over the weak referential thesis. The Argument From Churi" suggests that the most acceptable account of referential uses is one which acknowledges that definite descriptions can serve two distinct semantic functions. The argument suggests. 1 think. that in the case of referential uses of descriptions the semantic contribution made by descriptions is not the same as when they are used attributively. Descriptions used referentially function. at the semantic level, like genuine singular terms. whereas descriptions used attributively function like quantifier expressions. In this chapter. 1 will consider another argument for this strong referential thesis. Donnellan. in "Speaker Reference. Descriptions. and Anaphora". argues that the linguistic phenornenon of anaphora can be used to provide compellinp grounds for thinking that definite descriptions used referentially function like genuine sinpular terms. Followinp Neale. in Descriptims. 1 w il1 cal 1 thi s The Argument From Anaphora. (i) Donne1lm's Arawnent From Anaphora In "Speaker Reference. Descriptions, and Anaphora". Donnellan addresses the issue of whether or not his referentiaVattributive distinction shows anythinp about the semcinricfunction of definite descriptions. He notes that Our intuitions are. for the most part. quite clear conceming whether a panicular use of a description is referential or attributive. In addition. he notes that there are competing accounts which might be offered of the significance of this distinction. Although he does not use the terms "weak referential thesis" and "strong referential thesis", his intention is to address the dispute between these two views, and to present an argument in defense of the latter. He writes: While the referentia1Jattributivedistinction proves, 1 believe, to appeal to our intuitions. vagueness about the role of speaker reference threatens i ts significance. Are there tw O uses of definite descriptions in the sense of two semantic functions in one of which the description conveys speaker reference and in the other not? Or is it rather that definite descriptions are used in two kinds of circumstances, in one of which there is an accompanying phenornenon of speaker reference though it has no effect on the semantic reference of the description? If the latter, it is not clear what importance we should attach to the distinction in the philosophy of lanpuage. It would not, for example, seem to have a beanng on the comectness or incorrectness of a semantic analysis of sentences containing defini te descriptions such as Russell gives us (Donnellan 1978: 28). This passage suggests strongly that Donnellan's concern is with what 1 have been calling "the weak" and "the strong" referential theses. Donnellan claims that "certain arguments derived from a consideration of the phenomenon of anaphora ...show that speaker reference cannot be divorced from semantic reference" (Donnellan 1978: 28). Applied to uses of definite descriptions, this last clah is essentially the strong refe~ntialthesis. In previous chapters, our focus has been on one particular kind of occurrence of definitedescriptions. In these cases, a speaker normally uses a description as a means of identifying his intended referent for his audience. Such occurrences are charactenzed by the fact that the speaker typically introduces his intended referent, the person or thing which. in some sense. he has in mind. by means of the description uttered. Let us cal1 these sorts of occurrences "introductory occurrences." In the exarnple mentioned in Chapter Two. the speaker utters the phrase ( 1 ) The murderer of Smith is insane with the intention of first singling out some penon for his audience. and then predicating the property of insanity to him. There are, however. other sorts of occurrences of descriptions. In these cases. the description uttered is not the initial means by which the speaker tries to identify his intended referent for his audience. Rather, the occurrence of the description is subscqurnt to some other utterance of an expression whose function was to provide this initial identification. For example, suppose that Jones utters (2) Fred killed Smith this morning. The man is clearly insane. In this case, the definite description (3) Theman is not thefisr rneans by which the speaker tries to identify his intended referent to his audience. Instead, he identifies him first by means of a proper name. and then uses the description (3) as another device for refemng to the sarne person. On the face of it, it seems that Jones might have expressed exactly the same proposition by modifying (2) so that the only occurrence of (3) in it is replaced by the proper name "Fred". The only difference would be a stylistic one. Another exarnple of such an occurrence is provided by the following case. Suppose that both Alfred and Ben believe that Fred is the manager of the restaurant where Smith worked. On leaming of Smith's brutal murder. Alfred says to Bert, (4) Fred killed Smith this morning. The manager mut have lost his mind. As with the previous example, the speaker in this case utters a definite description with the intention of refemng to an individual to whom reference was already made in the preceding sentence. His utterance of (5) The manager is subsequent to an initial occurrence of a refemng expression. Since, in cases (2) and (4).the occurrence of the definite descriptions (3) and (5)is subsequent to the occurrence of an initial referring expression, and since the reference of the descnptions is meant io be deiemined. in some sense, by the initial. antecedent expressions, we will cal1 them "anaphonc occurrences" of definite descriptioris. Thus. there are botb in~rocluctonand cuwphoric occurrences of definite descnptions. Donnellan argues that considerations ansing from such anaphoric occurrences demonstrate that descnptions can function, sernantically, like genuine singular terms. Donnellan. following Chastain. in "Reference and Context", introduces the idea of anaphoric chains in order to show how speaker refereme can, in certain contexts. detetmine semantic referencc. Anaphoric chains are ."sequences of singular terrns that are such that if one of them refers to something, they all do" (Donnellan 1978: 3 1). (2) and (4) above are exarnples of such anaphoric chains. Although these both involve the occurrence of proper names in the chain, this feature is inessential to the idea of an anaphoric chain. Any sequence of refemnp expressions where if one expression refers to something, then they dl refer to this thing will count as an anaphonc chain. Such chains of refemng expressions can occur within one sentence. An example would be (6) Smith was murdered this mominp and Jones found his body. Here the expressions "Smith" and "his" fom an anaphonc chain. Within any sentence there may occur more than one anaphonc chain. For example, in (7) Jones murdered Smith and claims that he discovered his body by accident the occurrences of "Jones" and "he" fom one anaphoric chain. The occurrences of "Smith" and "his" form another. An important feature of such chains is that they can pass across speakers. To see this. consider the following exchange: (Ai) Jones has been charged with the murder of Smith. (Bert) He is under suspicion. but he hasn't been charged yet. Here there is an anaphoric chain which contains as "links" Al's utterance of "Jones" and Ben's two utterances of the pronoun "he". ln such anaphoric chains there will be one member that determines the reference of the othen. Without such a grounding, the other expressions will be left dangling in the sense that the audience will not be able to determine their cornmon referent. Donnellan calls this grounding occurrence of a refemng expression "the antecedent*'of the anaphoric chah Usuall y this grounding occurrence of a refemng expression will occur hefore the remaininp referring expressions in the anaphoric chain. This feature of such chains, however, is not a necessary one. Donnellan offers "His smile is John's best feature" (Donnellan 1978: 43 n.7) as an instance of an anaphonc chain in which the grounding expression occurs &er in the chain. Definite descriptions can occur as the antecedents of anaphoric chains. Donnellan notes that there are two distinct ways in which descriptions can perform this role. They can be used attributively or referentially in this prounding occurrence. Donnellan offers the following as an exarnple of a case in which an aiributive use of a description functions has an antecedent for an anaphoric chain. Suppose. for exarnple. t hat a speaker utters (8) The strongest man can lift over 4501bs. He can also win a tug of war with a jackass with the intention of expressing an object-independent proposition. There is. therefore. no speaker reference occuning with respect to his use of the definite description. With this anaphoric chain. Donnellan claims that the pronoun "He" merely serves as a means of avoiding a repetition of the noun phrase in the fint sentence. It is what Geach. in Reference und Generality. refers to as a "pronoun of laziness." An utterance of (9) The strongest man can lift over 4501bs. The strongest man can also win a tug of war with a jackass would express the same proposition as the utterance of (8)considered above. With respect to cases where the antecedent description is used attributively, the subsequent expressions in the chain will serve simpi y as a mean of avoiding a tiresome repetition of the same noun phrase.' A second way in w hich descriptions can occur as antecedents to anaphoric chains is when they are used referentially. Cases like this will be the focus of the discussion in this ' Donneltan's discussion here is difficult to reconcile with his claim, in "Reference Definite Descriptions". that attributive uses of definite descriptions denore but do not refer- If such uses are not refemng expressions, but only function to denote something, then it is certainly misleading to speak of them as being constituents in anaphonc chains. Recall that such chains are defined to be "sequences of singular terms that are such that if one of them refers to something. they al1 do" (Donnellan 1978: 3 1 ). If attributive uses of descriptions do not refer, then they are not really singular terms at all. Perhaps it would be clearer if we referred to such cases where the antecedent of a chain is a description used attributively as being "quasi-anaphonc chains." It will not. however, be important for the presentation of The Argument From Anaphora to mark this feature of anaphoric chains which involve attributive uses of definite descnptions. Our focus throughout this chapter will be on cases of such chains where the definite descnptions are being used referentially. chapter. An example. due to Geach and discussed by Donnellan. of such a use is the following. Suppose that Smith and his wife met one of his colleagues in the philosophy department. Suppose that the day after Mr. Smith says ( 10) The fat old humbup we met yesterday has been made a full professor. He rnust have bamboozled the cornmittee. The occurrence of ( 1 I ) The fat old humbug we met yesterday in his utterance of ( 10) is referential. It functions as the antecedent of the anaphoric chain consisting of ( l I ) and the pmnoun "He" in the second sentence. Donnellan wntes that. in this case, "We seem once more to have an anaphonc chain. Certainly there is some link between the pronoun in the second sentence and the definite description in the first. And one would suppose they are coreferential, if they refer at dl" (Donnel lan 1978 320. Such examples are instructive, Donnellan argues. in detetmining the extent to which speaker reference can determine semantic reference. Geach claims that speaker reference is irrefevutr when it cornes to the determination of sernantic reference. He writes that Penonal reference - Le. reference corresponding to the verb "refer" as predicated of persons rather than of expressions - is of nepligible importance for logic... Let me take an example: Smith says indignantly to his wife. 'The fat old humbug we saw yesterday has just been made a full professor!" His wife may know whom he refers to. and will consider henelf rnisinfonned if and only if that penon has not been made a full professor. But the acnral expression "rhe fat old hurnhug we saw vester&y" will refer to somehodv on& if Mr. und Mrs. Smith did mer sorneone righily describahleas af& old humhug on rhr &y brfore Smith's indignunr remnrk; if rhis is nor .sol rhen Smith's words will not have conveyed nue informution. even if whai Mrs. Smirh ggatheredfrom them wa.s me (Geach 1%2: 8. Quoted in Donnellan 1978:29. The emphasis is mine.). Geach's view is that speakers may succeed in cornmunicating something other than what their utterances literally express. but their particular referential intentions are poweriess to affect the literal sernantic reference of their utterances. Let's cal1 this The Independence Thesis. On this view. speaker reference and semantic reference are stnctly independent. As a result, linguistic phenornena which involve speaker reference are irrelevant when we are investipating logic or the semantic analysis of a language. On the Independence Thesis, DonneIIan's referentiaUattributive distinction would be considered uninteresting from the point of view of semantic analyses of a languap. This view thus fi& very nicely with the weak referential thesis. An alternative thesis is that, in certain contexts, speaker reference &es determine the semantic reference of uses of referring expressions. Let's cal1 this The Drpemknce Thrsis. According to this thesis, Smith's utterance of ( 1 1) may refer to some penon whom he has in mind. even if that person is not a fat old humbug. This thesis fits well with what I earliercalled the strong referential thesis. Thus, when considering cases like this last one, there seern to be two options available when we wish to determine the semantic values of the various expressions which purport to refer. Donnellan argues that we should not accept The Independence Thesis. To see why. consider the utterance of (10) where the description is used referentially by the speaker. In this case, his inrenrion is to express an object-dependent proposition about the person they met the day before in Smith's department. Suppose that we ask what it is that the constituents of the anaphonc chain in his utterance of ( IO) refer to. Donnellan argues that. according to The Independence Thesis, the answer is clear: they both refer to the denotation of the description. if it has one. Whai this means is that if the person Mr. Smith has in mind. his reference, does not in fact fit the description. "the fat old humbug we met yesterday," what his second sentence expresses will be true just in case there was a (unique)fat old humbug he and his wife met the day before and who bamboozled the committee. And this would be so even if that penon never enters into the Srniths' heads. If semantic reference is to he kepr untuinfed speaker reference. rhe pronouns in such oMphoric chainr musr he kept pure also (Donnellan 1978: 33. The emphasis is mine.). Donnellan argues that this consequences of the Indepenùence Thesis shows that it must be incorrect. He offers two arguments in order to show that this ihesis is problematic when we consider examples like (10). The first concems queries that rnay be made reparding such utterances. Suppose that Mrs. Smith. in response to her husband's utterance, asks ( 12) Do you mean the man wi th the goatee? Her intention, in uttering ( 12), is to ask about Smith's intended referent - the person about whom he is speaking. Donnellan claims that the same query could have been made by an utterance of ( 13) 1s he the man with the goatee? Matthis shows. according to Donnellan. is that the reference of "he" in ( 13) is not simply the denotation of (11). Mrs. Smith's utterance of (12) shows that she is concerned to identify the person to whom her husband is refemnp; not sirnply the person who happens to satisfy (uniquely) the description which he used. If (13) is another way of askinp the same question, as it seems to be. then we have sn instance of an anaphoric chain where the reference of the subsequent refemng expressions, the persona1 pronoun "he" in ( 13). is determined by speaker reference and not by semantic reference. The chain. consisting of Mr. Smith's utterance of ( 1 1) and her utterance of the pronoun "he". has his utterance of ( 1 1) as an antecedent. Her utteranceof "he" should, Donnellan argues. be taken to refer to the penon her husband inteded to talkabout in uttering (10). not simply the person who is the denotation of his utterance of ( 1 1). Of the utterance of ( 13), Donnellan wntes: If this is just another way of posing-the sarne question (as that posed by her utterance of (12)]. as 1 think it is, it too is a question about the speaker's reference. But then the pronoun "he" must refer to the referent of the speaker - to whatever person Mr. Smith was refemng to (Donnellan 1478: 33). This, then. is one reason for prefemng The Deperdence Thesis to The Independence Th es is. A second argument for the same conclusion which Donnellan offers concerns cases in which the audience disugrees with the appropnateness of the description used by the speaker. In such cases, the audience is able to identify the penon to whorn the speaker is refemng. but denies that the description used is apt (in the sense defined in chapter six). Suppose that Mn. Smith, to repister her disagreement about the aptness of the description used, utters ( 14) He's not fat. he's just big boned in response to Mr. Smith's utterance of ( 10). In this case. there is little temptation to view the pronouns as referring to whatever is the denotation of Mr. Smith's utterance of ( 1 1). If the occurrences of "he" in ( 14) do refer to the denotation of ( 1 1 ), then we ought to be able to replace them with (1 1). The expanded version of (14), if the pronouns really are refemng in this way. should mean just what ( 14) does. Inelegance should be the only consequence of such a transformation. Clearly, this is not the case. The result of removing the pronouns and replacing them by the initiai noun phrase gives us ( 14a) The fat old humbug we met yesterday is not fat, the fat old humbug we met yesterday is big boned. Not only is this less elegant than ( l4), but it is hard to see how an utterance of ( 14a) could express the same proposition as would be expressed by an utterance of ( 14) in the sarne context. As Donnellan notes, It would make nonsense of Mn. Smith's comments to suppose that the third-person pronouns they contain are "pronouns of laziness" standing for Mr. Smith's original description or that their referent is to be the denotation, if it has one, of that description. Surely it is Mr. Smith's reference that is in question and which determines the referent of these pronouns (Donnellan 1978: 33). Thus, Donnellan offen two arguments for the clairn that, at least in certain contexts, speuker reference does detemine the semantic refrence of expressions. In these cases the occurrences of the definite description and the pronouns subsequent to them seem to form anaphoric chains. Donnellan has hied to show that, with respect to the pronouns ofcurring later in the c hain, speaker reference detemines semantic reference. Since these pronouns are elements in anaphoric chains which also contain an initial occurrence of a definite descriptions, the semantic value of the description should be determined in the same way as that of the pronouns. This follows from the hypothesis that we have. in these cases. genuine anaphoric chains. Recall that such chains are sequences of refemng expressions such that if one of them refers to something. then they al1 refer to this thing. Since the pronouns later in the chains refer to what the speaker has in mind, so must the occurrence of the definite description. Thus, these considerations suggest that speaker reference determines the sernantic value of referential uses of definite descriptions. As Donnellan notes, the (third-person) pronouns in this discourse fia-ment [which we have been considering above] seem to form an anaphoric chah and the initial definite description seem to be the antecedent. If this were so, it would follow that the speaker's reference determines the semantic reference throughout (Donnellan 1978: 34). The argument thus appeals to the following strategy- Consider an anaphoric chah in which the initial refemng expression is a definite description and the subsequent referring expressions are pronouns which appear to refer to whatever the description refers to. Show that the referents of the occurrences of these pronouns are determined by speaker reference; that is. they refer to the entity which the speaker wishes to talk about - the thing he has in mind. Finally. infer that. since the expressions seems to be anaphorically linked, the occurrence of the definite description must also have as its semantic referent that entity which is the speaker's referent. Donneilan acknowledges a possible objection that might be made at this point. A defender of Russell's theory of descriptions could aque that the pronouns in these examples are not really anaphorically linked with the descriptions used. It could be ciaimed that although th- refer to the speaker's reference. the description used by the speaker merely denotes - its semantic function is not that of a genuine singular tem. Donnellan wri tes 1 suppose that it would be possible to maintain that despite these data the truth or falsity of the utterance containhg the definite description depends upon the properties of the denotation of the description. if it has one. and that its sernantic referent is its denotation - even if this is not so for subsequent pronouns that seem on the surface to be anaphorically linked with it (Donnellan 1978: 34). This view would then amount to the daims that (i) speaker reference does not detemine semantic reference in the case of definite descriptions (which are not singular refemng ternis at dl), but (N) speaker reference may determine the reference of pronouns (and other singular terms) in certain linguistic contexts. Thus. the arguments given do not show conclusively that the semantic value of descriptions cm be detemined by speaker reference. Donnellan acknowledges this, but notes that In any event, some pround will have to be ceded. It will be impossible to set aside speaker reference as of no importance in the detemination of semantic reference. For if speaker reference does not determine semantic reference in certain instances of the use of definite descriptions, it does for subsequent pronouns in some stretches of discoune containing them. The refereruial/attntnbutive distinction, rested on the notion of speaker reference. will have semicimportance because it will mark the dichofomy between occurrences of defnire descriptions rhat cm iniriaie srrings of pronouns whose reference depends upon the speaker's reference and those thar do nor (Donnellan 1978: 34. The emphasis is mine.). What he hopes to have shown, thus, is that there is good reason for rejecting The Mependence Thesis discussed above. Donnellan tums next to a different class of examples in which definite descriptions again occur in anaphoric chains. These cases differ from those which we have been considering in one central way: the definite descriptions used do not occur as antecedents within these anaphoric chains. Instead, they occur later in the chains. Furthemore, these examples involve anaphoric chains which are gmunded by occurrences of indefinite descriptions. Finally. the definite descriptions used are incomplete in the sense defined in Chapter Six. An exarnple is the following: ( 15) A man killed Smith this morning. The rnurderer must have been insane. Donnellan notes that, conceming the clas of examples he wishes to consider. The required definite description can be formed from the preceding sentence in one of two ways, eitherfrom a generic noun obtained from the indefinite description or from such a generic noun modified by adjectives or a restrictive relative clause obtained from what was predicated in the preceding sentence (Donnellan 1978: 36). He daims, plausibly, that in the following examples, and othen like them, the indefinite description occumng in the first sentence can be replaced, in the second sentence. by a definite description, a persona1 pronoun, or a demonstrative without altering "what we would understand as being said" (Donnellan 1978: 35). ( 16) A man came to the office today. He tried to sel1 me an encyclopedia. ( 16a) A man came to the office today. The man tned to sel1 me an encyclopedia. ( 16b) A man came to the office today. The man who came to the office today tned to sel1 me an encyclopedia. ( 17) A man came to the office today carryinp a huge suitcase. It contained an encyclopedia. ( 17a) A man came to the office today carrying a huge suitcase. The suitcase contained an encyclopedia. ( 17b) A man came to the office today carrying a huge suitcase. The huge suitcase carried by the man who came to the office contained an encyclopedia. Donnellan claims that in these exarnples, and others like them, the initial sentence serves to introduce some person or thing. The indefinite descriptions serve to ground an anaphoric chain. The subsequent use of a description or a pronoun refers, he claims, to the person or thing singled out by the grounding occurrence of the indefinite description. Thus. these examples suggest that indefinitr descriptions do not always function as simple existential generalizations. Instead. they can be used in a referential manner which seems very much like the referential uses of definite descriptions. 1 will retum to this point below. Donnellan argues that these examples show that there are cases where speaker reference succeeds in detennining the reference of definite descriptions. Recall that iri the earlier examples. where the descriptions initiate anaphoric chains, it seemed possible to daim that although the pronouns have their reference fixed by speakers' referential intentions. the sernantic function of the definite descriptions was simply to denote whatever happens to satisfy them uniquely. Thus. there was not yet reason to think that speaker reference determines the semantic reference of definite descriptions. With this second class of cases, however, where the descriptions do not serve as grounding elements in anaphoric chains. Donnellan argues it seems likely that the reference of the descriptions is the person that the speaker was refemng to in uttering the initial indefinite description. He writes that. One would like to Say that the initial sentences in these examples. the ones containing the indefinite description, serve to introduce a particular thing. a man, a suitcase. or whatever, and that this is what justifies the subsequent use of a pronoun or a definite description (Donnellan 1978: 36). What he wants to show is that these son of cases "link speaker reference with the semantic reference of certain occurrences of definite descriptions" (Donnellan 1978: 39). A central aspect of his argument concems the fact that in these cases, as well as similar ones. the definite description used is incomplere. As Donnellan notes. 'The descriptive content of many of the definite descriptions we actually utter is too meager to suppose that we mean to imply thai they fit something uniquely" (Donnellan 1978: 35). In such cases, not only is i t highl y implausible to think that speaken intend their audiences to think that they believe there is something which fits the description uniquely, but it is also implausible to think that speakers expect their audiences to determine the intended referent by appeai to the descriptive content alone. Speakers, in such cases, surely do not expect that the audience will understand them as refemnp to whatever uniquely satisfies the definite descnption uttered. Donnellan daims that The main problem brought up in the paper for a Russellian anaiysis in referential contexts was that of providing a unique denotation when neither speaker nor audience could be expected to believe that the description actual ly uttered was tme of just one individual (Donnellan 1978: 42). The argument which Donnellan presents seems to be the following: (u) In cases like ( 16) -( 1%) "some particular person or persons are beinp talked about and the definite descriptions and pronouns seem surely to have particular semantic referents" (Donnellan 1 978: 370. (h) The referents of these pronouns and descriptions are determined by either the descriptive content of the expressions used. perhaps in conjunction with certain background assumptions shared by the speaker and the audience. or by the referential intentions of the speaker. (c) The descriptive content of these expressions is insufficient, even with background assumptions, to detemine the referents of these expressions. (4 T herefore. i t must be the referential intentions of speaken that determines the referen ts of these expressions. Donnellan does not present an argument to show that the disjunction in (b) is in fact exhaustive of al1 the possible explanations of (a). These two options do, however, seem like the most natural explanations, and the onus should surely be on one who rejects this premise to provide either good reasons for denying (a). or an alternative explanation of (a) to those offered in (6). The central problem with attempts to determine the referents of the descriptions and pronouns which occur in the second sentences in ( 16) - ( 1%) is that these expressions fail to identify some unique person or thing. In these examples it seems very unlikely that the speaker would intend to be saying that exactly one penon came to his office on the day of his utterance. Furthemore, the speaker would not expect his audience to think that this is what he intends to be saying. Similarly. in exarnple (17a). it is very unlikely that the speaker would intend to be saying that there is exactly one suitcase. In these cases, the speaker does intend to be undentood as having said something about some particular person or thing, but he does not intend that the description used should single out this penon or thing by virtue of uniquely describing it. According to Donnellan, the problem is that in many cases we cannot suppose that the speaker believes or intends the description plus any background assumptions to pick out something uniquely. Our initial examples show this. [( 16). (16a). or ( 16b)j might naturally begin an anecdote about an event at one's office told to friends who know little or nothing about what goes on there. Even if one used the fully expanded description in [(16b)l. "A man came to the office today. The man who came to the office today tned to sel1 me an encyclopedia." the speaker is surel y not committed to. nor does he intend to suggest that just one man came to the office that day. Nor would he suppose that there are background assumptions shared by the audience that would allow them to recognize a particular man. There is a particular man presumably about which the speaker is talking. but that person is not identified by the descriptions used plus the circumstances of utterance ( Donnellan 1 978: 37). This feature then, of uses like those in ( 16) - ( 17b). suggest that the reference of the descriptions and pronouns in the second sentences is detemined by something other than their descriptive content. Donnellan argues that If the descriptive content of the uttered descriptions even augmented by background assurnptions. etc., are insufficient to detemine the referents. how is [a determinant reference] possible? My answer will not be unexpected. The speaker having some person or persons in mind to taik about can provide the needed definiteness (Donnellan 1978: 38). These are. he argues. cases in which speaker reference determines the semantic reference of the descriptions used. As we saw in Chapter Four. this phenornenon concerns the speaker's intentions "concerning the truth conditions of his utterances: that he intends that truth or falsity shall be a function. in part, of the properties of the person or thing he has in rnind" (Donneilan 1978: 38). In the examples above. the speaken intend to be expressing object-dependent propositions by their utterances of the second sentences. The tmth conditions of these propositions are determined by how things are wi th regard to the person about whom the speaker intends to be speaking. Thus, in ( Ma), for example, the sentence. ''The man tried to sel1 me an encyclopedia" is intended by the speaker to express a singular. object-dependent. proposition about the person to whom he is refemng. It is not intended to express the object-independent proposition that there is one and only one man and he tried to seIl the speaker an encyclopedia. Donnellan argues that there is an important connection between the two sorts of cases which we have considered - cases where the description occurs tour court in the speaker's utterance and serves as an antecedent for an anaphoric chain. and cases where descriptions occur later in an anaphoric chain which is prounded by an utterance of an indefini te description. He argues that the differences between them are not of a semantic nature. but concem non-semantic aspects of the relation between speaken and audiences. He remarks: let me Say sornething about how 1 view these two constructions - the definite description introduced tout coun and the definite description anaphoncally lin ked. In referential contexts. those where speaker reference is present. the choice of which construction to use is. 1 believe. a matter of the speaker's expectations and intentions toward his audience: does he expect and intend that they will recognize who or what he has in mind? If he does. then he will use a definite description with no further introduction: if not. he will begin with an introduction via an indefinite descnption. What the latterdoes. so to speak. is to announce that the speaker intends to speak about a particular thing or particular things following under (sic) a certain description ...Having done this. he can then go on to use a definite description or a pronoun to refer to what he wants to talk about. Where the speaker intends and expects his audience to be able to recognize what he speaks about from the descnption used (plus attendant circumstances). such an introduction is otiose (Donnetlan 1978: 40). Donnellan's analysis of the difference between these two sorts of cases is. 1 believe, correct. But what does this show regarding the semantic contribution made by definite descriptions? Donnellan's daim is that the similarities between the cases suggests that descriptions occumng as anrece&>us of anaphoric chains d.co function like genuine singular ternis. If the difference between these two kinds of cases concems on& the intentions and expectations of speakers regarding their audiences. this suggests that the distinction between them is largely just a maner of pragmarics - not of semcwtrics. Donnellan argues that if his analysis does represent the difference between the two [cases] as far as why one rnight be used in some circumstances and the other in other circumstances, it also suggests that there should be no real difference in tmth conditions or semantic references (Donnellan 1978: 40). Thus, since in the second sort of examples the descriptions are functioninp like penuine singular refemng expressions, they are also functioning this way in those examples in which they initiate anaphoric chains. Donnellan argues that if the only factor that affects [the speaker's] shift from using an introductory indefinite description to introducinp the definite description rouf court is his expectation or lack of it about whether his audience will be able to reco,pize his reference, there can be no reason why the semantic facts about reference in the two cases should be different. And we can then, after all, apply the arguments that show semantic reference to be detennined by speaker reference from one sort of case to the other (Donnellan 1978: 4 1 ). At this point it will be useful to stand back and examine the stratepy which Donnellan has followed in his argument. He has noted that referential uses of definite descriptions can occur in two ways in anaphoric chains. They can have what 1 called "introductory occurrences" where they initiate and apparently ground an anaphoric chain. In addition, they can have what I called "anaphoric occurrences" where they do not initiate or ground an anaphonc chain. but occur as a later link in the chah He considered the introductory occurrences first. and found that there is some reason for thinking that such occurrences function like genuine singular tenns. The reason for this was that they appeared to ground the reference of persona1 pmnouns which occurred later in the chain. Since the reference of these pronouns was detemined by the referential intentions of the speaker, and since they seemed to be anaphorically linked with the introductory occurrence of a definite description, it was concluded that there is reason for thinking that the utterances of the descriptions rnust also have their reference fixed by the referential intentions of the speaker. A possible objection was noted to this line of argument. It could be argued, Donnellan noted. that although the pronouns in these cases do have their semantic reference detemined by the speaker's referential intentions. this is not so for the uses of the definite descriptions. The latter function. in these examples. as quantifier phrases. and are not actually anaphorically linked to the later occurrences of the pronouns. DonneIlan's next step was to tum to the anaphoric occurrences of definite descriptions. The cases examined involved anaphoric chains which had occurrences of indefinite descriptions as antecedents. Furthemore. they involved uses of definite descriptions which were incomplete. Donnellan argues that, in such cases. there is good reason for thinking that the descriptions refer to something and that the referent must be detemined by the referential intentions of the speaker. He argues that since the descriptive content of the description uttered could not serve to identify for the audience the speaker's intended referent, the reference must be determined by the intentions of the speaker. Thus. Donnellan tried to show a sort of case in which speakers' referential intentions determine the semantic reference of utterances of definite descriptions. Finally. Donnellan aqued that since these anaphoric occurrences of descriptions are essentially the same, from the semantic point of view, as the introductory occurrences. these too must have their referents detemined by the referential intentions of the speaker. Thus. he has tned to show two large classes of uses of definite descriptions in which the semantic reference of the descriptions is determined by the referential intentions of the speaker. This is meant to show that what 1 called The Indepenclence Thesis is false: Donnellan has tned to show that the referential intentions of speakers can affect the sernantic value of refemng expressions. ( ii) Donne1 Ian '.Y Arg~lmentWithnur indefinite Descripr ions It will be useful to note briefly a worry that some may have with the preceding argument. This argument from anaphora involves the central claim that idejTnite descriptions, like definite descriptions, have a referential use. This daim, while interesting, is not essential. I believe. for making the point which Donnellan is trying to establish. In this section. 1 will briefly note the wony, and present a version of Donnellan's anaphora argument which does not involve appealing to referential use of indefini te descnptions. Donnellan 's argument appeals to examples w here speakers initiate anaphoric chahs by means of indefinite descriptions. As mentioned, these examples supgest that there is a referential function for indefinite. as well as definite, descriptions. This naturally suggests that indefinite descriptions, like definite descriptions, have two semanric functions. 1 think that this is likely correct. but this issue is really tangential to the question at hand: Does speaker reference ever detemine the semantic reference of utterances of defnite descriptions? An affirmative answer to this question has. as we have seen, been provided which appeals to apparently referential uses of indefinite descriptions. 1 think that very similar arguments can be offered for the same conclusion which do not involve. in any fashion. uses of indefinite descnptions. It will be useful briefly to consider such arguments. Someone might object to Donnellan's conclusion in the following manner: Since his argument depends on referential uses of indefinite descnptions, and since his argument seems to suggest that they too have multiple semantic functions, there must be sornething wronp with his argument. "Surely," it might be claimed, "the account of indefinite descriptions which views them as simple existential quantifier phrases is correct. Any aqument which involves the premise that indefinite descriptions have mzother type of semantic analysis must be unsound." Such a response appeals to an intuitively plausible thesis that we should not complicate the semantics of a laquage needlessly. If Donnellan's argument depends on a semantic account of indefinite descriptions according to which they are, on some occasions. singular terms, and on other occasions existential quantifiers. then this might be seen by some as good reason for rejecting his aqument. Donnellan could, 1 think. have argued for his central conclusion without appealing to a controversial account of the semantics of indefinite descriptions. As we have seen. The Argumenr From Amphora. appeals to examples where definite descriptions occur as part of an anaphoric chain of refemng expressions. The cases which, he feels, show clearly that descriptions can function like genuine singular tems involve anaphoric chains in which the antecedent is a use of an indefinite description. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter. there are uses of deftnite descriptions in anaphoric chains which have as their antecedents proper na me.^. If an aqument cm be presented for the strong referential thesis that appeals to such cases. it would avoid the sort of objection which we have just been considering. While it may be controversial to view indefinite descriptions as being genuine singular terms, it is a standard view that numes are singular refemng expressions. Consider. then. an example like the following. Suppose that Al utters ( 18) Fred. who is new to my department. has just been made full professor. The new professor must have bamboozled the committee. to Ben. In uttering (18). Al wishes to inform Bert of three facts: that Fred is new to his department; that Fred has been made full professor; that Al believes that Fred fooled the committee members. There rnay be other facts which Al wants Bert to glean from his utterance of ( 18). Very likely Al would not have uttered ( 18) unless he wanted Bert to understand that Fred is not very talented as an academic. To keep matters simple, let us focus just on the three pieces of information which are explicitly conveyed by the utterance Al makes. Additional pieces of information which are also comrnunicated. like the one mentioned, are perhaps best accounted for as being information which Al's utterance, in the context in which it occurs, succeeds in communicating, but does not literallyexpress. Suppose that Al believes correctly that Ben does not know Fred. He believes. however, that Bert understands, from the context of their discussion, that he is refemng to the same person by his utterances of "Fred and "the new professor". Here we have an instance of an anaphoric chain which has as antecedent the proper name "Fred". Al's utterance of the definite description ( 19) The new professor is meant to refer to the same person as that referred to by the use of the name in the previous sentence. Ben will nanirally interpret Al's utterance of the second sentence as being about Fred. In this example, and othen like it, it is difficult to view the use of the sentence con taining the definite description as expressing an object-independent proposition to the effect that there exists exactly one thing which fits the description used, and it has the property mentioned in the remainder of the sentence. It is difficult to understand Al's utterance of (20) The new professor must have bamboozled the committee, in the context described. as expressing the proposition that there is exactly one new professor and he has bamboozled the committee. The natural interpretation of the utterance is that it expresses a proposition about Fred - the penon referred to in the previous sentence. That is, the most natural reading of it is as expressing an object-dependent proposition about the person to whom "Fred" refen. Indeed, it is hard to imagine an English speaker who would, upon heanng an utterance of ( 18). interpret it as literally expressing two unrelated propositions: The first a singular, or object-dependent, proposition whose constituents are Fred and the property of being a full professor. The second a peneral. or object-independent. proposition which is true if and only if there is exactly one person who is a new professor, and every new professor must have bamboozled the commiaee. The normal interpretation is, 1 take it. one under which the speaker is viewed as having asserted three things about Fred - that he has been made a full professor. that he is new to the department, and that he must have bamboozled the cornmittee. Furthermore. it seems likely that a normal English speaker would view what AI said in uttenng (18) as being true just in case Fred is a new member of Al's depanment. has recently been made a full professor, and succeeded in fooling the committee members. Many of the points which Donnellan makes about cases where descriptions occur in anaphonc chains following uses of indefinire descriptions apply equally to this example. and others like it. It will be useful to examine some of these. To begin with. note that Al's utterance ( 18) expresses a somethinp which might just as well have been expressed by an utterance of (21 ) Fred, who is new to my department. has just been made a full professor. He must have bamboozled the cornmittee, or an utterance of (22) Fred, who is new to rny department. has just been made a full professor. That man must have bamboozied the committee. It seems hiphly plausible to think that utterances of (21 ) or (22)' in the same context. would succeed in saying the same thing. One would like to Say that whatever propositions would be expressed by an utterance of ( 18) would also be expressed by utterances of (2 1) or (22). What this seems to show is that the definite description occumng in the utterance of ( 18) functions very much like a persona1 pronoun or demonstrative. That is. the description seems to function very much like a genuine singular term. Furthermore, in the case of ( 18). one would like to Say that the first sentence serves to. among other things. introduce a particular person about whom the speaker wishes to Say something. In DonneIlan's examples. it was a phrase containing an indefinite descriptions which, according to him. served this purpose. 1 think that this is correct, but the case is even more clearly made when the introduction involves the use of an expression which is uncontroversially a singular term. The occurrence of the definite description is not naturally read as introducing an existential generalization. Instead it is most naturally read as being a further device for refemng to the person about whom the speaker is talking. The definite description used. however will not serve to identify some person uniquely. Ben. in the exarnple above, would not think that Al expects him to identify his intended referent as being that penon w ho uniquely satisfies ( 19) The new professor. Since Al may well be aware that there is not such a unique person. he ceirainly need not expect that Bert will be able to identify his intended referent by means of the descriptive content of ( 19). Nor need Al expect that Bert will avail himself of background contexmal clues to discover which person AI is refemng to. Certainly background assumptions play some role in this and similar examples. Bert understands, from the context. that AI is speaking about one person throughout. He understands, that is, that Al's utterance of "Fred" and 'The new professor" are intended to be coreferentiai. More than this, however. he does not know. Since Bert does not know who Fred is. these background assumptions are insufficient to identify the referent of Al's utterance of ( 18). Al's likely expectation would be that Bert will understand that the penon he is refemng to in his utterance of ( 19) is the same as the person to whom his use of "Fred refers. What this shows, 1 think. is a case in which. once again, speaker reference determines the reference of a description used referentially. What distinguishes it from Donnellan's case is that no appeal is made to referential uses of indefinite descriptions. Reconstructing Donnellan's argument to this example. we can Say that (a) In ( 18) some particular penon is beinp talked about by the speaker, and the definite description used, ( 19). seems to have a parUcular referent. (h) The referent of this description is determined by either the descriptive content of ( 19). perhaps in conjunction with certain background assumptions shared by the speaker and the audience. or by the referential intentions of the speaker. (c) The descriptive content of ( 19) is insufficient. even with background assumptions. to determine the referent of the speaker's use of ( 19). (d) Therefore. it must be the referential intentions of the speaker that determines the referent of his use of ( 19). The referential intentions in question are, 1 think. the following: The speaker has used the proper name "Fred" to refer to some person. This name, of course. is not unique to one person; there are. as we may Say. many Freds. The speaker, however. intends his use of "Fred" to refer to some particularperson about whom he wishes to Say something to his audience. Thus. speaker reference plays a crucial role in detemining that person which the singular proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance of (23) Fred. who is new to my department. has been made a full pmfessor is about. Bert. if asked to Say who it is that has been just made full professor. might reply wi th (24) The person to whom Al was refemng, or (25) The penon Al had in mind in uttering (18). Beyond this. however. it is unlikely that he will be able to provide any expression which singles out the particular person about whom Al was speaking. What this shows. 1 think. is that in this and similar cases. audiences defer to their interlocutors. Although they recognize that someone is being spoken about - that the speaker is asserting a singular proposition about some individual - they are unable to refer to this individual independently of reference to the referential intentions of the speaker. 1 will come back to this point in Chapter Nine. Since speaker reference is instrumental in determining the penon to whom Al is refemng in his utterance of (U).i t is also instrumental in determining the referent of his utterance of (20). Thus. DonneIlan's conclusion seems correct - speaker reference is instrumental in determining the reference of definite descriptions. In the example we have been considering. the speaker's intentions are central when we want to determine the truth conditions of his utterance of (23). Since it is very plausible to think that the speaker's utterance of the second sentence also is about the same penon. the speaker's intentions are again central in determining the truth conditions of his utterance of this sentence. In this chapter 1 have presented Donnellan's argument for the clah that speaker reference determines the semantic reference of certain occurrences of definite descriptions. These occurrences involved anaphoric uses of definite descriptions. The considerations he raises suggest that the semantic contribution of such occurrences of descriptions is the entity to which the speaker intended to refer. Thus. these considerations supgest that the strong referential thesis is correct. 1 aqued that Donnellan's argument does not depend on referential uses of imkjinite descriptions. 1 tried to show that occurrences of definite descriptions which are anaphoric to occurrences of proper narnes display the sarne features as the examples which he considers. This sort of case provides further reason, 1 believe, for thinking that the strong referential thesis is correct. In Chapter Nine. 1 will examine an important objection which has been made against The Argument From Amphora. Chapter Nine SOAMES' OBJECTION TO THE ARGUMENT FROM ANAPHORA In "Donnellan's ReferentialfAttributive Distinction". Soames argues that the argument from anaphora does not succeed in showing that Donnellan's referentialJattributive distinction has any semantic importance. He argues that the kind of phenornena isolated by Donnellan's examples are best explained by appeal to pra,matic features of languape and language users. As we saw in Chapter Six. Soarnes is arnonp those philosophen of language who defend a weak version of the referential thesis. Despite this. he does not believe that Donnellan's distinction is of no importance to the philosophy of language. Recall that Domeilan himself felt that if the distinction did not show that speaker reference can determine semantic reference, then. Tt is not clear what importance we should attach to the distinction in the philosophy of language" (Donnellan 1978: 28. Quoted in Soames 1994: 155). Soames rejects this view that either the distinction is of no importance for the philosophy of language or it rnust demonstrate that speaker reference can succeed in determining semantic reference. He remarks: 1 should emphasize that. in my view. the fact that the referentiaVattributive distinction is a pragmatic. rather than a semantic. one in no way dirninishes its significance. On the contrary. part of the beauty and importance of the distinction depends on the essentially pragmatic character of a speaker's true assertion of a singular proposition about an individual. even in cases in which the description used referentially is a misdescription of that individuai (Soames 1994: 155). In this chapter. I will examine an argument offered by Soames for the conclusion that Donnellan's argument from anaphoric uses of definite descriptions does not succeed in demonstrating that they may function, semantically. like genuine singular terms. There are two parts to Soames' argument: In the first. he argues. as have many other philosophers of language. that Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction is adequately explained by appeal to prugm.aicLfeatures of language. In particular. Gricean views about the principles which govern conversation are sufficient to explain the fact that speaken may succeed in comunicating singular or object-dependent propositions when they utter sentences in which definite descriptions are used referentially. The argument tries to show that positing two se~icfunctions for definite descriptions is unnecessary if Our goal is to explain this fact about referential usage. Appealing to a pnnciple which Grice calls the "Modified Occam's Razor", this argument "enjoins us not to multiply senses beyond necessity, i .e., to opt for a theory ihat (cererisparibus) does not have to appeal to a semantical ambiguity" (Neale 1990: 90). Kripke. in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference". has argued that these sorts of considerations tell against the view that Donnellan's distinction demonstrates the need to posit distinct semantic functions for definite descriptions. I will examine these objections to the strong referential thesis in the next chapter. The second part of Soames' argument involves an attempt to show that the conclusion that speaken can succeed in literally expressing singular propositions. in the examples discussed in Donnellan's "Speaker Reference. Descriptions, and Anaphora". mns counter to some very plausible intuitions which we have conceming the ability of hearers to uncl~irsfuncland beiieve the content of utterances in which definite descriptions are used referentially. The argument raises, 1 believe. important worries which any defender of the strong referential thesis must address. 1 will present the general line of argument which Soames offers, and then show how it can be used to support a conclusion which is even stronger than the one which he asserts. My response to this argument will be presented in the last section of the chapter. (i) An Argument Againsr The Strong Referential Thesir Soames begins with a summary of three central points which, he feels, Donnellan is tiying to establish by considering examples such as: ( 16) A man came to the office today. He tried to sel1 me an encyclopedia. ( 16a) A man came to the office today. The man tned to sell me an encyclopedia. ( 16b) A man came to the office today. The man who came to the office today tned to sell me an encyclopedia. Soames notes: There are several points which ...Donnellan wanted to make about these examples. First, he thought that the individual introduced by the initial clause in these examples is an individual the speaker refers to in very much the same sense as does a speaker who uses a description referentially. In both cases the speaker has an individual in mind about whom he wishes to make an assertion -- an individual who may, but need not. satisfy the descriptive information used by the speaker in refemng to him. Second, Domellan maintained that the referent of the anaphoric pronoun in the second sentence of (16) is determined semantically to be the individual the speaker referred to in uttering the initial clause. Thus the notion of speaker reference is not strictly pragmatic, but has semantic import for the interpretation of anaphoric pronoms. Third, Domeilan believed that the referents of the "anaphoric descriptions" ... in the second sentences of (Ma) and ( 16b) are also determined semantically to be the individual the speaker referred to in uttering the initial clause (Soarnes 1994. 1560. Soames argues that these points strongly suggest that Donnellari regarded the uses of the "anaphoric descriptions" as semantically referential. If they do have this status. then the second sentences in (16. 16a. 16b) should each semantically express the singular proposition that attributes to the man whom the speaker is referring to the property of trying to sel1 the speaker an encyclopedia (Soames 1994: 157). Given this interpretation of Donnellan's conclusion, Soames tries to show that his argument from anaphora does not support it. There are. he argues, very good reasons for not drawing the conclusion that descriptions used referentially function semantically as singular tenns. Two sets of considerations figure in his argument. 1 will mention these now. and then turn to a closer examination of them. Fi nt. he notes that the sort of cases considered by Donnellan are very like situations in which neirhrr the speaker rwr the hearer has any person in mind. Consequently. they are very like cases in which, according to Soames, there is no temptation to say that the descriptions function as singular tenns. This supports the view. he argues. that in Donnellan's examples the descriptions are also not functioning as singular terms. Second. he argues that there are plausible semantic intuitions which arise in cases where descriptions are used referentially in the context of anaphonc chains. but the audience is unable to identify the speaker's intended referent. In these cases. the speaker dors have some particular individud in mind, and wishes to assen some property of this person. The audience, however, is unable to identify the speaker's intended referent. The sernantic intuitions which arise in such cases, he feels, support the conclusion that referential uses of descriptions which occur in the context of anaphoric chains do not function sernantically as genuine singular terms. As 1 noted earlier, Soames' argument an be substantially strengthened. If the semantic intuitions to which he appeals are correct. then there is excellent reason for doubting that descriptions used referentially ever function as singular terms. 1 will try to show that the considerations which he raises, when properiy undeniood, do not pose sigificant problems for the strong referential thesis. I will now examine these two sets of considerations in paterdetail. Soames notes that the examples of anaphoric occurrences of referentiai uses of definite descriptions which Donnellan discusses share important features which "are found in contexts in which the speaker clearly doesn't have any particular individual in mind. and so cannot be asserting a singular proposition about such an individud" (Soames 1994: 159). It will be worthwhile to consider. briefly, the sort of examples which he has in rnind, and why he thinks that, in these cases, speakers cannot correctiy be said to have anything in mind. Suppose that the following exchange occurs between two speakers who are discussing an individual with whom neitherof them is acquainted: A stndent came to my office before I amved this rnorning and removed a book. 1 noticed something was wrong because when 1 got there the door was ajar, and the janitor had not been in. What really bothers me is that the student must have had a key, and I'm afraid he will be back. (Said by A) 1 share your wos, that he had a key, and may be back. but 1 don? think that he was a student. It seems more likely thai he was an ex-employee (Said by B) (Soames 1994: 159). In this example. we have an anaphoric chah like those in examples (16) - ( 16b). The chain has as its antecedent an indefinite description. A definite description and persona1 pronouns are then anaphoncally linked to it. Soames remarks: In such a case, neither pariy in the discussion need have any definite idea about the identity of the intmder... Thus, there is no individual that the speakers have in mind. no individual they are talking about, no assertion about anyone that he (or she) came to A's office, removed a book. or has a key, and no sinplar proposition toward which either speaker need bear a propositional attitude ... in order for the speaker's remark to be true. Consequently. the relevant clauses in this discourse do not semantically express singular propositions. By parity of reasoning, I see no reason to believe that similar clauses in DonneIlan's examples do either (Soames 1994: 159)- We should note that Soames' assumption that if neither party in the discussion has any definite idea about the identity of the intruder. then it follows that "there is no individual that the speakers have in mind (Soames 1994: 159) is not correct. In the exchange presented above, the speakers do have some person in mind. They are both talking about the individuai w ho came into the fint speaker's office and removed a certain book. Soarnes is correct to Say that. at least in one sense, they have no definite idea about the identity of the intruder, but it does not follow from this that they have no person in mind. In this case. the speakers would both agree that the penon whom they have in mind is the person. whoever it might be, who entered into the office and took the book. The daim that they have no definite idea about the identity of the intruder seems to admit of different inierpretations. In one sense, the first speaker surely has some idea about the identity of the person he is talking about. If asked, he might Say that the penon about whom he is thinking is the person who entered the office and removed his book. The second speaker would. presumably. offer a similar account of the identity of this person. This much they would agree on. What they disagree on is whether this person was a student. Soames' claim that the speakers here lack any definite idea about the intruder's identity seems to involve a different interpretation of w hat is involved in having a definite idea about the identity of something. On this interpretation, having such a definite idea would involve being able to supply distinct, presumably non-synonymous, means of identifying the thing or penon in question. Interpreted in this way, Soames' claim that the speakers lack a defini te idea about the identity of the intruder seems to amount to no more than the daim that there is no set of expressions in addition to 'The penon who entered the office and rernoved a book" which both of the speaken would be prepared to offer in answer to the question. "Who is it that you are talking about?' This last fact does not imply that there is no penon they are talking about. nor does it irnply that there are no singular propositions which the speakers are expressing in uttering the expressions that they do. To see this consider the following case. This example is analogous to that given by Soames since the speaken do not have any definite idea about the identity of their intended referent. In this case. however, there is little temptation to Say that the speakers have no person in mind. and are not expressing or believing singular propositions about sorne penon. Suppose that Al and Bert both recall reading about a philosopher named "Avicenna" in their introductory philosophy class. Suppose that neither can provide any identificatory descriptions which both would be prepared to offer as expressions which uniquely fit the person they read about. Given this. consider the following exchange: Avicenna's view on the nature of time was interesting. He was way ahead other Greek philosophers. (Said by A.) 1 agree that his views on tirne were sophisticated. but 1 don't think he was Greek. 1 seem to recall that he was Persian. (Said by B. ) In this exarnple i t seems that the speakers have no clear idea about the identity of their intended referent. We are supposing that they can not agree on any set of descriptions which uniquely fit this person. It could even be the case. as Kripke. in Numing and Necrssity. Donnellan. in "Proper Names and identifying Descriptions". and others have argued. that neither speaker is prepared to offer q description which he believes is uniquely satisfied by his intended referent. Despite this lack of identificatory knowledge there is little plausibility in claiming that, in this example, the speaken have no one in mind. Nor is there mvch plausibility in the view that they are expressing general propositions. Their utterances seem to express singular, object-dependent propositions about some particularperson whom they learned of in their philosophy course. If this is correct, then it seems that speaken ccm have something in mind even though they are unprepared to offer any uniquely identifying descriptions which single out this thing. Furthemore, it seems, if the above andysis is correct. that speaken cm express singular, object-dependent propositions about thing even though rhey are unable ro Offer expressions which uniquely iùentifi the rhings which their proposirions ure about. 1 will Say more about this point in section four below. Soames' response. at this stage. seems to beg the question against Donnellan. The thesis which is being defended by Domekm is that descriptions used referentially are genuine singular terms. In the argument from anaphora he is trying to defend the claim that definite descnptions. on certain occasions, function semantically like proper names. As the last example shows, proper names can be used as penuine singular terms even though speakers lack beliefs which uniquely identify the referents of these expressions. Soames' argument depends upon the premise that when speakers use definite descriptions without uniquely identifying knowledge of their intended referents. then the descriptions must be functioning like quantifier phrases and not like genuine singular ternis. But this premise assumes that descriptions used referentially cannot function like proper names. As we have seen. in the case of proper names. there is no temptation to Say that a speaker's use of a ncunr fails to function as a singular terni simply because he lacks identifying knowledge of the referent. Thus, his argument against Donnellan depends upon denyinp the very thesis that Donnellan is trying to prove. What this shows, 1 believe, is that either Soames mut acknowledge that his argument begs the questions against Donnellan, or he must acknowledge that uniquely identifying knowledge is required if speakers are to use proper names as genuine singular terms. If Soames accepts the first disjunct. then his argument assumes what it is trying to prove. If he accepts the second disjunct, then his argument depends upon a thesis which runs counter to a very plausible view about how proper names function. The onus. therefore. seems to be on Soames to demonstrate that uniquely identifying knowledge is a requirement for speakers who wish to use names as singular terms. The example of anaphoric uses of definite descriptions which Soames offers against Donnellan mighr involve attributive uses of the definite description "the student". His example does not. however. specify this. I have tried to show that in the example he provides. we cannot ussume that since the first speaker lacks identifying knowledge of his intended referent, he must be using the description attributively. If he i.~ using the description in this manner, then Soames is correct in claiming that "the relevant clauses in this discourse do not semanticaily express singular propositions" (Soames 1994 159). But this does not show that the utterances of these clauses do not express singular propositions when the description is used referentiall y. The above considerations show, I believe, that there are at least two different interpretations of the example Soames has provided. According to one interpretation. the fint speaker is using the description referentially. According to another interpretation. the speaker is using the description attributively. Soames does not recognize the first interpretation of the speakers' utterances. He assumes that without uniquely identifying knowledge. the speakers rnust be using the description "the student" attributively. This assumption is, 1 have tried to show, unwarranted. The fact that the speaker in ihis example might be using the description attributively is, according to Soames. important. He argues: The existence of examples like [the first one considered above] shows that there must be a semantics for anaphoric linking which assiqns general, rather than singular. propositions to clauses containing anaphonc pronouns and descriptions. This semantics is, of course, also available in contexts, like those emphasized by Donnellan, in which the speaker happens to have a particular individual in mind (Soames lm 159). The claim that the sernantic analysis appropriate to ~~ihutivruses of descriptions in anaphoric chains is also available for context in which descriptions are used referentiulf-v seems to be unjustified. Such a semantic analysis would. according to Donnellan, be incorrect for referential uses. The argument Soames offers fails. therefore, to show ihat Donnellan is mistaken in thinking that definite descriptions and personal pronouns used referentially in the context of anaphoric chains which are grounded by occurrences of indefinite descriptions function as singular tenns. Soames goes on to argue that "we can ... draw on some plausible intuitions to show that even in the cases that Donnellan provides. the speaker's sentences do no t semantically express singular propositions" (Soarnes 1994: 160). This is Soarnes' central argument against Donnellan. The relevant intuitions concem the ability of audiences to ruderstand the content of utterances made by speakers who use descriptions referentially in the context of anaphoric chains. As we will see. this argument, if it were sound. would provide good reason for rejecting the thesis that utterances of expressions containing definite descriptions whi ch are being used referentiall y ever express singular propositions about the speaker's intended referent. even when the descriptions do not occur in the context of anaphonc chains. If it were sound, this argument would provide excellent grounds for favouring the weak referential thesis over the strong referential thesis. Soames argues that consideration of the position of an interpreter who hears an utterance of ( 16) or (Ka) and who fui/-s to recognize the person that the speaker has in mind provides grounds for rejecting Donnellan's conclusion that in such cases the speaker's utterance expresses a singular proposition. Following Soames. let us represent ( 16) and ( 16a) as follows: ( 16c) A says to B: A man came to the office this moming. He (the man) tried to sel1 me an encyclopedia. Soames argues that. in a case like this, B can repon to othen what it is that A has sai d. even though B hm no ideu us ro rhe idenri~of the perron to whom A is referring . In addition. B is in a position to hrlirvr what it is that A has said. In reporting or believing what A has said. B does not. Soames argues. assen or believe singular propositions about the person to whom A is referring. He tries to show that if A's utterance in (16~) semanrical!\. expressed a singular proposition about some person. then B 's repon of w hat A said would also express a singular proposition about the penon to whom A was refemng. Thus, according to Soames, it must be false that the speaker's utterance semantically expresses a singular proposition. Soames summarizes his argument as follows: Pl. If A assertively utters the sentences in [Mc]to B (in the SO~of case that DonneIlan has in mind), then B is in a position to report what A said, to believe that report. and, if B trusts A, to believe what A said. In doi!g. these things B does not assert or believe singular propositions about the individual A has in mind. If A's use of the sentence in ( 16c) containing the anaphoric pronoun or description semantically expressed a singular proposition about the person A has in mind, then A's utterance would be an assertion of that proposition; if that were so, then B's report of what A said would also be an assertion of a singular proposition about the individual A had in mind, and B's believing that report would involve B's believing a singular proposition about that individual, as would B's believing what A said. A's use of the sentence in (l6c) containing the anaphoric pronoun or description does not semantically express a singular proposition about the person A has in mind (Soames 1994: 163). I will examineeachof these premises in tum. If they are in fact correct, then it seems that Soames' conclusion (C) must be correct. This argument would, if it were sound, show more ihan just (C). If the semantic intuitions to which Soames appeals are correct about the case of (16c). then there is excellent reason to reject the claim that referential uses of definite descriptions ever express singular propositions in a wide range of cases. In the cases which Soames discusses the hearer does not know the identity of the person or thing to which the speaker is refemng, and the speaker's use of a defi nite description occurs anaphorically. He argues thai in such cases, there is good reason for denying that a speaker's use of a definite description function semantically like singular terms. I will try to show that Soames' argument. if it were sound. would show even more than this. This argument and the principles to which it appeals imply. 1 believe, that in anv case where a speaker uners a sentence in which a definite description is used referentially the utterance does not semantically express a singular proposition in virtue of the description being used referentially. Before examining his argument in detail, it will be useful to see how the considerations it raises apply to referential uses of descriptions where the audience is aware of the identity of the speaker's intended referent and the descriptions do nor occur in the context of anaphoric chains. (ii) The Scope of Soames' Argumenr The first premise of Soames' argument claims that a hearer who is unaware of the identity of the speaker's intended referent may believe, and go on to assert. a proposition which the speaker's utterance in ( 16c) has semantically expressed. Soames argues that a hearer may believe or asert a proposition semantically expressed by the speaker's utterance even rhough rhe proposizion which the hearer believes or asserfs is no1 a singular proposition - this is the content of the second premise of his argument. We can, 1 think, make the content of these premises more precise in the following (Principle 1) If u is an utterance of a sentence which contains an anaphoric description that is beinp used referentially, and h is a hearer of u w ho is unaware of the identity of the speaker's intended referent, and ï' is the set of propositions semantically expressed by u, then if h believes or asserts a proposition which was semantically expressed in u. then h believes or asserts a non-singular (object- independent) proposition # which is a member of T. This way of stating the content of the first two premises rnay seem odd in the sense that it allows for the possibility that a speaker's utterance of some sentence semantically expresses more than one proposition. It does not seem, however. that these premises. by themselves, imply anything about whether or not speaken' utterances can semantically express more that one proposition. The third premise of Soames' argument. however. depends upon a very plausible principle conceming the semantic content of speakers' utterances which claims that speaken' utterances of sentences semantically express exactly one proposition, if they semantically express any proposition. It will be worthwhile to examine this principle, bnefly. and to see why his third premise depends upon its tmth. The third premise asserts that if a speaker's utterance of an expression containing anaphoric occurrences of definite descriptions expresses a singular proposition $, then if a hearer h believes what the speaker said (the semantic content of his utterance). then h believes the singular proposition #. This premise seems to depend upon the tmth of a principle about the literal semantic content of speakers' utterances which claims that utterances of expressions. if they sernanticaily express any proposition. semantically express exactly one proposition. Let us cal1 this Principle 2: (Rinciple 2) If an utterance u of a sentence semanticaily expresses any proposition. then it semanticaily expresses exactly one proposition. To see that the third prernise of Soames' argument depends upon this principle. consider the consequence of the view that an utterance of an expression can semantically express more than one proposition. If this view were correct. then an utterance u of a sentence containing an anaphoric occurrence of a definite description which is used referentially might semanticall y express horh a singular proposition about sorne enti ty mzd a non-singular (object-independent) proposition. If this were the case, then the speaker's utterance ri might involve the assertion of IWO propositions: one of them a singular proposition and the other not. Thus, a hearer h might conceivably believe what is asserted by the speaker's utterance. even though he does no? believe the singular propo.si?ion which the speuker rrîserred. He rnight, that is, believe or assert the non-sinpular (general) proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance. but fail to believe or assert the singular proposition w hich the utterance of the sentence expresses. Soames' third premise. however. claims that if a speaker's utterance of a sentence containing an anaphoric occurrence of a definite description expresses a singular proposition. then if a hearer understands and believes what the speaker's utterance semantically expresses, then the hearer's believing the content of the utterance would involve his believinga singular proposition. As we have seen, this clairn is correct on- if we make the assumption that speakers' utterances of sentences do not semantically express more than one proposition, if they semantically express any proposition. That is. premise three of his argument is correct only if Principle 2 is correct. This principle, however, seems unobjectionable, and 1 will assume that it is correct. These two principles imply that a speaker who utten a sentence like the second sentence in ( 16c) containinp an anaphoric descnption which is used referentially does nor semantically express a singular proposition if his hearer is not aware of his intended referent. To see this. suppose that there were an utterance u in which an anaphoric description. like that in (16c), is used referentially. Suppose that u did express a singular proposition $ about some entity e. Suppose, finally. that h is a hearer who undentands and believes what the speaker said in making K. but is unaware of the identity of the speaker's intended referent. Thus, from Principle 1, we can infer that the hearer h believes some non-singular proposition which is a rnember of the set. T, of propositions semantically expressed by u. Thus. we can infer that u must express a non-singular proposition. Principle 2 irnplies, however, the set, r. of propositions semantically expressed by u has exactly one member. if it has any members. Therefore, the proposition $ must be identical to the proposition y. Thus. if we assume (11 that an utterance of a sentence containing an anaphoric descnption which is being used referentially semantically expresses a singular proposition $ in a context where the hearer is unaware of the identi ty of the speaker's intended referent. and (ii) that (Principle 1) and (Principle 2) are correct, then it seems to follow that the proposition q!~ both is a singular proposition and is not a singular proposition. This conclusion shows that if we accept the two principles involved in Soames' argument. then it follows that utterances of sentences. like that in ( 162). containing anaphonc occurrences of definite description do not semanticall y express singular propositions in cases where the hearer is not aware of the identity of the speaker's referent. This conclusion can, it seems. be strengthened in a number of ways. First. note that it would be odd to think that the son of proposition which a speaker's utterance semantically expresses should depend upon knowledge possessed by his dience. Soames' argument would. if it were sound, seem to show that in uty case which is like the utterance in (16c). where an anaphoric description is used referentially, the speaker's utterance semantically expresses only a non-singular proposition. This would be tme even in cases where the hearer is aware of the identity of the speaker's referent. 1 will offer two arguments for the view that the scope of Soames' conclusion should be expanded in this way. Fint. consider two different cases in which the speaker A utters the sentences in (16c). In the fint case his hearer, B. is. as before, completely unaware of the identity of person to whom A means to refer. As we have seen. Soames' argument purports to show that. in this case. A's utterance would nor semantically express a singular proposition about his intended referent -- the penon who visited A's office that moming trying to sel1 an encyclopedia. Instead. according to the conclusion of Soames' argument. A's utterance would express a general (object-independent) proposition. In the second case. suppose that the hearer is aware of the identity of A's intended referent. although A does not know this fact about his audience. Suppose that. unbeknownst to A. B saw the person in question enter A's office with a suitcase full of encyclopedias. In this case. there seem to be two possibilities. Either A's utterance of the second sentence in (16~)semantically expresses a non-singular proposition, as in the first case, or it semantically expresses a singular proposition about A's intended referent. It seems likely, given that A's beliefs about his audience's knowledge is the same in each case. that A's referential intentions would be exactly the same in the two cases. Nothinp is changed. then, with respect to what the speaker intends or expects concerning his audience's ability to single out the peson to whom he means to refer. It would be very surprising to leam. considering that nothing about the speaker or his communicative intentions has changed, that A's utterance semantically expresses a pneral proposition in the first case, and a singular proposition in the second case. This, then. is one reason for thinking that if the speaker's utterance semantically expresses a non-singular proposition in cases where he utters an expression, like the second sentence in ( 16c), containing an anaphoric occurrence of a description which is used referentially. and his audience is UIlcZwure of his intended referent, then it expresses the same non-singular proposition in cases where his audience is mare of the identity of his intended referent. A second argument for this conclusion involves a consideration of cases where the speaker utters an expression like that in (16c). with the intention of using the definite description referentially, and there is more than one hearer whom he is addressing. Suppose that A utters the sentences in ( 16c) in a context where he intends to use the definite description referentially. but where there are two hearers. Cail them "B" and "C". Suppose that B has no idea about the identity of the speaker's intended referent. Suppose. however, that C is aware of the identity of this person. Perhaps C is in the position of the hearer in the second case discussed above. Once again there seern to be two options concerning the semantic content of A's utterance of the second sentence in ( 16c). given the conclusion of Soames' argument. Ei ther A's utterance of this sentence semantically expresses just one. non-singular. proposition to hoth speakers, or it semantically expresses a non-singular proposition @ to B and a singular proposition y> to C. Let's consider these two possibilities in tum. If the first disjunct is correct. then it seems that a speaker's utterance of a sentence like that in (Mc) semantically expresses a non-singular proposition even when the hearer ir aware of the idenrity of the speaker '.s intendedrefrrrnr. If the second disjunct is correct, then it seems that a speaker's utterance of this sentence can semantically express more than one proposition. But this conclusion violates Principle 2, discussed above. which appears to be an extremely plausible principle conceming the content semantically expressed by a speaker's utterance of a sentence. Therefore, once agaio, we have good reason for thinking that if Soames' argument is sound, it implies that if a speaker utters a sentence, like the second sentence in ( 16~).where an anaphoric description is being used referentially, his utterance semantically expresses a non-singular (object-independent)proposition even when his hearer is mure of the idenrie of his imended referent. If the above considerations are correct, then we cm strengthen (Principle 1) by omitting the restriction to cases where the speaker's audience is unaww-e of the identity of his intended referen t. This strengthened princi ple is the following: (Principle 3) If u is an utterance of a sentence which contains an anaphoric description that is being used referentially, and h is a hearer of u. and r is the set of propositions semantically expressed by u, then if h believes or asserts a proposition which was sernanticaily expressed in u, then h believes or asserts a non-singular (object-independent)proposition @ which is a member of r. This new version of (Rinciple 1) cm be even further strenphened. The reference in (Principles 1 and 3) to occurrences of descnptions in anaphoric chaim does not seern essential. If a hearer can believe what is said in an utterance of an expression in which a description occumng anaphorically is used referentially, even though the proposition which he helievrs is nnr a singularproposition, there seems little reason to doubt that a hearer can also believe the content of an utterance of an expression in which a description is used referentially but not anaphoncally. even though the proposition which he believes is nor a singuhr propmirion. There does not seem to be anything about utterances of expressions in which definite descnptions are used referentially and have anaphoric occurrences which would imply that on- in such cases, but rwr in cases where descnptions occur non- anaphoncal1 y. can a hearer believe the content of the utterance wi thout believing a sinpular proposition. For example. if a hearer can believe what is said in an utterance of ( 16a) A man came to the office this rnorning. The man tried to seIl me an encyclopedia. where the description is used referentially without believing a singuiur proposition ahout rhe speuker 's Nvenclrd refereni, then it seems highly probable that a hearer would also be able to beiieve what is said in an utterance of ( 1) The rnurderer of Smith is insane, where the description is again used referentially. without believing a singuior proposition ubour the speaker's referenf . Thus, it seems that (Rinciple 3) could be strengthened as follows: (Principle 4) If u is an utterance of a sentence which contains a descnption that is being used referentially, and h is a hearer of u, and l? is the set of propositions semantically expressed by u. then if h believes or assens a proposition which was semantical1y expressed in u. then h believes or asserts a non-singular (object- independent) proposition @ which is a member of r. Pnnciples two and four imply, however. that in all cases where descriptions are used referentially, the speaker's utterance does not. by virtue of his referentiai use of a descnption. express a sinpular proposition. To see this. suppose that a speaker uses a definite descnption referentially in an utterance u of a sentence. that u semantically expresses a singular proposition $J in vimie of this fact. and that a hearer h understands and believes what is said in K. By Rinciple 4, we can infer that h believes a non-singular proposition which is a member of the set of propositions, T, which are sernantically expressed by u. Thus we can infer that u semanùcally expresses a proposition. y. which is not singular (object-dependent). Since q'~ is, by hypothesis, a rnemberof T, and since y> is a member of T, we can infer (from (Rinciple 2)) that yt is identical to @ Thus. the assumptions that u expresses a singular proposition and that (Rinciple 4) and (Rinciple 2) are correct jointly imply that u expresses a proposition $ which is a singular proposition and is not a sinpular proposition. Therefore, it must be false that u expresses a singutar proposition. if (Rinciple 4) and (Principle 2) are correct. Thus, the sort of considerations, raised by Soarnes, concerning the ability of hearers to undersid, helieve. and reporr the content of propositions expressed by utterances of sentences in w hich referential descriptions occur anaphoricall y. would seen: to apply to dlcases where definite descriptions are used referentidly. Stephen Neale. in Descriptions, argues that these features of referentiai uses are suflcienr to show that definite descriptions used referentially do not function sernanticdly like singular referring expressions. According to Neale, genuine refemng expressions are such that for a hemr to understand utterances of expressions in which they occur. he must be able to identify the referent of the refemnp expression. By contrast, in the case of utterances of definite descriptions. a hearer may understand the speaker's utterance even though he is unable to identify the items denoted by the definite description. Neale expresses these two ideas in the followinp principles: (RI) If 'b' is a aenuine refemnp expression (singular term). then for a rnonadic predicate fis G'. i t is necessary to identify the referent of 'h' in order to undentand the proposition expressed by an utterance u of 'b is G' (Neale 1990: 18). (DI) If 'the F is a definite description. then for a (monadic) predicate phrase '- is G', the proposition expressed by an utterance of 'the F is G' can be perfectly well understood by a penon who does not know who or what is denoted by 'the F (indeed. even if nothing satisfies 'the F. and even if the penon knows that nothing satisfies 'the F) (Neale 1990: 2 1). According to Neale. the tmth of (R1 ) and (D1 ). which seem to be central intuitions behinds Scott Soames argument. "is quite sufficient to falsify the view that descriptions are genuine refemng expressions" (Neale 19%: 24). For this reason, it will be especially important to show what is wrong with Soames' argument. if we wish to maintain the strong referential thesis. I will tum now to his defense of the premises (P1 ) to (P3). (iii) The Premises of Soarnes' Argument Soames makes two initial observations about the example ( 16~).The first concerns reports which the hearer B rnay make of A's utterance of (16b). The second concerns beliefs which B rnay form on the basis of his having heard A's utterance of (16b). 1 will examine these observations in turn. First, he notes that the hearer B should be able to report what it is that A has said "as a result of hearing A's remark" (Soarnes 1994: 160). He notes ihat this fact about ( l6c) distinguishes it from cases where speakers utter expressions containing genuine singular terms. In the latter son of case, Soames claims, a hearer is not in a position to report the proposition which is expressed by a speaker's utterance unless hr knows the ikntity of the person to whom the speaker wos referring. Suppose, for example, that a speaker A uses the pronoun "he" as a genuine dernonstrative. not as what Geach has called a "pronoun of laziness." There is. suppose, some particular peson whom A sees, and about whom he wishes to Say something. Consider a case where B. his audience. does not see A's intended referent. and is not in a position to identify him. Soames remarks: In such a situation, if A assertively utters the sentence He was obnoxious. without any anaphoric linking, attempting to assert the singular proposition that lthis person] was obnoxious. A's audience will not be in a position to report her as having asserted that proposition (Soames 1994: 16 1). The case of A's utterance in (16b) is, according to Soames. unlike this in that "we take it for granted that the hearer. B. can successfuIly report A's assertions" (Soames 1994: 161 ). This supports the conclusion, Soames argues. that in the case of (16b) A has nor semantically expressed a singular proposition. Soames' second observation concems beliefs which a hearer may form on the basis of a speaker's utterance of an expression. Considering the case of ( 16c). he remarks that the hearer B should be in a position to believe that A asserted the proposition that he did assert. and. if he trusts A. to believe the content of A's assertion. Thus, Soames daims that the reports ( 18) and ( 19) could be tmly made by B: (18) 1 believethatA said thata man cameto theoffice this moming. 1 also believe that A said that he(the man) tned to sel1 her an encyclopedia. ( 19) 1 believe that a man came to the office this moming. 1 also believe that he (the man) tried to seIl A an encyclopedia. Regarding B's utterances of these sentences Soames remarks: The crucial question here is whether the clauses containing the anaphoric pronouns or descriptions ...express singular propositions about the individual A had in mind. We can test this by checking Our intuitions about certain related ascriptions (Soames 1994 16 1). The related ascriptions which he has in mind are the following: ( 18a) There is some man such that B believes (of that man)that A said that he tned to sel1 her an encyclopedia. ( 18b) B believes that A said that you tried to sel1 her an encyclopedia. (Said addressing the penon A had in mind.) ( 19a) There is some man such that B believes (of that man) that he tried to se11 A an encyclopedia. ( 19b) B believes that you tried to se11 A an encyclopedia. (Said addressing the person A had in mind.) Soames argues that the clause in B's utterance of (18) which contains the anaphoric occurrences of the pronoun or definite description expresses a singular proposition on- if ( 18a) and ( l8b) are tme. Similarly, the clause in B's utterance of ( 19) which coniains the anaphoric eiements expresses a singular proposition onfy if( 19a) and ( 19b) are true. According to Soames. however. that ( 18a) - ( 19b) are rwt tme. Since B has no id- of the identity of A's intended referent. Soames thinks that B would "sincerely deny. when confronted with any man, that he had asserted of that man that A said anything about him." (Soames 1994 162) Thus. he feels that ( 18a) and ( l8b) are false. Similarly, since B has no idea about the identity of the intended referent. he would sincerely deny. when confronted with any man. that he had asserted of that man that he tned to sel1 A an encyclopedia. Thus, Soames thinks that ( 19a) and ( l9b) are false. From this he infers that the relevant clauses in B's utterances of ( 18) or ( 19) do not semantically express singular propositions about the person to w hom A intended to refer. This and the tmth of premise three imply that the speaker's original utterance did not semantically express a singular proposition. These observations conceming the reports and beliefs which B, who is unaware of A's intended referent, can make or have, are the reasons Soames offers in defense of premises (Pl ) and (P2)of his argument. These considerations show. he argues. that a hearer. in such cases, who is unable to identify the individual whom his speaker has in mind. may still report or believe what it is that the speaker has asserted. Since B has no idea about the identity of the intended referent, the proposition which he expresses in his report of A's utterance, and the proposition which he believes if he trusts A's utterance. are not singular propositions about that person. Instead, they are general propositions. This completes the defense of premises one and two. Soames does not defend the third prernise. It seems. however. highly plausible to think that (P3). or something very like it, is correct. 1 will assume that prernise three. as Soames has presented it, is true. In the next section 1 will outline several objections to this argument. As we have seen. if one wishes to defend the strong referential thesis. it is important to show that this argument is unsound. (ivl Objections to Premises One and Two of Soames ' Argument What 1 will try to show is that premise one of Soames' argument is not straightfonvardly correct. That a speaker has uttered a sentence like that in ( 16c) does not imply that a hearer is automatically in a position to report or heiiew what it is that the speaker has said - the proposition which his utterance semanticaliy expresses. There may be cases. 1 will argue, in which this is not true. Furthemore. 1 will try to show that there is good reason for thinking that the second premise of Soames' argument is false. I will try to show that there is good reason for thinking that if a speaker utters an expression in which a definite description (occumng anaphorically or non-anaphorically) is used referentially. then a hearer can correctly be said to believe the content of the speaker's utterance. or to have repmed the content of this utterance. on/-v if the hearer believes w usserrs. respectivelx a singularproposition about the speaker's intended referent. A chief weakness with Soames' argument is the view he endorses about genuine refemng expressions. His contention - that hearers cm believe or assert the content of a speaker's utterance in which a genuine refemng expression is used onfy if they are able to identify the speaker's intended referent - is not correct. 1 will try to show why the principle (R1 ) should be rejected. Since Soames' argument, 1 believe. depends upon the tmth of this pnnciple. demonstrating its inadequacy should be sufficient to provide grounds for rejecting his argument. Ln order to develop my response to Soames' argument. it will be useful to make a brief digression. David Kaplan. in "Afterthoughts", presents two distinct models of the semantics of a language. He calls these Subjectivist and Consumerist Semantics. A subjectivist view of semantics is, I think, implicit in the principle (RI) to which Neale and Soames appeal. There are, however. powerful reasons for rejecting such a mode1 of semantics. The consumerist alternative is a central aspect of some recent. and highly plausible, developments in the theory of reference. in particular, a consumerist view of semantics fits very weil with the so-called "Causal Theory of Names". The arguments offered by Kripke, in "Identity and Reference" and Naming and Neressiiy, Donnellan. in "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions". and others conceming the role identificatory descriptions play in determining the referents of proper names are squarely within what Kaplan calls a "consumenst" program for semantics. What 1 hope to show is that the semantic intuitions which underlie adherence to (RI) run contrary to this very plausible view about reference. On a subjectivist approach to semantics, Kaplan argues, individual language users assign meanings to their words and referents to their refemnp expressions. Russell's view, in "On Denoting", that al1 the constituents of a proposition which we can express or undentand are items with which we are already acquainted. is an example of such a subjectivist semantics. According to Russell's position in 'On Denoting', in every proposition that we can apprehend (Le. not only in those whose truth and falsity we can judge of, but in al1 that we can think about), al1 the constituents are reaily entities with which we have immediate acquaintance (Russell 1905: 56. Quoted in Kaplan 1989: 600). According to this view. before a speaker can mean something by an expression. he must be acquainted with the meaning. In the case of refemng expressions. a speaker can use a name. for example, to refer to some entity only if he is already acquainted with it. What a speaker can mean or refer to is thus a consequence of what we might cal1 his "epistemic position." In this sense then. language is subjective. Two speakers A and B may, but need not. be able to express or understand the same propositions. Whether they can is a function of the experiences which they have had. On this model, meanings and referents can be shared, in the sense that multiple speakers may use the sarne words with the same meaning. Each speaker must. however. assign meanings to the words he uses. Kaplan explains that with this subjectivist model of semantics Althouph the enrifier which serve as possible meanings may be regarded as objective. in the sense that the same possible meanings are accessible to more than one person, the ussignmenr of meanings is subjective. and thus the semantics is subjective. Since each individual user must assign meanings rather than receiving them with the words. each user's semantics is autonomous. What the language community does make available to each of its members is a syntax. an empy syntax to which each user must add his own semantics (Kaplan 1989: 600. The implication of this view for thought is. according to Kaplan, that individuals can only have. or express. those thoughts which were already availableto them before they acquired language. The speaker's language community does not make available to him new thoughts. Kaplan remarks: The individual can express only those propositions that were already available to him as thoughts before receiving the benefits of linguistic communion. We cannot enlaqe the stock of possible rneanings that are available to us by drawing on the total stock of meaninbs extant in the language community. In this sense there is no semantic shanng. What each user can express is independent of the resources of other members of the language community. and in this sense what each user can express is idepenclenf of iunguuge ( Kaplan 1989: 60 1 ). The contention that subjectivist accounts of semantics involve speaken autonomously usigning meaning or referents to their words is interesting, but it is tangential to the main line of argument that 1 wish to build against Soames' criticisrn of the strong referential thesis. What is important. however. is the view that according to a subjectivist semantics speakers can only express sinpular propositions about objects which they are in a position to identify. 1 will cal1 this principle (El): (El ) If 'h' is a genuine refemng expression (singular term). then a speakers can express an object-dependent (singular) proposition about the referent of 'b' by uttering and expression of the form '6 is G' only ifs is able to identify the referent of 'b'. Related to (El) is the view that in order for a speaker to unders~undthe propositions expressed by utterances of expressions in which there are refemng expressions it is necessary that he be able to identify the object(s) that are being referred to. Stephen Neale. in Descriprions. defends this view about refemnp expressions. As we have seen. he claims that (Rl) is a principle which governs the ability of speakers to understand utterances of expressions in which referring expressions occur: (R1 ) If 'b' is a genuine refemng expression (singular term). then for a (monadic) predicate '- is Gy.it is necessary to identify the referent of 'b* in order to understand the proposition expressed by an utterance u of 'bis G' (Neale 1990: 18). Neale argues that the notion of identifying the referent of sorne singular terrn 'b' "will involve not only having ... some sort of episternic contact with the referent of 'b', but also seeing that it is that object to which 'h' refers. When these two condition obtain. let us Say that the subject idenfiJiesthe referent of '6"' (Neale 1990: 18). Following Neale. 1 will accept that these are necessary conditions for a speaker's being able to identify the referent of some expression. In contrast to this subjectivist view of semantics, a consumerist view claims that speakers may defer to other language users on the question of the meanings and referents of their words. Kaplan notes that we cm Contrast the view of subjectivist semantics with the view that we are. for the most part, language consumers. Words corne to us prepackaged with semantic value ...To use language as lanpuage. to express something, requires an intentional act. But the intention that is required involves the typical consumer's attitude of cornpliance. not the producer's asseniveness (Kaplan 1989: 602). On this view. neither (El) nor (R1 ) is a requirement for speakers who wish to use genuine refemng expressions. The referent of a singular term can be "camed" from speaker to speaker. Even if some later user of the terni cannot identify the referent, he can defer to earlier users of the tem. Their use was grounded in such an ability to identify the referent. This view of the semantics of refemng expressions is, of course. central to the historical chain account of how proper narnes refer. This last point is worth emphasizing, since it suggests that the argument Soames offers against Donnellan's argument from anaphora depends on semantic intuitions whic h run counter to the causal view of how proper names function. A response at this point might be to argue that the descnptivist theory of proper names is in fact correct. It might be maintained that for a speaker to use a name as a genuine singular term he mut be in a position to identify the name's referent. The referent, according to the descriptivist view. is whatever object satisfies the descriptive content, or most of the descriptive content, which the speaker associates with the name. This response seems implausible. The arguments mustered by Kripke. DonneIlan. and others against this view seem ovenvhelrning. A more plausible response would be to maintain that although identificaiory descriptions are not required in order that a speaker may use a proper name as a genuine refemng expression. (RI) is correct in so far as we restrict our attention to referring expressions other than names. 1 think that this response should also be rejected. There is reason to reject the view that if a speaker has used a genuine singularfenn in an utterance of some expression. then a hearer. who cannot identify the intended referent. cannot report or believe the proposition which the speaker's utterance has expressed. Consider the following case. Suppose that Jones is sitting in a chair facing both A and B. Suppose that A utters ( 17) That man is obnoxious. to B. Let us cal1 the proposition which A has expressed "4'. Suppose that B, w ho is blind, cm perceive neither A's pointing gesture nor A's intended referent. He recognizes. however. that A intends to refer to some particularperson. and assert of that person that he is obnoxious. Thus. he realizes that there is someone to whom A was refemng, but he cannot identify who this person is other than the individual. whomever he may be, that A had in mind. Suppose that C enten the room after A has Ieft and asks B what A said. There seems no reason to suppose that B cannot reply. truthfully, by saying: ( I7a) A said that that man is obnoxious. Suppose that C immediately recognizes the person to whom A must have been referring. Thus. he recognizes the proposition # about Jones which A asserted and, if he trusts A's judgment. he may believe #- C, it seems, may go on to report to another person A's views about Jones by saying ( 17b) A said that Jones is obnoxious. If asked how he knows this fact about A, C, it seems, would be warranted in saying ( 17c) B said that A said that Jones is obnoxious. This could be taken as a warrant or jusrijicurion for C's assertion of (1%) only if the second "that clause" semantically expresses the proposition #. If the second "that clause" in ( l7c) expressed some other proposition iy, then C's assertion of (l7c) would nor serve as an explanation or justification of why he asserted ( 1%). In uttering ( 17b). C is saying that A has asserted the proposition #. Clearly. C's saying that B asserted that A asserted sorne di'erenr proposition iy would not serve as a warrant for his daim that A asserted (9. Finally, we should note that, in addition to (17b) and (17~1,it seems that C may Say, tmthfully, to Jones ( 17d) A said that ?ou are obnoxious. as weil as ( 17e) B said that A said that you are O bnoxious. These considerations. if they are correct. sugpest that B's utterance must express. in part, the singular proposition @. If B's utterance of ( 17a)faiied to express the singular proposition $ about Jones. then there seem to be just three possibilities regarding what it does semantically expresses: Either B 's utterance expresses a singular proposition y> which is different from $, or his utterance expresses some non-singular (object-independent) proposition X,or i t semantically expresses no proposition at all. The fint alternative does not seem plausible. If B's utterance of (17a) does not express the singular proposition $, then it is highly implausible to suppose that it expresses any other singular proposition. After all, if it doesn't express a proposition about Jones. then who or what would it express a proposition about? There does not seem any way to answer this question. The third alternative also seems implausible. If B's utterance does not semantically express my proposition. then it seems that C would hardly be justified in saying that what warrants his assertion of ( 17b) - ( 17e) is B's utterance of ( 17a). After all. B's saying nozhing could hardly serve as a justification for the assertions which C made. Finall y, the second alternative also seems implausible. If B 's utterance of ( 17a) expresses some non-singular proposition X,rhen we might wonder what x is. It ceitainly seerns that, in uttering ( l7a). B is expressing some determinate proposition. However. there does not appear to be any way of determining which particular generd proposition is asserted by this utterance. What these considerations suggest, 1 believe, is that speaken may succeed in using singular terms to refer to some penon, even though they arewrabie to idenfifi that person. In Kaplan's tems, we can Say that speakers may become consumers of singular terms in the sense that they defer to the referential intentions of other speaken. The reference of their uses of such terms is determined by the fact that, in using them. they intend to cornp- wi th the referentiaf intentions of the speakers from whom they acquired the terrn. That this can occur in the case of proper narnes seems relatively uncontroversial. What I have tned to argue is that the same kind of deference may occur with singular ternis like demonstratives. 1 have tned to show that adherence to (RI) mns counter to very plausible views about refemng. Also, 1 have tned to show that there are cases in which it seems intuitively correct to Say that a hearer may believe or report the content of an utterance involving a singular tenn even though he is unahle to identifi the speuker's Nuencied refrrni. These considerations provide, 1 believe. good grounds for tejecting (RU. Thus. Soames' contention that there is an important asyrnrnetry between cases where hearers undentand utterances in which genuine refemng expressions are used and those where they understand utterances in which definite descriptions are used referentially seems unwarranted. As we have seen. there is good reason for thinking that hearers cm believe and report the content of utterances in which singular terms occur even thouph they are unable to identify the teferents of these terms. Thus, the fact that with referentid uses of descriptions it seerns correct to Say that hearers who cannot identify the intended referent may believe and report the content expressed by the respective utterance does not support the view that there is any sharp distinction to be drawn between cases in which demonstratives are used and those in which definite descriptions are used referentially. Let me turn now to the most central "intuitions" which Soames offers in defense of the second prernise of his argument. He argues that with respect to a case like ( Mc), if the proposition asserted or believed by the audience. B, were a singular proposition. then it would be correct to Say that ( 18a) There is some man such that B believes (of that man) that A said that he tried to sel1 her an encyclopedia. ( 18b) B believes that A said that you tried to sel1 her an encyclopedia. (Said addressing the person A had in mind.) ( 19a) There is some man such that B believes (of that man) that he tned to se11 A and encyclopedia. ( 19b) B believes that you tned to sel1 A an encyclopedia. (Said addressing the person A had in mind.) Since he thinks these ascnptions would not be correct, Soames concludes that B must not be asserting or believinp a singular proposition. This shows. he feels, that A's utterance in (16c) must not express a singular proposition (even though the definite description was used referentially ). 1 don't think that Soames' intuitions are correct regarding this, and sirnilar, cases. Recall the example, just considered above, involving a hearer. who cannot identify the speaker's intended referent. and who reports and believes the content of a speaker's utterance of 'That man is obnoxious." As we saw. it seems plausible that the hearer can believe and assert the proposition which the speaker asserted. In doing this, we saw. the hearer is defemng to the referential intentions of the speaker. In the example of (16c). it seems possible io maintain that the hearer, B. may also defer to the referential intentions of the speaker. The only reason offered by Soames for thinking that B does not believe or assert a singular proposition is that he is unable to identify the individual to whom A was referring. Because of this, Soames feels it is correct to Say that ( l8a - 19b) are false. He remarks: Since B had no idea who A was talkinp about, B would sincerely deny. when confronted with any man. that he had asserted of that man that A said anything about him. Indeed, it seems likely that B would maintain that there is no particular person about whom he. namely B. had asserted about that man that A said something about him (Soarnes 1994: 162). Similar considerations show, Soames claims, that in believing what A has said. B does not entertain a singular proposition about the person A encountered in his office. Since B cannot identify this penon. he cannot, accordirip to Soames. entertain singular propositions about that person. This argument fails, however, to consider the possibility that the hearer, B. rnay defer to the referential intentions of the speaker. If he does. then there seems no reason to deny that he rnay assert or believe a sinpular proposition about the speaker's intended referent. Sirnilar phenornena occur with speakers' uses of proper names. 1 have tried to show that this kind of deference rnay also occur with speaker's uses of demonstratives. Thus. it seems reasonable to hold that, in the case considered by Soarnes, and oihen like it. the audience rnay go on to report and believe what was said by the speaker. Furthemore, it seems reasonable to hold that in these kind of cases a hearer rnay go on to assert and believe the singular proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance even though he is not in a position to identify the speaker's intended referent. Thus, it seems that the second premise of Soames' argument is incorrect. I want to argue now that the first premise of Soames' argument needs to be arnended to account for cases of utterances in which definite descriptions are used referenriully. In cases like the one which we are considering. a hearer rnay assert and believe the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance, but only if his intentions, in reporting or believing what the speaker said, involve deference to the speaker's rderential intentions. Soames' first premise is correct. but only with certain refinements. A hearer like B. who is unaware of the identity of the speaker's referent, rnay be in a position to assert or believe the content of the speaker's utterance. but on- if he inrends ro be comp&ing with rhe speclkrr's referential in~entions. This feature of referential uses is not unique to these cases. The same requirernent of deference anses in cases where hearen go on to report or believe the content of utterances in which demonstratives or proper names are used. Consider the example of ( 17) which we looked at above. The hearer. B. can. it seems. go on to uner (17b). 1 think that the considerations raised above show that in making this report B may be expressing, in part, the singular proposition about the person to whom A was refemng. What is required. however, is an attitude of compliance with A's referential intentions. B must intend, in making his report, that the demonstrative expression "that man" refen to whomever A intended to refer to. If this condition is met. I see no reason why B cannot correctiy be said to have asserted a singular proposition about in uttering ( 17a). As we saw. this seems to be required if it the third speaker. C. is to make the assertions which he does. Attitudes of deference to speakers' referential intentions are also required in cases involving the use of proper names. The speakers in the exarnple discussed eariier involving the philosopher Avicenna are surely expressing singular propositions about the philosopher. Given their inability to articulate any descnptions which uniquely identify him. they must be defemng to the referential intentions of previous speakers - those from whom they acquired the narne. This fact about refemng expressions seems quite general, and as we have seen. is an inteeml part of what Kaplan cails a "consumerist" mode1 of semantics. There does not appear to be any principled reason. yet, for denying that the same sort of compliance with the referential intentions of previous speaken also occurs in cases involving of use of definite descnptions. Thus. 1 think that Soames' general line of argument against Donnellan's thesis that referential uses of descnptions function as penuine singular terrns is unsuccessful. In the next chapter. 1 will examine the first argument which Soames offers against the strong referential thesis. This is the view that the phenornenon of referential use is best explained by appeal to general, and independently motivated, pra,matic principles. Chapter Ten THE PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION OF REFERENTIAL USE In this chapter 1 want to address the first argument which Soames offers against what 1 have been calling the strong referentid thesis. In the previous chapter we have considered his argument to the effect that definite descnptions used referentially do not function sernantically as penuine singular ternis. I have tned to show that this line of objection should not be seen as providing good reason for rejecting the strong referential thesis. The strong referential thesis provides. 1 believe. the best explanation of how it is that speakers may succeed in communicating singular. object-dependent. propositions when they use definite descnptions referentially. The initial reaction which Soames offen against this thesis is that there is another. perfectly adequate. explanation of this phenomenon. This is the so-called pragmatic attempt to demonstrate how speaken succeed in communicating object-dependent propositions despite the fact that their utterances semantically express only general. object-independent. propositions. Given the availabili ty of non-semantic explanations of referential uses, Soames argues that considerations to do with semantic economy lead to the conclusion that we should prefer the weak to the strong referential thesis. He remarks that. as Saul Kripke has shown. piven a standard quantificational treatrnent of descnptions. we can typicall y explain referential uses of definite descriptions by appealing to that semantics together with independently needed Gricean conversational principles. Thus there is no need to complicate our [semanticJ theory -to accommodate referential uses (Soames 1994: 154). 1 doubt that matters are qui te this simple. Although it seems certain that the kind of Gncean principles which he. and Kripke. have in rnind are independently needed. 1 am not convinced that they succeed in explaining the fact that speaken regularly succeed in communicating derermi~esingular propositions by using descriptions referentially in their utterances. In order to explore this line of objection to the weak referential thesis. 1 will focus my discussion on the pra,matic account of referential uses which Stephen Neale offers in Descriptions. Before tuming to Neale's account. it will be useful to explore the argument which Kripke. in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference". offers against the strong referential thesis. fi)Kripke 's Argument Agaimi the Strong Referenriai îlesis In his paper, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". Saul Knpke has presented powerful reasons for rejecting the thesis that a semantic account of referential uses of descriptions is needed to explain the fact that audiences readily gather from such uses the singular proposition which the speaker intends to comrnunicate. He remarks: although 1 have a considerable interest in the substantive issues raised by ~onnellan'spaper, and by related Iiterature, my own conclusions will bé method~lo~icai,not substantive. 1 cm put the matterthis way: Donnellan's paper clairk to give decisive objections... to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English)... My concern is not so much with the question: is Donnellan right, or 1s Russell ... ? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donnrilun'spnper refute Russell's theory (Kripke 1977: 6)? Knpke concludes that the considerations raised by Donnellan, in "Reference and Definite Descriptions". are not sufficient to refute Russell's theory of descnptions. A central consideration which figures in this conclusion is that, if possible, we should prefer unirq? semantic theones to those. like Donnellan's. that posit semantic amhiguiries. This is w hat Neale. followinp Gnce. calls the "Modified Occam's Razor''. In Chapter Six we saw how Kripke explains the phenornenon of referential use. Recal l that he distinguishes between what he calls "speaker's reference" and "semantic reference". The latter is determined by the linguistic conventions of the speaker's language. He remarks: If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect (given various facts about the world) determine the referent in the idiolect: that 1 cal1 the semunric referenr of the designator (Kripke 1977: 14). The former is determined by a speaker's specific intentions to refer to a given object. He notes that we rnay tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and bel ieves fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator... The speaker's referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator. though it rnay not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect (Kripke 19n: 15). This last fact, that a speaker's specific referentiai intentions rnay diverge from his general referential intentions. is important, according to Kripke. for understanding Donnellan's distinction. He argues that the referential cases anse w hen a speaker believes, mistakenly. that the thing to which he wishes to refer is the proper semantic referent of the designator he uses. Recall that Kripke's hypothesis is that Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction should be generalized in this light. For the speaker, on a given occasion, rnay believe that his specific intention coincides with his general intention for one of two reasons. In one case. (the "simple" case). hts specific intention is simply to refer to the semantic referent .... Alternatively - the "complex" case - he has a specific intention, which is distinct from his general intention, but which he believes. as a matter of fact. to determine the same object as the one determined by his general intention. (For example, he wishes to refer to the man "over there" but believes that he b Jones.) In the "simple" case, the speaker's referent is. by definition. the semantic referent. In the "complex" case. they rnay coincide. if the speaker's belief is correct, but they need not. (The man "over there" rnay be Smith and not Jones.) To anticipate, my hypothesis will be rhat Donnellan's "attributive" use is nothing but the "simple" case. special ized io defini te descriptions. and that the "referential" use is. similarly. the "complex" case. If such a conjecture is correct. it would be wrong to take Donnellan's "referential" use, as he does, to be a use of a description as if it were a proper name. For the distinction of simple and complex cases will apply to proper names just as much as to definite descriptions ( Kripke 1977: 1 5). One thing to note about this account is that it concems only what we have been calling, since Chapter Six. bnproper uses of definite descriptions. Kripke seems to think that the central feature of Donnellan's referential examples is that the speaker uses a description to pick out some object or person which does not satisfy the descriptive content of the expression used. Thus. he feels that the referential cases are instances of what he calls "the complex" case above. As we have seen, many of Donnellan's examples do involve such improper uses of descriptions. However, 1 do not think that this is central to the distinction between referential and attributive uses. As 1 argued in Chapter Seven. goods reasons can be offered in defense of the strong referential thesis which do not appeal to improper cases. A focus only on cases where the speaker's referent does not match the semantic referent of the expression he used is, I have tned to show, a mistake. A description can be used referentially even though the speaker's intended referent is also the unique object or person denoted by the definite description which he uses. Thus. 1 think it is mistaken to claim. as Kripke does, that Donnellan's examples of referential uses can be viewed as a species of what Knpke calls the "complex case." Kripke's central argument against the strong referential thesis does not. however. tum on this last point. He proposes a general test for evaluating arguments which purpon to provide a counterexarnple to standard analyses of linguistic phenomena. Russell. as we have seen. provides a semantic account of how definite descriptions function in English. According to his theory, a speaker who utters a sentence of the fom 'The F is G" semantically expresses a proposition to the effect that there exists exactly one thing which is F. and everything which is F is also G. Thus. according to his theory. utterances of sentences of this form express general propositions. Definite descriptions, it is concluded, are not genuine singular terms. Instead, rhey function semantically as quantifier phrases. Donnellan's referentiallattributive distinction is offered. by Donnellan and others. as evidence for the clairn that Russell*~analysis is not correct for al1 uses of definite descriptions. The phenomena of referential usage is seen as providinp evidence for the conclusion that descriptions function semantically in distinct mannen, depending upon how they are used. Kripke's proposal is that we should assess this claim in the following rnanner. If Donnellan's phenomenon of referential use would occur even in a laquage which is sripulcrred to confom to Russell's theory of descriptions. then the phenomenon of referential use should not be seen as demonstrating the need for a distinct semantic account of how definite description function. He remarks: 1 propose the following test for any dleged counterexample to a linpuistic proposal: If someone alleges that a cehn linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to a piven analysis. consider a hypothetical language which (as much as possible) is like English except that the analysis is stipulated to be correct. Imagine such a hypothetical language iintroduced into a comrnunity and spoken by it. If the phenomenon in question would stilf urise in a community that spke sr~ha hvpothetical lunguugr (which mqv not be English), then the fath& it arises in English cannot disprovr rhe hypothesis rhat the analysis is correctfor Engfish (Kripke 1977: 1 6). This proposa1 seems quite reasonable. If it can be shown that referential uses of description would occur even in a language which is stipulated to be Russellian. regarding definite descriptions, then 1 think there is excellent reason for rejecting the stronp referential thesis in favour of the weak thesis. In order to apply this pmposal for assessing the strong referentiai thesis, Kripke ciaims that we should distinguish three possible variants of English. A weak Russell hguage is one in which there are definite descriptions, but "the truth-conditions of sentences with definite descriptions are sripulazed to coincide with Russell's" (Kripke 1977: In the weak Russell language, descriptions function as designators. thus this language is not yet fully Russeilian. The semantic referent of an utterance of a description will be the unique object which satisfies the descriptive content of the definite description. The truth conditions for this language stipulate that "A sentence of the simple subject- predicatefonn will be true if the predicate is true of the semantic referent of its subject; false if either the subject has no semantic referent or the predicate is not true of the semantic referent of the subject" (Kripke 1Qn: 16). An intermediate Russell lmguugt? diffen from the weak Russell language in the following way. Descriptions. in this language, are not primitive designators or refemng expressions. Instead. sentences contai ning definite descriptions are taken to be abbreviations or paraphrases of their Russellian analyses: for example, "The present King of France is bald means ..."Exactly one penon is at present King of France. and he is bald." or the like. Descriptions are not ternis, and are not assigned reference or meaning in isolation (Kripke 1977: 1 6). Such an intermediate Russell language is. presumably, how English should be understood according to what 1 have been calling the weak referential thesis. Finally, Knpke asks that we imagine a third language. the strong Russell languuge. in which definite descriptions do not occur. Instead. "Russellian paraphrases are used in iheir place" (Kripke 1977: 16). In this language. Instead of saying "Her husband is kind to her." a speaker of this language must say "Exactly one man is mamed to her. and he is kind to her." or even (better), 'There is a unique man who is mamed to her, and every man who is mamed to her is kind to her." or the like. If Russell is right. long- windedness is the on1y defect of these venions (Kripke 1977: 16). Supposing these three stipulated Russell language. Kripke tums to the question. "Would the phenomenon of referential use anse among speakers of these languages?" His answer is that it would. Even in these languages. Kripke argues. the distinction will be drawn between what speaker's intend to be refemng to and what their utterances semantically express. That is. a distinction between speaker's reference and semantic reference will be required in al1 of these languages. Thus, the phenomenon seems to be quite general. and. most importanily. present even in languages in which definite descriptions are stipulated to function semantically as Russell thought they function in English. He remarks that Since the phenomenon Donnellan cites would anse in al1 the Russell languages. if they wrrr spoken. the fact that they do anse in English, as uciuui(v spoken, can be no argument that English is not a Russell language (Kripke 19n: 17). His view seems to be that general. Gricean. principles of conversation will suffice. in the Russell languages to explain how it is that speaker's can succeed in comrnunicating singular propositions about their intended referents when the expressions which they utter semantically express only non-singular. general. propositions. Since the phenomenon of referential usage of definite descriptions would occur even in explicitly Russellian languages. and since general pragmatic principles would be sufficient to account for this, the fact of referential usage does not demonstrate any need to complicate the semantics of English by positing a non-Russellian analysis for some uses of descriptions. He argues that if we can explain referential use by appeal to non-semantic, pragmatic, pnnciples, then we should do so instead of appealing to any semantic arnbiguity in the definite article. "It is," he writes, very much the lazy man's approach in philosophy to posit ambiguities when in trouble. If we face a putative counterexample to our favorite philosophical thesis, it is always open to us to protest that some key term is being used in a special sense, different from its use in the thesis. We rnay be right, but the ease of the move should counsel a policy of caution: Do not posit an ambiguity unless you are really forced to, unless there are really compelling theoretical or intuitive grounds to suppose that an ambiguity is really present (Kripke 19n: 19). This counsel of semantic parsimony is entirely warranted, and, as 1 have tned to indicate, is the central idea behind the pragmatic accounts of the referential/attributivedistinction. Kripke does not explain, in detail, how the Gricean principles which he has in mind would succeed in explaining adequately the fact that speakers often succeed in communicating singular propositions about their intended referents despite the fact that their utterances express only pneral propositions. In Descriptions, Stephen Neale offers a developed account of how pra,matic pnnciples suffice to explain successful communication in the case of referential uses of descriptions. 1 will tum to Neale's account in the next section. (ii) Neafe's Pragmaiic Accounr of Refereniial Uses Stephen Neale argues that Paul Grice's notion of a conversational implicature provides the basis for an explanation of how speakers may succeed in communicating singular propositions by means of uttering sentences of the form 'The F is Go*,despite the fact that their utterances semantically express only general propositions (assuming that there is no referential material contained in the predicate expression). There are, Grice argues, many cases in which speakers may succeed in communicating propositions or information which their utterances do not literally, or semantically, express. A main motivation Grice had in developing this notion was to avoid the positing of distinct semantic analyses of expressions where one, unitary, analysis of the expression in question would be acceptable. To this end. Grice proposed that we analyze the conditions and principles which govem conversation generally. His contention was that many cases where speakers succeed in cornmunicating more than their utterances literally express can be accounted for by appeal to such general principles. In many such cases, a speaker will be violating one or more of what Gnce calls "maxims" which govern conversational exchanges. These violations are usually readily apparent to an audience. On the basis of such transgressions, it is often possible for a hearer to infer what it is that the speaker must have been intending to communicate. Transgressions of these basic conversational maxirns provide, therefore, the basis upon which speakers may succeed in intentionally communicating more than they acnially Say (in a strict sense of "say"). 1t w il 1 be useful to examine this account in sorne detail before turning to Neale's application of i t to the issue of referential uses of defini te descriptions. Grice argues that our conversational exchanges are. in a sense. rule-govemed. Remarks which are not relevant to the main therne(s) of the conversation. for example, are not readi 1y understandable. The general observation w hich he makes is that conversations consist of more that merely disconnected remarks. There are maxims or principles to w hich speakers are expected to confom. Gnce remarks: Our ta1 k exchanges do not normal1y consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are charactenstically. to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them. to some extent. a common purpose or set of purposes. or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start.... or it may evolve dunnp the exchange ...But at each stage. some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable (Grice 1967 26). This view of conversational exchanges leads Gnce to formulate a general principle counseling participants in conversations to cwperafe in such exchanges. He calls this the Cooperative Rinciple. Following Neale, 1'11 abbreviate this as (CP): (CP) Make your conversational contribution such as is required. at the stage at which it occurs. by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchang in which you are engaped (Grice 1%7: 26). Beneath this general principle goveming conversation, Grice lists a senes of maxims to which speakers are expected to conform. Grice collects these particular maxims under four general categories: Quantity. Quality, Relation. and Manner. Under the category of Quantity fall maxims which enjoin speakers to make their contributions "as informative as is required (Grice 1967: 26)- given the purposes of the conversation. The maxims of Quality concem the truth of speakers' contributions, as well as the evidence which they possess for making the assertions that they do. These maxims counsel speakers to make only contnbutions which they believe are true and for which they possess adequate evidence. The category of Relation contains just one maxim: Be relevant. Speakers, accordinp to this maxirn. should keep their conversational contnbutions relevant to the current purposes of the exchange. Under the category of Manner fail maxims which concern "how what is said is to be said" (Grice 1%7: 27). They counsel perspicuity. Speakers should avoid obscurity, ambiguity. prolixity. and should attempt to present their contributions in an orderly manner. While these maxims are. according to Grice. usuaily observed, they are sometimes ir?tenrionuI& flouted. This fact is central to his account of conversational implicatures. Grice argues that, on occasion, a speaker may intentionally violate one or more of these maxims. In these situations, the transgression is usually blatant. The problem. Grice notes. which this poses for an interpreter is to understand how he can reconcile the fact that the speaker has said sornething "unusual". given the context. wiih the assumption that the speaker is abiding by the Cooperative Principle? In such cases, the interpreter is often able to infer what it is that the speaker intends to be communicating. Once it is clear what the rpeaker mant. as opposed to what his utterance semnnricaiiy expressed. it is usually possible to view him as in fact respecting the general (CP). Gnce daims that it is situations like this "that charactenstically give nse to a conversational implicature" (Grice 1%7: 30). A crucial aspect of what Grice calls "conversational implicatures" is that it is possible for an interpreter to "work out" the proposition which the speaker intends to be communicating from the facts surrounding the context of utterance, the utterance itself. and the pneral assumption that the speaker is respecting the (CP). Neale calls this the Justifcürion Requirrmem. The idea is that there must be some means by which the audience can infer the content of what the speaker intended to communicate. Grice writes that: The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively psped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an arpment, the implicature(if present at all) will not count as a conversationai implicature ... To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used. together with the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims: (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledp; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that al1 relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case (Grice 1967: 3 1). Following Grice. Stephen Neale offers the following as a mode! of the kind of inference thai an audience must be able to construct in order to justify the claim that the speaker has conversationally implicated some proposition: (a) S has expressed the proposition thatp. (h) There is no reason to suppose that S is not observing the CP and maxims. (c) S could not be doing this unless he thought that q. (4 S knows (and knows that 1 know that he knows) that 1 can see thai he thinks the supposition that he thinks that q is required. (e) S has done nothing to stop me thinking that q. (f) S intends me to think that, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q. (g) And so. S has implicated that q (Neale 1990: 78). Conversational implicatures must. according to Grice, be justified in some such fashion. It will be useful to see one example of how this is meant to work. I will tum then to a presentation of how Neale applies this account of conversational implicatures to the problem of referential uses of definite descriptions. Grice, in "Logic and Conversation". offen the following as an example of a situation in which a speaker succeeds in conversationally implicatinp something other than what his words semantically express. Suppose that Jones is writing a letter of recomrnendation for Smith, who is one of his students. Smith has. suppose. applied to a graduate program at some other school. Jones' letter reads: "Dear Prof. A, Mr. Smith's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Youn Sincerely. Prof. Jones." Prof. A, upon reading the letter, would surely infer that Jones thinks very little of Smith's abilities as a student. According to Grice, this is not something which his words semantically express. It is. rather. something which Jones succeeds in conversationally implicating. Applying the above-mentioned schema. Rof. A should be able to draw this conclusion as the result of something like the following chain of reasoning: (a) Jones has said that Mr. Smith has a good command of the rules of English and regularly attends tutorials. (b) Since Jones wrote to me, there is no reason to think that he is not observing the (CP) and maxims. (c) The only way to reconcile Jones' letterwith this assumption is that he must really think that Smith is not very talented as a student. (4 Jones knows (and knows that 1 mut see that he knows) that this conclusion is required. te) Jones has done nothing to stop me from thinking that Smith is not very talented as a student. 0 Jones intends me to think that Smith is not very talentedas a studen t. (g) Thus. Jones has implicated that Smith is not very talented as a student. In discussing examples like this, Neale makes an important observation (Neale 1990: 107f. n.23). The schema. by itself. does not provide an explanation of how the audience is to amve at step three. The general problem of how the audience is able to ~~alc~~lurrethe proposition which the speaker conversationally implicates will become very important below. For now, we should note that it is not an obvious matter for an audience to calculatewhat it is. precisely. that the speaker intends to implicate. In this example. there seem to be numerous candidates for what Grice has called the impliccatum. Any one of these would, if taken to be what the speaker intended to communicate, justify the assumption that Jones is actuaily abiding by the (CP) and maxims. despite the oddity, in this context. of his utterance. For example, any of the following seem like reasonable candidates for the implicatum (the proposition conversationally implicated) in this case: ( 1 ) Smith is less than adequate as a student. (2) Smith is one of rhe worsr students Jones has encountered. (3) The person Rof. A is consideting is a poor student. (4) The student whom Prof. A is considering should not be a graduate student. This list could. obviously. be continued at some length. It seems intuitively correct to Say, however. that any one of these propositions would. if Prof. A amved at it in step (c). justify the assumption that Prof. Jones was still respecting the (CP) and associated maxims despite the apparent oddity of his letter. What seems to be correct is that there are numerous propositions which Prof. A mld take to be the implicatum of Jones' letter. While they al1 concem Smith's poor standing as a student, each of these propositions is distinct from the others. It is not cIear how. on Grice's account of conversational implicatures. an audience is supposed to amve at some unique. detexminate proposition as being the proposition which the speaker is conversationally implicating. In his account of conversational implicature, Grice acknowledges that there is some indeterminacy involved in the audience's arriving at the speaker's implicatum. He notes that there will be instances w here there is more than one assumption w hich could be made by the audience regarding the speaker's implicatum. According to Grice. Since, to caiculatea conversational irnplicature is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being observed. and since there may be vanous possible specific explanations. a list of which may be open. the conve~tionalimplicatum in such cases will be disjunction of such specific explanations; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just the kind of indeterminacy that rnany actual implicatado in fact seem to possess (Grice 1967: 390. In the example just considered, this indeterminacy may not be such a worry. It rnight be felt that this is one of those instances in which speakers communicate some, more or less, vague set of propositions, in addition to what their utterances semanûcaily express. If. however, there are cases in which our intuitions suggest strongly that the speaker is communicating some &reminore proposition. and the Gricean strategy cannot explain how this should be, then we will have some reason for thinking that such a strategy is illcuiequare with respect to those sorts of cases. 1 will return to this problem of indeterminacy below. It will be useful now to see how the notion of a conversational implicature is used by Neale to explain how speakers rnay succeed in communicatingsingulrv propositions when they utter expressions in which definite descriptions are used referentially. Consider the following example of a referentiai use. This exarnple is adapted from one provided by Neale (Neale 1990: 85). Suppose Al and Bert are members of the Hat Earth Society. Both know that Harry Smith is the cumnt chair of the Rat Earth Society. and that each knows that the other knows this. Furthemore, each believes. and knows that the other believes. that if Smith is in Toronto next week, there will be a meeting of the nat Earthers. Suppose that Smith informs Al that he will be in Toronto next week. Later Al mns into Bert and. while they are talking about future engagements, he says. (5) The Chair of the Rat Earth Society will be in Toronto next week. In uttering (5). suppose that Al intends to convey to Bert the singular proposition that Hamy Smith will be in Toronto next week. Bert recognizes Al's referential intentions, and thus realizes that AI intends to convey this singular proposition about Smith. According to the weak referential thesis, however. Al's utterance semantically expresses on1 y the general proposition that there exists some unique person who is chair of the Hat Eanh Society and everyone who is chair of the Rat Earth Society will be in Toronto next week. As we have seen, Kripke, Neale, Soames, and other defenders of the weak referential thesis, argue that the Gricean notion of a conversational implicature is sufficient to explain the fact that Al succeeds in conveyinp the singular proposition about Smith despite the fact that his utterance semantically expresses only the general proposition mentioned above. According to this account, something like the following chain of reasoning explains how Bert succeeds. in this situation. in recognizing the singular proposition about Smith which Al intends to cornrnunicate: Al has expressed the proposition that there exists exactly one Chair of the Fiat Earth Society and everyone who is Chair of the Rat Earth Society will be in Toronto next week. There is no reason to suppose that Al is not observing the (CP) and maxi ms. Al could not be doing this unless he thoupht that Harry Smith is coming to Toronto next week. (The assumption that Al is respecting the maxim which counsels speakers to make their conversational contributions relevont suggests that Al must intend to be comrnunicating something other than the ~neralproposition that there exists some unique Chair of the Fiat Earth Society who will be in Toronto next week.) Al knows (and knows that 1 know that he knows) that 1 know that Hamy Smith is the Chair of the Hat Earth Society. and that 1 recognize that the assumption that he thinks that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week is required in order to justify the hypothesis that Al is respecting the (CP) and maxims. AI has done nothing to prevent me thinking that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. Al intends me to think that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. Therefore, Al has impl icated that Hamy Smith will be in Toronto next week. The availabilityof such an account of referential use suggests, to Neale and othen. that positing two semantic analyses of definite descriptions would be a violation of what Grice calls the Modified Occam's Razor. The fact that such a pragmatic explanation is available tells. according to these authors. against the strong referential thesis and in favour of the weak thesis. Neale remarks: We have reached the situation of a stalemate, then, in which we appear to have a perfectl y good explanation of referential uses of definite descriptions that does not appeal to any sort of semantical ambi~ity. The Russellian [what 1 have been calfing the Weak Referential Theonst] and the ambiguity theorist [the Strong Referential Theorist] agree that when a description is used referentially, (one on the proposition(s) rneant is object-dependent: they just provide different explanations of this fact. The referentialist complicates the semantics of "the"; the Russellian appeals to antecedently motivated principles governing the nature of rational discoune and ordinary inference (Neale 1990: 90). This stalemate can be broken. Neale argues. when we recognize the Modified Occam's Razor as a methodological constraint on semantic analyses. He argues that, "'01 methodological grounds. then. if attention is restricted to basic cases1. a unitary Russellian theory seems to be preferable to a theory that posi ts a semantical arnbiguity" (Neale 1990: 91). The methodolo$cal constraint of semantic economy which is encapsulated in the Modified Occam's Razor seems well-motivated. There are, however. other rnethodological constraints relevant to situations in which descriptions are used referentially. 1 will argue below that the notion of not complicating a semantical analysis of a language needs to be balanced apainst the idea that an account of languape should try to hold to a minimum the number of inferences which the Gncean theorist wishes to attribute to audiences. Right now 1 want to focus on a more immediateproblern which faces the sort of Gricean explanations of referential use defended by Neale. This concerns the problem. discussed above. of explaininp how audience are able to calculate the implicatum in step (c) of the inference schema presented above. The problem posed by a speaker who uses a description referentiall y, according to the weak referential theorist, is that i t seems impossible to reconcile the semanticcontent of his utterance with the supposition that he is also respecting the (CP) and associated maxims. The solution. it is suggested, is apparent once we recognize that although the speaker's utterance semantically expresses only a general proposition, he conversationaily implicates a singular proposition about his intended referent. The presence of this implicatumj ustifies the supposition that the speaker is still abiding by these peneral constraints on rational discoune. I A basic case for Neale is a case where the following conditions are met: (a) There is an object h such that S knows that h is uniquely Fr (h) It is h that S wishes to communicate something about; (c) 'The F occurs in an extensional context; (cf) There are no pronouns anaphoric on this occurrence of 'the F (Neale 1990: 65). In the exarnple considered above, Bert, the hearer, is supposed to infer that Al intends him to believe the singular proposition that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. This assumption is not, however, the on& means available to Bert to justify the assumption that AI is respecting the (CP) and maxims. Bert might equally infer, at step (c), that Al believes (6) There will be a meeting of the Rat Earth Society next week, and intends that Bert should corne to believe this also. We seern to have, then, at least two candidates for being the proposition which Al intends to conversationally implicate to Bert in uttering (5). Ben might infer that Al intends to cornmunicate (7) Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week, or (6). Either assumption would j ustify the supposition that Al is abiding by the (CP) and maxims. The problem this poses for the weak referentialist's appeal to Gricean principles of rational discourse is that it seems intuitively right to think that Al, in uttering (5) intends to cornmunicate a deteminare proposition about Smith. Intuitively, it seems Bert will understand Al as having asserted the singular proposition that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. So far. then. the weak referentialist has not offered an explmation of this fact. 1 will cal1 this the Prohlem of Inclererminclq. The Gricean notion of a conversational implicature might explain how speakers who use descriptions referentially succeed in communicating something other than what their utterance semantically expresses. However. and this is the crucial point, it does not, in dl cases, explain how they are able to communicate a derennimie proposition. There are, as we have seen. several ways of reconciling the fact that a speaker has used a description referentially with the supposition that he is abiding by the (CP) and maxims. The vanous candidates for being the speaker's implicatum which an audience mipht entertain at step (c) are not equivalent; they are distinct propositions. The problem is that a speaker, like AI. seems to have communicated a unique, determinate singular proposition. Something like the Problern of Idezrminacy arises with attempts to provide Russellian accounts of incomplete uses of definite descriptions. What Neale calls the Prohlem of lncompleteness has ken noted by many cntics of the weak referential thesis. This is, I believe. one of the most senous problerns facing the Russellian. It will be instructive to examine this problem facing the weak referential thesis. In the next section 1 will present the general problem which incomplete uses pose. It will be useful to see how a version of what 1 have called the Problern of Indeterrni~cyanses in such cases. In section four. 1 will continue my criticismof the pragmatic strategy which we have been considering above. (iii ) nie Pro hkm of Incomplef eness We have had two occasions on which to note the interest of incomplete uses of descnptions to the question of the semantic function of referential uses. In Chapter Six. 1 contrasted the vanety of manners in which descriptions can be used. I noted that there is a temptation to interpret an incomplete use of a description ''The F' as making the same semantic contribution as an utterance of 'That F' would have made in the sarne context. An utterance of, (1) Thetableiscoveredwithbooks would normally be undentood as expressing the same proposition as an utterance. in the same context, of (2) That table is covered with books. In the case of (1). the audience would nomally assume that the speaker intends to be expressing a singular proposition about some table. The fact that utterances of sentences in which the subject expression is an incomplete description are nonnally undentood as expressing singular propositions seems to tell strongly against the weak referential thesis. The normal interpretation of such uses of descnptions seems to suggest that semantically they are functioninp as singular terms. In Chapter Eight, we saw again the importance of incomplete uses for the debate between the weak and the strong referential theses. The issue under consideration was whether speaker reference cm determine the semantic reference of descriptions which are used in the context of anaphoric chains. We saw that there is reason for thinking that in such cases. the descriptions uttered refer to the individuah singled out by refemng expressions which occur earlier in the anaphoric chain. The problem was to explain how such uses refer to some defermime individual when they are incomplete. We saw that when the description fails to denote uniquely. it is very implausible to think that the speaker would expect or intend that his audience should identify the thing to which he is refemng as being whatever the description denotes. In these cases, there is reason to think that audience identifies the referents of such uses of descriptions by appeal to the referential intentions of the speaker. Thus. reason was given for thinking that speaker's reference determines the reference of definite descnptions. 1 want to examine an argument for the strong referential thesis which appeals to the fact that speakers often succeed in expressing deremincile propositions about some object when they use descriptions referentially. This apparent fact poses, according to this line of thinking. important reason for thinking that uses of definite descnptions which are incompletr and refrentwl function semantically as genuine singular terrns. In responding to Russell's views regarding denotinp and definite descriptions. Strawson. in "On Refemng". notes that Russell's account runs into trouble with exarnples where the description used fits many different items. Suppose, for example. that Jones says. ''The table is covered wi th books." It seems intuitively correct to Say that Jones rnay well have succeeded in referring to some particular table, and may have succeeded in saying something true about it. The problem for Russell's account is that it implies that what Jones said, the proposition which his utterance semantically expresses. is false if there exists more than one table. In general, the problem posed by utterances of expressions in which incomplete uses of descriptions occur is that Russell's account clairns they will be false. This appears to run counter to fairly strong semantic intuitions. Stephen Neale presents this problern as follows. If 1 have uttered the sentence. "The table is covered with books", 1 would not normally be undentood as committing myself to the existence of one and only one table. But a naive application of the Theory of Descriptions appears to have precisely this unwelcome consequence. And since there does not seem to be any good reason for doubting that a determinate proposition is expressed by an utterance [of this sentence], prima forie the Russellian is under some obligation to specify its content. By contrast. a theory that postulates a semantically distinct referential interpretationof descriptions seems to provide a natural account of what is going on. ..: the description functions as a refemng expression (Neale 1990 94). The argument against the weak referential thesis seems to be the following: (i) Speakers may express determinate propositions in uttenng sentence of the fom 'The F is G". even when rhere is more thm one thing which is F. (ii) If Russell's Theory of description is correct, then the only proposition expressed by such utterances is the proposition that would huve been expressed, in the same context, by an utterance of "There exists exact1y one F, and everything which is F is G. (iii) Thus, if Russell's account is correct, a speaker who utters a sentence of this form commits himself to the existence of exactly one F. (iv) However. a speaker who utters a sentence of this form would not normal1 y be undentood to have asserted that there exists exactly one F. (v) Therefore, Russell's theory of descnptions seem to be incorrect (at least in so far as we restrict attention to such incomplete uses of definite descriptions). A standard response to this challenge, offered by numerous defenders of Russell's theory of descriptions. involves the assertion that premise (ii) is incorrect. This response denies that a defender of Russell's theory needs to be committed to the claim made in (ii). A Russellian about descriptions could, it is claimed, argue that incomplete uses of definite descnptions are elliptical for complete descriptions. According to this response, the context of utterance provides the missing descriptive content. Thus, in the example discussed above, a Russellian might assert that the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance is the proposition which would have been asserted by an utterance of, "There is exactly one table ovrr rhere. and everything which is a table mer zhere is covered with books." This analysis of descriptions permits the Russellian an account of incomplete uses of descriptions which does not imply that a speaker who uses such a description is asserting that there is exactly one thing in existence which is a table. Thus, it provides a more plausible candidate for being the determinate proposition which the speaker's utterance expresses. Howard Wettstein, in "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Desciptions", argues that there is a serious problem with this response. The objection which Wettstein raises centres on what 1 called the Probfem of Inclrermiinuq. Since this problem also faces the pneral pra=matic strategy of the weak referentialist, it will be useful to explore it in sorne detai 1. Wettstein's central objection to the Russellian's response to the Problem of Incompleteness is that the context of a speaker's utterance is not. ordinarily, going, to be sufficient to determine only one descriptive expansion which compleres the description used by the speaker. Accordinp to Wettstein, the strategy of appealing to the context of utterance to provide the needed descriptive content fails to account for the intuition that the speaker may have expressed some derermimre proposition. His argument is that while appeals to context of utterance may provide reasonable ways of filling out the descriptive content of the speaker's expression. they fail to provide a unique, determinate descriptive content. Thus. the Prohlem of Idettrrrninucy poses. according to Wettstein. a senous objection towards the standard approach to dealing with incomplete uses of definite descriptions. This conclusion. he argues. supports the view that descriptions used referentially function as genuine refemng expressions. Wettstein presents the supposed solution to the Problem of Incompfeteness as fol 1 ows: In support of Russell. it might be argued that while Russell's account does require that there be a uniquely denoting descnption which figures in the speech act, it does not require that the description actually uttered be uniquely denoting. The description, for example, 'the table'. as uttered in a particular context. may be elliptical for a uniquely denoting description, Say 'The (only) table in room 209 of Camden Hall at t, ' (Wettstein 1981: 40). According to this solution. the context in which the speaker makes his utterance provides. somehow, the additional descriptive content. Wettstein argues, plausibly, that this solution, must be rejected. He nrnarks: This defense of Russell, however, will not do. When one says, for example, 'The table is covered with books," the table the speaker has in mind can be more fully described in any number of ways, by the use of any number of nonsynonymous, uniquely denoting descriptions (for exarnple, 'the table in room 209 of Camden Hall at t, ', 'the table at which the author of The fersisrem of Objects is sitting at t, ,* etc.). Since these more complete descnptions are not synonymous, it follows that each time we replace the indefinite definite description 'the table' with a different one of these "Russellian" descriptions, it would seem that we obtain an expression for a differentpropositiorz, one that gets a different analysis via the theory of descriptions... The question now arises, which one of these more complete (or Russellian) descriptions (or conjunction of such descnptions) is tk correctone, the one that actuall y captures what the speaker intended by his use of the indefinite definite description 'the table' (Wettstein 1W 1: 41)? Wettstein's argument here involves an appeal to what 1 have called the Problem of Irdeterminuq. Faced with finding sorne completion for the incomplete descriptive content of the speaker's utterance, the Russellian must decide among nurnerous, nonsynonymous alternatives. The problem seems to be that the speaker's utterance, even when considered in conjunction with contextual features of the situation, fails to determine some unique definite description for which the speaker's actual utterance was elliptical. A possible response which might be made in defense of Russell's analysis is that the intenrions of the speaker will permit us to determine which of these nonsynonymous descriptions is the expression for which his utterance was simply elliptical. This response fails, Wettstein argues. since it will often be the case that the speaker himself will be unable to Say which of the completedescriptions was the one which he had in mind. He remarks: If the speaker is asked which Russellian description(s) was implicit in his utterance of 'the table', he will not ordinarily be able to answer. "Althouph 1 meant to refer to that table," our speaker might well reply, "1 don7 think 1 meant to refer to it m the table in room 209 of Carnden Hall at t, as opposed to. Say, us the table at which the author of 77ze Persistence of Objeczs is sitting at t,. Nor did I intend to refer to it ar the table in room 209 and the table at which the author is sitting as opposed to, Say, just UT the table in room 209 (Wettstein 198 1: 42). 1 think that Wettstein is correct about this matter. Mat this shows is that even when we consider dl of the speaker's actual utterance, the contextual features of the situation. und the intentions of the speaker. we siill lack any means of determining which of the nonsynonymous continuations is the correct one. It seems that the Russellian must either deny that there is some unique. determinate proposition which the speaker's utterance expresses' or he must offer some other analysis of incomplete uses of definite descriptions. Wettstein argues that the fact that even appeals to speakers' intentions need may be insufficient to determine some unique, 'cornplete' descnption implies that the Russellian account must be incorrect. If we cannot. even with the assistance of the speaker, determine the unique correct description, then it seems unlikely that there is some such correct description. He argues that. Surely it is implausible in the extreme to suppose that in fact one of these descnptions captures what the speaker intended but that we cannot. even with the help of the speaker himself, come to know which descnption that is (Wettstein 198 1: 42). At this point, the Problem of Incompieteness becomes more than just a worry for the Russellian. It seems that anyone interested in the semantics of definite descriptions must address the question, "If the Russellian solution does not explain how it is that speakers are able to express dereminare propositions in uttering sentences which contain incornplete descriptions. what alternative explanations are there?" There seems to be something intuitivelyright with the view that speakers in such cases do in fact succeed in expressing determinate propositions. which are not. as a naive application of Russell's theory would impl y. ohvious(v faise. Some account of this phenomenon is needed. Wettstein argues that a plausible answer is provided when we consider the case of utterances involving uses of genuine singular tenns. Suppose, for example, that a speaker points to some table and utten the sentence. William Blackburn considerç this option in "Wettstein On Definite Descriptions". (3) It is covered with books. It seems clear that the speaker, in this case, expresses a unique singular proposition about the table which he has in mind. Furthermore, the audience for such an utterance would surely take the speaker to have asserted this singular proposition. A similar problem to that which we have considered above anses: How is it that the speaker's use of "it" succeeds in refemng to that particular table? The demonstrative pronoun "it" refers to any number of things. What is it about such uses of" it " which explains how they succeed in refemng to some determinate item? Wettstein considers one possible response. One might maintain that the speaker's use of "it", in a particular context. is a surnogare for sorne descriptive characterization of the table in question. If the indexical were a surrogate for, Say, some Russellian description, we would certainly undentand how a complete and determinate proposition gets asserted via an utterance of this sentence. which, from a semantic point of view, seems incomplete (Wettstein 1981: 43). This response. however. is inadequate. The very sarne problem which faced Russellian account of incomplete definite descriptions also tells against such a Russellian account of demonstratives like "it". Wettstein notes that the argument utilized above with regard to definite descriptions like 'the table' applies mutatis mutandis to the case of indexicals. Given some utterance of "It is covered with books," there will be any number of replacements for 'it' and no pood reasons, at least in many cases, to choose one as the correct one (Wettstein 198 1: 43). This argument provides good reason, 1 think. for rejecting the view that dernonstratives are surrogates for definite descriptions. An alternative explanation is that expressions like "that" and "it" succeed in referring to some determinate item because of the speaker's referen~ialinrenrionr. The speaker inrrnclv to refer to some particular item. and this intention determines the referent of the speaker's use of the demonstrative. In these cases, the speaker's reference seems to detemine the semantic reference of the expression. Wettstein argues that the sarne explanation isavailable to account for the fact that speaken rnay use incornpiete definire descriptions to make determinate references to items. On this view, there is not a problem with explaining how it is that speaken who uses expressions of the form 'The F is G", where the description in not tme of some unique thing, rnay succeed in expressing deteminate propositions. Wettstein notes that a speaker may use an indefinite definite description ... to make a &temime reference. indeed, a "demonstrative reference," to some particular thing. We are now in a position to undeaiand how a fully detenninate assertion k made by the uiterance of ['The table is covered with books"]: the proposition is determinate since the speaker makes a dezemtinute refereme and goes on to predicate a property d the thing to which he has kferred (Wettstein 1981: 430. Thus. there seems to be reason for thinking that incomplete uses of definite descriptions may function semantically as genuine singular tems. On Wettstein's account. referential uses of such descriptionsjust are singular terms, and expressions in which they occur express singular, object-dependent, propositions. What 1 have been calling the strong referential thesis seems to have no difficulty in explaining the fact speaken may succeed in expressing determinate propositions by uttering expressions which contain incomplete definite descriptions in subject position. It is important, at this point, to recall that an incomplete use of a definite description need not be accompanied by speaker's reference. As we saw in Chapter Six, there are two kinds of incomplete uses. We have been considering those incomplete uses which are aiso referential. There are, however, incomplete uses which are arzrïhurive. These uses also pose significant problems for the defender of Russell's account of definite descriptions. Suppose. for example. that a speaker, upon seeinp the brutatly murdered body of Smith. announces that, (4) The murderer is insane. Imagine that his utterance of "the murderef' is not accompanied by speaker reference. Thus. his use of the description is attributive. Applying Russell's theory to this case suggests that the proposition expressed by the speaker is logically equivalent to the proposition which would have been expressed, in the sarne context, by an utterance of (5) There exists exactly one murderer, and everyone who is a murderer is insane. This result seems, intuitively, to be incorrect. Even though the description "the rnurderer9* is used attributively, we do not want to Say that the speaker, in making his utterance, commits himself to the existence of exactly one murderer. The problem, therefore, seems to be similar to that which arose for uses of descriptions which are both incomplete and referential: The speaker seems to have expressed some determinate proposition. but Russell's theory does not provide us with a plausible account of this proposition. Wettstein notes that the solution which he proposed regarding uses which are incomplete and referential will not serve for these attributive uses. He argues that. The "demonstrative" analysis just given to cases of referential use is surely not applicable to cases of attributive use. Although we can speak of a "referent" even in attributive cases, that is, the "semantic referent" (that person who in fact rnurdered Smith), the semantic referent is surely not demonstrated by the speaker's attributive use of the description. What is asserted by an attributive utterance is not anything Iike "niat one. Jones. is insane" but is rather like "One and only one penon murdered Smith and hefshe is insane" ...There is therefore an important sense in which the truth or fdsity of his proposition, unlike that of the referential case, does not depend upon Jones and his properties (Wettstein 1981 : 45). In addition. there are. Wettstein argues, serious problems with the proposa1 that by attending to the contextual features of the utterance we cm provide a complete definite description for which the speaker's description is merely elliptical. He notes that the same argument which he raised againsi Russellian attempts of this kind to account for uses which are referential and incomplete applies mutatis mutandis to these attributive cases. In the exarnple we are considering, there will be any number of ways to fiIl out the description so as to yield a RusseIlian description (e.3 'Harry Smith's murderer', 'the murderer of Joan Smith's husband', 'the murderer of the junior Senator from New Jersey in 197S1),and, in many cases, nothing about the circumstances of utterance or the intentions of the speaker which would indicate that any one of these descriptions is the correct one (Wettstein 1981: 45). Thus, neither Wettstein's strategy for dealing with referentiai and incomplete uses nor the traditionai Russeliian strategy for dealing with incomplete uses pnerally seems to provide us with an acceptable account of cases in which the speaker seems to have expressed some &enninute proposition, but his use of a definite descriptions is both incornplere and Wettstein's solution is that with these cases, the context of utterance does provide the needed complete description. This completed description will not be simply descriptive. but will contain referentiulnt~~~enaf.In the case of (4). the speaker's utterance is completed. not by some further descriprions which denote uniquely the murderer. but by an irnplicit reference to Smirh. Thus, the speaker, in using the description "the murderer*' in his utterance of (4) is also refemng to the individual who was murdered. Wettstein argues that in uttering 'The murderer is insane" in the presence of the mutilated body, the speaker relies on the context to reveal whose murderer is in question. The speaker. that is, makes an implicit reference to the victim (Wettstein 1981: 47). The speaker, in the case of (4). is expressing the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance. in the same context. of (6) There exists exactly one murderer of rhot mnn (Smith), and whoever murdered him is insane. This provides. Wettstein argues, an adequate explanation of the fact that the speaker seems to be expressing a determinate proposition in his utterance of (4). even though the use of the description "the murderei' is incomplete and attn butive. At this point it will be useful to summarize Wettstein's argument. The problem posed by incornpiete uses of definite descriptions is that we want to Say that the speaker may have expressed some unique, deteminate proposition, but also that the account provided by what Neale calls a "naive" application of Russell's theory does not provide a likely candidate for being the deteminate proposition expressed. The problem is to explain how the speaker succeeds in expressing this deteminate proposition. Wettstein notes that there are reaily rwo problems here since speakers may use incomplete descriptions referentially or attributively. In each case, a determinate proposition seems to be expressed. Wettstein considers the Russellian strategy which views incomplete descnptions as being ellipfical for complete descriptions. These complete descriptions are. according to this strategy, recoverable when we attend to the contextual features of the speaker's utterance, perhaps in conjunction with the intention of the speaker. Wettstein argues that this strategy will not work for eifher the referential or attributive uses of incomplete descriptions. The central difficulty is that the contextual features, even when considered in conjunction with the speaker's intentions, are insufficient to determine some unique completed description. Context will provide numemus nonsynonymous complete descriptions. Since there is no pnncipled way to choose among these various candidates. there is. Wettstein argues, no sense to the notion that exactly one of them ir the correct complete description. What 1 have called the Problem of Inderemi~cy poses. according to Wettstein. good reason for rejecting this Russellian approach to dealing wiih incomplete uses of descriptions. Wettstein's solution to the problem posed by incomplete and referential uses of descnptions is that. in these case. descriptions function semantically as singukur rrrrns. Their reference is determined by the referential intentions of the speaker. The propositions expressed by utterances of expressions like (4) are singular. object-dependent. when the description is used referentially. The pmblem posed by incomplete attributive uses requires, Wettstein argues, a different solution. Speakers do not. in these cases. make any demonstrative reference to the item which fits the definite description used. They do, however. make a demonstrative reference to orher objects. This demonstrative reference serves to complete the description used. Thus. in the case of the attributive use of "the murderer" in (4), the speaker Nnplicitfy refers to the person. Smith. who was murdered. This provides, he argues. an explanation of how the speaker succeeds in expressing a unique. determinate proposition in this case. Stephen Neale, in Descriptions. pmvides several objections to Wettstein's argument. He notes. to begin with, that Wettstein is simply incorrect to claim that the Russellian cannot pmvide an adequate explanation of cases in which uses of descriptions are both incornpiete and arnibutive. Recall that Wettstein proposes (6) as the completed description for the speaker's attributive use of "the murderei' in (4). Neale observes, correctly. 1 think, that this strategy is perfectly consistent with the general Russellian approach to incomplete descriptions. The Russellian, Neale argues, may claim that the incomplete description is elliptical for some expression which contains referential material. There is no constraint on the kind of material to which the Russellian may appeal in providing the required complete description (Neale 1990: 100). Thus. he thinks that the solution to the problem of incompleteattributive uses which Wettstein offen is one which a Russellian could accept. Neale argues that this last fact provides the resources for a Russellian solution to the problem of incomplete referentid uses of definite descriptions. He remarks: There is no reason, of course, why descnptions used referentially should not also be completed usinp referential matenal, thus avoiding the problem raised by nonequivalent codenoting descnptions ...Wettstein's own Iist of complete descnptions for which 'the table' might be viewed as elliptical includes only sentences containing descriptions completed with additional descriptive material ('the table in room 209 of Carnden Hall at t, '. 'the table at which the author of The Persistence of Objects is sitting at t, '. and so on). This is the weak point in his discussion. The semanticist who regards (uttetances on incomplete quantifien -- including incomplete descriptions -- as elliptical for complete quantifiers is under no obligation to treat the elliptical material as free of referring expressions and indexicals (Neale 1990: 101). Thus, if Neale is correct. the Russellian has the resources to provide perfectly adequate solutions to the problems of incompleteness which anse with both attributive and referential uses of incomplete descriptions. In the case of the referential use of the descnption "the murderer*' in (4), the Russellian may argue that contextual features do provide a unique completion for the description used. The speaker. in this case. is expressing the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance of (6). This provides an explanation of the fact that the speaker succeeds in expressing a determinate proposition which does not commit the speaker to the unreasonable belief that there exists exactly one murderer. 1 think that there is a serious problem with Neale's argument. Marga Reimer. in "lncomplete Descriptions". has argued persuasively. 1 believe. for the conclusion that Neale's proposa1 does not really provide a solution to the problem of incomplete uses of definite descriptions. It will be useful to consider. briefly. her argument. The central problem she identifies with the Russellian solution which Neale offers is that it does not adequately explain how speakers who use incomplete descriptions in their utterances succeed in expressing determirmie propositions. Thus, if she is right. the solution Neale offen does not provide a solution to the Problem of Indeterminucy as it arises when one considers cases of incomplete uses of descriptions -- that is, the problem of explaining how speakers who use incomplete descriptions referentially or attributively succeed in expressing unique, determinate proposi tions. Reimer argues that a serious problem with Neale's account is that it simply will not do the job that it is designed to do. For it is not difficult to see that. even if completions of incomplete descriptions are stipulated to be non-descriptive, the problem of adjudicating between non- equivalent. CO-denoting descriptions remains. To see this. consider a Donnellian courtroom scenario involving Jones - on trial for the murder of Smith. Suppose further that Jones is in fact guilty as charged. And finally . suppose that someone in the courtroom, observinp Jones' outrageous behaviour in the witness stand. cornes out with an utterance of 'The murderer is insane." Resumably, a deteminate proposition has been expressed. The difficulty is that there are at least two ways of completing the description with purely referential or indexical material - both of which yield descriptions which denote what is intuitively the denotation of the description, and neither of which seems any more plausible than the other. There is: "the murderer of Smith." where the referential expression picks out Smith. and there is: "the murderer over there," where the indexical expression picks out the location of Jones (Reimer 1992: 353 ). As Reimer notes. these plausible completions are mt equivalent. The proposition expressed by an utterance of 'The murderer of Smith is insane" is not. according to the Russellian account of descnptions. the same as the proposition expressed. in the same context, by an utterance of 'The murderer over there is insane." If the Russellian account is correct, the first utterance expresses the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance, in the sarne context, of "There exists exactly one murderer of Smith. and everyone who murdered Smith is insane." The second utterance, according to the Russeliian, expresses the proposition which would have been expressed by an utterance. in the sarne context, of ''There exists exactly one murderer over there, and everyone w ho i s a murderer over there is insane." To see that these are distinct propositions, consider their truth-value in counterfactual circumstances. Suppose a circurnstance in which Smith does not exist (and hence has not been murdered). It seems clear that in such a counterfactual situation. the second proposition might well be true, but the fint false. Thus. these two propositions are not logicaily equivalent. Reimer's conclusion, therefore, seems to be correct. Appealing to additional referential matenal in order to deal with the Prohlem of fndetermimc-y. as it arises with incomplete uses of definitedescriptions, does not solve the problem. Thus. the problem =mains, even on Neale's modified account of the Russellian strategy. of choosing between non-equivalent expressions to complete the description which the speaker actually uttered. Once again, appeals to contextual features of the situation. even when considered in conjunction with the speaker's intentions. may fail to help us choose between these. Repeating Wettstein's point, if there is, in pnnciple, no way to choose between these nonsynonyrnous completions. even with the help of the speaker. then there seems to be little sense in saying that just one of them is fhe correct completion. What this shows. 1 think. is that Neale's account fails to provide a solution to the problem of indeterminacy. In fact. the possibility of appealing to referential material in order to provide a needed completion only makes the problem more difficult. If he wishes to provide an account of incomplete uses that appeals to further expressions for which the description used by the speaker is elliptical, the Russellian rnust now choose from an even bger class of CO-denoting,nonsynonymous expressions. As Wettstein emphasizes. in many cases there rnay simply be no principled way of choosing among them. The considerations raised by Reimer also provide reason for rejecting Wettstein's account of incomp1ete attributive uses of descriptions. This problem was noted originally, I believe, by William Blackbum. in "Wettstein On Definite Descriptions*'. Blackburn considen an attributive use of the description "the man drinking a martini" in a speaker's utterance of 'The man drinking a rnartini, whoever he is, is breaking the niles of our club". Since the speaker's use of the description is incornplete and attributive, Wettstein's solution to the problem of incomplete attributive uses should explain how it is that he succeeds in expressing a determinate proposition. As we saw, this solution would appeal to some implicit reference made by the speaker. There are, however, several ways in which this might occur, and no principled means of choosing among them. Blackbum remarks: If Wettstein's account is correct, the speaker makes an implicit reference to some object. But which? The speaker may be unable to Say whether he rneans "the man nt this merring who is drinking a martini" or "the man in our club who is drinkinp a rnartini". or "the man in rhis house who is drinking a martini". Thus there is no more reason to Say that there must be a unique implicit reference than that the context always determines a unique complete description (Blackbum 1988: 276). Thus. it seems likely that Wettstein's account of such incomplete attributive uses fails. We have considered two stratepies for dealing with the problem of incomplete uses of definite descriptions. The first is defended by Wettstein. He proposes that uses which are incomplete and referential are best accounted for by the view that the definite descriptions uttered function as genuine singular terms. With incomplete and attributive uses, he argues that it is possible to recover, from the context of utterance. some unique cornpletion for the incomplete description used. His idea was that, in these cases, the speaker does make an implicitdemonstrative reference. The reference in question is not to the thing which his description is meant to pick out, but rather to oiher objects. As we saw. this allows us the option of using referential material to provide a unique completion for the incomplete description which was used. The second strategy is that proposed by Neale. He argues that the Russellian cm appeal to just the sort of referential material to which Wettstein has drawn our attention. This provides the Russellian with explanations of how speakers may succeed in expressing determinate propositions even though their use of descriptions is incomplete. Reimer's important observation is that the problem of indetemùnacy persists rvrn when wr inrroducerefereniid merid in order to provide completions for incomplete uses of descriptions. 1 think that we can draw the following conclusions from Reimer's argument: (i) Neale's strategy does not explain eirher referential or attributive uses of incomplete descriptions. Appealing to what Neale cails "referential material" only rnakes the problem of choosing the correct completion more intractable. (ii) Wettstein's account of incomplete attributive does not succeed. His account of incomplete referential uses. however. seems to be untouched by Reimer's argument. According to this account, the problem of choosing between nonsynonymous but CO-denoting descriptions does not anse in the case of referential uses. These uses of descriptions, Wettstein argues, function semantically as singular terms. His account is a version of what 1 have been calling the strong rrferenfid thesis. On Wettstein's account. the reference of a referential use of an incomplete description is not deterrnined by any descriptive content. This provides us with a further reason to prefer the strong referential thesis to the weak referentiai thesis which is defended by the Russellian. The stronp referential thesis provides an answer to one of the pmblems raised by incompiete uses of descriptions. The weak referential thesis. however, provides an answer to neitkr of these problems. This fact seems to sugpest that the stronp thesis should be adopted. A response which might be made, at this stage. is to reject the hypothesis that speakers who use incornplete descriptions express de~e~natepropositions. The main difficulty facing the Russellian has ken the pmblem of explaininp how speakers' utterances of expressions containing such descriptions succeed in expressing a single. determinate proposition. The thrust of Wettstein's challenge is that there is no pnncipled way for the Russellian to recover such a unique proposition from the context of utterance. even if the intentions of the speaker are considered. Reimer has argued that appealing to non-descriptive. referential material does not solve this problem: if anything, it makes the pmblem worse (Reimer 1992: 353). This might lead one to question the basic assumption which seems to generate the problem. William Blackburn, in "Wettstein On Definite Descriptions", proposes an alternative to the traditional Russellian strategy for solving the problem of incompleteness. Instead of looking to the context for additional matenal which will complete the description achrally uttered. the Russellian might simpl y daim that in such cases. the speaker's utterance does not express one determinate proposition. In such cases the speaker's utterance expresses a of propositions. Blackburn remarks: let us consider a rnodifed traditionolaccou~along the following lines: if a speaker uses an incomplete definite description "the F* (and if the simple traditional account does not apply to his use of the description) there is no single proposition which he expresses. Rather, there is some more or less vague chof propositions, each deterrnined by some expansion of the description - "The F that is H",'The F that is K.and so on ...According to the modified version of the traditional account. when the speaker says 'The F is G" he asserts the truth of the propositions in the resulting class (or, perhaps. of some weighted majorityof these) (Blackburn 1988: 271). As Blackburn notes. this account woufd allow a Russellian to solve the problem of incompleteness while avoiding the conclusion. favoured by Wettstein, that incomplete descriptions which are used referentially are genuine singular terms. There are. however, important objections to such a proposal. It seems contrary to our semantic intuitions to suggest that such utterances do not express deteminate propositions. An audience for such a use of a description would likely have no trouble understanding the proposition which the speaker wants to communicate. As 1 mentioned earlier, i t seems that the normal undentanding of such a use of a description 'The F' would view its semantic contribution as being the same as that of an utterance, in the same context, of "That F'. With respect to an utterance of 'That F is G", i t would seem very implausible to maintain that the speaker does not express a determinate proposition. This intuition can, 1 think, be supported. Consider the following example due to Howard wettstein:' Suppose a speaker utters ( 1) The table is covered with books intendinp to dernonstrate a particular table to his audience. The table is in full view of both. Imagine that the hearer is somewhat confused and does not recognize the table in question. Suppose that the speaker tries to make himself clearer by including more information in the descnption he uses. For example, he utters (7) The brown table is covered with books, (8) The brown wulnuf table is covered with books. As Wettstein notes, he rnay eventually add enough information so that his description is uniquely denotinp. Since his sole interest is identifying for the Iistener the table he means, the speaker may very well not realize that the last description uniquely denotes, nor will he intend it to be taken in any radical1y different fashion than the earlier description (Wettstein 198 1: 49). There is, then, a continuum of utterances which the speaker has made, the last of which contains, unbeknownst to him, a definite description which uniquely denotes. The earlierdescriptions are incomplete. According to the proposal we are considering, none of these utterances expresses a determinate proposition. Instead. each expresses some more or less vague class of propositions. The last utterance, however, does. according to this modified version of the Russellian approach. express a determinate proposition. After all, this is what I have been calling a cornplete use of a definite descnption. The unrnodified Russellian theory of descriptions will analyze the proposition expressed by the last utterance in the standard fashion. This is a version of an argument presented by Wettstein in "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions". His argument is meant to provide reason for thinking that even complete description are singular ternis when they are used referentially. He does not address the issue which we are considenng now. The argument which he offers can, This conclusion seems highly counter-intuitive. As Wettstein notes. 'The last description is. at least from the point of view of the speaker, indistinguishable from the earlier ones (except for the addition of one further bit of information)" (Wettstein 1981: 49). The speaker's intentions are the same throughout. He wants to express exactly the same thing in each of his utterances. The added information is simply meant to assist his confused interlocutor. He would Iikely find it very odd to leam that his earlier utterances did not express any determinate proposition. but his last one did. This provides some reason. then. for rejecting the modified Russellian account. As we have seen. the problem of understanding how speakers express unique. determinant propositions becomes pressing when we consider examples in which they utter expressions containing incomplete descriptions. The Problern of Indetenninoq. I have argued provides some reason for rejecting the weak referentialist's explanations of incornpiete uses. In the next section I will return to the argument which we were considering before we exarnined the issue of incornplete uses. As 1 argued. 1 think that the general problem of indeterrninacy provides compelling reasons for rejecting the prag~ic strriteg-v of explaining how speakers who use descriptions referentially succeed in communicating singular propositions. even though thei r utterances semanticall y express only general propositions. My defense of the strong referential thesis will be complete when 1 have outlined my reasons for rejecting the pra,gnatic straiegy. As we saw in section (ii) of this chapter, a centrai component to Grice's idea of conversational implicatures is that it must be possible for the audience to "work out" the implicatum which the speaker intends to be comrnunicating. This implicatum. recall, is not however. be adapted to provide reason for rejecting the Modified Traditional Account which Blackburn discusses. semantically expressed by the sentence@)he utten. Instead, the implicatum is something which the audience is able to infer from what the speaker actually said, features of the context of utterance. and the hypothesis that the speaker is still observing the (CP) and maxims. The implicatum, according to Grice, is the proposition which we need to assume that the speaker believes, and intends to cornmunicate, if we are to reconcile (a) the fact that the content of his utterance. what he acruaify says, violates one or more of the maxirns governing rational discourse with (b) the assumption that he intends. nonetheless. io be observing the (CP) and maxims. As we saw, Grice notes that, in some cases, there will not be one unique implicatum. Often it will be the case that there is a class of distinct but related implicata, any of which would sufice to explain how it is that the speaker still intends to be observing the (CP) and maxims. Wilson and Sperber, in "lnference and Implicature", note that there is a wide range of cases to be considered when we are concemed with the conversational implicatures made by speakers. In some cases, there rnay be a unique proposition which is, cfew[v. the on1 y candidate available as to w hat the speaker is intending to communicate. In some cases, the implicature may consist of a large set of distinct propositions. What 1 want to develop in this last section, is an account of the Prohlem of Ideferminaq for the pqmatic exphnation of referential usage. This problem. 1 believe, has not received sufficient attention. It is, in fact, just the same problem which faces Russellian accounts of incomplete descriptions. Again. this is someihing which. I thi nk. has not received enough attention. Consider, for example, Kripke's view of the referentiallattributive distinction. He argues that the availability of pragmatic explanations of how speakers are able to cornmunicate singular propositions when their utterances semantically express only general propositions is good reason for rejecting the view that referential uses of descriptions function sernanticallyas singular tenns. As we have seen, this is the central thesis defended in "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". He also notes, however, that the problem of incomplete descriptions probably provides reason for rejecting the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. He remarks: if I were asked to take a tentative stab about Russell, I would Say that although his theory does a far betterjob of handling ordinary discourse than many have thought, and although many popular arguments against it are inconclusive, probably it ultimately fails. The considerations 1 have in rnind have to do with the existence of "improper" definite descriptions. such as "the table," where uniquely specifying conditions are not contained in the description itself. Contrary to the Russellian picture, 1 doubt that such descriptions can always be regarded as elliptical with some uniquely specifying condition added (Kripke 1977: 6). This is not, to be sure, a point on which he puts much emphasis. It is, nonetheless, interesting that Knpke would recognize the significance of the Problem of Indefermi~c;~ for Russell's theory, in so far as we consider incomplete descriptions, but fail to reco,pize the significance of the same problem for the traditional pragmatic strategies of explaining referential use. If 1 am right, the problem confronting such Gricean approaches to the referentiallattributive distinction is just the sarne as the problem confronting incomplete uses. Consider, again, the inference scherna which, according to Grice. would explain how audiences are able to "work out" the proposition which the speaker means to conversationally irnplicate: (a) S has expressed the proposition that p. (h) There is no reason to suppose that S is not observing the CP and maxims. (c) S could not be doing this unless he thought that q. (4 S knows (and knows that 1 know that he knows) that 1 can see that he thinks the supposition that he thinks that q is required. (e) S has done nothing to stop me thinking that q. 0 S intends me to thnk that, or is at Ieast willing to allow me to think. that q. (g) And so. S has implicated that q (Neale 1990: 78). As Wilson and Sperber note, "lt is unclear what sort of argument this is rneant to be: it is not even clear which of [(a)to (g)] are meant to be prernises and which conclusions" (Wilson and Sperber 1986: 378). It is clear, however, that step (c) does not follow deductively from (a) and (h). Indeed, it could not follow deductively from the earlier steps. According to Grice, "the tmth of a conversational implicature is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be tme- what is implicated may be false)" (Grice 1%7: 39). What Neale calls the requirement of cancellability is "a necessary condition for an implication to count as a conve~tionalimplicature" (Neale 1990: 77). It must be possible to explicitly ccuacel an implicature without any contradiction. For example. in the case involving a letter of recommendation, discussed earlier. the professor writing the letter might have continued with "ln addition. he is the brightest student 1 have ever had." Although this would be odd. there would be no contradiction in doing so. For Grice, an implicature counts as a conve~tionalimplicature only if it is not part of the meaning. and is no! logically entailedby. what the speaker actually said (Neale 1990: 77f). A crucial question facing such pra,patic accounts is, therefore. to explain how audiences are able to calculate the speaker's impiicatum in step (c). According to Wilson and Sperber. "An adequate pra,omatic theory should...p rovide scrne method of deriving not (g) but (c)" (Wilson and Sperber 1986: 378). 1 think that this is correct. and that it poses a senous problem for the weak referentialist's strategy of providing a pragmatic explanation of referential use. What this account needs to provide is some method by which audiences are able to derive the determinate singular propositions which speakers implicate when they use descriptions referentially in uttenng some larpr expression. My argument will be that. in many cases. no such account is possible. These pragmatic strategies, 1 will argue. can explain. at best. how audiences are able to infer some more or less vague ciuss of propositions which the speakers intend to communicate. 1 will argue that the Prohlem of indererrni~cypresents an important objection to the weak referentialist's thesis. Consider again Neale's example concerning a speaker's utterance of, (5) The Chair of the Hat Earth Society will be in Toronto next week. The weak and strong referentialists agree on what it is that the speaker has succeeded in conununicating in uttering (5). Both will acknowledge that he communicated a singular proposition about Smith: that is. that Smith will be in Toronto next week. An explanation of this fact seems to be required. Each has an explanation to offer. The strong referentialist. like Domeilan or Wettstein, offers a very simple explanation. That the speaker communicates the singular proposition about Smith is explained because his use of the description "the Chair of the Hat Earth Society" functions semantically, in his utterance, as a genuine singular terrn. The weak referentialist 's explanation is more complicated. The speaker's utterance, according to this view, semanticallyexpresses only a general proposition to the effect that there exists some unique Chair of the Hat Earth Society, and everyone who is Chair of this society is in Toronto. However, since the speaker was presumably intending to make his conversational contribution relevant, he must have meant to communicate something else. As we saw. the weak referentialist, like Neale. appeals to the following chain of inference to explain how the audience is able to figure out what it is that the speaker meant to comrnunicate: Al has expressed the proposition that there exists exactly one Chair of the Fiat Earth Society and everyone who is Chair of the Fiat Earth Society wili be in Toronto next week. There is no reason to suppose that Al is not observing the (CP) and maxims, AI could not be doing this unless he thought that Harry Smith is coming to Toronto next week. (The assumption that Al is respecting the maxim which counsels speakers to make their conversational contributions relevm suggests that Al must intend to be cornrnunicating something other than the general proposition that there exists some unique Chair of the Rat Earth Society who will be in Toronto next week.) AI knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I know that Harry Smith is the Chair of the Flat Earth Society. and that 1 recognize that the assumption that he thinks that Hany Smith will be in Toronto next week is required in order to justify the hypothesis that Al is respecting the (CP) and maxims. Al has done nothing to prevent me thinking that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. Al intends me to think that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. Therefore, Al has implicated that Harry Smith will be in Toronto next week. As we saw. this account needs to be developed. The third step in the above "argument" is not the onfy plausible one. The audience might equally infer that (6) is what the speaker meant to conversationally implicate. (6) There will be a meeting of the Flat Earth Society next week. Neither, in the situation we are considering seems to be more salietu or relrvm than the other. Each of these would, if taken to be what the speaker meant to communicate, justify the assumption that he is observing the (CP)and maxims. The weak referentialist's account must, it seems, provide some expianation of how the audience divines that the speaker intends to communicate the determinate singular proposition about Smith. As we saw, this is the Problem of Indetennimzq in so far as it faces the prapatic strategy which we are considering. This phenornenon of indeterminacy is quite general. Many of the examples discussed by Donnellan and others will exhibit this feature. Consider DomeIlan's courtroom example. Suppose that A and B observe Jones's highly erratic behaviour in the dock. Imagine that he appears likely to become violent. Suppose A says, 'The murderer is insane." B would understand from this utterance that A believes that Jones, the man in the dock, is insane. He would understand that A intends to be communicating that singular proposition about Jones. According to the weak referentialist's account, B will Nfer that this is what A meant to conversationally implicate, but will recognize that this is not what A's utterance semantically expresses. However, the singular proposition about Jones is not the only proposition which B might arrive at in interpreting what it is thatA means to be implicating. He might, at step three in the Gncean inference schema, infer that A intends to communicate the proposition that Jones must be guilty. or that the two of them should quickly leave the courtroom, and so on. B will have, then several possible ways in which to reconstruct how it is that A is actually observing the (CP) and maxims, despite the apparent irrelevance of what he actually said. These two examples illustrate the general problem of indeterminacy facing the pragmatic account. For many cases in which definite descriptions are used referentially. there will be a class of propositions, any member of which would, if taken to be the speaker's implicatum. warrant the hypothesis that he is still observing the (CP) and maxims. Since the weak referentialist is arguinp that speakers, in such cases, conversationally implicate unique singuiar propositions about their intended referents. some explanation is needed of how this occurs. A response that might be made is that, in these examples, there is a way to choose arnong the several candidates for being the speaker's implicatum. It might be argued that expressions of the form 'The F' are conventionulfy used by speaken to indicate to their audiences that they intend to express some singular proposition about some object. Audiences, aware of this fact about the conventional force of defini te description. thus have some pnncipled basis for choosing arnong the possible implicata. According to this response. there is no serious problem of indeterminacy facing pra=gnatic explanation s of referential use. A speaker's use of a description 'The F' in the context of an utterance of the form 'The F is G". is, it might be argued, conventionclllv taken to be a signal that the speaker wants to communicatea singular proposition about some object. Therefore. in the sort of examples which we have been considering, the audiences do not really face any difficulty in amving at a determinate singular proposition at step three of the Gncean inference schema. Given the above convention conceming the use of the definite article. a singular proposition about the speaker's intended referent will seem more relevant or salient than will any of the other possible candidates which we have been considering. 1 think that this response faces at least two objections. First. if there is such a convention conceming the use of definite descnptions, as 1 think there is. then this would seem to provide prima fuie evidence in favour of the stronp referential thesis. If definite descriptions are conventionally understood in this fashion. then it seems reasonable to think that this should be reflected in any sernantic analysis of descnptions. Second. and perhaps more important. if there is such a convention poverninp the use of the definite article. then it seems that Grice's notion of a conversational impiicanire would not be applicable to cases of referential use. In developing his account of conversational implicatures. Gnce is careful to distinguish two manners in which speaken may succeed in comrnunicating more than their utterances actuaily express sernantically: They may do this by means of convenrioml or convrrsafional irnplicatrires. We have been considenng the case of conversational irnplicatures. These, as we have seen, involve cases where speakers appear to be blatantly transgressing certain of the maxims which, Gnce argues. govem rational discourse. Such implicatures are highly context-dependent and, most imponantly. do not arise because of the conventional force of the expressions used. Conversational implicatures are not conveyed by the conventional meaning of the expressions used. As Gnce notes, "the implicature is not camed by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by putting it that way" (Grice 1%7: 39). lnstead, it is the fact that the conventional meaning of the expression seems odd. given the context of the speaker's utterance, that generates the search for some conversationai implicature. Attnbuting to the speaker the intention to be communicating the conversational implicature is the means by which the audience is able to reconcile the blatant transgression of some of the maxims governing rational conversation with the hypothesis that the speaker is not opting out of the general Cooperative Rinciple. Conventional implicatures, according to Grice. are tied to the conventional meaning of the speaker's utterance. As Neale notes. "Unlike conversational implicatures. conven tional im plicatures ari se regwdZess of conrrrr and me (ur Irmt in pan) ntnibuiuhle io 1inLquistic~*onvrnrion"(Neale 1990: 107, 11-20. The emphasis is mine.). It will be useful to consider one of Grice's examples of a conventional implicature. He remarks: In some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated. besides helping to determine what is said. If 1 Say (smugly). He is un Englishman; he i~.therefore. brave, 1 have cettainly cornmitted myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words. to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows frorn) his being an Englishman. But while 1 have said that he is an Englishman. and said that he is brave, I do not want to Say that I have suid (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though 1 have certainl y indicated. and so irnplicated. that this is so. 1 do not want to Say that my utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking. false should the consequence in question fail to hold. So some implicatures are conventional ...( Grice 1967: 25f). Whether one agrees wi th Gnce's analysis of this particular example. i t does seem plausi bie to Say that certain implicatures might be bom. in pan. by the actual words used by the speaker. The central point which 1 want to emphasize is that conventional implicatures do, as Neale observes, seem to be independent of context. If. for example. Grice is correct about the case of "therefore." the irnplicature would seem to be one that is ulwuys bom by a speaker's use of expressions of the fonn "ptherefore q". If Grice is correct. audiences would normally infer that when a speaker has uttered such an expression, he means to be indicating or implicating that he believes that such and such a consequence holds, even though this may not be what he has actually said in making the utterance he did. The devance of this to the question of referential uses of descriptions should be apparent. It is sirnply not tme that speakers always intend to be communicating singular propositions when they utter expression of the form 'The F is G". Nor do they always expect to be undentood this way. Similarly, audiences, do not always infer from such utterances that the speaker must be intending to cornmunicate some singular proposition. As we have observed, there seems to be very compelling evidence for the view that there are two distinct kinds of ways in which descriptions rnay be used: airributive& or referen~ially. How a description is used depends crucially. as we have seen, on details of the context. In particular, it depends upon how the speaker intends to be using the description. Thus, it seems unlikely that referential uses of descriptions can be explained by appeal to this notion of a convenrio~lirnplicawe. The ten~uiveconclusion which 1 wish to draw from the above is that there seems to be reason for questioning the weak referentialist's strategy of appealing to pragrnatic considerations in order to explain how it is that speakers may succeed in communicating determinate singular propositions by uttering expressions in which definite descriptions are used referentially. As 1 have tned to show. Neale's use of the idea of convenational implicatures does not readily explain how it is that speakers are able successfully to comrnunicate determinate singular propositions in such cases. The central problem seem to be that in many cases of referential use, there will be numerous candidates for being the proposition which the speaker intends to conversationall y implicate. The Gricean must explain how it is that audiences in such cases have no difficulty in determining the singular proposition which the speaker rneant to express. A natural response, we saw, might be to ciaim that audiences are able to recopize the singular proposition which the speaker means to communicate because there is a particular convention conceming the use of expressions of the form "the F'. While this response might solve the indetenninacy problem. it is not compatible with the idea that referential use is explained by means of the idea of a conversarional implicature. This response suggests that referential use involves the idea of a ~~mz~ioruzlimplicature. There is, however, an important way in which referential uses differ from such conventional irnplicatures. Such uses are. as we have seen. hiphly dependent upon contextual features of the context of utterance. Conventional implicatures, however. seem to be independent of these sorts of contextual features. Furthemore. if it is argued that there is a linguistic convention according to which definite descriptions, on some occasions, are understood to function as singular terms, then it seems that this should be reflected in any semunric analysis of descriptions. I mentioned above that I view these conclusions in a tentative fashion. It may be possible ta develop the pragmatic account which Neale offers. The weak referentiaiist rnay be able to provide the means for explaining. in some cases. how it is that speakers who use descriptions referentially succeed in communicating determinate propositions. Appeais to relevance or salience. for example, rnight explain how the indetenninacy problem is overcome in some cases. 1 suspect, however, that there will remain examples for which such an explanation fails. It seems likely that there will be cases w here appeals to pragmatic niles governing rational discoune will be insufficient to explain how speakers are able to communicate deteminate singular propositions by uttering expressions of the form 'The F is G". If this is the case. then we have reason for thinking that the strong referential thesis provides the best explanation of referential use in these cases. This. it seems. would be sufficient reason for thinking that descriptions admit of two distinct semantic analyses. 1 will end this chapter with one further tentative claim. The general methodological principle, what Gnce cails the Modified Occam's Razor, favoured by Kripke is well- motivated. However, as I suggested above, there is reason for thinking that it should be considered in connection with amther methodological principle. It seems plausible to think that that if we have two semantic analyses of a given linguistic phenomenon. and the first. but not the second. requires that languap usen frequent!v rely on inferential processes. like those considered by Grice. then this is some reasoo for prefemng the second account to the first. For example, consider two languages, LI and L,, which are such that the first, but not the second, requires that audiences frequently provide the sort of Gncean inferences we have been considering. LI is the more paaimonious of the two when it cornes to rnultiplying meanings. In order to expiain successful communication. it relies on general pra,matic principles goveming rational discourse. Speakers are generally understood because, in many cases, their audiences can be expected to provide a chain of reasoning which begins with what they actually said. and ends with a conclusion about what they must have meant. L, is much less panirnonious at the semantic level. More linguistic expressions are semanticaliy ambiguous in this language than in LI. There is an intuitive sense according to which we might Say that while L, is more efficient at the semrrnric level. L, is more efficient at the L-ognirivrlevel. I think that considerations of semunfic efficiency should be balanced against considerations of efficiency. That is. the Modified Occam's Razor needs to be considered in conjunction with views about the psychological requirements imposed upon speakers and audiences. A brief example rnight illustrate this point. Suppose two semantic interpretations of Enplish, 1, and 12. They are identical except for the fact that while I, assigns two meanings to the word "bank" (loosely. "bank" means either "the edge of a river" or "a financial institution"). 1, assigns oniy one meaning to this word ("bank", according to 4 means 'Othe edge of a river"). Although it is contrary to our semantic intuitions. someone cocild defend the claim that. as a matter of fact, I, is the correct semantic interpretation of English. It might be aqued that this interpretation can provide an adequate explanation of the fact that there appear to be two distinct fashions in which "bank" is used by English speakers, and that speakers may succeed in comrnunicating different things by using the word. Suppose. for example. Jones says to Smith, (3) 1 just deposited rny winnings in a bank. Suppose Smith knows that Jones has not been near any rivers lately. Furthemore. Jones knows that Smith knows this. Smith could. with the assistance of pneral principles goveming rational discourse, reason as follows: (a) Jones has expressed the proposition that he has just deposited his winnings in the edpe of a river. (b) There is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the (CP) and maxims. (c)Jones could not be doing this unless he thought that he had just deposited his winnings in a financial institution. (Gloss: On the assumption that Jones is observing the maxim (of Quality) which counsels tmthfulness, it is clear that he must intend to communicate something other than the manifestly false proposition in (a). There is a convention according to which "bank" is used to mean the sarne as "a financial institution". Jones must, therefore, be using "bank" with the intention of meaning "a financial institution.") (4 Jones knows (and knows that 1 know that he knows) that 1 know that the assurnption that he intends to communicate the proposition that he has just deposited his winnings in a financial institution is required in order to justify the assurnption that Jones is respecting the (CP) and maxims. (e)Jones has done nothing to prevent me thinking that he has just deposited his winnings in a financial institution. (f) Jones intends me to think that he has just deposited his winnings in a financial institution. (g) Therefore, Jones has implicated that he has just deposited his winnings in a financial institution. Thus. the defender of I, can provide a good explanation of how speakers, like Jones, communicate propositions about financial institutions by usinp a word which means the same as "the edge of a river." Such a defender might, in addition. go on to assert that his semantic interpretation of English should be preferred over Il since i t is more semantically efficient than this interpretation. It might be argued that pneral methodological considerations involving the Modified Occam's Razor, suggest that 4 should be preferred over I,. While such an interpretation may seem possible. it is hardly plausible. An appropriate response might be to note that although 4 is more semanticallyefficient than I,. it is much less cognitively efficient. I, requires that audiences must frequently engage in the kind of reasoning just presented. The response might end with the observation that the Modified Occam's Razor must be considered in lipht of considerations to do with rninirnizing the number of such inferences which are required for successful communication. The interpretation provided by I, seems the more plausible of the two. when we consider this issue of cognitive efficiency, and the fact that English does possess a convention according to which "bank" rneans the same thing as "a financial institution." The devance of this example to the issue of referential uses of descnptions is, I hope. clear. As Donnellan has observed. there do seem to be two common ways in which description are used. Furthemore, audiences usually have liitle difficulty in deciding how to interpret utterances of definite descnptions. The weak referential thesis tries to provide an explanation of this fact by appealing to antecedently required principles goveminp rational discourse. 1 have argued that such explanations likeiy will noi succeed. in ail cases. in explainhg successful communication which involves referential uses of descriptions. Even if these explanation did succeed. it should be observed that this account requires much more cognitive energy of language users than is required by the strong referential thesis. General views about semantic efficiency should. 1 think, be considered in light of such views about cognitive efficiency. These last remarks are, to be sure. schematic at best. 1 suspect that this line of argument could. however. be developed in such a way as to provide further reason for preferring the strong referential thesis to the weak referential thesis. In this. chapter 1 have discussed the weak referentiaiist's strategy of explaining referential use by appeal to general principles which govem rational discourse. My argument throughout has been rather pro,gammatic. There are. 1 have argued. problems with the pragmatic explanation of referential use. I have considered Neale's attempt to provide such an explanation. The central problem identified with this attempt is what 1 have called the Problrrn of Inde~rrmirzuq. The problem is that we have strong intuitions that speakers who utter expressions in which descnptions are used referentially succeed in cornmunicating determinate singular propositions. The praomatic strategy favoured by Neale does not adequately explain how audiences are able to interpret referential uses in this fashion. Grice's notion of a conversational impiicature explains how speakers might communicate more than their utterances semantically express. but it does not providr an explanation of how, in some cases, speakers are able to communicate &terminaie singular prnposirions. 1 argued that the Prohlem of In~-omplefenrssprovides reason for rejecting the weak referential thesis. This problem. 1 tried to show. is actually a version of the more general Prohlrm of Iruier~rrminuc~v. Thus. we have seen two reasons for rejecting the weak referential thesis: (11 It seems unable to explain adequatel y how speakers w ho use incompferr descnptions referentially succeed in communicating deteminate propositions which are not obviously false: (ii)It seems the general pragmatic strategy to which it appeals cannot always explain how speakers who use descriptions referentially may succeed in cornmunicating deteminatesingular propositions. 1 have tried to argue that the strong referential thesis cm provide an adequate explanation of successful communication for cases involving referential uses of descnptions. These considerations suggest that the strong thesis should be preferred to the weak thesis, at Ieast in so far as our aim is to provide an adequate semantic anal ysis of definite descriptions as they are used in English. CONCLUSION The argument which I have developed over the course of the 1st nine chapters has rwo parts. First. 1 tned to present reasons for thinking that there cor two distinct manners in which definite descriptions are used by English speakers. Second. I tned to present reasons for thinking that definite descnptions. when used referentiaily. function semantically as gen uine singular tems. Descriptions used attributive1y function as quantifier phrases. Thus, if the arguments presented are sound, there is reason for thinking that the semantic contribution made by utterances of definite descriptions depends upon the intentions of the speaker. The arguments in Chapten Seven through Ten support. 1 believe, the conclusion that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous in the following sense: When the definite description is used attributively the analysis provided by Russell's theory of descriptions is correct. The logical form of such a sentence can be represented as Represen ting the logicai form of the attributive uses of such sentences in this fashion makes it perspicuous that the utterance of the sentence is not ubour any particular itern(s). There are no singular tems in ( 1 ). When descriptions are used referentially, however. the logicai fom of sentences of the form '*The F is G " is not properly represented as ( 1 ). Instead, the definite description funsiions semantically as a genuine singular tem. The logical fom of an utteranceof a sentence of this form in which the description is used referentially can be represented as (2) Gu. This manner of representing the logical form of referential uses of sentences of this fom makes it perspicuous that the description "The F" is functioning as a singular term. In Chapters Two ihrough Five 1 tried to develop an account of what is involved, in tems of speakers' intentions. in referential uses of descnptions. Donnellan's account. in "Speaker Reference. Descriptions. and Anaphora". offers. 1 believe. a very useful way of constming the difference between referential and attnbutive uses. As we saw. this account expiains the difference between referential and attributive uses in terms of the NUenrions which a speaker has when uttering a definite description. We saw that in both attnbutive and referential cases there is a sense in which speakers have some particularitem(s) in mind when uttering a description. The notion of hming something in mind does not. 1 argued, adequately distinguish referential cases from attn butive cases. DonneIlan's view is that speakers who use descriptions in the referential fashion intend to be expressing a proposition whose [ruth-conditions mention a particular individual. The notion of a singular. or object-dependent. proposition was appealed to. in Chapter Four. in order to explain this type of speaker intention. In referential cases. I argued, a speaker intends to be communicating an object-dependent proposition about some item(s) to which his use of a description refen. In attnbutive cases. the speaker's intentions are quite different. As we saw. in these cases speakers who utter sentences of the forrn "The F is G" intend to be communicating general, or object-independent, propositions. The tmth conditions of these propositions do not mention any individuais as being referred to by the gammatical subject phrase "The F'. Although the tnith conditions of such propositions may invoke individuals for orher terms in the sentence. they do nor invoke any individuais for the subject phrase. In Chapters Seven through Ten. 1 considered several arguments for the conclusion that descriptions are semantically ambiguous in the sense discussed above. What 1 called The Argumrnr From Chu- involves two very plausible pnnciples goveming the ascnption of beliefs. and other propositional attitudes. to speakers. The argument purports to show that an account of descriptions which posits two distinct semantic analyses for sentences of the form "The F is G " is to be preferred over accounts which offer just one. RusseIlian. analysis of such sentences. The latteraccounts. 1 argued, when conjoined with the Principle cf Disqrrotation irnply that speakers often have contradictory bel iefs. The former account, 1 argued. avoids this conclusion. 1 argued that when these accounts are considered in light of the respective belief attributions which they appear to warrant. nie Principle of Churifi suggests that the former is to be preferred over the latter. The argument does not depend upon what. in Chapter Six. 1 called Nnproper uses of definite descriptions. This fact is, 1 believe. one of the strengths of The Argument From Chwin. In Chapter Eight. I examined Donnellan's Argurnenr From hphora. This argument suggests that referential uses of descriptions which are connected ~~~~ In Chapter Nine 1 addressed an argument which Scott Soames offers against the strong interpretation of the referentiallattributive distinction. This argument appeals to certain intuitions concerning the abilities of hearers to believe and report the content of utterances of sentences in which descriptions are used referentially. Soames argues that hearers may believe and report the content of such utterances withour helieving or reportinfi sinplur proposirions. Thi S. Soames argues. suggests that speakers' utterances of such sentences do not. by virtue of their using the description referentially. express singular propositions. His argument depends upon what David Kaplan calls a Subjecrivisr view of language. This view denies that audiences may frequently &fer to the referential intentions of speakers. What Kaplan calls a consume ris^ view of language emphasizes this phenornenon of deference. Speakers frequently, Kaplan argues, intend to be complying with the referential intentions of other speakers. 1 argued that the causal-historical account of naminp appeals to this fact about language-users. If we acknowledge the existence of this sort of linpuistic deference, then I think that much of the force of Soames' argument is removed. A central point which tells against Soames' argument is that there is good reason for thinking that speakers rnay express and believe the singular propositions which are expressed by utterances of sentences containing referring expressions wiihour hring cible IO idenrifi the referertts of the re/erring rxprrssions. In Chapter Ten 1 presented what I called The Prohlern of Indrrrrminuq. The problem arises frorn the fairly strong semantic intuition that speaken who utter sentences containing definite descriptions often succeed in communicating deteminute propositions. The Russel lian account of descriptions has great di fficul ty in explaining this phenomenon for cases in which incomplete descriptions are used. I presented the general problem of incompleteness for Russellian accounts of descriptions. and argued that several recent attempts to account for such cases. which have been offered by defenders of Russell's theory, fail. My main argument in this chapter is that the problem of indeterminacy confronts accounts of referential use which appeal to non-semantic. pragmatic features of language and langage-usen. These accounts do not adequately explain how speaken may succeed in communicating deremirme singular, object-dependent propositions when they utter sentences in w hich descriptions are used referentially. As we have seen. the phenomenon of referential use is not easy to ignore. There dri seem to be two quite distinct mannen in which English speakers use definite descriptions. Defenders of Russell's theory typically acknowledge this fact. Furthemore. they typically acknowledge the fact that speakers frequently succeed in cornmunicating determinate singular propositions by uttering sentences of the fomi "The F is G ". This fact seems to require some explanation. The standard appeals to pragmatic features of language do not. 1 have argued, adequately explain this fact. The strong referential thesis. which posits two semantic functions for definite descriptions, does offer a plausible explanation for this fact. This suggests. 1 believe. that the strong referential thesis should be preferred over the weaker referential thesis. This argument coupled with The Argument From Churi8 provide. 1 believe. compelling reasons for thinking that definite descriptions coe sernantically ambi guous. References Bach. K. ( 1981 ). ReferentiaVAttributive.S-vnthrse 49, 2 19 - 244. (Reprinted in S. Davis (ed.). Prugmticr.:A Rrder. New York: Oxford University Press. 199 1. 17 - 32.) Bilgrami. A. ( 1992). Belief und Meming. 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