The Semantic Significance of Donnellan's ReferentiaVAttri butive Distinction Andrew John Hunter A Thesis Submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy. in the University of Toronto e> Copyright by Andrew John Hunter ( 1997) National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, nie Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfichelfilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. The Semantic Significance of J>onnellan's ReferentiaUAttributive Distinction Andrew John Hunter (Ph.D., 1997) Graduate Department of Philosophy The University of Toronto Abstract In " Reference and Definite Descriptions", Keith Donnellan introduces the notion of refere>üiul and umihurivr uses of definite descriptions -- phrases such as "the author of Waverly". Here and in subsequent papen he argues that Russell's Theory of Descriptions is inadequate as a semantic analysis for al1 uses of definite descnptions. According to Russell's theory. definite descriptions are quantifier phrases. not singular terms. Donnellan's arguments suggest that definite descriptions are ambiguous. When they are used attnbutively. definite descriptions should be read as quantifier phrases. When they are used referentially. they should be reed as genuine singular tems. 1 argue that it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Following Donnellan. I argue that whether a description is used referentially or attributively depends on the inrrntions of the speaker conceming the truth-conditions of the proposition he wishes to express. This provides us with a precise way to determine whether a definite description is used referentially or attributively. 1 tum next to the question: Does Donnellan's referentiai/attributivedistinction show that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous? 1 distinguish two positions which have emerged in the literature. What 1 cal1 The S~rnngRrferenriul Theris maintains that definite descriptions are singular terms, when they are used referentially. On this account. definite descriptions are semantically am biguous. What 1 call The Weuk Refmntiuf Thesis maintains that defini te descriptions, when used referentially, are properly analyzed according to Russell's Theory of Descriptions. This thesis maintains that in referential cases. a speaker's utterance semantically expresses one proposition, but he may succeed in communicating some other proposition. This account attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the apparent counterexarnples offered by Donnellan and others. 1 present two arguments in support of The Strong Referenfial Thesis. First. t argue that The Weuk Referentiul Thesi.$ resutts in the ascription of contradictory beliefs to speakers. 1 call this The Argumentfiom rhr Principleof Chariv. Second. 1 argue that The Weuk Referrntiul Thesis cannot, in al1 cases, explain how speakers may succeed in communicating a deteminate proposition other than that which their utterances semantically express. Acknow ledgments First. 1 would like to thank my supervisor. Prof. Bernard Katz. for his encouragement. sound advice. and patience. His attentions to clanty of presentation and closeness of argumentation provide a mode1 of how philosophy should be done. I consider myself very fortunate to have benefited from such excellent supervision. Likewise. I would like to thank my thesis advisor. Prof. Peter Apostoli. for his advice. interest, and encouragement. His enthusiasm for the issues discussed in this dissertation was infectious, and invaluable to the completion of this project. I am grateful to the Department of Philosophy at Ryerson Polytechnic University for providing the stimulatinp and collepial environment in which much of this dissertation was written. Financial support for this dissertation was provided by an Ontario Graduate Scholarship and by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Fellowship. And finally, 1 wish to thank my wife, Janet. for her tremendous patience, support, and love throughout my studies. TABLE OF CONTENTS A bstract Acknowledgments Chapter One: Introduction (i) Rus.srf1's Throry of Descriptions (ii) Srrawson's Objections ro Ri~ssell'sTheon* (iii) Orgciniuion of Chupters Chapter Two: Referential and Attributive Uses of Definite Descriptions Chapter Three: Refemng and Denoting ( il Referenticil and Artrib ut ive Uses: Thrir Pre.wpposiriom or rlrnplic~rions ( ii) Denoring und Referring (iii) The Debute Between Donnellun und MücKuy (iv) The Difierence Brrwern Referring und Denoting (v) Summury Chapter Four: Speaker Reference and Referential Use Chapter Five: Searle On the Referential-AttributiveDistinction (i) Huving Sameone in Mid f ii) Seurle1.\.4lrermtive Account of the Referenriul-Artriburive Disrinc-tion (iii) Two Objection.\ ro Seurlr '., Accounr (iv) Summury Chapter Six: Cricean Responses to the Referential Challenge (i) The Strnng and Weuk Referenriai Thesa ( ii) Clussificution of Uses of Definite Descrip f ims Chapter Seven: An Argument For the Strong Referential-Attributive Thesis 118 (il The Argumenr From rhe Principfr of chu ri^ (ii) A Defme of Prrmisr Onr (iii) A Defense of Prernise Two (ir) A Defense of Prrmise Three v Chapter Eight: The Argument From Anaphora (i1 DonnellunlsArgmenr Frmn Anuphnru (ii) Donne 1fun ls Argument Wirhour Indef nilr De.sc*ription.s (iiil Srrmrnuy Chapter Nine: Soarnes' Objection to the Argument From Anaphora (il An Argumrnr Aguimr the Strong Rrfrrenriul Thrsic (ii) The Smpe of Soumes' Argumenr (iiil The Premisrs of Snarnes' Argument (iv) Objections tu f remises Orte und Two ofsoames' Argument Chapter Ten: The Pragmatic Explanation of Referential Use 1% References Chapter One INTRODUCTION Since the publication of "On Denoting". one of the main debates in the philosophy of language has concemed the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions such as " the author of Waveriey". Bertrand Russell propounded. in a number of places. a theory of definite descnptions. Three of the places in which he presents his theory are "On Denotinp". Inrroducrinn rn Marhematicul Philosop&. and Principiu Muthematiccl. According to Russell's theory of descnptions, an English sentence having a definite description as grammatical subject is deceptive in tems of its logicu[form. For example. a sentence like ( I ) The man with a rnartini is happy, seems to resernble, in ternis of its grummaticalform, sentences like (2) John Smith is happy. (3) That man is happy. (4) He is happy. (3 1 am happy. Each of these sentences is. gramrnatically, of the subject-predicate fom. The subject phrase in each appears to refer to some person. The predicate phrase in each mentions the property of happiness. Given this similarity, one might expeci that the logical form of these sentences would be the same. Russell's theory of descriptions denies this claim. Sentence ( 1). he argues, is only superficially like sentences (2) - (5). While the subject phrases in the latter sentences are al1 refemng expressions. the subject phrase in the first sentence is no? a refemng expression. One can see this by considering the different manners in which sentences ( 1) - (5) would. according to Russell's theory of descnptions. be represented in logicai notation. If "u" is a singular terni and "G" is a one-place predicate that abbreviates the predicate phrase "is happy", then the logical form of (2) - (5)would be represented as (6) Ga. The propositions that would be expressed by utterances of these sentences are ubout some person who is referred to by the use. in a particular context. of the subject phrase. Sentence ( 1 ). according to Russell's theory, is not about anybody. As David Kaplan emphasizes in "What is Russell's Theory of Descriptions". its logical form reveals this. The proposition expressed by an utterance of the fint sentence, Russell argues. is the same as that which would be expressed by an utterance of (7) There exists exactly one man with a martini, and whoever has a rnartini is happy - If "F' abbreviates the predicate phrase "is a man with a martini", and " G" abbreviates the predicate phrase "is happy". then the logical form of sentence ( I ) can be represented as The difference between ( 1 ) and (2) - (5)is thus made fully perspicuous when we consider the distinct mannes in which their logical form is represented. While (6) contains a singular tem. the symbolic counterpart of a referring expression. (8)does not contain any singular tems at ail. Russell's theory has been challenped by numerous authors. They contend that. for one reason or another. the theory of descnptions