Uhm Phd 8003287 R.Pdf

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MI 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW. LONDON wei R 4EJ. ENGLAND 8003287 MORELLI, RALPH A. AN EXAMINAnON OF RECENT PROPOSALS IN THE THEORY OF REFERENCE University ofHawaii PH.D. 1979 University Microfilms InternationaI 300N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 BedfordRow,London WeIR 4EJ, England AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT PROPOSALS IN THE THEORY OF REFERENCE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY AUGUST 1979 By Ralph Morelli Dissertation Committee: Irving M. Copi, Chairman Chung-ying Cheng Winfield Nagley Edward Harter Ty Pak ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and encouragement of my teachers, friends and family. I am especially grateful to Professors Irving Copi and Edward Harter who gave unselfishly of their time and patience to discuss and critique my work. I sincerely appreciate their many helpful suggestions and much needed encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge and thank my parents and family for their many years of encouragement and support from afar. Finally, I sraII always be indebted to Choong-Ian, my wife, for sharing my frustrations during the past two years and for her constant warmth and reassurance. ABSTRACT This dissertation examines recent proposals addressed to a problem in the theory of reference: viz., what determines the referent of a word? Traditional answers to this question have relied on the "inten sionalist principle"--Le., the principle that the intension of a word (or the descriptive backing in the case of a proper name) determines its extension or denotation. Recently, however, Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan and Hilary Putnam have raised objections to this principle and have pro posed theories which attempt to explain reference without relying on the intensionalist principle. The major shortcoming of traditional intensionalism is identified herein as due to conceiving the 'intension' both conceptualistically-- as something which guides the speaker's use of a word--and essential istically--as comprised of the essential attributes of the things to which the word applies. It is shown that Jerrold Katz' version of intensionalism, which is representative of the traditional approach, conceives of intensions in this way. Several problems with this approach are identified and an interpretation of 'intension' which disassociates it from both conceptualism and essentialism is suggested. The result is a view of the intensionalist principle which is immune to many of the criticisms raised by its detractors. In particular, Putnam's "Twin Earth" examples are discussed and shown to fail in their attempt to refute the intensionalist approach. Kripke's "rigid designation" thesis is viewed as an alternative to Russell's "disguised description" theory, and both Kripke' s and Putnam's v defenses of rigid designation are discussed. It is maintained that, like Russell's theory, rigid designation represents an interesting recommendation for how we might interpret the designators of formal modal logics but fails as a theory of how proper names (and other desig nators) are used in ordinary discourse. Putnam's defense of rigid designation, which is seen to conflict with several points of his "sociolinguistic hypothesis"--Putnam's alternative to the intensionalist thesis, is shown to rely on a faulty notion of the "extension" of a word. Kripke's arguments in support of rigid designation are shown to depend on our intuitions about the contingency or necessity of certain English sentences, and, since our intuitions may vary, his arguments are judged inconclusive. A similar objection is raised against Kripke's belief in the existence of contingent ~ priori and necessary a posteriori statements. Kripke's "causal theory" and Donnellan's Ilhistorical explanation theory" are both attempts to provide an alternative to the Fregean "sense theory" of proper names. It is maintained herein that the key deter minant of the referent of the use of a proper name is the speaker's intention to refer to a unique individual. Because they are based on a rejection of the thesis that the referent is determined by the "descrip tive backing" of a name, Kripke's and Donnellan's theories give a less than-central role to "speaker's intention" and are found wanting on that basis. It is concluded that the recent proposals by Kripke, Donnellan and Putnam do not provide a superior basis (to intensionalism) for an understanding of the connection between words and their referents. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii ABSTRACT iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER II TRADITIONAL INTENSIONALISM 12 The Classical View and Its Problems 12 Katz' Theory of Meaning. •• ••. 24 CHAPTER III PUTNAM'S VIEWS ON MEANING. 41 Putnam's Attack on Intensiona1ism • 41 Putnam's Account of Rigid Designation. 53 CHAPTER IV THE INTENSIONALIST APPROACH TO PROPER NAMES 80 Fregeau Sense and Reference •• 80 Mill's Theory of Proper Names. 85 The Backing of Descriptions •.••••• 91 Kripke's Interpretation of the Principle of Identifying Descriptions . •• ••. 95 CHAPTER V RIGID DESIGNATION •• 112 Rigid Designation and Formal Semantics 112 Rigid Designation as a Theory of Ordinary Proper Names . • . • . • • .• •• 118 Response to an Objection • • . • . • • 127 CHAPTER VI CONTINGENCY, NECESSITY AND RIGID DESIGNATION 138 The Contingent A Priori? 138 The Necessary A Posteriori? 147 CHAPTER VII THE ATTACK ON THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTIFYING DESCRIPTIONS ••••• •••• 160 Donnellan's Argument 160 Some Purported Counterexamples 175 vii CHAPTER VIII THE HISTORICAL AND CAUSAL THEORIES OF REFERENCE 183 An Exposition of Donnellan's and Kripke's Theories ............. 183 Genuine Alternatives to the Intensionalist Approach? ............... 187 Some Problems with Donnellan's and Kripke's Proposals •••• 195 CHAPTER IX CONCLUDING REMARKS 204 BIBLIOGRAPHY 207 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION It is obvious that, in some sense, language is 'about' the world: we use verbal and written symbols to refer to things in the world, to attribute properties to those things, to report relations between them, and so on. What is not so obvious, and what has, indeed, generated some controversy recently, is the precise relationship between the expressions of our language and the world. An important question presents itself: what sort of relationship must obtain between a referring expression and its referent in order that the expression may be used to refer to the referent? Traditional answers to this question have relied on the principle that intension determines extension. They have held that associated with any significant expression is some meaning or concept or property or, more generally, an intension, by virtue of which that term denotes a unique individual or class of individuals. For instance, Frege argues that there is connected with every sign "the sense of the sign, wherein the mode 0f presentat10n" 1S conta1ne. d • ,,1 One example that Frege uses is that the sense of 'Aristotle' might be the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. 2 Basically, Frege's view is that the sense of the name 'Aristotle' serves as a criterion of identity for the referent of the name. Other proponents of the Fregean approach to proper names-- for example, Searle and Strawson--have viewed the sense of proper names in terms of a "backing of descriptions" which serves, again, to pick out or identify the referent of the name. 3 2 Similarly, with regard to general terms, it has been maintained, traditionally, that an expression deserves to be applied to certain individuals only if those individuals display the attributes which make up that term's intension. For example, Mill argued that the word 'man' connotes the attributes of corporeity, rationality, animal life and a certain human form, and he argued that nothing deserves to be called 'man' unless it possesses those attributes.4 Again, according to the tradi tional view, the extension of a term, in this case those individuals to which the term may correctly be applied, is determined intensionally- i.e., by checking each individual to see that it possesses the attributes associated with the term.

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