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Bamyan, First Ever Cultural Capital of South Asia: a Big Party, but What Else?

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Bamyan, First Ever Cultural Capital of South Asia: a Big Party, but What Else? Bamyan, First Ever Cultural Capital of South Asia: A big party, but what else? Author : Qayoom Suroush Published: 8 June 2015 Downloaded: 5 September 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/bamyan-first-ever-cultural-capital-of-south-asia-a-big-party-but-what- else/?format=pdf Five months late and almost half-way through its crucial year, Bamyan has finally been inaugurated as the 2015 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) cultural capital, the organisation’s first ever. Second Vice President Sarwar Danesh, Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq and Minister of Information and Culture Bari Jahani were among the guests who also included a handful of officials from SAARC countries (mainly staff from Kabul embassies), some Afghan artists and local people. AAN’s Qayoom Suroush reports that the ceremony itself which, according to the advisor on SAARC to the former governor, cost some four hundred thousand dollars, appears to have been the main achievement. He looks at how lack of government interest, lack of a budget and lack of security in the wider region has meant that, for Bamyan, getting cultural capital status has, so far, been a near profitless enterprise. A few days before the opening ceremony, there was nothing to suggest Bamyan was soon to be 1 / 6 SAARC’s first ever capital of culture. Many in the bazar did not know what SAARC meant or when the celebration was to be. Then, on Thursday 4 June, the day before the inauguration, official guests began arriving – several dozen – by plane, mainly from Kabul. On the day itself, thousands of people gathered in Bamyan city park for the inauguration, fewer, locals said, than the annual Silk Road Festival. Later on the same day, there was a small official gathering in the new, fancy Gholghola Hotel (owned by Abdul Karim Khalili’s family, former Second Vice President and the most powerful former mujahedin commander in the province). Sarwar Danesh, the current Second Vice President who is from Khalili’s party said, “destroying the Buddha statues was the worst and bitterest cultural crime of the Taleban.” He also said Bamyan has received less development aid than other provinces and more balance was needed. In the evening, there was a music event at Gholghola city. The point of having a city of culture? Naming a city as ‘cultural capital’ has been a common practice since the 1970s, carried out by organisations like the UNESCO (United Nation Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation), ASEAN (Association for Southeast Asian Nations), ISESCO (Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and, jointly, the European Commission and the European Parliament: it is a way of highlighting a city’s attractions, inspiring art, attracting additional investment from governments or private business and drumming up the tourist trade. Bamyan is Afghanistan’s second ever ‘cultural capital’, following Ghazni becoming city IESCO’s Islamic Cultural Capital for 2013 (read AAN Report here). It was the Afghan government, through the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information and Culture, which put the bid in for Bamyan to be the SAARC capital of culture 2015. On 21 June 2014, a SAARC delegation announced the city had won the bid and the inaugural ceremony would be held in January 2015 to launch the start of its year as cultural capital. The delegation agreed that around eight events would be conducted throughout the year, including a photo and painting exhibition, seminars, traditional music recitals, art and craft workshops, a handicrafts bazar, a film festival, a food show, a literary festival and, in December 2015, a valedictory ceremony. Most of the programme was to be managed and financed by the Afghan government. Additionally, according to an official report from the SAARC secretariat, a copy of which AAN has seen, SAARC agreed to organise some events which officials or artists from other SAARC member states would participate in, such as an artists camp, a South Asian food festival, South Asian music festival and South Asian handicraft exhibition, as well as some Afghan-only events, including a film festival, the launch of a ‘cultural anthem’ for Bamyan and the release of commemorative stamps or coins. The Afghan government’s plans for preparing Bamyan to be SAARC’s first cultural capital were ambitious. In early November 2014, the cabinet decided to carry out around 40 development projects for Bamyan by the start of 2015, with almost every Afghan ministry responsible for two or three projects. For example, the Ministry of Public Health promised to promote the provincial Bamyan hospital into a regional hospital by expanding hospital facilities and increasing the number of staff in order to provide more diverse services; the Ministry of 2 / 6 Higher Education promised to add medical and fine art faculties to Bamyan University; and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics – why it chose to do this is not clear - (and later, the project was handed on to the Bamyan governor’s office with the help of Indian Embassy in Kabul) said it would build two symbolic gates to mark the city’s new status. Bamyan’s suitability as a cultural capital might seem obvious. It is the site of the two massive Buddha statues (build in third and fifth centuries) which were destroyed by the Taleban in 2001; although smashed (see AAN dispatch here), the site is still breath-taking and archeologically significant. Then there are the still impressive remains of Shahr-e Gholghola, (the City of Sighs) which was built in the sixth century and destroyed by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth, and another pre-Islamic city, Shahr-e Zohak, built on the top of crimson rock sediments, with walls, towers and ramparts in the same colour. It is situated at a strategic point to the east of Bamyan where the two main roads leading into the valley meet, one from the south, through the Kalu gorge, and the other from the east, over the Shibar pass. (For more on Bamyan province’s cultural heritage and AAN tips on the sights – many of them off the beaten trail – to see, take a look here). In a peaceful country, these remains and the beautiful landscape of the Bamyan valley would attract many tourists – as it did before the war. However, other than the archaeology and potential tourist appeal of Bamyan, it is not clear what new and innovative culture - art, music or literature – it is producing now. Delays and disappointments In autumn 2014, it became clear Bamyan would not be ready for the planned inauguration ceremony in January. A ministerial meeting of SAARC in September 2014 announced that the ceremony would be delayed until April 2015. Later, because there had been no budget allocation, the inauguration was further postponed, until June, almost half-way into the city’s year of being ‘cultural capital’. Moreover, none of the 40 or so promised development projects have been implemented. A few of them are very important. For example, the Afghan government had promised that the Ministry of Public Works would carry out, before the inauguration ceremony, a cobbling of the road in front of the Buddha niches; a separate asphalted road is planned for further away from the protected area, but, for now, the cobbling would be a temporary solution for a major problem. The large trucks which now thunder past the cliff, still a precious archaeological and tourist site, cause underground vibrations which are widening the shearing of rocks in the cliff. On a recent trip by this author, a guide pointed out a rift in the cliff which he said had widened recently; chunks of the cliff, he said, were at risk of falling off. Previously, tourists had been allowed to climb both sides of the smaller Buddha niche up to the level of where its head used to be. Now, however, due to the danger of falling rocks, the eastern steps have been blocked off. The road is an urgent project, but like all the other promised projects, has not been carried out. (It is worth noting that Bamyan cultural heritage is still on the UNESCO list of world heritage sites in danger because of the ongoing war in the country and the government’s neglect of the site. (1)) Bad timing and lack of interest 3 / 6 One wonders why the Afghan government asked for Bamyan to be a cultural capital and then did almost nothing to ensure the project was a success. One wonders especially why the Karzai government and SAARC representatives had the confidence to make any plans in June 2014 during the acrimonious and disputed presidential elections, as well, obviously, as during an on- going war. The fact that none of those 40 development projects were actually implemented can be blamed partly on the protracted electoral crisis itself – which meant not much governing happened for many months – and partly, on falling state revenues and budgets. However, there has also been a basic lack of interest in the programme. Bamyan’s recently ex-governor, Ghulam Ali Wahdat, admitted to AAN that, despite the government’s ambitious plans, nothing fundamental had been done for Bamyan. He told AAN they had asked for a four and half million dollar budget to prepare Bamyan to be the cultural capital, but in the end, had received “only” 400,000 dollars for the whole programme (development projects, ceremony, everything). Wahdat said paying for the programme out of the province’s own budget would have been impossible as, he said, it was too small. He blamed the Ministry of Finance for creating problems for the organisers; what he called “this small amount of money” had only been paid over a month ago.
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