Design Status of the DEMO-FNS Steady State Tokamak in RF B.V

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Design Status of the DEMO-FNS Steady State Tokamak in RF B.V NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ЦЕНТР KURCHATOV INSTITUTE «КУРЧАТОВСКИЙ ИНСТИТУТ» Kurchatov Nuclear Technology Complex Moscow, 123182, Russia Design status of the DEMO-FNS Steady State Tokamak in RF B.V. Kuteev E.A. Azizov, P.N. Alexeev, S.S. Anan’ev, V.M.Chernov, B.K. Chukbar, A.S. Bykov, A.A. Frolov, A.A. Golikov, A.V. Golubeva, P.R. Goncharov, M.P. Gryaznevich, M.I. Gurevich, A.Yu. Dnestrovskij, A.A. Dudnikov, D.P. Ivanov, R.R. Khairutdinov, V.I. Khripunov, A.A. Klischenko, B.N. Kolbasov, А.I. Krylov, V.E. Lukash, V.V. Lukyanov, S.Yu. Medvedev, A.A. Morozov, A.A. Panasenkov, V.S. Petrov, P.V. Savrukhin, A.A. Sedov, V.Yu. Sergeev, E.V. Shestakov, A.B. Sivak, A.V. Spitsyn, S.A. Subbotin, A.L. Shimkevich, Yu.S. Shpanski, V.P. Tsibulskiy, A.V. Zhirkin e-mail: [email protected] Collaborators: Efremov Institute, Dollezhal Institute, AtomProject, Bochvar Institute, Polytechnic University, CTF-Centre B.V. Kuteev et al., IAEA SSO-8, 26-29 May 2015, Nara, Japan DEMO-FNS background • DEMO-FNS tokamak device is the key facility in the hybrid branch of the Russian fusion program. • The construction of DEMO-FNS is planned by 2023. This facility should provide the choice of steady state operation regimes, tests of materials and components, demonstration of tokamak enabling technologies and molten salt nuclear technologies of hybrid blanket and radiochemical plant for Pilot Hybrid Plant (PHP). • The PHP construction is planned by 2030. Design targets are 40 MW for the fusion power, 500 MW for the total thermal power and 200 MW for the electric power that should provide engineering Qeng ~ 1 (self- sufficiency). Strategy 2013 for Fusion‐Fission development in Russia E. Velikhov, IAEA FEC‐25, O‐3 Burning Plasma Physics B.Kuteev et al. NF, 55 (2015) accepted T-15 ITER DEMO PROTO Nuclear physics and technology DEMO‐ FNS PHP Test beds for enabling technologies Hybrid Fusion Nuclear Test beds for technologies of molten salt new generation technologies 2015 2030 2050 Major facilities on the path to Industrial Hybrid Plant SSO&MS Globus-M3 FNS-ST DEMO-FNS Steady State Technologies DT neutrons MS blankets • Magnetic system • Vacuum chamber • Divertor • Blanket • Remote handling • Heating and current drive • Fuelling and pumping • Diadnostics •Integration •Materials •Hybrid Tech • Safety • Molten salts Pilot Hybrid Plant construction by 2030 P=500 MWt, Qeng ~1 Industrial Hybrid Plant construction by 2040 P=3 GWt, Qeng ~6.5 P=1.3 GWe, P=1.1 GWn, MA=1t/a, FN=1.1 t/a Feasibility of Pilot Hybrid Reactor by 2030 PHP, DEMO‐FNS 1. Regimes with Q~1 are realized in tokamaks, low BPP impact 2. Electron temperature sufficient for DT beam driven fusion T = ~4 keV has been demonstrated in numerous experiments 3. Non‐inductive current drive was demonstrated in conventional tokamaks and is close to demonstration in spherical machines 4. Reduction of technical requirements on neutron loading in PHP to 0.2 MW/m2 and fluence value for operation time below 2 MWy/m2 allows to use commercially available materials 5. Economics of PHP is acceptable in case of total products selling : MA incineration, electricity production, tritium breeding, fuel FNS‐ST, Globus‐M3 breeding for U‐Pu and Th‐U nuclear fuel cycles. 6. System models and codes predict appropriate parameters of PHP Qbf~1 7. Russia has an appropriate cooperation of fusion and fission organizations and well qualified staff Construction Risks for Pilot Hybrid Plant 1. Low design level for Hybrid systems (conceptual or pre‐conceptual) 2. Enabling Technologies for tokamak Steady State Operation need substantial resource upgrade (from minutes to ~5000 hours) 3. Additional R@D are mandatory for fusion nuclear science and technology 4. Molten salt nuclear technology of hybrid blanket and radio‐chemical system require demonstration 5. Lack of information on tokamak operation under high plasma loadings, noninductive current drive and non‐equiliblium plasmas 6. Poor database on radiation damage of materials in 14 MeV neutron spectra 7. Challenging choice of materials and molten salt compositions is foreseen 8. Licensing delays and Atomic Energy Law update Structural and Functional Materials of the Hybrid Concept Structural materials: austenitic steels 12Х18Н10Т (SS316) ЧC‐68 ЭК‐164 Nickel alloys Hastelloy Vanadium alloys V-(4-9)Cr-(0.1-8)W-(1-2Zr) V-4Cr-4Ti Materials for Magnetic System Cu CuCrZr Nb3Sn NbTi MgB2 Insulators MgAl2O4 Functional materials Be Li4SiO4 T DEMO-FNS Features • DEMO-FNS has a superconducting magnetic system utilizing low temperature superconductors Nb3Sn and NbTi • The steady state operating device has the major radius R =2.5-2.7 m and the minor radius a =1 m, toroidal magnetic field B = 5 T, plasma current Ip = 5 MA, neutral beam heating and current drive system with the total power of 30 MW and 6 MW of gyrotron power at 170 GHz Parameters of R, m 2.7 DEMO-FNS R/a 2.7 2.1 δ 0.5 Ip, MA 5.0 BT, T 5.0 n, 1020m-3 1.0 2 Pn/S, MW/m 0.2 Eb, keV 500 Pb, MW 30 Angle NBI, deg 0 PEC, MW 6 H-factor 1.0 β <3 N Demonstration f 1.0 non-ind •Tritium breeding Pdiss, TF, MW 10 •MA incineration Pdiss, PF, MW 5.0 •Fissile nuclide production Swall, m2 188 •Destruction of long life Vpl, m3 113 radionuclides •Heat transfer FNS-ST, DEMO-FNS and ITER parameters FNS-ST DEMO-FNS ITER Major radius R, m 0.5 2.75 6.2 DT-fusion option Beam driven Beam driven Thermonuclear fusion and fusion thermonuclear fusion Heat transfer from alphas to plasma no yes small yes BPP valuable Divertor configuration DN DN SN Toroidal field at the VV center, T 1.5 5 5.3 Fusion power, MW 1 - 3 30 - 40 500 Auxiliary heating power PAUX, MW ~ 8 - 10 30 - 40 50 - 70 Fusion energy gain factor Q ~ 0.2 ~ 1 ~ 10 Shielding at high field side, m Без защиты ~ 50 cm 60 – 80cm Type of magnetic system CuCrZr LTS LTS 2 Neutron loading Гn, MW/m 0.2 0.2 0.5 Neutron fluence at lifetime, MWy/m2 ~ 2 (*) ~ 2 0.3 DEMO-FNS Map of physical parameters Zeff 1.5 0.6 li 1.3 0.7 Steady state current density profile j(r) Hy,2 ne /nGW 3 0.5 N, 6 0.5 fCD q 95 fBS Steady state profiles of ne(r) , Te(r) , Ti(r) , q(r) Physical assumptions are moderate DEMO-FNS Basic plasma configuration Steady State free boundary equilibrium magnetic configuration Breakdown in DEMO-FNS R, cm Z, cm R, Z, cm I, MA*t VNS-SC FIELD NULL cm 600 5 x 10 2 400 PF1_U 125 460 30 30 0.2 1 PF1_L 125 -460 30 30 0.2 Bz [G] Bz 0 200 PF2_U 175 480 35 35 0.34 -1 PF2_L 175 -480 35 35 0.34 0 200 400 0 R [cm] PF3_U 310 495 50 50 0.69 Z [cm] PF3_L 310 -495 50 50 0.69 15 PF4_U 400 445 30 30 0.96 -200 10 PF4_L 400 -445 30 30 0.96 5 psi [Vs] psi PF5_U 495 360 55 55 0.68 -400 0 PF5_L 495 -360 55 55 0.68 0 200 400 PF6_U 535 255 30 30 -0.5 -600 R [cm] 0 200 400 600 PF6_L 535 -255 30 30 -0.5 R [cm] CSU1 42.5 280 15 76 -13.7 CSU2 42.5 160 15 158 40.4 CS1 42.5 0 15 160 14.0 0 10 Vs CSL2 42.5 -160 15 158 40.4 BZ max 12 T CSL1 42.5 -280 15 76 -13.7 Current generation and fusion power in DEMO-FNS 8 100 total 7 P fn 6 d t maxwell I P 150 P 5 p fn fn MA MW 4 d t I (E =500 keV) P 500 NBCD d 10 fn 3 I BS 2 t d P 500 I (E =500 keV) fn NBCD t t d 1 P 150 fn 0 0,00,20,40,60,81,01,21,40,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 -3 n , m-3 n , m 20 20 Current and its components versus Fusion power and components (beam plasma density plasma fusion + thermonuclear) versus plasma density System codes suggest reaching design parameters of DEMO-FNS and the neutron loading that is higher than 0.2 MW/m2 DEMO-FNS magnet system details • The magnetic coil system consists of 18 toroidal coils, 12 poloidal coils, 2 vertical control coils and 18 RMP correcting coils • The partitioned central solenoid (CS) has the flux storage of 8 Wb increased by poloidal coils up to 20 Wb that is sufficient for plasma formation and the current rump up to 5 MA during 2 seconds • Peripheral parts of the CS are used for shaping the magnetic configuration Toroidal field coils Number of toroidal field coils NTF = 18 Two loops Nb3Sn+NbTi Total TFC current ITF = 70 MA-turns TFC magnetic energy WTF = 6 GJ DEMO-FNS Poloidal magnetic system PF2 5 PF1 PF3 4 PF4 CS3 3 ACu PF5 2 CS2 PC1u 1 VV 0 CS1 -1 PC1l PF coils CS -2 ACl -3 -4 -5 0 2 4 6 DEMO-TIN cross section. Position of passive (PC1) and active (AC) control coils is shown. Two variants of passive stabilisation coils with 2 (left) and 24 (right) frames General layout of DEMO-FNS TF coil cross section Equatorial section of DEMO-FNS Radial structure of DEMO-FNS Vertical axis TF coil body Vacuum vessel Plasma First wall Vacuum vessel SOL First wall TF coil loops Blanket TF coil body T- TF coil body Central solenoid Shield TF coil body Plasma TF coil loops T-Shield Central solenoid TF coil loops First wall VV centre Vacuum vessel Blanket Plasma Blanket SOL First wall TF coil loops Vacuum vessel T-Shield TF coil body DEMO-FNS vacuum vessel details • The vacuum vessel (VV) is made of austenitic stainless steel (SS) with the shell thickness of 3 cm and the 2 cm bulkheads (ribs) • The volume of the VV is filled with 70% SS and 30 % water for neurton&gamma shielding • The VV thickness is 50 cm at the high field side (HFS) and 60 cm at the LFS and divertor regions • The VV acts as a radiation shield of the magnetic system reducing the radiation heating below 1 mW/cm-3 DEMO-FNS Vacuum vessel (VV) VV sector VV sector (inside) (outside) Blanket segmentation Shield between two shells of VV Electronic mockup of VV VV shell VV ribs VV shell under 40 bars of internal Distribution of EM pressure for upward disruption accident pressure VV cooling system Pump1 Heat exchanger 1 Circuit1 Neutron shield unit VV shell VV shell
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