Rethinking Science: a Philosophical Introduction to the Unity of Science

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Rethinking Science: a Philosophical Introduction to the Unity of Science RETHINKING SCIENCE Science and humanity are usually seen as very different: the sciences of nature aim at explanations whereas the sciences of man seek meaning and understanding. This book shows how these contrasting descriptions fail to fit into a modem philosophical account of the sciences and the arts. Presenting some of the major ideas within the philosophy of science on facts, explanation, interpretation, methods, laws, and theories, Jan Faye compares various approaches, including his own. Arguing that the sciences of nature and the sciences of man share a common practice of acquiring knowledge, this book offers a unique introduction to key aspects in the philosophy of science. ASHGATE NEW CRITICAL THINKING IN PHILOSOPHY The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy series aims to bring high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, the international library market, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars from across the philosophical spectrum, this new monograph series presents cutting-edge research from established as well as exciting new authors in the field; spans the breadth of philosophy and related disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives; and takes contemporary philosophical research into new directions and debate. Series Editorial Board: Professor David Cooper, University of Durham, UK Professor Peter Lipton, University of Cambridge, UK Professor Sean Sayers, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK Dr Simon Critchley, University of Essex, UK Dr Simon Glendinning, University of Reading, UK Professor Paul Helm, King’s College London, UK Dr David Lamb, University of Birmingham, UK Professor John Post, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA Professor Alan Goldman, University of Miami, Florida, USA Professor Joseph Friggieri, University of Malta, Malta Professor Graham Priest, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia Professor Moira Gatens, University of Sydney, Australia Professor Alan Musgrave, University of Otago, New Zealand Rethinking Science A philosophical introduction to the unity of science JAN FAYE University of Copenhagen ROUTLEDGE Routledge Taylor & Francis Gruop LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2002 by Ashgate Publishing Reissued 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 ThirdAvenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jan Faye 2002 The Author has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Publisher's Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 2002018698 ISBN 13: 978-1-138-72800-4 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-315-19016-7 (ebk) Contents Preface vi 1 The Unity of the Sciences 1 2 Reductionism, Emergentism, and Holism 11 3 Explanation 24 4 Interpretation 47 5 Facts 64 6 Methods 83 7 Laws and Rules 114 8 Theories and Models 142 9 Realism and Antirealism 168 10 Beyond the Sciences 201 Index 215 To Lisa Preface Philosophy of science was founded by the logical positivists as a separate discipline within philosophy. They had great knowledge of science, wrote extensively on mathematics and physics, and wanted to provide a solid ground for doing science - much like Kant did before them. As a conse­ quence the positivists opted for the unity of all the sciences. But their focus was more on the cognitive meaning of scientific theories than on the distinctive scientific practices, and their meta-language was logic rather than ordinary language or mathematics. The positivists were undoubtedly some of the great thinkers of modern­ ism. But time passed - and a strong reaction against anything that carried a hint of positivism emerged, including the idea of the unity of the sciences. First came the Wittgensteinian turn within the philosophy of science, then the historical turn, and finally the sociological turn. These different move­ ments were forerunners in the ideological confrontation with modernism that culminated in so-called social constructivism and post-modernism. Among them we see an increasing mistrust in a notion of common truth, rationality, representation, method, meaning and origin. All these notions were now to be understood in relation to a language game, a context, a paradigm, a power structure, a society, or a tradition. Feyerabend bit the bullet when he claimed that anything goes within science believing that we could find no general norms of doing science. As much as anybody, he was a philosopher of the post-modern era. I think we can leam something from the post-modern criticism of modernism, its rejection of absolute and transcendental norms and values, cognitive or otherwise. Nonetheless I also believe that time has come to rethink science and to reintroduce the notion of the unity of science on new ground. The solutions and suggestions that post-modernism and social constructivism have offered are much too extravagant. Even if epistemic values and norms can only be justified with respect to the process of knowledge itself, this fact does not entail that these norms are merely relative to any particular subject, language, power structure, or culture. Instead I call for a revision of the rational basis of science in accordance with the insights we gained from the criticism of positivism and modern­ ism, but still maintaining some trust in the rationality and unity of the viii Rethinking Science scientific enterprise. Thus, the position being advocated here can be seen as a kind of neo-modernism. For the most part this book is a translation of a work I recently pub­ lished in Danish under the title Athenes kammer. En filosofisk indf0ring i videnskabemes enhed. Only minor additions and corrections have been made except in Chapter 3 which has been considerably enlarged. I wish to express my gratitude to the Danish publisher, Morten Hesseldahl, H0st & S0n for allowing me this English edition. My thanks also go to Susan Dew for having struggled successfully with the translation, and no less to my friend and colleague, Henry Folse, who with characteristic generosity has commented on the entire manuscript and thereby helped to improve it greatly. I am also indebted to the Danish Institute for the Advanced Studies in Humanities for funding making this translation possible. Copenhagen, June 2002 1 The Unity of the Sciences Science is one of the cornerstones of modern society. Indeed, it is true to say that the development of science since the Renaissance has been crucial to the emergence of modem society. Today vast sums of money are channelled into science in the expectation that it will yield solutions to specific problems, and by so doing enhance the conditions of human life and further technological progress. Science enables us to combat disease, furnishes us with knowledge about the structures of chemical substances, thereby enabling us to manufacture new materials; it studies the forces of nature in order to harness them for the production of energy and heat. But quite apart from these practical aims, science satisfies the common human aspiration to acquire systematic knowledge of nature and society and to arrive at an understanding of our own peculiar nature, culture and history. As determined by its object, science is partitioned into natural science, social science and human science. Briefly, the natural sciences seek to attain knowledge about both inanimate and animate nature. They encom­ pass such subjects as astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, meteorology, biology, botany and zoology. The social sciences, on the other hand, study society or sectors of society and their subdivisions; its compass takes in states, nations, political parties, organizations, institutions and the family. Among the various disciplines in this area we find economics, political science, sociology and anthropology. And lastly we have the human sciences. These comprise a very large group of varied disciplines whose focus is the human person qua thinking, willing and acting subject, and human cultural products ranging from linguistic utterances, texts and works of art to myths, utensils, tools and clothing. They encompass human history too in all its dimensions and aspects. The humanities include such subjects as psychology, linguistics, art history, film, comparative literature, ethnol­ ogy, archaeology and the history of ideas. It is important in a democratic society that citizens are informed about what science is in a general sense, what distinguishes the particular sci­ ences and marks them off from one another. Even if, in the final analysis, it is the researchers themselves who define their subject, it is important that the wider public be capable of entering into critical dialogue with them. 2 Rethinking Science Even more important is that scholars and scientists not only know about the subject content of their own discipline but also have a fairly clear idea of what science is - what marks out science as a species of knowledge. For even if a researcher knows a good deal about physics, biology, economy or philology, he or she need not necessarily know very much about what science is in a generic sense, or how it is practised. Habitual engagement with the problems of a particular subject takes the form of practical knowledge comparable to the ability to ride a bike.
Recommended publications
  • Three Chronic Errors: Some Misconceptions Concerning the Direction of Time
    1 Three Chronic Errors: Some Misconceptions concerning the Direction of Time In a subject in which differing opinions are rife, it is difficult to discern anything like a consensus on what constitutes the direction of time. Physicists routinely identify it with the direction of increasing entropy, and then part company over whether this is in turn founded on such esoterica as the expansion of the universe (Gold), the no-boundary condition + weak anthropic principle (Hawking), a broken time-symmetry at the microscopic level (Prigogine), or the surfeit of entropy produced by a massive inflation of spacetime in the first –35 10 seconds of the universe’s existence (Guth, Davies).1 Philosophers, on the other hand, have been skeptical of attempts to define time’s direction in terms of entropy considerations, at least since the failure of Reichenbach’s efforts in mid-century.2 Grünbaum has abandoned the idea of a ‘direction’ in favor of an anisotropy between the two possible directions of time3; Earman doubts the relevance of entropy4; and Mehlberg, Horwich and Price see time as intrinsically symmetric.5 There is, nevertheless, an orthodoxy of sorts. For, despite their differences over the origin or relevance of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, all these authors (save Prigogine) agree on the following premises as their point of departure: the direction of time is not the direction in which events “come to be”, since temporal becoming is a mere facet of 1 Thomas Gold, “Cosmic Processes and the Nature of Time”, in Mind and Cosmos, ed. Robert G. Colodny (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 311-329; Stephen Hawking, “The No- Boundary Condition and the Arrow of Time”, in The Physical Origins of Time Asymmetry ed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Philosophy in a Naturalized World
    EuJAP | Vol. 8 | No. 1 | 2012 ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER UDK: 1 Dummett, M. 1:53 530.1:140.8 113/119 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN A NATURALIZED WORLD JAN FAYE University of Copenhagen ABSTRACT 1. Introduction This paper discusses the late Michael Dummett’s Why are humanists and natural scientists characterization of the estrangement between unable to understand one another? Th is physics and philosophy. It argues against those physicists who hold that modern physics, seems to be one of the two main questions rather than philosophy, can answer traditional that concern Sir Michael in his thought- metaphysical questions such as why there is provoking essay “Th e Place of Philosophy something rather than nothing. The claim is that in the European Culture.” He does not physics cannot solve metaphysical problems since metaphysical issues are in principle himself supply us with any defi nite answer, empirically underdetermined. The paper closes but suggests that philosophers in general with a critical discussion of the assumption of do not know much about the natural some cosmologists that the Universe was created sciences, and therefore do not dare to speak out of nothing: In contrast to this misleading up against the natural scientists (and those assumption, it is proposed that the Universe has a necessary existence and that the present epoch who do are not interested in the same kind after the Big Bang is a contingent realization of of problems as the scientists.) Moreover, the Universe. because of the great success of the natural sciences scientists are often arrogant by Keywords: : Dummett, physics, philosophy, meta- assuming that the only knowledge we physics, underdetermination, cosmology can have is the knowledge they are able to provide.
    [Show full text]
  • Luis-Alberto CORDERO-LECCA)
    Luis-Alberto CORDERO-LECCA) Full Professor of Philosophy and History, City University of New York at the CUNY Graduate Center and Queens College CUNY. Director of Graduate Studies, Philosophy Department, Queens College, CUNY. Numerary Member of the Academie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences and of the Institute de Hautes Sciences Theoriques, Brussels. Doctor, Honoris Causa, Universdad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos; Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad Peruana Ricardo Palma, Lima; Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad, Universidad Nacional del Altiplano, Puno, Peru; Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad Nacional Hermilio Valdizán, Huánuco. Honorary Professor, Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia, Lima, Peru. Former Chairman of the Philosophy Panel of the Research Foundation, CUNY. Former Chairman of the Columbia University Seminar on the History & Philosophy of Science. Former University Director of the Library, Publications and Museums of Cayetano Heredia University (Lima-Peru). Former Chairman of the Department of Physics & Mathematics and Honorary Director of the Program for Scientific Thought, Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia, Lima, Peru. Fields: Philosophy of science and the philosophical history of science; scientific realism, foundations of physics, contemporary naturalism. ALBERTO CORDERO (Luis-Alberto Cordero-Lecca) Curriculum Vitae, January, 2021) FIELDS: Philosophy of science and the philosophical history of science; scientific realism, foundations of physics, contemporary naturalism. NATIONALITY: Peruvian HIGHER EDUCATION
    [Show full text]
  • Science and Reality
    Science and reality Jan Faye Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen Since the heyday of logical positivism, the dominant view in philosophy of science has been Realism. But over the last two or three decades its prominence seems to decline. No one wants to return to the excesses of logical positivism, but as the dust after the battle settled, it became more and more clear that not everything the defeated part stood for was without merit. And, as we shall see, Realism has its excesses and problems too. Hardcore instrumentalists believed that the scientific theories are mere tools for predictions and calculations and that they contain no content telling us how the world really is, being conceptual tools that are neither true nor false. Theories help us to organize empirical data in virtue of the claim of theoretical entities, but theoretical entities are, and always will be, fictitious mental constructions because their alleged existence would transcend anything that could be established by sense experience. Realism grows out of the practical and observational success of science it- self. Instrumentalism, in contrast, is generated by a philosophical desire to strip metaphysics of any veil of legitimacy and to dress science in armour of epistemic warrant. As long as astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology dealt mainly with macroscopic objects which could be observed, as was the case to the end of 19th century, the acceptance of the instrumentalist view had no far-reaching implica- tions, neither with respect to the number of theoretical entities explained away, nor with respect to possible technological consequences of a belief in these enti- ties.
    [Show full text]
  • The Great Math Mystery Mario Livio (1950 - ) Astrophysicist and Writer Astrofísico Y Escritor Astrophysicien Et Écrivain Space Telescope Science Institute
    “How is it possible that mathematics, a product of human thought that is independent of experience, fits so excellently the objects of physical reality?” “¿Cómo es posible que la matemática, un producto del pensamiento humano independiente de la experiencia, se adapte tan admirablemente a los objetos de la realidad?”1 Albert Einstein (1879-1955) “Intelligent people would never say, ‘I don’t care about art, or music. But it is totally okay to say, ‘I hate math.’” The Great Math Mystery Mario Livio (1950 - ) Astrophysicist and writer Astrofísico y escritor Astrophysicien et écrivain Space Telescope Science Institute LIVIO, Mario, “The Great Math Mystery”. This is a Nova Production for WGBF Boston. © 2015 WGBF Educational Foundation. All rights reserved. This program was produced by WGBF, which is solely responsible for its content. Cf.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pPUTrIgdCZI 1 JAMMER, Max, Einstein and Religion, Princeton University Press, 1921, p. 124. The Great Math Mystery Documentary New 2015 HD http://docuwiki.net/index.php?title=T... The Great Math Mystery Documentary New 2015 HD NOVA leads viewers on a mathematical mystery tour –a provocative exploration of math’s astonishing power across the centuries. We discover math’s signature in the swirl of a nautilus shell, the whirlpool of a galaxy, and the spiral in the center of a sunflower. Math was essential to everything from the first wireless radio transmissions to the successful landing of rovers on Mars. But where does math get its power? Astrophysicist and writer Mario Livio, along with a colorful cast of mathematicians, physicists, and engineers, follow math from Pythagoras to Einstein and beyond, all leading to the ultimate riddle: Is math an invention or a discovery? Humankind’s clever trick or the language of the universe? Whether we think we’re good with numbers or not, we all use math in our daily lives.
    [Show full text]
  • PHI 514 – from Physics to Metaphysics
    PHI 514 – From Physics to Metaphysics Weeks 4–6, 10–12: Indeterminacy in Quantum Mechanics (Halvorson) 1. Logic and probability in classical physics [Bub97, pp. 13–22], [Var85, Chap. 1] 2. The uncertainty relations and their interpretation [UH01], [Jam74, Chap. 3]. (a) Some thought experiments (b) The epistemic interpretation. Heisenberg’s disturbance interpre- tation [Hei30, pp. 13-20]. (c) The statistical interpretation (Popper) [Pop82, pp. 52-64, 144ff.], [Jam74, pp. 448–453] (d) The conceptual interpretation (Bohr); complementarity 3. From uncertainty to indeterminacy: Operationlism, positivist criteria of meaning (a) Operationalist definitions of concepts [Bri27] (b) Historical fact: Bohr doesn’t infer indeterminacy from uncer- tainty [Gr¨u57], [Mur87, pp. 139–154], [How00]. 4. Logic and probability in quantum mechanics Resources: Clifton’s notes [Cli96] are thorough and self-contained. There are shorter introductions in [Ism00], [Alb92, pp. 17–60], [Red89, pp. 5–32, 170–178], and [Bub97, pp. 23–39, 246–274]. For a more in- depth treatment, see [Hug89, Chaps. 1–5] or [van92, pp. 139–237]. 5. Against the disturbance interpretation (a) (For a technical critique – making use of details of the gamma- ray microscope – see [BR81]. I do not plan to discuss this in the seminar.) (b) The “no hidden variables” theorems of von Neumann and Kochen- Specker [Red89], [Hea79] (c) The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument 6. Contextual hidden variables; de-occamization [Shi93a] 1 7. Which quantities are real? (a) Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link (This is what Fine [Fin87] calls the “rule of silence” and “rule of law.”); Collapse of the Wavefunction (b) Booleanism (c) The problem of the non-maximal observable (d) Definability and the Bub-Clifton theorem [BC96] 8.
    [Show full text]
  • Bohr's Relational Holism and the Classical-Quantum Interaction1
    1 Bohr’s Relational Holism and the classical-quantum Interaction1 Mauro Dorato Department of Philosophy Communication and Media Studies University of Rome “Roma Tre”, Via Ostiense 234, 00144, Rome, Italy [email protected] 1 Introduction: a conflict in Bohr’s philosophy? Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been charged for what is allegedly one of its major shortcomings, namely the advocacy of an unambiguous classical/quantum distinction (let me refer to this view with the label the distinction thesis). As is well known, such a distinction is needed to defend Bohr’s view that any communicable measurement outcome must presuppose a classically describable instrument, with respect to which any reference to the quantum of action can be neglected (Bohr 1958, 4). Critics have then often insisted on the fact that the distinction in question is hopelessly vague (Bell 1987, 29) or at least strongly contextual (Ghirardi 2004), so that Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from the same vagueness and adhoc-ness. The resulting problem is, allegedly, a renunciation to describe the dynamical interaction between system and apparatus in a physically precise, theoretically based and non-contextual way, and therefore to offer a much-needed solution to the measurement problem. In my paper I will present and critically discuss the main strategies that Bohr used and could have used to defend from this charge his interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, in the first part I will reassess the main arguments that Bohr used to advocate the 1 Thanks to Henry Folse and Jan Faye for their attentive reading of a previous draft of the paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant, Gödel and Relativity1
    1 Kant, Gödel and Relativity1 Mauro Dorato Dept. of Philosophy Università di Roma Tre Via Ostiense 234 00146, Rome, Italy tel. +39-06-54577523; fax +39-06-54577540 e-mail: [email protected] Forthcoming in P. Gardenfors, K. Kijania-Placek and J. Wolenski (eds.), Proceedings of the invited papers for the 11th International Congress of the Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002, pp.329-346. Abstract Since the onset of logical positivism, the general wisdom of the philosophy of science has it that the kantian philosophy of (space and) time has been superseded by the theory of relativity, in the same sense in which the latter has replaced Newton’s theory of absolute space and time. On the wake of Cassirer and Gödel, in this paper I raise doubts on this commonplace. I first suggest some conditions that are necessary to defend the ideality of time in the sense of Kant, and I then bring to bear some contemporary physical theories on such conditions. 1 What is “the problem of time”? Time is absolutely central in our inner experience, but at least since the foundation of modern physics, it also plays an important role in the description of the outer world. To the extent that there is a physical and a mental time, one can safely surmise that the problem of trying to establish whether and how they are related is one of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of time. Are physical and mental time in conflict, or we can regard the former as some sort of appropriate extension to the outer world of the main features of the latter? These questions, important as they are, already presuppose, however, that there are two sides of the problem, namely that there is, at a fundamental level of description, a physical time.
    [Show full text]
  • Causality, Contiguity, and Construction
    __________________________________ Papers ________________________________ Causality, Contiguity, and Construction Jan Faye Abstract: The paper discusses the regularity account of causation but finds it insufficient as a complete account of our notion of causality. The attractiveness of the regularity account is its attempt to under- stand causation in terms of empirically accessible features of the world. However, this account does not match our intuition that singu- lar causality is prior in normal epistemic situations and that there is more to causation than mere succession. Apart from succession and regularity, the concept of causality also contains a modal feature which allows us to engage in counterfactual discourses about singular causal events and to claim that a particular cause is both sufficient and neces- sary for its effect in the circumstances. However, we may directly ob- serve singular causes, but the modal element is not something we can possibly observe. Rather, this element is something we add to our per- ception of succession. Thus, the paper suggests that the modal feature of causality is a mental construction which was originally formed by our knowledge of certain structural features of similar events in other situations. It stems not from what we actually observe but from what we have observed or may observe under different but relevant cir- cumstances. So the concept of causation has partly an empirical con- tent and partly a constructed one. Keywords: causation, the regularity account, causal modality. The concept of causality is commonly regarded as essential for understanding the difference between accidental and non-accidental happenings and the relation between the actual and the possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
    NIELS BOHR AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editor ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University Editorial Advisory Board THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University ofPittsburgh SAHOTRA SARKAR, Dibner Institute M.l. T. SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University MARX W. WARTOFSKY, Baruch College of the City University ofNew York VOLUME 153 NIELS BOHR AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY Edited by JAN FAYE Carlsberg Foundation, Copenhagen , Denmark and HENRY J. FOLSE Department ofPhilosophy, Loyola University, New Orleans, U. S. A. ...,~ Springer-Science+Business Media, B.Y. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Niels Bohr and contemporary phIlosophy / edited by Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse. p. cm . -- (Boston studIes in the phi losophy of scIence; v. 153) Includes bIblIographIcal references and index. 1. Physlcs--Phl10sophy. 2 . PhIlosophy. Modern. I . Faye. Jan . II. Folse. Henry J .• 1945- III. Series. [DNLM : 1. Bohr. Niels Henrik DaVid. 1885-1962--Views on phIlosophy.] aC16.B65N493 1993 530' .01--dc20 DLC for Library of Congress 93-24825 ISBN 978-90-481-4299-6 ISBN 978-94-015-8106-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8106-6 Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved © 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1994. Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1994 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechancial, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
    [Show full text]
  • Bohr Meets Rovelli: a Dispositionalist Account of the Quantum Limits of Knowledge
    Bohr meets Rovelli: a dispositionalist account of the quantum limits of knowledge Mauro Dorato Department of Philosophy, Communication and Media Studies Università degli Studi Roma Tre, Via Ostiense 234, 00146, Rome, Italy 1) Introduction: ignoramus and ignorabimus?1 In the last couple of centuries, the history of physics has at times been sparkled by two opposite attitudes, which to simplify we could denote a radically pessimistic and an overoptimistic one. As a famous representative of the former first camp, we find the German physiologist Emile Du Bois- Reymond, who in a famous speech held in 1880 at the Berlin Academy of science claimed that there were seven world enigmas (Die Sieben Welträtzel) that neither science nor philosophy could ever solve. Among these mysteries, he listed the nature of matter and force, the origin of life, the origin of intelligent thought and the question of free will. As a representative of the overoptimistic camp, we can enlist Lord Kelvin when, a couple of decades later (April 27, 1900) gave a speech at the Royal Institute entitled "Nineteenth-Century Clouds over the Dynamical Theory of Heat and Light”, in which he defended the view that physical knowledge was complete, so that the only future task for physicists was the “minor” one of providing more precise experimental measures of already known quantities. However, more realistically, deeply cognizant as he was of contemporary physical theories, mentioned “two clouds” - that as we now know, will lead to a thunderstorm! - namely the failure of Michelson and Morley’s experiment and the ultraviolet catastrophe (clouds that have been swept away thanks to the special theory of relativity and to quantum mechanics respectively).
    [Show full text]
  • Is Time an Abstract Entity?
    Is Time an Abstract Entity? Jan Faye, Copenhagen Introduction Time is a shadowy entity. On the one hand, it appears elusive, intangi- ble, and invisible. What we see is not time itself but changes of things and thoughts. In its proper form time seems to be given to us in the immediate experience as things and thoughts undergoing change prior to any concep- tual understanding. Th us immediate experience and the temporal conscious- ness of the world have profound implications for how we reach a grasp of time. Some philosophers therefore think that the actuality of the present is a fundamental property of any change and see this feature as a manifesta- tion of temporal becoming from the past to the future. On the other hand, modern physics takes the combination of space and time to be a real entity which may even have an infl uence on the distribution of energy and matter. Th is is why others maintain that the study of physics can give us a complete and correct answer concerning the nature of time. It is in this perspective that I shall suggest that time is not a concrete but an abstract particular. If we apply all the common criteria of abstractness, it turns out that time is able to meet each and every one of them. I think this is because our concept of time is a result of an abstraction from our experience of concrete, physical things undergoing change. We need such a concept in order to be able to name and measure such things and events.
    [Show full text]