Rethinking Science: a Philosophical Introduction to the Unity of Science
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RETHINKING SCIENCE Science and humanity are usually seen as very different: the sciences of nature aim at explanations whereas the sciences of man seek meaning and understanding. This book shows how these contrasting descriptions fail to fit into a modem philosophical account of the sciences and the arts. Presenting some of the major ideas within the philosophy of science on facts, explanation, interpretation, methods, laws, and theories, Jan Faye compares various approaches, including his own. Arguing that the sciences of nature and the sciences of man share a common practice of acquiring knowledge, this book offers a unique introduction to key aspects in the philosophy of science. ASHGATE NEW CRITICAL THINKING IN PHILOSOPHY The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy series aims to bring high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, the international library market, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars from across the philosophical spectrum, this new monograph series presents cutting-edge research from established as well as exciting new authors in the field; spans the breadth of philosophy and related disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives; and takes contemporary philosophical research into new directions and debate. Series Editorial Board: Professor David Cooper, University of Durham, UK Professor Peter Lipton, University of Cambridge, UK Professor Sean Sayers, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK Dr Simon Critchley, University of Essex, UK Dr Simon Glendinning, University of Reading, UK Professor Paul Helm, King’s College London, UK Dr David Lamb, University of Birmingham, UK Professor John Post, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA Professor Alan Goldman, University of Miami, Florida, USA Professor Joseph Friggieri, University of Malta, Malta Professor Graham Priest, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia Professor Moira Gatens, University of Sydney, Australia Professor Alan Musgrave, University of Otago, New Zealand Rethinking Science A philosophical introduction to the unity of science JAN FAYE University of Copenhagen ROUTLEDGE Routledge Taylor & Francis Gruop LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2002 by Ashgate Publishing Reissued 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 ThirdAvenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jan Faye 2002 The Author has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Publisher's Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 2002018698 ISBN 13: 978-1-138-72800-4 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-315-19016-7 (ebk) Contents Preface vi 1 The Unity of the Sciences 1 2 Reductionism, Emergentism, and Holism 11 3 Explanation 24 4 Interpretation 47 5 Facts 64 6 Methods 83 7 Laws and Rules 114 8 Theories and Models 142 9 Realism and Antirealism 168 10 Beyond the Sciences 201 Index 215 To Lisa Preface Philosophy of science was founded by the logical positivists as a separate discipline within philosophy. They had great knowledge of science, wrote extensively on mathematics and physics, and wanted to provide a solid ground for doing science - much like Kant did before them. As a conse quence the positivists opted for the unity of all the sciences. But their focus was more on the cognitive meaning of scientific theories than on the distinctive scientific practices, and their meta-language was logic rather than ordinary language or mathematics. The positivists were undoubtedly some of the great thinkers of modern ism. But time passed - and a strong reaction against anything that carried a hint of positivism emerged, including the idea of the unity of the sciences. First came the Wittgensteinian turn within the philosophy of science, then the historical turn, and finally the sociological turn. These different move ments were forerunners in the ideological confrontation with modernism that culminated in so-called social constructivism and post-modernism. Among them we see an increasing mistrust in a notion of common truth, rationality, representation, method, meaning and origin. All these notions were now to be understood in relation to a language game, a context, a paradigm, a power structure, a society, or a tradition. Feyerabend bit the bullet when he claimed that anything goes within science believing that we could find no general norms of doing science. As much as anybody, he was a philosopher of the post-modern era. I think we can leam something from the post-modern criticism of modernism, its rejection of absolute and transcendental norms and values, cognitive or otherwise. Nonetheless I also believe that time has come to rethink science and to reintroduce the notion of the unity of science on new ground. The solutions and suggestions that post-modernism and social constructivism have offered are much too extravagant. Even if epistemic values and norms can only be justified with respect to the process of knowledge itself, this fact does not entail that these norms are merely relative to any particular subject, language, power structure, or culture. Instead I call for a revision of the rational basis of science in accordance with the insights we gained from the criticism of positivism and modern ism, but still maintaining some trust in the rationality and unity of the viii Rethinking Science scientific enterprise. Thus, the position being advocated here can be seen as a kind of neo-modernism. For the most part this book is a translation of a work I recently pub lished in Danish under the title Athenes kammer. En filosofisk indf0ring i videnskabemes enhed. Only minor additions and corrections have been made except in Chapter 3 which has been considerably enlarged. I wish to express my gratitude to the Danish publisher, Morten Hesseldahl, H0st & S0n for allowing me this English edition. My thanks also go to Susan Dew for having struggled successfully with the translation, and no less to my friend and colleague, Henry Folse, who with characteristic generosity has commented on the entire manuscript and thereby helped to improve it greatly. I am also indebted to the Danish Institute for the Advanced Studies in Humanities for funding making this translation possible. Copenhagen, June 2002 1 The Unity of the Sciences Science is one of the cornerstones of modern society. Indeed, it is true to say that the development of science since the Renaissance has been crucial to the emergence of modem society. Today vast sums of money are channelled into science in the expectation that it will yield solutions to specific problems, and by so doing enhance the conditions of human life and further technological progress. Science enables us to combat disease, furnishes us with knowledge about the structures of chemical substances, thereby enabling us to manufacture new materials; it studies the forces of nature in order to harness them for the production of energy and heat. But quite apart from these practical aims, science satisfies the common human aspiration to acquire systematic knowledge of nature and society and to arrive at an understanding of our own peculiar nature, culture and history. As determined by its object, science is partitioned into natural science, social science and human science. Briefly, the natural sciences seek to attain knowledge about both inanimate and animate nature. They encom pass such subjects as astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, meteorology, biology, botany and zoology. The social sciences, on the other hand, study society or sectors of society and their subdivisions; its compass takes in states, nations, political parties, organizations, institutions and the family. Among the various disciplines in this area we find economics, political science, sociology and anthropology. And lastly we have the human sciences. These comprise a very large group of varied disciplines whose focus is the human person qua thinking, willing and acting subject, and human cultural products ranging from linguistic utterances, texts and works of art to myths, utensils, tools and clothing. They encompass human history too in all its dimensions and aspects. The humanities include such subjects as psychology, linguistics, art history, film, comparative literature, ethnol ogy, archaeology and the history of ideas. It is important in a democratic society that citizens are informed about what science is in a general sense, what distinguishes the particular sci ences and marks them off from one another. Even if, in the final analysis, it is the researchers themselves who define their subject, it is important that the wider public be capable of entering into critical dialogue with them. 2 Rethinking Science Even more important is that scholars and scientists not only know about the subject content of their own discipline but also have a fairly clear idea of what science is - what marks out science as a species of knowledge. For even if a researcher knows a good deal about physics, biology, economy or philology, he or she need not necessarily know very much about what science is in a generic sense, or how it is practised. Habitual engagement with the problems of a particular subject takes the form of practical knowledge comparable to the ability to ride a bike.