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Home , Geisteswissenschaft, Jan Faye

Notes

1 From Geisteswissenschaft to

1. Snow (1959/1964). 2. Sokal (1996a). 3. Sokal (1996b). 4. Lyotard (1979) coined the term “postmodern” in opposition to the “grand narratives”, i.e. large overarching theories and philosophical systems. A fam- ous quotation from this book goes like this: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legit- imation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narra- tive function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements – narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the inter section of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.” (pp. xxiv-xxv) 5. See Habermas (1968/1971), pp. 140–145; 209–212.

2 The Naturalization of the

1. I want to make a distinction between ‘presentation’ and ‘representation.’ Mental states like sensory impression and perceptual experience I consider to be presentations because their epistemic content is not intentionally deter- mined by the observer’s act of will, whereas artefacts like words and pictures are representations because their epistemic content is intentionally determined by how they are used, are put to use, or understood in one way or another. 2. Faye and Kauffmann (2012). 3. Some philosophers argue that we cannot understand what a cognitive system is unless we go beyond the function of a singular brain and regard cognition as distributed among other systems as well. However, these other systems include not only other neurological systems but all kinds of material, non- neurological devices such as paper and pencil, computers, TVs, apparatuses, etc. A good representative for this position is Andy Clark. He goes even fur- ther by arguing that a person’s mind should be thought of as including these artifacts. See Clark (1997: 213–218). But I agree very much with Ronald Giere (2006) on this point when he claims that such extensions of the concept of the mind do “not provide theoretical advantages for the study of science. On the contrary, they introduce a host of theoretical problems that confuse

207 208 Notes

more than enlighten. We are theoretically better off rejecting those supposed innovations.” (p. 110). But I disagree with Giere’s form of reductive natural- ism illustrated by the following remark: “I am willing to regard the ordinary concept of an agent as an idealized model, like that of a point mass in classical mechanics. Such things do not physically exist, but is useful model nonethe- less. The same could be true of our ordinary notion of human agency. Like idealized models in science, it has proven useful in organizing our individual and collective lives. Indeed, our systems of morality and justice are built upon it.” (p. 111) According to Giere, because human agency does not physically exist, it is not really real. But the view I defend here is that the notion of human agency is not a construction in the sense that there are no phenom- ena to be described unless they first have been constituted by a constructive act. The properties we normally associate with human agency, such as being a mind, having consciousness, intentionality, and free will, are just as objective as physical properties like mass and electric charge. These properties cannot be explained in terms of neurological structures. 4. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), p. 24. 5. See Dutton (2009), pp. 13 ff. 6. I do not suggest that Dutton believes otherwise; rather he might very well agree with this claim judged from what he has to say about intentionalism on pp. 164–177. 7. For instance, Henry Folse has informed me that there has been an enormous production of Katrina art (named after the hurricane ‘Katrina’ that destroyed a large part of New Orleans in 2005), most intended to invoke pity, shock and awe, but other more outré emotions as well, including even humour. There are probably nearly a hundred “arty” photo books alone; there are also films, dramas, installations, and other less categorizable productions. Consider the evolutionary value of humour as a response to tragedy. 8. Miller (2009), p. 335. 9. Indeed, we can and do ‘speak’ about inanimate things as though they had intentions, but we understand this mode of speech as metaphorical, not in the literal way which is understood when talking about human actions. 10. Spohn (2011), p. 243. 11. Ibid., p. 247. 12. Ibid., p. 248. 13. Cf. Dorato & Faye (2003) 14. Sellars (1956/1997), pp. 102 ff.

3 Explanation in the Sciences of Man

1. Cf. Hempel (1948/1965). 2. See also Faye (2010) and (2011). 3. See, for instance, van Frassen (1980), p. 144, and Achinstein (1983), p. 42. 4. See Faye (1999); Faye (2002) chap. 3; and in particular Faye (2007). 5. Bitzer (1968), p. 8. 6. Achinstein (1983), p. 16. 7. Austin (1962). 8. See Faye (2002). Giere (1999) and Giere (2006) defend a similar view. Notes 209

9. See, for instance, Dennett (1985) and (1991). 10. Ryle (1949), pp. 86–87. 11. Melden (1961) pp. 52–53, 78 ff. 12. Davidson (1980), pp. 11 ff. 13. von Wright (1971), pp. 116 f. 14. See Faye (2002), pp. 38–39. 15. Davidson (1980), p. 79. 16. No doubt this is true, but alternative explanations are a feature of virtually all frontier areas of ongoing research in the natural sciences as well. 17. Elster (1989), p. 13. 18. Methodological includes different theoretical positions such as functionalism, , and Marxism 19. See Hollis (1994), pp. 94–114. 20. Ricoeur (1976), p. 74. 21. Ibid., p. 74. 22. Ibid., pp. 74–75. 23. Faye (2002), 40 ff.

4 The Pragmatics of Interpretation

1. An exception is and Jill Sigman (1993) in which they write about interpretation in the natural sciences and the arts. But van Fraassen does not attempt to relate their discussion of interpretation to his pragmatic theory of explanation. 2. Pettersson (2003), p. 30. After having mentioned all kinds of works on inter- pretation he states: “But whatever their focus, insights, or differences, these discussions and numerous others have one thing in common: they fail to define their subject. Apparently the concept of interpretation is so ingrained in our culture that even scholars who devote considerable energy to a scru- tiny of some of its aspects see no need to define or delimit the concept itself beyond a few simple assumptions.” 3. Levinson (1999), p. 3 4. Hermerén (1992), p. 136 5. See Faye (2002), p. 53. 6. I use the word “interpretee” for the recipient of an interpretation in the same way as an awardee is the recipient of an award. 7. Faye (2002), p. 53. 8. Hirsch (1967), p. 129. 9. Ibid., p. 136. 10. Ibid., p. 134. 11. Levinson isolates two notions of interpretation which he calls the “deter- minative mode of interpretation” and the “exploratory modes of interpret- ation”. The first is concerned with the question “What does it mean?”; the second is dealing with “What could it mean?” Even though the first notion is similar to the one suggested here, the second is not. 12. Pettersson (2003), p. 32. 13. The quotation is taken from the abstract of a talk entitled “Inaccessible Earth: Geomagnetism, In Situ Measurements, Remote Sensing, and Proxy Data” given by Gregory Good in Copenhagen, October 2010. 210 Notes

14. Nietzsche (1967), p. 346. 15. Popper (1959/1968), p. 107 n. 16. Hanson (1958), p. 7, p. 18. 17. Ibid., Ch. 1. 18. Sellars (1956/1997), p. 68 ff. 19. Ibid., pp. 79 ff. 20. See Faye (2000) 21. Stecker (2003), p. 20.

5 The Aims of Interpretation

1. Dilthey (1894), s. 144. 2. Gadamer (1960/1993), pp. 302–307. 3. Ibid., p. 307. 4. Ibid., p. 397. 5. In a paper from 2004 Stein Haugom Olsen gives the following summary of the traditional view on interpretation: “Both in German hermeneutic theory and in theories of interpretation current in the Anglophone world the mental uptake constituted by an interpretation is taken to be understandingg.” Olsen (2004), p. 135. The natural way of reading this passage is that interpretation does not only lead to understanding but that it is somehow necessary for understanding, which means that there is no understanding without inter- pretation. So, according to the traditional view, interpretation is conceptually sufficient and necessary for understanding. However, Olsen does not reject the view that interpretation is somehow more basic than understanding, but he believes that interpretation may also lead to forms of apprehension other than understanding: “[t]here are interpretations of texts the object of which is not understanding but other kinds of apprehension.” (p. 135). His reason is that “if an interpretation can be legitimate but still a misunderstanding, then this suggests that the link between interpretation and understanding cannot be a conceptual link and that there are modes of interpretation that do not aim at understanding.” (p. 144). I agree that the connection between interpretation and understanding is not conceptual. In my opinion the con- nection is causal. Understanding may be the intended causal effect of an interpretation (as it may be of an explanation). For instance, the object of interpretation is meaning, and the process of interpretation results in under- standing. Therefore, in contrast to Olsen, I also think that all misunderstand- ings appear to be understandings in the eyes of the beholders and that is not required in order to have what the subject regards as understanding. 6. Ibid., p. 7–8. 7. I bid., p. 306. 8. Ibid., pp. 369–70. 9. It would seem, given Gadamer’s omni-interpretation doctrine, that no text could raise a question all by itself. It got to be ‘interpreted as’ raising the question. So it appears there are really two interpretations going on in each case: first the object (text, speech, action) has to be interpreted as raising some particular question. This is the ‘pre-interpretive’ interpretation of the object as question-raising. Then, of course, we have to interpret the object a Notes 211

second time to answer the question raised by the pre-interpretation. This is the one we usually refer to when we say we interpret the object. 10. Ibid., p. 372. 11. Can “really” have any meaning in Gadamer’s omni-interpretation view? Suppose two rival answers were proposed by two rival interpreters. Which one is really the answer? How can that question have any meaning for Gadamer? If I associate the expressed meaning with the actors’ intentions, then there is a question of what their intentions really were. But Gadamer has disdained that approach. So I don’t see how he can use “really” here. 12. Ibid., p. 374. 13. Ibid. 14. See Betti (1962/1980). 15. Gadamer (1960/1993), p. 265. 16. See Hirsch, “Gadamer’s Theory of Interpretation” in Review of (1965). Reprinted in Hirsch (1967) 17. See Føllesdal (1979). In this paper Føllesdal characterizes the hermeneut- ics as the hypothetico-deductive method applied on meaningful material. Apparently he is not aware that Hirsch put forward a similar position four- teen years earlier. 18. See Hirsch (1967), Ch. 5. 19. Ibid., p. 264. 20. I think it is misleading to refer to one’s background or one’s worldview or the concepts and categories derived from them as a ‘prejudice.’ The word “prejudice” indicates a judgmental (usually negative, but possibly positive) attitude taken towards the object of prejudice. Furthermore, part of the intention in calling something a prejudice is the normative suggestion that is should be “stripped away” to reveal the unprejudiced judgmentally neutral ‘facts.’ I think that without maintaining Gadamer’s radical views about the omnipresence of ‘interpretation’ one can accept the broadly prag- matic view that the judgments we make presuppose a certain conceptual framework or scheme which structures our world, and that there is an ele- ment of construction in it, but a construction which is highly constrained by the content that concepts structure. 21. Faye (2002), Ch. 6. 22. Betti (1962/1980), p. 12. 23. Ibid., p. 35. 24. Hirsch (1967), p. 8. 25. Ibid., p. 249. 26. Ibid., p. 257. 27. As I said above, I think using the word “prejudice” to refer to the way in which our background beliefs influence our experience of the world is at least misleading and plays directly into the hands of the historicist relativ- ist. Nobody likes being called “prejudiced”; it is something to be avoided or if unavoidable, corrected for. But background beliefs cannot be avoided or corrected for, although of course they can, to an extent (depending on the psychological plasticity of the human mind), be replaced by different ones. 28. Barthes (1977), p. 148. 29. Eco (1983/1984), p. 7. 30. Fish (1980), p. 327. 212 Notes

31. Ibid., s. 317. 32. Hirsch (1967), p. 24. 33. Wimsatt & Beardsley (1946), p. 469. 34. Ibid., p. 470. 35. Juhl (1980), pp. 70–74. 36. Of course for the partisans of chimp speech these productions are intended. If we take as true the account of “Baby in my soup”, then the fact that this chimp is looking at a bowl of soup with a baby doll floating in it provides us with a context in which it seems quite reasonable to believe that when the chimp signs “Baby in my soup” she indeed does intend to communicate that meaning. Suppose it was further revealed that the chimp’s trainers had invested five years in teaching the chimp to use the computer to communi- cate her needs. Unless we know both the situation of the chimp when she makes this production and the semantic content of the apparent ‘text,’ then the conclusion that this could not have been intended seems to be nothing but a prejudice against chimpanzees. 37. Danto (1964) 38. Hirsch (1967), p. 1. 39. Ibid., p. 4. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 42. Some philosophers of literature such as Knapp & Michaels (1982) argue for a very extreme form of intentionalism: “We have argued that what a text means and what its author intends it to mean are identical and that their identity robs intention of any theoretical interest” (p. 19). But regardless of what they say, intentions and the meaning of a text cannot possibly be identical because individual intentions are psychological states, whereas the meaning of a text is not an individual psychological state. The meaning of a text may express the content of the author’s individual intentions in virtue of the text being a physical representation of the corresponding psychological states. 43. See Ricoeur (1976) 44. Eco (1992), p. 73ff. 45. See Tolhurst (1979) and Levinson (1996) 46. Booth (1961/1983), p. 74. 47. Levinson (1996), p. 229. 48. Booth (1961/1983), pp. 158–159. 49. Cf. Stecker (2003). 50. Cf. Faye (2000) and Faye (2002). 51. I am fully aware that visual and musical artworks communicate an artist’s intentions non-linguistically. But avoiding that the text becomes too tedi- ous and convoluted I often mention only the author and the text. 52. By function I mean that an expression is stated by a rhetor with an intended effect in mind. 53. Frow (2008), pp. 74–75. 54. This statement qualifies as an explanation only in the light of a question my daughter might have asked, such as “Why does the Queen live in London?” All by itself it simply communicates a piece of information; it states a par- ticular fact. 55. See Grice (1975), pp. 45 ff. Notes 213

6 How to Overcome a Myth?

1. See Faye (2003) for a critique of postmodernism. 2. It is also common among adherents of the semantic view of scientific theo- ries to see them as sets of models. I have, however, certain objections towards this view. Cf. Faye (2002), Ch. 8. 3. See Kuhn (1991/2000), p. 219 ff. In Kuhn’s vocabulary they are not yet ‘mature’; the social sciences, at least, are treated as immature sciences. Kuhn explicitly distinguishes the sciences from the humanities on the grounds that they do not display progress in the same way as do sciences (i.e. through normalcy, crisis, revolution, normalcy). Almost immediately humanistic scholars began applying his views to their disciplines (at least art and ), which Kuhn remarks was not at all his intention. Kuhn’s view seems to have been that we can apply his scheme of progress to the human sciences (those that study phenomena in which intentional- ity is involved essentially) but they come out immature, but it’s not at all applicable to the humanities since those fields do not progress (or progress in the same way) as the sciences do. While calling , , , ethnology, and “human sciences” seems quite appropriate, and one could then distinguish between the humanities and , I use “humanities” and “human sciences” synonymously and distinct from the “social sciences”. 4. Stratton-Pruitt (2003), pp. 137–138. 5. Snyder (1985). 6. Stork and Furuichi (2009) have made a very instructive confirmation of the representation of the mirror image by computer simulation: “Our geometric and (new) lighting confirm Janson’s and Snyder’s contention that the plane mirror on the back wall reflects the other side of the large paint- ing depicted within the tableau, not the king and queen themselves in the studio.” 7. Stratton-Pruitt (2003), p. 6. 8. Ibid., p. 128. 9. Brown (1978), p. 102. 10. Stratton-Pruitt (2003), p. 129. See also Brown (1978), p. 94. 11. Cf. Luxenberg (2003). 12. Stratton-Pruitt (2003), p. 126. 13. Quoted from Stratton-Pruitt (2003), p. 137. 14. Foucault (1966/1970), pp. 3–16. 15. Ibid., p. 7. 16. Ibid., p. 18. 17. Snyder (1985), p. 547. 18. Hirsch (1967), p. 209. 19. Ibid., p. 211. 20. Henry Folse has made this point in a private communication. 21. An anonymous reviewer challenges this statement, saying: “The mul- tiple reshapings of texts by editors, publishers, audiences and revisions (Richardson’s Clarissa, Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Nightt, Eliot’s The Waste Land) undermine the logical force of this argument.” However, I don’t see 214 Notes

this as an unavoidable consequence. First, authors’ artistic intentions are multifarious, stretching from paying attention to overall genre, style, narra- tives, structure, and plot to particular characters, episodes, metaphors, and single expressions. Even if editors and publishers change an author’s text, most of the author’s original intentions would continue to be expressed by the remaining text. If not, the text would no longer be the author’s but a pastiche. Moreover, the author would usually have accepted the editor’s and publisher’s alterations, and therefore these textual modifications can still be considered to articulate the author’s intentions or state a compromise between different people’s intentions. If the author cannot accept or object to such alterations (because he or she is dead or because copyright allows others to change the text without author’s permission), the situation would be very similar to what one finds in film production where one can make a distinction between the producer’s cut (Hollywood) and the director’s cut. A later film scholar can then take these alternative cuts into consideration. 22. Frow (2008), p. 10. 23. Currie (1993), p. 415. 24. Ibid., p. 421. 25. See Faye (2002), pp. 94 ff. 26. Cf. Ibid., pp. 110 ff.

7 Neomodernism – A New Approach to Humanistic Science?

1. For instance, Foucault (1966/1970) claims that the modern episteme began around the turn of the 18th century. 2. Dretske (2000). 3. Derrida (1967/1976), p. 7 ff. 4. For Derrida ‘différance’ is a structuring principle according to which the meaning of a sign, a word, or a text cannot be settled in isolation but is always determined with respect to its positive and negative relations to add- itional signs, words, or texts. Meaning changes over time because the attri- bution of meaning is forever “deferred” or postponed through this endless chain of meanings. See Derrida (1972/1981), pp. 39–40. 5. De Man (1979), p. 152: “To the extent that all language is conceptual, it always already speaks about language and not about things.” A little later he continues: “All language is language about denomination, that is, a concep- tual singular, metaphorical metalanguage. As such, it partakes of the blind- ness of metaphor when metaphor literalizes its referential indetermination into a specific unit of meaning.” (p. 152). Literal language pretends to be about things when in fact it consists of self-referring metaphors: “If all lan- guage is about language, then the paradigmatic linguistic model is that of an entity that confronts itself.” (p. 153). Such statements illustrate de Man’s radical scepticism about the referential capacity of language. 6. Derrida (1967/1976) pp. 158–159. Notes 215

Conclusion

1. Collins (1992), p. 16. 2. A similar suggestion is made by Fink (2001). 3. Cf. Dickie (1984). 4. Intentional behaviour must have been evolutionarily coeval with con- sciousness, which surely evolved more than a few million years ago. I don’t see any problem with attributing intentional behaviour to the dinosaurs; and I know that some palaeontologists attribute a social order to them. I really don’t have an armchair opinion on the issue, but it doesn’t seem to me absurd to suppose that they did. References

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Achinstein, Peter, 59, 61, 208 constructivism aesthetic view, 158–168 literary, 122, 177, 187, 199 Aristoteles, 20 social, 15–17, 23–25, 180, 181, 195, Austin, John, 61, 208 201, 202, 206 author context, passim biographical, 79, 123, 130, 131, 149, of discovery, 57, 81, 146 169, 175, 193 of justification, 57, 81, 146 death of, 121–122, 191–192 conventionalism, 122, 131 implied, 130–131, 149, 169, 195 Currie, Gregory, 172–173, 175, 214 and intention, 5, 11, 114, 115, 119–120, 122–123, 125–126, Dante, Alighieri, 157–158, 183 128–132, 139, 149, 166, 169–173, Danto, Arthur, 126, 212 191–193, 214 Darwin, Charles, 37, 201 real, see author, biographical Davidson, Donald H., 68, 70, 209 deconstructivism, 15, 17–18, 25, 177, Barthes, Roland, 121–122, 123, 211 187, 199 Beardsley, Monroe, 122, 123, 212 de Man, Paul, 190, 214 Bedaux, Jan B., 154 Dennett, Daniel C., 65, 209 behaviourism, 8–9, 24, 26, 53 Derrida, Jacques, 17–18, 97, 187, 189, Berger, Peter L., 15–16 191, 214 Betti, Emilio, 116–117, 118, 211 Descartes, René, 9–10, 35, 204 Bitzer, Lloyd, 61, 208 Dickie, George, 203, 215 Bohr, Niels, 47 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 9, 11–12, 13, 20, 108, Booth, Wayne, 130–131, 212 109–110, 112, 115, 116, 143, 210 Brown, Jonathan, 152, 154, 213 discourse normative, 46–53 Champollion, Jean–François, 190 scientific, 59–65 Cicero, 176 Dorato, Mauro, 208 Clarke, Andy, 207 Dretske, Fred, 186, 188, 214 Cliburn, Van, 167 Duchamp, Marcel, 132 Collin, Finn, 7 Durkheim, Émile, 72 Collingwood, R.G., 113 Dutton, Denis, 40, 208 Collins, Harry M., 18, 200, 215 communication, 21, 27, 179, 193, 198, Eco, Umberto, 122, 123, 129, 139, 200–203, passim 142, 209, 211 and art and literature, 132–139 Eco’s dilemma, 139–142 content of, 140 –141 Einstein, Albert, 47 declarative, 136–138, 139 Elster, Jon, 74, 209 evocative, 132, 136, 138–139, 168, Explanation 202–203 actual, 64–65 and explanation, 59–64 causal, 42, 52, 55, 67–68, 71, 76–78, meaning of, see communication, 88, 94 content of conventional, 81

221 222 Index

Explanation—Continued Galileo, Galilei, 10 covering-law model, 57 genre, 130, 131, 134, 141–142, 149, in the humanities, 75–81 169, 184 and illocutionary act, 61 Ghirlandaio, Domenico, 80 intentional, 4, 26, 36, 41, 49, 51–52, Giere, Ronald, 207–208 55, 56, 65–71, 73, 78, 94, 172 Good, Gregory, 210 and interpretation, 86–89, passim Greimas, Algirdas J., 78 interpretive, 79–81 Grice, Paul, 142, 212 and meaning, 4, 81, 86, 93, 94, 108, 117, 144, 149, 166 Habermas, Jürgen, 20–22, 26, 27, 207, and perlocutionary act, 61–62, 64, 213 65 Hanson, Norwood R., 98, 99, 210 possible, 64 Heidegger, Martin, 13, 109, 116, 120, pragmatic theory of, 59 122, 192 pragmatic-rhetorical theory of, 2, 3, Hempel, Carl G., 26–27, 57, 208 4, 58–63, 71, 160 hermeneutics, 4, 11, 13–15, 16, 25, 30, in the social sciences, 71–75 45, 58, 109–110, 112, 116–118, structural, 78–79 122, 143, 144, 146, 157, 159, and understanding, 59, 64, passim 196, 211 evidence, 52, passim Hermerén, Göran, 85, 209 external, 159 Hirsch, E.D., 5, 92, 93, 116, 117, internal, 159 122–123, 127–128, 132, 171, 209, 211, 212, 213 Feyerabend, Paul, 98, 195 criticism of Gadamer, 118–120 Fink, Hans, 7, 215 evaluation vs. interpretation, 165 Fish, Stanley, 122, 211 intentionalism, 123, 129 Folse, Henry, 7, 208, 213 meaning vs. significance, 118–119, Foucault, Michel, 22, 155–157, 181, 166 213, 214 objectivity, 119–120 Frege, Gottlob, 163 Hollis, Martin, 209 Freud, Sigmund, 163 Horowitz, Vladimir, 167 Friedrich, Casper David, 163 Husserl, Edmund, 109, 186 Frow, John, 134, 169, 212, 214 Høyrup, Jens, 7 Furuichi, Yasuo, 213 Føllesdal, Dagfinn, 116, 117, 118, 211 intention, passim author’s, 5, 11, 114–115, 120, 122, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 4, 13–15, 108, 128–133, 139, 149, 166–173, 109, 110–119, 120, 122, 123, 189, 191–193, 214 210, 211 as part of nature, 3, 24–26, 33 and author’s intention, 114 intentionalism, 206, 212 horizons, 110, 113, 114, 119 actual, 123, 129 historicity, 14, 114, 119–120 hypothetical, 129–130 interpretation as question and interpretation answer, 113–115 and construction, 93–94, passim methods, 14, 112 determinative, 94, 106, 107, 147, objectivity, 114, 116 163, 164, 168 prejudice, 113, 114, 117, 120, 211 and evaluation, 157–166 understanding as interpretation, and explanation, 86–89, 93, 110–112, 115–116 passim Index 223

investigative, 94, 95, 100, 106, 146, denotative, 140 147, 166 explanation of, 4, 81, 93, 94, 108, and justification, 81, 128, 143, 117, 144, 149, 166 146–147, 159–160, 196 intended, 93, 126, 128, 132, norms of, 168–176 141–142, 172, 175 object of, 85, 89–91, 94, 97, 102, literal, 79, 80, 81, 97, 102, 127, 137, 113, 118–121, 128, 141, 163, 166– 141, 169, 189–190 167, 169, 210 literary, 5, 45, 124, 127, 129–130, and objectivity, 1, 116–121, 141, 132, 141, 146, 148, 168–169, 193 172, 173, 189 textual, 5, 119–120, 124–125, 127, and postmodernism, 96–98 129, 132, 165–166, 169, 171, representation, 4, 79, 83, 87, 88, 90, 175, 193 91, 99, 106, 188 utterance, 132 and understanding, 78, 82–83, verbal, 118, 120 96–103, 111–112, 210 Melden, Abraham, 65, 67, 68, 209 intersubjectivity, 24, 39, 82 methods, 109, 145–147 and objectivity, 25, 49, 158 abductive, 56, 117, 145, 194, 196 of discovery, 147 Johnson, Mark, 37, 208 hypothetico–deductive, 117, Joyce, James, 174 118, 211 Juhl, P.D., 124, 212 inference to the best explanation/ interpretation, 56, 117, 145, 160, Kafka, Franz, 174 174, 194, 196 Kant, Immanuel, 12, 13, 117, 186 inductive, 56, 105, 112, 117, 145, Kauffmann, Oliver, 207 178, 194, 196 Kristensen, Heidi, 7 of justification, 147 Knapp, Steven, 212 methodology knowledge, 203–206, passim dualism, 6, 112, 204 objective, 15, 96, 185, 204 and hermeneutics, 116–118, 144– public vs. private, 204 145 transcendental, 178 Michaels, Walter B. 212 Kuhn, Thomas S., 27, 98, 147, 148, 213 Miller, Mara, 42, 208 models, 145–149 Lakoff, Georg, 37, 208 Mondrian, Piet, 166, 167 Las Meninas, 5, 149–157, 163, 174, 175 Latour, Bruno, 18 narrator Levinson, Jerrold, 84–86, 89, 129, explicit, 126, 127, 131 130, 171, 209, 213 implicit, 126, 127, 131, 168, 169, 172 Lewis, C.I., 99 , 6, 32, 35, 208 Luckmann, Thomas, 15–16 epistemological commitment, 32 Luxenberg, Alisa, 213 non-reductive, 36–44 Lyotard, Jean–Francois, 207 ontological commitment, 32 pragmatic, 6, 29, 31 The Marriage of the Virgin, 87, 88, 105 naturalization, 32–36 Marx, Karl, 72 descriptive, 37 meaning, passim normative, 37 connotative, 140 neomodernism, 2, 6, 176, 177 construction of, 4, 93, 103, 108, interpretation, 98–103, 185–189 163, 188 meaning, 189–191 224 Index neomodernism—Continued Sigman, Jill, 209 norms, 178–180 Snow, P.C., 8, 17, 28, 207 phenomenon, 191–193 Snyder, Joel, 151, 156, 213 truth, 180–185 Soelmark, Martin, 7 unity of science, 194–197 Sokal, Alan D., 16–17, 207 New Criticism, 5, 122–123, 158, 192 Spohn, Wolfgang, 48, 51, 208 Newton, Isaac, 10 Stecker, Robert, 103, 131–132, Nietzsche, Friedrich, 96, 181, 210 210, 212 Stork, David G., 213 objectivity, 15–17, 46, 63, 96, 110, Stratton–Pruitt, Suzanne L., 152, 154, 118, 159, 168, 170, 172, 185–187, 213 199–200, 205–206, passim structuralism, 9, 78, 79, 122, 177, 199, O’Keefe, Georgia, 167 209 Olsen, Stein H., 210 theory Pettersson, Torsten, 84, 209 of interpretation, 106–107, 130 Popper, Karl R., 57, 98, 210 pluralism, 147–149 postmodernism, 15–20, 176–178, theory-ladenness, 99 passim Thomsen, Christian J., 163 interpretation, 96–98, 185–189 Tolhurst, William, 129, 130–131, 212 meaning, 189–191 truth, 180–185 norm, 178–180 metaphysical theory of, 2, 180, 181 phenomenon, 191–193 pragmatic theory of, 182 truth, 180–185 unity of science, 194–197 underdetermination pragmatism, 6, 31 empirical, 5, 64, 173 intensional, 5, 131, 160, 173, Quine, Willard v. O., 96 181, 197 understanding Raphael, 87, 88, 105 and explanation, 82, 86 representation, 4, 29, 31, 41–43, 58, first person perspective, 3, 24, 73–74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86–95, 103, 35–37, 45–49, 51–52 106–107, 166–167, 186–188, 195, idiographic vs. nomothetic, 12 207, passim and interpretation, 110–112 and author’s intention, 142, 157, 169 objective, 15, 46, 120, 158, and presentation, 29, 207 170, 187 Rickert, Heinrich, 12, 13 third person perspective, 3, 24, Ricoeur, Paul, 75, 128, 209, 212 36–37, 39, 45–53 Ryle, Gilbert, 67, 209 van Fraassen, Bas, 59, 171, 209 Saussure, Ferdinand, 9, 139, 163 Velázquez , Diego, 5, 149–156 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 11, 12, Ventris, Michael, 190 109, 116 von Wright, Georg H., 68, 209 Searle, John, 136, 156 Sellars, Wilfrid, 53–54, 101, 208, 210 Wimsatt, William, 122, 123, 212 semantic autonomy, 119, 122, 131, Windelband, Wilhelm, 12, 13 139, 191 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 42, 133