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1 from Geisteswissenschaft to Human Science 2 the Naturalization of the Humanities Notes 1 From Geisteswissenschaft to Human Science 1. Snow (1959/1964). 2. Sokal (1996a). 3. Sokal (1996b). 4. Lyotard (1979) coined the term “postmodern” in opposition to the “grand narratives”, i.e. large overarching theories and philosophical systems. A fam- ous quotation from this book goes like this: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legit- imation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narra- tive function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements – narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the inter section of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.” (pp. xxiv-xxv) 5. See Habermas (1968/1971), pp. 140–145; 209–212. 2 The Naturalization of the Humanities 1. I want to make a distinction between ‘presentation’ and ‘representation.’ Mental states like sensory impression and perceptual experience I consider to be presentations because their epistemic content is not intentionally deter- mined by the observer’s act of will, whereas artefacts like words and pictures are representations because their epistemic content is intentionally determined by how they are used, are put to use, or understood in one way or another. 2. Faye and Kauffmann (2012). 3. Some philosophers argue that we cannot understand what a cognitive system is unless we go beyond the function of a singular brain and regard cognition as distributed among other systems as well. However, these other systems include not only other neurological systems but all kinds of material, non- neurological devices such as paper and pencil, computers, TVs, apparatuses, etc. A good representative for this position is Andy Clark. He goes even fur- ther by arguing that a person’s mind should be thought of as including these artifacts. See Clark (1997: 213–218). But I agree very much with Ronald Giere (2006) on this point when he claims that such extensions of the concept of the mind do “not provide theoretical advantages for the study of science. On the contrary, they introduce a host of theoretical problems that confuse 207 208 Notes more than enlighten. We are theoretically better off rejecting those supposed innovations.” (p. 110). But I disagree with Giere’s form of reductive natural- ism illustrated by the following remark: “I am willing to regard the ordinary concept of an agent as an idealized model, like that of a point mass in classical mechanics. Such things do not physically exist, but is useful model nonethe- less. The same could be true of our ordinary notion of human agency. Like idealized models in science, it has proven useful in organizing our individual and collective lives. Indeed, our systems of morality and justice are built upon it.” (p. 111) According to Giere, because human agency does not physically exist, it is not really real. But the view I defend here is that the notion of human agency is not a construction in the sense that there are no phenom- ena to be described unless they first have been constituted by a constructive act. The properties we normally associate with human agency, such as being a mind, having consciousness, intentionality, and free will, are just as objective as physical properties like mass and electric charge. These properties cannot be explained in terms of neurological structures. 4. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), p. 24. 5. See Dutton (2009), pp. 13 ff. 6. I do not suggest that Dutton believes otherwise; rather he might very well agree with this claim judged from what he has to say about intentionalism on pp. 164–177. 7. For instance, Henry Folse has informed me that there has been an enormous production of Katrina art (named after the hurricane ‘Katrina’ that destroyed a large part of New Orleans in 2005), most intended to invoke pity, shock and awe, but other more outré emotions as well, including even humour. There are probably nearly a hundred “arty” photo books alone; there are also films, dramas, installations, and other less categorizable productions. Consider the evolutionary value of humour as a response to tragedy. 8. Miller (2009), p. 335. 9. Indeed, we can and do ‘speak’ about inanimate things as though they had intentions, but we understand this mode of speech as metaphorical, not in the literal way which is understood when talking about human actions. 10. Spohn (2011), p. 243. 11. Ibid., p. 247. 12. Ibid., p. 248. 13. Cf. Dorato & Faye (2003) 14. Sellars (1956/1997), pp. 102 ff. 3 Explanation in the Sciences of Man 1. Cf. Hempel (1948/1965). 2. See also Faye (2010) and (2011). 3. See, for instance, van Frassen (1980), p. 144, and Achinstein (1983), p. 42. 4. See Faye (1999); Faye (2002) chap. 3; and in particular Faye (2007). 5. Bitzer (1968), p. 8. 6. Achinstein (1983), p. 16. 7. Austin (1962). 8. See Faye (2002). Giere (1999) and Giere (2006) defend a similar view. Notes 209 9. See, for instance, Dennett (1985) and (1991). 10. Ryle (1949), pp. 86–87. 11. Melden (1961) pp. 52–53, 78 ff. 12. Davidson (1980), pp. 11 ff. 13. von Wright (1971), pp. 116 f. 14. See Faye (2002), pp. 38–39. 15. Davidson (1980), p. 79. 16. No doubt this is true, but alternative explanations are a feature of virtually all frontier areas of ongoing research in the natural sciences as well. 17. Elster (1989), p. 13. 18. Methodological holism includes different theoretical positions such as functionalism, structuralism, and Marxism 19. See Hollis (1994), pp. 94–114. 20. Ricoeur (1976), p. 74. 21. Ibid., p. 74. 22. Ibid., pp. 74–75. 23. Faye (2002), 40 ff. 4 The Pragmatics of Interpretation 1. An exception is Bas van Fraassen and Jill Sigman (1993) in which they write about interpretation in the natural sciences and the arts. But van Fraassen does not attempt to relate their discussion of interpretation to his pragmatic theory of explanation. 2. Pettersson (2003), p. 30. After having mentioned all kinds of works on inter- pretation he states: “But whatever their focus, insights, or differences, these discussions and numerous others have one thing in common: they fail to define their subject. Apparently the concept of interpretation is so ingrained in our culture that even scholars who devote considerable energy to a scru- tiny of some of its aspects see no need to define or delimit the concept itself beyond a few simple assumptions.” 3. Levinson (1999), p. 3 4. Hermerén (1992), p. 136 5. See Faye (2002), p. 53. 6. I use the word “interpretee” for the recipient of an interpretation in the same way as an awardee is the recipient of an award. 7. Faye (2002), p. 53. 8. Hirsch (1967), p. 129. 9. Ibid., p. 136. 10. Ibid., p. 134. 11. Levinson isolates two notions of interpretation which he calls the “deter- minative mode of interpretation” and the “exploratory modes of interpret- ation”. The first is concerned with the question “What does it mean?”; the second is dealing with “What could it mean?” Even though the first notion is similar to the one suggested here, the second is not. 12. Pettersson (2003), p. 32. 13. The quotation is taken from the abstract of a talk entitled “Inaccessible Earth: Geomagnetism, In Situ Measurements, Remote Sensing, and Proxy Data” given by Gregory Good in Copenhagen, October 2010. 210 Notes 14. Nietzsche (1967), p. 346. 15. Popper (1959/1968), p. 107 n. 16. Hanson (1958), p. 7, p. 18. 17. Ibid., Ch. 1. 18. Sellars (1956/1997), p. 68 ff. 19. Ibid., pp. 79 ff. 20. See Faye (2000) 21. Stecker (2003), p. 20. 5 The Aims of Interpretation 1. Dilthey (1894), s. 144. 2. Gadamer (1960/1993), pp. 302–307. 3. Ibid., p. 307. 4. Ibid., p. 397. 5. In a paper from 2004 Stein Haugom Olsen gives the following summary of the traditional view on interpretation: “Both in German hermeneutic theory and in theories of interpretation current in the Anglophone world the mental uptake constituted by an interpretation is taken to be understandingg.” Olsen (2004), p. 135. The natural way of reading this passage is that interpretation does not only lead to understanding but that it is somehow necessary for understanding, which means that there is no understanding without inter- pretation. So, according to the traditional view, interpretation is conceptually sufficient and necessary for understanding. However, Olsen does not reject the view that interpretation is somehow more basic than understanding, but he believes that interpretation may also lead to forms of apprehension other than understanding: “[t]here are interpretations of texts the object of which is not understanding but other kinds of apprehension.” (p. 135). His reason is that “if an interpretation can be legitimate but still a misunderstanding, then this suggests that the link between interpretation and understanding cannot be a conceptual link and that there are modes of interpretation that do not aim at understanding.” (p. 144). I agree that the connection between interpretation and understanding is not conceptual. In my opinion the con- nection is causal. Understanding may be the intended causal effect of an interpretation (as it may be of an explanation).
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