China's Soft Power in Europe
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China’s Soft Power in Europe Falling on Hard Times Edited by: Ties Dams, Xiaoxue Martin and Vera Kranenburg Peer reviews by: Richard Turcsanyi, Plamen Tonchev, Tim Summers, John Seaman, Tim Rühlig, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Iulia Monica Oehler-Sincai ’ A Report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) April 2021 China’s Soft Power in Europe Falling on Hard Times Edited by: Ties Dams Xiaoxue Martin Vera Kranenburg Peer reviews by: Richard Turcsanyi Plamen Tonchev Tim Summers John Seaman Tim Rühlig Miguel Otero-Iglesias Iulia Monica Oehler-Șincai A report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) April 2021 April 2021 All rights reserved © The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’ Cover photo: © Ai Weiwei Exhibition, Istanbul, Turkey 13 September, 2017: The first solo exhibition in Turkey of work by Ai Weiwei, one of the most influential figures of contemporary art, has opened at SSM / Shutterstock. Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Important Disclaimer The views presented in ETNC reports are the sole responsibility of the signed authors and do not in any way represent the views of all members of ETNC, its participating institutions, nor the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. Contents Contributing institutions to ETNC 1 List of authors 2 Executive summary 3 Foreword 4 Does China still care about soft power? Assessing the diversity of approaches in Europe 5 China’s soft power in Austria: building on the power of nonchalance 14 China’s soft power in the Czech Republic: almost a fiasco 21 The hardships of Chinese soft-power promotion in Denmark 26 China’s waning soft power in France 31 Germany: strong economic appeal and competing values 36 The thrill is gone: China’s diminishing appeal in Greece 43 Hungary: no need for a Chinese soft-power strategy 48 Economy and culture: two tracks for China’s soft power in Italy 52 China’s soft power in Latvia: cultural appeal, political hesitance 57 Taking the stage, but missing the audience: China’s soft power in the Netherlands 62 China’s lukewarm soft power in Poland 70 Portugal–China: passions and interests crafting ‘special’ relations? 76 China’s soft power in Romania: limited audience, limited impact 80 Limits of China’s soft power in Slovakia 86 China’s soft power in Spain: in damage-control mode 91 China’s dwindling soft power in Sweden 97 Limited appeal: China’s soft power in the United Kingdom 102 China’s communication strategy towards the EU: increasingly sceptical reception 107 Contributing institutions to ETNC Coordinating institutions – Elcano Royal Institute, Spain – French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), France – Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Germany Participating institutions – Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, Austria – Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium – Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic – Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark – Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece – Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland – Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary – Instituto Affari Internazionali, Italy – Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia – The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, The Netherlands – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway – Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Poland – University of Aveiro, Portugal – Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), Slovakia – The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy (Foraus), Switzerland – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, United Kingdom 1 List of authors – Lucas Erlbacher, Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) – Rudolf Fürst, Institute of International Relations Prague – Andreas Bøje Forsby, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen – Alice Ekman and Cristina de Esperanza Picardo, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) – John Seaman and Marc Julienne, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) – Barbara Pongratz, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) – Plamen Tonchev and Angelos Bentis, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens – Tamas Matura, Central and Eastern European Centre for Asian Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest – Lorenzo Mariani and Francesca Ghiretti, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy – Kristiāna Purva, Department of Political Science, Riga Stradins University – Ties Dams and Xiaoxue Martin, Clingendael Institute – Justyna Szczudlik, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) – Carlos Rodrigues, University of Aveiro – Iulia Monica Oehler-Șincai, Romania – Richard Q. Turcsanyi, Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), Bratislava – Mario Esteban and Ugo Armanini, Elcano Royal Institute – Tim Rühlig and Oscar Shao, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) – Tim Summers, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) 2 Executive summary – Based on separate analyses of 17 countries and EU institutions, this report concludes that Chinese soft power in Europe – defined as the ability to influence preferences through attraction or persuasion – has fallen on hard times. – Developing soft power has been a pillar of Chinese foreign policy and remains a stated goal of China’s long-term policy orientation. – We identify three prominent Chinese approaches to developing soft power in Europe: promoting Chinese language and culture; shaping China’s image through the media; and using the secondary soft-power effects of economic prowess. – Recently, and over the last year in particular, China has become more assertive in attempting to shape its image by expanding its toolkit, particularly to enhance its political messaging. This includes the systematic use of social media. – On the importance of China’s economy, the lines can often be blurred between the attractiveness of economic cooperation and the pressures of economic coercion. Withholding market access for European firms and products has long been an observed practice of reactive Chinese diplomacy, but an increasingly formalized development of sanctioning mechanisms, including “unreliable entity lists” and export control legislation, is a cause for growing concern. – In other words, market access, trade and investment opportunities are perhaps the single largest factor determining China’s appeal in Europe, but also a major source of its coercive power. – Different patterns of Chinese soft power projections can be seen across four groups of countries analysed in this report: • In the first group (Austria, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), China does not appear compelled to actively project its soft power, mostly because of the lack of public interest in these countries. • In Italy and Greece, China’s soft power approach aims to arrest the trend of a deteriorating image and is geared towards damage containment. • In Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the UK, perceptions of China are clearly becoming less favourable, and Beijing is struggling with growing vigilance. • Finally, in Czechia, Denmark, France, and Sweden, China’s soft power is clearly in a state of free fall. – In turn, EU institutions appear to follow the trend described in the third group, of growing vigilance, as the risks posed by China’s geopolitical ambitions increasingly underlined. – A number of factors have driven these trends, from the fallout of COVID-19 to Chinese domestic developments (including in Xinjiang and Hong Kong) and the impact of growing US-China rivalry. These factors ultimately appear to be more substantive drivers of European perceptions and attitudes towards China today than the traditional sources of soft power. – In response, the Chinese government’s public messaging in Europe has become increasingly proactive, even aggressive, including through the imposition of sanctions. – These new methods, though deployed differently across the continent and aimed in part at a Chinese political audience, point to Beijing’s objective to increase its sway over Europe by influencing related discourse. They are presumably designed to prevent negative publicity and criticism, rather than achieve likeability. – An open question can thus be raised: has China become less interested in growing its appeal than in exercising its influence? 3 Foreword The European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) is a gathering of China experts from various European research institutes. It is devoted to the policy-oriented study of Chinese foreign policy and relations between China and European countries, as well as China and the EU. The ETNC facilitates regular exchanges among participating researchers with a view to deepening understanding within the European policy and research community and the broader public about how Europe, as a complex set of actors, relates with China and how China’s development and evolving global role are likely to impact the future of Europe. The network’s discussions and analyses take a decidedly ‘bottom–up’