THE IMPACT OF CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS ON XINJIANG UYGHUR MUSLIM RIOTS

BY

MS QIANLI LIANG

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIALFULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2015 COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY THE IMPACT OF CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS ON XINJIANG UYGHUR MUSLIM RIOTS

BY

MS QIANLI LIANG

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2015 COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

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Thesis Title THE IMPACT OF CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS ON XINJIANG UYGHUR MUSLIM RIOTS Author Ms. Qianli Liang Degree Master of Political Science Major Field/Faculty/University International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University Thesis Advisor Prof. Dr. Jaran Maluleem Academic Years 2015

ABSTRACT

Due to the escalation in Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots in recent years, the issue of cracking down on the three evil forces: terrorism, separatism, and extremism in China has become a topic of worldwide interest. However, the complexity of the issue urges China not only to care about internal obstacles but also to concentrate on the broad picture, a regional solution to calm the storm. This paper focuses on two key sub-topics. One is exploring the reasons behind the escalating Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim uprisings and the other is to assess whether closer China-Central Asia co-operation has helped ease the tension. Moreover, this research attempts to investigate the additional external players involved in the Uyghur turmoil. The study will employ a qualitative method to analyze the function of Sino-Central Asia relations on combating East Turkestan forces based on an in-depth analysis of primary and secondary data. The analysis and arguments are based on institutionalism of Neo-liberalism to examine the impacts of China's foreign policies toward Central Asia, especially the institute of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as the constructivism theory to analyze the norms and ideas that shape the political attitudes of external players on the Xinjiang issue. This paper argues that in order to prevent the further sprawl of the East Turkestan forces and to maintain regional stability and peace, China will have to (2) continue to work with Central Asian countries in terms of countering the three evil forces through the SCO. Finally, the research will explore the development and challenges that SCO will face and attempts to analyze its impacts on the solution of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots in the near future.

Keywords: China, Central Asia, Uyghur Muslim Riots, Three evil forces, East Turkestan forces, SCO, Institutionalism, Constructivism

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am heartily thankful to my adviser, Prof. Dr. Jaran Maluleem, whose encouragement, guidance and support from the beginning to the end enabled me to develop an understanding of the topic. In addition, Asst. Prof. Dr. Sarawut Aree and Asst. Prof. Dr. Wasan Luangprapat from the thesis committee provided me many valued suggestions. Dr. Sarawut Aree also recommended me several books related to the Uyghur Muslim riots in Xinjiang and Chinese foreign policies in Central Asia. Moreover, I really want to give my gratitude to Waraporn Raksorn, who helped me a lot during the process of writing the thesis. Meanwhile, all the staff of the MIR program helped me continuously at the very beginning. I would also like to thank the officials of the organizations and people concerned in China, who were generous in granting me interviews and providing crucial data. Last but not the least, I want to thank Ed. Dr. Phraprommangkalachan, the vice president of Wat Traimit Temple, who sponsored me to study in the MIR program, my family and my boyfriend for cheering and inspiring me.

Ms Qianli Liang

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ABSTRACT (1)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3)

LIST OF TABLES (8)

LIST OF FIGURES (9)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (10)

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Background and Significant of the Study 1 1.2 Research Objectives 5 1.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis 5 1.3.1 Research Questions 5 1.3.2 Hypothesis 5 1.4 Theoretical Framework 5 1.4.1 Neo-liberalism 5 1.4.2 Constructivism 6 1.5 Scope of the Study 7 1.6 Research Methodology 8

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 9

2.1 Literature on China-Central Asia Relations 9 2.2 Literature on the Origin of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots 11

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2.2.1 Support from the Soviet Union 11 2.2.2 Nationalists’ Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism Propaganda 12 2.2.3 Economic Development Unbalance 13

CHAPTER 3 XINJIANG UYGHUR MUSLIM RIOTS: EAST 15 TURKESTAN

3.1 The Origin and Evolution of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots 15 3.1.1 Qing Dynasty 15 3.1.2 Kuo Min Tang’s Period 17 3.1.3 People’s Republic of China’s Rule 18 3.2 The Resurgence of Uyghur Muslim Riots Since 1990s 21 3.2.1The Cause of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots 24 3.2.1.1 Overseas Support 25 3.2.1.2 Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism 31 3.2.1.3 Economic Condition 40 3.2.2 New Trend Analysis of Uyghur Muslim Riots 43 3.2.2.1 Range Extension 44 3.2.2.2 Uncertain Targets 44 3.2.2.3 Timing Choice on Key Days 44 3.2.2.4 Internet Boost 45 3.3 Main Terrorist Groups Related to East Turkestan 46 3.3.1 East Turkestan Islamic Movement 46 3.3.2 East Turkestan Liberation Organization 47 3.3.3 World Uyghur Youth Congress 48 3.3.4 East Turkestan Information Center 49

CHAPTER 4 CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 52

4.1 Overview: Origin and Development 52 (6)

4.1.1 China's Interests in Central Asia 54 4.1.1.1 Geopolitical Interests 55 4.1.1.2 Energy Interests 56 4.1.1.3 Regional Security Interests 57 4.2 Bilateral Relations 58 4.2.1 China-Kazakhstan 58 4.2.2 China-Afghanistan 60 4.2.3 China-Uzbekistan 63 4.2.4 China-Kyrgyzstan 64 4.2.5 China-Tajikistan 65 4.3 Multilateral Relations----Shanghai Cooperation Organization 66 4.3.1 The SCO: Origin and Development 69 4.3.2 The SCO: Current Framework 71 4.3.3 Anti-Terror Cooperation Analysis 76 4.3.4 The SCO: Future and Challenges Analysis 83 4.3.4.1 Internal Structure Contradictions 84 4.3.4.2 External Conditions 85

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 89

5.1 Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots 89 5.2 China-Central Asia Relations 91 5.3 Challenges Ahead 95

REFERENCES 96

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter 106 APPENDIX B Xi Jinping Attends SCO Summit in Dushanbe and Delivers 119 Important Speech Stressing Gathering People’s Will and (7)

Power and Coordinating Sincerely to Push SCO to the New Level

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LIST OF TABLES

Tables Page 3.1 Uyghur Population Data in Four Prefectures of Southern Xinjiang (2012) 41 3.2 The Sampling Survey on the Per-capita Annual Income at Urban & Rural Residents in Xinjiang and China (2013) (Unit: Yuan) 41 4.1 Agreement on Sino-Kazakhstan Border 59 4.2 The National Conditions of the SCO Member States (2014) 67 4.3 The SCO Heads of States Summit (2001-2015) 72 4.4 Joint Anti-terror Drills within the Framework of the SCO (2002-2014) 81

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page 4.1 Central Asia, Formerly Part of the Soviet Union 55 4.2 The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 71

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations Terms CHS (The SCO)Council of Heads of State CHG (The SCO) Council of Heads of Government CNC (The SCO) Council of National Coordinators CPC Communist Party of China ETIC East Turkestan Information Center ETIHP East Turkestan Islamic Hezbollah Party ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement ETIOP East Turkestan Islamic Opposition Party ETIRP East Turkestan Islam Reformer Party ETLO East Turkestan Liberation Organization ETNC East Turkestan National Congress ETNIA East Turkestan National Independence Alliance ETPRP East Turkestan People's Revolutionary Party ETR East Turkestan Republic ILP Islamic Liberation Party or Hizbut-Tahrir IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan KMT Kuo Min Tang PRC People's Republic of China RATS (The SCO)Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SETP Second East Turkestan Republic TIP Turkistan Islamic Party ULO Uyghur Liberation Organization WUC World Uyghur Congress WUYC World Uyghur Youth Congress WUYL World Uyghur Youth League XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Significance of the Study

On July 28th, 2014, a violent terrorist attack was conducted by a gang of thugs using axes targeting the Ailixihuzhen local government and police office in Yarkand, in the Kashgar area of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), causing 13 injuries and two Uyghur Muslims and 35 innocent Han people to die. Meanwhile, there were 31 vehicles smashed, including 6 cars burned. Coincidently, that day was the Feast of Breaking the Fast. That’s why critics have considered that it was a deliberate and well-organized action aimed at destabilizing the region, spreading a terrorist atmosphere and inciting ethnic hatred by connecting religion and ethnic issues. Two days later, Jume Tahir, the chief imam of Kashgar's Id Kah Mosque was assassinated by three mobs deeply influenced by religious extremism after he finished Al Fajr (morning call to prayer). Since serious Uyghur Muslim uprisings occurred on July 5th, 2009, leaving about 200 people dead and more than 1,000 injured, according to Chinese government release, there have been an observable continuity of violent attacks on civilians in Kunming, Guangzhou, and Beijing in recent years. However, seen in other parts of the world, similar violence between different ethnicities based on different religious beliefs, especially in the Islamic world, happens almost every day. For instance, a series of anti-Muslim riots broke out in Sri Lanka in June 2014. Muslims and their property were attacked by fanatical Buddhists mobs, leaving over 10,000 people displaced. Again, in Southeast Asia, disputes between ethnic Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists living in western Myanmar have been common. It is also very common to see reports published in various media pointing out bombs blasts and bloody incidents in the deep south of Thailand. Hence, Uyghur Muslim violence is not a problem solely troubling the Chinese government when it attempts to draft national and transnational policies to maintain security and stability in the region. Other states are also being confronted with similar problems. 2

Xi Jinping made his first presidential visit on April 27, 2014 to what he called the "front line against terrorism" in the restive region of Xinjiang and urged steps towards Uyghur integration and promotion of economic growth. However, when he attended the 14th SCO summit held in Dushanbehe called for holding regular anti- terrorism joint military exercises in Central Asia in order to protect regional security and stability. He even proposed negotiating and signing the anti-extremism convention in the context of escalation of Uyghur Muslim riots. From his remarks, it is obvious that Uyghur Muslim riots have been one of major concern in recent years for the Chinese government, which has attempted to make policies in the country and out of the border. As counter-terrorism is not a task that a single state can complete, seeking cooperation with other states, especially states just across the border, is vital for victory over terror nowadays. There were many reasons why the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots occurred, but the three evil forces: terrorism, separatism and extremism, are the primary factors behind the violent attacks. The three evil forces have existed in China and Central Asia for a very long time. To counter these forces every state in the region needs to cooperate without skepticism. Since there are many differences and similarities between China and Central Asian states, the relations of the two sides will inevitably influence the cooperation level and finally function to find a solution to the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots. Before gaining an insight into the relations between China and Central Asia and its impact on the Xinjiang riots, it is vital to have some general knowledge about Xinjiang. Xinjiang is located along the ancient Silk Road and historically has been the nexus connecting the East with the West. As one of five ethnic minority autonomous regions in China, it is situated within a large and strategically important territory bordering several Central and South Asian countries (Toops, 2004). Xinjiang is a multi- ethnic area with Uyghurs, Han, Hui, Mongol, Manchu, and Kazak etc. living in the XUAR. The history of violence in northwest China can be traced to the 18th century. In 1884, the authority of the Qing dynasty formally established a province in the Western Region and renamed the area as Xinjiang (meaning "old territory returned to the motherland") after the Qing government’s military led by General Tso Tsung-t'ang defeated the Dzungar Mongols. As Xinjiang was incorporated into the Chinese map, 3 the people living there, including the Uyghur, other Turkic-speaking ethnicities, and the Mongols were identified as Chinese people. Due to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang fell into an extended period of political, economic and social unrest, as both the Han and Hui Muslim warlords entered this area to take over alternatively. In order to protect the security of the Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region, the Uyghur went to war against the suppressing authority and succeeded in building two small East Turkestan Republics (ETR), but neither of them lasted long. It is worth mentioning that the latter ETR was mainly supported by the Soviet Union which later persuaded the leaders of ETR to be incorporated into Mao Tse-tung’s Communist Party of China (CPC) after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Some Uyghur separatists’ resistance towards the Chinese state has intensified since the early 1990s, when the number of reported incidents of Uyghur political mobilization spiked up. For example, during the Baren Incident of 1990, the rebel group Islamic Party of East Turkestan (or East Turkestan Islamic Party, ETIP) planned a series of synchronized attacks on government buildings, calling for jihad to kick out the Han Chinese from Xinjiang (Millward, 2004). After the war on terror declared by the Bush government under the pressure of the 9/11 terrorist attack in US territory, the Chinese central government also identified the first list of four East Turkestan terrorism organizations aiming at separating the Xinjiang region from China's dominance and establishing a so-called new state, "East Turkestan" by resorting to violent means. During the first 15 years of the 21stcentury, the number of terrorist attacks plotted by those East Turkestan terrorist organizations or some other Uyghur separatists groups against Chinese legal authority in Xinjiang increased, but most of the mare small-scale incidents. The most severe riots were the Urumqi riots in July 2009, leaving at least 197 Han and Uyghur people dead. Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna said in a telephone interview with Xinhua on Friday that the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which China alleges instigated the riot, is closely associated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uyghur separatist group that has been labeled by the UN Security Council as well as the Chinese and the United States (US) governments as a terrorist organization. There are many 4 sympathizers and supporters of the ETIM in the WUC. The ETIM is a big threat for the Central Asian area ("Xinjiang riot", 2009). Given such background about the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots and China's attitude toward Central Asia, this thesis firstly attempts to analyze the causes of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots and show the anti-terror achievements and challenges of the SCO, a key multilateral cooperation institute between China and Central Asian states, as well as its impact on resolving the uprisings. Secondly, the issue of cracking down on three evil forces: terrorism, separatism and extremism in China has become a topic of worldwide interest, especially for the US government who has tremendous national interests in Central Asia and wants to reduce China's influence in this area by criticizing Chinese practices towards East Turkestan terrorism as encroaching on minority human rights. This study will also shed light on the external factors affecting the settlement of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots. Thirdly, this thesis explores the development and challenges that SCO will face and tries to analyze its impacts on the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots in the near future. However, the paper will focus more on the trans-boundary factors influencing the settlement of Xinjiang issues instead of China's domestic policy recommendations. Meanwhile, as the trend of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots is changing with the international Islamic movement, the author could only analyze what happened before, and give possible predictions on the future of China-Central Asia cooperation on anti- terror. When confronted with the new situation, both China and Central Asian states have to consider more carefully and come up with corresponding measures. In addition, though the SCO has been set up for 15 years since 2001, it is still a very young international organization compared with other institutes in Central Asia. So its regimes and norms have just relatively completed, with large room for further improvement. That's why the research on the security cooperation among the SCO member states and relative shareholders has certain limitations. Furthermore, the policy implementation in several states should be also considered if China wants to fully eradicate the Xinjiang problem.

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1.2 Objectives

1) To study the evolution of China and Central Asia relations 2) To analyze the cause and development trend of East Turkestan forces 3) To show achievements and challenges of the SCO and its impact on countering East Turkestan forces (or the solution of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots).

1.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis

1.3.1 Research Questions 1) Why did the Uyghur Muslim riots escalate in northwest China? 2) How have the relations between China and Central Asia been transformed from bilateralism to multilateralism? 3) How can the Beijing government manage and control the three evil forces in the context of China-Central Asia cooperation?

1.3.2 Hypothesis This paper argues that in order to prevent the further sprawl of the East Turkestan forces and maintain regional stability and peace, China will have to continue to work with Central Asian countries in terms of countering the three evil forces through the SCO.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

1.4.1 Neo-liberalism Neo-liberalism is one of the dominant theories of international relations (IR). Neo-liberal institutionalism is discussed by many scholars to present the most convincing challenge to realist and neo-realist thinking. These studies indicate that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems. However, cooperation is never without problems, but states with shift loyalty and resources to institutions if these are 6 seen as mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their international interest (Lamy, 2011). For neo-liberal institutionalists, the focus on mutual interests extends beyond trade and development issues. Graham Allison states that one of the consequences of the globalization of security concerns such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and pandemics like HIV/AIDS is the realization that threats to any country’s security cannot be addressed unilaterally. Successful responses to security threats require the creation of regional and global regimes that promote cooperation among states and the coordination of policy responses to these new security threats (Allison, 2000). Robert Keohane suggests that one result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US was the creation of a very broad coalition against terrorism, involving a large number of states and key global and regional institutions. New-liberals support cooperative multilateralism and are generally critical of the pre-emptive and unilateral use of force previously condoned in the 2002 Bush doctrine. The core assumptions of neo-liberal institutionalists include: 1) States are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant actors. States are rational or instrumental actors, always seeking to maximize their interests in all issue-areas. 2) In this competitive environment, states seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation. Rational behavior leads states to see value in cooperative behavior. States are less concerned with gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative arrangements. 3) The greatest obstacle to successful cooperation is non-compliance or cheating by states (Keohane, 2002).

1.4.2 Constructivism Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life (Ruggie, 1998). This focus on human consciousness suggests a commitment to idealism and holism, which, according to Alexander Wendt, represents the core of constructivism. He said, “Idealism demands that we take seriously that role of ideas in world politics. The world is defined by material and ideational forces. But these ideas are not akin to beliefs or psychological states that reside inside our heads, instead, these 7 ideas are social. Our mental maps are shaped by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, language, and rules. Idealism does not reject material reality but instead observes that the meaning and construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. There are two important observations of the social construction of reality: one is the emphasis on the socially constructed nature of actors and their identities and interests. Actors are not born outside of and prior to society, as individualism claims. Instead, actors are produced and created by their cultural environment. The other one is how knowledge, that is, symbols, rules, concepts, and categories, shape how individuals construct and interpret their world. Reality does not exist out there waiting to be discovered; instead, historically produced and culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct and give meaning to reality (Wendt, 1999). ‘Terrorism is a social construction’ as what sociological thinkers believe it to be. ‘Terrorism is not a ‘given’ in the real world; it is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes (Yehuda, 1993).’ The oft-quoted statement that ‘One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ reminds us that the definition of terrorism is based on how it is being constructed by an individual or state. ‘The meaning of ‘terrorism’ varies depending on the context, available cultural resources, and combinations of people involved (Stump, 2009). Terrorism does not exist outside our subjective understandings. Constructivism just reminds us that terrorism is a social fact, ‘which requires human institutions for its existence’ (Searle, 1995).

1.5 Scope of the Study

The scope of thesis will focus on Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots from the Qing Dynasty to present day, especially analyzing the period of the PRC's regime over Xinjiang. In order to explore the impacts of China-Central Asia relations on Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots, the author would like to emphasize three main areas: 1) the evolution of China and Central Asia relations over decades; 2) the causes and development trend of East Turkestan forces (The main drive to Xinjiang Uyghur 8

Muslim riots); 3) the impact of the SCO (The main China-Central Asia cooperation mechanism) on cracking down on the East Turkestan force.

1.6 Research Methodology

This paper intends to apply a qualitative method of research to analyze how China-Central Asia relations play a role in the process of countering East Turkestan forces and ease Xinjiang tension. It is based on in-depth analysis of primary and secondary data. The primary resources will be collected through several elite interviews of experts and commentary reporters on Xinjiang Uyghur minority ethnic issues, while the secondary data will be carefully selected from speeches of Chinese leaders, Central Asia states leaders, professors, policy statements, books, journals, theses, and press releases.

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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of related literature emphasizes various academic books, journal articles and documents that provide information of the evolution of China-Central Asia relations since ancient times till now. Moreover, the literature below also explains the reasons why the Chinese government looks West and how these reflect China's foreign policies toward Central Asia. Besides China's attitude on Central Asia, what several states located in Central Asia expect from China will be further discussed in this chapter. In addition, literature related to Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots are also arranged in this section, as there are some academic disputes between Chinese scholars and Western ones, such as the definition of terrorism, the nature of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim unrest and the history of East Turkestan.

2.1 Literature on China-Central Asia Relations

Before elaborating the scholarly reviews on China-Central Asia relations, it will be better to understand the geographical concept of Central Asia. The idea of Central Asia as a distinct region of the world was introduced in 1843 by the geographer Alexander von Humboldt. The borders of Central Asia are subject to multiple definitions. Historically built political geography and geo-culture are two significant parameters widely used in the scholarly literature about the definitions of Central Asia (Okur, 2014). After the collapse of Soviet Union, the five "-stan" (meaning "land of") are extensively recognized as the central Asian region, consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But sometimes the term of Central Asia also includes Afghanistan and Pakistan. These states are located in the center of the Eurasian continent, stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east, and from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north. Prominent Kazakhstani sinologist Konstantin Syroyezhkin says that Central Asia is seen by China as a "strategic rear," since the problems that take place in the 10 region have significant impact on one of China’s Achilles’ heels: Xinjiang (Tukmadiyeva, 2013). Why has Xinjiang become the very front-line of the implementation of China's foreign policy in Central Asia? The answer might concern the geographical, historical, cultural, religious and ethnic ties between Xinjiang and Central Asian states. For instance, Xinjiang represents the only border China shares with Central Asia; more than 1700km with Kazakhstan, approximately 1000km with Kyrgyzstan, and about 450km with Tajikistan. And some minority ethnicities living in Xinjiang speak the same language or similar dialects as citizens in Central Asian states. ZhaoHuasheng argues that the logic behind the Chinese presence in Central Asia is inherently led by domestic pressures, particularly with regard to security needs (Rumer, Treinin, & Zhao, 2007). Stephen Blank emphasizes in his article "Xinjiang and China's Strategy in Central Asia" that Xinjiang, like Taiwan and neighboring Tibet, is a neuralgic issue for China, which desperately needs internal stability in that predominantly Muslim, resource-rich and strategically important region. Beijing's strategic and energy objectives are based on stability in Xinjiang, and its Central Asian policies grow out of its preoccupation with stability there (Blank, 2004). Shen Wei and Weng Cuifeng wrote in their journal of China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges, “China's concern over Uyghur ethnic separatism in Xinjiang has pushed it to increase the pace of development in what is its largest region, yet remains one of its poorest. China's aspirations of "leapfrog development" and "long- term stability" in Xinjiang are likely to result in respective "leapfrog" increases of Chinese presence in Central Asia (Shan & Weng, 2010).” Furthermore, Xing Guangcheng argued that, "to a large extent the stability and prosperity of Northwest China is closely bound up with the stability and prosperity in Central Asia (McMillan, 2009)." Even though the Soviet Union has been dissolved for such a long time, these five Central Asia states still own legacies of military industrial complexes as well as the threat of terrorist groups and radical movements, such as a terrorist organization named Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) activating in the region for constructing an atmosphere of menace by conducting a series of incidences of terror and violence in Uzbekistan and its neighbors. 11

Besides the economic and security concerns, energy resources are shown in numerous studies on China-Central Asia relations and what governments from both sides care a lot about. From Chinese analyst Lan Peng's view, greater energy cooperation with Central Asia is just an inevitable consequence. He contends that other energy supplying regions all bear high levels of risk. "The Middle East, which has 61% of global oil reserves and 41% of natural gas reserves, is politically unstable; Africa has other drawbacks such as societal instability, the risk of terrorism, and its distance from China; Latin America, in geopolitical as well as geographical terms, is too close to the US. Central Asia is a geographically adjacent, stable region, and its economic development would serve to boost the economy and security of Xinjiang (Lan, 2011)." However, in the view of Central Asian states, it is beneficial to cooperate with China in the natural resources sector, as they could speed up the process of modernization by reducing the number of poor households and become less reliant on Russia. As Professor Wang Jiangping observed, "China has very rich resources, like oil, gas, and metals….and also China has very strong human resources; and experienced, skillful Chinese workers can play a very important role to help the Central Asian Republics build some basic infrastructure –such as highways, electrical power stations, and factories. And, of course, China can supply light-industry production to Central Asia. So, in many ways, China can contribute to the economic development of Central Asia (Dwivedi, 2006)."

2.2 Literature on the Origin of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots

2.2.1 Support from the Soviet Union Most literature recognizes that the modern Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots originated from the establishment of the Soviet Union, who supported various rebellion activities against China’s central government led by Turkic Islamist militant organizations, most notably the ETIM in the early and mid-20th century. As Andrew D. W. Forbes observed in his book Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949, "The Soviet Union supported the Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion against the Republic of China. Many of the Turkic peoples of the Ili region of Xinjiang 12 had close cultural, political, and economic ties with the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. Many of them were educated in the Soviet Union and a community of Russian settlers lived in the region. As a result, many of the Turkic rebels fled to the Soviet Union and obtained Soviet assistance in creating the Sinkiang Turkic People's Liberation Committee (STPNLC) in 1943 to revolt against Kuomintang rule during the Ili Rebellion." For example, the pro-Soviet Uyghur who later became leader of the revolt and the Second East Turkestan Republic, Ehmetjan Qasim, was Soviet educated and described as "Stalin's man" and as a "communist-minded progressive" (Forbes, 1986). Besides, Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer remembered in her autobiography: Dragon Fighter: One Woman's Epic Struggle for Peace with China that her father served with pro-Soviet Uyghur rebels under the Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (Three Province Rebellion) in 1944–1946, using Soviet assistance and aid to fight the Republic of China government under Chiang Kai-shek (Kadeer, 2009). After the CPC established its authority in 1949, especially at the time of all the Russian experts withdrawing from China, the deterioration of China and Russia relationship played a vital role in the Xinjiang conflicts. Yitzhak Shichor in his article: The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy reveals that "The Soviet Union intensified their support in 1967, doubling their Uyghur language broadcasts, and broadcasting Radio Tashkent, which encouraged Uyghurs to revolt against the Chinese. Separatist fighters were harbored by the Soviets, and it is estimated that 5,000 soldiers launched attacks on China via the Sino-Soviet border in 1966." (Starr, 2004)

2.2.2 Nationalists’ Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism Propaganda Ablet Kamalov also believes in his article: The Uyghurs as a Part of Central Asian Commonality: Soviet Historiography on the Uyghurs that "The Soviet Union supported Uyghur nationalist propaganda and Uyghur separatist movements against China. Soviet historians claimed that the Uyghur native land was Xinjiang and Uyghur nationalism was promoted by Soviet versions of history on turcology. Soviet turcologists like D. I. Tikhonov wrote pro-independence works on Uyghur history and the Soviet supported Uyghur historian Tursun Rakhimov wrote more historical works 13 supporting Uyghur independence and attacking the Chinese government, claiming that Xinjiang was an entity created by China made out of the different parts of East Turkestan and Zungharia (Bellér-Hann, Cesáro, Harris & Finley, 2007). The recall of Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer in her autobiography also confirmed that the impact of Soviet Turcological works on the nationalists, as "Kadeer and her family were close friends with White Russian exiles living in Xinjiang and Kadeer recalled that many Uyghurs thought Russian culture was "more advanced" than that of the Uyghurs and they "respected" the Russians a lot." (Kadeer, 2009) As Chinese government official White Book on History and Development of Xinjiang indicates that "In the early 20th century and later, a small number of separatists and religious extremists in Xinjiang, influenced by the international trend of religious extremism and national chauvinism, politicized the unspecialized geographical term "East Turkestan," and fabricated an "ideological and theoretical system" on the so- called "independence of East Turkestan" on the basis of the allegation cooked up by the old colonialists. They claimed that "East Turkestan" had been an independent state since ancient times, its people with its history of almost 10,000 years being "the finest nation in human history." They incited all ethnic groups speaking Turkic and believing in Islam to join hands to create a theocratic state (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [IOSCPRC], 2003)."

2.2.3 Economic Development Unbalance In the past decades, Chinese central government has spared no effort to invest in infrastructures and natural resource-based industries in Xinjiang, specifically in the northern part of the region, where fossil fuels deposited. However, native Uyghur Muslim people dominate the southern part where is less developed and modernized. There is a clear income gap and living standard disparity between the industrialized north area and the southern agricultural rural place, which lead to the instability of Xinjiang. As Lai Hongyi says that "Southern Xinjiang, as well as Yining in the western part of the region, has severe unemployment and other economic problems, and these areas appear to be hotbeds of such activities (refer to the Uyghur Muslim unrests) (Lai, 2002)." 14

"Most Uyghurs were rural and 'not necessarily equipped well with skills that are sellable in an urban environment, especially ... where the majority of the population may be Han", said Barry Sautman, an associate professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Yang Siyuan, a professor at Minzu University of China, warned of discrimination against Uyghurs in the broader economy. He said, "Temporary frictions can't justify denying the Uygur workforce opportunities. The government should step in and keep encouraging businesses to hire Uyghurs. The growth was driven by state monopoly investments in mega industrial, oil and resources projects in Xinjiang. But unfortunately, these projects usually hire ethnic Han laborers and managers. Even though regulations require a minimum of minority staff, but they were not strictly enforced (Zhou & Tam, 2009)."

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CHAPTER 3 XINJIANG UYGHUR MUSLIM RIOTS: EAST TURKESTAN

3.1 The Origin and Evolution of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots

3.1.1 Qing Dynasty In the mid-18th century a part of the northwestern territories, which would later be known as Xinjiang, was gained by Tso Tsung-t'ang under the authority of the Qing Empire. Before that happened, Manchu, Mongol, and some Uyghur local officers had respectively run their operations in line with indigenous ethnicities, on which these people lived. Before the 1820s, Xinjiang could be described as a peaceful land, however, with the support of the khanate of Khokand (Kyrgyz tribesmen), the offspring of the former rulers of Tarim Basin oases, who both belonged to a Sufi clan, invaded southwestern Xinjiang several times since the year 1828. Even though the attack gradually damaged local authorities from the Qing Empire in Khotan, Yarkand, and Kashgar, there were cruel massacres of Chinese businessmen conducted by the ethnic soldiers who transferred their sentiments of hate and desperation. The descendants mentioned above failed to keep Qing troops from controlling the area again. In the 1850s, due to the lack of adequate support of local power, the chaos came to an end. However, the peace did not last for a long time, as a massive confrontation with Hui Muslims in the northwestern provinces of Shanxi and Gansu broke out, which had inevitably influenced the stable social circumstances of Xinjiang which was close to the place of insurgency. When Hui troops were quartered in Xinjiang, the rumors that Manchu authorities attempted to preemptively disarm and slaughter Uyghur minorities were widely spread. In order to ensure their own safety, Uyghurs were persuaded by Hui people to combat Qing’s rule, moreover, Uyghurs staged their own revolts all over Xinjiang. Through these fights, Uyghurs dominated the south and west oases, while the east and north parts were controlled by Hui people, which formed a relatively stable situation. On the other hand, the rule of Qing Empire was almost damaged by the Taiping Rebellion Movement headed by Hong Xiuquan, who established the special Christian 16 organization named Baishangdi Religion (Worship God) by absorbing the orthodoxies of Christianity. Meanwhile, the imperial authority had to pay countless money as war indemnity to the strong West after the Second Opium War. With this background, the Qing central government had no capacity to pursue its former dominance in Xinjiang. At the time of the 1870s, Mohammad Yaqub Beg (Yakubbae), a Khokandi militarist built an emirate named CiDshal Khan, including 7 cities in southern Xinjiang, and even expanded his dominance in Turfan, with the support of Czarist Russia and Great Britain. External intervention made the situation of Xinjiang more complex and severe. In the late 1870s, after a systematic campaign financed by foreign loans, the Qing succeeded in re-conquering most of Xinjiang. Qing armies fought fiercely with mainly Hui forces in the Turfan-Urumqi-Manas area but faced little resistance further west after Yaqub Beg died of a stroke in 1877 (Kim, 2004). The Russian Empire had controlled the rich Ili Valley for many years until 1881. Although Russia was reluctant to give back the Ili Valley, it had to return the majority of territories to the Qing imperial government under the international community and Manchu army’s success. According to the Information Office of the State Council of PRC’s White Paper on History and Development of Xinjiang, "Following the Opium War of 1840, Xinjiang was subject to aggression from Tsarist Russia and other powers. In 1875, Tso Tsung-t'ang, governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, was appointed imperial commissioner to supervise the affairs of Xinjiang. By the end of 1877, Qing troops had recovered the areas north and south of the Tianshan Mountains which had been occupied by Yakubbae of Central Asia’s Kokand Khanate (Fergana). In February 1881, the Qing government recovered Ili, which had been forcibly occupied by Tsarist Russia for 11 years. In 1884, it formally established a province in the Western Regions and renamed the area as Xinjiang (meaning "old territory returned to the motherland"). The establishment of Xinjiang as a province was a significant reform, on the part of the Qing government, of the administration of Xinjiang by the previous dynasties. From then on, the provincial governor oversaw all military and administrative affairs in Xinjiang, and the military and administrative center of Xinjiang was moved from Ili to Dihua (Current Urumqi) (IOSCPRC, 2003)."

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3.1.2 Kuo Min Tang’s Period Even though the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang joined in the 1911 Republican Revolution, overturning the Qing Empire’s authoritarian, the main political power transfer was only a few military officials of Qing’s rule pledged loyalty to then republican government without any declaration of independence in Xinjiang. Why? The answer could be seen as either a Uyghur united rebellion or Chinese monopolized military force which existed during that vulnerable time of newly established Kuo Min Tang (KMT)’s regime. By the end of the 19thcentury, industrialists and merchants in Kashgar, Turfan, and Ili, who had traveled to Kazan, Istanbul, and Europe, launched a movement as an attempt to reform Uyghur education. The Uyghur nationalists consisted of teachers from outside Xinjiang and colleges in Kashgar, Turfan, etc. wanted to modernize Uyghur education through many new journals and newsletters. The modern schools generally planted this Uyghur nationalist awareness into every local reader, which later stimulated several insurgencies in the early 1930s. However, a rural insurgency trying to combat the promiscuous Chinese military officer in Hami and several revolts against the Chinese warlord government in Urumqi by ethnic locals around Tarim Basim occurred one after another, which later made the current situation tough to solve in the early1930s. A few years later, Ma Zhongying, a Hui Muslim warlord from Gansu entered the controversy, while Han armies from the northern Xinjiang mutinied. So the leaders of Uyghur riots, allied with Han authorities in Urumqi, to fight against the Hui warlord as well as a newly established ETR in Kashgar. What needs to be explained here is that the initial Uyghur rebels acquired the Soviet Union’s support, the Hui warlord was encouraged by the Nanjing government and actually supported by Japan, and the ETR attempted to get rid of both Chinese and Soviet influence, forming a conflict among three forces. It is not difficult to understand that at that time, the Soviet Union was much stronger than the newly born KMT’s Republic of China. With the air force and chemical weapons and support from the Soviet Union, Sheng Shicai controlled the situation in Xinjiang as a governor in Urumqi and as an actual warlord clearing away all the dissidents, including Han, Hui and Uyghur Muslim. Despite the ideological confusion and shifting political and ethnic loyalties of this period, the first ETR (November 1933- February 1934) was established in Kashgar and 18 had become a milestone of Uyghur nationalist history and a precedent cited by today's independence advocates. The ideological outlook of the short-lived ETR government was essentially the non-theocratic, reforming approach of the Jadidists, though it wrestled with identity questions, debating whether to call itself "Uyghuristan" before ultimately using both "ETR" and "ETIR" in official materials. (Yasushi, 1990) Until the early 1940s, the KMT government took over the power of Xinjiang from Sheng Shicai and later blocking the Soviet Union’s impact. But in 1944, a large scale rebellion raised by Kazakhs and Uyghurs in northern Xinjiang broke out, as several unstable factors worked together including economic difficulty after the KMT cut off trades between Xinjiang and Soviet Union, continuous hatred to the former harsh warlord’s dictatorship as well as the KMT’s local officers’ blind patriotism. The rebellion was still featured with Islam and the Soviet military support. One year later, the second ETR emerged in northern Xinjiang backed by the Communist or as some historians believed, was controlled by the Soviet Union to some extent, as this secular socialist government was 'forced' to come to a ceasefire with the KMT in Urumqi by the Soviet's instruction after the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed on August 14, 1945. This event made the second ETR. The Soviets and KMT appeared to agree on governing Xinjiang together, but the tension had not been eased and the second ETR dominated in northern Xinjiang and enjoyed high autonomy, even without the Nanjing government’s interference. Defeated by the CPC in late 1949, the KMT was busy escaping to Taiwan, having no vigor to manage the Xinjiang issue.

3.1.3 People's Republic of China’s Rule The PRC's resumed dominance over Xinjiang and it was facilitated by the KMT surrender in the south and a deal struck with the Soviet Union in the north. Though Xinjiang, unlike Tibet, did not require full-scale military deployment, the CPC's efforts to consolidate its rule and develop its policies did face sporadic resistance from Uyghurs, especially in the southern Tarim Basin. An internal source refers to 19 revolts and 194 cases of "counterrevolutionary" separatist activities in Xinjiang from 1951 to 1981 (Zhang, 2003). The goals of these ethnic separatist activities can be mainly categorized into two types. One was to establish a republic and be incorporated 19 into the Soviet Union, just as Kazakhstan; the other was to set up a theocratic regime in Xinjiang. Directed by Abdimit Maulana, a group of people from Khotan, Karakash, and Lop attacked a labor reform camp and county governmental buildings, especially in Khotan. The PRC central government’s stand was that the above chaos should be blamed on Abdimit Maulana and Muhammad Amin Bughra, who had conducted an independence movement in Khotaninin the year of 1933, and later served as a senior officer of the KMT’s Xinjiang government after the 1940s. They lived in exile in Kashmir and Turkey with some Uyghur groups when the KMT’s authority was cracked down on. From 1954 to 1956, the combination of Abdimit Maulana and Muhammad Amin Bughra led to a series of "counter-revolutionary riots", or more appropriated "counter-CPC rule riots", which were well-planned and broke out in Turfanand Yining. Despite these challenges, the PRC largely succeeded in bringing the Islamic establishment under its control while reforming land tenure, dispossessing powerful Uyghur landholders, and redistributing lands once held as shrine and mosque endowments. This success was due in part to a relatively liberal policy with regard to Uyghur religious life and other forms of cultural expression in the early years of the PRC (Zhang, 2003).The radical collectivization and industrialization drive known as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was accompanied by the instigation of the Soviet Union consultants in Xinjiang cities, which led to an exodus of some 60,000 people (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others) and 30,000 heads of cattle to the Soviet Union in April to May 1962. This exodus was followed by violent demonstrations in central Yining city involving 2,000 people, during which the crowd called for the overthrow of the Communist Party and elimination of the Han people. Regular PLA troops and Xinjiang bingtuan (production-construction corps) militia sealed the border and quashed the riot. Chinese sources blame the exodus and Yiningincident on Soviet machinations (Zhao, 1991). During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) 50,000 bingtuan workers marched on Urumqi, air force, militia and Red Guard units fought pitched battles over the railway line near Hami, and the control of the Lop Nor nuclear test facility was even in doubt. Furthermore, the disruptive legacy of the Cultural Revolution lingered into the Deng Xiaoping era. In 1979, some 8,000 Chinese youth from Shanghai and other 20 eastern cities had been dispatched to Xinjiang in the previous decade demonstrated in Aksu. They occupied party and government offices for 40 days; 1,000 of them staged a hunger strike. This may have been the largest—and certainly the longest—lasting- popular demonstration in Xinjiang's modern history (Zhu, 2000). Meanwhile, the East Turkestan People's Revolutionary Party (ETPR), the most serious "counter-revolutionary separatist conspiracy" succeeded in developing party members in Xinjiang and prepared to conduct large-scale separatism activities by firstly spreading anti-China materials and illegally collecting capital and weapons from the Soviet Union. Before it was crushed, this party maintained central and branch offices in each of Xinjiang's prefectures and cities and issued some 50 separate publications. Allegedly the group sought to establish an independent ETR that was secular, communist, and pro-Soviet in orientation. The Soviet Union initially offered help to this party, but veterans of the movement in exile today say that the Soviets never fulfilled their promises. (Li, Liu, Li & Liu, 1994) When Deng Xiaoping started to take over the power to ease the tension from the damaging effects of the previous class struggle and go back to focus on economic development, Xinjiang did enjoy a period of stability. However, the actual economic unbalance which exists between Xinjiang and the more developed eastern provinces in China, between southern and northern Xinjiang and between the rural residents and urban residents, resulted in increased discontent in Xinjiang. In addition, in order to assist the development of Xinjiang, it is true that a large amount of Han people from other provinces settled down here, which inevitably caused fierce competition for water resources, job chances, and led to environmental tensions. It also resulted in ethnic minorities and even Xinjiang Han people's demonstrations and conflicts. According to the author's interviews, some of my Uyghur friends’ parents still have memories of slogans, such as "Drive out the Han!" and "Oppose Han migration to Xinjiang!" Worried about ruining the natural environment of Xinjiang and damaging the health of Uyghurs in southeastern Xinjiang, protesters also insisted on stopping any nuclear tests there.

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3.2 The Resurgence of Uyghur Muslim Riots in the 1990s

With the impacts of religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism since the 1990s, East Turkestan forces existing in the region and across the border attempted to conduct separatist and disruptive activities using terrorist violence, such as explosions, assassinations, arsons, and poisoning. During the unstable time after the crumbling of the Soviet Union, international Islamic movements surged. Some East Turkestan organizations even promoted the use of bloody and cruel terrorism as means to achieve their purpose of separating Xinjiang from China’s legal dominance. Under such political instruction, these splitting forces planned and organized a series of attacks in Xinjiang, as well as several countries in Central Asia, which caused great damage in terms of the safety of Chinese people’s lives and property and social stability. Furthermore, their actions present a threat to the security and stability of China, Central Asia and even Southeast Asia, especially in major cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, Kunming, and Bangkok which saw terrorist attacks against civilians and the governmental establishment in recent years. Chinese researchers on counter-terrorism generally believe the official reports revealed by the PRC that the resurgence of violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang began when the armed insurrection in the town of Baren (It is located in Akto county of Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture in southern Xinjiang) on April 5, 1990, which led to the deaths of six armed police officers and soldiers. Since then, the three evil forces: religious extremism, ethical separatism, and violent terrorism have been rampant in Xinjiang. As Wu Fuhuan said, " From 1990 to 2001, there were more than 200 violent terrorist incidents in Xinjiang conducted by the three evil forces, leaving 162 people died and over 440 people injured. The causalities include various ethnic people, grass- root level cadre, and religious people (Wu, 2009)." The Baren Riot was the most serious armed violence since the liberation of Xinjiang. It is also seen as the first terrorist incident occurring in the region in the 1990s. It was a signal that the resurgence of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots started, as a number of violent terrorist activities ensued after that. A year after the Baren Riot, the first terrorist training base was discovered in a humble yard in Yecheng county of Kashgar. The base belonged to an organization named East Turkestan Islamic Reformer Party 22

(ETIRP), mainly training 62 terrorists at three different times from Oct. 1991 to Jun. 1992 for the assembly of explosive devices and how to use various weapons, such as the Type-79 pistol. The ETIRP placed four bombs in the line No.2 bus, cinema and residential buildings in Urumqi on Feb 5, 1992 (the second day of Chinese New Year). The line no.2 bus exploded, leaving many people died and injured. Before this terrorist attack, no one thought about such a bomb attack occurring and endangering public security. The explosion created terror in Xinjiang, and even in the entirety of China. After the 7-month investigation of the Xinjiang Public Security Department, there was not only one-time bomb attack in Urumqi by the ETIRP, but 15 bombings targeting innocent public people in the Xinjiang region after that. In order to raise funds for buying materials to make bombs and train terrorists, ETIRP robbed 500,000 yuan of cotton revenue from the Agriculture Bank of China in Shaya County on Nov. 13, 1991, which was seen as the largest bank robbery in China since the liberation of Xinjiang region. Because of the rigorous and precise investigation into the 1992 Urumqi Bus Bombing, the commandos of the ETIRP suffered a severe crack-down. However, several escaped terrorists rapidly slipped into various parts of Xinjiang. Their next destination for a bombing attack was a southern city, Kashgar. On Jun. 17, 1993, an office building owned by a regional agricultural machinery company exploded in the downtown of Kashgar, leaving two dead, one seriously injured and 7 slightly injured. 1993 was another restless year for Xinjiang people, as several criminal cases by terrorists ensued. For instance, terrorists assassinated public security policemen and pro-Chinese dominance religious figures, as well as inciting unrest through bombing attacks. A new terrorist group of at least 17 terrorists named East Turkestan Islamic Opposition Party (ETIO) was founded by Arken Abula and Abudu Mijiti. This party changed its name to East Turkestan Islamic Hezbollah Party (ETIHP) three years later, treated as the predecessor of East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM). After the establishment of the ETIO, terrorists did not start violent attacks immediately but secretly developed members, enlarged the scale of ETIO, and set up branches in different parts of Xinjiang to organize terrorists training and propaganda pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Their activity fund was raised by the way of robbery, theft, etc. When 23 the scale of the organization was large enough, they could not wait to make violent chaos from 1996 to 1997, the peak of violent terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. The ETIM had a secret meeting in Hotan, Xinjiang on 29 Dec. 1996, coming up with an action agenda on how to implement terrorist attacks, and asked all the members to be loyal to the party. At the Hotan meeting the ETIHP party's founding principles in pursuit of Xinjiang Independence were established. They wanted to build the East Turkestan Islamic Republic (ETIR) as a theocratic state, shouting "Starts in 1996, ignites large-scale riots and realizes Xinjiang Independence in 2000!" 22 terrorist representatives from this organization in 11 different branches planned to assassinate 24 cadres from the government and the CPC, and religious figures for creating a large- scale rebellion in Xinjiang on the 17th of Ramadan. The entire meeting contents were recorded for later sending to similar groups overseas to gain international support. But the video was seized by the police and some clips of the video broadcasted on China Central Television (CCTV). According to targets on their assassination list, what the ETIHP wanted to do was to cut off the communication bridge between Han people and Uyghur Muslims and to drive Han out of Xinjiang. For instance, these mobs attacked 70 year-old Aronghan Aji, the then Khatib of Id Kah Mosque and vice-president of National Islamic Council of China (NICC), when he was on the way to Id Kah Mosque for hosting the first pray of the day with his son in the morning. Luckily he and his son both survived but were injured heavily. There were over 20 deep wounds on his body caused by knives. When the terrorists were arrested by local police, they said that they felt conflicted in finishing such a task, as they respected the spiritual leader very much. On February 5, 1997, a group of national separatists claimed that "religion is suppressed by the government" with an excuse of government limitation on cross- region preaching. They said, "We need to march on the road to promote our belief and jihad. We do not require what the government gives us. We wish to expel the Han people. And we have to establish our Islamic Kingdom" and instigated Uyghurs to demonstrate on the main avenues of Yining city. Moreover, according to the investigation by the police, some national separatists were from Kashgar and Hotan. They forced Uyghur citizens to burn up identification cards, marriage certificates etc., and said "Only then can we become the real Muslim." As recorded in the Xinjiang Yearbook 1997, this riot led to 198 citizens being wounded by those mobs, including 24

50 people seriously injured, 7 Han people were killed, 24 cars were smashed and another 6 cars burned. (Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region [SBXUAR], 1997). 20 days after the Yining incident, bombs were placed in four crowded places around Urumqi and set to explode at the same time. Local police found that the explosive devices were filled with iron nails, steel balls, nuts and screws, which indicated that those separatists wanted to gain maximum causalities.

3.2.1 The Cause of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots According to the theory mentioned in the first chapter, it is essential to analyze and understand the complexity of Xinjiang Muslim violence, which contains the interactive impact of historical and realistic factors, secular and religious factors, economic and political factors, ethnic cultural difference, and geographical factors etc. Since 2009, over 100 cases of terrorism-related group crimes have occurred in Xinjiang. In the new era, the scale of riots have expanded with the application of media, which becomes one of the important tools for the terrorist groups to communicate, to exchange information, and to conduct terrorism events. Hence, Uyghur Muslim violence is rather more complicated than ever before in recent years, especially when the violent trend moves to inland major cities. Not only local authorities, but the central government would like to solve the issue or at least ease the tension. People living in other provinces of China are eager to find reasons why Xinjiang Muslim violence has resurged. Before digging up the reasons why Uyghur Muslim Violence happened, the author believes that it is more significant to figure out the nature of Uyghur riots occurring in distinct eras. For example, to view the outbreak of riots in the early 20th century one should be aware of the background of the warlord period and the Soviet Union’s influence, rather than Islamic identification, while to observe the resurgence of Uyghur Muslim unrest in the early 21st century, one should pay more attention to the actual unjust distribution of economic resources in Xinjiang between Uyghurs and Han and the international counter-terrorism’s influence in the process of globalization.

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3.2.1.1 Overseas Support Currently, East Turkestan forces dwelled in Central Asia, primarily in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These separatist groups came back to life in the 1960s, expanding rapidly to more than 20 groups in the 1990s. But if tracing the source, the formation and development of the East Turkestan forces are closely connected with the invasion of imperialist powers after the Opium War and the US-led western powers' support for curbing China's peaceful rise during the post-Cold War period. Modern China's weak national strength provided the possibility for the so-called western and eastern advanced powers to interfere in Xinjiang and Tibet issues. The Soviet Union's Xinjiang strategy changed based on how to maximize its benefits. In 1933, the United Kingdom endorsed the East Turkestan Independence Association led by Sabit Damolla to establish the ETR in southern Xinjiang, Kashgar city in particular. At that time, there were fierce battles between Xinjiang Warlord Sheng Shicai backed by the Soviet Union and Ma Zhongying based in Gansu province and supported by Japan. However, defeated by Sheng Shicai, Ma Zhongying then retreated to southern Xinjiang and routed the ETR with only a slight effort. Finally, with the great support of the Soviet Red Army, Sheng Shicai eradicated the remnants of Ma Zhongying in the south, which led to many main leaders of the ETR to flee abroad. Although the ETR had only existed three months, it was for the first time that East Turkestan forces could build a 'state', which leveled the ethnic split and was also the beginning of the East Turkestan independence movement. This ethnic-separatism history has been inherited by Xinjiang ethnic separatists so far. Before Sheng Shicai fell out with the Soviets, the Soviet Union developed its own forces vigorously in Xinjiang and even sought for the northern Xinjiang Independence. Thereby Xinjiang would be incorporated into the jurisdiction range of the Soviet Union. The break of Ili Rebellion in 1944 showed the Soviet's aggressive desire to occupy Xinjiang, a part of China's territory. The Soviets launched the ideology of communist among ethnic minorities at first, but it seemed that those local Xinjiang people were not interested. So the Soviets later took advantage of various anti-Han sentiments among local ethnic minorities and their religion to promote the theory of Pan-Turkism with a goal of controlling Xinjiang and creating a "second Mongolia". Moreover, the Soviet Union was also directly involved in the Ili Rebellion by providing 26 weapons, personnel training, organizational coordination and propaganda bases relevant to the thoughts of Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang Independence for rebel forces. As Andrew D. W. Forbes observed, "The Soviet Union supported the Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion against the Republic of China. Many of the Turkic peoples of the Ili region of Xinjiang had close cultural, political, and economic ties with the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. Many of them were educated in the Soviet Union and a community of Russian settlers lived in the region. As a result, many of the Turkic rebels fled to the Soviet Union and obtained Soviet assistance in creating the Sinkiang (Xinjiang) Turkic People's Liberation Committee (STPNLC) in 1943 to revolt against KMT's rule during the Ili Rebellion (Forbes,1986)." According to Shen Zhihua, the Soviet government set up the Xinjiang Turkic National Liberation Committee in Almaty in the year of 1943 with the principal mission of contacting the upper class of ethnic minorities in Ili and conducting armed riots. At that time, the Soviet Union established two military training bases respectively in Alma-Ata and Andijon for training Xinjiang authority rejectionists fleeing to the Soviet Union. The Alma-Ata base was in charge of regular warfare training, while the Andijon one was responsible for guerrilla training (Shen, 1999). By 1946, the East Turkestan national army commanded by Ivan J. Polinov hit the Manas River located in the west of Dihua (modern Urumqi) with strong tanks, artilleries and cavalries. Xinjiang was quite about to be a new Central Asian republic of the Soviet Union. However, East Turkestan Revolution Organization, the political wing of the national army was in an alliance composed of local Bolshevik ethnic groups, Muslim nationalism groups and Pan-Turkism forces. During the period of "the revolution against the oppression of capitalists in Xinjiang", the Soviets were aware of the fact that once the power of Pan- Turkism and Pan-Islamism became strong enough, it was very likely to influence the similar forces existing in the Central Asian republics, leaving a seriously negative aftermath on the Soviet's control of Central Asia. Thus the Soviet Union adjusted its policies to no longer pursue the Xinjiang Independence for building up a new ETR, but rather have recognized Chinese sovereignty over Xinjiang since 1946. The Soviets asked for the establishment of a highly organized "autonomy" region in Xinjiang as the national army was a fait 27 accompli. The East Turkestan national army became a bargaining chip of the Soviet to 'negotiate' with Chiang Kai-shek for guaranteeing vested interests. Xinjiang nationalist authority of Republic of China led by Zhang Zhizhong signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union government. Then the newly established Xinjiang Provincial Coalition Government was nominally led by Nanjing government representatives, but actively participated by pro-Moscow and pro-Nanjing ethnic minority representatives. As the author observed, the Soviet government was not sincere in helping Xinjiang ethnic separatists to pursue Independence, but regarded them as a bargaining chip, which could be utilized to exchange with competitors for benefits. After its interests were guaranteed by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the Soviets agreed to mediate the conflicts in Xinjiang and prevent Xinjiang Independence. In this way, the Soviet's control of Xinjiang had been retained. Until the PRC's establishment, Xinjiang was liberated peacefully. The Ili rebellion was identified as the Three Districts Revolution (revolution against capitalists), while the national army was gradually dissolved or incorporated into the People's Liberation Army as Xinjiang Fifth Army Corps, which was still the strongest in PLA. The Fifth Army Corps led by Ivanovich Leskin, a Russian citizen and a former member of the CPSU (later turned to be a member of the CPC). Obviously, though the Soviet's ambition to challenge China's sovereignty in Xinjiang had decreased, its actual influence in Xinjiang society was not eliminated. On the occasion of China's regime change, the Soviet's special status and special interests in Xinjiang at least had not been weakened. Numerous strategic minerals in Xinjiang were exploited by Sino-Soviet joint companies, which were actually controlled by the Soviets. Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued its old consulate system in Xinjiang to run five consulates in Urumqi, Kashgar, Ili, Tacheng, and Altay. It is quite irregular for one country to set up 5 consulates in a provincial administrative region. The above five consulates managed over 200,000 Soviet residents and positively admitted new ones. Since many of these Soviet residents actively participated in the Three Regions Revolution, they had collected much political capital, which made them possible to be officers in China's political party, provincial government and army in Xinjiang. It is also not natural to see a large proportion of Soviet residents served as officers in China. The proportion was not only higher than local ethnic minorities', but also Hans. 28

In the early 1960s, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations drove the Soviets to begin to instigate separatist activities in Xinjiang region again. It set up training centers in Talas of Kazakhstan and Samarkand of Uzbekistan to train Uygur and Kazak refugees fleeing from China to be agents, then dispatched them back to China to steal information and incite separatist activities. Meanwhile, it printed materials and set radio stations to broadcast ethnic separatism content via the Uyghur language. The radio station was withdrawn in 1985. Thus, the "East Turkestan" separatist forces in Central Asia began to rebound. Shortly after the Great Leap Forward, the Soviet consul to Yining started to issue identification documents to ethnic Kazakhs and other Turkic people living in Ili, Tacheng, Altay region. On April 22 1962, more than 60,000 Xinjiang residents left China for the Soviet Union, even including two major generals of Xinjiang military command. The Chinese central government believed that the Soviet embassy in Ili plotted the so-called Yita Event. Over the next few months, there were 67,000 inhabitants living in a border area between China and the Soviet Union fleeing to the Soviet Union, which led to a long-time diplomatic negotiation between these two nations. Among the people who defected from China, some were East Turkestan separatists. They established a series of separatist organizations, with its bases dispersed in Central Asia, especially in those previous Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These groups got support from the Soviet's intelligence services and launched many anti-China activities. In the 1990s, many active leaders in various East Turkestan terrorist groups had all received such training in the Soviet Union. In addition, in the year 1969, the Soviet Union and China had a conflict on Damansky island (or Zhenbao island) in March and bloodshed in Tielieketi of Xinjiang in August. In the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet relationship was full of hostility and mistrust. China's Chairman Mao Zedong advanced three world international strategic theories to call on opposing the domination of the first world (US and the Soviet Union). The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 also caused China's strong opposition. It was not until the early 1980s that the decades of hostility between China and the Soviet Union ended. In response, China sponsored Afghanistan’s legal government to go against the Soviets, and ally with the US and Pakistan. Before Deng Xiaoping's promotion of the policies of reformation and opening in China, the East 29

Turkestan independent activities had never been stopped. Thousands of people participated in the riots and even high-ranking officials defected during that time. After the Cultural Revolution broke out, the ETPR was founded under the support of the Soviets because it was lawful to fight against capitalists in China. The charter clearly declared that 'the current program and mission are to rely on the Soviets to realize the Xinjiang Independence' (Li, 2004). By learning the above content, it is not hard to see that the Soviet Union largely helped the East Turkestan separatists to leave China and launch anti-China activities. Before the establishment of the PRC, the Soviet Union assisted East Turkestan separatists to build up the second ETR and that resulted in the Three District Revolution in Xinjiang. Moreover, the Soviet embassy in Ili plotted the Yita event, encouraging residents to live along the border to escape from China, which gave the possibility of the resurgence of East Turkestan separatist organizations. Besides the Soviet Union, the escalation of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots in recent years should also be blamed on the financial and political support from the US, Turkey, Europe, and Middle East. In the past decades, the Soviets supported the so-called 'Xinjiang national liberation movement' by propaganda and organization, resulting in the further enhancement and intensification of the East Turkestan separatism theory. And now western countries led by the US prefer to legitimize the existence of East Turkestan forces from a view of 'human rights' and providing much assistance. Some US government-related scholars attempted to legalize 'Xinjiang Independence' by criticizing China's legal authority in Xinjiang as a relation of suzerain (Han) and settlers (Uyghur), provoking the relationship between Han and local ethnic minorities and imposing western values on Chinese authority. East Turkestan separatist forces overseas established the 'East Turkestan National Independence Alliance (ETNIA) in New York under the intervention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1983, later setting up many branches in other states of the US. Since then, the US became the new stronghold of East Turkestan separatist forces, providing a large stage for them to spread separatist speeches. In the 1990s, the Uyghur American Association was founded in Washington, which further strengthened the power of East Turkestan separatist forces in the US. In 1996, Rebiya Kadeer's second husband Sidik Haji Rozi arrived in the US 30 and got in touch with the Uyghur American Association (UAA), trying to enlarge East Turkestan separatist activity space, and paving the way for Rebiya Kadeer to reach the US. Rebiya Kadeer was released on bail for medical services on March 17, 2005 and she directly fled to the US with 17 months of her jail term left. A year after, she was 'elected' to be the chairwoman of the WUC and strengthened the propaganda of East Turkestan by plotting and instigating several terrorist attacks. The 'exile groups' referred to by RFA is in fact the Washington D.C.-based WUC, openly funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy. This so-called 'exiled group' is literally sitting in Washington D.C., funded by the US State Department, and serving the convenient role of destabilizing China, widely acknowledged by the US itself as an adversary it must encircle, contain, and undermine, clearly explains why efforts to teach Uyghurs Mandarin and thus secure a better future, is opposed, with no viable alternative provided (Cartalucci, 2015).Some right wing forces of the US congress support the WUC by holding hearings relevant to Xinjiang issues, while the CIA sent specialized personnel to train 'Xinjiang Independence' supporters. For example, after the July 2009 Urumqi riots, US Congressman McGovern said, " The PRC has violated internationally recognized human rights and legal due process standards by carrying out executions after trials marred by procedural abuses and by carrying out arbitrary detentions targeting Uyghurs and other individuals in Xinjiang in the aftermath of a suppressed demonstration and ensuing mob violence on July 5 to 7, 2009 (McGovern, 2009)." The Xinjiang issue is still unlikely to be one of the US's main concerns. However, the US hopes the East Turkestan separatist force led by Kadeer increases media exposure and expands its influence. The author believes that the US would not like the peaceful settlement of Xinjiang issue because it can make trouble for the Chinese government, eventually curbing the rapid rise of China. Turkish successive governments normally showed two distinct attitudes to East Turkestan forces. Some administrations would like to cooperate with the Chinese government to constrain East Turkestan forces, but sometimes they feel sympathetic and provide support for those East Turkestan forces. In the early 1990s, senior Turkish officials publicly met leaders of East Turkestan forces. But a few years later, the Turkish government seldom gave speeches supporting Pan-Turkism but turned to criticize China's ethnic minority policies. Currently, there are 20 groups advocating the 31

East Turkestan separatism in Turkey. On the foreign policy front, Turkey has been proactive in participating regional affairs, and has used cultural links and business ties to strengthen cooperation between Turkic-speaking countries. Turkish politicians have long aspired for a "Turkic Union" with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the Turkish government has made Turkic people and Muslims their priority when making policies. In addition, the Turkish government has an open attitude toward immigrants, whether they have arrived in the country legally or illegally ("Some Uyghurs travel to Turkey ", 2015). The loose immigration policy under the Turkish government makes some Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang leave China legally and illegally. And it is also true that a small group of Uyghur Muslims became terrorists to fight 'enemies' in Syria and Afghanistan after they were lured by East Turkestan extreme groups, such as East Turkestan Education and Mutual Assistance Association. 3.2.1.2 Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism The ideologies of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were introduced into Xinjiang from the early 20th century. As many materials reveal, Pan-Islamism was raised by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani during the middle of the 19th century, with its core ideology of uniting all Islamic countries to establish a unified Islamic political entity under the rule of a strong Caliphate. One school of Pan-Islamism is Islamic fundamentalism, which resolutely opposes all non-Islamic and anti-Islamic ideologies and systems. It also calls for all devout Muslims to realize the goal of ‘cleaning the world’ by all means. Meanwhile, the aim of Pan-Turkism is to unite all Turkic peoples living in the region from Asia Minor to Central Asia to establish a unified Turkic empire. Pan-Turkism should be identified as one kind of Pan-nationalism, while Pan- nationalism refers to an ideology of some ethnic individuals or national groups, when they attempt to unify several weak nations to change their nations’ destinies as well as the irrational international political and economic order, under the rapid expansion of western hegemony during the post-Cold war. The concept of East Turkestan was proposed by the late 19th century by western scholars, especially those from the Soviet Union. They take Central Asia of the Soviet Union as West Turkestan, and regard the Xinjiang region of China as East Turkestan, where is the homeland of East Turkic people. Since then, East Turkestan became both a geographical and political concept. 32

Pan-Turkismis widely acknowledged as a movement aiming at political and/or cultural unification of all Turkic peoples, emerged among Turkic intellectuals of Russia as a liberal-cultural movement in the 1880s (Fishman & Garcia, 2011). The Pan- Turkism is an ideological trend created by the Russian Tatar intelligentsia during the 19th century. They advocated uniting all the Turkic-speaking ethnicities to set up a "Turkic nation" in order to resist the rule of the Russian Kingdom. By the early 20th century, this idea was used by the Young Turks for creating a "Turk Empire" and reviving the ancient glory of the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with the Pan-Turkism theory, the birthplaces of all Turkic people should be considered as "Turks' native lands", including a part of Western Asia, almost the whole of Central Asia and a part of Xinjiang, China. Following this logic, Han people could also unite all the Han people around the world, particularly in Asia to recover a once-prosperous Han empire, which would lead to many conflicts. That is clearly not possible in the current era. The first seeds of modern Turkic nationalism in Xinjiang were planted around the beginning of the twentieth century in the Kashgar and Yining (Gulja) areas. Uyghur capitalists who had traveled to Germany, Turkey, and Russia found their homeland to be backward by comparison. Deeply influenced by liberal Tatar and Turkish intellectuals, they sought to implement modern education among the Turkic peoples in Xinjiang (Millward & Perdue, 2004). With the influence of Pan-Turkism, some Uyghurs extreme nationalists pursued 'the Xinjiang Independence or The Establishment of East Turkestan', as they felt 'oppressed' by China’s government. However, 'oppression' is different from people to people. According to constructivists, the term is constructed by people or groups with different backgrounds, knowledge and living experience. That's why East Turkestan forces vainly sought to achieve their ideal goal by using violence with the support of anti-Chinese forces instead of using the legal way offered by the Chinese government to express their alternative perspectives. The most recent and dangerous terrorist organization is the ETIM. According to a Chinese government release, from the 1990s to the early 2000s, the ETIM planned and conducted a number of violent attacks in Xinjiang and neighboring Central Asian countries, such as kidnapping, poisoning, vehicle bombs and other explosions. Its targets included local Uyghur and Han government officials, ordinary people and overseas Chinese officials and businessmen. The development of 33

ETIM is similar to other terrorist organizations, as it began with a bottom-up organizational structure. It was founded outside China by Hasan Mahsum and other separatists with an initial goal of building an Islamic state named East Turkestan in Xinjiang. Its goal was to eventually establish a unified pan-Turkestan Islamic state covering the entire Asia Minor and Central Asia. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, the scale of different ETIM and its allied groups had reached unprecedented new heights, which increasingly became a major threat to the Chinese government. It is also during this period that some groups of the East Turkestan separatism campaign started to turn to radicalization. The ETIM and its allies implemented many terrorist attacks. Hence, Beijing declared the 'East Turkestan Separatism' as one kind of terror. Moreover, as China's official intelligence said, ETIM has had contact with the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan since its establishment. Beijing believed that Hasan Mahsum acquired funding from Osama bin Laden and the ETIM members were trained for military attacks in the camps of Al Qaeda. The penetration of Pan-Islamism is identified as one of the major factors that lead to the unrest in Xinjiang over the past decades. Well, Wahhabism, Hizbut- Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) and Hejira (Immigration Jihad) are seen as the key reasons for the growing number of terrorism cases in Xinjiang in recent decades. Before studying the above Pan-Islamism, it will be better to understand the classification of the Xinjiang local Muslims. After Islam was introduced in Xinjiang and became popular among Uyghurs, four types of Muslims, including cultural Muslim, secular Muslim, conservative Muslim and Muslim extremists developed based on the degree of Muslim secularization in Xinjiang. Cultural Muslims seldom participate in religious activities, and usually do not avoid smoking and drinking alcohol. But they still follow some traditional customs. Secular Muslims join in more religious activities, such as fasting, as they keep the belief in Islam and follow their ancestral traditions. Conservative Muslims or Wahhabism followers promote a simple life, resisting waste and seeking inner peace and stability. But this group normally does not advocate violence or has any political aspirations. Muslim Extremists, or Political Muslims, evolved from conservative Muslims, regarded as religious reformers with obvious political demands, such as the establishment of theocracy in Xinjiang. 34

Wahhabism is one schools of Modern Islamic revivalism, which is acknowledged by Saudi Arabia as a state religion. It was introduced into Kumul prefecture of Xinjiangin the 1980s so that most of Kumul's residents are conservative Muslims. However, Wahhabism followers in Xinjiang do not copy the cultures and customs of Saudi Arabia, such as local women normally do not wear the burqa but their ethnic dress. Although many local conservative Muslims think that watching TV affects keeping the peaceful mind, they do not avoid vehicles and mobile phones. Some Muslims will also buy big houses if they can afford one. In fact, the localization of Wahhabism in Xinjiang does not exactly replicate the Arabic culture. The process of its introduction should be summarized as "I accept your religious thought, but refuse to change national traditions." For example, the Shamanism customs of fortunetelling, prophecy, and other forms of divination are still very prevalent in Kashgar. Moreover, some witchcraft of Han people, like "Punching Voodoo dolls who represent villains", are often seen in Xinjiang Uyghur communities. These activities are never allowed in line with the doctrines of Islam. However, such actions are kept and preserved in local Uyghurs' daily life. Wahhabism’s valuing personal insights on the classic rather than scholars' explanations, makes religious study more easily accepted by the public. Plus this school originated from Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, so it is widely believed in some parts of southern Xinjiang. But the negative factors of Wahhabism in Xinjiang include different interpretations of classic Islam, which confuses its believers and damages local traditional culture and customs. Because every preacher has his own understanding of Al Quran, such interpretations are formed with references to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Afghanistan etc. Believers inevitably feel confused. On the other side, Wahhabism followers actively promote strict adherence to Islam in their social life, which has negative impacts on local Uyghurs' traditional culture and customs. For instance, an increasing number of Uighur women do not dress in colorful costumes anymore and instead don black burqas. In some parts of southern Xinjiang, ethnic music, traditional dance, painting, sculpture and other socio-cultural activities are banned according to Wahhabism's guidance. Some Wahhabism followers even accuse that traditional Uyghur customs like weddings and funerals are in violation of Islam. Aza Sultan, chairman of Xinjiang Federation of Literary criticizes that the aim 35 of strengthening public awareness of religious identity by such means deliberately is to erode, even deracinate Uyghur traditional culture gradually. It should be noted in particular that the Muslim extremists are isolated from Wahhabism followers. If Wahhabism followers seek for clear political appeals, like Xinjiang independence, an Islamic state etc., they will be recognized as separatists and extremists by the central government. The most prestigious political Muslims in Xinjiang are Ablikim Mahsum and his 800 followers. Ablikim was a farmer living in Kuqa county of Aksu prefecture before he set up the first terrorist organization, Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party. In the 1950s, Ablikim was sent down for 20 years for the separatist proposition. Released in 1977, he was elected as Deputy Member to the People's Congress of XUAR, Member of Standing Committee of Islamic Association and vice chairman of the CPPCC in Yecheng County because of his religious academic accomplishments. In 1987he started to establish preaching schools. The number of his students was nearly 800, also called 800 followers. He had organized his students to wear uniforms for silent demonstrations both in the old town and the new town of Kuqa County. Later, these students (members of ETIP) scattered all over Xinjiang and become core members engaged in violent terrorist activities around the region. Hizbut-Tahrir is also known as Islamic Liberation Party (ILP), a radical, international, Pan-Islamic political organization. The party mission is the re- establishment of "the Islamic Khilafah (Caliphate)" or Islamic state, ruled by Islamic Shariah law by non-violent methods. The organization was founded in 1953 as a Sunni Muslim organization in Jerusalem by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar and appeals court judge (Qadi) (Global Security Organization [GSO], 2014) from the Palestinian village of Ijzim. The ILP's caliphate national reconstruction plan is divided into three stages. The first stage is enlightenment, that is to find and train believers supporting party's ideology; the second one is interaction, that is to make believers love and support Islam with a life goal to preaching Islam as well as to devote themselves to the Islamization of their daily lives, states and societies; and the third stage is to seize political power, that is to create a government fully implementing Islamic law and charging for the promotion of Islam to the world. Since then Hizbut-Tahrir has spread to more than 50 countries and by one estimate has about one million members (Shiv, 2004). After evolving for half a century, 36 it gradually becomes a group to advocate national separatism and religious extremism. It has a tendency to be a terrorist organization rather than self-appointed "non-violence campaign", as it is keen on 'Jihad' spirit, wishing to save the declining Muslim community from 'al-kuffār' (Non-Islamic followers) and their political, economic and social systems by Jihad. Maybe, at first, they widely advocated peaceful Jihad, but their followers turned to violent Jihad when the US launched the Afghanistan war aiming at cracking down on the Taliban regime. The ILP's three stages are too idealistic to realize their political goal. Without violent revolution, the possibility to overthrow an existing regime is minimal. Logically speaking, the party wants to go back to the old Islamic social system recorded in the Al-Quran, while the society is moving forward. Currently many countries in the world have declared "Hizbut-Tahrir" as a terrorist organization. The ILP entered Central Asia in the early 1990s after the collapse of Soviet Union and later introduced from Central Asia to China. According to the People Daily's report, "Hizbut-Tahrir" originally posed as an Arabic language school to preach its caliphate national reconstruction plan. It carried out activities in Urumqi, Hotan, Turpan and other places. A key member of their organization is Ibrahim Usman, a former graduate of Xinjiang Institute of Technology, who went to Turkey for two years further study in 1995. After graduating in Turkey, he returned to Urumqi for developing the "Hizbut-Tahrir". In recent years, the ILP and its secret branches in Xinjiang has unified guiding principles and clear political views under the tightly organized system. It wants to realize the dream of 'Xinjiang independence' by persuasion (missionary), military training preparation, and unifying all the supporters and jihad successively. Its members are composed of education workers, religious figures, individual craftsmen in the bottom level of society, released people, ethnic minority women and minors. Its capital sources are from various channels, such as foreign religious extremist groups' financial aid, personal donations, payments of party members, money from drug smuggling and illegal border trades. The party also cooperates with ethnic separatist forces, other religious extremist forces, violent terrorist forces to achieve their ultimate goal of so- called 'East Turkestan Independence'. "Hizbut-Tahrir" organizations in China tend to carry out illegal religious propaganda as their major mission supplemented by violent and terrorist activities. On one hand, the party set up many points to preach separatism 37 and religious extremism by a large number of illegal religious publications and anti- government leaflets; on the other hand, it attempts to persuade party cadres of the CPC and patriotic religious figures in Xinjiang by violence and other extreme dangerous measures. What is Hejira Jihad? According to historical accounts of Muslims, the Islamic prophet Muhammad was frustrated when he preached his religion on the Arabian Peninsula. Then he was forced to flee from Mecca in AD 622 to Medina for continuing his missionary work. Later, he moved to Medina and established a unified Muslim community (Ummah).This event was called Hijra. The majority of Chinese scholars currently consider that the modern theory of Hejira Jihad should be linked to Shukri Mustafa, who led the extremist Islamist group Jama'at al-Muslim in (Society of Muslims), popularly known as Takfirwal-Hijra (excommunication and emigration). He began his path toward Islamist thought by joining the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. After being arrested for activities related to the group, he became interested in the works of Sayyid Qutb and other radical thinkers. After being released in the 1971, he gathered followers and withdrew from contemporary society. He was executed in 1978 for kidnapping and killing an Egyptian government minister (“Sukri Mustafa,” n.d.). Shukri Mustafa challenged the ideology of nationalism existing in the Egyptian society, since the country began going against imperialism and colonialism in modern times. He appealed to Muslims to practice their religion by emigration, ignoring the limitation of the state border. He asked Muslims to pursue Jihad in the Ummah where people had the same Islamic faith. Moreover, Mustafa developed his "Migration and Jihad" Theory by suggesting Islamic fundamentalists to leave where they live in order to realize Jihad. He even said, "A devout Muslim is never satisfied with a permanent residence. The place, where a Muslim can perform his faith and strive for his ideal, is his home (Tu, 2007)." Shukri Mustafa's "Migration and Jihad" Theory succeeded in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Due to the oppression of a strong domestic regime, a large group of Egyptian religious intellectuals (including Shukri Mustafa and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad), with a strong ideological leadership of the Islamic world, had to leave their homeland for Afghanistan. But they were not exiled in a general sense, as they placed a priority on Ummah rather than their own motherland. 38

Therefore, the practice of "Migration and Jihad"in Afghanistan includes Jama'at al- Muslimin founded by Shukri Mustafa, Egyptian Islamic Jihad created by Ayman al- Zawahiri and many fundamentalists who believed the above theory all over the world. There is a saying that, "Since 2009, more than 90% of terrorism-related violence cases occurring in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region are connected with Hejira Jihad(or migration Jihad) (Gu, 2013). According to some official brochures on countering the three evil forces (separatism, extremism and terrorism), "The so-called Hejira Jihad organizations are groups formed by terrorists and violent extremists in fact. Members of those groups incite and conduct Jihad for going to heaven when they become Ghazis." Currently, many Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang are motivated by the above theory and decide to go for Jihad by the way of migration. They choose to leave China illegally. According to the cases of people smuggling investigated by the police, there are mainly two routes that the illegal immigration brokers normally organize for illegal Muslim migration. The first one is from Xinjiang, through Central Asia, to Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq, and the second one is from Xinjiang, across the east-southern border or west-southern border of China (including Guangdong province, Guangxi province, Yunnan province), through Southeast Asia to Turkey, and finally arriving in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. It is clear to see that in recent years, thanks to the closer cooperation between China and Central Asia on cracking down non-traditional security, the first route has been less popular among those migration Jihadists. If they choose the first route, they will be discovered by Chinese police easily in the context of the past ten years' crackdown on three evil forces, which means that they are faced with many obstacles in crossing the borderline between Xinjiang and Central Asia. Even if they flee to Central Asia by a fluke, they are very likely to be arrested and then repatriated by the police of Central Asian states who work closely with China on counter-terrorism issues. While the second route has been favored by the migration jihadists in recent years, especially during the past five years, as the route transits through many countries and regions, it involves many unpredictable factors. Moreover, the police deployed along the east-southern border or west-southern border of China are usually not familiar with the migration jihadists' motivations and behaviors when they attempt to go across 39 the national border illegally. There are many mountains and jungles in Southeast Asia, which provide stowaways a good place to hide. Although China and Southeast Asian governments cooperate closely on preventing human trafficking, it is still not easy for the local police to arrest those migration jihadists. Generally speaking, once the migration jihadists arrive in Turkey, they will go to Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan for jihad activities more easily because of the long-time disputes on Xinjiang Uyghur issues between the Chinese government and the Turkish government. Here are two examples about some migration jihadists trying to illegally migrate from the southwest border of China to Southeast Asia as a transfer stop. Later they were to move to their destination, which would have been Turkey or the war-torn Middle East for their 'obligation' Jihad. Unfortunately, they were stopped by the border police, resulting in their Jihad at the Kunming Train Station, Yunnan province on March 1st, 2014 instead of illegally leaving for Syria or Afghanistan etc. to fulfill their obligation as migration jihadists according to the extreme Islamic theory. Soon after the Kunming violent terrorists attack, the Vietnamese police force was attacked by 10 of 16 Chinese Uyghur Muslim stowaways, when the police prepared to send them back. These migration jihadists planned to launch jihad in the building of the immigration station. They were shouting "fighting for Allah" as they attacked Vietnamese policemen with sticks and snatched submachine guns to spray bullets around. Motivated by migration jihad theory, some Uyghur Muslims attempt to leave China illegally. If they are blocked by the local police somewhere, they may launch terrorist activities there, causing great harm to innocent people. 3.2.1.3 Economic Conditions Gary Becker, a professor at the University of Chicago Business School, has also argued there is a connection between wealth and terrorism, based on the observation that "nations or regions that are experiencing rapid growth appear to have lower incidences of terrorism." Becker posits that political activism, including violent activity, is less appealing to individuals when their economic opportunities expand. So, even if it were the case that poverty does not directly cause terrorism, it could still be true that economic growth reduces terrorism. Terrorists may be powerfully motivated by existential frustration, the feeling of being unrecognized (Zalman, 2015). 40

As the author observes from common sense, if a citizen from a country cannot get what he or she demands as a human being, such as reasonable economic opportunities, he or she is more likely to be frustrated in society and to express his or her dissatisfaction by peaceful or violent means. According to data collected by the Ministry of Public Security, several riots occurred in Urumqi were conducted by or participated in by unemployed Uyghur youth from southern Xinjiang. Southern Xinjiang refers to Kashgar Prefecture, Hotan Prefecture, Aksu Prefecture and the Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture, which accounts for one-third of Xinjiang territory. But over 90% of southern Xinjiang territory is the Gobi desert and mountains, leaving a very small part of land for cultivation. Influenced and restricted by nature, socio-cultural history and other factors, the economic and social development level of ecologically fragile southern Xinjiang lags behind the northern part significantly. Geographically, due to the natural conditions of northern Xinjiang, it is better than the southern part. Xinjiang’s government has emphasized more on development of the northern part in the past decades and has relatively neglected the development of Muslim-populated southern Xinjiang. Statistics show that, due to the scale of the second and third industries in southern Xinjiang being rather small for a very long time, there are less employment opportunities, except for farmers. The number of surplus labor in four prefectures of southern Xinjiang is above 1.5 million, or 60% of the total surplus labor in Xinjiang. Additionally, the implementation of the ethnic minority population policy and rapid population growth in Southern Xinjiang led to a large number of surplus labor (well-educated and uneducated) becoming migrant workers. They had to travel to big cities for good living conditions like many Han people who relocated from rural places in China. But because of the dissimilarities between Uyghurs and Han in terms of ethnic group, religion, culture, lifestyle and other aspects, it is very difficult for those Uyghur Muslims leaving home for work to integrate into the inland Han-dominated society. If the surplus laborers stay home, they could lead to instability for the local community. Furthermore, there are 1.59 million people identified as poor people in accordance with the national poverty standard of 2014(RMB: 2,800 Yuan) in southern Xinjiang, or over 80% of the impoverished population in Xinjiang. One thing has to be 41 clear is that Uyghur Muslims are distributed mainly over four prefectures of southern Xinjiang. The Table-3.1 below explains the poverty situation of southern Xinjiang as representing very low standard soft living for Uyghurs living there, in accordance with the data above. Furthermore, according to the Table-3.2 below, the per-capita annual income gap between urban residents and rural residents in four southern prefectures of Xinjiang is huge. The per-capita annual income of urban residents in Aksu is the highest among the four prefectures, reaching 20,049 yuan, but still ranks 6th out of 14 cities and prefectures in the XUAR. The per-capita annual income of rural residents in Aksu is also the highest among the four prefectures, reaching 7,875 yuan, but ranks 9th of 14 cities and prefectures. Moreover, compared with the advantage data of China in the year of 2013, seven out of 13 cities and prefectures in the XUAR do not reach the national average of per-capita annual income of rural residents, which includes four prefectures in southern Xinjiang with very big gaps respectively.

Table-3.1: Uyghur Population Data in Four Prefectures of Southern Xinjiang (2012)

Prefecture Uyghur Total Percentage of Total population Aksu 1,888,881 2,396,877 78.81% Kirgiz 360,792 560,627 64.36% Kashgar 3,803,463 4,151,345 91.62% Hotan 2,044,223 2,123,377 96.27% Notes. Reprinted from Xinjiang statistic yearbook 2012, by Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2014).

Table-3.2: The Sampling Survey on the Per-capita Annual Income of Urban & Rural Residents in Xinjiang and China (2013) (Unit: Yuan)

Area Urban Residents Rural Residents Urumqi City 21304 11496 Karamay City Maximum 25249 ------Turpan Prefecture-level City Minimum 11943 8170 Hami Prefecture-level City 20865 9908 Changji Hui AutonomousPrefecture 20111 Maximum 13014 Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture 18496 8503 TachengPrefecture 19005 11096 AltayPrefecture 18427 7267 Boertala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture 18863 10636 42

Area Urban Residents Rural Residents Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 20408 11239 Southern Xinjiang Aksu Prefecture 20049 7875 Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture 17094 Minimum 3857 Kashgar Prefecture 15454 5393 Hotan Prefecture 18478 4951 Chinese National Average Data 26955 8896 Notes. Reprinted from Xinjiang statistic yearbook 2012, by Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2014).

Back to the general logic the author mentioned previously, these poor and less-educated Uyghur people who are lacking work chances are more likely to use violent methods to achieve their basic economic goals when they feel hopeless. This is not absolute, but it does offer more possibilities. Since the Chinese central government started carrying out the policy of reformation and opening nationwide, the wealth gap between Xinjiang and the inland areas widened dramatically. Deng Xiaoping's economic strategy is to achieve common prosperity by allowing some people to get rich first, and then the rich leads the poor. After the reform and opening up began, the economic development levels and standards of living gap between all ethnic groups in Xinjiang and the inland people, especially people located in coastal areas widened dramatically, due to the implementation of the coastal areas priority development strategy. Moreover, Xinjiang is vast in territory and rich in resources. The ethnic minorities are not pleased with the expanding income inequality. They feel unsatisfied when they see that other provinces and regions only care about the East-West Pipeline project and East-West Coal Transportation project. These kinds of projects always bring gas or coal from the energy-rich Xinjiang to the booming east coast seemingly for meeting the energy demands of rapid developing regions. The situation also makes many ethnic minorities, especially Uyghurs, consider that the reason why Xinjiang is less modernized than other provinces and regions of China is to maintain the cheap price of large quantities of energy resources transported from Xinjiang to East China. Uyghurs plan that if there were less migrants (mainly Han people) coming to Xinjiang for resources and living spaces, they could rely on the abundant resources such as oil 43 and gas, to live a better life like Saudi Arabia in Middle East by granting the rights of resource exploiting and mining to foreigners. In this way, Xinjiang people will enjoy affluence, while the Xinjiang region will develop much better than now. This logic is easy to understand but is quite hard to realize, as a region with rich resources does not result in a rich place or a peaceful area. Many cases prove that people holding this logic ignore a fact, that is a better living standard is based on many interactional factors.

3.2.2 New Trend Analysis of Uyghur Muslim Riots With the rapid development of modern science and technology, the East Turkestan forces have mastered more advanced tools and use more high-technology. However, violence will continue to be the primary method of its terror activities. Compared with traditional terrorist activities, modern terrorism is crueler. Its scope expands wider with a more severe social impact. Moreover, terrorists' activities become more concealed, which has posed a great threat to national security and social stability. After analyzing the features of East Turkestan forces’ terrorist activities in recent years, you can see that their activities will intensify in the following trends:

3.2.2.1 Range Extension The randomness of violent terrorist activities decides the uncertainty of attack targets, which could be either inside Xinjiang or out of the region, could be any domestic facilities, any places, and any members of the society. Anything is likely to be the target of East Turkestan forces' violent terrorist activities. Furthermore, with modern communication and transportation improving continuously, the activity range of East Turkestan forces goes broader and becomes more uncertain, eventually forming a situation that terrorist activities activate everywhere inside Xinjiang. Authoritative statistics collected in recent years show that in order to escape strict preventive control inside Xinjiang, East Turkestan forces' terrorist activities are not only held in high risk places, such as Kashi, Hotan, Aksu, Urumqi, Ili and Karamay, but have also expanded from small towns to big cities, from relatively isolated areas to well-developed locations, from southern and northern Xinjiang and to the eastern and northern parts. At the same time, in order to produce greater social and political impacts, East Turkestan forces also launch violent terrorist attacks (including bombing, 44 poisoning, and hijacking) in other parts of China’s mainland, where counter-terrorism security forces are relatively weak, especially in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi'an, Wuhan, Guangzhou , Shenzhen and other cities. According to Wu Heping, then spokesman of the Ministry of Public Security, the Xinjiang police successfully cracked down on the premeditated violence against the Beijing Olympics by terrorists from the ETIM and arrested 10 key members of terrorist group led by Adji Mamat. Under the direct command of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the terrorist group led by Adji Mamat secretly developed members in Xinjiang, sent members abroad to attend terrorist training, and then helped well- trained members sneak into China. The group has also raised funds for the purchase of explosive materials and carried out 13 explosion tests in China. In accordance with the ETIM's command, the group plotted to prepare a terrorist attack before April 2008, and then started to conduct poisoning, bombing and other terrorist attacks in Beijing, Shanghai and other places in May, with an aim of disrupting the Beijing Olympics. 3.2.2.2 Uncertain Targets Analyzing the current international situation, there are two ways that terrorism affects the political process. One is to create an atmosphere of terror by killing innocent people in the community, which has indirect impacts on the political process. The other one is to attack specific targets, which changes the political process directly. East Turkestan forces in China and international terrorist groups are inextricably linked. Domestic terrorists often follow the means and methods of international terrorist groups, when they plan and conduct violent terrorist activities. Therefore, aiming at achieving specific political objectives, East Turkestan terrorist forces in Xinjiang are highly likely to implement the two ways of international terrorism practiced in the present or future. Their goals are to assault either Han people or minorities, the police or party members, unclear structures or important infrastructure (like transportation facilities, telecommunication equipment, power plants and reservoirs etc.), civilian targets such as refineries, radio and television stations or important military installations (like ammunition depots and radar stations etc.). 3.2.2.3 Timing Choices on Key Days With the rapid rise of China's comprehensive national power and the continuous improvement of its international status, China's political activities and social 45 affairs catch more attention of many countries and regions. East Turkestan forces want to further internationalize the Xinjiang issue, so they continue pursuing the strategy of relying on Europe and the US as well as spare no effort to seize any important opportunity to engage in violent terrorist activities, which help them attract the international community's attention and gain support of anti-China forces. Data and facts show that East Turkestan forces usually create trouble when major festivals come or major national political activities are organized. It is because launching terrorist activities during sensitive periods allow East Turkestan forces to not only cause greater social panic, but also to have a greater negative impact politically and economically at home and abroad. According to statistics, violent terrorist incidents in Xinjiang conducted by East Turkestan forces, mostly occurred in the Spring Festival, Labor Day, Chinese Army Day, CPC Founding Day and other major political events and social affairs organizing periods. Hence, you could predict that in the next period of time, East Turkestan forces are highly likely to continue to choose major festivals and other sensitive days to launch a variety of violent terrorist activities in domestic cities in order to enlarge the influence on the international community and stir greater political, economic and social chaos. 3.2.2.4 Internet Boost In the new century, the Internet has been widely used by East Turkestan forces. Its advantages include the fast-spread of information, wide coverage and low cost, etc. Ideology disputes are the source of breeding separatist terrorist forces, and it is also the 'main front' that East Turkestan forces compete with the Chinese central government for the will of the people. After the 9/11 incident, the East Turkestan forces intensified its domestic and international collusion and organizational integration under the control and support of Western anti-China forces. They pursued a policy of using seditious words to instigate racial hatred. Through radio broadcasting, secession-related material posting, underground preaching and other means, they tried to incite ethnic antagonism and ethnic hatred, to distort religious doctrines, to make up poisoned propaganda, and to preach the idea of Xinjiang independence, with a goal of whipping up public opinion to back their separatist and disruptive activities. Currently, the East Turkestan forces overseas rely on the East Turkestan Information Center, 46 headquartered in Munich, Germany to collect and spread information about the Xinjiang region's politics, economy, culture, ethnic people, religion and other aspects on the internet. The East Turkestan Information Center has become a central hub for East Turkestan organizations around the world, which makes these groups much closer. In 2009, WUC led by Kadeer used the above network system to incite, plan and organize the shocking July 2009 Urumqi Riots. In early 2011, in order to produce a second Urumqi Riot, Kadeer commanded all East Turkestan groups to use the internet to hype some sensitive issues online for intensifying conflicts between Uyghurs and Han people. For example, Kadeer believes that ethnic Uyghurs are forced to learn Chinese, to migrate involuntarily and suffer from employment discrimination. According to the National Security Department statistics, over 100 websites operated by East Turkestan forces overseas have published more than 350 announcements and resolutions, and over 1000 false claims in forms of reports, postings and videos focusing on instigating domestic Uyghurs to fight against the central government. It is obvious that with the rapid development and the increasing popularity of the Internet, East Turkestan forces will continue to use it as a major tool of separatist propaganda and mutual collusion.

3.3 Main Terrorist Groups Related to East Turkestan

3.3.1 East Turkestan Islamic Movement According to the PRC's 2002 report, in February 1998 Hasan Mahsum, leader of the ETIM sent "scores of terrorists" into China, where they established about a dozen bases in Xinjiang and "inland regions" and trained more than 150 terrorists in 15 training camps. They also set up large numbers of "training stations" in scattered areas, each consisting of three to five members, and workshops producing weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Xinjiang police uncovered "many" of these training stations and workshops, confiscating antitank grenades, grenades, detonators, guns, and ammunition (Millward, 2004). For example, from early 1998 to the end of 1999, under the direct command of Hasan Mahsum, a group of violent extremists in Hotan prefecture of Xinjiang set up several bomb manufacturing dens for recruiting over 1000 new members and manufacturing more than 5000 hand grenades, explosive devices and 47 other self-made bombs. Moreover, in 1999 they conducted violent terrorist crimes in Moyu county of Hotan and Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, leaving six innocent people dead and significant property loss. The most serious of the accusations against this group, from the US' point of view, is the ETIM's connections to Al Qaeda and the Taliban—including a meeting with Osama Bin Laden, a receipt of Al Qaeda funds, and training of Uyghurs in Taliban and Al Qaeda camps. ETIM's leader, Hasan Mahsum, has denied having contacts with Al Qaeda or intending to carry out terrorist acts (Pan, 2002). In May 2002, the Kyrgyz government extradited two Uyghurs to China accused of planning attacks on embassies and public places in Bishkek. The US embassy in Beijing further announced that the US had received intelligence reports from a non-Chinese source that ETIM planned to attack the US embassy in Bishkek. At the US and PRC urging, in September 2002 the United Nations added ETIM to its own list of terrorist organizations. The Pakistan government announced in December 2003 that Pakistani forces had killed Hasan Mahsum in October during a raid on an Al Qaeda hideout in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. ("Pakistan Confirms", 2003)

3.3.2 East Turkestan Liberation Organization The ETLO headed by Mehmet Emin Hazret, stands accused of violent incidents both inside and outside Xinjiang, including the murders of Nigmat Bazakov and Wang Jianping, 15 incidents of arson in Urumqi, a poisoning in Kashgar, a series of attacks on Chinese nationals in Turkey, arms smuggling, shootouts with Chinese border guards, and, most recently, the attack on a China-bound bus in the Kyrgyzstan mountains and murder of its passengers. One source also credits the ETLO with the ransom kidnapping of a Chinese businessman and bombings in Osh. (Elsewhere these crimes are blamed on the Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO). Chinese and Central Asian official announcements often link the ETLO to the IMU and Chechen and Afghan terrorist training camps. Hazret has denied having any links to the ETIM or involvement in any of the past incidents of which the ETLO stands accused. In a January 2003 interview, however, he said that the ETLO's "principal goal is to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means. But to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable." 48

Nevertheless, sources with information on the interrogation of Uyghur prisoners in Guantanamo express skepticism over the Chinese claims that the ETLO is an international terrorist organization opposed to the US interests. Despite Chinese urging, the US has not placed ETLO alongside ETIM on its list of terrorist groups (Akilova, 2002).

3.3.3 World Uyghur Youth Congress One thing that is clear is the WU Cwas established on 16 April 2004 in Munich, Germany, after the East Turkestan National Congress (ETNC) and the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) merged into one united organization. The WUYC was founded by a group of outbound Uyghurs from Xinjiang, Uyghurs who resident overseas for years, as well as their descendants, identified by the Ministry of Public Security of PRC as a terrorist organization, which aims at splitting the Xinjiang region from China's territory. It has also been called the International Uyghur Youth League (IUYL), World Uyghur Youth League (WUYL), and the World East Turkestan Youth Congress (WETYC). The first meeting of the WUYC was held in Munich, Germany in November of 1996. The core leaders and subordinate organizations of the WUYC engaged in violent terrorist activities. The former chairman, Dolkun Isaonce organized criminal gangs to conduct theft, robbery, explosive events and other terrorist crimes. He served as vice president of the ETLO, in charge of all the affairs of the ETLO German branch, and developed several terrorist attacks with another terrorist head, Mehmet Emin Hazret. The East Turkestan Youth League (ETYL) was a subordinate organization of the WUYC, established in Istanbul, Turkey in March 1993, and then it moved to Switzerland. This group explicitly advocated forming a strong force in order to achieve Xinjiang independence by overthrowing the current regime of China violently. After the WUYC was founded, main leaders and members made an action plan to assassinate CPC heads, military leaders and government officers working in Xinjiang, to damage railways and bridges, to launch bombing events towards China's official overseas agencies and to develop military attacks along the borders between China and its Central Asian neighbors. For example, the WUYC plotted and 49 implemented two explosive events in the office building of Kashgar Agriculture Machinery Company and a video hall in Yarkand respectively, leaving two people dead and 22 injured in total. The WUYC obtained their funds through conducting crimes, such as theft, robbery, and receiving financial assistance from international terrorist organizations. The personnel source of the WUYC was mainly inbound and outbound young Uyghur people. The WUYC is closely related with other terrorist groups. The subordinate group of the WUYC, ETYL, contacted some violent organizations active in West Asia frequently, and asked those violent groups for help with purchasing arms, explosive devices, etc. Furthermore, the WUYC cooperated with other East Turkestan terrorist organizations at the third WUYC meeting held with great support from the East Turkestan Liberation Organization. The WUYC also made great efforts to rescue East Turkestan terrorists. According to the report released by the PRC government, Dolkun Isa and his friend brought a terrorist from Alma-Ata of Kazakhstan to a terrorist training center located at the border of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, then illegally immigrated to Germany before assisting terrorists to request asylum there (Ministry of Public Security of PRC [MPSPRC], 2003). The WUYC, identified by The Ministry of Public Security, has been replaced by the WUC. In fact, especially when Rebiya Kadeer became the second chairman of the WUC, this group of separatist terrorists planned and instigated many bloody conflicts in Xinjiang and other major cities around China.

3.3.4 East Turkestan Information Center The East Turkestan Information Center (ETIC) was founded in Munich, Germany in June 1996, with the goal of developing internet networks to spread religious extremism and Jihad violence propaganda. The Xinjiang Uyghur ethnic separatists travelling to Germany are the core members. Abdujelil Karakash was the chairman of the ETIC as well as the vice chairman of East Turkestan Ethnic Congress. After a large-scale violent riot occurred in Yining (Ghulja) on February 5, 1997, which led to seven people being cruelly killed, 198 50 civilians, public security officers, and armed policemen being injured, and many citizens going missing. Abdujelil Karakash encouraged the East Turkestan terrorists in China to conduct bigger activities. In April 1999, he worked with Mehmet Emin Hazret and other terrorists to plot another explosive terrorism campaign in Africa, specifically targeting the Chinese embassy there. After the 9/11 incident, Abdujelil Karakash used the internet to teach domestic East Turkestan terrorists how to make poisons and explosive devices covertly and prepare for the launch of violent terrorist actions at any time. ETIC has used various media, especially the internet to propagandize terrorism, extremism and separatism. Its articles, such as, “Is There Any Hope for Our Independence? Independence or Death?”, unashamedly promote religious extremism and encourage Jihad by violent terrorist actions. Moreover, the content of those writings publicly calls on Muslims living in China to attack kindergartens, schools, government and other armed force agencies of Han people by bombing, poisoning and other criminal means. The ETIC hoped to achieve the purpose through a series of violent activities. The ETIC teaches East Turkestan terrorists in China how to make poisons and explosive devices through the internet secretly. It also directly planned and carried out terrorist sabotage against oil pipelines, gas pipelines, railways and other large civil facilities in China. In March 2003, the ETIC plotted an explosive event on the railway linking Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu province, to Kumul of Xinjiang. The ETIC attempted to raise funds through various channels. For example, Abdujelil Karakash was authorized by the East Turkestan Ethnic Congress to use its name to raise funds. Some Xinjiang merchants in Turkey and Saudi Arabia and ethnic separatist groups offered the ETIC operational capital. The main personnel of the ETIC should be categorized into two parts. The first group of them are employees working as journalists and publishers. There are 30 employees working in the so-called headquarter of the ETIC, including eight people hired as full-time workers. Meanwhile, there are more than 40 people working in 18 different countries as reporters and publishers. The second group of the ETIC personnel are underground news source providers living at home and abroad ostensibly, but they 51 are in fact criminal offenders at large listed as wanted by the Chinese government and outbound trained East Turkestan terrorists (MPSPRC, 2003).

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CHAPTER 4 CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

4.1 Overview: Origin and Development

The relations between China and Central Asia can be traced back to the Western Han Dynasty. In an ancient Chinese history book, Central Asia is called 'Xiyu' (Western territory). To ensure the smooth flow of traffic between China and the 'Xiyu', envoy Zhang Qian went to Xiyu two times under the dispatch of Emperor Han Wudi. Zhang Qian not only brought back information about Central Asia's political, economic and cultural situations, but also boosted communications and exchanges between the Western Han dynasty authority and Central Asia. Moreover, he contributed to opening the 'Silk Road'. Today, the goal of China's foreign policy "Belt and Road" is to revive the old Silk Road by focusing on cooperation and development between China and Central Asia, and finally achieving a 'win-win' result based on mutual benefits. By the time of the Tang Dynasty, Chinese merchants brought tea, porcelain, silk, technologies like drilling and paper-making, and Chinese traditional culture to Central Asia, and then through Central Asian states to the Western world. Similarly, China's Central Plains region also imported various exotic fruits and vegetables, like grapes, walnuts, spinach, carrots, minerals and rare animals from Central Asia. In terms of religious and cultural influences of Central Asia on China, and the Xinjiang region in particular, Buddhism, Nestorianism, Manichaeism, and Islam were introduced. Various ethnic groups living in Central Asia brought their music, instruments, dances and acrobatics to China, which later helped play a big role in the process of forming the diverse Chinese national and cultural traditions. In 1911, the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen overthrew the feudal Qing Dynasty, resulting in the establishment of the Republic of China. Meanwhile, the Russian October Revolution broke out in 1917, leading to the establishment of the Socialist Soviet Union. After the October Revolution, a number of autonomous republics were set up in Central Asia. Soon after, these republics became 53 part of the Soviet Union. During a long period of time, individual communication between China and the five Central Asian republics should be viewed through the lens of China-Soviet Union relations. China's official communication with Central Asian states was almost fully interrupted. Shortly after the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union disintegrated and then five Central Asian republics declared independence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China began making efforts to establish and strengthen cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries in Central Asia. China's authority mainly emphasized on the solutions of border disputes inherited from the Soviet days at first, but then with the boost in China-Central Asia relations, China's foreign policies toward Central Asia increasingly reflected China's broader economic and security interests in the region. Since the independence of five Central Asian countries, China has made effort to keep a harmonious bilateral relationship with them and promoted bilateral developments in terms of the regional economy, security and other vital aspects. It is obvious that good relations between China and Central Asia have brought many benefits for both sides, especially economic development, counter-terrorism cooperation, and social-cultural collaboration. Today, a great network including roads, rails, airlines, telecommunication systems and oil & gas pipelines, have been formed step by step between China and Central Asia, showing that the fate and future of China and Central Asia have been closely linked. According to statistics reported by China's National Statistics Bureau, the total trade between China and the five Central Asian countries reached 46 billion US dollars in 2012. For five Central Asian republics, China became the most significant source of foreign direct investment in the region. Moreover, since China established diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian countries in 1992, the region's total trade has increased by 100 times (National Bureau of Statistics of China [NBSC], n.d.). China also provides a huge amount of capital and foreign direct investment in energy, construction, natural resource mining and commodities sectors. For instance, many significant infrastructure projects have become headlines in global media, including the Turkmenistan-China oil pipeline, Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline (from Atyrau to Alashankou), Chinese public and private enterprises' energy transportation 54 and communication investment in Uzbekistan, and new roads and tunnels built by Chinese companies in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. China has also offered low-interest loans to Tajikistan and other fund-shortage Central Asian countries, which is one of the prominent features in China-Central Asia relations. In June 2012, then Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that China would provide 10 billion USD for any member countries of the SCO. Furthermore, Central Asia has become one of China's important commodity markets. On the one hand, expanding energy ties with Central Asian neighbors has facilitated Beijing’s domestic goal of developing its western provinces and turning Xinjiang into a new center for the Chinese energy industry. On the other hand, economic development has highlighted inequalities within the province and unleashed social tensions that erupted into riots in the provincial capital of Urumqi in July 2009. The interethnic violence in Xinjiang may have long-term consequences for both the stability of Central Asian states with Uighur minorities and perceptions of China in these countries (Wishnick, 2009).

4.1.1 China's Interests in Central Asia The five countries in Central Asia have been independent for more than 20 years after consolidating their sovereignty over newly-born motherlands and devoted themselves to social development in separated lands. After experiencing a series of significant incidents occurring in the range of specific regions and even the whole world, these five countries respectively boosted country-building processes and jointly participated in the establishment of a new order in the international community. Moreover, five countries in Central Asia have found their own positions in the process of regional economic integration and economic globalization by various ways and attempts. Though the interaction process is proceeding step by step, its impacts made the current geopolitical layout of Central Asia and regional security structure change significantly. China was one of the first states to recognize the independence of the five Central Asian republics and established diplomatic relations with them. The development of bilateral cooperation between China and each Central Asian state in various fields is relatively smooth. The leaders of the Central Asian countries repeatedly 55 visited China, while Chinese leaders also visited every state in the region many times and signed a series of bilateral agreements. Since the five countries' official attitude toward China is very friendly, China and Central Asian countries have not only achieved consensus on many issues in terms of the border disarmament, mutual confidence, and boundary problems, but also promoted cooperation and exchanges in terms of politics, economy, and culture.

Figure-4.1: Central Asia, Formerly Part of the Soviet Union. Reprinted from Commonwealth of Independent States-Central Asian States, by Royal Berglee, (2002).World regional geography: People, places and globalization, ch. 8. retrieved from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/ maps/commonwealth/central_asian_common_2002.jpg

4.1.1.1 Geopolitical Interests From the perspective of geopolitical theory, Central Asia is a very important region for China. Central Asia could be regarded as a buffer zone between China and other major powers in the world, such as Russia, and the U.S. China's external security environment has been greatly improved since the independence of the five Central Asian republics, especially direct military pressure in the northwest from the Soviet Union being eliminated. Although Central Asia is surrounded by Russia, 56

NATO, the Islamic world and India, its vast territory almost blocks all the geopolitical functions from each power on China directly. Currently, the process of each power competing for Central Asia shows that there has yet been an individual power controlling the region overwhelmingly and the five Central Asian republics have not expressed extraordinary enthusiasm to any particular major power. It seems that the status quo of Central Asia should be described as 'balance of power' in a dynamic, because the consequence of several major powers repeatedly competing and gambling in Central Asia is likely to reach strategic coordination among the parties, which is conducive to a relatively stable situation in Central Asia. In this case, Central Asia has become China's buffer zone. 4.1.1.2 Energy Interests China has energy security interests in Central Asia. As Huang Xiaoyong, Dean of the Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Director of the International Center for Energy Security Studies said, "The current annual oil consumption of China is more than 500 million tons. Meanwhile, the percentage of China's dependence on foreign oil in 2014 is close to 60% and it shows an upward trend in the near future. Due to the offshore oil transportation presenting a certain risk, there is a big vulnerability in the status quo of China's energy security. Therefore, it is urgent and essential to establish and improve multi-level oil storage systems to ensure a stable supply of China's domestic oil market (“Zhongguo shiyou nianxiaofeiliang,” 2015). In the next few years, China will become the fastest-growing consumer of oil. By the 2030s it will overtake the US as the biggest consumer of oil and has a larger gas market than the European Union. China’s total energy demand in 2040 will be almost double that of the US (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2015). In order to ensure domestic oil consumption, it is quite necessary for China to promote the diversification of China's oil import channels and transport channels, as well as strengthen the capability in shielding against international oil market risks. However, at present, China imports oil mainly from the Middle East, which accounts for nearly half of its imports. The vast majority of China's oil is transported by sea via a simple route. It is said that more than 85% of China's oil goes through the Indian Ocean-Malacca Strait-South China Sea line. In this way, China's oil import security is rather vulnerable. 57

During the Soviet era, Central Asia was recognized as a land abundant with energy. And the two largest oil and gas fields were discovered in the region after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Kashagan oil field found in Kazakhstan’s Caspian region in 2000 has been identified as the largest oil field discovered in over 30 years. Moreover, Gaffney, Cline& Associates has estimated reserves at Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan as between13.1-21.2 trillion cubic meters. Hence, Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves ranks fourth in the world behind those of Russia, Iran and Qatar, BP data shows ("Turkmenistan plans", 2012). Compared with the time consuming and long distance oil import route, Central Asia is much closer to China. Therefore, Central Asia plays a great role in ensuring China's energy security and promotion of China’s Western Development, especially in the Xinjiang region. 4.1.1.3 Regional Security Interests The peace and stability of Central Asia is very significant for China, because geographically, Northwestern China is adjacent to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. If there were some conflicts or any transnational crimes occurring in those states, China's national interest must be affected, Xinjiang in particular. Thereby, the long-term stability of northwestern China and the smooth implementation of China's "Go West" strategy are associated with Central Asia to some extent. Moreover, there are a large number of cross-border nations in Central Asia and China. Some ethnic minorities living in northwestern China have cultural links and ethnic kinship with those settling in five Central Asian states. For example, the largest ethnic population of Kazakhstan is the Kazakh, and there are 1,462,588 Kazakhs living in China, mainly located in the XUAR (NBSC, n.d.). When the economic development level of Kazakhstan is lower than China's, it is possible that a large group of Kazakhs will move to China legally and illegally and vice versa. It will cause many unstable social factors, both in Kazakhstan and China. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, Islamic extremism developed rapidly all over the world. It is obvious that this kind of religious extremism has had great influence on Muslims living in Central Asia. If the newly independent Central Asian republics are submerged in a wave of extreme Islamic fundamentalism, it will be very difficult to maintain a stable situation in China's northwestern region. It should be 58 noted that since the five Central Asian republics declared independence, not over 30 years ago, their abilities to withstand such extreme Islamic fundamentalism maybe quite weak still. The Chinese government is willing to work together with these countries to form a strong force to resist religious extremism. Moreover, China expects the five Central Asian countries to be a sound barrier to resist the influence of Islamic fundamentalism. In this sense, the security of Central Asia is also closely related with the security of northwestern China, especially in the Xinjiang region. It can indirectly affect the long-term stability and the smooth implementation of the "Go West" strategy in China, and then it could affect the political stability and economic development of China.

4.2 Bilateral Relations

4.2.1 China-Kazakhstan Today, bilateral relations between the two neighbors are flourishing. Whether in trade, commerce or diplomacy, Kazakhstan and China are key strategic partners. Energy is also a key area for cooperation. China has invested heavily in building pipelines and in buying stakes in existing and new fields in Kazakhstan. At a time when regional instability and the rise of extremist views in the Middle East is causing mass uncertainty and panic, collaboration through the SCO is more important than ever ("Kazakhstan, China: Close Neighbors", 2015). Among five states in Central Asia, the Chinese government believes that Kazakhstan presents the most significant position in terms of national benefits, as China has the most extensive and various interests in this country. China recognized an independent Kazakhstan on 27 December, 1991 and then formally established diplomatic relations with it on 3 January, 1992. According to the Table-4.1 below, during the first 10 years of China-Kazakhstan relations, settling border disputes peacefully was the main concern for both states' high-ranking officials.

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Table-4.1: Agreements on Sino-Kazakhstan Border

Date Agreements Apr., 1994 Agreement on Sino-Kazakhstan Border Sep., 1997 The First Supplementary Agreement on Sino-Kazakhstan Border Jul., 1998 TheSecond Supplementary on Sino-Kazakhstan Border Nov., 1999 Joint Communiqué on the Complete Settlement of Border Disputes between Kazakhstan and China

China and Kazakhstan became the co-founders of the SCO in 1996. After that, the relations between China’s government and Kazakhstan’s counterpart were proceeding steadily until a strategic partnership was established in July, 2005. Amid the foreign policies of Kazakhstan, China is one of its focuses. Since 2008, high profile visits have increased rapidly. Economic cooperation between China and Kazakhstan has also expanded gradually since diplomatic relations were established. It is not exaggerated to say that the two states mainly cooperate in the energy field, as China's domestic energy demand has increased rapidly. Along with operating four smaller oil fields, the China National Petroleum Corporation in 2005 bought Petrokazakhstan, which was the former Soviet Union's largest independent oil company, for USD 4.18 billion and spent another USD 700 million on a pipeline that will take the oil to the Chinese border. Petrokazakhstan was the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company (Marat, 2004). During the year 2010-2011 the strategic partnership between China and Kazakhstan deepened constantly with mutual political trusts and trade relations being increasingly consolidated, resulting in a comprehensive strategic partnership upgrade by two the countries in 2011. Firstly, close high-level governmental exchanges, such as Chinese president Hu Jingtao paying three state visits to Kazakhstan, which was really rare in the diplomatic history of China. Secondly, China and Kazakhstan coordinated and cooperated positively amid international and regional affairs. For instance, Kazakhstan supported China to host the Shanghai Expo and the Asian Games in Guangzhou, while China gave a strong backing to Kazakhstan to organize the Asian Winter Games. Moreover, the Chinese government also dispatched a high-level delegation to attend the 3rd Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 60

Measures in Asia (CICA) Summit initiated by Kazakhstan, with the theme of "enhanced political and security dialogue in Asia: key to elaborating cooperative approaches to security". Third, the bilateral social-cultural communication is getting closer. By the end of 2014, about 8000 students from Kazakhstan were seeking their education in China, while about 1000 Chinese students preferred to study in Kazakhstan. Also, there are four Confucius institutes aiming at teaching Chinese language and facilitating cultural exchanges. Fourth, the mutually beneficial cooperation has expanded in terms of field and scale. According to the Chinese government's data, there were 29 Chinese mega projects established in Kazakhstan, with a total value of 18.5 billion dollars, 11 projects under construction with combined value of 20.31 billion dollars, and 20 projects under negotiation valued over 30 billion dollars. The value of trade between China and Kazakhstan reached 20.31 billion dollars, an increase year-on-year by 45.3%, surpassing the level before the global financial crisis. China's trade deficit to Kazakhstan was 1.76 billion dollars in the year of 2010. Kazakhstan became the second trading partner of China among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries by exporting energy and raw material based products and mainly importing garments, machinery and electrical and footwear products. However, during the last 10years of relations between China and Kazakhstan, security, economic, and culture threats remain. In developing ties with China, Kazakhstan aims to balance the geopolitical and economic influence of its northern neighbor, Russia. However, potential conflicts exist around China's cultural ties between the Kazakh people and the Uyghur of China's Xinjiang province, which could influence a Uyghur separatist movement. China also aims to prevent the growth of US influence in the region and the possible establishment of American air bases in Kazakhstan (Pala, 2006).

4.2.2 China-Afghanistan Formal diplomatic relations between China and Afghanistan was formed on 20 January, 1955. Before the year of 1979, bilateral relations developed very well, as high-level leaders of both sides exchanged visits a couple of times. However, the Chinese government rejected to recognize the then Afghanistan Karmal authority's 61 legal status, when Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Union. The normalization of China-Afghanistan relations was recovered in 1992. But in February 1993, the Beijing government decided to withdraw workers from China’s Embassy in Afghanistan based on security concerns, which signified that normal contact between the two nations was forced to be interrupted. After the 9/11 incident, the Chinese government launched a temporary rescue mechanism, providing emergency material aid to Afghanistan refugees who were flooding into Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan’s interim government was established in December 2001. Then the Chinese authority established contacts with Afghanistan, leading to the rapid recovery and development of China-Afghanistan relations and opening a new chapter for both sides. In January 2002, the then president of Afghanistan’s temporary government Hamid Karzai paid a state visit to China, who made a commitment of offering assistance of 0.15 billion dollars to Afghanistan for peaceful reconstruction within five years. After a month, China’s Embassy in Afghanistan reopened. Since then, high-level leaders from both countries have met at different occasions, many times bilaterally and multilaterally. After attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, Hamid Karzai visited China and signed the Sino- Afghanistan Treaty of Good-neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation with Chinese president Hu Jingtao in June 2006. The two countries announced the establishment of a comprehensive cooperative partnership. In the new era of the China-Afghanistan relationship, especially after the horrible impacts of the 9/11 incident on China's Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim region, leaders from both sides became more cautious about the development of healthy relations by considering many factors involved in the process. First of all, the two nations focused on political reconstruction on top of the frequent meetings and visits. Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attack, then Chinese president Jiang Zemin contacted other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other national leaders from Pakistan, Egypt etc. by discussing the topics of international counter-terrorism conflicts and China's own national security issues in the Xinjiang region. It resulted in reaching a consensus to work hard to strengthen cooperation and resolutely fight all forms of terrorism. The then Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan also exchanged opinions with many foreign ministers from dozens of countries to 62 facilitate the political solutions on counter-terrorism in the Xinjiang region. Moreover, foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan attended the 6+2 foreign ministers' meeting on the Afghan Issue at the headquarters of the UN and issued a speech, declaring the Chinese government's stand on how to respond to the changes of China's national counter- terrorism situation. The Chinese foreign ministry dispatched some relevant delegations to visit Central Asia and Arabic countries for coordinating standpoints on the common fight against international terrorism and national terrorism threats in China. In December 2002, the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations was signed by the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this declaration, the Beijing government respected Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity and supported the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan by taking full consideration of Afghan national condition in the role of an important member of the United Nations. China held a suggestion to establish a coalition government, which owned an extensive mass base and was recognized by relevant domestic and international interested parties, especially Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. Secondly, China is always there to assist Afghan security reconstruction in terms of defeating terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking, as the stability of Afghanistan is of central concern to Central Asia and China. Chinese leaders do not want Islamic extremists to use bases in Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban terrorist organization, by 20006 the Chinese government provided police supplies, military uniforms, policeman uniforms, and police cars, with a combined value of 5 million dollars. China also sent Chinese peacekeeping police officers to Afghanistan starting from early 2004. China's Ministry of Public Security cooperated with the Afghan ministry of internal affairs positively on police affairs by offering policeman training courses, leading to an effective collaboration on drug control, anti-terrorism and combating transnational crimes. Thirdly, from China's view on regional stability, economic development and balance are very important in the process of Afghanistan reconstruction, especially after the US army withdrawal. Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister gave speeches when he visited Kabul in 2014, "We hope to see the development of Afghanistan. Development is fundamental and only with economic growth can the poverty problem be solved and 63 the foundations of terrorism and extremism be eliminated ("FM: China Attaches", 2014)."China’s economic aid will likely focus, if the security situation allows, on its traditional strength of building basic infrastructure. Beijing will, however, pursue other aid options if the security situation does not allow work on infrastructure projects. However, China’s main interest is ensuring that instability doesn’t spread to Xinjiang (Kley, 2014).

4.2.3 China-Uzbekistan China established diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan in 1992. The two nations' relations have upgraded from a friendly and cooperative partnership in 2005 to a strategic partnership in 2012. In October 2011 in Beijing, Uzbekistan and China established an intergovernmental committee on cooperation in the trade-economic, investment, security, cultural-humanitarian, energy, transport, and scientific-technical spheres (Tolipov, 2013). Due to not having a border dispute between China and Uzbekistan, the main concern is security. Focus is on the maintenance of regional stability and constraining the three evil forces: terrorism, separatism and extremism, as the religious extremism in Uzbekistan is rather serious. For example, in May 2005, the Andijan riots organized by the IMU, a radical Islamic organization, caused nearly 200 deaths. The armed terrorists not only attacked the prison, where 23 local businessmen were charged with extremism, fundamentalism and separatism, but also freed hundreds of other prisoners. This case demonstrated that it was quite necessary to be on alert of external forces to interfere with Uzbek internal affairs and it should never allow another “Arab Spring” to happen in Central Asia. The external forces should be at least divided into two groups. The first one is some states who are keen to export their own democracy institutions and values, while the other one is religious extremism. In response to the first interference force, China and Uzbekistan agreed to defend their own rights of handling internal affairs. As the three evil forces were more rampant in Central Asia, influenced by the unrest in North Africa and Middle East, the economic difficulties and livelihood issues became excuses of those radical organizations to incite upheaval. In this context, it is very important for China and Uzbekistan to deepen the security and economic cooperation based on mutual trusts. Thereby China and Uzbekistan pledged 64 to boost cooperation on security and law enforcement in order to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia via the multilateral frameworks of the UN and the SCO. Furthermore, these two countries expressed a willingness to continue military cooperation if encountering any serious security issue. Besides, the trade cooperation of both sides has gotten closer in recent years. According to statistics published by the Chinese government, the bilateral trade between China and Uzbekistan stood at 2.88 billion US dollars in 2012, up 32.8 percent from the previous year, putting China second among Uzbekistan’s largest trading partners. While Uzbekistan's statistics show that Chinese investment accounted for 35.6 percent of total foreign investment in Uzbekistan, making China Uzbekistan’s biggest foreign investor("Uzbekistan: Close neighbor", 2013). Also, there are several mega projects under construction in Uzbekistan invested in by the Chinese private sector, which means energy cooperation and infrastructure investment between the two nations are further enhanced.

4.2.4 China-Kyrgyzstan From China's perspective, Kyrgyzstan is a political partner, an economic partner and a military partner for maintaining regional stability in Central Asia as well as helping keep the three evil forces from the Xinjiang province. With mutual trust on political issues, public and private investors are encouraged to do business. It is not hard to find China’s economic influence in Kyrgyzstan, since it has been growing rapidly over the past decade. Thanks to Kyrgyzstan’s early membership in the WTO and its generally free economic environment, the country became a major importer, re- exporter and transporter of Chinese goods. As a result, bazaars have become major economic lifelines for Kyrgyzstan, concentrating great amounts of wealth and benefiting hundreds of thousands of people (Marat, 2014). Citing statistical data from Chinese Customs, bilateral trade reached 5.298 billion dollars in 2014 with year-on- year growth of 3.1% (Zhao, 2016). Dating back to modern history of the above two nations, Kyrgyzstan has been a good neighbor to China after the two nations established a diplomatic relationship in 1992. Then Chinese president Jiang Zemin paid a formal state visit to Kyrgyzstan, signing a joint declaration on Sino-Kyrgyz Friendship and a Sino-Kyrgyz Border 65

Agreement in July 1997. Six years later, the Sino-Kyrgyz Treaty of Good- neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the then president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev and Jiang Zemin. Chinese president Xi Jinping declared the upgrading of the relationship between Sino-Kyrgyz into a strategic partnership in order to achieve extensive cooperation in more sectors, such as agriculture, telecom and infrastructure. China seeks to maintain good trade relations with Kyrgyzstan for its own reasons as well. A foremost reason is the Chinese concern for the province of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is the furthest West of all of China’s provinces, one of the poorest Chinese provinces, and is home to the Uighur minority, an ethnically unique Muslim population that makes up about 48% of the province’s population. One of the main solutions China has used to address concerns over stability in Xinjiang is relying on economic growth (Paul, 2011).

4.2.5 China-Tajikistan Almost the same as other Central Asia countries, China and Tajikistan relations were established on January 4, 1992, shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The relationship between the two countries has steadily gone up from that time. Similarly, the most urgent tasks of China’s and Tajikistan’s government after formal diplomatic relations were established were to settle down border disputes as well as resuming the normalization of bilateral relations. The total length of the Sino-Tajikistan border is about 497 km. The two states signed the Agreement on Sino-Tajikistan Border in 1999 and a supplementary agreement in 2002 to resolve the border dispute. As high- level meetings and talks increased, the two nations have enjoyed fruitful achievements on many cooperation agreements in terms of official traveling, investment promotion and protection, business loans, civil aviation, broadcast and TV cooperation, etc. by using bilateral contacts and multilateral discussions on many occasions. However, due to the Russian economy’s deep financial crisis over the last few years, a "mountainous country" located in Central Asia's southeast preferred to cooperate with China. According to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the total volume of exports and imports between China and Tajikistan reached over 2.5 billion dollars by 2014 (NBSC, n.d.).The Silk Road’s revival, proposed by 66

China, could not only provide a network of roads and maritime links for countries along the route and promote exchanges and cooperation in the economy, culture, tourism and investment, and a special significance to Tajikistan. Moreover, Beijing sees Tajikistan as a very important transfer station of delivering natural gas from Iran to China in the near future. For a long time now, it has been feared the mountainous regions of southern and south-eastern Tajikistan could provide safe-haven for Taliban insurgents. This fear has become increasingly apparent in 2015, as evidenced by Tajikistan’s mobilization of more troops to its southern border (Cavanough, 2015). Hence, currently the most significant interest for China in Tajikistan is security, which refers to three meanings, including East Turkestan terrorist groups, regional security and strategic stability. As mentioned above, Tajikistan is a mountainous country close to Afghanistan. The border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is extremely complicated to guard from any potential transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, extremism and terrorism expansion. In this sense, border security of Tajikistan is also an important concern for the Chinese government, as it matters to the stability of Central Asia and the peace of the Xinjiang region. Furthermore, though Tajikistan is not a country with large territory, its strategic position attracts the attention of the US and India, who seek establishing military bases besides Russia. Tajikistan became a balancing power existing in Central Asia, making China focus more than before. That's also why a new chapter of Sino- Tajik relations opened after border disputes were solved in 2002.

4.3 Multilateral Relations----Shanghai Cooperation Organization Proposed by China and Russia, the SCO was founded in June 2001, with six member states: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO started up the observer states mechanism in 2004. In the same year, Mongolia became the first observer state. Then in July 2005, the fifth SCO Summit officially welcomed Pakistan, Iran and India as observer states; and Afghanistan and Belarus became observer states in June 2012 and July 2015 respectively. But since July 2015, the SCO has activated the process of receiving India and Pakistan as new member states, so later these two states' status in the SCO will be upgraded from 'observer state' to 'member state'. There are also six dialogue partners, including Sri Lanka, Turkey, 67

Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, and Nepal. The total population of all the Member States is 1,525 million, or a quarter of the world's population. It will be over 2.8 billion in total, or nearly half of the global population, if observer countries are included. Moreover, the total area of the six member states is over 30.18 million square kilometers, accounting for three-fifths of Eurasia. It will be more than 37.8 million square kilometers, if the territories of observer states are included. According to the Table-4.2, in terms of national territory size, Russia ranks 1stwith 17,098,242 km², and China follows it with 9,596,961km². Kazakhstan ranks 3rdwith 2,724,900 km². However, in terms of national population, China ranks1st. With the reference to the GNI index, Russia and Kazakhstan respectively rank the 1stand 2nd, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are relatively backward. From the data below, it is possible to guess the rapid rise of Kazakhstan can be an important factor influencing regional stability and development, and to the internal bargaining structure of the SCO, which could be one of the challenges the SCO has to encounter.

Table-4.2: The National Conditions of the SCO Member States (2014)

Territory Population GDP GNI Country (km²) (Million) (Billion USD) (USD) China 9,596,961 1,364 10,350 7,380 Russia 17,098,242 143.8 1,861 13,210 Kazakhstan 2,724,900 17.29 217.9 11,670 Kyrgyzstan 199,951 5.834 7.404 1,250 Tajikistan 143,100 8.296 9.242 1,060 Uzbekistan 448,978 30.76 62.64 2,090

The operation mechanism of the SCO should contain two parts, the first is the meeting mechanism and the other is the permanent body. The SCO has run for 15 years, resulting in a lot of declarations, treaties and agreements. These documents have helped to establish a relatively sound organizational structure and legal system, which effectively ensures the pragmatic cooperation in the fields of security, economy, trade, and culture. Meanwhile, the SCO also kept close ties with other international or regional organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), clearly demonstrating an international image of cooperation and 68 openness. Thereby, it has created a positive impact on managing a variety of international and regional affairs. The SCO is one of the oldest international organizations putting forward the initiative of counter-terrorism. In the initial stages of the SCO, all heads of states from the six member states were determined that the objective of defense security cooperation should include the fight against the three evil forces----terrorism, separatism and extremism. At the same time, the six defense ministers from member states decided to intensify military cooperation and ensure substantive coordination when member states are working together to combat the three evil forces. Security cooperation has become an important cornerstone of the SCO. The SCO member states uphold the 'Shanghai Spirit' featuring mutual trust and benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and seeking common development. They adhere to the principles of openness and transparency, and positively create good neighborly and friendly relations in the region. Moreover, member states have made new progress in the process of promoting defense security cooperation based on the mutual benefits. The SCO member states have organized 17joint military maneuvers within the framework of the organization so far. These bilateral and multilateral military exercises have not only enriched the connotation of defense and security cooperation among the SCO member states, but also enhanced the cohesion of the SCO to deter the three evil forces, eventually playing an important role in safeguarding international and regional security and stability. In addition to security cooperation, economic cooperation is another focus area of the SCO. Economic cooperation and security cooperation within the organizational framework are referred to the 'two driving wheels' of the SCO's development. So far, six member states have laid a more completed law and regulatory basis in the process of the SCO economic cooperation. They not only have formed the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation, but also established agencies like the Business Council and the Interbank Consortium Council to boost regional trade and financial collaborations, especially in making great progress in the implementation of energy, transportation, telecommunications and other infrastructure projects. Besides the two key cooperative focuses within the SCO framework, socio-cultural cooperation is also a concern for the six member states, but not a major field. 69

4.3.1 The SCO: Origin and Development Though nowadays SCO is an intergovernmental political and economic cooperation institution, it is originated on the basis of The Shanghai Five, which is a group originally organized on April 26, 1996. The "Shanghai Five" mechanism originated in the late 1980s and is a negotiating process of trust-strengthening and disarmament in the border areas between China and a group comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since the first meeting was held in Shanghai, the mechanism is called the "Shanghai Five". After the end of the Cold War, the international and regional situation underwent great changes. In order to strengthen mutual trust and friendly cooperation to build good-neighborly relations, five states in the large Central Asian region decided to intensify talks on confidence-building and disarmament in the border areas. On April 26, 1996, five heads of these above states met in Shanghai to discuss the possibility of disarmament in the border areas and promoting friendly relations among states, resulting in signing of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions. Then on April 24, 1997, they met again in Moscow and signed the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. These two agreements are the first ever bilateral political and military treaties among several countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which attracted widespread attention and was highly appreciated by the international community. Since then, the annual heads of state summit mechanism has been fixed. The summit is normally held alternately by these five states. From 1998 to 2000, the summits were held in Almaty, Bishkek, and Dushanbe successively. Uzbek President Islam Karimov was invited to attend the Dushanbe Summit in 2000. The discussion content of the summit gradually expanded from trust-strengthening in border areas to the comprehensive cooperation in the fields of politics, security, diplomacy, economy and trade, culture etc. based on mutual interests. At the Dushanbe summit, members agreed to "oppose intervention in other countries' internal affairs on the pretexts of 'humanitarianism' and 'protecting human rights;' and support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the five countries' national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social stability." 70

Faced with the trend of globalization in the 21st century, every state in the world has accelerated its pace in the process of regional cooperation for grasping the historical opportunity for peace and development and acting against a variety of risks and challenges more effectively. Meanwhile, the campaigns of terrorism, separatism and extremism in the region became increasingly rampant after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which seriously threatens regional security and stability. In addition, six states in Central Asia all faced their own arduous tasks of economic development and national rejuvenation. So it is urgent and essential for them to further enhance regional cooperation. In this context, heads of the "Shanghai Five" member states held a meeting with the Uzbek president in Shanghai and finally signed a joint statement to involve Uzbekistan in the "Shanghai Five" mechanism on June 14, 2001. Then the six heads of states issued the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to announce that the SCO was officially founded on the basis of the "Shanghai Five" mechanism the next day (June 15, 2001). Thereby, a new intergovernmental organization was born aiming at leading to the development of Central Asia to a higher level by expanding cooperation and content. Meanwhile the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was also confirmed by then presidents of the six member states, which signified that those signatory governments made an important step on the way of deepening regional security cooperation. This convention also gave a specific legal definition of terrorism, separatism and extremism, becoming an international law document on the regional 'war on terror' for SCO member states. Soon after the initial establishment of the SCO, the Saint Petersburg summit in 2002 concluded with the confirmation of the SCO Charter, which illuminated the purposes, principles, and structures of the SCO and its form of operation. Then representatives of India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan attended the Kazakhstan summit as observer states in 2005. During 2005, SCO called for a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, which was believed by some experts that China was hoping to use its influence in Central Asia through the SCO in an attempt to constrain US power.

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4.3.2 The SCO: Current Framework The operation of the SCO is mainly being in charge of the meeting mechanism and permanent body. There are a series of sessions on the level of Speakers of Parliament, Secretaries of Security Councils, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Emergency Relief, Economy, Transportation, Culture, Education, Healthcare, Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies, Supreme Courts and Courts of Arbitration, and Prosecutors General, apart from the annual Council of Heads of State (CHS) meeting and the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) meeting. The Organization has two permanent bodies----the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent (Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], 2001).

Figure-4.2: The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Reprinted from Shanghai Organization Cooperation, (n.d.), Wikipedia, retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation

The CHS is the highest decision-making body in the SCO.(Wikipedia of the SCO) The main functions of the CHS summit include: 1) to identify priority areas and basic directions of SCO activities; 2) to decide on matters of principles guiding internal structural settings and operations; 3) to make principles directing mutual cooperation between the SCO and other countries/international organizations; and 4) to intensely research on urgent international issues. The CHS session is held alternately every year based on the Russian alphabetical order of member states' names. Generally, the host country of the annual CHS session is the rotating presidency of the SCO. In 2016, 72

Uzbekistan is under the presidency. Table-4.3 below shows the main achievements reached in the SCO CHS meetings (or summits) held from 2001 to 2015.

Table-4.3: The SCO Heads of States Summits (2001-2015)

NO. Date Place Notes 1. Six member states signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization to declare the formal foundation Jun.14- Shanghai, 1 of the SCO. 15, 2001 China 2. They also agreed and signed the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.

1. Six member states signed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter, which clearly set the purpose, Jun. 7, St. Petersburg, organizational structure, operational form, cooperation 2 2002 Russia direction and international diplomacy principles of the SCO, marking that the SCO was formally established in the sense of international law.

1. Six heads of member states approved to set up the permanent body (The Secretariat in Beijing and Regional May 29, Moscow, 3 Anti-Terrorism Structure in Tashkent ), and appointed the 2003 Russia first Secretary-General. 2. They approved the logo of the SCO.

1. Six heads of member states officially launched the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure and signed/ approved Tashkent Declaration, Agreement on Anti-drug Trafficking etc. 2. They also decided to take new measures to proceed Jun. 17, Tashkent, pragmatic cooperation on security and economy. 4 2004 Uzbekistan 3. The foreign ministerial coordination mechanism was approved at the meeting. 4. Mongolia was admitted as the observer state of the SCO. 5. The Tashkent summit marked the end of the 3-year start- up phase of the SCO and the start of a new period of comprehensive development.

1. Six member states signed Astana Declaration, and approved the conception of joint counter- three evil forces Jul. 5, Astana, 5 (terrorism, separatism and extremism) 2005 Kazakhstan 2. Pakistan, Iran, and India became the observer states of the SCO.

1. Heads of Six member states signed the 5 Anniversary Jun. 15, Shanghai, 6 Declaration to provide the development vision of the SCO 2006 China and the future of the region. 73

NO. Date Place Notes 1. Heads of Six member states signed the Treaty on Long- term Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation among the SCO Member States. 2. They also announced the Bishkek Declaration to further Aug. 16, Bishkek, 7 cooperate on traditional and non-traditional security concern, 2007 Kyrgyzstan as well as the comprehensive economic development, energy cooperation in particular. 3. The summit also approved the Drug Control Strategy (2011-2016) and its action plan.

1. Heads of Six member states reached the new and important consensus on the key directions of cooperation and development within the framework of the SCO and the basic position on foreign diplomacy. Aug. 28, Dushanbe, 2. They signed the Dushanbe Declaration to support the six 8 2008 Tajikistan principles of solving South Ossetia conflict and agreed preventive diplomacy as a effective tool to deal with security and development issues. 3. The summit also approved the Regulation on Dialogue Partners

1. Heads of Six member statessigned the Yekaterinburg Declaration. 2.Heads of Six member states signed the Convention on Anti- Jun. 15- Yekaterinburg, terrorism, aiming at further strengthening the legal basis 9 16, 2009 Russia within the framework of the SCO's anti-terrorism cooperation and enhancing member states' coordination capacity and efficiency in combating terrorism. 3. Sri Lanka and Belarus were admitted as dialogue partners.

1. The summit announced the Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO. Jun. 11, Tashkent, 10 2. The Regulations on procedure for admitting new members 2010 Uzbekistan to the SCO and Rules of Procedure of the SCO that are designed to assist to enhance the legal bases of Organization's activity were approved. (SCO, 2010)

1. Heads of Six member states signed the 10th Anniversary Astana Declaration based on the deeply analysis of international and regional developing conditions and Jun. 15, Astana, 11 confirmed the priorities of the SCO(Security and Economy) 2011 Kazakhstan in the Declaration. 2. Called on strengthening coordination of international information security. 74

NO. Date Place Notes

1. Heads of Six member states signed the Declaration on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity Jun. 6-7, Beijing, and the SCO Medium-term Strategic Development Plan. 12 2012 China 2. Afghanistan was admitted as an observer state at the summit. 3. Turkey was admitted as a dialogue partner at the summit.

1. Heads of Six member states signed the Bishkek Declaration. 2. The summit approved the Implementation Outline of Sep. 13, Bishkek, 13 Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness and Friendly 2013 Kyrgyzstan Cooperation among the SCO Member States(2013-2017) 3. The establishment of the Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Council of The SCO.

1. Heads of Six member states signed the Dushanbe Declaration. 2. The summit signed the Treaty on the Transport Sep. 12, Dushanbe, 14 Facilitation of Inter-governmental International Roads in 2014 Tajikistan Member States of the SCO 3. The summit discussed and approved regulations relevant to the legal process of the SCO new membership.

1. Heads of Six member states signed the Ufa Declaration. 2. The summit approved the Development Strategy of the SCO 2025. Jul. 10, Ufa, 15 3. They also signed the Treaty on Border Defense 2015 Russia Cooperation. 4. The summit has activated the process of receiving India and Pakistan as new member states

The CHG holds a regular session each year, and its main functions are: 1) to focus on the research on the strategy and priority of multilateral cooperation within the organizational framework; 2) to address the principles and urgent issues, such as economic cooperation, etc.; and 3) to approve the annual budget of the organization. According to usual practices, the annual foreign ministers' meeting will be held one month before the scheduled CHS summit. The foreign minister of the member state who organizes the CHS summit should chair the foreign ministers' meeting and also represent the organization to carry out external exchanges. However, the foreign ministers' meeting is generally responsible for studying and dealing with some important issues in the organization's current activities, such as the preparation for the 75

CHS summit, the implementation of SCO's decisions, and the consultations on international issues. In order to promote further cooperation among SCO member states, observer states and dialogue partners, other ministries and departments also have joined the process of coordination. Currently, the SCO has established other ministerial level meeting mechanisms, such as the Attorney General meeting, defense ministers' session, economy and trade ministers' conference. This system could be seen as the supplement of the CHS and the CHG sessions, because the specific department will play a more appropriate role in studying and resolving specific issues during cooperation and coordination. The Council of National Coordinators (CNC) is an agency for coordinating SCO daily operations, which hold discussions or meetings at least three times a year. The national coordinator from the host country of the CHS summit will chair the CNC, who can represent the SCO once authorized by the chairman of the foreign ministers' meeting. The Secretariat of the SCO is a permanent administrative body, based in Beijing, founded in January 2004.Its main functions are: 1) to provide organizational and technical support for the organization; 2) to participate and organize research and implementation of various agencies' documents; and 3) to make recommendations on the annual organizational budgets. The SCO Secretary General is appointed by the CHS with a term of three years, barred from seeking another term. The current Secretary General of the SCO is Rashid Alimov, who served as Tajikistan's ambassador to China in 2005-2015 and permanent representative of the country at the SCO Secretariat ("Rashid Alimov of Tajikistan", 2016). The RATS is the other permanent body of the SCO. Based in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan, it was officially launched in January 2004. Its main function is to coordinate member states cracking down on the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. The RATS is composed of the RATS Council and RATS Executive Committee. The RATS Council is a decision-making and leading body in charge of regional efforts to counter the three evils, while the RATS Executive Committee is an agency for handling regional efforts to counter the three evils a daily basis. The director of the RATS Executive Committee is appointed by the CHS. Each member state also 76 sends a permanent representative to the RATS (SCO, n.d.). The newly appointed director is Yevgeniy Sysoyev, who previously worked as Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation - Head of the National Antiterrorism Committee Central Office ("Yevgeniy Sysoyev becomes head", 2016).

4.3.3 Anti-terror Cooperation Analysis The common concern of all the member states of the SCO is security, because member states in Central Asia have faced serious domestic and international security threats. It is urgent for them to solve social instability before emphasizing the economic enhancement. The issues of terrorism, separatism, and extremism and other non- traditional security concerns are the most worrying realities in front of the member states of the SCO in the context of globalization. It is usually very difficult for an individual country to combat the issue of terrorism if it hopes to achieve a multiplier effect. That's why member states are willing to unite and cooperate through the stages of the SCO for keeping the peace and stability in the region. The conception of the SCO joint anti-terror should be understood in two ways. The first meaning is that the SCO itself attempts to jointly combat international terrorism with other countries and organizations in the international community. The second meaning is that the SCO member states jointly strike the three evil forces, namely international terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism active in the Central Asia region. Here in the paper, I mainly focus on the second meaning of the SCO joint anti-terror efforts. Security is the first cooperation direction agreed on by the SCO member states, which is related to the international and regional context of the time. They were all facing threats of international terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. For example, the Al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan became a well-known international terrorism organization after its terrorists destroyed the world trade center complex in New York by hijacking airplanes. It also conducted a series of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, which led to the instability of some nations in Central Asia, such as the unstable social conditions caused by the East Turkestan forces in the Xinjiang region of China. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement is one of those terrorist groups keeping in touch with Al-Qaeda. As the author mentioned previously, the ETIM 77 gathered a group of ethnic separatists featuring religious extremism. Since the 1990s, these separatists have plotted and conducted assassinations, kidnappings, bombings and other terrorist subversive sabotages in order to realize their goal of national independence. Also the most influential terrorist group in Uzbekistan is the IMU and the ILP (Hizb-ut-Tahrir) aiming at spreading Islamic fundamentalism. These two terrorist groups have been considered as radical Islamic organizations whose ultimate goal is to unite other terrorist forces in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Chechnya, and Afghanistan to establish a theocratic Islamic state in the Fergana Valley. In early 1999, the IMU conducted six bombings and attempted to murder Islom Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan. As for Hizb-ut-Tahrir, although it wanted to realize its purpose without using violence at first, it has grown increasingly radical and has further expanded the IMU's momentum. Thereby if the SCO member states let these terrorist, separatist and extremist forces go unchecked, regional peace and stability cannot be guaranteed. The three evil forces, terrorism in particular, should be recognized as a non-traditional threat, which is a borderless issue. Any state in the region cannot solve it individually, as this force will move from one area to another. So it is quite significant for the SCO member states to maintain regional stability through international cooperation based on mutual security benefits. This also shows the institution a list spirit of neo-liberalism and that international organizations are possible and most readily successful in terms of the creation and maintenance of international institutions in an anarchic environment (Sterling-folker, 2013). In the context of international anarchy, the interdependence among states will not seek for cooperation automatically, even though they have common interests, as states may fail to cooperation because of distrust, cheating, high costs and potentially bad consequences. However, the institutional design will help them to cooperate based on mutual benefits. One of the most important functions of institutional design should be negotiations and bargaining among related shareholders. In order to reach a collectively agreed decision, states with comparatively different resources and interests need a degree of regularity in the rules and procedures for their collective decision-making (Sterling-folker, 2013).Article 16 of the SCO Charter has clearly defined the decision- 78 making procedure. All the decisions will be approved by agreement rather than vote. Only if all the member states reach a consensus, the relative decision could be adopted. Some critics say that this decision-making process is rather ineffective on joint cooperation, because consensus is not easy to reach and is also a time-consuming process. However, Article 16(3) regulates that if some member states are not interested in certain cooperation projects but others have interests, the non-participation of these member states does not affect others' willingness in the projects. The flexibility of the negotiation procedures within the SCO makes the possibility of broader cooperation among a part of member states. For example, in order to combat the three evil forces, countries will launch anti-terror military drills or border defense department exercises. According to Table-4.4 summarized below, the military drills within the SCO framework do not always get full participation by the six member states. Currently, security cooperation among member states of the SCO can only proceed further, rather than come to a halt, as the three evil forces are still active with the emergence of the Arab Spring in the Islamic world. One thing has to be clear is that the SCO is definitely not a military alliance but an empirical security cooperation based on the Shanghai spirit featuring 'mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilization and seeking common development'. The SCO member states have made efforts to combat the three evil forces in Central Asia through joint anti-terror exercises, regular large-scale international information exchange meetings, and the set- up of the joint combating internet terrorism working groups and other feasible meeting mechanisms. There are three levels in which the SCO member states attempt to constrain terrorism in the region. Firstly, the SCO has established a legal basis. Member states have signed a series of conventions, treaties and agreements related to anti-terrorism, such as the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, Treaty on Combating Illegal Trafficking of Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives, the Agreement on the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Joint Anti-Terrorist Exercise by the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Convention on Combating Terrorism by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The last one defined several key terms. It explicitly states the connotation and denotation of "terrorism" and "terrorist act" and offers a clear and basic identifying standard of "terrorist 79 organizations". It also regulates the application of scope and principles of the convention as well as the jurisdiction. The convention provides a lot of measures to prevent terrorism by asking each member states of the SCO to prescribe terrorist acts, the establishment of legal entities involved in terrorism, public inciting terrorist acts, terrorist recruitment and training, participating in terrorist organizations, to finance terrorist groups, and to assist terrorist activities as criminal offenses by enacting domestic laws. It also regulates that member states should monitor financial transactions to prevent and combat terrorism financing by legislative and other measures based on the principles of domestic laws. Moreover, the convention provides the conditions and procedures of the extradition, transfer of sentenced persons and judicial assistance, when terrorists of one state are captured in another member state. The regulations in the Convention on Combating Terrorism by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization illustrate that the norms within the institution could provide the impetus to have influence on a member states' policies. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) believe, "One approach has been to examine how international institutions act as norm entrepreneurs and agenda setters in global politics. Because international institutions are generally viewed as neutral parties who represent commonly-shared values, they are accorded a certain degree of legitimacy in world affairs. This allows them to promote particular values and goals on a global scale. They derive additional authority from their control and coordination of technical expertise and information (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998)." The SCO is an intergovernmental organization mostly active in Central Asia. Its neutral position allows it to promote values, such as principles of equality, negotiation, non-alignment, openness, etc. on the world stage, at least in Central Asia at the present. Yet as Martha Finnemore argued, a major element in the process involves the institution's ability to socialize states, and particular domestic constituents within those states, into global norms. In this way, the domestic political agendas and hence foreign policies of even relatively powerful states can be affected by international institutions(Finnemore, 1996).The SCO should be identified as such an international institution, as its value of the Shanghai Spirit, including the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and pursuit of common development, do socialize the member states in dealing with the regional 80 affairs in Central Asia. The Shanghai Convention on Anti-terror signed by member states has socialize the particular domestic legal system within the member states, as it requires member states to enact related laws on anti-terrorism. China's top legislature adopted the country's first counter-terrorism law in the latest attempt to address terrorism at home and help maintain world security ("China adopts first counter- terrorism law", 2015) on December 27, 2015 according to the article III of the SCO Anti-terror Convention, "Member states shall take necessary measures, including enacting domestic legislation when it is appropriate, to punish people who conduct the activities related to the article I (1) above (terrorism, separatism, extremism)." Secondly, the SCO has formed several agencies and a series of security cooperation mechanisms. For example, the RATS based in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan, is a permanent body of the SCO. This agency promotes the establishment of a database on terrorism and boosts the counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation among member states. In addition, the mechanisms, like the national security secretary meeting, the defense minister meeting, the presidency of the supreme court meeting, and the attorney general meeting, are formed to facilitate the smooth cooperation on regional security issues, including anti-terrorism. As Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan stressed on the tenth anniversary of the SCO, "The SCO has made a significant contribution to the maintenance of international security. Thanks to the effective work of the SCO regional anti-terrorism agencies, more than 500 terrorist incidents have been prevented successfully during 2004 to 2011 ("Hasakesitan zongtong", 2011)." The third level is to improve the coordination of member states on combating terrorism by anti-terror exercises. In addition to the legal and institutional cooperation, it is undoubtedly that security cooperation in the sense of defense is the most specific and reliable tool to counter terror for the SCO member states. The main role of the defense minister meeting mechanism within the framework of the SCO is to strengthen cooperation among states to promote regional security, and of course anti-terrorism is one of the most important issues. The role of drills can be understood in two perspectives. On one hand, they can deter aggressive international terrorists, ethnic separatists, and religious extremists and safeguard peace and stability in the region. They can also deepen trust among the 81

SCO member states, and improve the capacity of member states' troops and public security institutions, and strengthen the counter-terrorism strategy synergy among participants. Table-4.4 demonstrates the joint anti-terror drills within the framework of the SCO organized by member states from 2002 to 2014. There have been 17 joint anti- terror exercises with China participating 16 times. Moreover, eight exercises were conducted in China and six of them were launched in the XUAR or along the Sino- Central Asia borderline. But the table below does not count the joint military cooperation between China and Afghanistan, which was one of the SCO's observer states.

Table-4.4: Joint Anti-terror Drills within the Framework of the SCO (2002-2014)

No. Name Participants Place Notes This is the Chinese army's first real ammunition military drill Alpine Area of China, with a foreign army, and is also Exercise-01 China- 1 Kyrgyzstan the first bilateral joint military (2002) Kyrgyzstan drill within the framework of the Border SCO ("China & Kyrgyzstan", 2007). China, This is the first multilateral joint Kazakhstan, Coalition-2003 Yining city, anti-terrorism military drill 2 Kyrgyzstan, Ucharal city within the framework of the Russia, SCO. Tajikistan This is the first large-scale China- Russia joint anti-terrorism Vladivostok military drill with nearly 10,000 Peace Mission- China, Russia city, Shandong troops joining. It helps strengthen 3 2005 Peninsula, and the capability of the two armed nearby waters forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism. This is the first joint China- Kazakhstan anti-terrorism exercise within the framework of the SCO. It is also for the first time that China's law Almaty 4 Tianshan-I China, enforcement and security province, (2006) Kazakhstan departments (such public security Yining city force or the police, border defense force, and the customs, etc.) and foreign counterparts to cooperate for fighting against terrorism in a joint exercise. 82

No. Name Participants Place Notes This is the first joint anti- China, terrorism military drill with six Kazakhstan, member states' military forces Peace Mission- Urumqi city, 5 Kyrgyzstan, under the framework of the SCO 2007 Chebarkul city Russia, with 6,500 servicemen, 400 units Tajikistan, of military hardware and 50 Uzbekistan aircraft. This is the third military drill Khabarovsk, between China and Russia with Taonan about 2600 military men, 300 Peace Mission- 6 China, Russia Training Base units of military hardware, over 2009 of Shenyang 40 planes and helicopters Military Area participating ("Russia and China hold peace", 2009). China, Kazakhstan, This exercise aimed at 7 Kyrgyzstan, coordinating the commands of Norak-2009 Russia, Norak member states on counter- Tajikistan terrorism.

China, Kazakhstan, Almaty This is another multilateral anti- Peace Mission- 8 Kyrgyzstan, province and terrorism military drill with more 2010 Russia, Matybulak than 5000 personnel and various

Tajikistan Range advanced weapons joining.

China, India, Kazakhstan The exercise was conducted by Kyrgyzstan, the law enforcement agencies and Mongolia, special services of the SCO 9 Pakistan, member states and divided into Saratov-2010 Russia Saratov region two stages, with a goal of Uzbekistan constraining terrorists' attacks International and rescuing hostages. It helps anti-terror coordinate the counter-terror institutes efforts of states involved.

Khabarovsk city and a This is a joint military drill 10 Peace Mission- China, Russia certain area of between China and Russia with 2011 the Sea of both countries' navy, army, and Japan air forces participating.

It is an exercise featured how law enforcers and security personnel China, from the three countries have Kashgar 11 Tianshan-II Kyrgyzstan, coordinated efforts to locate and county, (2011) Tajikistan crack down on "terrorists" in the Xinjiang border region ("China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan", 2011).

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No. Name Participants Place Notes This is the ninth joint anti- terrorism military drill under the China, framework of the SCO. It is also Kazakhstan, the second regular multilateral Peace Mission- 12 Kyrgyzstan, Khujand city joint military exercises after six 2012 Russia, heads of the SCO member states Tajikistan agreed on "A moderate-scale joint military exercise should be held every 2-3 years. The exercise involved over 1,500 servicemen and some 250 units Peace Mission- 13 China, Russia Chelyabinsk of military hardware, as well as 2013 20 aircraft ("Peace mission- 2013", 2013). The command and staff of the forced structures of the member- states improved their capacities in planning, preparation and conducting special operations to Kazakhstan, prevent possible terrorist attacks, South 14 Kazygurt-Anti- Kyrgyzstan, identification and suppression of Kazakhstan Terror 2013 Tajikistan activities by terrorist groups, Region hostage release and investigation activities during the exercise (Shanghai Cooperation Organization Regional Anti- Terrorist Structure [SCO RATS], 2013). The exercise involved 1,075 troops from border defense Border area 15 Border Defense China, departments, which helped deter along China Joint Kyrgyzstan the three evil forces across the and Determination- border between China and Kyrgyzstan 2013 Kyrgyzstan and benefit the normal immigration order. China, This is the largest joint anti- Kazakhstan, Peace Mission- Inner terrorism military drill conducted 16 Kyrgyzstan, 2014 Mongolia by the SCO with about 7000 Russia, troops taking part in. Tajikistan The drill attempted to deepen China, pragmatic cooperation in 17 Russia Manzhouli- maintaining stability in border Oriental - 2014 Zabaykalsk areas and enhanced the capacity border port in border management ("China, Russia hold 'oriental - 2014'", 2014).

4.3.4 The SCO: Future and Challenges Analysis There are four Central Asian states out of the six member states of the SCO, so Central Asia is basic the region where the SCO operates multilateral cooperation. As 84

I observed, the primary purpose of the SCO is to maintain stability in the region, especially jointly anti-terror practices, for creating a good condition for economic development of member states. But with changes in the current situation in the context of globalization, many new problems have emerged in front of the SCO, in terms of internal structure and external conditions.

4.3.4.1 Internal Structure Contradictions Firstly, some member states of the SCO are faced with multiple pressures to maintain domestic stability. If internal peace breaks, it will be a good chance for terror groups to expand their influence. Central Asian countries have produced a large number of negative issues, like political corruption, economic imbalance, social poverty, ecological degradation stemming from the imperfect regimes of market operation, democracy and rule of law. Therefore, there are still many uncertain factors affecting the smooth replacement between the old regime and the new administration, resulting in serious challenges to domestic stability of some SCO member states. For example, a series of serious riots occurred in Kyrgyzstan on April 7, 2010. Within a few days, the regime of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted almost overnight, while the opposition quickly set up a provisional government and gradually took control of the domestic political situation. This phenomenon can be attributed to the severe economic downturn in Kyrgyzstan. Since independence, the living conditions of Kyrgyzstan citizens have declined significantly. And the financial crisis has worsened the dire economic situation in Kyrgyzstan. Due to geographical and historical reasons, the unbalanced economic development between the northern and southern Kyrgyzstan has lasted a very long time, which leads to the long-term North-South conflict. Furthermore, the family-based administration and serious corruption also stir up considerable public discontent. As the author observed, the economic factors in the process of modernization are the main causes of the ongoing social unrest in Kyrgyzstan. Secondly, interest coordination. Common interests among the SCO member states are the basis for collaboration and the greatest impetus for its development. It is no doubt that there are a wide range of common interests among the SCO member states. However, each member of the SCO is an independent state with its own particular needs or preferences. Therefore, it is rather important to coordinate 85 the differences from state to state in terms of interests and positions on security issues. If the coordination runs well among member states when dealing with some certain issues, the SCO will gain power to move forward; if not, the distrust among states will arise and stagnate cooperation. While it is very vital to understand that interest coordination is not a one-time job, but a regular procedure, as the differences of interests among member states frequently occur in the process of cooperation from time to time. Due to the serious shortage and uneven distribution of water resources in Central Asia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan prepare to construct hydropower stations upstream for easing tensions in energy consumption and economic development. But Uzbekistan is located downstream, and usually strongly opposes the hydropower station projects, as it naturally worries about their water quality, irrigation being negatively affected, and their citizens' lives and economic development being harmed. Such friction and disputes happen frequently among the SCO member states, which may lead to the lack of mutual trust and then affect joint counter-terrorism cooperation. It finally makes the cooperation on combating the three evil forces and other transnational crimes complicated to solve with a consequence of a serious impediment to peace and stability in Central Asia. 4.3.4.2 External Conditions Afghanistan domestic conflicts and the upheaval in the Middle East have led to the formation of a new wave of Islamic extremism frenzy, posing a serious challenge to security in Central Asia. Firstly, Afghanistan's domestic situation has deteriorated since the US President, Barack Obama, announced a gradual drawdown of American forces there, which will give the SCO a negative impact on security maintenance. On one hand, the international terrorist forces are very likely to rebound, as the US's war on terror has not eradicated international terrorism thoroughly, but actually provoked anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in the Islamic world, and also activated the vigor of terrorism forces to some extent. For example, the branches of Al-Qaeda combined with different geographical characteristics, have quickly gathered a large amount of local personnel (jihadists), resulting in a number of new upgraded terrorist groups. The behavior of such groups is more extreme and their means are more brutal and bloody, compared to 86

Al-Qaeda. Although these new terrorist groups are derived from Al-Qaeda, the religious extremism of their slogans is rather distinctive, upgrading from "anti- American" and "anti-Western" to "anti-modernization" and "anti-globalization." The rapid rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since June 2014 should be acknowledged as one of the typical cases. Originally, ISIS was an organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda before it separated. It quickly demonstrated remarkable combat capability, extensive international influence and appeal. Reportedly, ISIS has sent a so-called "official delegation" to southern Pakistan for conducting field studies on local extremist groups and negotiated the feasibility of admitting them as members of the ISIS terrorist organization. The Pakistan Taliban active in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to join ISIS publicly. Moreover, ISIS has started recruiting in southern Afghanistan, which has led to a fierce competition with the Taliban there, even resulting in bloodshed at times. Afghanistan’s fragility has led terrorists to use it as a base for international terrorist activities and to gain easy access to attack SCO member states. In addition, due to the continuing competition for the leadership of international jihad movements between the newly born ISIS and the old Al-Qaeda, ISIS decided to allocate 70 million dollars to open up a second front in Central Asia. Meanwhile, some extremist and terrorist forces in Central Asia affected by ISIS, may also intensify their terrorist attacks here, which has formed a new concern for SCO member states. On the other hand, another worrying part for SCO is the resurgence of the Taliban. Because of the Bush administration's "War on Terror" strategy, the Taliban suffered miserable losses. However, the Taliban is still the prominent representative of domestic extremist groups in Afghanistan. Presently, the Taliban controls several parts of Afghanistan's territory, mainly in the southern region, whose political stance is extremely stubborn. The authorities of the Taliban insist that they will keep fighting until all the foreign troops leave Afghanistan. Since the US government announced the army withdrawal scheduled in 2014, the Taliban never concealed its ambition of taking over Afghanistan' regime. With the US’ withdrawal schedule proceeding, Taliban forces have been resurgent and launched a series of violent attacks. According to a report released by the United Nations in February 2015, there were a total of 10,548 civilian casualties in 87

Afghanistan’s domestic conflicts in 2014, which included 3,699 deaths and 6,849injuries. An increase of 22% compared to the previous year. It was also the year of the largest number of victims since2009 (United Nations [UN], 2014). Thereby, after the complete withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan in 2016 and the cancel of military assistance and guidance in 2017, the security situation in Afghanistan is not optimistic. Afghanistan’s authorities are confronted with the rebound and infiltration of international terror forces and the counterattack threat of local old terrorist organizations. Once the civil strife is renewed in Afghanistan, it will give rise to domestic terrorist activities, the drug trade and large quantities of weapons expanding to its neighboring countries directly or indirectly, so that the external pressure on the SCO member states will certainly increase. Secondly, a new frenzy of Islamic extremist ideology has formed during the upheaval in the Middle East and has diffused to Central Asia. Member states of the SCO are faced with the arduous task of holding secularization and resisting radical Islam ideology. Terrorist groups affected by the Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia include: (1) IMU. In recent years, due to the success of joint anti-terror drills organized by SCO member states, the main force of the IMU has gradually moved from the Fergana basin along the common border area of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to northern Afghanistan. The IMU has been waiting for an opportunity to return to Uzbekistan. At the same time, influenced by the jihad described in Salafism, one of the extreme Islamic fundamentalist schools, the target of the IMU is no longer confined to overthrowing the secular government of Uzbekistan, but to respond to the call for a global jihad movement. Furthermore, the revival of the Taliban forces in the region will easily provoke the offensive of religious extremist forces, like the IMU. The reality is that such activity has been found in the Badakhshan, Kunduz, and Badghis provinces in northern Afghanistan. (2) Jund al-Khilafah, founded in summer 2011, is a terrorist group identified by the Kazakhstan authority. Influenced by Salafism, this group launched a series of terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan and claimed that it desired to overthrow the apostate, Nursultan Nazarbayev administration for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate regime in Kazakhstan. 88

(3) ILP (Hizbut-Tahrir). The ILP was founded in Palestine in 1953 with the Salafist doctrine as the dominant ideology. It initially emerged in Uzbekistan and gradually extended to other states in the Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most recently, the ILP took the chance to recruit in Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 South Kyrgyzstan ethnic clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The Hizbut- Tahrir further expanded rapidly in Central Asia, even penetrating into the southern region of Kazakhstan. The authorities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan arrested several batches of Hizbut-Tahrir members carrying religious extremism propaganda materials. (4) TIP. The TIP was founded in 2008, and identified as a Uyghur extreme terrorist group active in the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan by the Chinese government. It is the third-largest terrorist group in Central Asia at the present, which has attempted to bring 'Xinjiang Independence Movement' and other terror activities into the global jihad movement. The TIP equates its jihad acts against the Chinese government with the jihad movements in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Chen Xinming and Li Yuanzheng believe, "The security situation in Xinjiang has a direct relationship with Central Asian states. Several violent terrorist incidents have occurred successively in Xinjiang recently with certain new features. For example, the planners and conductors of terrorist attacks have watched audio and video materials related to the ETIM or TIP. They are eager to launch jihad so that their preparation time is rather short, but they seek for high causalities by violently attacking people regardless of ethnicity. Both Non-Islamic believers and 'Hypocritical' Islamic followers are their targets. They are directly affected by the propaganda of the global jihad movement and are ready to participate in Syria's domestic conflicts. Due to the difficulty of illegally trafficking out of China's border, they prefer to launch jihad in local communities." Chen Xinming said that these terrorists normally have not escaped after committing violent crimes during several cases happening in China, but bid farewell to partners and are ready for suicide (Chen& Li, 2015).Clearly, what happens in Xinjiang is closely related to the instability in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim Riots

After violent terrorist attacks, mainly conducted by Xinjiang Uyghur Muslims in recent years, China's policymakers, scholars, and ordinary people from inland are reflecting on why such terrible things have suddenly happened in a consistently peaceful area with 14 native ethnic groups (includes Han). But the Xinjiang riots have never really stopped in China, especially in the period of the KMT's regime and the Sino-Soviet split, when many large-scale riots or revolts occurred in Xinjiang under the influence of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, several Xinjiang uprisings hit the headlines of media. However, the number of these riots is less than before. It is more often to see that many small-scale terrorist attacks frequently occur in Xinjiang, Beijing, Kunming, and even in Bangkok last year. Some scholars believe that the resurgence of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim uprisings is influenced by domestic economic unbalances and the support by overseas anti-China forces, which see the Xinjiang riots as a chance to contain China’s rise. Compared with developed regions in China, (such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, etc.) the pace of development in Xinjiang is relatively slow, leading to a relatively large poor population. When they feel hopeless, some ethnic minority youth easily accept and are influenced by extreme national and religious speeches to commit crimes. However, poverty is a global problem. It is universally believed that not all poor areas are breeding terrorists, so the relative poverty of Xinjiang is not the root reason resulting in terrorist violence but one of the factors that boosts the formation of some terrorist groups. As the author mentioned above, religious extremism is the fundamental factor. It is Pan-Islamism that encourages many agitated young people to commit violent crimes in Xinjiang. Generally speaking, secularized Muslims in Xinjiang are not likely to organize a large-scale violent terrorist attack in public places without caring about lives of innocent people. Moreover, a number of young people are dissatisfied with the status quo, which sees other ethnic people increasing in numbers in Xinjiang, as they think it harms the interests of native ethnic minority groups. So the young attempt to 90 arouse social attention by terrorist moves, resulting in serious ethnic conflicts based on the guidance of Pan-Turkism. However, it is a multi-cultural world now. Different races need to learn how to compromise for living in harmony with each other. Xinjiang is a multi-ethnic gathering area, as there are other native ethnic minorities other than the Uyghur, such as Han, Hui, Mongol, Manchu, and Kazak, etc. Hence, Pan-Turkism is just an unrealistic conception, as it requires all the Turks to unite for the renaissance of the old Ottoman Empire created by Turks. To sum up, the reasons of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots are really complex and diverse. When authorities or other people attempt to solve the Xinjiang issue, they always instinctively take measures based on what they have learned. Scholars and governments consider the Xinjiang issue with their own background and culture as filters. As constructivists believe, "Our mental maps are shaped by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, language, and rules. Idealism does not reject material reality but instead observes that the meaning and construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation (Wendt, 1999). "They may analyze the issue based on their experience, which may easily lead to a biased opinion without thinking of the whole of the situation and simplify the issue intentionally or unintentionally. For example, the ideologies of China and the US insist that their state's governance is completely different. China is a socialist state, while the US is a capitalist state. Moreover, China and the US generally hold a different emphasis on social values, so much so that the understanding of democracy and the relations between sovereignty and human rights can be divergent. It results in different views on the issue of fighting against terrorism between the US and China. In China's anti-terrorism law, the term of "terrorist" refers to three categories of people who conduct acts based on the concepts of separatism, extremism and terrorism, while the FBI defines domestic terrorism as having three characteristics: (1) acts dangerous to human life and violate law; (2) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion and to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (3) within the US' s territorial jurisdiction (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], n.d.). However, the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots or the Xinjiang Independence issue are not naturally identified as terrorism according to 91 some representatives in the US congress. Even though several Uyghur Jihadists have conducted violence toward a lot of civilians at the Kunming Train Station in 2014, the US embassy in China identified the case as 'horrible and senseless acts of violence in Kunming' at first. Then the US State Department spokesman, Jen Psaki, said, the violence in Kunming "appears to be an act of terrorism targeting random members of the public" (Sudworth, 2014) based on the reports released by China's media. She continued, "But we do not have independent sources to verify the case." The words used by the US government shows there are double standards in defining terrorism. China's state-run news agency Xinhua said that revealed "double standards in the global fight against terrorism. Behind its wording is the entrenched US belief that the Xinjiang murderers were 'ethnically oppressed and seeking autonomy' (Sudworth, 2014). "That's why the WUC is identified as one of the main terrorist organizations by the Chinese government, but gains a lot of support from the US. This phenomenon shows the world is constructed by ideas and material reality.

5.2 China-Central Asia Relations

There is a Chinese idiom, ‘Chun Wang Chi Han’, literally means that ‘With lips gone, teeth are exposed to cold’, which describes an interdependence relationship. It is quite appropriate to use this idiom to represent the political and economic connections between the Xinjiang region of China and Central Asia. In such an anarchic environment, cross-border cooperation among states and major actors in international relations should be considered as a good way to solve transnational problems. Therefore, in order to settle the Xinjiang Uighur Muslim unrest, the affinities between China and Central Asian countries will affect final solutions to the issue. China’s domestic policy coordination in terms of political and economic balance affects the development imbalance between rural and urban areas in Xinjiang, and the modernization gap between Xinjiang and other richer provinces in China. Several States in Central Asia are important neighbors for China and are also one of the Chinese government's diplomatic focuses. China has a significant geo- strategic interest in Central Asia, as it wants to achieve the goal of peace and development. However, since 1940s, the Comintern and the Soviet Union authorities 92 mistakenly identified the Xinjiang internal political struggle of ethnic people as an ethnic liberation movement instead of one against the exploitation and oppression by local warlords and autocracy. Then in the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split is one of the major consequences of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots. Taking advantage of China's failure of the Three Red Banners (the General Line for socialist construction, the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes)(Yang, 2012) and nationwide natural disasters, the Soviet Union encouraged ethnic minorities living along the Xinjiang borderline to escape from China's management, resulting in ethnic conflict. Especially from the runaway high-level Uyghur Muslim leaders who left for the Soviet Union. They started to spare no effort to propagandize the ideology of East Turkestan or Xinjiang Independence, targeting domestic Uyghur Muslims via broadcasts and written materials related to anti-China principles. During the Cold War, relations between the Soviet Union and China sometimes was good but sometimes it wasn’t, which buried the curse for the resurgence of the East Turkestan forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PRC started to establish diplomatic relations with former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The 25 years of interaction between the PRC and states in Central Asia show the Chinese central government's strategic thoughts, including (1) to maintain a status quo of balance of power in the Central Asia region by avoiding a unipolar dominance; (2) to maintain security and stability in Central Asia and to prevent insecurity and instability issues from spilling over to Xinjiang, China's far northwest region; (3) to enhance China's influence in Central Asia by deepening economic cooperation. Under the guidance of the above strategic spirit, China's strategic interests in Central Asia are mainly in security and economic sectors. During the past 25 years of relative peace, the relations between China and Central Asian states should be divided into three phases: (1) From December 1991 to September 1997, the good-neighborly and friendly relations phase; (2) From September 1997 to June 2001,the closer cooperation on energy, trade and security phase; and (3) From June 2001 to now, the all-round bilateral and multilateral (SCO) cooperation phase. Nowadays, the SCO, as one of the most important international institutions in Central Asia, plays a vital role in the development of China and Central Asia relations. It is a main platform for China and Central Asian states to combat the three evil forces. 93

The SCO is also a key institution for member states to safeguard regional peace and stability through mutual coordination and cooperation. The Shanghai Spirit advocated by the member states was primarily formed in the process of the ‘Shanghai Five’ negotiation mechanism, the predecessor of the SCO. It includes the principles of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and seeking common development," which has led to valuable experience and wealth accumulated by the SCO member states over the years. The SCO is an international organization, while the cooperation base among member states is the Shanghai Spirit, which guides member states and other partners how to collaborate and is a very significant institutional design. Without these basic guiding principles, the multilateral cooperation within the SCO framework could have produced serious disagreements and disputes, so that the cooperation among member states based on mutual interests would be difficult to continue. Neoliberal scholars are aware that institutions do not always achieve a desired collective outcome, but there may be an important role for institutional redesign in achieving a more desirable outcome (Sterling-folker, 2013). The development of the SCO should be a good example. From the Shanghai Five, a negotiating process of trust- strengthening and disarmament in the border areas, to the current SCO, an intergovernmental political and economic cooperation institution with a relatively completed framework on safeguarding the regional security and seeking mutual prosperity. It is a process of institutional redesign, as states in Central Asia and China want to gain practical benefits through multilateral cooperation. Established on June 2001, the SCO is a significant milestone for the development of China and the geopolitical structure of Central Asia outside of bilateral cooperation. After 15 years of development exploration, China has finally confirmed its strategy towards Central Asia with several goals of preventing further impacts from terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim community, facilitating economic development, political stability, and social-cultural prosperity in Central Asia. Beijing’s government believes that China must work hard within the framework of the SCO to seek improving mutual trusts with Central Asian nations and strengthening all-around cooperation with Central Asia in terms of economy, politics, 94 security, military, energy, social-culture sectors, and maintaining regional security and stability. To sum up, after the establishment of the PRC, the East Turkestan separatists were influenced by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, and conducted a lot of violent attacks with the support of the Soviet Union. At that time, even though the CPC was allied with the CPSU, such unrest cannot be avoided as the actual influence of the Soviets in Xinjiang was quite deep. As the author observed, the Sino-Soviet relations was not equal during the first decade since the PRC was founded. From the perspectives of the then Soviet leaders, China was more like an actual Kazakhstan-style republic, or at least the Xinjiang region of China was similar to a Kazakhstan-style republic. That's why the Xinjiang Independence was less active before the year 1959. Since the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet relationship turned to be hostile because of many internal and external factors. The East Turkestan forces came back to life again in the 1960s, as the Soviets provided them funds, weapons, and training centers. Up until the end of the 1980s, relations between China and the Soviet Union was still unfriendly, leaving many disputes in terms of the border, Marxism ideologies, and Afghanistan, etc. During this period, Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots still occurred but the number and scale were relatively reduced, as the Soviets were busy in competing with the US, the other Hegemon in the anarchic world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China established diplomatic relations with those Central Asian republics for the first time, aiming at building up friendly bilateral relations to maintain regional peace. However, the resurgence of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots in the 1990s could not be separately analyzed, concerning the influence of the changes in the pattern of international relations and the Islamic renaissance movements in West Asia and North Africa. Currently, the relations between China and Central Asian states are closer and better than before in terms of security and economic cooperation in particular. The joint efforts on countering the three evil forces in Xinjiang and Central Asia have made the scale and frequency of those terror cases shrink. But these East Turkestan forces still attempt to gain support from western societies, trying to instigate relations between Uyghurs and Han people in all sorts of ways and lure a part of Muslims to immigrate illegally to join in Jihad. As the strike-hard campaigns in China and the closer 95 cooperation between China and Central Asian states, via the SCO, a small part of terrorists prefer to illegally travel from southern provinces of China to Southeast Asia as a transfer station, and then to Turkey, or to fight in the frontline of Syria and Afghanistan rather than escaping from Xinjiang to Central Asia for jihad directly. This can be seen as another achievement of the good Sino-Central Asia relations on constraining of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim riots, as the author analyzed recent populous terrorism in the form of migration Jihad in Chapter 3.

5.3 Challenges Ahead

With changes in the current situation in the context of globalization, many new problems have emerged in front of the SCO, in terms of the internal structure and external conditions. Domestic pressure within the member states and interest coordination among member states are identified as the main internal challenges that may affect the constraint of the three evil forces in Central Asia. As the analysis in Chapter 4 shows, the external impacts, such as Afghanistan’s domestic conflicts and the upheaval in the Middle East, also pose a critical obstacle to peaceful coexistence for China and Central Asia. Afghanistan's domestic situation has deteriorated since Barack Obama, the US president, announced a gradual drawdown of American forces there. Apparently, the international terrorist forces are very likely to rebound, as the US's war on terror has not eradicated international terrorism thoroughly, but provoked anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in the Islamic world. The rise of ISIS and the resurgence of the Taliban is good evidence of that. The local terrorist groups affected by the increasingly expanding Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, including the East Turkestan forces are main concerns for both China and other Central Asian states. How to react appropriately to those old and new threats is what the SCO has to consider and research. In this sense, China and Central Asia will continue deepening their closer cooperation on countering the three evil forces within the framework of the SCO and attempt to coordinate shareholders' interests based on the Shanghai Spirit.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan being the founding states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (hereinafter SCO or the Organisation), Based on historically established ties between their peoples; Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation; Desiring to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multi- polarity and economic and information globalization; Being convinced that the establishment of SCO will facilitate more efficient common use of opening possibilities and counteracting new challenges and threats; Considering that interaction within SCO will promote the realisation of a huge potential of good neighborliness, unity and cooperation between States and their peoples; Proceeding from the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration to joint development that was clearly established at the meeting of heads of six States in 2001 in Shanghai; Noting that the compliance with the principles set out in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996, and in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area of 24 April, 1997, as well as in the documents signed at summits of heads of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the period from 1998 to 2001, has made an important 107 contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and in the world; Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other commonly acknowledged principles and rules of international law related to the maintenance of international peace, security and the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations, as well as the cooperation between States; Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation of 15 June, 2001, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Goals and Tasks The main goals and tasks of SCO are: to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member States; to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order; to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration; to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of common interest; to facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States; to coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy; to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member States and their national legislation; 108

to maintain and develop relations with other States and international organisations; to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful settlement; to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 21st century.

Article 2 Principles The member States of SCO shall adhere to the following principles: mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, nonuse of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas; equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for opinions of each of them; gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest; peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States; SCO being not directed against other States and international organisations; prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests; implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.

Article 3 Areas of Cooperation The main areas of cooperation within SCO shall be the following: maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region; search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including issues arising within international organisations and international for a; development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration; 109

coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control; support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in various forms, fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and technologies; effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and development of energy systems; sound environmental management, including water resources management in the region, and implementation of particular joint environmental programs and projects; mutual assistance in preventing natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications; exchange of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO; development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, education, healthcare, culture, sports and tourism. The SCO member States may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.

Article 4 Bodies 1. For the implementation of goals and objectives of the present Charter the following bodies shall operate within the Organization: The Council of Heads of State; The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers); The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies; The Council of National Coordinators; The Regional Antiterrorist Structure; Secretariat. 2. The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the Regional Antiterrorist Structure, shall be governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the Council of Heads of State. 110

3. The Council of Heads of State may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New bodies shall be established by the adoption of additional protocols to the present Charter which enter into force in the procedure, set forth in Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 5 The Council of Heads of State The Council of Heads of State shall be the supreme SCO body. It shall determine priorities and define major areas of activities of the Organisation, decide upon the fundamental issues of its internal arrangement and functioning and its interaction with other States and international organizations, as well as consider the most topical international issues. The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council of Heads of State shall be chaired by the head of State organizing this regular meeting. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall generally be determined in the Russian alphabetic order of names of the SCO member States.

Article 6 The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) shall approve the budget of the Organisation, consider and decide upon major issues related to particular, especially economic, spheres of interaction within the Organisation. The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the head of Government (Prime Minister) of the State on whose territory the meeting takes place. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall be determined by prior agreement among heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States.

Article 7 The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall consider issues related to day-to-day activities of the Organisation, preparation of meetings of the Council of 111

Heads of State and holding of consultations on international problems within the Organisation. The Council may, as appropriate, make statements on behalf of SCO. The Council shall generally meet one month prior to a meeting of the Council of Heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be convened on the initiative of at least two member States and upon consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member States. The venue of a regular or extraordinary meeting of the Council shall be determined by mutual agreement. The Council shall be chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, during the period starting from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council.

Article 8 Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies According to decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member States shall hold, on a regular basis, meetings for consideration of particular issues of interaction in respective fields within SCO. A meeting shall be chaired by the head of a respective ministry and/or agency of the State organising the meeting. The venue and date of a meeting shall be agreed upon in advance. For the preparation and holding meetings the member States may, upon prior agreement, establish permanent or ad hoc working groups of experts which carry out their activities in accordance with the regulations adopted by the meetings of heads of ministries and/or agencies. These groups shall consist of representatives of ministries and/or agencies of the member States.

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Article 9 The Council of National Coordinators The Council of National Coordinators shall be a SCO body that coordinates and directs day-to-day activities of the Organisation. It shall make the necessary preparation for the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. National coordinators shall be appointed by each member State in accordance with its internal rules and procedures. The Council shall hold its meetings at least three times a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the national coordinator of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State. The Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may on the instruction of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of National Coordinators.

Article 10 Regional Antiterrorist Structure The Regional Antiterrorist Structure established by the member States of the Shanghai Convention to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism of 15 June, 2001, located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, shall be a standing SCO body. Its main objectives and functions, principles of its constitution and financing, as well as its rules of procedure shall be governed by a separate international treaty concluded by the member States, and other necessary instruments adopted by them.

Article 11 Secretariat Secretariat shall be a standing SCO administrative body. It shall provide organizational and technical support to the activities carried out in the framework of SCO and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organisation. 113

The Secretariat shall be headed by the Secretary-General to be appointed by the Council of Heads of State on nomination by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the nationals of member States on a rotational basis in the Russian alphabetic order of the member States' names for a period of three years without a right to be reappointed for another period. The Secretary-General deputies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on nomination by the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot be representatives of the State from which the Executive Secretary has been appointed. The Secretariat officials shall be recruited from among nationals of the member States on a quota basis. The Secretary-General, his deputies and other Secretariat officials in fulfilling their official duties should not request or receive instructions from any member State and/or government, organisation or physical persons. They should refrain from any actions that might affect their status as international officials reporting to SCO only. The member States shall undertake to respect the international character of the duties of the Secretary-General, his deputies and Secretariat staff and not to exert any influence upon them as they perform their official functions. The SCO Secretariat shall be located at Beijing (the People's Republic of China).

Article 12 Financing SCO shall have its own budget drawn up and executed in accordance with a special agreement between member States. This agreement shall also determine the amount of contributions paid annually by member States to the budget of the Organisation on the basis of a cost-sharing principle. Budgetary resources shall be used to finance standing SCO bodies in accordance with the above agreement. The member States shall cover themselves the expenses related to the participation of their representatives and experts in the activities of the Organisation. 114

Article 13 Membership The SCO membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and principles of this Charter and to comply with the provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in the framework of SCO. The admission of new members to SCO shall be decided upon by the Council of Heads of State on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in response to an official request from the State concerned addressed to the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. SCO membership of a member State violating the provisions of this Charter and/or systematically failing to meet its obligations under international treaties and instruments, concluded in the framework of SCO, may be suspended by a decision of the Council of Heads of State adopted on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. If this State goes on violating its obligations, the Council of Heads of State may take a decision to expel it from SCO as of the date fixed by the Council itself. Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the Depositary an official notification of its withdrawal from this Charter no later than twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising from participation in this Charter and other instruments adopted within the framework of SCO shall be binding for the corresponding States until they are completely fulfilled.

Article 14 Relationship with Other States and International Organisations SCO may interact and maintain dialogue, in particular in certain areas of cooperation, with other States and international organisations. SCO may grant to the State or international organisation concerned the status of a dialogue partner or observer. The rules and procedures for granting such a status shall be established by a special agreement of member States. 115

This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the member States under other international treaties in which they participate.

Article 15 Legal Capacity As a subject of international law, SCO shall have international legal capacity. It shall have such a legal capacity in the territory of each member State, which is required to achieve its goals and objectives. SCO shall enjoy the rights of a legal person and may in particular: - conclude treaties; - acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it; - appear in court as litigant; - open accounts and have monetary transactions made.

Article 16 Decisions-Taking Procedure The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during the vote(consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of membership or expulsion from the Organisation that shall be taken by "consensus minus one vote of the member State concerned". Any member State may expose its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record. Should one or several member States be not interested in implementing particular cooperation projects of interest to other member States, non-participation of the above said member States in these projects shall not prevent the implementation of such cooperation projects by the member States concerned and, at the same time, shall not prevent the said member States from joining such projects at a later stage.

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Article 17 Implementation of Decisions The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member States in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation. Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement this Charter, other agreements and decisions adopted within SCO shall be exercised by the SCO bodies within their competence.

Article 18 Permanent Representatives In accordance with their domestic rules and procedures, the member States shall appoint their permanent representatives to the SCO Secretariat, which will be members of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of the member States in Beijing.

Article 19 Privileges and Immunities SCO and its officials shall enjoy in the territories of all member States the privileges and immunities which are necessary for fulfilling functions and achieving goals of the Organisation. The volume of privileges and immunities of SCO and its officials shall be determined by a separate international treaty.

Article 20 Languages The official and working languages of SCO shall be Russian and Chinese.

Article 21 Duration and Entry into Force This Charter shall be of indefinite duration. This Charter shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification. 117

For a State which signed this Charter and ratified it thereafter it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary. Upon its entering into force this Charter shall be open for accession by any State. For each acceding State this Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of receiving by the Depositary of appropriate instruments of accession.

Article 22 Settlement of Disputes In case of disputes or controversies arising out of interpretation or application of this Charter member States shall settle them through consultations and negotiations.

Article 23 Amendments and Additions By mutual agreement of member States this Charter can be amended and supplemented. Decisions by the Council of Heads of State concerning amendments and additions shall be formalised by separate protocols which shall be its integral part and enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided for by Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 24 Reservations No reservations can be made to this Charter which contradict the principles, goals and objectives of the Organisation and could prevent any SCO body from performing its functions. If at least two thirds of member States have objections the reservations must be considered as contradicting the principles, goals and objectives of the Organisation or preventing any body from performing its functions and being null and void.

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Article 25 Depositary The People's Republic of China shall be the Depositary of this Charter.

Article 26 Registration Pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Charter is subject to registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Done at Saint-Petersburg the seventh day of June 2002 in a single original in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authoritative. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the Depositary who will circulate its certified copies to all signatory States.

Source: Shanghai cooperation organization charter. (n.d.) Retrieved from http://people.unica.it/annamariabaldussi/files/2015/04/SCO-Charter.pdf

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APPENDIX B Xi Jinping Attends SCO Summit in Dushanbe and Delivers Important Speech Stressing Gathering People's Will and Power and Coordinating Sincerely to Push SCO to a New Level

2014/09/12 On September 12, 2014, the 14th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was held in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. President Xi Jinping of China, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, President Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, President Emomalii Rahmon of Tajikistan and President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan attended the meeting. Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the meeting, stressing that the member states should firmly establish a sense of community of common destiny and community of common interests, helping each other and sharing weal and woe, gather people's will and power and coordinate sincerely, and take maintaining regional security and stability as one's own responsibility, achieving common development and prosperity as the goal, promoting the communication of peoples as the tenet, and expanding foreign exchanges and cooperation as the driving force, so as to fully promote the SCO to develop towards a direction that is more improved in mechanism, more comprehensive in cooperation, more smooth in coordination, and more open to the outside, bringing benefits to people of the region. Heads of the member states first held small-scale talks, and then the heads of the SCO observer states including President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, President Hassan Rouhani of Iran, President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj of Mongolia and representatives of India and Pakistan, guest of the host state President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow of Turkmenistan, as well as representatives from the relevant international and regional organizations were invited to attend the large-scale talks. Rahmon hosted the meeting. The meeting summarized the SCO's main working achievements over the year since the Bishkek Summit in 2013. The participants had an in-depth exchange of views on further improving the work of the SCO, developing the long-term and good-neighborly friendship among the member states, safeguarding the 120 regional security, enhancing practical cooperation as well as current major international and regional issues and reached broad consensus. During the meeting, Xi Jinping delivered a speech titled "Gathering People's Will and Power and Coordinating Sincerely to Push SCO to a New Level". Xi Jinping pointed out that since the Summit last year, the SCO member states have comprehensively implemented the "Guidelines for Implementation of the Treaty of Long-term Good-neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation", and achieved new progress in maintaining regional security and stability, promoting practical cooperation and strengthening people-to-people and cultural exchanges, which manifests vigorous vitality of the SCO. Today's world is undergoing complex and profound changes. Favorable conditions of maintaining the overall stability of the international situation are increasing, but the world is still far from tranquil. The SCO is entering a critical period of inheriting the past and ushering in the future. It is our common responsibility and mission to ensure that the SCO always develops along the established track and brings more security and greater well-being to its member states and their peoples. Xi Jinping made four points of proposals. First, adhere to taking the responsibility of maintaining regional security and stability. Strengthen the construction of the capacity to maintain stability, continue to perfect the cooperation system of law enforcement and security, improve the existing cooperation mechanism, grant the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) of the SCO the function of drug control as soon as possible, and establish the security challenge and threat response center, so as to resolve the current problems and eliminate the root causes by taking different measures at the same time and coordinately combat the "three evil forces". The present emphasis should be put on combating religious extremism and internet terrorism. The Chinese side suggested discussion and signing of an anti-extremism convention as well as research on initiating an action mechanism for cracking down on internet terrorism. Second, adhere to the goal of achieving common development and prosperity. Discuss the exploration of cooperation in a broader and higher level in fields of trade and investment, promote the process of regional economic integration, and construct a unified economic, trade, investment and logistic space in this region. Tap the transit transport potential of each country and reach an early agreement on the establishment of an SCO financial institution. Strengthen energy policy coordination as well as 121 demand and supply cooperation, and enhance security cooperation in transnational oil and gas pipelines. Enhance food policy coordination and improve the comprehensive capacity of grain production. Draw up the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Science and Technology Partnership Program" and accelerate the establishment of information sharing platform on environment protection. The Chinese side decided to expand the ultimate size of the China-Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund to 5 billion USD. The National Commodity Trade Fair of the SCO will be held during the Western China International Fair in 2015. Third, stick to the principle of promoting the connection of people's hearts. Conduct friendly communications and people-to-people and cultural exchanges in an all-round manner [should be done]. Strengthen the construction of the SCO's international communication capacity as well as media cooperation, support the training and exchanges of personnel in such fields as public policy, government administration, and judicature. China is willing to offer 2000 places for the training of officials, administrators and technical talents for the member states of the SCO from 2015 to 2017, and invite 50 youth leaders of the states of the SCO each year to research and study in China in the next five years. The 70th anniversary of the victory of the world anti-fascist war will be commemorated solemnly in 2015. Fourth, insist on taking the expansion of foreign communication and cooperation as impetus. Welcome the willing and qualified countries to apply for full membership of the SCO. Reinforce the member states' cooperation with observers and communication with dialogue partners, and promote the cooperation between the SCO and international and regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). China welcomes the SCO's member states, observers and dialogue partners to actively participate in the joint construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt so as to promote the regional connectivity and the progress of the new-type industrialization. Xi Jinping pointed out that the development of the SCO faces major opportunities and bright prospects. We should stick to the concept of win-win cooperation, insist on the "Shanghai Spirit" featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development, practice the outlook of Asia's safety featuring commonness, 122 comprehensiveness, cooperation and sustainability, adopt the forces of collectiveness, solidarity and cooperation, join hands to cope with threats and challenges, and jointly promote the SCO for greater development. China is in full support of Russia holding the next Summit of the SCO. (The full speech is published separately.) The heads of state agreed that today's world is complicated and volatile, which brings the region with increasing factors of uncertainty and instability. The member states of the SCO are all committed to development, but are all faced with common threats and challenges such as terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crimes, which needs the promotion of the SCO's development, the deepening of security cooperation, the deepening and expansion of cooperation in security, economy and people-to-people and cultural engagement, so as to cope with new threats and challenges hand in hand and build a harmonious region of good-neighborly friendship, common safety and common development. The heads of state unanimously agreed that they will continue to take active measures to jointly combat the "three evil forces"; jointly promote the establishment of a peaceful, safe, fair and open information space based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs; support and actively participate in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative put forward by China and promote trade and investment facilitation and infrastructure connectivity; expand fiscal and financial cooperation and speed up the study of setting up the Development Fund and Development Bank of the SCO; ensure food and energy security, and develop transport logistics; strengthen cooperation in culture, science and technology, innovation, education, sanitation, tourism, sports and other fields, and promote the dialogues among civilizations; and expand cooperation with the UN and other international and regional organizations and strengthen the links between the member states and the observer countries as well as the dialogue partners. All sides highly appreciated the amendments of "For SCO Membership Program" and "Memo Template of Duties for Application to Join SCO" approved at this summit, and held that as the significant steps to perfect the legal basis of SCO, they officially open the door to the enlargement of SCO. The parties also exchanged views on the Afghanistan issue, Syrian issue and Ukrainian issue. All stressed that the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 123 of Afghanistan should be respected. They support the achievement of "Led and Owned by Afghanistan" in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction, so as to make Afghanistan a country that is independent and neighbor-friendly. The parties called for the implementation of the "Geneva Communiqué" and the continuous promotion of concerned parties of Syria to hold wide and direct dialogues and solve the Syrian crisis through political and diplomatic means. The parties welcomed the consultation minutes recently signed by the tripartite joint team of Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the implementation of the common steps based on Ukrainian President's peace plan and Russian President's initiative. They support seeking a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis through negotiation and restoring peace in Ukraine as soon as possible. The meeting decided that the 2015 Summit of SCO will be held in Ufa of Russia. The heads of the member states of SCO signed "the Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO", approved a series of resolutions, and met with journalists together. At the meeting, "Press Communique of the Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO" was released. Wang Huning, Li Zhanshu and Yang Jiechi attended the above activities.

Source: Xi Jinping attends SCO summit in Dushanbe and delivers important speech stressing gathering people's will and power and coordinating sincerely to push SCO to a new level. (2014, September 12). Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/zjpcxshzzcygyslshdsschyb dtjkstmedfsllkydjxgsfw/t1191482.shtml