Pannwitz, Heinz Vol. 2 0042
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• ,CLASSOLCATION MI4VAICH SYMUOL ANU NO DIS ATCH S.;E C R IZMA-:44214 TO hief, EE; Chief, SR Huo0uAATEAs FILE NO.-7.— INFO -2664r=1"1:_ COS/G, BOB., NOB .Pield file-1181 FROM Chief, Munich Base DATE 26 August 1959 uOiEcT W-WROVE,EQVAL.CARETINA OPERATIONS RF,:.."43.3--ICHECK "X" ONE) ‘0AllgTTNAs Report on the German-Controlled Interne MARKED FOR INDEXING Att_13. Communist Party Radio Network in France, 1943/44. NO INDEXING REQUIRED ACTION ncouinio See paragraph b. • INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED•. HQ. DESK 0%0 REFERENCE.SI d a. EGmA.334, 28 May 1959 yi b. EGMA-10213, 17 Aug 1959 4,4J, 1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is CARETINAs account of the French Communist Party, internal, radio network -which the Germans had penetrated and were controlling, according to% grouSTTNA, during 1943 and 1944. The attached report is listed as item i. of paragraph 10 of refer- ence a. CARETINA, ,states that he and Kriminaldirektor Karl ROEMELBURG were aware that a "sleeper" radio communication net had been established in - France for the FreLch C. After Leopold TREPPERs escape,CARETINA was constantly worried about the possibility that TREPPER, by means of a French CP radio transmitter, would establish radio contact with Moscow be- fore the German DFing companies could fix the transmitter and bring it under control. This possibility offered a continuous threat to CARETINkis "MARS" radio play-back for which SUKOLOV OKENT was the principle agent. According toQAHETINA:;- it was his idea to eliminate this threat by offer- ing the French CP a . radio network which was actually German controlled. In this way. CARETINA felt he could be certain of controlling all French CF communications, not only inside of France but to the Soviet Union and 111,a Western Allies. >■• OM co 3. The British theory, as advanced in th,ir Rote Kapelle Study Part II, CO <X /Li C") w is that both KENT and Tli1PPEN were practicing: h triplo-play, and that L.L.1 CIO re= 0, Cl, CD Waldemar OZOLS OSOLYA, one of KENTs principle agents, was also witting ••ct L.J.J of the triple-play against the Germans. The primary support for the Brit- ish theory is not contained in any of the evidence they cite in their Lt.1 La/ W Study but in events which occurred after the last information in the Study, ›.‹ 0 OD i.e. KENTs willingness to return to the Soviet Union with,CABETINA in tow. .c/ cr, CZ) It is difficult to follow KENTs reasoning in this act if he was honestly e. CP 0_, working for the Germans as a double agent during two and a half years. He 4.1 appears to have been a well trained GRU intelligence officer and to have --- knowledge of his own, the GRU, service. It is interesting to speculate Cr) c= what he thought would occur when he and his German counterintelligence con- •cr trol officer,_CARETINki appeared in Moscow. He may possibly have thought --I c., W that the (Hid was the more powerful service and ceiuld protect its principle agents against the Soviet State Security Service. He may also have thought that the information, although under Carman control, which had been sent to the Director in Moscow was sufficiently important to justify his behav- ior. We know from CARETINA that the intelligence sent over KENTS radio link was 90% factual (see reference b.). It would be hard to believe that KENT did not know that interrogation and imprisonment were in store ft-. .•;cARETINk::.in the Soviet Union and that CARETINA!s.interrogation would reveal that the Germans were convinced of KENT IS honesty toward them. 4._CARETINAas the attached and the report forwarded with reference b. indicate, is convinced that he had control of KENT and that OZOLS OSOLYA and LEGENDRE were entirely unwitting of the German control behind KENT and his networks. Some of the British evidence for a . triple-play are explain- ed by .:-_CABETINA. For example on page 62, paragraph B. 1. of the British Study Part II is the following: "An example of SUKOLOVs (OKEVTs) ambiguous behavior surviVesin his instructions to the LEGENDRE network against an Allied landing CS COPY .CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO. FORM 536 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 10.57 51 . 25. 51 .28A AND SI.29 SECR ET CONTINUED 1 :401 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. HQ COPY HQ CLASSIFICATION DISPN:CII SYNDOL AND NO. C'ONTINUAT:ON OF DISPATCH SECRET EGMAJ0219t page 2 in France. They were to supply him with detailed reports on the scale, successes, and reverses of the attack. This increased the doubts of certain members of the network who already suspected German penetration at the upper levels of their organization (The British do not reveal how they learned the doubts were in- cr(ased or who had doubts). But taking into account all the possi- bilities of thu situation these particular instructions can be construed: (a) :is a brief to the OZOLS (@SOIYA) bogus "Russian Intelli- cence" organization, producing information from which de- ception material could be selected for transmission to Moscow on the MARS play-hack (KENTs radio link to Moscow). (b) As a means of collecting intelligence directly useful to the Germans; (c) As a means of collecting intelligence directly useful to the Russians; postulating (1) that SUKOLOV had a means of concealing from the Germans his transmission of true intelligence to the Russians; (2) that he was able to ' con- ceal from the Germans intelligence that he collected from the OZOLS t organization, or to mutilate such intelligence until it was.useless or misleading to the Germans." In all of the British speculation and attempted reconstruction of motives, they overlooked the ultimate German goal (as stated by -CARETINA) which was to split the Soviet Union from her Western Allies. In pursuit of this goal the Germans were more than willing to feed the Director in Moscow factual intelligence about. the Western Allies and willing to leave intact a French CP network in the hope that the Western Allies would find radio operators . transmitting intelligence about the invasion to Moscow. We believe , that, if CARETINA is describing accurately his and his Chief l s,:MUELLER of Amt.IV, goal, much of the ambiguity which the British cite can be explained. It probably should also be remembered that the British Study was written immed- iately following World War II and the British (as did the United States) still regarded the Soviet Union as an ally. 5. As was stated in paragraph 3 of the covering dispatch of reference b., the extent of the German penetration and control of the Fi-ench CP under- ground and of the resistance was not known to us previously. ,CARETINV, should be questioned in detail, if contact with him is resumed, on many • points in the attached report. It is not clear from his report whether the Germans left witting German penetrations in the CP network when they withdrew from France , ,CAFIETINA could probably recall more factual details if he could be questioned on the basis of the British information which has not been done to.date. 6. For Headquarters action: a. We could find no record of the German traitor, fnu HELLDORF4. whose actions are described in pares. 15 and 16 of.Attach A. Tlaces would be appreciated. It would also be interesting to learn whether the British passed along the information .• from HELLDORF regarding German control of certain resistance groups and German playback of English radio agents, in France. • (continued pagt 3) CLASS! F ECAtION - PAGC NO. FORM 53c USC PREVIOUS EDITION. 7'. 1 4 10.57 I.EPLACES FORMS 51.28. SI .28A AND 51.29 " 1 CONTINUED 1401 WHICH ARC OBSOLETC. I E C 2 CLASSIFICATION DMr.fLu almui/L AND NO. CONTINUAT:ON 1 SECRET EGMA44214page 3 DISPATCH b. Traces on Paul Victor LEGENDRE and Waldemar (Vladimir) 0ZOLS are requested. The last record of OZOLS in our files comes from,CARETINAwho stated that OZOLS was in Paris as of June 1945, awaiting transport to Moscow. LEGENDRE presumably remained in France. c. We have not included the WE Division or other Headquarters components in the distribution, assuming that the SR and EE Divisions will handle the distribution. APPROVED: — Attachments: A B herewrt-h4 Dist tion: - EE w/atts A B - SR w/atts A B 2 - COS/G w/atts A B 2 - BOB w/atts A B 2 - FROB w/atts A B NIQ:cgf A& ca — t tvi MY.FILED lI ; . CLASSIFICATION t NO. FORM USE PREVIOUS EDITION. 53c REPLACES FORMS CONTINUED 10.57 51.28. 51•28A AND 51-20 F1 3 l401 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET ATTACHMENT A TO EGMA-442:14 OUR INTERNAL RADIO NET IN FRANCE DURING 1943/44 Successor of the French Communist Party Internal Net 1. The French CF had an internal radio net established in France which included seven stations. Almost all of the stations had been detect- ed when I entered on service in Faris. The supply depot of radio equip- ment which the French CP had at its command was locatnd during my tour of duty. If my memory is correct, the depot was connected with a small - elec- tric or radio shop but if necessary this could be located exactly. do not remember all the addresses because I did not know Paris and especially in the early days every trip in a car was for me a trip through an unknown labyrinth. To give a review of all the arrests and interrogations, in short a review of the Rote Kapelle in France as of August 1943, I was re- quired to write a detailed report which had attached sketches of organiza- tions, etc.