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Articles of Confederation ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION Did the Articles of Confederation provide an effective national constitution? Viewpoint: Yes. The Articles of Confederation provided an effective frame- work of government by resolving the postwar financial crisis, establishing the basic policies for westward expansion, and creating a permanent fed- eral bureaucracy to carry on the affairs of state when Congress was not in session. Viewpoint: No. The Articles of Confederation provided for a central govern- ment that was too weak to confront and resolve the postwar financial, com- mercial, and diplomatic emergencies facing the young nation. The Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1781 as the first national con- stitution of the United States, reflected American fears of consolidated authority and the potential for corruption resulting from their experiences under a strong centralized British government that regulated commerce, imposed taxes, raised a standing army in peacetime, quartered troops in pri- vate buildings, and abrogated colonial charters and jury trials. Motivated by such fears, the Framers of the Articles ignored the issue of ultimate sover- eignty—a major bone of contention in the Anglo-American dispute—and, instead, divided the major powers of government between the union and the states. They also believed—perhaps naively—that the exigencies of war and public virtue would encourage the states to abide by Congressional mea- sures. Thus, the Articles allowed each state to retain its "sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right" not expressly del- egated to the U.S. Congress. The only prerogatives entrusted to Congress included the "sole and exclusive right and power" to regulate foreign affairs, initiate war, declare peace, fix weights and measures, regulate Indian affairs, establish a post office, send and receive ambassadors, coin money, and mediate boundary disputes between the states. As extensive as these pow- ers may appear, the new U.S. Congress lacked the critical ability to raise troops, levy taxes, or even regulate trade. To fund operations during wartime, it could only lay assessments on the states, hoping they would comply. The Articles also made no provision for an executive branch or a system of courts to force obedience to national laws. Consequently, the union was little more than "a firm league of friendship" among thirteen independent states under an emasculated federal government. Although Congress lacked the ability to resolve important fiscal, political, and diplomatic problems confronting the nation, the question still remains: Could the United States have nonetheless survived under the Articles of Con- federation? Contemporaries were divided on this question. Some of the elite feared that Shays's Rebellion (1786-1787) was a portent of even greater law- lessness unless the central government was given sufficient power to impose order. Urban artisans wanted a stronger national government with the author- ity to exact tariffs to protect domestic manufacturing. Likewise, wealthy mer- chants and shipowners wanted a national government powerful enough to secure trading privileges, while land speculators and settlers desired a gov- 17 eminent capable of removing threats to westward expansion posed by Native Americans, the Span- ish, and the British. Many other Americans were content with the Confederation government. Farmers and mer- chants living in the Middle and Southern states, for instance, were enjoying either high tobacco prices or increasing food exports to Europe, thus enabling them to begin climbing out of the postwar depression and to pay off their war debts. Additionally, many small, subsistence-level farmers living in relative isolation were unconcerned with protective tariffs, trading privileges, or national politics, for that matter. This division between Americans over the circumstances of the nation during the 1780s reflects contentions among historians in assessing the viability of the Articles of Confederation. Some schol- ars point out that the Articles carried the nation through a protracted, pernicious, and successful war against a powerful nation; secured a vast territory; laid down the basic policies for an orderly west- ward expansion; and created a bureaucracy that carried on the day-to-day work of the central gov- ernment. In short, the United States during the Confederation period was a prosperous society with a populace in high spirits and a federal charter that enabled the nation to begin recovering from the dislocations of war. However, other historians have taken a more critical view of the Articles, blaming them for crip- pling Congress's ability to confront national economic, political, and diplomatic problems during the critical period of the 1780s. They highlight that Congress had difficulty getting a quorum necessary to conduct business; had no permanent source of revenue; lacked the power to resolve the national financial crisis; and failed to satisfy foreign creditors or to maintain a military force capable of defend- ing Western territories from foreign threats. In brief, these critics conclude, the federal government was a threat to the general welfare of the nation and a laughingstock in the international community. Because nationalists at the Constitutional Convention (1787) scrapped the Articles of Confeder- ation and replaced it with the present federal constitution, it will never be known for certain if the United States would have flourished under the initial charter. A counter-factual analysis of the ques- tion might be interesting, but it would probably not prove to be any more conclusive. If nothing else, though, the issue forces one to consider which groups of people were suffering the most during the 1780s and what the nationalists hoped to gain with a stronger central government. Were they moti- vated in their actions by a true concern for the public welfare or by self-interest? Moreover, were they upholding or violating the political principles of the American Revolution as expressed in the Decla- ration of Independence (1776) that a people have a right to "alter or abolish" a government when it "becomes destructive" of their "unalienable rights" to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"? The criticisms about the Articles of Confed- eration are based on a set of assumptions that in anthropological terms could be described as eth- Viewpoint: nocentric. Ethnocentrism is the evaluation of a Yes. The Articles of Confederation society or culture from the perspective of one's provided an effective framework own culture and imposing as a standard of judg- of government by resolving the ment one's own values. To describe the natives postwar financial crisis, of the New World, following European contact establishing the basic policies for (1492), for example, as "heathens" or "uncivi- westward expansion, and creating a lized" is to impose a European model upon permanent federal bureaucracy to another culture. It leads to frequent misunder- carry on the affairs of state when standings about the nature, customs, and values Congress was not in session. of the foreign society. Likewise, historians judge the Articles from the perspective of the Constitu- Many historians regard the Articles of Con- tion of 1787 and impose as a standard of judg- federation, the first federal constitution of the ment the answers to questions of constitutional United States, as materially flawed. They compare order and public policy created by the latter doc- the Articles to the Constitution of 1787 and ument. In doing so they profoundly misunder- assume as a standard of judgment the answers to stand the Articles and the alternative solutions questions of constitutional order and public pol- to governance they represent. icy created in the latter. Historians then judge the No doubt the Articles of Confederation cre- alternative answers crafted in the Articles to be ated a "weak" central government, if the standard inadequate or incorrect. In so doing they misun- of measurement is the national government cre- derstand the Articles and the political culture that ated by the Constitution of 1787. It created a con- underlay them. federation rather than a national government. A 18 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION more meaningful assessment would be a compari- lands of the king. Other states disliked the appor- son of the powers and practices of the central gov- tionment of expenses among the states on the ernment under the Articles to previous basis of the white population only. Seven states, confederations known to Americans at the time. even as they ratified the Articles, expressed a con- In "Notes on Ancient and Modern Confedera- cern that in particular ways the document created cies" (1786) James Madison described and evalu- too powerful a central government. Individual ated several confederacies, some of which state legislatures called for a diminution of the possessed in theory greater powers than those central government's power to maintain a peace- held by the central government under the Arti- time army and to pass legislation with the votes of cles. The Amphictionic Confederacy (circa six- only nine states. Some states also wanted to teenth century B.C.E.), for example, possessed full impose greater controls on the post office, while power "to propose and resolve whatever they others wanted to have the rights to conduct for- judged useful to Greece." In the Belgic Confeder- eign affairs and to allow state, rather than federal, acy (mid seventeenth century C.E.) the "States courts the power to try pirates and settle disputes General" held a power to levy both import and over land claims. In the context of eighteenth- export taxes. In both cases, however, Madison century America, the problem is not that the Arti- observed, the execution of powers was quite differ- cles lacked adequate powers but that they pos- ent from the theory. The Amphictionic Confeder- sessed too many powers. acy did not prevent war between its constituent The political power of its defenders, during parts, and the taxing authority existed in the Bel- the debate over ratification of the Constitution, gic Confederacy but was never utilized.
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