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Clough, Ralph N The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project RALPH N. CLOUGH Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: April 16, 1990 Copyright 1998 A ST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born and raised in Seattle Washington University of Washington$ Lingman University (China) Fletcher School Entered the Foreign Service in 1941 Comments on China e,perience Toronto Canada- Pro.ation Officer 1941-1940 Out.reak of WW11 Tegucigalpa Honduras- Consular2Cultural Affairs Officer 1940-1943 Coordinator for 1nter-American Affairs Nelson Rockefeller War declared Em.assy staff Ti.urcio Carias Andino Political Parties Bananas Su.marines Road building Chinese language interest 1nformation program Am.assador 6ohn 1rwin 1nterim 1943 Draft board deli.erations State Department- Pu.lic Affairs Division 1943 Comments on China and Pacific War efforts 8unming China- Political Officer 1943 Travel 1 Living conditions Politics Chungking China- 9eneral2Political Officer 1943-1946 9eneral Hurley Decline of 8uomintang (8MT) —China Service“ mem.ers 9eneral Marshall Mission Walter Ro.ertson Military equipment disposal Beijing China- Chinese language study 1946 Military atmosphere Zhou En-lai2Chiang 8ai-shek negotiations Hong 8ong Contacts Nanjing China- Chinese language study 1946-1947 Em.assy relocation Environment Walter Ro.ertson 1nstructors Communists Nanking China - AChinese B Secretary 1947-1930 Document Translation Am.assador Leighton Stuart Negotiations 1nflation Environment Communist2Nationalist conflict Wedemeyer Mission Walter 6udd Ful.right Program Aid programs Communists victory Communist Military 9overnment Relations with communist government British recogniDe PeopleEs Repu.lic of China Beijing made Capital Treatment of Em.assy China2Soviet Union relationship Family Hong 8ong- Chief of Political Section 1930-1934 0 8orean War Communist China threat Dependents evacuation China in 8orean War Mao Zedong 1ntelligence on China Political reporting 6oe Alsop US2China relations Taiwan National War College 1934-1933 State Department- Deputy2Director Director of Chinese Affairs 1933-1938 Defense Treaty with Repu.lic of China Formosa Resolution Communists attack islands Huemoy and Matsu Am.assador Ale, 6ohnson 9eneva Talks Ed Martin Bern SwitDerland- Deputy Chief of Mission and Advisor 1938-1939 US2China 9eneva talks Release of US civilians Chiang 8ai-shek Taiwan Secretary Dulles Wong Ping-non Am.assador 6ake Beam Negotiating atmosphere US2China Warsaw talks (1938) I Advisor 1938-1939 Huemoy Taiwan Strait Negotiating atmosphere —9reat Leap Forward“ —Bugging“ conference site Sino-Soviet relations Cease-Fire proposals Breaking the —.lockade“ London England- Political Officer Conservative Party and 1939-1961 US2China talks in Warsaw Warsaw talks 3 Law of the Sea Conference 9eneva Hong 8ong and 1ndia Taipei Deputy Chief of Mission 1961-1963 Outer Mongolia and UN Mauritania and UN Am.assador Drumwright Taiwan-China Averill Harriman President 8ennedy and China Chiang 8ai-shek China policy Cultural Revolution Soviet forces build-up Soviet-China split Roger Hillsman speech (1963) President 8ennedy death Vietnam War Dean Rusk China-Vietnam relationship US Military in Taiwan 8issinger visit to China (1971) Taiwan-African relations Harvard University- Diplomat in Residence$ Associate of the 1963-1966 Far East Asian Research Center State Department- Policy Planning Council$ Far East Specialist 1966-1969 British withdrawal east of SueD Singapore Personnel Domino theory Vietnam Retirement 1969 Author book on US Policy toward East Asia Comments on China US policy Chinese in US Tiananmen Square Democracy Economic reforms Cultural Revolution Hong 8ong influence Taiwan 4 INTERVIEW ": Mr. Clough, I wonder if you could give me a little about your early bac(ground. )here did you come from* CLOU9H- Well 1 grew up in Seattle born and went to school there. 9raduated from the University of Washington 1939. But 1 had a .rush with China during my college years that really directed my future. When 1 was a freshman at the University of Washington 1 applied for and received an award for an e,change scholarship at Lingnan University in 9uangDhou (Canton) China. 1 hadnLt particularly been interested in China before that 1 had been studying Spanish. 1 had four years of Spanish in high school. 1 was majoring in foreign trade at the university and hoped to get into business with Latin America. But suddenly came this offer to go a.road and 1 was interested in traveling. 1t happened to be China$ it could have been Argentina or 9ermany or whatever. So 1 went off to China. And after a year as a student at Lingnan University 1 was hooked. 1 started studying the Chinese language. 1 came back and took second-year Chinese at the University of Washington and finished up with a major in economics and business and a minor in East Asian Studies. 1 went on for the Masters at the Fletcher School in order to prepare myself for the Foreign Service e,amination to fill in some of the gaps that 1 hadnLt had in my undergraduate work. Took the Foreign Service e,am in the fall of 1940 and the oral e,am in early L41 and was appointed to the Foreign Service in April of L41. 1 was assigned to Toronto as a pro.ationary post which we had in those days. ": I wonder, could you tal( a little about what you saw, because going to China... In the first place, wasn't your family a little bit nervous about going to China, because the China incident was in full swing, wasn't it at the time* CLOU9H- No it wasnLt in full swing. Actually the Lukouchiao incident that set off the full-scale war between 6apan and China was in 6uly of L37. 1 went out in Septem.er of L36. There was war intermittent battling in North China but it was mostly a kind of encroachment process of negotiation intimidation and so on as the 6apanese encroached from Manchuria into North China and finally set off the full-scale war by that attack on Lukouchiao in 6uly of L37. But 1 went in L36 and at that time the Province of 9uangDhou had been governed by a warlord Chung Titong. 6ust before 1 arrived in Canton or 9uangDhou as itLs known now the central government succeeded in prevailing over the local warlord. They sent him on a world tour and took over the province. At that time 9uangDhou Province still had its own currency which was at a different rate with the US dollar from the national currency (it was 3 five-to-one rather than three-to-one) and the process of bringing 9uangDhou into the national system was underway. ": ,bviously, you were a young lad at the time, but what was your impression of the Kuomintang government* CLOU9H- 1n that year the 8uomintang government was very popular among the students. Although it was felt that it was moving too slowly to resist the 6apanese there was a lot of patriotic pressure. They started an ROTC program on the campus that year. 1t created some pro.lems because the officers spoke Mandarin and the local students mostly spoke Cantonese--they couldnLt understand each other. But there was tremendous pressure on the government to stand up to the 6apanese resist encroachment. 1n Decem.er 1936 when Chiang 8ai-shek was kidnapped at Sian .y the Communists in an effort to pressure him into a united front against the 6apanese the first reaction on the campus was gloom. People had regarded Chiang 8ai-shek as the .est sym.ol of resistance against 6apan the best leader against the 6apanese. Now he was captured$ no one knew what was going to happen to him. 1t was a very sad few weeks while he was held by the Communists and by some of his own troops from Manchuria who were involved also in the sequestering. 1n any case the result was they worked out a deal for cooperation .etween the 8MT and the Communists against the 6apanese. Chiang was released sent back to Nanjing along with Chang Hsueh-liang the nationalist general who had colla.orated with the Communists in holding him. There was rejoicing in 9uangDhou. 1t was around Christmastime when the news came of his release and there were firecrackers going off all over the city and great joy that Chiang 8ai-shek had .een released and that a united front of resistance against the 6apanese was developing. ": id you have any feel for incipient Communist movement in the students at the time* CLOU9H- No not at that time. The 8uomintang was the sym.ol of nationalism. The Communists were far off in the northwest. There was no significant underground Communist movement. ": The enemy was warlordism. CLOU9H- No the enemy were the 6apanese. As far as the national government was concerned the warlords were a pro.lem .ecause they still hadnLt gotten control of the west and the southwest. Even in the south even 9uang,i Province ne,t to 9uangDhou was governed by a couple of warlords with whom the 8MT had to make deals. 1n resisting the 6apanese the 8MT had to make deals with the various warlords in order to get the use of their forces against the 6apanese. And thatLs one of the things that over the long run weakened the 8MT. 6 ": Then we move bac( to your Foreign Service time. .ou were in Toronto from '41 to '40. )hat were you doing there most of the time* CLOU9H- Oh 1 was doing the usual things. Mou know it was so-called pro.ationary period. The system at that time was that you reported for one year usually at a near.y post so it wouldnLt cost much to send you there. ": )hy didn't they send you to 1ancouver* CLOU9H- Well that would have .een a little too... No 1 was envious of a few friends who got sent to places in Western Europe.
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