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Tunisia's Presidential Elections

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Tunisia's Presidential Elections DISCUSSION PAPER Tunisia’s Presidential Elections: A Reflection of Popular Discontent? Elif Zaim DISCUSSION PAPER Tunisia’s Presidential Elections: A Reflection of Popular Discontent? Elif Zaim © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY ELIF ZAIM PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE JANUARY 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 2 Tunusia’s Presidential Elections: A Reflection of Popular Discontent? Introduction n Sunday 13th of October, defense minister (Abdelkarim Zbidi). Moreover, Tunisians headed to the for the first time, the ‘Muslim democrat’1 - En- polls for a presidential run- nahda Party put forward its nominee rather off to choose between two than rallying support behind a non-affiliated extraordinary contenders- candidate as it did in the first presidential elec- O law professor Kais Saied tion of the post-Ben Ali era in 2014. Predictably, and media magnate Nabil Karoui. In an open within this crowded field of competitors, the competition in which no one knew who the votes were divided. While no one succeeded in winner would be, a rarity in the region, Saied securing more than 20 per cent of the votes, the became the country’s next President with a candidates who received the highest percent- landslide victory by garnering more than 70 per age were not from the establishment elite but cent of the vote according to the official results were political outsiders. In fact, the results were (Aljazeera, 2019). While the voter turnout was a manifestation of the disappointment among only around 55 per cent (BBC, 2019), it was still Tunisian voters with the existing political actors higher than both the first round of the presiden- and their failed promises. tial election and the parliamentary election de- spite the debates on the possibility of election This paper examines the reasons behind this fatigue as the runoff was the third vote within protest vote that carried Saied to the presiden- the scope of five weeks. Looking at Saied’s strik- cy. Firstly, it discusses the failures of consensus ing victory in numbers, the strong support of politics between the country’s leading political the citizens also resulted in him surpassing the parties, namely Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda. It total amount of votes won by the entire parlia- then proceeds to examine two vital causes be- ment combined. hind this disillusionment being the deteriorat- ing economic situation and rampant corruption Notwithstanding the prevailing popularity that have not been tackled efficiently by any of of both Karoui and Saied, the outcome of the the governments since the revolution. Finally, it election still came as a surprise to many, since analyses the appeal of both Saied and Karoui as the first round of the presidential race was sig- populist anti-establishment candidates and the nificantly competitive. Not only were there 24 ways in which they managed to capitalize on candidates running for the post (two of them the growing discontent among Tunisians. Thus, withdrew a day before the election) but among while it argues that all of these interconnect- them were many political heavyweights includ- ed factors have led to the alienation of citizens ing some former prime ministers (Hammadi from the existing class of politicians, they also Jabali and Mehdi Jomaa), a former president resulted in a quest for alternatives which even- (Moncef Marzouki) in addition to the incum- tuated in people choosing Saied as their new bent Prime Minister (Youssef Chahed) and the president. 1 During the tenth congress of the party in May 2015, Ennahda declared the separation of politics and religious preaching (dawa’) and rebranded itself as a ‘Muslim democratic’ party. 3 Tunusia’s Presidential Elections: A Reflection of Popular Discontent? 2014 Election: Unexpected Alliances On October 2014, Tunisia held its second parliamenta- In December same year following the parliamentary ry election following the revolution. The main secular election, the country held the second round of its first party, Nidaa Tounes, emerged victorious securing 86 post-revolutionary Presidential election. The result out of 217 seats in the legislature (Carnegie Endow- was another victory for Nidaa Tounes as the leader of ment, 2017). The Ennahda Party which was the biggest the party Beji Caid Essebsi won the election in a run-off coalition partner in the government that was formed ballot by claiming over 55 per cent of the votes against following the first post-revolution election, fell into the his competitor, Moncef Marzouki, who served as an in- second place by winning 69 seats (Ibid). terim President after the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (BBC, 2014). The election took place amid a political crisis that be- gan with the assassination of two leading leftist politi- Being the largest party in the parliament, Nidaa cians Chokri Belaid in February and Mohamed Brahmi Tounes was tasked with forming the government. Af- in July in 2013. Simultaneously, the military coup which ter the first cabinet proposal by the newly appointed took place in Egypt also contributed to the already ex- Prime Minister Habib Essid was denounced by other isting tensions and polarisation between the two ideo- parties in the parliament as being ‘non-representative’, logical camps. The secularist opposition groups led by Essid announced a grand coalition government that Nidaa had already been denouncing the government included Ennahda on February 2015 (Marks, 2015). as being illegitimate due to the coalition’s lack of pro- gress in enacting a new constitution and scheduling While this breakthrough coalition between the two of the upcoming elections (Marks, 2015, p.8). The op- leading rivals was praised internationally, it led to dis- position also held Ennahda as ultimately responsible satisfactions domestically, especially among the re- for the death of the politicians (Wolf, 2014a, p.3). After spective voter bases. Secularists have long been con- months of anti-government protests following the as- cerned about the possibility of Ennahda’s employment sassinations, eventually Ennahda was forced to step of democratic mechanisms for the sake of imposing down handing power to a technocratic government their own vision on the rest of the country (Cavatorta, on the lead to the upcoming elections. 2018, p.244). For them, the issue at stake was the pro- tection of their individual rights and freedoms from The 2014 parliamentary election was seen as a referen- any religious restrictions (Zemni, 2015, p.13). These dum on Ennahda’s political performance (The Guard- concerns were particularly evident during the consti- ian, 2014). In this regard, the winning party, Nidaa tution drafting process with regards to three conten- Tounes, not only united secularists in a bid to counter tious issues being the possibility of inclusion of Sharia, Islamists (Marks, 2014) but also capitalized on both the definition of the status of women, and blasphemy the economic stagnation and the political turmoil to (Marks, 2014, p.20). Despite the fears, Ennahda com- garner votes through creating a perception that they plied with the consensus in each one of the topics and would be the key player making sure that the transition the new constitution was adopted in 2014 ahead of the process was kept on track (Wolf, 2014b, 2). That being elections that was held in the same year. However, for said, although Ennahda came second in the election, Nidaa Tounes, being a party that was founded on the despite all the chaos and frustration, the result was an premise of countering Islamists, becoming coalition indicator that the party had been able to establish it- partners with Ennahda risked alienation of its voters self as a major force in the political arena (Ibid.). (Wolf, 2014b, p.5). On the other hand, Ennahda’s sup- 4 Tunusia’s Presidential Elections: A Reflection of Popular Discontent? porters viewed Nidaa as being the descendants of the between the political partners, but rather a reflection old regime which committed a series of human rights of the internal rifts within Nidaa Tounes. Ever since violations such as torture against the political opposi- the accession of Essebsi to the Presidency the party tion in the country including themselves (Ibid.). There- has been plagued with a leadership struggle and the by, Ennahda’s alignment with Nidaa was seen as an President has been accused of trying to make way for act of disloyalty to both party’s past and the revolution his son, Hafedh Essebsi, to replace him (Williamson, (Ajmi, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the concerns, the 2016). Thus, when Ennahda party decided to back alliance was justified by the party leaders Essebsi and Chahed’s bid to keep his post amid the political battle Rached Ghannouchi as a necessary step to avert po- with Hafedh Essebsi, the President declared that he larization and to constitute political stability and unity had ended his alliance with Ghannouchi (The Econo- to tackle mounting challenges with regards to econo- mist, 2018). my and security (Grewal and Hamid, 2018). While this grand consensus was celebrated as an im- The inclusive coalition government broadened fur- portant step in the country’s democratic transition, in ther into a more all-encompassing alliance under the reality, it turned out to be problematic on a number Carthage Agreement resulting in a national unity gov- of fronts. First of all, as almost 80 percent of the par- ernment in July 2016.
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