The Q Crisis

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The Q Crisis VENEZUELA THE Q CRISIS ©Alessandro Gandolfi Caracas (Venezuela), a favela of the capital High inflation, continuos blackouts, hospitals without medications, endless queues out of supermarkets and the capital, Caracas, declared the “most dangerous town in the world”. Venezuela is living one of its worst moments: corruption, devastating policies and the oil price drop put the whole country on its knees. The government has been forced to control the prices of necessary goods, and most people stay in perennial queues out of almost empty supermarkets. Queues are ruled by your ID: if the number ends with “1”, or “2”, you can be queueing on Mondays, if with “3” or “4” on Tuesdays, and so on. Queues are needed for everything: water, sugar, salt, eggs, olive oil, milk, coffee, pasta, rice, flour, and quite often people are queuing from morning to night. It also happens that after many hours in line what you need is no more available, probably bought by a bachaquero (little ant), as here those operating in the black market are called. Half a kilogram of soap may pass from 36 bolivars to 400, a kilogram of flour from 19 bolivars to 300. This way, for some, crisis become business. Caracas (Venezuela), the equivalent of 70 USD at the black market exchange. During March 2016, in Venezuela inflation reached quite high levels: it now takes 1,000 Bolivars to make a US dollar Caracas (Venezuela), a woman living in the favela of Santa Cruz arguing with Henrique Capriles Radonski, the opposition candidate at the presidential elections in 2013 Caracas (Venezuela), heart of palm boxes filling lots of shelves in supermarkets: a way to hide the lack of products Caracas (Venezuela), during a visit at the favelas of Santa Cruz del Este, some journalists interview Henrique Capriles Radonski, the opposition candidate at the presidential elections in 2013 and now serving as Governor of Miranda state Caracas (Venezuela), an elderly woman at the supermarket. With the economical crisis, at the beginning of 2016 the lack of products started to be severe, and the government imposed controlled prices Caracas (Venezuela), kids playing football among the buildings of Santa Eduvigis district Caracas (Venezuela), people in a queue out of a supermarket where, as the government decided, necessary goods are sold at controlled prices Caracas (Venezuela), young people attending a concert in a park of the city Caracas (Venezuela), a glimpse of the favela of Santa Cruz del Este Caracas (Venezuela), salt packs filling lots of shelves in supermarkets: a way to hide the lack of products Caracas (Venezuela), people queueing at an ATM to get some cash. Because of the economical crisis, the amount of money that can be withdrawn is limited Caracas (Venezuela), young musicians playing out of a music school in the favela of Santa Cruz del Este Caracas (Venezuela), people living in the favela of Santa Cruz del Este attending a speech of Henrique Capriles Radonski, the opposition candidate at the presidential elections in 2013 and now serving as Governor of Miranda state Caracas (Venezuela), favelas and residential buildings are quite close Caracas (Venezuela), because of the economical crisis, supermarkets and malls are often closed Caracas (Venezuela), people queueing at an ATM to get some cash. Because of the economical crisis, the amount of money that can be withdrawn is limited Caracas (Venezuela), maizena boxes filling lots of shelves in supermarkets: a way to hide the lack of products Caracas (Venezuela), people in a queue out of a supermarket where, as the government decided, necessary goods are sold at controlled prices Caracas (Venezuela), an man at the supermarket. With the economical crisis, at the beginning of 2016 the lack of products started to be severe, and the government imposed controlled prices Caracas (Venezuela), a Virgin Mary statue in the gatehouse of a building Caracas (Venezuela), people in a queue out of a supermarket where, as the government decided, necessary goods are sold at controlled prices. Caracas (Venezuela), windows of a council building in the suburb of the town PARALLELOZERO, VIA DONATELLO 19/A MILAN - [email protected] - WWW.PARALLELOZERO.COM - +39 02 89281630.
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