CTC-SENTINEL-102020.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
July Luncheon
HAPPY BIRTHDAY USA July 1, 2011 Volume 4, Issue 7 JULY BIRTHDAYS JULY LUNCHEON Anne Capizzi 2nd Gloria McCarthy 2nd JULY 26, 2011 Molly Black 5th Jan Giroir 9th Mark Amodei Michele Turner 9th Sharon Keahl 11th Republican Candidate CD2 Lynn Pendleton 11th Carol Shubert 22nd Mary Ann Keahl 23rd Is Mark Amodei the man to reveal Nevada’s true Dolores Harris 25th color? The “Hot Air Express” asked this question and Beverly Ellopulous 30th we answer a resounding YES! After completing 12 If you have a birthday in July and don’t see your name on this years in the Nevada State Senate, Mark Amodei list, it’s because I don’t know the date of your birthday. Send (pronounced AM-UH-DAY) was drafted by the Republi- me an e-mail so I can complete my records. can Party to be the State Chairman. A few months [email protected] later, when Dean Heller stepped up to the US Senate, INSIDE THIS ISSUE his Party again called on him to be their standard bearer in the special election to fill the Congressional PAGE CALENDAR 2 District 2 seat vacated by Heller. Appalled by the NFRW CONVENTION 3 things that have happened these past three years NvFRW CONVENTION 3 (government takeover of private businesses, govern- COMMITTEES 4 ment debt spiraling out of control, government take- VIRGINIA FINNEGAN COLUMN 4 over of the Health Industry) he says, “In my mind, it’s NEW MEMBERS 4 worth fighting for—to get us off this track…..that is RON REAGAN TRIP 5 anti-private sector, anti-capitalism and anti-fiscal re- WOMEN WARRIORS 6 sponsibility.” He is the right man to turn Nevada back WE THE PEOPLE PROJECT 7 from blue to red. -
Septemberluncheon
September 1, 2011 Volume 4, Issue 9 SEPT. BIRTHDAYS SEPTEMBERLUNCHEON Diane Cox 1st Joyce Bowdle 2nd SEPTEMBER 27, 2011 Nancy Combs 8th Jan Carney 11th Commander Kirk Lippold, Connie Carll 15th Mary Jane Hillery 15th Paulette Glass 18th Mary Walters 21st Commander Lippold was the commanding officer of the USS Susan Grossman 26th Cole when it was attacked by al Qaeda suicide bombers in Yemen in Marilyn Olson 26th October of 2000. He and his crew distinguished themselves in the af- Linda Buckardt 27th termath of that attack by saving the ship, which remains in service Beverly Lynch 28th today. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he grew up in Carson City, Nevada and returned If you have a birthday in Septem- there after his retirement from the Navy after ber and don’t see your name on this list, it’s because I don’t know 26 years of distinguished service. the date of your birthday. Send During his naval career, he participated in the me an e-mail so I can complete my records. [email protected] seizure of the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijack- ers, the Black Sea Freedom of Navigation operations against the Soviet Union and combat operations in the INSIDE THIS ISSUE Gulf of Sidra following the Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks in Europe. He was PAGE also deployed to Beirut, Lebanon when terror- ists attacked the U.S. Embassy there. Com- CALENDAR 2 mander Lippold also played an instrumental REPUBLICAN CLUB role in crafting detainee policy for suspected UPDATE 3 terrorists during the initial stages of the War on VOLUNTEERS WANTED Terrorism following the 9/11 attacks. -
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Order Code RL31339 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Updated March 29, 2006 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, as well as growing sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting casualties and costs — and growing sectarian conflict — have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term National Assembly, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. -
Kata'ib Sayyid Al Shuhada
Kata’ib Sayyid al Shuhada Name: Kata’ib Sayyid al Shuhada Type of Organization: Militia political party religious social services provider terrorist transnational violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Iranian-sponsored Shiite Jihadist Khomeinist Place of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: 2013 Founder(s): Abu Mustafa al Sheibani Places of Operation: Iraq, Syria Overview Also Known As Kata’ib Abu Fadl al-Abbas1 Kata’ib Karbala2 Battalion of the Sayyid’s Martyrs3 Executive Summary Kata’ib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) is an Iraqi militia that has fought in both Iraq and Syria and is closely connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Houthis.4 Its leader is Abu Mustafa al Sheibani, a U.S.-designated terrorist who also assisted in forming the IRGC-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) militias.5 The group was founded in 2013. Its first public announcements were three martyrdom notices for members killed fighting in southern Damascus alongside Syrian regime forces.6 In Syria, KSS operates within the fold of the mixed Syrian and Iraqi Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, another Iranian- backed militia.7 KSS follows the same Shiite jihadist ideology as fellow pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, framing its fight in Syria as a defense of Shiites and the Shiite shrine of Sayyida Zaynab.8 In a 2013 interview, KSS’s information office stated that the group sent 500 militants to Syria.9 Other media Kata’ib Sayyid al Shuhada statements have affirmed the presence of KSS fighters in rural Damascus along the frontlines in eastern Ghouta.10 The Associated Press has reported that KSS fighters enter Syria via Iran.11 In 2015, KSS declared Saudi Arabia “a legitimate and permissible target” after that country executed a prominent Shiite cleric.12 A 2018 KSS statement indicated the group was ready to send fighters to Yemen. -
Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy. -
From Battlefield to Ballot Box: Contextualising the Rise and Evolution of Iraq’S Popular Mobilisation Units
From Battlefield to Ballot Box: Contextualising the Rise and Evolution of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units By Inna Rudolf CONTACT DETAILS For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact: ICSR King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS United Kingdom T. +44 20 7848 2098 E. [email protected] Twitter: @icsr_centre Like all other ICSR publications, this report can be downloaded free of charge from the ICSR website at www.icsr.info. © ICSR 2018 From Battlefield to Ballot Box: Contextualising the Rise and Evolution of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units Contents List of Key Terms and Actors 2 Executive Summary 5 Introduction 9 Chapter 1 – The Birth and Institutionalisation of the PMU 11 Chapter 2 – Organisational Structure and Leading Formations of Key PMU Affiliates 15 The Usual Suspects 17 Badr and its Multi-vector Policy 17 The Taming of the “Special Groups” 18 Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq – Righteousness with Benefits? 18 Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Iranian Connection 19 Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada – Seeking Martyrdom in Syria? 20 Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba – a Hezbollah Wannabe? 21 Saraya al-Khorasani – Tehran’s Satellite in Iraq? 22 Kata’ib Tayyar al-Risali – Iraqi Loyalists with Sadrist Roots 23 Saraya al-Salam – How Rebellious are the Peace Brigades? 24 Hashd al-Marji‘i – the ‘Holy’ Mobilisation 24 Chapter 3 – Election Manoeuvring 27 Betting on the Hashd 29 Chapter 4 – Conclusion 33 1 From Battlefield to Ballot Box: Contextualising the Rise and Evolution of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units List of Key Terms and Actors AAH: -
Iraq: Politics and Governance
Iraq: Politics and Governance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs March 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21968 Iraq: Politics and Governance Summary Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite- dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State. U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater inter- communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad. -
Shiite Foreign Militias in Syria
Shiite Foreign Militias in Syria Iran's role in the Syrian conflict and the ISIS fight By Aaron Hesse- Research Fellow August 2015 Introduction: This paper seeks to identify and elucidate the role that Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters play in Syria and to compare how often they target the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the Syrian opposition. Shiite foreign fighters inside Syria present a major problem for the Syrian opposition forces due to their generally superior morale and fighting abilities. They also pose a long-term threat to American and Western interests due to their role in expanding the Syrian conflict and increasing its sectarian content. Many of these militias arose in Syria for the stated purpose of protecting Shiite religious shrines.i When ISIS burst onto the scene in summer 2014, the goal of fighting ISIS brutality was added on as a second ostensible purpose of the militias. However, contrary to the prevailing narrative that is based mainly on Iraq, the Iran-backed Shiite militias have been of extremely limited value in the ISIS fight in Syria. This paper will attempt to show that these groups work and perform military duties on behalf of the government of Bashar al-Assad and their benefactors in Iran almost exclusively to target the Syrian rebels. The Iran-backed militias have no real interest in fighting ISIS in Syria. This makes Assad, as well as Iran, unreliable partners in the fight to destroy ISIS. Metrics: This paper will focus on the outsized role that Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters are playing in Syria. -
Badr Organization
Badr Organization Name: Badr Organization Type of Organization: Militia political party religious social services provider terrorist transnational violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Iranian-sponsored Islamist jihadist Khomeinist Shiite Place of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: 1983 Founder(s): Iraqi Shiites loyal to the al-Hakim Shiite clerical dynasty, with the help of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Places of Operation: Iraq, Syria Overview Also Known As: Badr Brigade1 Badr Brigades2 Badr Corps3 Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development4 Badr Organisation in Iraq5 Martyr Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr Forces6 Martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr Forces7 Munathamat Badr8 Quwet Shahid Baqir Sadr (BOQSBS)9 Executive Summary: The Badr Organization is a Shiite political party and paramilitary force that acts as “Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq,” according to Reuters.10 Reuters notes that the group’s military wing is considered “perhaps the single most powerful Shi’ite paramilitary group” fighting in Iraq.11 One Iraqi, in 2015, official described the Badr Organization as “easily” the most powerful force in Iraq, stronger even than Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.12 Given the group’s deep ties to Iran and its political and military preeminence, analysts have compared the Badr Badr Organization Organization in Iraq to Hezbollah in Lebanon.13 The militia stands accused of gross human rights violations by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.14 Formed in 1983 under the name “the Badr Brigades,” the group originally served as the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iraqi Shiite political party aimed at bringing Iran’s Islamic Revolution to Iraq. -
USS Elrod Encounters Suspected Drug Smugglers in Mediterranean
® Serving the Hampton Roads Navy Family Vol. 18, No. 22, Norfolk, VA FLAGSHIPNEWS.COM June 3, 2010 Gates addresses troops on A seven man visit, board, search and seizure team ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ repeal from USS Elrod (FFG 55) conducts a consensual BY JIM been in effect since 1994. boarding on a ridged hull GARAMONE “Key to successful repeal will infl atable boat to verify American the vessel’s registration be the ongoing Defense Depart- Forces Press ment review, and as such, I am and country of origin, May Service 25. Elrod encountered grateful that the amendments the three suspected WASH- … will ensure that the Depart- drug smugglers off the INGTON ment of Defense can complete coast of Morocco in — Defense that comprehensive review international waters in the Secretary that will allow our military and Western Mediterranean Defense Secretary Robert M. Robert M. Gates their families the opportunity Sea while conducting Gates told to inform and shape the imple- routine operations in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of troops worldwide, May 28, that mentation process,” he said in a operations. any repeal of the so-called “Don’t written statement released by the Ask, Don’t Tell” law will be de- White House May 27. U.S. Navy photo layed until the ongoing Defense Obama said being the com- Department high-level review is mander in chief is his greatest USS Elrod encounters suspected completed and only after he, the honor. “This legislation will help president and the chairman of the make our armed forces even Joint Chiefs of Staff all can certi- stronger and more inclusive by drug smugglers in Mediterranean fy that the department is ready to allowing gay and lesbian soldiers PRESS RELEASE make the change without hurting to serve honestly and with integ- Commander, U.S. -
Iran-Backed Shiite Militias in Iraq
Behnam Ben Taleblu September 26, 2018 Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for inviting me to testify. It is a privilege to present my analysis alongside Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Mr. Michael Pregent, and Ambassador Barbara Leaf, all of whose work on Iraq and Iran, as well as their service to our country, I respect and admire. Today, I will focus my comments on Iran’s proxy strategy and militias while highlighting measures to counter these forces in Iraq. Designating Iran’s armed agents of influence can serve as a predicate for a new Iraq policy beyond the anti-Islamic State mission. It can also help implement the regional component of a more comprehensive Iran policy, which the current U.S. administration called for almost one year ago.1 Broader Iranian Motivations and Strategy Properly orienting the present discussion about Iranian militias in Iraq begins not in Baghdad but in Tehran. The radical Khomeinist interpretation of Shiite Islam underpinning the 1979 Islamic Revolution was something Iranian revolutionaries intended for export. Despite emphasis on the prioritization of “regime survival”2 in assessments of Iranian strategy, the regime’s ideology and desire to export the revolution remain important drivers of Iranian foreign and security policy. Indeed, surveying the chaos in the Middle East in 2015, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds-Force (IRGC-QF), Qassem Soleimni, boasted, “We are witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. -
Tuesday December 5 4:50 PM ET Persian Gulf Security Increased by ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer WASHINGTON
Tuesday December 5 4:50 PM ET Persian Gulf Security Increased By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer WASHINGTON (AP) - Defense Secretary William Cohen has authorized military commanders to send dozens of additional U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf to strengthen port security, Pentagon (news - web sites) officials said Tuesday. The move is part of a Pentagon effort to improve the protection of American ships and other military forces in the region in the aftermath of the Oct. 12 terrorist bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The Navy, meanwhile, said the heavily damaged Cole is due to arrive back in the United States next week. The Cole, which lost 17 sailors in the suicide bombing, has been in transit from the Middle East since early November aboard a Norwegian-owned heavy lift ship. It will be off-loaded at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Miss., for repairs that are expected to take one year and cost roughly $240 million. A small boat maneuvered close to the Cole while it was refueling in Aden harbor and detonated a bomb that blew a hole in the ship's hull 40 feet wide and 40 feet high. Yemeni and American law enforcement authorities are still investigating the attack, for which no credible claim of responsibility has been made. The day the Cole was attacked, U.S. Navy commanders in the Middle East ordered all ships out of port and they have not returned since. Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. Craig Quigley said Tuesday ``there is a great desire'' to ease the security restrictions ``to have a more comfortable and relaxed standard of living, if you will, for our sailors and marines in that area, and yet the first priority has to be force protection.'' To strengthen port security in the Gulf, Cohen authorized the deployment of extra Navy and Coast Guard security personnel, Quigley said.