OBJECTIVE ·· RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULYOCTOBER 2020 2018 · ·VOLUME VOLUME 13, 11, ISSUE ISSUE 10 6 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE TheThe Future Jihadi of Threat Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iran's LTC(R)Drew Bryan Endy Price to Indonesia Other Proxies in Iraq Associate Former Chair, Director, Bioengineering, KirstenMichael E. Knights Schulze CombatingStanford Terrorism University Center FEATURE ARTICLE Editor in Chief 1 Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iran's Other Proxies in Iraq Paul Cruickshank Michael Knights Managing Editor INTERVIEW Kristina Hummel 23 A View from the CT Foxhole: Drew Endy, Associate Chair, Bioengineering, EDITORIAL BOARD Stanford University Stephen Hummel, Paul Cruickshank, and Don Rassler Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Department Head ANALYSIS Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 35 Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique Grows in Sophistication and Reach Brian Dodwell Tim Lister Director, CTC 46 Twenty Years after the USS Cole Attack: The Search for Justice Pete Erickson, Seth Loertscher, David C. Lane, and Paul Erickson Don Rassler Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights assesses the future of Ka- CONTACT ta’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Iran’s other proxies in Iraq. He notes that in the Combating Terrorism Center wake of the death of KH’s founder and leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a U.S. airstrike on January 3, 2020, “KH is still the engine room of anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq but it is less U.S. Military Academy politically agile and operates in a more hostile counterterrorism environment where deniability and 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall secrecy have become more important again.” He assesses that the “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard West Point, NY 10996 Corps Quds Force is also leaning on a more diversified model in Iraq, drawing on non-KH factions like Saraya al-Jihad and Saraya al-Ashura, and engaging more directly with Iraq’s minorities, includ- Phone: (845) 938-8495 ing Sunni communities and the Shi`a Kurdish Faylis and Turkmen. History may be repeating itself Email: [email protected] as Iran develops new smaller and more secure Iraqi cells that are reminiscent of the formation of Kata’ib Hezbollah itself.” Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Our interview is with Drew Endy, Associate Chair, Bioengineering, Stanford University, who has served on the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. He argues the United States urgently needs a bio strategy to take advantage of rapid advances in biotechnology, protect against SUBMISSIONS the growing danger posed by its potential malevolent use, and prevent the United States from per- The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. manently falling behind as a biopower. “First, we need to demonstrate operational mastery of cells by Contact us at [email protected]. learning to build them. Second and third, we need to build and secure the bio net. And we have to do this now, within the decade, so that we can translate these advances as infrastructure undergirding a uniquely American bio economy that projects power while advancing life, liberty, pursuit of happi- The views expressed in this report are ness. If we do this, then we have a chance of taking infectious disease off the table. If we don’t develop those of the authors and not of the U.S. and implement a coherent bio strategy, it’s game over, not to be dramatic.” In early August 2020, fighters loyal to the Islamic State captured the town and port of Mocimboa Military Academy, the Department of the da Praia in Mozambique’s northernmost province of Cabo Delgado. They have yet to be dislodged Army, or any other agency of the U.S. from the town. Tim Lister examines a jihadi insurgency in Mozambique that has grown in sophisti- Government. cation and reach. This month marks 20 years since al-Qa`ida’s attack on the USS Cole, which killed 17 American sailors. Lieutenant Colonel Pete Erickson, Seth Loertscher, First Lieutenant David C. Lane, and Cap- Cover: Supporters of Iraqi Hezbollah tain Paul Erickson assess the search for justice. brigades march in military uniforms during Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief a Quds Day march in Baghdad, Iraq, on June 23, 2017. (Hadi Mizban/AP Photo) OCTOBER 2020 CTC SENTINEL 1 Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq By Michael Knights to close the embassy and retaliate against tens of militia targets in Kata’ib Hezbollah was Iran’s most favored militant group Iraq, of which a significant proportion would likely be KH leaders in Iraq from its formation in the mid-2000s until the death and sites. On October 10, 2020, general spokesman of KH Mu- of its founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on January 3, 2020. hammed Mohyee announced a “conditional truce” with U.S. forces Yet, the activities and influence of al-Muhandis and KH in Iraq in an effort to reduce political pressure on the movement were not synonymous, as has been shown since his death. to cease its attacks, which Mohyee admitted had been brought to a 2 KH is still the engine room of anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq, head by the U.S. threat. Two days later, a senior KH leader Abu Ali al-Askari encouraged but it is less politically agile and operates in a more hos- Iraqi militias to continue reconnaissance and preparations to strike tile counterterrorism environment where deniability and American targets in Iraq and “Ziono-American” aircraft over Iraq if secrecy have become more important again. The Islamic the United States does not withdraw from the country.3 The untidy Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is also leaning stream of messages originating from different centers within KH on a more diversified model in Iraq, drawing on non-KH these days is one indication that the group is becoming less cohesive factions like Saraya al-Jihad and Saraya al-Ashura, and and more erratic. engaging more directly with Iraq’s minorities, including At this point, it is especially valuable to look closer at KH, sepa- Sunni communities and the Shi`a Kurdish Faylis and rating myth from reality to the greatest extent possible in the case Turkmen. History may be repeating itself as Iran develops of such a secretive organization. In August 2019, this author con- new smaller and more secure Iraqi cells that are reminis- cluded that “the central nervous system of IRGC-QF influence in cent of the formation of Kata’ib Hezbollah itself. Iraq is Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Kata’ib Hezbollah,” suggesting a synonymous capability, which arguably oversimplified the rela- tionship.4 Now, nearly a year after al-Muhandis’s death, there has ata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is at the forefront of U.S. threat been an opportunity to observe KH operating without the bene- assessments due to an increasing drumbeat of militia fit of al-Muhandis’s political top-cover. In the author’s experience, attacks on U.S. interests in Iraq and the approaching since al-Muhandis died, there has also been a slight opening-up of anniversary of both the December 31, 2019, assault Iraqis’s willingness to talk privately on the issue of al-Muhandis, on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the January 3, KH, and the other fasa’il (Arabic for armed groups, used in Iraq K2020, killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force to describe the militias that have existed prior to the formation (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobili- of the PMF). Some KH leaders have become more visible due to zation Forces (PMF) vice chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.1 If their involvement in the PMF, in assaults on the government, or militias continue to strike U.S. targets, Washington has threatened in the suppression of protestors. This has allowed investigation of al-Muhandis’s real relationship to KH, the parsing of al-Muhandis’s influence versus KH’s, and the assessment of KH’s future role and Dr. Michael Knights is the Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow with the relations with the IRGC-QF. Military and Security Program at The Washington Institute for In an intensive multi-year research effort, building on increas- Near East Policy. He has traveled extensively in Iraq since 2003, ingly detailed previous CTC Sentinel articles,5 the author undertook including periods embedded with a variety of security forces in two interlinked research processes in the 2018-2020 period. militia-dominated environments. He has written for CTC Senti- First, the author visited Iraq on six occasions and interviewed nel since 2008. Follow @mikeknightsiraq over 30 security officials and politicians. The conversations were substantive, usually over an hour of focused discussion on militia The author wishes to express special thanks to Hamdi Malik, Inna issues and particularly KH. The interviewees included very senior Rudolf, Phillip Smyth, Aymenn Al-Tamimi, and Henry Mihm politicians, many of which were Shi`a leaders with strong ties to for their help in preparing and researching this piece. The author IRGC-QF. Many were interviewed multiple times, with very de- thanks any other confidential co-researchers for their necessar- tailed notes taken. All the interviews were undertaken on deep ily un-referenced but appreciated contribution. The author also background due to the severe physical security threat posed by mi- wants to recognize Hisham al-Hashemi, killed by militiamen in litias, and great care was taken, and is needed in future, to ensure Baghdad on July 6, 2020, as the foremost expert on KH and other that such individuals are not exposed to intimidation for cooperat- Iraqi militias, and who remains more than capable of striking important blows from his current location.