(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/20/4 Image Reference:0001 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. November 1941.

SECRET. Copy No.

W.M. (41). 111th Conclusions.

TO' BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to' ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET 111 (41).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, November 11, 1941, at 5 P.M.

Present: The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair). The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., M.P., Lord President of the Council. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Right Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P., The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Minister without Portfolio. Minister of Supply (Items 5-8). The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., The Right Hon. Sir KINGSLE Y WOOD, Minister of Labour and National M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. Service. " The following were also present The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Secretary of State for Dominion Home Department and Minister of Affairs (Items 1-6). Home Security (Items 1-6). The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., The Right Hon. LORD MOYNE, Secre- Secretary of State for India and tary of State for the Colonies Secretary of State for Burma (Items 1-6). (Items 1-6). The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, Captain the Right Hon. H. D. M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty MARGESSON , M.P., Secretary of State (Items 1-6). for War (Items 1-6). The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, SINCLAIR , Bt., M.P., Secretary of M.P., Minister of Information State for Air (Items 1-6). (Items 1-6). The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Minister of Economic Warfare Permanent Under-Secretary of State (Item 6). for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-6). Admiral of the Fleet Sir DUDLEY Sir JOHN DILL, Chief of the POUND , First Sea Lord and Chief of Imperial General Staff (Items 1-6). Naval Staff (Items 1-6). Air Chief Marshal Sir CHARLES F. A. -General Sir P. MITCHELL, Chief PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff Political Officer, Occupied Terri­ (Items 1-6). tories, East Africa (Item 5). Lieut.-General Sir W. PLATT, General Officer Coinmanding-in-Chief, East Africa (Item 5); Secretariat. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. Mr. W. D. WILKINSON. Major-General Sir HASTINGS ISMAY. Mr. L. F. BURGIS. [23142] WAR CABINET 111 (41).

CONTENTS. Minute No. Subject. Page 1. Parliament 141 Debate OH the Address. Naval, Military and Air Operations 141 Air Operations. Naval Operations: Shipping losses. Military Operations: U.S.S.R. 3. Par East 142. Co-operation with the Netherlands Government. 4y Air Policy 142 5. ...... 142 6. Blockade 145

Interception of French convoy en route from Madagascar. 7. War Cabinet Arrangements ...... 146 146, 81 UTSi&R. Parliament. 1. The Prime Minister said that he thought the Debate on the Debate on the Address should be allowed to continue over Wednesday and Address. Thursday, the 12th and 13th November, and also Tuesday and Wednesday, the 18th and 19th November, if so desired. There should be the fullest opportunity for the expression of views, but it would, of course, be necessary to move the House into Secret Session at once if airy dangerous topic was touched on. He hoped that Ministers generally, and in particular the Foreign Secretary and First Lord of the Admiralty, would find it possible to be on the Front Bench for a considerable time during the progress of the Debate. The Prime Minister indicated some of the topics he proposed to refer to in his speech in the Debate on the Address. He did not propose to be drawn into discussion of strategical matters. The War Cabinet took note, with approval, of this statement.

Naval, Military 2. The Chiefs of Staff gave the following information in and Air amplification of Cabinet War Room Records Nos. 795-800 :—* Operations. Summary of aircraft losses since the 5th November :— (Previous Reference: Home Theatre-— W.M. (41) 109th Enemy— Conclusions, 14 destroyed. Minute 3.) 9 probable. Air Operations. 13 damaged. Our Own— 24 fighters (3 pilots safe). 52 bombers. 7 Coastal Command aircraft. Overseas Theatre— Enemy—­ 10 destroyed. 4 probable. 4 damaged. Our Own—­ 18 destroyed. 18 damaged.

In the last six days we had made 690 bomber sorties, compared with 237 sorties by the enemy against this country; of which only 82 had penetrated inland. On the night of the 7th/8th November 400 bombers had been despatched, of which 37 had been lost, mainly on account of weather conditions. The forecasts had been fairly good, although it had been known that there was a strong wind. After the last forecast had been received weather conditions had worsened. The wind had shifted 35 degrees and had increased 10 m.p.h. in velocity. There had been cloud up to 18,000 feet, with heavy icing. As a result, fuel expenditure bad been heavy and many of our aircraft had gone off their course on the return journey. It was possible that this accounted for most of the 37 casualties. Seventeen fighters had been lost in a sweep against a target at extreme range on the 8th November. A number of fighters had got off their course, and probably failed to return owing to a fuel shortage. , [23142] B 2 The Prime Minister said that instructions had several times been given that attacks should not be pressed too hard if the weather was unfavourable. In battle, heavy losses must be faced; but it was undesirable to expose our aircraft to extreme hazards in the course of routine operations. Clear instructions must be given to the Commanders-in-Chief that in planning operations they should take into account the need to build up our Air Force so as to have a stronger force available in the Spring. Naval The Prime Minister congratulated the Admiralty on the Operations. brilliant action by H.M. Ships A urora, Penelope, Lively and Lance against an Italian convoy during the night of the 8th/9th November. Aircraft from H.M. Auxiliary Aircraft-Carrier Audacity had brought down two Focke Wulf aircraft while escorting a convoy to Gibraltar. One of our aircraft had been shot down. Shipping Losses. During the previous six days 22,000 tons of shipping had been reported sunk. This figure included one belated report. Military The Russians appeared to have carried out a successful counter- Operations. attack on the Murmansk front, probably about six weeks ago. Two U.S.S.E. German mountain divisions on this front had been relieved. The Germans were negotiating for their withdrawal through Sweden. The Germans yesterday claimed the capture of Tikvin on the Leningrad-Vologda Railway (250 miles from Vologda). They were attacking Tula heavily from the north-west with armoured forma­ tions. The Russians had concentrated reserves in this area and considered the situation was in hand. Nearly the whole of the Crimea had been overrun except for Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. The general picture was heartening. The situation had stabilised on the greater part of the Russian front. There was no indication of the Finnish forces ceasing to take part in active operations. The near future would probably see a further German attempt against Moscow and Rostov. The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

Far East. 3. The War Cabinet had some discussion on the situation in Co-operation the Far East, a record of which is contained in the Secretary's with Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions. Netherlands Government. (Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 108th Conclusions, Minute 5.)

Air Policy. 4. The War Cabinet agreed to defer for one month the con­ (Previous sideration of the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air Reference- (W.P. (41) 260). The view taken was that action on the lines W.M. (41) 104th proposed would be inopportune at the present time. Conclusions, Minute 2.) .

Ethiopia. ' : ! 5. The War Cabinet had before them­ (Previous (1) A report of a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Reference: : f " 1 Lord President of the. Council (W.P. (41) 261). W.M. (41) 103rd (2) A memorandum by the Secretary of State forthe Dominions Conclusions,., - (.W.P, (41) 263) setting out.the special interests of Field-

Miwte &) ; ;' - - - " Marshal Smuts and ,the-Union* Government in regard to 0 ' ; " -v. - the administration of Ethiopia. After a short preliminary discussion, Lieutenant-General Sir William Platt and Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell entered the meeting. Discussion ensued as to our military interests. Lieutenant-General Sir William Platt said that the War Office wanted the road kept open through Ethiopia from Kenya to the Red Sea, as an alternative to the sea route. The Air Ministry also attached importance to the air facilities in the country and to the maintenance of a meteorological station at Addis Ababa. The position would, however, be greatly changed once the Italian force at Gondar had been captured and all the Italian civilians had been evacuated. If, at the same time, the British troops in Ethiopia were to be removed, the maintenance of adequate communications with the country would be a matter of relative indifference. Sir Philip Mitchell said that it would probably be necessary to leave 300 or 400 Italians to run the railway. These would, however, stay of their own accord, and would make their own terms with the Emperor.

Removal of Italian civilians. Sir William Platt said that without the use of Jibuti the Italian civilians could be removed at the rate of about 1,000 a week. With the resources of Jibuti available a much higher rate could be achieved. The Prime Minister said that the present policy was to allow the blockade of Jibuti to continue for another month. Sir Philip Mitchell said that while the question was mainly a matter of transport, at the present time, however, destinations had only been found for some 14,000 of the Italian civilians. Dealing with the question of internal security, Sir Philip Mitchell said that the Emperor was now in a weak position. The reason for this was that he was the only important leader in Ethiopia who had not got an army of his own. It was necessary to create one for him, and steps to this end had been set on foot. The Emperor was anxious to put an end to the feudal system of govern­ ment, and to avoid undue reliance on the Rasses. He was still in dispute with Ras Sayoum. Given reasonable time to establish himself, the Emperor should be able to maintain his position, provided that his local Governors did not commit atrocities on the subject tribes, who were now armed. The discussion then turned on the terms of the draft A greement. The Lord President explained that the Agreement was based on the instructions given to Sir Philip Mitchell after the meeting of the War Cabinet held on the 9th June last. The draft correctly interpreted the instructions given by the Cabinet, subject to the important qualification that in a number of respects Sir Philip Mitchell had felt bound to defer to arguments put forward by the Emperor that complete acceptance of the Cabinefs instructions would make Ethiopia indistinguishable from a protectorate. The draft Agreement had been reported to the Committee under his Chairmanship as in the main an agreed document between the Foreign Office and the War Office, subject to certain outstanding points. The first ten Articles were read to the War Cabinet. The conclusion generally expressed was that some provisions of the draft

Agreement were more appropriate to a protectorate than fto,^anv independent native State. . 7 ' t'0^^^^0(ip^f^^^4^^j^i% thought that our policy should , be defined as follows .^x-iihiwio^jm & - J^aoi vv:)-sm (1) An endeavour1 should be made; to remove the Italian: JTTS&i)^^ as possible. Tt must be assumed that the facilities of Jibuti would not be available for a month. Thereafter endeavours should be made to get them out of the country at the rate of five or six thousand a week. (2) All military rights must be retained until the Italian force in Gondar had been captured, and the prisoners captured in this operation and the Italian civilians had been got out of the country. (3) In the meantime we should proceed to help the Emperor to build up an army to enable him to maintain his position. We would also provide him with advisers who would be his servants. (4) An agreement should be signed with the Emperor as quickly as possible. This, however, should be on much simpler lines than the draft agreement, the provisions of which had been read to the War Cabinet. (5) We should undertake to make payments to the Emperor to enable him to maintain his position until the inter­ national settlement at the end of the war. No doubt we should be able to use the power of the purse to secure some of the objectives set out in the draft agreement which it was undesirable to provide explicitly in that agreement. Some part of the payment could also be regarded as rent for, e.g., the air facilities we required. (6) We should make it clear that we did not propose to continue paying a subsidy to Ethiopia after the international settlement at the end of the war. (7) Diplomatic relations should be resumed as soon as possible, though it must be clearly understood that, while military operations continued, those relations would have to be subject to special limitations. For example, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief must have direct access to the Emperor.

General agreement was expressed in the War Cabinet with this general policy. The following points were made in regard to it: — (i) Sir Philip Mitchell said that he feared that it would take longer than the Prime Minister contemplated to get the Italians out of the country. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought it was important that this period should not be unduly delayed, as otherwise we should be faced with trouble in Ethiopia. (ii) On the question of resuming diplomatic relations, Sir Philip Mitchell pointed out that the appointment of a diplomatic representative at Addis Ababa at the present moment would present certain difficulties, since the problems with which he had been faced were mainly administrative. Considerable administrative work remained to be done before the Emperor would have an organisation which could stand on its own. It was agreed that this was a matter which would require special consideration. (Hi) The Chancellor of the Exchequer was anxious that it ,, should be provided.that the Exchequer assistance to the

, ' s / Emperor should take the form of a fixed,sum. The Lord President of the Council said that while a fixed subvention might be appropriate for part of the field, there were-certain services which he thought would have to be dealt with on a different basis in the early stages. (iv) The Secretary of State for Dominion.Affairs said that it was important to advise Field-Marshal Smuts in advance of whatever decision was taken, for his position in South Africa on this question was a difficult one. This was the more important, since the policy now decided upon might appear at first sight to be somewhat inconsistent with that announced on the 6th February.

The War Cabinet decided as follows :-— I. General1 agreement was expressed with the policy outlined by the Prime Minister under heads (l)-(7) above. II. The Lord President of the Council was invited to arrange for the draft agreement to be revised, as a matter of urgency, on the lines indicated in discussion. A repre­ sentative of the Treasury should be associated for the settlement of the financial articles. III. The Secretary of State for War was invited to convene a Technical. Committee of representatives of the Depart­ ments concerned: to- arrange a programme for the reception in appropriate countries of the Italian civilians still in Ethiopia, and to put forward a scheme to enable them to be removed from the country as quickly as possible. IV. The Secretary for Dominion Affairs was invited to concert with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the terms of a telegram to Field-Marshal Smuts explaining the position to him.

Blockade. 6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Interception of Foreign Secretary (W.P. (41) 264) proposing that no specific com­ French Convoy munication should be made by His Majesty's Government in the en route from to the Vichy Government about these ships. Madagascar. The Minister of Economic Warfare said that he concurred in (Previous this course. We had three different grounds on which we could Reference: justify the action taken; but if we made a statement at the present W.M. (41) 108th time we might weaken our case. Conclusions, Minute 2.) The War Cabinet concurred in the course proposed by the Foreign Secretary.

The Minister of Economic Warfare reminded the War Cabinet that a ship with 7,000 tons of rubber on board had put in to Casablanca. The question arose as to what action it would be allowable to take to intercept this cargo if an attempt was made to send part of it to Metropolitan France by sea. Would it, for instance, be allowable to enter Spanish territorial waters for this purpose ? The Foreign Secretary thought that this course might expose us to certain risks at the present time. The -Prime Minister proposed, and the War Cabinet agreed, that the matter was one which should be settled by discussion between the Ministers concerned. War Cabinet 7. The Prime Minister said that he proposed that in future Arrangements, the usual arrangement would be that the Meeting of the War Cabinet on Monday would be attended, as at present, by War Cabinet Ministers and the other Ministers who normally attended Meetings, together with the three Chiefs of Staff; but the Meeting on Thursday would be attended by War Cabinet Ministers only unless some matter arose which made it necessary to invite other Ministers to attend. These would continue to be the two regular Meetings of the War Cabinet, but other Meetings would, of course, be held as and when necessary. If the War Cabinet agreed, a detailed note would be circulated as to the revised arrangements. The War Cabinet approved the arrangements proposed.

U.S.S.R. 8. The War Cabinet were informed of certain communications between the Prime Minister and M. Stalin. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Great George Street, S. W. 1, November 11, 1941.