The Echoes of International Intervention on Post-Civil War Democracy

The echoes of international intervention on post-civil war democracy

A Qualitative Study

Siddhartha Kumar Dhar Department of Peace and Conflict Research Peace and Conflict Studies C Uppsala University Bachelor Thesis Supervisor: Henrik Angerbrandt

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Research Question ...... 1 1.2 The purpose and importance of the study ...... 1 1.3 Previous research, gaps and findings ...... 2 2. Theory ...... 5 2.1Theories pertaining to the research topic ...... 5 2.2 Theoretical claim ...... 6 2.3 Arrow diagrams illustrating the proposed theory ...... 7 2.4 Definition of key concepts ...... 8 2.5 Hypotheses ...... 9 3. Research Design ...... 10 3.1 Operationalisation of independent and dependent variables ...... 10 3.2 Mediating variables ...... 11 3.3 Method of qualitative analysis ...... 12 3.4 Cases and case selection ...... 12

3.5 Sources of empirical data...... 13

3.6 Control variables...... 13

4. Results and Analysis………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………14 4.1 Empirical patterns observed in the empirical material ...... 14 4.2 Empirical consistency with the hypotheses ...... 24 4.3 Responses to potential objections……………………………………………………………………………………………………27

4.4 An alternative explanation……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….28

5. Summary and Conclusion ...... 29 5.1 Main conclusion ...... 29 5.2 Policy implications ...... 30 6. Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….31

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Question

How does the engagement from international actors in civil wars shape the post-conflict democratic trajectories of a state?

1.2 The purpose and importance of the study

The purpose of the study is to investigate the political implications the involvement of international actors in civil wars has on the post-conflict democratisation of a state. Post-conflict democratisation remains a puzzle that continues to elude peace researchers. Despite widespread efforts, often both from international and domestic actors, very few societies emerging from a civil war experience democratisation in the post-conflict phase, and even fewer morph into full democracies (Grimm and Weiffen, 2018). Much of the scholarly literature on post-conflict democratisation focuses on the post-conflict dynamics that shape the democratic trajectories of a country. Little attention has been given, so far, to the civil war traits that could possibly influence the post-conflict democratic progress. Previous research on civil wars found little evidence that could link the conflict with post-conflict democracy. However, with the recent growth in scholarly work in this field, there are emerging signs indicating how civil war traits leave residuals that mould the post-conflict political configuration of a country.

This study will attempt to link one of the most common civil war traits, international engagement, with post-conflict democratisation. Most civil wars experience international involvement of some kind—which run the spectrum from direct military intervention to acting as mediators. While the literature on post-conflict democratisation mostly focuses on the post- conflict phase, the literature on international intervention concentrates primarily on its effect on the conflict outcome. However, if the impact of foreign intervention in an intrastate conflict reverberates beyond the conflict-termination stage, how does it bode for the future democratic trajectories of a society? An answer to this pertinent question will not only provide a vital clue in solving the puzzle why post-conflict democratisation fails in some cases and why it succeeds in others but also bridge the existent lacuna between the scholarship on international intervention and post-conflict democratisation.

1.3 Previous research, gaps and findings

Both the research on post-conflict democratisation and international intervention constitute parts of the broader literature on civil wars which is segmented in different research avenues. Because of such segmentation, very little attention has been given on the civil war–democracy link. Most of the research investigations conducted on post-conflict democratisation focus on the post- conflict dynamics that influence the outcome of democratisation efforts. While a few have linked post-conflict democratisation to the civil-war outcome, even fewer linked it to the civil war traits during the conflict-phase.

Mross (2019), for example, looked at the post-civil war dynamics by comparing the effectiveness of the different strategies international actors often employ in fostering peace in a post-conflict society. Notably, she examines the efficacy of the two approaches, the prioritisation and gradualist approach. She concludes that the gradualist approach, which promotes both peace and democracy simultaneously, is most apt in cultivating peace in a post-conflict setting. In doing so, the author assumes a contrarian position to the mainstream view among peace researchers which espouses prioritising peace over democracy. Based on the comparative study she conducted in Burundi and Nepal, Mross (2019) argues that when peace is prioritised over democracy, the violation of many democratic procedures—such as election fraud—is overlooked; it then impedes both the flourishment of peace and democracy in the long run. She also found that when power is concentrated in the hands of a few elites, it derails the peace initiative. This particular finding is pertinent in answering our research question. Later we will see that, in most cases, whether political power is concentrated or dispersed after a civil war, is influenced by the conflict outcome.

In his quantitative study on the linkage between civil war outcome and the success probability of post-conflict democratisation, Nilsson (2012) found that civil war outcome bears critical political implications for the post-conflict society. He found that when conflicts end in negotiated settlements, the prospects of democratisation are brighter. A negotiated settlement guards the political power against becoming concentrated in the hands of a few political actors or a party. On the contrary, when a conflict ends in a military victory, it leads the victorious party to seize political power who base their legitimacy of holding onto political power on their battleground performance and resist any democratic practices, such as holding national elections, lest it would

2 threaten their hegemony over political power. Based on the research findings, Nilsson (2012) came to the conclusion that when the aim is to foster democracy in a post-conflict society, a negotiated settlement is the best method to terminate a conflict. A similar earlier study conducted by Gurses and Mason (2008) also found support for the proposition that negotiated agreements that bring an end to civil wars are conducive towards higher levels of post-conflict democratisation; in contrast, they found that when civil wars end in military victories, the post- conflict society experiences lower levels of democratisation. Both the studies on the linkage between civil war outcome and post-conflict democratisation (Grimm and Weiffen, 2018; Nilsson, 2012), therefore, corroborates Mross’s (2019) claim that concentration of political power is detrimental towards building a peaceful and democratic society.

Based on the above literature review of post-conflict democratisation, it could be reasonably argued that conflict outcome plays a vital role in shaping the post-conflict political dynamics of a country. One particular civil war trait that plays a vital role in moulding the civil war outcome— whether it ends in military victory or negotiated settlement—is the engagement of international actors in the conflict-phase. The literature on biased military support, a facet of international intervention, found that external support for either the government or the rebels plays a vital role in determining which party will prevail over the other. Foreign support for rebels is found to increase the chances of rebel victory while the prospects for government victory are high only when the rebels match or surpass the government in terms of military capability (Gent, 2008; Sawyer et al., 2017; Sullivan and Karreth, 2015). Either way, external military support is proven to often lead to a military victory for one of the warring parties. However, much of the studies conducted on external support have a narrow focus in the sense that they only investigate its influence in determining the conflict outcome and not how such engagement has reverberating consequences in the post-conflict society. Nonetheless, to claim international intervention that leads to a military victory is also responsible for the poor outcome in democratisation efforts, further evidence is required that directly links external intervention in the conflict phase with post-conflict democratisation.

In recent years, few researchers have taken up the mantle to investigate the likelihood of such a link, and their findings are nothing but promising. Colaresi (2014), for example, found the existence of one such link by examining the role transnational aid from external actors in civil

3 wars plays in shaping regime behaviour in the aftermath of conflict. Through accepting military aid from an external rival, when a conflict actor achieves a military victory and consequently grabs state power, the regime ends up impeding the democratisation efforts. Seizing political power by accepting aid from a rival state engenders a legitimacy crisis for the new regime in the eyes of the broader population. It then subsequently undermines the regime’s faith in prevailing in any national election. The regime, therefore, has incentives to hinder any democratic procedures, for example, holding free and fair national elections, unless it is certain that the election outcome will be in its favour (Colaresi, 2014).

External support for rebels in civil wars has also been found to increase the risks of conflict recurrence. In his research on why some intrastate conflicts recur after conflict termination while others don’t, Karlén (2017a) identified the legacy of external support for rebels as the key motivating factor behind conflict recurrence. An external support structure that remains intact in the aftermath of civil war not only boosts the rebel willingness to fight but also leaves the rebels with ample opportunities to remobilise. In his research, Karlén (2017a), therefore, found support for the proposition that external military support provided to rebels in civil wars increases the risks of conflict recurrence. However, he did not find any evidence that confirms the proposition: support for the government makes conflict recurrence more likely. In a separate study, Karlén (2017b) found that warring parties in a civil war are less inclined to come to the negotiating table when rebels receive military support from an external actor. It entails that military support is an impediment for the negotiated settlement of the conflict—an outcome that Nilsson (2012) identified as crucial for facilitating post-conflict democratisation.

The evidence provided by Colaresi (2014) and Karlén (2017a, 2017b) lends credence to the idea that external military support not only plays a role in determining the conflict outcome but it also leaves its residue that shapes the post-conflict political configuration of society. However, the research focus of these two authors is narrow in the sense that they focus on the only aspect of international intervention, namely military support. International actors often opt to intervene diplomatically, and since the cold war, the international community have intensified efforts in resolving conflicts through non-violent means. For example, third-parties often assume the role of a mediator with the goal of bringing a peaceful end to the conflict. Similar to the research investigations carried out on military intervention, the research avenue on diplomatic

4 intervention mostly focuses on its impact on the conflict duration and outcome. In their research on the effects of diplomatic interventions on conflict duration, Regan and Aydin (2006) found that diplomatic intervention dramatically cuts short the expected duration of a civil war. When compared with conflicts that did not experience diplomatic intervention, the expected duration of conflict that experienced diplomatic intervention is reduced by 76 percent. Thanks to the mediating efforts from third parties, the asymmetry in information about military capabilities and incentives to fight is reduced which induces the warring actors to opt for a negotiated settlement and consequently conflict termination is precipitated (Regan and Aydin, 2006).

In their dataset comprising 438 diplomatic interventions in civil wars, Frank et al. (2009) identified some key features of diplomatic interventions. The United Nations remains the most frequent intervener, followed by nation-states and regional governmental bodies. Compared to Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, where military intervention is common, diplomatic intervention is more common in the Americas and Europe. When it comes to mediation outcome, 58% mediations resulted in a ceasefire, 25% resulted in a full settlement, 13% in a partial settlement and 4% were unsuccessful (Frank et al., 2009). Given that civil wars are in most cases mired in intractable complexities, 25% of mediation efforts resulting in a negotiated settlement is an impressive result. However, what are the implications of these negotiated settlements achieved through diplomatic interventions for post-conflict democratisation? The study conducted by Regan and Aydin (2006) and the dataset developed by Frank et al. (2009) do not shed light on this issue. However, non-military external intervention is observed not only to produce the perception among the belligerents that the conflict is ripe for resolution but also, thanks to the mediator's problem-solving skills, capable of adding stipulations in the subsequent peace agreement with the aim of preventing conflict recurrence and facilitate democratisation (Ohlson, 2008). The effectiveness of these mechanisms in facilitating democratisation is a topic of interest of this study.

2. Theory

2.1 Theories pertaining to the research topic

This section attempts to develop a theory that will bridge the divide that currently exists between the scholarly works on international intervention and post-conflict democratisation. More

5 specifically, it will attempt to integrate the findings made by Colaresi (2014) and Karlén (2017a, 2017b) on military support and the research findings on diplomatic intervention (Frank et al., 2009; Regan and Aydin, 2006) with those made by Gurses and Mason (2008) and Nilsson (2012).

2.2 Theoretical claim

The main theoretical argument of this study is as follows: In civil wars, which experienced international intervention, the success rate in post-conflict democratisation is influenced by the type of intervention carried out by international actors that led to conflict termination. The proposed theory focuses explicitly on the effects of two particular types of international intervention—namely military and diplomatic—on post-conflict democratisation. It claims that military support from international actors for one side increases the chances of a civil war ending in military victory. Such conflict outcome leads to the concentration of political power that undermines the prospects of post-conflict democratisation. On the other hand, when a conflict ends through diplomatic intervention, or more specifically through third-party mediation, and the result is a negotiated settlement, greater success is achieved in democratising the post-conflict society.

The rationale behind this theoretical argument is based on some key findings from the literature review carried out in the previous section. Military intervention is not only found to play a critical role in determining conflict outcome (Gent, 2008; Sawyer et al., 2017; Sullivan and Karreth, 2015) but also observed to have reverberating echoes in the post-conflict society by undermining the democratisation efforts (Colaresi, 2014; Karlén, 2017a, 2017b). Claiming military intervention’s negative impact on post-conflict democratic efforts, the theory, therefore, attempts to corroborate the claims made by the previous studies on the military intervention- democracy link. Furthermore, by analysing the role played by diplomatic interventions in conflict termination, the theory introduces a contrasting element by juxtaposing diplomatic intervention with military intervention. In doing so, it makes a conceptual claim by arguing that if diplomatic intervention facilitates negotiated settlement (Frank et al., 2009; Regan and Aydin, 2006), then theoretically, it should also have a reverberating effect on post-conflict democracy as negotiated settlements are observed to have a positive impact on post-conflict democratisation (Nilsson, 2012). The main theoretical argument finally culminates into the following proposition:

6 biased military intervention in civil wars hinders post-conflict democratisation, while third-party mediation in civil wars facilitates post-conflict democratisation. In other terms, variations in the success rates in post-civil war democratisation is influenced by the type of international intervention carried out during the conflict.

Regarding scope conditions, the theory applies to civil wars which experience not only military or diplomatic interventions, but those interventions also play a significant role in conflict termination in the form of military victory or negotiated settlement. The theory is concerned with military interventions which lead to military victories. In other words, it is applicable only in explicating biased military interventions. The theory does not apply to unbiased military interventions, which are mostly carried out to decrease hostilities or to monitor ceasefires. This type of intervention does not enable any side to gain military victory—a conflict outcome that plays the role of a mediating variable in the theoretical framework of this study. Moreover, an intrastate conflict which does not experience international engagement falls beyond the scope of the theory. Similarly, the theory will not apply to civil wars that experience economic interventions. Nor does the theory applies to civil wars in which international actors do not participate in the peace negotiation process; for example, civil wars in which the warring parties reject explicit offers of mediation from third parties or third parties play a minimal role that does not influence the conflict outcome. The theory also does not take into account international engagements to facilitate peace and democracy in the post-conflict period. However, biased diplomatic interventions are well within the purview of the theory because they can still deliver a negotiated settlement.

2.3 Arrow diagrams illustrating the proposed theory

Military support Lower success rates in from international post-conflict actor(s) democratisation

Conflict Political power: Outcome: Concentrated

Military victory

Mediation efforts Higher success rates in from international post-conflict actor(s) democratisation

Conflict outcome: Political Power: Negotiated Dispersed

Settlement

2.4 Definition of key concepts

One of the concepts recurrently discussed in this study is international intervention. Its definition will be construed by narrowing its definition down to two of its facets most relevant to the theoretical framework—biased military intervention and mediation. The decision of narrowing the focus on these two particular facets is motivated by the fact that both often lead to conflict termination; albeit of different types. International interventions which do not lead to conflict termination cannot bear any implications for post-conflict democratisation, and therefore, are excluded from the definition.

For defining biased military intervention, this paper will rely on Karlén’s (2016, p. 117) definition, which he identifies as the unilateral military intervention in a civil war by international actor(s), either on behalf of the government or the rebel side, in the form of direct aid such as provision of military and security troops as well as indirect forms of aid such as arms and ammunition, monetary aid, training, intelligence or sanctuary. Unbiased military interventions and international peacekeeping operations are excluded from this definition since they are not carried out to enable a particular party to achieve military victory or reach a settlement, rather decrease hostilities and monitor ceasefires in the short term (Karlén, 2016, p. 117).

Mediation, the second facet of the independent variable, will be defined by relying on the definition devised by Pruitt et al. (2003). They define mediation as third party assistance, a form

8 of outside intervention, where third parties help the warring parties in a civil war to reach a mutually-acceptable negotiated settlement (Pruitt et al., 2003, p. 232).

Post-conflict democratisation is a thick concept with many different facets, and therefore, measuring the success rate in post-conflict democratisation, the dependent variable of this study, is a challenging task. However, thick concepts are evaluative and at the same time, substantially descriptive (Kyle, n.d.). The concept of democracy itself has some key traits which can be both evaluated and described. The existence and quality of these traits in the post-conflict setting can be taken into account to measure the success of the efforts to democratise. For example, the establishment or retainment of some key institutions and the enactment or re-enactment of certain democratic practices vital to maintaining a healthy democracy, and a measurement of their quality should serve as indicators in determining the success rate in democratisation. Institutions that serve as the bastion of a democratic order include a multi-party political system that guards against autocracy, a constitution that upholds popular sovereignty where the ultimate source of political authority is the citizens, that guarantees fundamental human rights such as rights to life, liberty and property, equality before the law, and freedom of expression. Some essential practices to maintain a stable and liberal democracy include maintaining the separation of power between the legislature, judiciary and executive branches of the government, the democratic transition of power through holding elections. Post-conflict democratisation, therefore, can be defined as the initiative to establish or retain these vital democratic institutions and practices with the aim of transforming the post-conflict society into a fully-fledged democracy.

2.5 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: When biased military intervention in a civil war leads to military victory for one side, the success rate in post-conflict democratisation is lower.

Hypothesis 2: When mediation efforts from international actors lead to a negotiated settlement of the conflict, the success rate in post-conflict democratisation is higher.

3. Research Design

3.1 Operationalisation of independent and dependent variables

Independent variable

Not all international interventions lead to conflict termination, nor do they always play a pivotal role in all civil war terminations. Biased military intervention and mediation are the two most common types of international intervention, which, more often than not, lead to conflict termination. Therefore, the independent variable, international intervention, will be operationalised by looking at whether a civil war experienced either biased military intervention or diplomatic intervention in the form of mediation. To ensure validity and reliability, only those biased military interventions or mediations from international actors that played a central role in conflict termination, either in the form of military victory or negotiated settlement, will be taken into account.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable, the success rate in post-conflict democratisation, will be measured by, first and foremost, investigating whether any democratisation efforts were initiated in the aftermath of a civil war. Moreover, secondly, by evaluating the outcome of the democratisation efforts by looking at the democratic progress made by the society in terms of establishing the independent institutions and performing democratic practices, crucial for sustaining a healthy democracy—in the 12 years following the conflict termination. The decision to limit the time frame within 12 years is motivated by the reasoning that the effect of civil war traits on the post- conflict society should be best observed in the years following the conflict termination. The more time passes, the less civil war dynamics matter for post-conflict society and eventually, post-civil war dynamics begin to play a dominant role in moulding the political configuration of society. Because the impact of the independent variable, international intervention, on post-conflict democracy should be best observed in the immediate years after the civil war ends, the operationalisation of the dependent variable should be temporally as narrow as possible.

3.2 Mediating variables

The two mediating variables that will establish the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables are as follows:

Conflict outcome

The scholarly literature on international interventions consulted in the 1.3 section of this paper found that they often play a decisive role in conflict termination. When civil wars experience biased military intervention(s), on behalf of one or both parties, the chances of the conflict ending in a military victory for one side is much higher. On the other hand, mediation efforts from third parties increase the chances of the conflict ending in a negotiated settlement. Although they lead to very different outcomes, among all types of intervention strategies, these two particular types of intervention strategies are more effective in bringing an end to the conflict. These different outcomes, namely military victory and negotiated settlement, will have different effects on the political power structure of the post-conflict society. Therefore, the mediating variable, conflict outcome, will be operationalised by looking at if the two different intervention strategies led to conflict termination and if there are variations in the conflict outcomes.

Control of political power

The literature on post-conflict democratisation reviewed in this study shows that conflict outcome is crucial for moulding the post-conflict political power structure of a society. When one side in a civil war comes out as an outright winner and consequently seizes state power, it will have fewer incentives to democratise. On the other hand, in a negotiated settlement neither of the warring parties come out as the outright winner, and the provisos of the agreement often demand the dispersion of political power to be initiated in the post-conflict phase. Therefore, the mediating variable, control of political power, will be operationalised by looking at whether military victory led to the absolute control of political power in the hands of the victorious party and if negotiated settlement enabled the dispersion of political power where the handover of state power through democratic means was possible as speculated by the first and second hypothesis respectively.

3.3 Method of qualitative analysis

By adopting the method of ‘structured focused comparison,’ this paper will conduct a between– case comparison. The method of ‘structured focused comparison’ is suitable for this study since it facilitates the accumulation of knowledge in qualitative research design. This method uses a set of pre-established questions that are used in the selected cases to gather comparable and parallel data (Powner, 2014, p. 129). Through analysing the comparable and parallel data, a ‘structured focused comparison’ will provide an answer to the question of whether the variation in the independent variable international intervention leads to the variation in the dependent variable—success rates in post-conflict democratisation.

3.4 Cases and case selection

Both of the two hypotheses developed in this study predict variations in the independent variable, namely international intervention, will lead to variations in the success rate in post- conflict democratisation—the dependent variable. Because the focus is on the impact of international intervention on post-conflict democratisation, two different civil war cases will be chosen that shown variation in the independent variable. In other words, the cases will vary regarding the type of international intervention where one experienced biased military intervention and the other third-party mediation. Such case-selection strategy will then be suitable to test the two hypotheses developed in this paper, which predict that these two different intervention strategies bear different implications for post-conflict democratisation.

The two cases selected for this comparative study are the secessionist wars that were fought in the disputed territories of East Pakistan and East Timor. Despite the temporal gap between the two cases—East Pakistan gained independence from Pakistan in 1971 and became Bangladesh while East Timor gained independence in 2002 from Indonesia and became Timor-Leste—both cases are similar in many regards. Both Bangladesh and Timor-Leste experienced subjugation by first European colonisers and later under regional powers. The Bengal region was part of the British Empire in South Asia, the Eastern part of which, after the partition the Indian subcontinent, joined Pakistan as the province of East Pakistan in 1947—where a secessionist rebellion broke out in 1971 after decades of repression wrought on them by West Pakistan's leaders. In the same vein, East-Timor was also under the colonial subjugation of Imperial

Portugal until 1975. After the Portuguese left, Indonesia forcibly seized control of East-Timor and ruled Island nation until 1999—a period marked by repression, brutality and violence.

In both cases, rebellions were motivated by ethnolinguistic nationalism that gained potency after decades of marginalisation under the new rulers. Most importantly, the two cases show variation in the independent variable. Bangladesh gained independence after the rebel forces in East Pakistan received military support from the neighbouring country India. Timor-Leste, on the other hand, gained independence, thanks to the mediation efforts led by the international community, especially by its formal ruler Portugal, under the sponsorship of the United Nations. In both cases, although they chose very different methods, international actors played vital roles in bringing an end to the conflicts. Such a difference in international engagement provides the opportunity to investigate whether the success rates in democratising the two post-conflict societies varied within the chosen time frame of 12 years.

3.5 Sources of empirical data

For empirical data, this study will rely on a wide variety of resources. Scholarly bodies of work published on the conflict dynamics of each of the two secessionist rebels, especially those on international engagement, will be consulted to investigate the roles international interventions played in conflict termination. Furthermore, the scholarly works of literature which focus on the political dynamics of the two post-conflict societies will be consulted to measure the success rate in the democratisation efforts undertaken. Often sources that deal with conflict history are biased, for example, written by the victors from a nationalist perspective. Therefore, to avoid bias, the necessary information will be extracted only from peer-reviewed journals, books on the cases written by knowledgeable scholars, reports published by intergovernmental bodies and reputed non-governmental organisations.

3.6 Control variables

The control variables, necessary to be held constant so that they do not affect the dependent variable, are as follows: regime type, the nature of incompatibility and geographical region. The variable regime type is necessary to control because not only civil wars mostly break out under autocratic rule, but autocratic regimes also approach conflicts differently than democratic regimes. Regime type, therefore, bears implications for conflict outcome. In intra-state conflicts

13 over territory, negotiated settlements are less frequent (Wallensteen, 2015, p. 83). Therefore, it is necessary to select cases that are identical in terms of the nature of conflict incompatibility. Geographical region is also controlled as a variable because intervention strategies vary across regions. During the time of the conflict, both East Pakistan and East Timor were under the autocratic rule of Pakistan and Indonesia respectively. In both cases, the incompatibility or dispute was over territory, and both territories are situated in Southern Asia, where military interventions are more frequent (Frank et al., 2009).

4. Results and analysis

4.1 Empirical patterns observed in the empirical material

East East Timor/Timor- Pakistan/Bangladesh Leste (1972-1984) (2001-2013) Q1. Pre-conflict regime type Authoritarian Authoritarian Q2. Geographical region South Asia South-east Asia Q3. Type of incompatibility Territory Territory Q4. Type of intervention Military Third-party mediation Q5. Conflict outcome Military victory Negotiated agreement Q6. Third-party role in conflict outcome Significant Significant Q7. Post-conflict governments Hybrid & Military Democratic Q8. Separation of powers Low High Q9. Number of parliamentary elections 2 3 Q10. Number of presidential elections 2 3 Q11. Election quality Unfair Fair Q12. The democratic transition of power No Yes Q13. Number of successful military coups 3 0 Q14. Freedom of the press Low Moderate

East Pakistan (Bangladesh): Independent variable

In 1947, the Muslim dominated eastern section of the Bengal province joined the State of Pakistan as East Pakistan, after the British occupied Indian subcontinent was divided along religious lines. Separated by Indian territories, the newly independent state of Pakistan was divided into two noncontiguous sections—West and East Pakistan; although both having a Muslim majority population, vastly different in terms of ethnicity, culture and language. 98% of East Pakistan’s population were Bengalis, who were also the largest ethnolinguistic group in Pakistan. Under the rule of West Pakistan’s Urdu speaking politicians, Bengalis in East Pakistan faced economic marginalisation and ethnic discrimination (Schendel, 2009, p. 107).

These multifaceted discriminations paved the way for secessionist sentiments to gain traction, in which ethnic identity played a central role. What began as a dissatisfaction over governance soon mutated into conflict over territory. Pakistan went through a prolonged period of military rule, and in 1970, the military ruler Yahiya Khan refused to hand over power to Awami League, a Bengali nationalist party, which won 160 of the 162 parliamentary seats in East Pakistan in the general election held that year. Instead, the Pakistan government deployed military troops in East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, the military arrested the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. On the same day, it launched a military operation, ‘Operation Searchlight’, targeting Awami League activists, minority Hindus, university students and East Pakistan border forces, which led to massive civilian casualties. Under Awami League’s leadership, the Bengali nationalists formed a rebel government in exile, with its headquarters in the neighbouring Indian state West Bengal’s capital Kolkata, and declared a liberation war against Pakistan (Saikia, 2011, pp. 38–39).

From the very onset of the conflict, the Indian government came to the aid of the rebel government and provided the rebel forces—named Mukti-Bahini—with arms, ammunition, funding and training opportunities. It established scores of training camps across the India–East Pakistan border region—which the Mukti-Bahini used as their military bases. Under the artillery cover provided by the Indian military, the Mukti-Bahini guerrilla forces infiltrated into East Pakistan and conducted raids on Pakistani military bases (Hiro, 2015, p. 207). The Indian government had two main reasons to engage itself in the East-Pakistan conflict. First, breaking up the territorial integrity of its arch-rival Pakistan would serve India’s interest in the long term.

A pro-India government on its eastern border would not only secure a new ally but also expand its influence in the region. Second, India had to intervene because its eastern states that bordered East Pakistan were flooded with millions of Bengali refugees from East Pakistan. In the long run, India could not afford the humanitarian crisis that unfolded within its border. The humanitarian crisis also created the conditions for India to intervene directly inside East-Pakistan, which it justified on humanitarian grounds (Saikia, 2011, p. 42).

East Pakistan (Bangladesh): Conflict outcome

The Indian military entered into a formal coalition with the Mukti-Bahini and launched a joint military operation against Pakistan military in East Pakistan on December 4, 1971. One day later, the Indian government also recognised the exiled rebel government as the Government of Bangladesh. Within a few weeks, with the help of the local population, the combined forces of the Indian Army and Mukti-Bahini overwhelmed the Pakistan army in East Pakistan. The chief of the Pakistan Army’s Eastern Military High Command, Lieutenant A.A.K Niazi was forced to sign an instrument of surrender on December 6, 1971, in the presence of the Indian Army’s Eastern command chief Jagjit Singh Aurora—a decisive military victory for the secessionist rebels and its ally India (Levie, 1974). The remaining 90,370 Pakistani soldiers who surrendered were declared prisoners of war. The exiled Awami League leaders returned to the new country of Bangladesh and took charge of the government (Hiro, 2015, p. 216).

Bangladesh: Control of political power

The Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was incarcerated in West Pakistan, was released and upon his return on 10 January 1972, assumed power as the prime minister of Bangladesh. With the Awami League as the only dominant political party, the first challenge the new regime faced came from the Mukti-Bahini—the freedom fighters who played an instrumental rule in defeating the Pakistan Army. A section of the Mukti-Bahini refused to surrender weapons and became engaged in looting, plundering and settling personal scores through violent means. To placate the volatile situation, the Awami League government put party activists who fought in the war in key government positions while denying other liberation fighters who were not Awami League members. Such nepotism led the Mukti-Bahini to split into three factions. While one group remained loyal to the Awami League, one of the two others

16 formed a left-wing political party called the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), and the other continued to engage in antisocial activities, thus severely undermining the law and order in the nascent country (Dowlah, 2016, pp. 72–73).

The nationalisation of the economy mostly benefited the urban intermediary classes connected to the government. The concentration of control over state resources in the hands of the regime made it the primary source of patronage which aggravated the economic crisis the country found itself in its early years (Riaz, 2016, p. 46). The government also restructured the civil administration and decreed new acts that made it possible for the government to axe civil servants at it saw fit. Many government officials were dismissed on political grounds. A splitting of the Civil service in 1973, across generalist–developmenatist lines, further damaged the morale of the officials (Dowlah, 2016, p. 74). After the Mujib regime was toppled in a violent coup in 1975, the military regimes—the country was under military rule from 1975 to 1990—followed the Awami League’s authoritarian rule book as state power remained mostly concentrated in the hands of a few military strongmen, all of whom seized control through undemocratic means (Hakim and Huque, 1993).

Bangladesh: Dependent variable

Within a few years in power, the Awami League government backtracked on its pledge of building an inclusive and liberal democracy. Initially, in November 1972, the parliament adopted the National Constitution with little opposition since there were only three opposition members, all of whom abstained from voting. A West-minister-style parliamentary democracy was established with a unitary government and a unicameral parliament. The Constitution adopted nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as its four fundamental principles—the reconciliation between these diverse principles later found to be difficult; nor was the regime committed to upholding any of these principles. The constitution also guaranteed freedom of speech, electoral selection of representatives at all levels of administration; it banned not only religious discrimination but also the abuse of religion in achieving political goals. The constitution stipulated the separation of the judiciary from the executive branch with the chief justice reserving the prerogative to administer the highest judiciary. The provision of 15 parliamentary seats for women who would be elected by the members of the parliament was also included in the constitution. Less than a year after the constitution was promulgated, in

September 1973, the government brought amendments to the constitution by introducing provisions of declaring a state of emergency and preventive detention. The Special Powers Act 1974 provided the scope for arbitrary detention, denial of bail and meting out death penalties and life imprisonments to black marketers, smugglers and hoarders (Dowlah, 2016, pp. 76–77).

In the first parliamentary election in 1973, the ruling party Awami League achieved a landslide victory, winning 292 of the 300 parliamentary seats. The election was nonetheless marred with inconsistencies—the opposition candidates were intimidated, and the government used its power to sway the votes in its favour. Had it been a fair election, the ruling party still would have won. At the same time, at least 50 to 60 opposition candidates could have also secured seats in the parliament. In 1974, the government went on the offensive against the main opposition party JSD, decimated its capability to organise and drove the JSD members to underground (Riaz, 2016, pp. 52–54). One year later, the regime ended the multi-party democratic system and introduced the monolithic presidential rule with Sheikh Mujib as the president. It also amended the constitution to give its leap towards autocracy a legislative cover. All opposition political parties were banned, and the judiciary and the legislative branches were brought under executive control. Only four state-controlled newspapers were allowed to operate, the rest of the independent media outlets were banned. Without any term limit, the president had the sole authority to veto any parliamentary legislation, appoint and remove judges at the highest courts, and the cabinet was accountable only to the President (Dowlah, 2016, pp. 122–124).

The Mujib regime’s decision to establish a separate paramilitary group, the Rakhhi Bahini, and divert funds, generally allocated for the military, towards modernising the Rakhhi Bahini created much discontent among the military personnel. The Rakhhi Bahini—extremely unpopular among the ordinary Bangladeshis because of its violent tactics—mainly targeted the government’s political opponents. A non-aggression treaty signed with India, which made Bangladesh reliant on India for the national defence, put the regime’s legitimacy at stake not only in the eyes of the army personnel but also the wider population (Dowlah, 2016, p. 126). In the early hours of August 15, 1975, a section of the military orchestrated a coup in which the President and most of his family members were killed at his residence. One of the cabinet ministers Khondoker Mushtaq Ahmed assumed the presidency, who was soon replaced within a few months. The rumour of an imminent Indian intervention contributed further to the unrest. After almost three

18 months of political turmoil, coups and counter-coups, the military general Ziaur Rahman, who was freed from imprisonment, took charge of the presidency (Riaz, 2016, p. 67).

As the President, Zia took steps to reverse the steps taken by the Mujib regime; for example, he reintroduced the multiparty system. Even though he did not assume the presidency until 1977, he was the de facto ruler since late 1975. Armed mutinies, however, continued to break in different parts of the country, including a few unsuccessful but bloody coups. The Zia regime brought further changes to the constitution, giving it an Islamic veneer. In its attempt to legitimise its rule, the Zia regime arranged a referendum on the presidency in 1977 and a presidential election in 1978—both of which were rigged in favour of Zia. President Zia also established a new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with its ranks mostly filled by defectors from other political parties. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured 207 of the 300 parliamentary seats—a victory achieved with the assistance from the administration. Despite its efforts, the Zia regime failed to prevent military coups from taking place. Zia was killed in a military coup in 1981, though the orchestrators ultimately failed to seize power. The Vice- President Abdus Sattar, who succeeded Zia, could stay in power only for ten months before the then Army Chief Hussain Muhammad Ershad ousted him in a coup in 1982. By the end of 1984, Bangladesh was under a dictatorial rule with a constitution that lost its original democratic character and the judiciary, legislative and executive powers concentrated under a presidential authority that lacked democratic mandate (Riaz, 2016, pp. 68–74).

East Timor (Timor-Leste): Independent variable

East Timor, once a Portuguese colony between 1702 and 1975, was forcefully integrated by Indonesia as its twenty-seventh province after its Portuguese occupiers left the territory. Before the Indonesian invasion, the pro-independence party Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) declared the independence of East Timor. Portugal, however, continued to claim its right to exercise its administrative control over the territory. The United Nations also abstained from recognising East Timor as an Indonesian territory. In the conflict and famine that ensued, as many as 200,000 people died. The Indonesian army was accused of committing extensive human rights violations against pro-liberation forces and their supporters. Under the guidance of the United Nations secretary-general, negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal commenced in 1983, although little progress was made in more than a decade. Portugal,

19 nonetheless, continued with its lobbying at the United Nations to attract the international community’s focus on East Timor. In 1997, the new secretary-general Kofi Annan rejuvenated the tripartite process where the United Nations assumed a more proactive role. This drive towards reaching a solution also gained momentum when Indonesia’s powerful neighbour Australia—despite not changing its historical position of considering East Timor as an Indonesian territory—urged its neighbour to begin direct negotiations with the Timorese leaders. The Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who rose to power in 1998, tentatively agreed to grant East Timor greater autonomy with Indonesia retaining control over its foreign affairs, defence, monetary and fiscal policies—a surprise move deprecated by the Indonesian military and its pro-integration paramilitary groups operating in East-Timor. Although the situation deteriorated on the ground, significant progress was made on the diplomatic front (Martin, 2001, pp. 14–19).

East Timor (Timor-Leste): Conflict outcome

On January 27, 1999, the Indonesian president made a further concession by announcing that he was willing to grant East Timor a referendum on the issue of accepting autonomy within Indonesia. It meant that if East Timor decided to reject the option of special autonomy, it would be set free. On May 5, 1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations came to a formal tripartite agreement on arranging what they described a ‘popular consultation’ based on a universal, direct and secret ballot through which the people of East Timor would accept or reject the proposed special autonomy within Indonesia. The United Nations established a supervisory body, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), to oversee the referendum process which registered over 450,000 East Timorese voters both in the territory and abroad (Kingsbury, 2009, pp. 68–70). The result of the popular consultation, which the United Nations hailed as ‘a show of courage’ went in favour of the independence movement. 98.6 percent of registered voters cast their vote, 78.5% of whom voted in favour of independence (Martin, 2001, p. 11).

Even though the Indonesian government accepted the outcome of the popular consultation, the Indonesian military and the paramilitary forces under its command continued to wreak havoc in East Timor even after the vote. The international community, with Australia in charge, compelled Indonesia to give up its control over East Timor. On October 29, 1999, the Indonesian military left the territory after the United Nations authorised peacekeeping force (Interfet) arrived

20 in East Timor in the earlier month (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 76). The United Nations formed a transitional administration, called the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to oversee the war-torn territory’s transition towards democracy (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 78).

East Timor (Timor–Leste): Control of political power

Under the supervision of the United Nations’ transitional administration, East Timor, even though it had not immediately declared itself as a sovereign nation, embarked on a new path of state-building—which meant creating functional state structures for sustainable governance, drafting a new constitution and holding elections. Given the significant role it played in the negotiation process, the United Nations had the legitimacy to assist in the state-building process (Kingsbury, 2009, pp. 79–80). The influential East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmão, who led the revolutionary war against Indonesia before he was captured, was released by Indonesia. Upon returning to East Timor, he joined the upper echelons of United Nations-led administration. Even though they were not democratically elected, the members of the National Congress of the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and the transitional cabinet, had representatives from different political parties (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 97).

On 9 August 2001, a Constitutional Assembly was democratically elected which had the mandate to promulgate a constitution. Voter turnout was more than 90 percent and twelve of the sixteen political parties that participated in the election, secured representation in the constitutional assembly. 55 of the 88 members of the assembly represented the largest political party Fretilin. East Timor headed towards becoming an independent nation with its political power structure firmly based on democratic principles (Devereux and de Jesus Soares, 2015, pp. 22–23).

Timor-Leste: Dependent variable

In February 2002, the constitutional assembly approved the draft constitution. The constitution follows the Portuguese model and is also written in Portuguese. While the President is officially the head of the state, the presidency is mostly ceremonial with some executive power at the president’s disposal. The legislative power belongs to a unicameral parliament. The president is required to be elected in a direct vote, and they are re-eligible only once. A direct vote also elects

21 the parliament members. Both the presidency and parliamentary positions are limited to a five- year term. The judiciary, separate from the executive and legislative branch, is protected by the provision that makes judges irremovable. The parliament elects only one of the Supreme Court justices; the Supreme Council for the Judiciary elects the rest. An independent Ombudsman, who represents the judiciary, is vested with the power to investigate public complaints against the government officials. A new Ombudsman is to be elected every four years by the parliament (ConstitutionNet, n.d.).

The first presidential election was held in April 2002. Xanana Gusmão won the election securing 82.69 percent of the vote and became president. On 20 May 2002, East Timor declared independence as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Constitutional Assembly took charge of the new government. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) ended its mission and replaced by the United Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Later in September, the then newest country in the world, Timor-Leste became the United Nations’ 191st member ((Kingsbury, 2009, p. 103). Under the leadership of prime minister Mari Alkatiri, the Fretilin attempted to exploit its majority in the parliament in its goal of dominating the political landscape of the nascent country. However, it faced a strong adversary in the form of President Gusmão. Despite possessing limited executive power, given that he was democratically elected, coupled with his high popularity across the wider population, Gusmão mustered enough clout required to disrupt the prime minister’s totalitarian ambitions over the next four years (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 120).

In 2006, the country found itself in a political crisis when army personnel who hailed from the western part of the country deserted their barracks accusing the top brass of the military of discrimination. Many of the rebel soldiers were later suspended. Together with their civilian supporters, the renegade soldiers started a protest in the capital Dili. At the request of the government, foreign forces once again arrived to placate the situation. When calls for his resignation within the party ranks grew louder, and the president Gusmão threatened to quit presidency, the prime minister Alkatiri resigned, and José Ramos-Horta assumed prime- ministership. In May next year, Ramos-Horta ran as an independent candidate for the presidency which he won securing 69 percent of the vote. The Fretilin candidate Francisco Guterres got 30 percent of the vote (BBC, 2018). In March 2007, in his bid for the prime-ministership, the

22 outgoing president Gusmão, appropriating the acronym of the pre-independence national council, founded a new political party National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT). The second parliamentary election was held in June 2007. In an election declared generally free and fair by the European Union election monitors, Fretilin achieved a narrow majority winning 29% of the votes. It nonetheless failed to form a government. Despite winning 23% of the vote, Gusmão’s party managed to form a coalition government. Gusmão was sworn in as the prime minister in Dili on 8 August (BBC, 2007). The agitated Fretilin supporters went on a rampage across the country, burning several buildings. Although Fretilin initially boycotted the parliament, its elected members started attending the parliamentary sessions from late August (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 186).

In February 2008, the renegade soldiers from West Timor launched a coordinated attack on both the president and the prime minister. The president Jose Ramos-Horta was shot in the stomach at his residence. The leader of the renegade soldiers Alfredo Reinado was killed in the event. Later in April, their new leader Gastao Salsinha together with 12 of his men surrendered. While Ramos-Horta was recuperating from his wounds, two interim presidents, first Vicente Guterres and then Fernando de Araújo, looked after presidential affairs until April 2008. Ramos-Horta was able to complete his presidential term of 5 years. In March 2010, a court awarded rebels it charged with attempt to assassinate the president with up to 16 years in imprisonment. The president later pardoned some and commuted the sentences of the others. In the third presidential election held in April 2012, the independent candidate Taur Matan Ruak, supported by the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), won the election beating the Fretilin candidate Francisco Guterres. The outgoing president Ramos-Horta came third. In the parliamentary election held on July 7 2012, the Gusmão led National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) won 36.66 percent of the vote and formed a coalition government. Fretilin lost its long-held majority, winning only 29.87 percent of the vote. Later that year, the United Nations officially ended its peacekeeping mission (BBC, 2018). By the end of 2013, a little over a decade after its independence, the new country of East Timor, despite experiencing several political unrests and violence, made significant progress towards consolidating democracy when it comes to adhering to the constitution and practising democratic transition of power.

4.2 Empirical consistency with the hypotheses

The empirical patterns observed in the case of East Pakistan supports the first hypothesis, which claims that civil wars that end in military victory for a conflict actor, the success rate in post- conflict democratisation is low. The Indian government not only played a significant role in turning the conflict in favour of the East Pakistani rebel forces but it also recognised the Awami League-led rebel government as the sole representative of the Bengalis in East Pakistan. Such steps had reverberating consequences in post-conflict Bangladesh. It seems unlikely that the Indian government was concerned with the post-conflict future of democracy in its nascent eastern neighbour; instead, its primary concern seemed to be establishing a friendly regime that would serve its interests in the near future. It was also the first country to accept Bangladesh as an Independent country and the Awami League-led rebel government as the government of independent Bangladesh. India did not place any demand on the Awami League government to democratise the post-conflict society—probably because it did not trust any political party, other than the Awami League, to remain loyal towards India. India shielded the new government from international pressure. It also failed to take any concrete efforts to involve the United Nations in resolving the conflict in East Pakistan.

As a result, the Mujib regime did not feel any obligation to put its legitimacy to any democratic test before assuming control of state power. Members of the constitutional assembly who framed the constitution lacked democratic mandate because they were elected members of the Pakistan assembly, not independent Bangladesh. Their legitimacy solely derived from a decree issued by the president who himself was declared president by the extralegal government-in-exile. The government-in-exile was not elected democratically either, and its upper echelons were dominated by Awami League leaders. Although the Awami League government initially did make efforts to democratise, for example promulgating a constitution that stipulated a parliamentary democracy, without any formidable political opposition, within a year in power it consolidated its grip of political power by amending the constitution.

With all political power concentrated in its hands, the Awami League struggled to meet the demands of the citizens of the war-torn country. Its weak performance in uplifting the economy, rampant corruption and nepotism in the bureaucracy eroded the people’s trust in Awami leadership. Without any significant political opposition, the opposition had to come from within

24 its ranks. Awami League government treated the new political parties formed by its former party members as mere renegades and not legitimate political opponents. As a result, it launched a brutal crackdown of the opposition political parties. Fearing a public backlash, the government rigged the election even though it still would have won in a fair election. When the regime effectively turned the country into a one-party state, banning political oppositions and independent media outlets, it was the armed forces, the only entity capable enough to change the status quo, decided to intervene. The bloody removal of the Awami regime by a fraction of the army commenced the tradition of military engagement in the political affairs of Bangladesh from which the country did not recover for a long time—thus impeding democracy from fledging. The Awami League government’s poor governance also inadvertently engendered hostile attitudes towards neighbouring India among the Bangladeshis who branded Awami League as its puppet regime. Because the Indian government never put any pressure on the Awami League government to democratise, it lost the legitimacy to demand any such steps from the subsequent military regimes. It mostly stayed away from intervening in the domestic affairs of a neighbour—the population which turned hostile within a few years. Such developments support the research findings that demonstrate how military victory as a conflict outcome undermines post-conflict democracy (Grimm and Weiffen, 2018; Nilsson, 2012) and also the one that claims external military support in civil wars often have negative consequences for post-conflict democratisation (Colaresi, 2014)—and ultimately the first hypothesis developed in this paper that places biased military support in a negative relationship with post-conflict democratisation.

The second hypothesis is also supported by the empirical patterns observed in the secessionist conflict in East Timor. In this case, leading third-party Portugal played a very different role than what India played in East Pakistan. Since Indonesia forcefully took control of East Timor, Portugal remained persistent in its efforts to engage the international community, especially the United Nations, in resolving the dispute. Thanks to the lobbying efforts from Portuguese diplomats, the United Nations rejuvenated the tripartite negotiations in 1997. Since the Indonesian government were unwilling to hold direct talks with East Timorese rebel leaders, Portugal assumed the role of representing the people of East Timor. Eventually, Portugal not only succeeded in convincing Indonesia to allow the East Timorese to decide the future status of their territory through a referendum, but it also convinced the United Nations to administer the referendum process. Portugal and other international actors also refrained from providing

25 military assistance to the rebels, which benefited the negotiation process, because military support for rebels is found to delay the onset of negotiation (Karlén, 2017b). East Timor acknowledged Portugal’s efforts by framing its constitution in the Portuguese model. The constitution provision of selecting a president through a presidential vote, which gave the president a democratic mandate, proved crucial in thwarting the largest political party Fretilin’s efforts in consolidating power. The separate election of the president meant, unlike the Awami League, Fretilin could not appoint a president on its own, nor it could achieve its ambition of establishing monolithic rule over Timor-Leste.

Despite the political crisis the nascent nation went through in 2006 and 2008, Timor-Leste’s governments and political parties respected the constitutional principle of democratic transition of power. The referendum and election of the national assembly prior to the declaration of independence was crucial in instilling a culture of democracy in which Portugal, the United Nations and the broader international community played a crucial role. The parliamentary and presidential elections were mostly fair, and most importantly, candidates from different political parties were able to assume presidency and prime-ministership—an indication of the robustness of the country’s multiparty political system. Although occasionally clamping down on media outlets, the government mostly refrained from infringing on the freedom of the press and expression and allowed independent media outlets to operate. It terms of gender equality, unlike Bangladesh, Timor-Leste also made significant progress in its early years as a sovereign nation (Freedom House, 2013).

Although, Timor-Leste has a long way to go before it could be counted as a full democracy, and despite the flawed nature of its democracy, in the immediate post-independence years, its success in democratisation is far higher than that of Bangladesh. This contrast in the success rate in democratisation seems to have far-reaching consequences. In 2019, despite gaining independence much later, Timor-Leste outperformed Bangladesh in indices that measure human development, democracy and freedom (Freedom House Report, 2019; Human Development Report, 2019). This success was influenced by not only how the conflict terminated as demonstrated by Nilsson (2012), but also by the mediatory roles international actors played in resolving the conflict— therefore, confirming the positive relationship between mediation and post-conflict democratisation as claimed by the second hypothesis.

4.3 Responses to potential objections

Several valid objections and demands for further explanations could be raised regarding the theoretical framework constructed, operationalisation adopted and the conclusions drawn in this study. To begin with, one might question the choice of the independent variable and its operationalisation. Are biased military support and third-party mediation variations of the same independent variable, or should they be regarded as two separate independent variables? Moreover, even if these are variations of the same independent variable, why are other types of international interventions overlooked while framing the definition? The answer to this question lies in the fact that military intervention and third-party mediation are both most effective in conflict termination which is why international actors use them in the first place—as demonstrated in the literature reviewed. Measuring the success achieved in post-conflict democratisation first requires conflict termination. In this paper, other types of international interventions are, therefore, ignored while constructing the narrow definition of international intervention.

Does the theory apply in civil war cases where both sides receive military support? Theoretically, it should. Civil wars in which both parties receive military support tend to last longer. Nonetheless, if they still end in military victories, the theory should still apply. Does the theory apply to civil wars which experienced unbiased military interventions? In response, it could be argued that it is challenging to measure impartiality than it is to measure bias, and even more difficult is to rule out the possibility that the intervention was not biased in some way.

Further objections could be raised regarding Timor-Leste’s success in post-conflict democratisation. Could Timor-Leste indeed be counted as an example of successful democratisation given the political turmoil it went through in its first decade as an independent nation? Moreover, Timor-Leste required international peacekeepers even after its independence which might mean that Timor-Leste’s success in democratisation can be attributed to the post- independence engagement from the international actors. In response to the first question, it could be argued that despite remaining a flawed democracy, Timor-Leste’s success in democratisation cannot be overlooked, especially when compared with Bangladesh. The long-term effects of the early success in upholding the constitutional principles and retaining the culture of democratic transition of power are reflected in its standing in the indices that measure freedom and

27 democracy, in which it outperformed many post-colonial countries, including those which gained independence long before Timor-Leste. The importance of the engagement from the international actors which Timor-Leste required in the post-conflict period cannot be overlooked. However, it could also be argued that international actors were successful in their post-conflict involvement because of their prior engagement in the pre-independence conflict phase. The legitimacy the international actors gained in resolving the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor bestowed them the right to intervene in post-independence Timor-Leste, and because of the legitimacy they had in the eyes of the Timorese population, they were successful in their mission. Without any such prior engagement, it would not have been possible for the post-conflict intervention to be effective in such a limited time. Nonetheless, the Timor-Leste example shows that mediators and third parties also have essential roles to play in the post-conflict phase.

4.4 An alternative explanation

An alternative explanation could be put forth by using the Cold War paradigm. The contrast in the outcome of the dependent variable could be attributed to the fact that the two cases represented two vastly different periods of world history in terms of the nature of international politics. The events in East Pakistan and subsequent Bangladesh took place in a bipolar world where there was less opportunity for both mediation and democratisation, which could be the reason why there was little effort for mediation in East Pakistan and subsequently independent Bangladesh had fewer intensives to democratise which was also an ally of the Soviet Union at that period. In contrast, the onset of mediation in East Timor unfolded in a unipolar world where there is an increased drive for both solving conflicts through mediation and putting pressure on third-world countries to democratise. It would then explain why Bangladesh failed to democratise while Timor-Leste managed some success.

However, a counter-argument can be put forward by arguing that the regions of South and South-East Asia have primarily remained immune from the global drive for mediation and democratisation. Many of the countries in this region remain undemocratic and as long as they subscribe to the neo-liberal economic policies prescribed by the Western countries and donor agencies, the need to place the demand for democratisation is often deliberately overlooked. In fact, Timor-Leste’s success as a democracy has made it an anomaly in the region so much so that it remains so far unsuccessful in its bid to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), a regional association of countries which has many autocratic countries as its members such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Talesco, 2016). Furthermore, in the post–Cold War period, despite the increased scope for mediation, international actors often opt for military intervention even when such steps negatively affect the flourishment of post-conflict democracy as it is witnessed in Libya. The difference in the pre and post-Cold War dynamics of international politics cannot therefore solely account for the variation in the dependent variable of the two cases.

5. Summary and Conclusion

5.1 Main conclusion

This study aimed to investigate why democratisation efforts fail in some post-conflict societies while in others, they succeed. Towards that goal, it attempted to synthesise or combine the research findings of the researchers who study the role of international intervention in civil wars with the findings of their colleagues who study the impact of civil war outcome on post-conflict democratisation. It then developed a theoretical framework which argued that since international intervention plays a vital role in conflict outcome, it could have reverberating consequences for post-conflict democracy. Furthermore, since international actors employ different strategies to terminate civil wars, these different strategies could have different consequences for post-conflict democracy. The paper then investigated the effects of the two most effective intervention strategies international actors adopt for conflict termination, biased military intervention and third-party mediation, on post-conflict democratisation. It found that biased military intervention in civil wars negatively impact post-conflict democratisation efforts since they lead to military victories, and once the victors take control of state power, they are less willing to democratise and often deliberately undermine democracy as it was in the case of post-independence Bangladesh. Third-party mediated negotiated settlements do not result in any party being outright winners and mediators often mould these settlements in order to stipulate provisos and establish democratic precedents that safeguard against the concentration of political power. Such strategies then subsequently lead to greater success in the democratisation of the society—as observed in the case of East Timor. However, this paper does not claim the variations in international engagement as solely responsible for both success and failure in democratisation. It is because all civil wars are unique in some way, which means case-specific factors can also play

29 important roles. Nonetheless, hopefully, this paper has made some contribution towards meeting the challenge of democratising post-conflict societies.

5.2 Policy implications

There are significant political implications of this study, as well. Civil wars continue to spring up around the world, and in this globalised world, international actors often have no choice but to intervene. Since it has been found that military interventions are detrimental towards post- conflict democracy, those international actors, who aim not only to terminate the conflict but also to foster peace and democracy in the post-conflict society, should opt for intervening diplomatically, even if they are biased towards one side. Violence begets violence—the world would be a better and safer place once we realise this universal truth.

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