Strategic Visions: Volume 17, Number II.

Which was the Most Significant factor in interests the most significant factor in Causing the United States to Intervene in triggering US involvement in the 1954 in 1954: Business Interests or Guatemalan coup, or was it the potential Anti-Communism? communist threat? By: Tom Golebiowski The divisiveness of this issue is In 1954, Guatemala underwent a reflected strongly in scholarship of the controversial US-engineered coup d’état subject. Notable academics such as that would prove to be a significant Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger moment in US-Latin American Cold War point to United Fruit as the driving force relations. The coup was seen by many in creating a false communist panic across the world as a clear example of whereas others like Richard Immerman the United States testing the limits of and Piero Gleijeses argue that business justifying its intervention in foreign interests only contributed minimally to regimes. The US defended its actions by what was a long-established anti- directing focus to the left-wing policies communism campaign.3 In this essay, I of President Jacobo Arbenz and his will be exploring the different frequent collaboration with known arguments surrounding this debate and communists. Overthrowing Arbenz was showing that, despite the complexity argued to be a legitimate act as the US and interdependence of both factors, the was exercising its responsibilities to threat of communism was ultimately the protect the western hemisphere from main cause of the coup. communist infiltration as agreed by Organisation of American States.1 The arguments presented for both However the fact that Arbenz’ anti-communism and business interests government made significant challenges as factors within this debate are to the businesses interests of the US in comparably coherent. The suggestion Guatemala hints that anti-communism that the (UFCO) may not have been the true source of had a significant impact on the 1954 the coup. The US-owned United Fruit coup is convincing when the scale of Company was a dominant force in their influence is revealed. UFCO was a Guatemala’s economy with ownership major player in the Guatemalan of over 42% of the country’s land as economy. Conventionally, the company well as control of the country’s railroad focused on fruit production and and telegraph systems.2 Arbenz’ distribution and had a monopoly over extensive land reforms threatened the Guatemalan banana industry. United Fruit and US business hegemony However as it grew, ‘El Pulpo’ (the in Guatemala and it could be argued that octopus), as it came to be known, this is true reason why he was expanded into Guatemala’s overthrown. There therefore exists an infrastructure.4 By the late 1940s, UFCO important debate over the cause of US controlled 690 of the 719 miles of intervention: were American business Guatemala’s railroad as well as the telegraph system and two out of three of

1 Council on Foreign Relations. The Organization of American States. [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american- 3 Streeter, S. "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in states [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Post Revisionist 2 Agyeman, Opoku. Power, Powerlessness, and Perspectives” The History Teacher, Vol. 34, No. 1 Society for Globalization: Contemporary Politics in the Global South History Education, 2000 p. 65-67 Lexington Books, 2014, p. 45 4 Immerman, R. The CIA in Guatemala. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982 p. 70

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the country’s trading ports.5 It is twenty times more was demanded by unsurprising that by 1954, 77% of all UFCO and its lobbyists in the State Guatemala’s exports went to the US and Department.12 UFCO’s power was 65% of imports came from the US.6 heavily diminished by Arévalo and Arbenz and it is clear to see why they Prior to the 1944 revolution in would have a motive for wanting Guatemala, UFCO was looked upon revolution. favourably by Guatemalan dictators Manuel Estrada Cabrera and In addition, UFCO affiliates had a who independently granted the strong presence within the US company a number of tax concessions government. John Foster Dulles and and deregulation opportunities with the Allen Dulles, Secretary of State and goal of gaining favour with the US.7 Director of the CIA under Eisenhower However after the overthrow of Ubico respectively, were both former lawyers and the rise of new president and of UFCO.13 Eisenhower’s personal former professor Juan José Arévalo, secretary was married to UFCO’s chief UFCO’s previously unchallenged power lobbyist and Henry Cabot Lodge, US began to diminish.8 In 1947 Arévalo ambassador to the UN, was a major introduced the Labor Code which stockholder in the company.14 It was awarded protection and benefits, such John Foster Dulles in fact who lobbied as a minimum wage, to Guatemala’s Arbenz’ government for greater workers.9 As the largest employer in the compensation for UFCO’s expropriated country, UFCO was strongly affected by lands.15 A representative of Dulles’ State Arévalo’s reforms and accordingly felt Department even argued that “If persecuted by the new regime.10 [Guatemala] handles an American Matters were made worse when company roughly, it is our business.”16 Arévalo’s successor, Arbenz, went a step UFCO had important influence at the further by enacting mass land reforms highest level and was even heavily that expropriated around 408,000 acres involved in the CIA’s early operation of uncultivated land from UFCO.11 PBFORTUNE, in which it offered to turn Arbenz offered compensation to the over two its freighters to the CIA for company to the value of $1,185,000 but arms transportation.17 Likewise UFCO had massively undervalued its independently from the CIA, at Salama, land for tax avoidance purposes. Nearly United Fruit, together with Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, provided weapons and funds to a group led by a 5 Magoc, C. and Berstein, D. Imperialism and Expansionism in American History. A Social, Political, and Cultural former UFCO associate in a failed Encyclopaedia and Document Collection. 4 vols. Santa uprising.18 It is unsurprising therefore Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2015, p. 856 6Agyeman, p. 45 7 Mirza, R. (2010). American invasions. Canada to Afghanistan, 1775 to 2010. Trafford, 2010, p. 161 12 Ibid. 8 The Library of Congress. Juan José Arévalo Bermejo 13 Schoultz, L. Beneath the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: (Guatemala) (1904-1990). [online] Available at: Harvard University Press. 2003, p. 338 https://www.loc.gov/item/n81127285/juan-jose-arevalo- 14 Cohen, Rich The Fish that Ate the Whale. New York: bermejo-guatemala-1904-1990/ [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012. p. 186. 9 Gleijeses, P. Shattered Hope: The 15 Schlesinger, S. and S, Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Story of the and the United States, 1944-1954. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton American Coup in Guatemala. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 94 University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American 10 Streeter, S. Managing the Counterrevolution: The United Studies, 2005, p. 76 States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 Ohio University Press, 16 Cullather, N. and Gleijeses, P. Secret History: The Cia's 2000, p. 15 Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952- 11 Gleijeses, P. “Juan Jose Arevalo and the Caribbean 1954. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 16 Legion.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 17 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 230 1989 p. 474 18 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 220/221

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that in his final address to the nation leanings of Arbenz.24 This assessment before abdicating, Arbenz claimed: “the was intensified by the close relationship United Fruit Company, in collaboration of his wife to known communists25 and with the governing circles of the United the fact that upon the death of Stalin in States, is responsible for what is 1953, Arbenz declared that Guatemala happening to us.”19 was in public mourning.26

Despite the clear influence of United In the early 50s, the political climate Fruit on the overthrow of Arbenz, the of the United States also contributed to notion of communism within the the assessment of Guatemala as a administration provides a similarly communist threat. The US was gripped strong argument for the basis of the by the ‘red scare’; a communist witch- coup. Within Arbenz’s government hunt led by Senator Joseph McCarthy of there was considerable leniency Wisconsin that heightened the fear of towards communism and to some communist infiltration in the US.27 degree, actual communist influence. Risking being blacklisted if they did not Although Arbenz was not a communist stand with McCarthy, government himself, Arbenz’s left-wing ideology employees sought to demonstrate their matched the political objectives of the anti-communist leanings and many Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo reports on strong communist threat of (Guatemalan communist party) and Arbenz were written by McCarthyites.28 thus they mobilised support for him in This was contributed to by a number of the working classes.20 Though they Eisenhower’s top advisors such as the played only a small part in his Dulles brothers, who were hard-line government (only four out of fifty-one anti-communists.29 John Foster Dulles deputies in 1953/54 Guatemalan consistently increased tension over the congress were PGT representatives), communist threat in Guatemala, even Arbenz legitimised the PGT as one of remarking over national television: “If four ruling parties in Guatemala.21 In the United Fruit matter were settled, if fact one of Arbenz’s closest advisors on they gave a gold piece for every banana, his controversial land reforms came the problem would remain as it is today from the PGT. José Manuel Fortuny was as far as the presence of communist a key part of Arbenz’s agricultural infiltration in Guatemala is department and was responsible for concerned.”30 This anxiety fed through drafting large amounts of Decree 900.22 to the public and by early 1953, Fortuny was a popular public figure in American publications such as the New Guatemala with great ambition and had York Times were running articles with run a campaign for congress in 1952 but titles such as “How the communists won was unsuccessful due to his radical views.23 The presence and influence of 24 Cullather and Gleijeses, p. 22 popular communists in Arbenz’s 25 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 51 government such as Fortuny convinced 26 Forsythe, D. Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions, Nebraska: U of Nebraska Press, 1993, many in Washington of the communist p. 37 27 Eisenhower.archives.gov. Eisenhower Presidential Library. [online] Available at: https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_doc 19 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 199 uments/mccarthyism.html [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] 20 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 58/9 28 Schlesinger, S. and S, Kinzer, 94 21 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 58/9 29 Porter, S. Benevolent Empire: U.S. Power, 22 Dosal, P. Comandante Che: Guerrilla Soldier, Commander, Humanitarianism, and the World's Dispossessed, and Strategist, 1956-1967, Penn State Press, 2010, p. 36 Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, p. 131 23 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 57 30 Immerman, p. 82

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control of Guatemala?” and publishing business interests are the primary cartoons of dancing to factor within this debate. In the book music performed by Stalin.31 For Bitter Fruit for example, Kinzer and America in the 1950s, the Cold War was Schlesinger make the argument that seen as a zero-sum game, if Guatemala UFCO is responsible for constructing the wasn’t with them, it had to be firmly on communist threat to the US in order to the side of the enemy.32 This firmly further public support in their favour.37 placed Guatemala, which was lenient on They point to the fact that UFCO communists and acting against US consistently manipulated the press interests through its land reform, into through carefully crafted “fact finding the communist camp and thus an enemy trips to .” On these trips of the USA. The sympathy towards visiting journalists “were shepherded communism displayed by the Arbenz on elaborately choreographed tours of administration increased in early 1954 Fruit Company facilities, and [spoke] to when a shipment of weapons from the local politicians who were sympathetic Soviet satellite state of Czechoslovakia to the company's plight.”38 All this arrived on Guatemalan shores as a resulted in considerable press about the result of a deal brokered by Fortuny.33 “Spector of Communism in This, some historians have argued, was Guatemala.”39 Likewise McCarthyites the final step in forcing the hand of the such as John Clements were specifically US to intervene.34 hired by UFCO to make reports on the communist threat. Kinzer and It is clear therefore that strong Schlesinger write that “Clements' hastily arguments can be made for both sides of written study predictably came up with this debate. As post-revisionist of this a panorama of scheming Guatemalan topic, Gleijeses has pointed out however communists plotting to take over a that the causes of the coup are more corrupt administration run by a crypto- nuanced than simply one factor versus Marxist President, Arbenz.”40 UFCO, the other. Instead, it is more accurate to Kinzer and Schlesinger claim, used consider both business interests and propaganda to instigate anti-communist anti-communism as co-dependant sentiment over Guatemala. factors.35 Immerman sums this concept up well by drawing attention to the fact Further to this point, it has been that Eisenhower’s administration claimed that UFCO’s communism “thought like United Fruit because they propaganda even stretched to the had the same backgrounds… There was administration of Arbenz’s predecessor, no conspiracy.”36 The interests of UFCO Arévalo. Discontent with Arévalo’s and the Cold War ethos were Labor code, UFCO had been encouraging interwoven. the press to see a communist threat in Guatemala since 1950.41 The story When considering the importance of "Communism in the Caribbean", which both factors on one another, some was based on conversations with UFCO historians make the argument that officials, was splashed across New York Herald Tribune’s front page for five

31 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 233 32 Hogan, M. The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 61 37 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 106 33 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 280 38 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 87 34 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 151 39 Ibid. 35 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 366 40 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 95 36 Immerman, p. 124 41 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 88

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consecutive days, helping to promote “President Arbenz is still convinced that the idea of communism in Guatemala.42 he is “using” communism to further his This tactic was particularly impressive own ends and in no sense, is he dictated from United Fruit considering Arévalo’s to by communist elements.”48 This public assertion that he was not a official report suggests that Arbenz was communist and had banned the unaffected by communism, contrasting formation of a communist party.43 considerably from US public opinion Nonetheless Arévalo was considered and the general fear of the ‘red scare’. It untrustworthy by the US government suggests that realistically, the US and insofar as in 1950, US Ambassador the CIA were not particularly concerned Patterson demanded Arévalo fire about the link between Arbenz and several of his ‘communist’ cabinet communism. Equally, a year later, the members.44 Gleijeses even corroborates threat of Arbenz’ communism was this line of argument towards UFCO’s downplayed further by US ambassador ability to successfully spread to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, who wrote propaganda, writing that “the US in a memorandum to Secretary Dulles: embassy’s concern with communism “[Arbenz] is not a communist; he will under Arévalo owed much to UFCO’S certainly do until one comes along.” This smoke and mirrors.”45 also suggests that the link between Arbenz and communism seen by the US Furthermore, as Bitter Fruit argues, as weak, further enhancing the businesses interests must have been the argument of Bitter Fruits that UFCO was key focus of the coup because the threat the most significant factor behind the of communism was greater elsewhere in coup. Latin America. Kinzer and Schlesinger write: “Larger numbers had taken part However, despite the evidence in political activity on a greater scale presented by Bitter Fruits in favour of during the post-war years in Brazil, businesses interests over communism: Chile and Costa Rica without causing this line of argument is largely excessive concern in the U.S. oversimplified. Business interests were government.”46 This suggests that there important but as revisionists such as were bigger threats than Guatemala and Immerman have claimed, these were to some extent this is true. In 1946 for secondary issues.49 For instance, the example, a US report on the state of implication that UFCO advanced the Soviet objectives in the Western perceived threat of communism in hemisphere found issue only with Costa Guatemala under both Arévalo and Rica, not with Guatemala.47 The Arbenz is fair, but the suggestion that significance of the threat in Guatemala is they devised it is incorrect. Arévalo for further downplayed when evidence example, despite openly condemning including a 1952 CIA intelligence report communism, still acted in conflict to the is considered. The report claimed that: US. The Guatemalan president was responsible for an attempted

42 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 84 expropriation of the largely US-owned 43 Black, C. Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses airline, Guatemala Airways, and of of Political Violence, Princeton University Press, 2015, p. 335 44 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 86 45 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 632 48 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 46 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 106 GUATEMALA, DOCUMENT 27. NO. 00-B57327 Central 47 Lorenz, C. Elespiritudel48.org. Costa Rica and the 1948 Intelligence Agency Information Report Available at: Revolution – El Espíritu del 48. [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952- https://elespiritudel48.org/costa-rica-and-the-1948- 54Guat/d27 [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] revolution/ [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] 49 Immerman, p. 81/2

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course introducing the Labor code, both to see. In 1952 for instance, US of which conflicted with US business Ambassador to Guatemala, Rudolph interests.50 However more concerning Schoenfeld, commented on the “pro- to the United States was Arévalo’s communist” slant of Guatemala’s official international stance. Fundamentally newspaper Diario de Centro America problematic was his lack of (DCA) in a meeting with Guatemalan submissiveness, which his predecessor Ambassador Guillermo Toriello.56 In fact Ubico had displayed in abundance.51 As in 1953 alone, fifty-three articles in the Gleijeses has shown, Arévalo was DCA promoted life within the Soviet heavily involved in the US-opposed Bloc, with titles such as: “The high Caribbean Legion; an organisation standard of living of the Czech involved in replacing Central American workers.”57 This fact, coupled with the dictators (who were often US-backed) presence of communists such as with democratic regimes.52 Guatemala Fortuny in high governmental positions was also the only American nation to and the strength of the PGT, shows that refuse to sign the 1947 Rio Pact, which the Arbenz administration was not condemned communist influence on the trying to hide its communist Western Hemisphere.53 For the United inclinations. As Gleijeses correctly States, Arévalo’s assertions of anti- points out therefore: “it did not require communism meant little. He was acting the efforts of UFCO to generate concern boldly against them and the US within the US government about government did not need UFCO to tell Arbenz.”58 them that. In the climate of the late 1940s, prior to McCarthyism or the In addition, there is a strong involvement of the Dulles brothers, as argument to be made that ties to UFCO Immerman explains: “a communist was weren’t actually effective in the State defined as anyone who opposed United Department. For example, a strong basis States interests.” 54 It is clear therefore of the argument favouring business that Arévalo’s own actions account interests over anti-communism lies in considerably for the label of the fact that the Eisenhower communism in Guatemala: a label only administration had a number of added to by UFCO propaganda. significant ties to United Fruit. However according to the memoirs of Richard Similarly, UFCO’s propaganda had Bissell, the CIA official who directed little effect on US government policy PBSUCCESS: Allen Dulles, Director of the over Arbenz. Gleijeses claims that CIA, never even discussed United fruit’s “Arbenz’s sympathy for the communist interests.59 Likewise in Eisenhower’s cause was obvious … It required no personal memoirs he wrote manipulations by UFCO minions for U.S. “expropriation in itself… does not prove officials to appreciate these truths.”55 communism”, which shows his lack of UFCO didn’t invent and expose the sympathy to the plight of United Fruit.60 communist elements within the Arbenz administration because they were clear 56 Memorandum of Conversation, by Milton K. Wells, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations” US Department of State Archive Available at: https://2001- 50 Immerman, p. 86 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/iv/20208.htm [Accessed 51 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 85 12 Dec. 2017] 52 Gleijeses, “Juan Jose Arevalo and the Caribbean Legion.” p. 57 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 178 474 58 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 632 53 Immerman, p. 94 59 Bissell, Jr. R, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to 54 Immerman, p. 81 the Bay of Pigs, New Haven: CT, 1996, p.90 55 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 362 60 Immerman, p. 94/5

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John Foster Dulles declared on national company donated 100,000 acres of its television in 1954 that “communist Guatemalan holdings to peasants: infiltration… in Guatemala is the holdings that it had lobbied the US problem, not United Fruit.”61 In a 1953 government so strongly to get reobtain meeting with ambassador Toriello, leading up to the coup. By 1972 UFCO’s assistant Secretary of State Cabot shareholders had been forced into dismissed business interests over selling the company off to various local communism, calling them “secondary businessmen and the Del Monte interests.”62 It is clear therefore that the corporation.66 Thus for the US effect of UFCO on the government was government, protecting UFCO clearly rather minimal. Key members of the wasn’t a concern, especially as they Eisenhower administration, all with ties were responsible for much of the to UFCO (including the president companies undoing. One would expect himself through his secretary’s that, if business interests were the main affiliation) did not concern their policy concern of the US government, UFCO with UFCO’s interests. Both in public would have done better as a result of and in private, US officials made no the coup rather than worse. effort to state that United Fruit was the problem at the heart of the Guatemalan Furthermore, the suggestion that the issue. threat of communism was greater elsewhere than in Guatemala is also Perhaps the most telling element of incorrect. For example, although it is this argument can be seen in the post- fair to assert that Costa Rica, Brazil and coup achievements of United Fruit. As a Chile posed significant communist result of Arbenz’ reforms, UFCO had lost threats; this was mostly limited to the a considerable amount of land, however late 1940s and not the 1950s.67 While after the coup, new Guatemalan leader the communist party of Chile had held Castillo Armas returned the positions in the Chilean government, the expropriated land to UFCO along with party of Costa Rica had ruled as part of a returning the company to the coalition and in Brazil, the communists heightened status it had enjoyed under had won 10% of the 1945 vote; by 1948, Ubico in the 1940s.63 On the face of it, the communist party had been outlawed this fact strengthens the argument that in all three of these countries.68 In the coup took place with the intention of Guatemala Arévalo had also taken the protecting UFCO but the story from the decision to outlaw the official United States suggests otherwise. Due to communist party, but in the 1950s, UFCO’s dominance in Guatemala, the US unlike in other countries, the Department of Justice hit UFCO with a communists grew strength by strength substantial antitrust lawsuit.64 This under the administration of Arbenz.69 lawsuit was backed up by John Foster Under Arbenz of course, prominent Dulles in an effort to further prove his communists such as Fortuny were lack of allegiance to the company.65 relied upon in important government Further lawsuits followed and, in an positions. In 1946, specifically at the effort to diffuse the tension, the request of US officials, Chile had

66 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 229 61 Immerman, p. 225 67 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 106 62 Immerman, p. 82 68 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope 362 63 Streeter, p. 239 69 Blasier, C. The Hovering Giant (Revised Edition): U.S. 64 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 220 Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910– 65 Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 221 1985, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985, p. 158

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expulsed communists from its easing fear in the US State government.70 However, under similar Department.75 Significantly, Paz requests from the US, Arbenz had Estessoro’s willingness to collaborate refused.71 Clearly to the US, by the with US anti-communists led to 1950s the threat of communism was compromise in Bolivia where it could considerably greater in Guatemala than not in Guatemala. Buying into Bolivia’s in other Latin American nations with assurances, the US sent $18.4 billion in Marxist ties. aid to Bolivia, just less than the $20 billion it cost to topple Arbenz.76 In the Bolivia is an important case study of 1950s, this was the most US aid per a country that was in a similar position capita of any country in the world.77 to Guatemala in the 1950s yet did not This suggests further that in the 1950s, warrant US intervention. As bananas business interests did not dominate US were to Guatemala; tin was to Bolivia. interventionist foreign policy in Latin Tin was Bolivia’s major export and for America. the US, it was a vital resource. US investors owned one of the three Evidently therefore, the threat of biggest tin companies in Bolivia and communism is the most significant Eisenhower even once remarked that “it factor within this debate. The business would be better to have tin in Fort Knox interests of US corporations within than gold.”72 However in 1952, Guatemala were an important influence following the Bolivian revolution and on the coup, as historians such as Kinzer growing strength of left-wing factions and Schlesinger have shown, but within Bolivia’s new ruling party, the ultimately the foreign policy of the State three biggest tin companies, including Department and CIA was considerably the one owned by US investors, were more focused on anti-communism in the expropriated by the government.73 This 1950s than protecting US investments. was followed in 1953 by a land reform, The strongest arguments in favour of designed to redistribute land to Bolivia’s business interests, such as the role of peasantry.74 Compared to Guatemala, propaganda and relationship of UFCO to Bolivia was in a similar position: US top government officials have been businesses had been expropriated and debunked by revisionist and post socialist policies were being introduced revisionist thinking of historians in the Latin American nation. However, including Immerman and Gleijeses, as unlike Guatemala, the US chose not to fundamentally, the hostility of topple Bolivia’s leadership. Although the Guatemala was enough in the 1950s for expropriation of business concerned the the US to fear communist infiltration. US, as Becker has shown, fundamentally, Likewise, the poor treatment of UFCO where Arbenz relied on communists, by the US government following the Bolivian leader Paz Estessoro was coup discredits possible suggestions apprehensive about the radical left, that the US acted primarily on their behalf. Additionally, while there were

70 Morris, M. Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and other communist threats elsewhere in Antarctica, Springer, 1990 p. 80 Latin America, Guatemala’s was by far 71 Carlisle, R. Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Routledge, 2015, p. 109 the strongest. Bolivia provides an 72 Rabe, S. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism, UNC Press Books, 2017 73 McPherson, A. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles. Dulles: 75 Becker, M. Twentieth-Century Latin American Potomac Books, 2006, p. 32 Revolutions, Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, p. 101 74 Morales, W. A Brief History of Bolivia, Infobase Publishing, 76 Ibid. 2010, p. 152 77 McPherson, p. 32

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example of a similar situation to https://www.loc.gov/item/n811 Guatemala with expropriated business 27285/juan-jose-arevalo- but little communist threat and the lack bermejo-guatemala-1904-1990/ of US intervention here is key to [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] understanding the motives behind US  Eisenhower.archives.gov. intervention overall. Fundamentally Eisenhower Presidential Library. therefore, whilst the role of business McCarthyism [online] Available interests undoubtedly exaggerated the at: threat, it has to be said that the threat of https://www.eisenhower.archiv communism in Guatemala was the most es.gov/research/online_docume significant factor for explaining US nts/mccarthyism.html [Accessed intervention in Guatemala in 1954. 12 Dec. 2017] Fortuny described the situation best  Foreign Relations of the United when he stated: “They would’ve States, 1952–1954, GUATEMALA, overthrown us even if we had grown no Document 27. NO. 00-B57327 bananas.”78 Central Intelligence Agency Information Report Available at: https://history.state.gov/historic aldocuments/frus1952- 54Guat/d27 [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017]  US Department of State Archive Memorandum of Conversation, by Milton K. Wells, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Available at: https://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike /iv/20208.htm [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017]

Books

 Agyeman, Opoku. Power, Bibliography Powerlessness, and Websites Globalization: Contemporary Politics in the Global South  Council on Foreign Relations. Lexington Books, 2014 The Organization of American  Becker, M. Twentieth-Century States. [online] Available at: Latin American Revolutions, https://www.cfr.org/backgroun Rowman & Littlefield, 2017 der/organization-american-  Black, C. Communism and states [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017] Revolution: The Strategic Uses of  The Library of Congress. Juan Political Violence, Princeton José Arévalo Bermejo University Press, 2015 (Guatemala) (1904-1990).  Bissell, Jr. R, Reflections of a Cold [online] Available at: Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay Pigs, New Haven: CT, 1996 78 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 4

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 Blasier, C. The Hovering Giant:  Dosal, P. Comandante Che: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Guerrilla Soldier, Commander, Change in Latin America, 1910– and Strategist, 1956-1967, Penn 1985, University of Pittsburgh State Press, 2010 Press, 1985  Forsythe, D. Human Rights and  Cullather, N. and Gleijeses, Peace: International and National P. Secret History: The CIA’s Dimensions, Nebraska: U of Classified Account of Its Nebraska Press, 1993 Operations in Guatemala, 1952-  Porter, S. Benevolent Empire: 1954. Stanford, Calif: Stanford U.S. Power, Humanitarianism, University Press, 1999 and the World's Dispossessed,  Immerman, R. The CIA in Philadelphia: University of Guatemala. Austin: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016 Texas Press, 1982  Hogan, M. The End of the Cold  Magoc, C. and Berstein, D. War: Its Meaning and Imperialism and Expansionism in Implications, Cambridge American History. A Social, University Press, 1992 Political, and Cultural  Morris, M. Great Power Relations Encyclopaedia and Document in Argentina, Chile and Collection. 4 vols. Santa Barbara: Antarctica, Springer, 1990 ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2015  Carlisle, R. Encyclopedia of  Mirza, R. American invasions. Intelligence and Canada to Afghanistan, 1775 to Counterintelligence, Routledge, 2010. Trafford, 2010 2015  Gleijeses, P. Shattered Hope: The  Rabe, S. Eisenhower and Latin Guatemalan Revolution and the America: The Foreign Policy of United States, 1944-1954. Anticommunism, UNC Press Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Books, 2017 University Press, 1992  McPherson, A. Intimate Ties,  Streeter, S. Managing the Bitter Struggles. Dulles: Potomac Counterrevolution: The United Books, 2006 States and Guatemala, 1954-  Morales, W. A Brief History of 1961 Ohio University Press, Bolivia, Infobase Publishing, 2000 2010  Schoultz, L. Beneath the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Articles Harvard University Press. 2003,  Cohen, R. The Fish that Ate the  Gleijeses, P. “Juan Jose Arevalo Whale. New York: Farrar, Straus and the Caribbean & Giroux, 2012 Legion.” Journal of Latin  Schlesinger, S. and S, American Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Story of Cambridge University Press, the American Coup in Guatemala. 1989 Cambridge, Mass: Harvard  Gleijeses, P. “The Agrarian University, David Rockefeller Reform of Jacobo Center for Latin American Arbenz.” Journal of Latin Studies, 2005 American Studies, vol. 21, no. 3,

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Cambridge University Press, 1989  Streeter, S. "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Post Revisionist Perspectives” The History Teacher, Vol. 34, No. 1 Society for History Education, 2000

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