DOCSLIB.ORG

Download This Report

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Download This Report Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-385-4 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org October 2008 1-56432-385-4 Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia Map of Colombia ...................................................................................................... 1 Glossary...................................................................................................................2 I. Summary and Recommendations ..........................................................................3 II. Background: Paramilitaries, Impunity, and the Justice and Peace Law................20 III. Changes to the Justice and Peace Law...............................................................24 Constitutional Court Ruling ...............................................................................24 Executive Decrees.............................................................................................28 IV. Confessions under the Justice and Peace Law....................................................30 Problems in the Taking of Confessions .............................................................. 31 Flawed Lists of Applicants ........................................................................... 31 Insufficient Resources .................................................................................33 Most Applicants Have Withdrawn from the Process......................................34 Types of Abuses Confessed...............................................................................36 Paramilitaries’ Statements about Accomplices..................................................39 Statements Implicating Members of the Security Forces...............................40 Statements Implicating Politicians...............................................................44 Statements Implicating Businesses and Economic Backers .........................46 Unanswered Questions.....................................................................................48 The La Rochela Massacre.............................................................................49 The Mapiripán Massacre..............................................................................52 The El Aro Massacre..................................................................................... 55 The El Salado Massacre.............................................................................. 60 The Chengue Massacre................................................................................63 Extraditions of Paramilitary Leaders ................................................................. 66 The Government’s Failure to Ensure Paramilitaries Fulfill their Commitments .................................................................................................................. 68 The Impact of Extraditions on Truth and Accountability in Colombia.............82 What the US Department of Justice Could Do ...............................................84 V. The Parapolitics Investigations ..........................................................................87 Background on Supreme Court Investigations .................................................. 88 The Role of the Attorney General’s Office...........................................................91 Status of Prominent Cases...........................................................................92 Initial Progress in Cases Related to Jorge 40’s Computer ............................. 99 Delays and Cases of Concern in the Attorney General’s Office ....................100 Uribe Administration Response....................................................................... 110 Proposal to let the “Parapoliticians” Out of Prison ......................................111 Attacks on the Supreme Court ................................................................... 112 Failure to Adequately Reform Congress...................................................... 122 Judicial Reform Proposal............................................................................ 124 VI. International Legal Standards......................................................................... 127 Victims’ Rights to Truth, Justice, and Non-Repetition of Abuses ....................... 127 The Right to Justice .................................................................................... 127 The Right to Truth ...................................................................................... 130 Potential for Involvement of the International Criminal Court ............................131 Acknowledgments................................................................................................136 Map of Colombia 1 Human Rights Watch October 2008 Glossary AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, a coalition of most paramilitary groups in Colombia. CTI: Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación, Technical Investigation Body, an entity attached to the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia and charged with providing investigative and forensic support to the office in criminal cases. DAS: Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, the national intelligence service, which answers directly to the president of Colombia. ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army, a left-wing guerrilla group. FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombia’s largest left-wing guerrilla group. High Commissioner for Peace of Colombia: Alto Comisionado para la Paz, an official advisor to the president of Colombia on peace initiatives. The high commissioner often represents the president in peace negotiations with armed groups. Office of the Attorney General of Colombia: Fiscalía General de la Nación, a Colombian state entity charged with conducting most criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Office of the Attorney General is formally independent of the executive branch of the government. Office of the Inspector General of Colombia: Procuraduría General de la Nación, a Colombian state entity charged with representing the interests of citizens before the rest of the state. The office conducts most disciplinary investigations of public officials and monitors criminal investigations and prosecutions, as well as other state agencies’ actions. Breaking the Grip? 2 I. Summary and Recommendations In Colombia, more than in almost any other country in the Western hemisphere, violence has corroded and subverted democracy. Too often, killings and threats—not free elections or democratic dialogue—are what has determined who holds power, wealth, and influence in the country. Nowhere is this more evident than in the relationship between paramilitary groups and important sectors of the political system, the military, and the economic elite. Paramilitary groups have ravaged much of Colombia for two decades. Purporting to fight the equally brutal guerrillas of the left, they have massacred, tortured, forcibly "disappeared", and sadistically killed countless men, women, and children. Wherever they have gone, they have eliminated anyone who opposed them, including thousands of trade unionists, human rights defenders, community leaders, judges, and ordinary civilians. To their enormous profit, they have forced hundreds of thousands of small landowners, peasants, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous persons to flee their families’ productive lands. The paramilitaries and their supporters have often taken the abandoned lands, leaving the surviving victims to live in squalor on city fringes, and leaving Colombia second only to Sudan as the country with the most internally displaced people in the world. With their growing clout aided by drug-trafficking, extortion, and other criminal activities, paramilitaries have made mafia-style alliances with powerful landowners and businessmen in their areas of operation; military units, which have often looked the other way or worked with them; and state officials, including numerous members of the Colombian Congress, who have secured their posts through paramilitaries’ ability to corrupt and intimidate. Through these alliances, paramilitaries and their cronies have acquired massive wealth and political influence, subverting democracy and the rule of law. But Colombia now has before it a rare opportunity to uncover and break the influence of these networks by holding paramilitaries and their accomplices 3 Human Rights Watch October 2008 accountable. In the last two years, paramilitary commanders have started
Load more

Recommended publications
  • PARAMILITARIES Kill Suspected Supporters of the FARC
    UniTeD SelF-DeFenSe FoRCeS oF ColoMBiA (AUC) PARAMiliTARY TRooPS, lA GABARRA, noRTe De SAnTAnDeR, DeCeMBeR 10, 2004 PARAMiliTARieS kill suspected supporters of the FARC. By 1983, locals reported DEATh TO KIDNAPPERs cases of army troops and MAS fighters working together to assas- sinate civilians and burn farms.5 After the 1959 Cuban revolution, the U.S. became alarmed power and wealth, to the point that by 2004 the autodefensas had this model of counterinsurgency proved attractive to the Colom- that Marxist revolts would break out elsewhere in latin Ameri- taken over much of the country. bian state. on a 1985 visit to Puerto Boyacá, President Belisario Be- ca. in 1962, an Army special warfare team arrived in Colombia to As they expanded their control across Colombia, paramil- tancur reportedly declared, “every inhabitant of Magdalena Medio help design a counterinsurgency strategy for the Colombian armed itary militias forcibly displaced over a million persons from the has risen up to become a defender of peace, next to our army, next to forces. even though the FARC and other insurgent groups had not land.3 By official numbers, as of 2011, the autodefensas are estimat- our police… Continue on, people of Puerto Boyacá!”6 yet appeared on the scene, U.S. advisers recommended that a force ed to have killed at least 140,000 civilians including hundreds of Soon, landowners, drug traffickers, and security forces set made up of civilians be used “to perform counteragent and coun- trade unionists, teachers, human rights defenders, rural organiz- up local autodefensas across Colombia. in 1987, the Minister of terpropaganda functions and, as necessary, execute paramilitary, ers, politicians, and journalists who they labelled as sympathetic government César gaviria testified to the existence of 140 ac- sabotage, and/or terrorist activities against known communist pro- to the guerrillas.3 tive right-wing militias in the country.7 Many sported macabre ponents.
    [Show full text]
  • COLOMBIA the Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links
    February 2000 Vol. 12 No. 1 (B) COLOMBIA The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................2 COLOMBIA AND MILITARY-PARAMILITARY LINKS .......................................................................................................................6 THIRD BRIGADE .....................................................................................................................................................6 FOURTH BRIGADE................................................................................................................................................10 THIRTEENTH BRIGADE.......................................................................................................................................19 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Human Rights Watch here presents detailed, abundant, and compelling evidence of continuing close ties between the Colombian Army and paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations. This information was compiled by Colombian government investigators and Human Rights Watch. Several of our sources, including eyewitnesses, requested anonymity because their lives have been under threat as a result of their testimony. Far from moving decisively to sever ties to paramilitaries, Human Rights Watch=s evidence strongly suggests that Colombia=s military high command has yet to take the necessary steps to accomplish
    [Show full text]
  • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002
    Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002 Requested date: 2002 Release date: 2003 Posted date: 08-February-2021 Source of document: Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 Filing a FOIA Records Request Online The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. 1 O ct 2000_30 April 2002 Creation Date Requester Last Name Case Subject 36802.28679 STRANEY TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH OF INDIA; HONG KONG; CHINA AND WTO 36802.2992 CRAWFORD EIGHT DIFFERENT REQUESTS FOR REPORTS REGARDING CIA EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS 36802.43927 MONTAN EDWARD GRADY PARTIN 36802.44378 TAVAKOLI-NOURI STEPHEN FLACK GUNTHER 36810.54721 BISHOP SCIENCE OF IDENTITY FOUNDATION 36810.55028 KHEMANEY TI LEAF PRODUCTIONS, LTD.
    [Show full text]
  • Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card
    ENDING COLOMBIA’S FARC CONFLICT: DEALING THE RIGHT CARD Latin America Report N°30 – 26 March 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FARC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES................................................................... 2 A. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ...................................................................................................................4 B. AN ORGANISATION UNDER STRESS ..............................................................................................5 1. Strategy and tactics ......................................................................................................................5 2. Combatant strength and firepower...............................................................................................7 3. Politics, recruitment, indoctrination.............................................................................................8 4. Withdrawal and survival ..............................................................................................................9 5. Urban warfare ............................................................................................................................11 6. War economy .............................................................................................................................12
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia: the U.S
    UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Simulation on Colombia: The U.S. Response to the Changing Nature of International Conflict This simulation provides participants with a profound understanding of the political agendas, options, and dynamics at play within the US. foreign policy apparatus when prospects of foreign intervention by the U.S. military are under consideration. Participants grapple with a scenario of increasing political and economic crisis in Colombia, and debate the decisions that U.S. policy- makers must consider in defining an appropriate American response to help bring stability to that country. Simulation participants role-play officials from the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, members of human rights organizations, and journalists representing various U.S. media. In representing their particular positions in these challenging negotiations, participants will have ample opportunity to consider the broader implications of the scenario on U.S. foreign policy and international conflict in general. Simulation on Colombia: The U.S. Response to the Changing Nature of International Conflict Simulation on Colombia: The U.S. Response to the Changing Nature of International Conflict Table of Contents Introduction ...................................................................................... 4 Materials............................................................................................ 5 Scenario ............................................................................................ 6
    [Show full text]
  • Women, Conflict- Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process Ben Keenan/Trocaire Contents
    Colombia: Women, Conflict- Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process Ben Keenan/Trocaire Contents Executive Summary 1 Recommendations 3 1.0 Background to the Conflict 5 1.1 The Prospect of Peace 1.2 Land and displacement 1.3 Poverty and inequality 2.0 Conflict Related Sexual Violence 7 2.1 Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Women 2.2 Children, sexual violence and the conflict 2.3 Sexual violence and economic interests 3.0 Modus Operandi of Sexual Violence in Conflict 10 3.1 Sexual and gender violence used for social control 3.2 Sexual violence and sexual slavery 3.3 Sexual violence within armed operations 3.4 Sexual violence and the Security Forces 4.0 Access to Justice and Reparation 13 4.1 Social stigmatisation 4.2 Patriarchal attitudes and re-victimisation in the administration of justice 4.3 Impunity and the Rule of Law 4.4 Policies and laws 4.5 Gender Equality Law 1257 4.6 Constitutional Court Auto 092 of 2008 4.7 Investigation and prosecution 4.8 The Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448 4.9 Health and psycho-social support 4.10 Marco Para La Paz (Legal Framework for Peace) 5.0 Women and the Construction of Peace 21 5.1 Women defenders and community leaders 5.2 Women as peace builders 5.3 International instruments 1 Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process Executive Summary The magnitude of conflict-related sexual violence against women in Colombia is yet to be fully understood. It is a crime that is massively underreported. Where it is reported women encounter major obstacles to accessing the justice system including extremely high levels of impunity.
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia Country Assessment/Bulletins
    COLOMBIA COUNTRY ASSESSMENT October 2001 Country Information and Policy Unit CONTENTS 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 - 1.5 2. GEOGRAPHY 2.1 - 2.2 3. HISTORY 3.1 – 3.38 Recent history 3.1 - 3.28 Current political situation 3.29 - 3.38 4. INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE 4.1 – 4.60 Political System 4.1 Security 4.2 - 4.19 Armed forces 4.3 - 4.18 Military service 4.12 - 4.18 Police 4.19 - 4.28 DAS 4.29 - 4.30 The Judiciary 4.33 - 4.41 The Prison System 4.42 - 4.44 Key Social Issues 4.45 - 4.76 The Drugs Trade 4.45 - 4.57 Extortion 4.58 - 4.61 4.62 - 4.76 Kidnapping 5. HUMAN RIGHTS 5A: HUMAN RIGHTS: GENERAL ASSESSMENT A.1 – A.176 Introduction A.1 - A.3 Paramilitary, Guerrilla and other groups A.4 - A.32 FARC A.4 - A. 17 Demilitarized Zone around San Vicente del Caguan A.18 - A.31 ELN A.32 - A.48 EPL A.49 Paramilitaries A.50 - A.75 The security forces A.76 - A.96 Human rights defenders A.97 - A.111 The role of the government and the international community A.112 - A.123 The peace talks A.124 - A.161 Plan Colombia A.162 - A.176 5B: HUMAN RIGHTS: SPECIFIC GROUPS B.1 - B.35 Women B.1 - B.3 Homosexuals B.4 - B.5 Religious freedom B.9 - B.11 Healthcare system B.11 - B.29 People with disabilities B.30 Ethnic minority groups B.31 - B.46 Race B.32 - B.34 Indigenous People B.35 - B.38 Children B.39 - B.46 5C: HUMAN RIGHTS: OTHER ISSUES C.1 - C.43 Freedom of political association C.1 - C.16 Union Patriotica (UP) C.6- C.13 Other Parties C.14 - C.16 Freedom of speech and press C.17 - C.23 Freedom of assembly C.24 - C.28 Freedom of the individual C.29 - C.31 Freedom of travel/internal flight C.32 - C.34 Internal flight C.35 - C.45 Persecution within the terms of the 1951 UN Convention C.46 ANNEX A: POLITICAL, GUERRILLA & SELF-DEFENCE UNITS (PARAMILITARY) ANNEX B: ACRONYMS ANNEX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.
    [Show full text]
  • La Alianza De Paramilitares Y Polticos En Colombia
    1 LA ALIANZA DE PARAMILITARES Y POLÍTICOS EN COLOMBIA Revista Semana Noviembre 2006 Un genio del mal La maquinaria que 'Jorge 40' montó a sangre y fuego en Cesar resultó un fenómeno asombroso de eficiencia electoral. SEMANA estuvo en este departamento, que lucha por reponerse de los embates de la violencia. Cuando estalló la crisis de la parapolítica, en Valledupar no hubo sorpresa. "Eso estaba visto. Tan visto, que hasta Leandro Díaz lo había visto", dice la gente en la calle. El viejo Leandro Díaz es un venerado compositor vallenato, ciego. Y es que los paramilitares empezaron a controlar la política ante los ojos de todos. Abiertamente, los paramilitares crearon distritos electorales y candidaturas únicas. De frente, obligaron a renunciar a los aspirantes y funcionarios que no les servían. Sin necesidad de esconderse, han defraudado la salud, las obras públicas y las regalías. La historia de la política en Cesar, en los últimos años, está unida a la historia sobre cómo 'Jorge 40' construyó su imperio. Una historia llena de ambición, corrupción, impunidad, traición y muerte, que empezó dos décadas atrás. En los años 80 las más importantes familias de Cesar, los Araújo, los Castro, los Pupo, entre otras, se encontraron, de la noche a la mañana, frente a la crisis económica. La caída del algodón los afectó a todos. "La gente de la plaza", como se les conoce en Valledupar, porque sus enormes caserones rodean la plaza Alfonso López, no sólo estaban endeudadas hasta el cuello, sino que empezó a esfumarse la influencia política que otrora gozaron. El Cesar, que durante años puso ministros, embajadores y congresistas, estaba completamente rezagado.
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia's New Armed Groups
    COLOMBIA’S NEW ARMED GROUPS Latin America Report N°20 – 10 May 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MORE THAN CRIMINAL GANGS?.......................................................................... 2 A. THE AUC AS PREDECESSOR ..................................................................................................3 B. THE NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS ......................................................................................6 III. CASE STUDIES.............................................................................................................. 8 A. NORTE DE SANTANDER .........................................................................................................8 1. AUC history in the region..........................................................................................8 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations ..............................8 3. Conflict dynamics....................................................................................................10 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................11 B. NARIÑO ..............................................................................................................................11 1. AUC history in the region........................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Research Going Beyond Drug Seizures COCAINE Cocaine Insights Table of Contents INSIGHTS
    The illicit trade of cocaine from Latin America to Europe from oligopolies to free-for-all? Research Going Beyond Drug Seizures COCAINE Cocaine Insights Table of Contents INSIGHTS The cocaine market presents a clear threat at global level. THE ILLICIT TRADE OF COCAINE FROM LATIN AMERICA Well-defined locations of production in South America and TO EUROPE – FROM OLIGOPOLIES TO FREE-FOR-ALL? large consumer markets in the Americas and Europe lead to trafficking routes from a circumscribed origin to specific, Key findings 3 even if far-flung, destinations. While some parts of the world play a crucial role as transit regions, the routes, modali- Future prospects for the European cocaine 4 ties and networks employed by criminal actors continue to market evolve, diversify and become more efficient. The increasingly globalized, interconnected, digitalized and technologically UNODC perspective and policy implications 4 sophisticated nature of society, as well as a growing affluent demographic in some regions where cocaine use has tradi- Changes in Colombia’s landscape and implica- 7 tionally been low, can potentially catalyse and accelerate the tions for Europe dynamism and expansion of the market. The global cocaine trade and the role of criminal 8 The series Cocaine Insights, developed by UNODC in the networks framework of the CRIMJUST programme and in coopera- tion with partners and stakeholders at national, regional Recent developments in cocaine trafficking to 11 and international levels, delivers the latest knowledge and Europe trends on issues related to cocaine markets in an accessible and informative format. European actors in Latin America and challenges 18 to established supply chains Suggested citation: UNODC and EUROPOL, The illicit trade of cocaine from Latin America to Europe – from oligopolies to free- Latin American criminal networks maintaining a 25 for-all?, Cocaine Insights 1, UNODC, Vienna, September 2021.
    [Show full text]
  • La Guajira En Su Laberinto Transformaciones Y Desafios De La Violencia
    La Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) es un centro de pensamiento creado en 1999 por un grupo de empresarios colombianos. Su misión es generar conocimiento de manera objetiva y proponer iniciativas que contribuyan a la superación del conflicto armado en Colombia y a la construcción de una paz sostenible, desde el respeto por los derechos humanos, la pluralidad y la preeminencia de lo público. La FIP con independencia se ha propuesto como tarea central contribuir de manera eficaz a la comprensión de todos los escenarios que surgen de los conflictos en Colombia, en particular desde sus dimensiones política, social y militar. Como centro de pensamiento mantiene la convicción de que el conflicto colombiano necesariamente concluirá con una negociación o una serie de negociaciones de paz que requerirán la debida preparación y asistencia técnica. Como parte de su razón de ser llama la Informes FIP atención sobre la importancia de preparar al país para escenarios de postconflicto. La Guajira en su laberinto transformaciones y desafios de la violencia Gerson Iván Arias Milena Peralta Carolina Serrano Carlos Prieto Miguel Ortega Carol Barajas Joanna Rojas Roa Agosto de 2011 Fundación Ideas para la paz La Guajira en su laberinto transformaciones y desafios de la violencia Gerson Iván Arias Milena Peralta Carolina Serrano Carlos Prieto Miguel Ortega Carol Barajas Joanna Rojas Roa Agosto de 2011 Serie Informes No. 12 2 • www.ideaspaz.org/publicaciones • Contenido La Guajira en su laberinto transformaciones y desafios de la violencia 4 1. Introducción 5 2. Contexto geográfico e histórico 6 2.1. Contrabando y contexto de la ilegalidad en La Guajira 8 2.2.
    [Show full text]
  • United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
    UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Welcome Letter from the Secretary General It is with my utmost pleasure to welcome you all to the 3rd annual session of EKIN Junior Model United Nations. My name is Isabella Yazici and I will be serving as your Secretary General. Our conference will take place in Izmir, Turkey between the 11th and the 13th of January, 2019. In alliance with our annual slogan imagine, innovate, inspire we are aiming for younger generations to comprehend that they have the capability of changing the world. As Albert Einstein once said, “In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.” This year in EKIN JMUN we will simulate 12 extraordinary committees. In light of these words, these committees will focus on finding the spark of light within all of the darkness and try to solve the crises both our world and the conference presents. I fully believe that every participant will do their best to make the world a better place. Both the academic and organizational team have worked many hours to bring you the best version of EKIN JMUN and an overall inspiring, unforgettable experience that will stay with you your whole life. To come to a conclusion, on behalf of our academic and organizational team I would like to invite you to the third annual session of the biggest JMUN organization in the region. I cannot wait to meet you in January. Sincerely, Isabella Yazici EKINJMUN 2019 SG Introduction A) Introduction to the committee The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, or the UNODC for short is a United Nations office that was established in 1997 under the name of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention.
    [Show full text]