Anarchism: a History of Human Judgement These Principles Cannot Always Be Applied
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ernments have no right to our obedience. Reason, exercised independently in the discovery of justice, is the only true role of conduct. If every man listened to its voice, there would be a society of unconstrained concord. But it may be granted that in the present imperfect state of Anarchism: A History of human judgement these principles cannot always be applied. Libertarian Ideas and Crime occurs, and, though punishment is in its nature unjust, restraint may be unavoidable. Yet men are what they are, God- Movements win insists, because of the environment that has shaped them, and we must therefore abolish the social causes that make re- straint necessary. ‘He that would reconcile a perfect freedom in this respect with the interest of the whole, ought to propose George Woodcock at the same time the means of extirpating selfishness and vice.’ In considering the question of necessary restraint, Godwin asks in what manner the supercession of private judgement for the sake of public good may, where necessary, be carried out. And this in turn leads him ‘to ascertain the foundation of political government’. He begins with three hypotheses com- monly advanced. The first two — that government originates in the right of might and that it originates in divine right — he dismisses as alien to the concept of an immutable justice. The third hypothesis is that of the social contract, deriving from Locke and Rousseau and commonly held by radicals in the eigh- teenth century. Godwin departs emphatically from the men of his age on this point, and anticipates the anarchists of the nineteenth century by dismissing the social contract also as a basis for political justice. It seeks to bind one generation by the promises of another. It negates the obligation of each indi- vidual to exercise his private judgement on what is right. It is based on the fallacious idea that we must fulfil our promises, whereas we should make no promises at all, but perform acts only because they are just. Godwin hastens to add that an emphasis on the duty of private judgement does not preclude common action. Indeed, 1962 when measures have to be adopted for the general good, 80 morality. Clearly, duty can only demand that we serve the gen- eral good according to the full extent of our capacities. On the other hand, neither incapacity nor ignorance can give the qual- ity of justice to an unjust act. And so, while men cannot expect to be absolutely virtuous, they should endeavour to form ‘vir- tuous dispositions’. But a virtuous disposition cannot be im- posed; it can only be cultivated by each man within himself. It ‘is principally generated by the uncontrolled exercise of pri- vate judgement and the rigid conformity of every man to the dictates of his conscience’. If we insist on this autonomy of the individual judgement, then we follow the path of the radical Dissenters to a declar- tion of the moral equality of men. Physically and mentally men may be unequal, though Godwin believes that such differences are exaggerated, but morally all men are equal because of their essential independence. Justice must be applied to them in equal measure, and opportunities and encouragement should be given without discrimination. Man has duties to truth and to morality, which is an aspect of truth. But has he rights? No man, Godwin answers, has the right ‘to act anything but virtue and to utter anything but truth’. What he does have, strictly speaking, are not rights, but claims on the assistance of his fellows under reciprocal justice. Many things commonly regarded as rights, such as freedom of conscience or speech, should be sought not because men have a right to them but because they are essential for the attainment of moral truth. Society and government have neither claims nor rights. They exist only for the convenience of individuals. And here Godwin comes to the perennial confusion between justice and humas law. The first, he argues, is based on immutable moral truths, the second on the fallible decisions of political institutions. Man must recognize what is right by his own understanding, and here it is evidence, not authority, that should move him. It follows from this reasoning that gov- 79 ing principle — a moral principle — is Justice, which Godwin defines as ‘a rule of conduct originating in the connexion ofone percipient being with another’. Justice demands that we do ev- erything in our power to assist other individuals according to their need and worth; it sees our persons and our property as Contents things we hold in trust for mankind. ‘I am bound,’ Godwin de- clares, ‘to employ my talents, my understanding, my strength and my time for the production of the greatest quantity of gen- 1. Prologue 5 eral good.’ Yet we should beware of setting up the general good, or society itself, as something above or outside individuals. It is always what is good and just between individuals that is good PART ONE: THE IDEA 34 and just for society. For ‘society is nothing more than an ag- 2. The Family Tree 35 gregation of individuals. Its claims and duties must be the ag- gregate of their claims and duties, the one no more precarious 3. The Man of Reason 60 and arbitrary than the other.’ The purpose of society is to do for its members ‘everything that can contribute to their wel- 4. The Egoist 98 fare. But the nature of their welfare is defined by the nature of mind. That will most contribute to it which enlarges theun- 5. The Man of Paradox 112 derstanding, supplies incitements to virtue, fills us with a gen- erous conscience of our independence and carefully removes 6. The Destructive Urge 155 whatever can impede our exertions.’ 7. The Explorer 198 Society, in other words, is best employed when it assists man to be a moral being. But here we come to another direction of 8. The Prophet 240 relationship. If man’s links with society are a kind of horizon- tal pattern of magnified connexions between individuals, his relationship to morality is a vertical one. For, Godwin insists, PART TWO: THE MOVEMENT 255 Morality is, if anything can be, fixed and im- 9. International Endeavours 256 mutable; and there must surely be some strange deception that should induce us to give an action 10. Anarchism in France 295 eternally and unchangeably wrong the epithets of rectitude, duty and virtue. 11. Anarchism in Italy 352 The difficulty arises when we come to consider howman, 12. Anarchism in Spain 384 bounded by the limits of his perception, is to establish the verti- cal relationship with those absolute truths that constitute ideal 78 3 13. Anarchism in Russia 432 as if it were the nature of mind always to degener- ate and never to advance. 14. Various Traditions: Anarchism in Latin Amer- ica, Northern Europe, Britain, and the United Godwin’s third proposition is really a corollary of the States 461 second; government is as bad in practice as it is in princi- ple. In demonstrating this, he concentrates mostly on the 15. Epilogue 509 vast economic differences between the classes of his own eighteenth century world. Both legislation and the operation Postscript 519 of laws work in favour of the rich, and, indeed, it is in the Selected Bibliography 533 nature of politic institutions, by giving power and privilege to individuals, ‘greatly to enhance the imagined excellence of wealth’. Godwn| was one of the first to describe clearly the intimate link between property and power which has made the anarchists enemies of capitalism as well as of the state. The fourth basic proposition is the celebrated statement on the perfectibility of man. ‘Perfectibility is one of the most un- equivocal characteristics of the human species, so that the po- litical as well as the intellectual state of man may be presumed to be in a course of progressive improvement.’ Godwin rein- forces this bold statement by a comparison between primitive and the civilized states of man, and maintains, with a naivety worthy of the early Ruskin, that even in the arts a constant im- provement has been evident. Subsequently, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, he was to deny any such Utopian intent and to maintain that he meant merely that man was capable of indefinite improvement. And even here his progressivism differs from the customary Victorian type in that it is primar- ily moral, and envisages as its principal goal an inner change in the individual that will take him to the condition of natural justice from which his subjection to political institutions had diverted him. It is on Justice that Godwin lays the stress as he begins to develop from his four basic statements a discussion of the prin- ciples of society. Society, he maintains, originated in men’s consciousness of the need for mutual assistance, and its mov- 4 77 He begins with four basic propositions. First, he claims that ‘the moral characters of men are the result of their perceptions’, and that neither good nor bad is born into us. If this is the case, the elimination of harmful external factors can also eliminate criminal tendencies from the characters of human beings. But 1. Prologue it is not merely a question of acting upon people by changing their environments. We have to awaken their minds as well, for voluntary actions originate in judgements of goodness or ‘Whoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist,’ desirability, and are therefore acts of reason. As such, they said Sebastien Faure. The definition is tempting in its simplic- can be changed by rational persuasion, and even the power of ity, but simplicity is the first thing to guard against in writing a environment can often be countered by the proper influencing history of anarchism.