The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia Melisa R. Serrano and Vera Eileen V. Pupos

Mapping Trade Union Context and Possibilities to Organise

BWI Building and Wood Workers’ International www.bwint.org BWI is the Global Union Federation grouping free and democratic unions with members in the Building, Building Materials, Wood, Forestry and Allied sectors. BWI brings together around 334 trade unions representing around 12 million members in 130 countries. The Headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland while the Regional Offices are in Panama, Malaysia, and South Africa. Our mission is to defend and advance workers’ rights, and to improve working and living conditions in our sectors. The BWI, above all, has a rights-based approach. We believe that trade union rights are human rights and are based on equality, solidarity and democracy, and that trade unions are indispensable to good governance. BWI goals include 1) to promote and defend human and trade union rights; 2) to increase trade union strength; 3) to promote a stable and high level of employment in our sectors; and 4) to influence policy and strengthen the capacity of institutions and tripartite structures in our sectors.

©2019 Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI). Parts of this publication may be excerpted or cited as long as the source is acknowledged.

About the authors Dr. Melisa R. Serrano is Associate Professor and Vera Eileen V. Pupos is University Extension Specialist at the School of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Dr. Serrano wrote this paper. V.E.V. Pupos prepared the database and a summary of the general findings and country-level findings from the Asia BRI database. The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Contents

Foreword iv

Introduction 1

BRI progress: A reality check 3 The missing employment dimension of BRI 4 Political Economy Overview of the Region 5

The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia: “Debt-trap” diplomacy or developmental strategy for poorer countries? 8 Infrastructure investment gaps in Asia 9 BRI projects in Asia 10 Challenges and concerns facing BRI 11 Chinese workers in overseas BRI projects 12

Country Level Situation and Plans of BRI 13 A concentration of BRI projects in five countries 13 BRI projects in Pakistan 13 BRI projects in Cambodia 14 BRI projects in Bangladesh 14 BRI projects in Myanmar 15 From cautious diplomacy to outright critique: BRI in Viet Nam and India 15

Trade Union and Workers’ Rights Context 17 Ratification of ILO core conventions 17 Violations on freedom of association and collective bargaining rights 18 A difficult legal framework for unionization and collective bargaining 18

BWI Presence in the Region 20

Prospects of Unionization in BRI 20

Findings from the Database 21

List of Figures and Tables Figure 1: Belt and Road by numbers (2018) 1 Table 1: Key financing sources of BRI projects 2 Table 2: The funding mechanism of BRI 3 Figure 2: Democracy Index of Selected Asian Countries 5 Table 3: Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Region, 45 Developing Member Countries, 2016–2030 9 Table 4: Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Sector, 45 Developing Member Countries, 2016–2030 9 Figure 3: Selected BRI projects in Southeast Asia 10 Table 5: Ratification of ILO Core Conventions 17 Table 6: Labour Rights Indicators: Violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining in law and in practice 18 Table 7: Union density in the study countries based on available most recent data 19 Table 8: BWI affiliates in selected BRI countries 20 Table 9: Project cost of BRI projects in selected Asian countries 21

iii Building and Wood Workers’ International

Foreword

The Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) is pleased to present its multi-region study on one of the most ambitious and economically and geopolitically significant infrastructure projects in the next 5 years – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of the People’s Republic of China.

BRI, inspired by the ancient Silk Road, is a multi-country and multi-region cooperation project aimed at facilitating sustainable development within the frame of economic cooperation based on market rules and international norms, geared for mutual benefits and inclusivity and tolerance.

BWI, as the global union for building-construction workers, sees its massive implications to its sectors, its affiliated unions, and to millions of workers in the covered regions and countries.

As it spawns major infrastructure projects and create employment for our represented sectors in the supply chain of building industry, it is imperative that decent work governs this global undertaking. Trade unions have to be present in the work sites to represent workers as they exercise their freedom of association, negotiate fair wages, institutionally ensure safe working conditions, and influence policy regimes that will affect their societies.

To perform the representation role of BWI as a global union and of its affiliates as national and work place representatives, we need the knowledge base that can help us locate the precisely related projects, assess the labour relations context and possibilities in the country, map the employment of workers and possible unions that can organise them, and to identify the current or future financial institutions and construction companies.

With this backdrop, BWI has undertaken a research project to make a preliminary map of the whole chain of the BRI. While the elements mentioned above shall be covered in the study, the central aim of the undertaking is having an “internal organising map” to ensure decent work through trade unions are achieved within the big chain. Future case studies on how the projects are being implemented based on the criteria of ILO core labour standards are also foreseen in next phases of this long-term initiative.

While decent work is the heart of the agenda of BWI, BRI has multi-dimensional impact as debates about developmental policies, trade relations, debt traps, geopolitical positioning, community displacements, labour laws reforms, guidelines of development funding by IFIs, and even cultural threats simmer around this mega-construction project. Trade unions as social actors will have to deal with the related issues eventually.

The research project is part and parcel of BWI Solidarity Projects’ developmental objective which is to actively contribute to creating strong and autonomous, gender-fair and democratic trade unions that fight for both trade union and human rights as well as for decent employment and living conditions for all building, wood and forestry workers [BWI Strategic Goal].

This project aimed for the following: ྲྲ To map the Belt and Road Initiative in relation to the location of its affiliates and analyse the potentials and limitations of union organising and representation. ྲྲ To assist BWI in developing a comprehensive strategy document for BRI organising and engagement for decent work by mid-2020.

The descriptive and analytical parts (the Regional Reports) of this project are publicly available while the organising map and projects database is for internal BWI use. We are cognizant that some needed information about the BRI projects may not be immediately available thus we view the database as a work in progress that will be updated as new data becomes available.

We would like to thank the report writers Agnieszka Ghinararu (Summary Report and Pan-Europe Report), Melisa R. Serrano and Vera Eileen V. Pupos (Asia Report) and Davids Etyang (East Africa Report).

We also express our gratitude for the continuing solidarity support of FNV Mondiaal of Netherlands and Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung of Germany and our affiliates in both countries for the technical and financial contribution in making this study a reality.

Ambet Yuson General Secretary Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) 30 November 2019 iv The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Introduction

Launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents China’s unprecedented ambition to improve the country’s connectivity with more than 65 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa. The core components of BRI include physical infrastructure (roads, railways, pipelines, transmission networks), trade and investment financial flows, and people-to-people exchanges. Asa revival of the iconic land and maritime Silk Road,1 BRI is widely seen as “China’s landmark globalization, development, and soft power strategy, and is strongly associated with President Xi’s leadership.”2 BRI’s strategic priorities are the following: support China’s “Go Global” policy; increase exports to BRI countries; promote industrial restructuring among Chinese firms; strengthen China’s geopolitical role; strengthen the renminbi’s (RMB) global role; and reduce the country’s industrial oversupply.3 Figure 1: One Belt One Road China’s modern-day adaptation of the ancient Silk Road aims to revive the routes via a network of railways, ports pipelines and highways

Source: Reproduced from Belt and Road by numbers. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.sc.com/en/feature/belt-and-road-by-the-numbers/

According to Boucher, China has grown its economy for the past 10 or more years by building infrastructure (i.e. roads, high-speed rail, and ports) within its borders.4 But as the infrastructure in China produces declining returns, the BRI gives China’s infrastructure firms access to other markets abroad. Thus, the big construction firms in China—the Gezhouba Group, the China Railway Group, and the China Communications Construction Company—are the big names in the BRI. Therefore, the BRI is an upgrade of China’s “Going Out” or “Go Global” strategy which was adopted in the 1990s, pushing Chinese businesses and industries to internationalize and invest abroad. China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been facing overcapacity issues domestically, especially in steel, cement, coal, and chemical industries.5 Meanwhile, rising demand in fast-growing developing economies, which comprise the bulk of BRI countries, clearly presents opportunities for Chinese metals, building materials, and construction equipment firms, particularly in light of weaker domestic activity in such sectors in China. Chinese firms engaged in BRI projects will also lean heavily on local suppliers. The BRI is thus seen as a strategy to export China’s industrial overcapacity.

1 The Silk Road was “a vast and ancient network of trade routes linking China’s merchants with those of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe” which “took place in the seventh century, after war had made it unusable for hundreds of years. Xi Jinping, China’s president, looks back on that era as a golden age, a time of Pax Sinica, when Chinese luxuries were coveted across the globe and the Silk Road was a conduit for diplomacy and economic expansion. The term itself was coined by a German geographer in the 19th century, but China has adopted it with relish.” See: The Economist (2016, July 2). Our bulldozers, our rules. The Economist. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/ china/2016/07/02/our-bulldozers-our-rules 2 Kohli, H. 2018. Looking at China’s Belt and Road Initiative from the Central Asian Perspective. Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies 9(1-3): 3-11. 3 Baker McKenzie (2017). Belt & Road: Opportunity & Risk, p. 6. Retrieved from https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/ publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf 4 Boucher, R. (2019, March 29). China’s Belt and Road: A Reality Check. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas- belt-and-road-a-reality-check/ 5 Friends of the Earth United States (2016). China’s Belt & Road Initiative: An Introduction. Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Earth U.S., p. 6. 1 Building and Wood Workers’ International

There are seven major land and maritime corridors currently included in the BRI: New Eurasian Land Bridge, from Western China to Europe; China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor, from Northern China to Eastern Russia; China–Central Asia–Western Asia Corridor, from Western China to Turkey; China–Indochina Peninsula Corridor, from Southern China to Singapore; China–Myanmar–Bangladesh–India Corridor, from Southern China to India; China–Pakistan Corridor, from Southwest China to Pakistan; and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), from the Chinese coast/South China down to Singapore and across to Mediterranean through Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea.

The countries that have so far joined the BRI cover 69% of the world’s population and roughly 51% of global gross domestic product.6 The magnitude of investments anticipated under the BRI is massive: The Economist (2016) reports that, according to the Chinese government, US$890 billion worth of investments have already been disbursed for BRI-related projects, with an expected total Chinese investment of US$4 trillion over the course of the initiative.7 It should be noted, however, that Chinese banks have already been investing in BRI countries for over a decade prior to the formal launch of the BRI as a national Chinese initiative. These projects have been constituted as BRI projects as well. Thus, it is likely that the amount includes older projects which predate the announcement of the BRI.

Financing sources for BRI projects include Chinese policy and commercial banks, state-owned enterprises equity, bonds, peer to peer lending, private Chinese equity, private-public partnerships, and others. While China is actively encouraging parallel financing of BRI projects by other parties, to date, “the bulk of BRI- related investments still appear to be conceived, driven, and primarily financed by China and financial institutions controlled by Beijing.8 Table 1 lists the key investment sources for BRI projects. Table 2 presents the funding mechanism of BRI. So far, the majority of investments have been in infrastructure, energy, and mining, ranging from standard gauge railway in Kenya to hydropower projects in Cambodia and lignite coal power plants in Pakistan.9

Table 1: Key financing sources of BRI projects

Financing source Type of projects financed Chinese policy banks: China Development Bank, China Export Transportation energy, roads, railways, ports, power resources, Import Bank pipelines, communication, industrial parks Chinese largest commercial banks: Industrial and Commercial Bank of Same projects financed by Chinese policy banks China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of Communications (BOC) State-owned enterprises (may function as an investor, developer, or Energy, oil and gas, telecommunications, shipping contractor to a project) Silk Road Fund (a US$40 billion private equity fund) Infrastructure, resources and energy development, industrial capacity cooperation, financial cooperation Green Silk Road Fund The first equity investment fund dedicated to eco-environment improve- ment and development of eco-friendly photovoltaic clean energy Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Infrastructure, energy and power, transportation, telecommunications, rural infrastructure, agriculture development, water supply and sanita- tion, environmental protection, urban development, logistics New Development Bank Infrastructure and sustainable development China Ocean Strategic Industry Investment Fund (COSIIF) (launched Investment in businesses with potential, infrastructure by Hong Kong-based Golden Grain Capital Management Limited, with Dubai-based Elyseum Capital Partners as a major partner) China-Central Eastern Europe Fund Infrastructure, high tech manufacturing, consumer goods (in Central and Eastern Europe and may extend to Western Europe)

Source: Friends of the Earth United States (2016). China’s Belt & Road Initiative: An Introduction. Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Earth U.S., pp. 6-7.

6 Baker McKenzie (2017: 7). 7 The Economist (2016). 8 Kohli (2018: 4). 9 Baker McKenzie (2017: 2). 2 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Table 2: The funding mechanism of BRI

Funding mechanism (US$ billion) Institutions Authorized capital size Recent lending per year Possible lending per year by early 2020s Multilateral Development Banks Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 100 1.7 10 - 15 New Development Bank 100 1 - 1.5 5 - 7 Silk Road Fund 40 2 - 3 2 - 3 Commercial Banks An estimated US$90 billion annual lending by the “big four” banks in 2016 Policy Banks China Development Bank (CDB) - 15 (2015) Export-Import Bank of China - 24 (2015)

Source: Reproduced from Sarker, M.N.I; Hossin, M.A.; Yin, X.; and Sarkar, M.K. (2018). One Belt One Road Initiative of China: Implica- tion for Future of Global Development. Modern Economy 9: 623-638. Retrieved from file.scirp.org/pdf/ME_2018041715192752.pdf

The mechanism in developing BRI projects involves the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between China and a BRI country. Bilateral and multilateral agreements and investment treaties are the other ways to promote trade and investment in BRI countries. As of June 2016, China has signed bilateral investment treaties with 104 countries. In facilitating project investment, the Chinese government has also signed numerous implementation plans and cooperation agreements with various countries. These documents are rich sources of information about BRI projects in specific countries. However, they are kept hidden from the public. BRI progress: A reality check

What has been the progress of BRI to date? In 2017, The Economist reported that the BRI “has been long on rhetoric and short on implementation.”10 According to the same report, merchandise trade between China and the 65 BRI countries has remained fairly constant: In 2016, two-way trade reached US$962.6 billion, accounting for 25.8% of China’s external trade, while in the years since 2013, this number hovered around 25%. In the first quarter of 2017, this proportion rose to 26.7%. In addition, China’s exports to the BRI countries have performed better than its imports. The BRI countries’ share of the value of Chinese exports stood at 27.9% in 2016, compared with 25.8% in 2013. The rising share of Chinese exports heading to the BRI regions may confirm what has been pointed out earlier—that the initiative is designed to help export China’s industrial overcapacity.

Meanwhile, imports from the BRI countries comprised 23% of China’s inbound shipments in 2016, down from 24.1% in 2013. In fact, China’s imports from BRI countries declined by an annual average of 7.5% in period 2014-2016. The Economist notes that there is a risk that the already-large trade surplus China maintains with the BRI regions could rise significantly. In 2016, China had an accumulated trade surplus of US$231.8 billion with the BRI countries.11 The Economist warns: “A failure to lower the surplus could eventually compromise the viability of the BRI, as it will stoke political and economic concerns.”12

At the same time, the share of overall Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) flows to BRI countries has actually fallen in recent years. The Economist estimates that these flows amounted to 10.2% of China’s total ODI in 2016, compared with 14.7% in 2015 and 11% in 2014.13 In contrast, Chinese investment in developed countries in North America and Europe has risen more robustly over the same period. Chinese firms have been acquiring brands and technology from these countries in a bid to raise their competitiveness.

In light of these developments, it appears that so far, the biggest winner from BRI is China. As one writer puts it: “China’s Belt and Road [is] largely focused on projects operated and built by Chinese firms with Chinese labour, with much of the money and profit going to Chinese firms and banks.”14 Nonetheless,

10 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2017, May 18). 11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 Boucher (2019). 3 Building and Wood Workers’ International

there has been a significant rise in contracted projects involving Chinese firms in the BRI countries. Most of these projects are funded by concessional loans financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (China EXIM Bank). These loans, according to The Economist, offer discounted financing in return for negotiated benefits, such as guarantees on project tenders or importing Chinese labour and capital.15

In addition, the turnover from completed contracted projects signed in 2016 between China and BRI countries grew by 9.7% to US$75.9 billion; these contracts accounted for almost half of China’s total turnover in overseas contracting projects.16 Moreover, pipeline projects appear strong as well: The value of newly-signed foreign contracting projects in BRI countries grew by 36%, to US$126 billion, in 2016. This suggests a big push behind the BRI in the coming years. The participation of nearly 40 heads of state in the second Belt and Road forum on 25-27 April 2019 is expected to provide the needed boost in the implementation of BRI.17

The missing employment dimension of BRI The massive infrastructure development that is the core of BRI will undoubtedly create immense employment opportunities, particularly in the building and construction sector, not only in BRI countries but also for Chinese workers who would accompany Chinese investment in these countries. However, to date, data is wanting on the number of workers that are involved in on-going (and even completed) BRI infrastructure projects. In fact, six years from its launching, an official list of BRI-related projects that is available to the public remains lacking. The Chinese government has said its SOEs have invested in nearly 1,700 infrastructure projects.18 However, this pronouncement leaves much to be desired as some of these projects may have been contracted years before the BRI was launched. A number of them could be previously stalled projects which are given new life under BRI. For example, the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail in Indonesia has been largely seen as a BRI investment, yet plans for the project have been discussed as early as 2008. Another example is the Gwadar port built in Pakistan between 2001 and 2007. This project was a centerpiece of BRI with Xi’s 2013 announcement. As one writer observes: “Today, any Chinese investment almost everywhere in the world becomes a star in the Belt and Road firmament. From shoe factories in Ethiopia to auto production in Hungary, whether begun under the earlier “Go Out Policy” of 1999 or after Xi’s 2013 announcement, everything gets tagged Belt and Road.19

Nonetheless, it is clear that BRI as a mammoth global project involves and will involve a huge workforce globally. For example, the Kyaukpyu deep water port project in Myanmar is expected to generate 100,000 jobs, although again there are scant details on the kind, timing and quality of this employment. The on- going Colombo International Financial City mega-port project in Sri Lanka is expected to create more than 80,000 jobs, while the Anwara 2 Economic Zone project in Bangladesh is set to generate 75,000 jobs. A study by Tu, Lu and Jia, which measured the effect of BRI on the employment rates of BRI-participating countries, found that the BRI has a positive effect on the total employment of these countries—the average employment growth rate of the BRI countries since the BRI was implemented has been 0.093% higher than the average of the non-BRI countries.20

With hundreds of thousands of workers employed in BRI projects, China’s spotty labour rights record and its authoritarian institutions, as well as those of some BRI recipients, are thus a cause for concern, especially for trade unions. This and the apparent stealth surrounding BRI projects raise questions about the working conditions of workers engaged in BRI projects. It also means that reaching out to and organizing these workers present an immense challenge to trade unions. On the other hand, BRI projects offer a greenfield for union organizing.

15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 For a good summary of the Forum outcomes, see https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007967/chinas-belt-and-road-forum- ends-more-support-and-us64-billion. 18 SCMP Reporter (2019, February 21). Explained: Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved from www.scmp.com/week-asia/explained/article/2187162/ explained-belt-and-road-initiative 19 Boucher (2019). 20 Tu, X., Lu, Y. and Jia, Y. (2018). The Effect of the “Belt and Road Initiative” on Countries’ Employment. In J. Chaisse and J. Gorzki (Eds.) The Belt and Road Initiative. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 4 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Political Economy Overview of the Region In many parts of Asia, the intensification of neoliberalism has been accompanied by a rising trendof authoritarian regimes in recent years. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that among the seven regions in the world, Asia registered the biggest decline of its Democracy Index from 5.74 in 2015 to 5.63 in 2017.21

Between 2016 and 2017, a decline of the index was noted in many Asian countries countries, including many key nodes on the BRI network: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. There was a consistent decline of the index in the last three years in Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Only two countries—Nepal and South Korea—exhibited an increase in the index during the said period. Figure 1 plots the trend of the Democracy Index in some Asian countries.

Figure 2: Democracy Index of Selected Asian Countries

Source: Graph constructed by the authors using data from The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack. London and New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, p. 15.

According to The Economist Intelligence Unit, a fall in the index means democratic regression which may be a result of any or a combination of the following: ‹‹declining popular participation in elections and politics ‹‹weaknesses in the functioning of government ‹‹declining trust in institutions ‹‹dwindling appeal of mainstream representative parties ‹‹growing influence of unelected, unaccountable institutions and expert bodies ‹‹widening gap between political elites and electorates ‹‹ decline in media freedoms and erosion of civil liberties, including curbs on free speech.22

21 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack. London and New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, p. 27. The Democracy Index, which follows a 0 to 10 scale (with 10 the highest score), is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories, namely: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. 22 Ibid: 3. 5 Building and Wood Workers’ International

Pongsudhirak argues that the China model of authoritarianism is accelerating in Southeast Asia, at the expense of liberal values.23 He provides an overview of how authoritarianism has been accelerating in several countries in the region:24 ‹‹Since Thaksin Shinawatra’s ouster in 2006, Thailand has since been stuck in a political tailspin, marked by street protests and two military coups. It is now being run by an authoritarian government that has constitutionally embedded the military’s role in politics. ‹‹In Myanmar, the promising reforms in 2011 culminated with elections four years later and a power- sharing agreement between generals and civilians, the latter led by Aung San Suu Kyi. However, due to the shortcomings of the Suu Kyi-led government, combined with intractable ethnic unrest, Myanmar has become a single-issue country revolving around the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine state. ‹‹ In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte has shaken the country with a vengeful and violent anti-drugs crusade since winning office in 2016. Human rights and freedoms have been thrown out of the window. Yet the civilian strongman with authoritarian instincts remains popular, with no military coup in sight and no visible risk of “people’s power” demonstrations that could dislodge him. Unlike his predecessors, Duterte also has thrown in his lot with China, which is not a bad fit for his brand of authoritarianism. ‹‹The Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is also “all-in” on China, at the expense of relations with the U.S. and the European Union. In recent months, he has effectively shut down independent media outlets. In early September 2017, he arranged for the arbitrary arrest of Kem Sokha, leader of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party, on treason charges. By mid-November 2017, the CNRP was dissolved by the Hun Sen-aligned Supreme Court, accused of a plot to overthrow the government. ‹‹Brunei, Laos and Viet Nam harbor regimes that do not tolerate demands for rights and freedoms, and prospects for the rest of Southeast Asia do not bode well. ‹‹ Indonesia is still front and center in the struggle for democracy and human rights. It has passed the point of no return to military rule, but openness and basic freedoms are being eroded, as in the recent jailing of the Christian-Chinese former mayor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaha Purnama, after a conviction for blasphemy against Islam. If Indonesia cannot meet the challenge of maintaining secularism and electoral democracy with economic growth, it also could face democratic rollback.

As discussed later in this paper, workers’ and trade union rights are under attack under these authoritarian regimes.

It is in light of these developments, among others, that led The Economist Intelligence Unit to suggest that “hybrid” political regimes dominate in Asia. Hybrid regimes are marked by the following: substantial irregularities in elections; government pressure on opposition parties and candidates; serious weaknesses in political culture, functioning of government, and political participation; widespread corruption and weak rule of law; weak civil society; harassment of and pressure on journalists; and lack of independence of judiciary.25 Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand are examples of hybrid political regimes.

Several countries in Asia, including India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea, are classified by The Economist Intelligence Unit as “flawed democracies” where, while elections are generally free and fair and basic civil liberties are respected, there are infringements on media freedom, problems in governance, low levels of political participation, and the political culture remains underdeveloped. Meanwhile, countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam are ruled by authoritarian regimes.26 In these regimes, state political pluralism is absent and heavily circumscribed. There is outright dictatorship. Elections if they occur are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime, and there is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is also an absence of an independent judiciary. For The Economist, the only “full democracies” in Asia are Australia and New Zealand, where basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, the political culture is conducive to the flourishing of democracy, government functioning

23 Pongsudhirak, T. (2018, January 1). Authoritarianism is accelerating in Southeast Asia. Nikkei Asian Review. Retrieved from asia.nikkei.com/ Editor-s-Picks/Looking-ahead-2018/Authoritarianism-is-accelerating-in-Southeast-Asia 24 Ibid. 25 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). 26 Ibid. 6 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

is satisfactory, independent and diverse media operate, an effective system of check and balances exist, and the judiciary is independent judiciary and judicial decisions are enforced.27

Surprisingly (or unsurprisingly), the march to authoritarianism in many countries in Asia does not disturb the neoliberal economic agenda that dominates the region. The ASEAN, for example, has been fiercely pursuing regional integration through unrestricted economic liberalization resulting in an “Asian-noodle bowl” of multiple free trade agreements with various countries, including China, and economic blocs. ASEAN’s integration process underscores the primacy of market and economic dimensions and the subordination of social and labour dimensions.

The combination of neoliberalism and authoritarian regimes presents a fertile ground for China’s BRI to flourish. The ruling elite in BRI recipient countries may see the BRI as an opportunity to addup their achievements (e.g. roads, railways, bridges, airports, dams, economic zones, etc.) in order to gain legitimacy and sustain the survival of their regimes. Thus, Chheang remarks: “Complex political-business ties between Chinese entrepreneurs and local politicians partially explain the responses of the ruling elite towards BRI and LMC [Lancang-Mekong Cooperation].”28 It is not surprising therefore that BRI-related projects tend to be concentrated, with few exceptions, in many countries ruled by authoritarian regimes.

Nonetheless, having cooperative authoritarian political regimes are not a guarantee that the implementation of BRI projects will go smoothly. BRI land and maritime routes cross through countries and regions with high levels of corruption and weak governance. Moreover, domestic politics greatly affect the implementation of BRI. Baker McKenzie lists some of the legal and political risks that may constrain the implementation of BRI: ‹‹There are major differences in legal regimes practiced across the BRI region, including common law (Singapore and Malaysia), continental law (Central Asia), and Islamic law (Middle East). ‹‹Foreign companies may not have adequate legal protection in BRI countries where legal regimes are undeveloped and have low credibility, and where social and judicial corruption is rife. ‹‹Chinese companies must avoid being used by BRI governments as a stalking horse or a screen to conceal the fact that local favorites have already been chosen for specific projects. ‹‹Chinese and foreign companies must avoid capture by “rent-seeking” local business tycoons who seek to use a multinational’s brand value and reputation for their own purposes. ‹‹Select BRI countries do suffer from political instability, civil unrest, or even armed conflict, andall companies will, therefore, require a robust business continuity plan and good security intelligence. ‹‹Environmental and social issues are growing considerations, especially for infrastructure projects. It is critical to engage local communities early in the process and demonstrate how a project will benefit them.29

The last point is further discussed later in this paper.

Chheang lists some other concerns that may hamper the implementation of BRI projects: the political anxiety caused by the power asymmetry and the overdependence on China, anti-China sentiments (mainly due to malpractices by some Chinese enterprises and overexploitation of natural resources) and questions relating to transparency and quality of mega infrastructure projects.30 These and other key challenges and concerns facing the BRI are discussed in the next section.

27 Ibid. 28 Chheang, V. (2018, August 15). China’s Economic Statecraft in Southeast Asia. Perspective. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Issue 2018, No. 45. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, p. 6. Retrieved from www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/[email protected] 29 Baker McKenzie (2017: 23). 30 Chheang (2018: 6). 7 Building and Wood Workers’ International

The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia: “Debt-trap” diplomacy or developmental strategy for poorer countries?

The BRI is seen as a “springboard for China to strengthen its geo-economic power and exert its geostrategic influence”31 in Asia. Boucher explains how this can be done through the BRI:

China’s infrastructure projects mainly focus on bringing raw materials to Chinese industry and moving Chinese goods to growing markets in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe…

The major axis of infrastructure in South and Southeast Asia will give China routes through Myanmar and Pakistan, including pipelines for oil supplies and railways for goods and eventually tourists. The premium on Myanmar and Pakistan for Chinese planners comes from the fact that these routes avoid the Straits of Malacca, the tight bottleneck between Singapore and Indonesia which the U.S. Navy frequents and where the bulk of China’s oil and other supplies pass now. It is doubtful that a significant portion of this dependency can be shifted, but China seeks alternatives as it also seeks to establish its presence in the South China Sea.32

While the BRI International Cooperation Forum, a biannual summit launched in May 2017, is the top decision-making body of the BRI, regional mechanisms such as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), China-ASEAN partnership, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and Boao Forum for Asia serve as platforms for policy consultation and joint project implementation in the Asian region. As mentioned earlier, bilateral cooperation, usually in the form of bilateral MOUs and agreements, is the most important mechanism for concretising BRI projects in Asia and elsewhere.

The BRI is not starting at zero in Asia, although the initiative is expected to stimulate growth by increasing trade flows and infrastructure development in the region. Several cooperation and connectivity programs have been carried out in the region, notably in Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a relatively advanced cooperation initiative involving 10 countries. The ASEAN region is also the third largest trading partner of China. In fact, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area is the world’s largest free trade zone in terms of population. Between 2013 and 2015, ASEAN member states received over 60% of Chinese overseas direct investment to BRI countries, with Singapore getting the largest share.33 In addition to bilateral agreements with countries in ASEAN, China established the LMC Fund in 2015 to support the construction of infrastructure within the Mekong region (comprised of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam). LMC serves as a sub-regional mechanism for BRI projects in the Mekong region and a springboard for China to expand its economic footprint and play a preponderant economic role in the Mekong region. China is now the largest trading partner to Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam, and the second largest to Laos. Under the LMC framework, China has pledged to provide concessional loans of up to US$1.6 billion and credit loans totaling another US$1.6 billion to promote industrial capacity cooperation and infrastructure construction within the region.34

In contrast, connectivity for trade and investment is taking a slower pace in South Asia and Central Asia. The inclusion of these two regions in the BRI is expected to boost trade and investment and consequently growth in these areas.

31 ibid: 5. 32 Boucher (2019). 33 Singapore’s share, nonetheless, is unlikely to be related to the core infrastructure-development purpose of the BRI; it had more to do with the attractions of the Singaporean business environment. See: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2017, May 18). Progress and next steps for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved from http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1765436560&Country=Uganda&topic=Politics# 34 Chheang (2018: 4) 8 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Infrastructure investment gaps in Asia Therefore, Asia is critical to the implementation of BRI as much as BRI is seen in the region as a source of much-needed infrastructure investment. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has estimated that Asia requires infrastructure investments of around US$22.6 trillion (in 2015 prices) from 2016 to 2030 (US$1.5 trillion annually) in transport, power, telecommunications, and water and sanitation, without taking climate change into account.35 Table 3 presents the estimated infrastructure investment needs by region in Asia, while Table 4 lists the investments needs by sector. Table 3: Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Region, 45 Developing Member Countries, 2016–2030 ($ billion in 2015 prices)

2030 Baseline Estimates Climate-adjusted Estimates** 2030 UN Projected Projected Region/ Population Investment Investment Annual GDP Per Subregion Projection Investment Annual Needs as Investment Annual Needs as GDP Capita (billion) Needs Average % of Needs Average % of Growth (2015 $) GDP GDP Central Asia 3.1 0.096 6,202 492 33 6.8 565 38 7.8 East Asia 5.1 1.503 18,602 13,781 919 4.5 16,062 1,071 5.2 South Asia* 6.5 2.059 3,446 5,477 365 7.6 6,347 423 8.8 Southeast 5.1 0.723 7,040 2,759 184 5.0 3,147 210 5.7 Asia The Pacific 3.1 0.014 2,889 42 2.8 8.2 46 3.1 9.1 Asia and 5.3 4.396 9,277 22,551 1,503 5.1 26,166 1,744 5.9 the Pacific

Note: * Pakistan and Afghanistan are included in South Asia. ** Climate change adjusted figures include climate mitigation and climate proofing costs, but do not include other adaptation costs, especially those associated with sea level rise. Source: 2015 Revision of World Population Prospects, United Nations; ADB estimates. Source: Reproduced from Asian Development Bank (2017). Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, p. xiv. Retrieved from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf

Table 4: Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Sector, 45 Developing Member Countries, 2016–2030 ($ billion in 2015 prices)

Climate-related Baseline Estimates Climate-adjusted Estimates Investments (Annual) Sector Investment Annual Share of Investment Annual Share of Adaptation Mitigation Needs Average Total Needs Average Total Power 11,689 779 51.8 14,731 982 56.3 3 200 Transport 7,796 520 34.6 8,353 557 31.9 37 – Telecommunications 2,279 152 10.1 2,279 152 8.7 – – Water and Sanitation 787 52 3.5 802 53 3.1 1 – Total 22,551 1,503 100.0 26,166 1,744 100.0 41 200

Source: Reproduced from Asian Development Bank (2017). Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, p. xiv. Retrieved from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf

Thus, many of the ruling elite across Asia see the infrastructure investment opportunities offered by the BRI as a way to address the infrastructure investment gap in their countries and consequently win legitimacy among their constituencies, especially amidst the rising trend of authoritarianism in the region.

35 Asian Development Bank (2017). Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, p. 5. Retrieved from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf 9 Building and Wood Workers’ International

BRI projects in Asia In light of the above, a number of the flagship BRI projects are found in Asia, such as the dry port of Khorgos located at the border of China and Kazakhstan; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that connects China to Pakistan’s seaport of Gwadar; and a network of gas and oil pipelines across Central Asia stretching as far as the Caspian Sea.

In Southeast Asia, three types of BRI projects dominate—transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones. Some of the key connectivity projects under BRI include the China-Laos rail project, the China-Thailand rail project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project, and road projects connecting Kunming (in China) and Bangkok, Kunming and Hanoi, Kunming and Kyaukpyu, and Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville (in Cambodia).36 Additionally, some economic or industrial zones have been designated as BRI projects, such as the Thai-China Industrial Park in Rayong (Thailand), Sihanoukville Economic Zone (Cambodia), Longjiang Industrial Park (Viet Nam), China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (Indonesia), Vientiane Saysettha Development Zone (Laos), China-Indonesia Julong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (Indonesia), Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and Malaysia- China Kuantan Industrial Park (Malaysia). Figure 2 lists some of these infrastructure projects and others.

As mentioned earlier, some of the BRI projects in the region predate the launching of BRI and some countries (e.g. Indonesia and Viet Nam) are reluctant to regard infrastructure projects decided before 2013 as BRI projects. Therefore, Viet Nam does not regard the infrastructure projects listed in Figure 2 as BRI projects.

Figure 3: Selected BRI projects in Southeast Asia

Source: Reproduced from Hong, C. and Johnson, O. (2018). Mapping potential climate and development impacts of China’s Belt and Road initiative: a participatory approach. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 2. Retrieved from www.sei.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/china-belt-and-road-initiative-hong-johnson.pdf

36 Chheang (2018: 5). 10 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

There are many opportunities for BRI investments in Asia. Private business consulting companies have been very active in promoting some countries in the region as ‘havens’ for BRI investments. An example is Baker McKenzie which lists the following BRI investment opportunities in Southeast Asia: ‹‹Chinese private firms are focused on Asia’s rising middle-class and established distribution networks. They see the region as an area with potential in terms of electronics, internet and real estate. ‹‹Viet Nam is already tightly integrated with China’s supply chain. But there are still huge opportunities for further improvement in road and rail links, all underpinned by robust commercial activity. ‹‹Malaysia is emerging as a regional hub for Chinese industrial companies seeking to tap Southeast Asia’s growing markets. This will in turn feed the country’s real estate scene. ‹‹ China’s construction projects in Bangladesh may be transformational for the country’s already large clothing sector. Chinese private investment in the country’s manufacturing sector is accelerating.37

Challenges and concerns facing BRI The implementation of BRI in many countries in Asia does not come without hurdles. The trade imbalance between China and the BRI countries, the perception that the BRI has a geopolitical dimension, the lack of transparency surrounding many BRI projects, and the high interest rates attached to some of them (2% to 3% as against Japan’s loan interest rates between 0.25 and 0.75%), concerns relating to the quality, bankability, economic feasibility of some BRI projects, and lack of social and environmental safeguards are the biggest challenges that China faces in the implementation of BRI. In light of this, there are local grassroots movements and opposition groups in some of the BRI countries which label China as a threat to national economic sovereignty, democracy and human rights, and good governance. These groups are organizing to challenge China’s growing economic presence in their countries.38

The US$1.5 billion Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka has come to be identified as a symbol of ‘debt trap’ associated with BRI infrastructure loans. In fact, it is often used as a poignant example of China’s debt- trap diplomacy towards poorer countries. Sri Lanka’s inability to pay its loans to China, in combination with the losses it incurred due to lack of commercial activity in the port, forced the country to enter into an equity swap arrangement with China by the end of 2017. The deal included the lease of a 70% stake in the port to the China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years.39 The initial deal gave the Chinese firm an 80% stake in the port but protests by trade unions and opposition groups forced the Sri Lankan government to make revisions that reduced the Chinese firm’s stake to 70% in a joint venture with the state-run Sri Lanka Ports Authority.40 The revised deal also limits China’s role to running commercial operations while the government retains oversight of broader security issues.

The Hambantota case prompted more and more leaders to pay closer attention to the terms of BRI deals. A growing number of countries, such as Myanmar, Malaysia, Nepal, and Pakistan have successfully forced the renegotiation or cancellation of particular Chinese projects.

The government of Myanmar is currently renegotiating to scale down the controversial Chinese mega- project Kyaukpyu port on the western tip of Myanmar’s conflict-torn Rakhine state to avoid a debt trap. The US$10 billion project includes a new deep-sea port (US$7.5 billion) and an industrial park ($2.5 billion) and is planned to be an entry point for a 480-mile (770 km) pipeline delivering oil and natural gas to China’s Yunnan province, giving China an alternative route for energy imports from the Middle East that avoids the strategic chokepoint of the Malacca Strait.41

In Malaysia, the recently-elected Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is reviewing BRI projects that were signed between China and the previous government.42

37 Baker McKenzie (2017: 20). 38 Chheang (2018: 6). 39 Reuters (2017, December 10). Sri Lanka hands over running of Hambantota port to Chinese company. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2123658/sri-lanka-hands-over-major-port-chinese-company 40 ibid. 41 Mendoza, D.J. (2018, November 12). The Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN: Cooperation or Opportunism? BusinessWorld. Retrieved from www.bworldonline.com/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-aseancooperation-or-opportunism/ 42 Tang, S.M. (2018, June 8). China’s infrastructure strategy under review in Malaysia. ISEAS Perspective Commentary. 11 Building and Wood Workers’ International

Chinese loans are neither cheap nor easy. According to Hiep, the Thai government dismissed the 2.5% interest rate offered by China for its high-speed rail line connecting Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima as being too high, and decided not to seek loans from China.43

The lack of workers’ and companies’ participation and fair distribution of benefits, the displacement of millions of people, and the potential environmental degradation associated with infrastructure projects are the other major problems that accompany the BRI. Mendoza surveys some of the challenges that ASEAN member states face in the implementation of BRI projects:

In Cambodia, civil society groups are protesting against a 36,400-hectare project in the country’s southwestern coast. The international eco-tourism and trade center project has led to thousands of locals forcibly evicted, resettled on land and houses of poor quality with limited access to utilities and given inadequate compensation. The Lower Sesan II hydropower plant project may lead to the eviction of almost 5,000 people from their villages once operational with around 40,000 people living along the Sesan and Srepok rivers losing their livelihood that is dependent on fishing.

In Laos, the most expensive infrastructure project, the Laos-China railway, is also causing displacement among those living in the Phu Din Daeng Village. Families in the affected areas were told by the government to relocate to pave way for the railway which requires around 3,832 hectares of land. Neither relocation nor compensation have been provided to more than 4,000 Lao families that will be affected. For the Lao government, the project is the key to “transforming their ‘land-locked’ country into a ‘land-linked’ country.” Like Cambodia, China has emerged as Laos’ largest donor and source of foreign direct investment.

Potential environmental degradation is a problem that usually accompanies any infrastructure project. In Indonesia, civil society groups are protesting the 510- megawatt hydroelectric dam on the Batang Toru river under Chinese loan. Both local villagers and conservationists fear that the dam may “irreversibly alter” the river’s ecosystem, hence, threatening the livelihood of thousands of people who reside downstream. Equally important, rare species of orang-utan that currently number 800 are in danger of extinction.

In Myanmar, local protests against the Chinese-operated Letpadaung copper mine continue for expropriating land without providing the displaced families adequate compensation and for damaging the environment. Protests also continue relating to the controversial $3.6 billion, 6,000-megawatt Myitsone Dam project. In 2010, more than 2,100 people from five villages were forcibly resettled. The Myitsone Dam project was suspended by the government in 2011 due to protests over its enormous flooding area and environmental impacts. The project also angered locals because of the fact that 90% of the dam’s electricity was expected to go to China. To date, China is heavily courting Myanmar’s government to restart work on the dam to help meet its growing power demands.44

In South Asia, the construction of the US$1.6 billion Orange Metro Line in Lahore, Pakistan caused mass protests and triggered lawsuits in 2016, as thousands of people were displaced since demolition for the metro line began four months before the loan from China Export Import Bank was approved.45 The Orange Line is one of the first major overseas infrastructure projects China is financing under President Xi’s BRI.

Chinese workers in overseas BRI projects China normally imposes conditions on their preferential loans, including the use of Chinese technologies, equipment, contractors, and workers. As in earlier Chinese infrastructure investments, it is expected that the BRI will bring with it a movement of Chinese people, including workers, state employees, entrepreneurs and accompanying families, to countries along both belt and road. Although skilled migration may contribute to employment, capital accumulation, and income in destination countries, there is a risk that Chinese workers may be seen as competing for low-wage jobs and thereby cause tensions and negative responses. Mendoza provides an example in Brunei:

The Muara Besar project has angered some locals as they compete with Chinese workers for employment. The entry of thousands of Chinese workers, shipped into Brunei to build the refinery and petrochemical complex in this country’s small island, seems to exacerbate the country’s employment problems with the unemployment rate at 6.9% already. Nonetheless, with oil and gas reserves probably running out in the next 20 years, Chinese investment is welcome.46

43 Hiep, L.H. (2018, March 29). The Belt and Road Initiative in Viet Nam: Challenges and Prospects. Perspective. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Issue 2018, No. 18. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 4. Retrieved from www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/[email protected] (2018: 4). 44 Mendoza (2018). 45 Bengali, S. (2016, May 25). China’s dream of a new Silk Road runs into hurdles at its first stop: Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from www. latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-pakistan-china-snap-story.html 46 Mendoza (2018). 12 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Indeed, there is evidence that in developing countries, particularly in Africa, Chinese workers fill up about 50% of low-skilled and 90% of professional and managerial positions in Chinese construction firms.47 The regular use of labour from China by Chinese companies overseas may also apply to BRI countries where Chinese foreign direct investment and development projects are concentrated. However, accounting for the number of Chinese workers and migrants (including the undocumented) who are and will be in BRI countries is a difficult task. Most of the documents we reviewed for the BRI database for the seven countries in Asia (i.e. Cambodia, Viet Nam, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) do not include the number of workers that are and will be engaged in the BRI projects, more so the number of Chinese workers. However, we found that two projects in Cambodia—the US$1.9 million Phnom Penh- Sihanoukville National Highway Project and the US$11.2 billion 405-Preah Vihear to Koh Kong Province Railway Project—mentioned that 200 and 3,000 Chinese workers will be employed, respectively. Country Level Situation and Plans of BRI

As mentioned earlier, one of the criticisms against the BRI is its lack of transparency; most BRI projects are shrouded in secrecy. Not even an official list of projects exists. This was the main challenge encountered by the researchers in preparing the database of BRI projects in the seven study countries (i.e. Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam). Information about BRI projects are piecemeal and scattered and mainly sourced from articles and news items from various websites, including those run by the Chinese government. In this regard, it is difficult to determine the real and actual situation and plans of BRI-related projects in BRI countries, including the seven study countries. Thus, information provided in this section were largely sourced from articles in BRI-related websites of the Chinese government, online databases of private companies providing information about BRI, the Asian Development Bank project database, online articles and news published by private entities, academic journal articles and discussion papers, as well as from our database which, in turn, has been built using the same sources.

A concentration of BRI projects in five countries Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and increasingly Myanmar appear to be China’s favourite BRI-investment destination countries. It doesn’t matter if there are democratic and workers’ right deficits in these countries as discussed earlier; these are of little interest to China. The attraction appears mutual as these countries appear to be “all-in” on China.

Of the 136 BRI projects we were able to record in our database, Pakistan registered the highest number at 54, followed by Cambodia with 32 projects, and Bangladesh, 18 projects. It should be noted however that there may be more BRI projects that we were not able to include in our database because of lack of available information about these other projects. As pointed out earlier, a number of these projects have started even before 2013. In this regard, the estimated cost of the projects may have included loans, grants, investments, and the like that were released prior to 2013.

1. BRI projects in Pakistan At the time of writing, we identified 54 BRI projects in Pakistan. Nearly half (24) of these projects are energy and natural resources projects: 22 power plants and two transmission lines. We also identified 22 transport and logistics infrastructure projects, which include 15 roads and highways, four ports, and two railways, among others.

Of the 54 projects in Pakistan, only 46 have data on the estimated project cost which totaled about US$57 billion. [Seven of the said projects were in Rupees and was converted to US Dollars using the current conversion value of 1 Pakistani Rupee equivalent to 0.0071 United States dollar.] Nonetheless, the transport and logistics infrastructure projects incurred the highest project cost at US$30.6 billion for 20 projects. Meanwhile, the energy and natural resources projects, composed of 10 power plants, seven renewable energy, and two general energy projects, cost about US$26.1 billion. The remaining projects are industrial parks, water treatment, supply and distribution, ICT infrastructure, and others.

47 Chen C., Goldstein A. and Orr, R. (2009). Local Operations of Chinese Construction Firms in Africa: An Empirical Survey. The Journal of Construction Management, pp. 75–89. 13 Building and Wood Workers’ International

Of Pakistan’s 54 projects, only 16 have clear information about the nature of funding: 11 are concessional loans, three are grants, and two are a combination of grants and concessional loan. Information about the ownership of the projects is even more scant. From our database, we identified three under a build- operate-transfer scheme. The Gwadar Port Free Zone was handed to the China Overseas Port Holding Company as part of the 43-year lease of the Gwadar Port.

Only 28 projects have information about the funding institution involved. Of these, 10 are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government, 16 by Independent Power Producers (IPP), and two by Independent Transmission Company (ITC). Of the 28 projects, only seven have been confirmed as completed while 17 are still on-going. The rest of the projects have no information as to their status of completion.

Only three of the BRI projects in Pakistan mentioned about the expected number of workers to be mobilized for the projects. There are three affiliated unions of BWI in Pakistan.

2. BRI projects in Cambodia We have identified 32 BRI projects in Cambodia. The transport and logistics infrastructure projects comprised the most number at 27 projects, of which 12 are bridges, seven roads and highways, four railways, two ports and two aviation. The rest of the projects include water and sanitation, manufacturing, and power plant, among others.

Only 24 of the 32 BRI projects in Cambodia include information about project costs. The total project cost of the 24 projects is nearly US$20 billion. Among the transport and logistics infrastructure projects, the railway is the most expensive, followed by the roads and highways, then the bridges. The most expensive BRI project is the 405-kilometer railway from Preah Vihear to Koh Kong Province, which costs about US$11.2 billion. This is followed by the National Highway Project from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville, which costs US$2 billion. The Cambodia Oil Refinery, which covers 80-hectares of land between the provinces of Preah Sihanouk and Kampot costs US$1.67 billion.

Like in Pakistan, information about the nature of funding of the projects is also scant. Of the 32 projects, only 17 have known funding arrangements, which include 14 concessional loans, one loan with zero interest, and the other two loans bear no specific details. With regards to the ownership/investment arrangements, five projects are on a build-operate-transfer scheme, three of which range from 44 to 55 years. One project is owned by a private company.

Only 14 of the projects have known funding institutions, of which 13 are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government. One draws funding from a private institution. Among the 32 projects, 15 are known to have been completed and eight are currently on-going. It should be noted, however, there are four projects that were completed before 2013.

Of the BRI projects in Cambodia in our database, only three mentioned about the number of workers that are/will be needed. We also didn’t find any information about labor issues related to the BRI projects, more so the presence of unions in any of the projects, although there is one BWI union affiliate in Cambodia—the Building and Wood Workers Trade Union Federation of Cambodia (BWTUC).

3. BRI projects in Bangladesh We have listed 18 BRI projects in Bangladesh. Transport and logistics infrastructure projects counted most at 13, of which seven are roads and highways, three are tunnels, two are bridges, and one railway. The rest of the projects include a power plant, economic zones, and water treatment. Of the 18 projects, only 13 have information about the project cost. The total estimated cost of these projects is around US$12.1 billion, most of which (around US$11.5 billion) accounts for bridges and tunnels. The most expensive BRI projects are the Padma Multipurpose Bridge which costs around US$3.7 billion and the Dhaka-Chittagong Express Railway with an estimated cost of US$3.3 billion.

14 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Only two projects bear information about the nature of funding: the loans for Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel Project and Karnaphuli tunnel are repayable over 20 years with an interest of 2%. One mega expressway is under a 25-year concession period, another one is under a concessional loan, and the other ODA-like. Meanwhile, only two expressway projects have information about the type of ownership, both are under a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement. With regards to the identity of funding institutions, of the seven projects that have information, six are funded by China Eximbank and the other from the World Bank. Of the 10 projects that have information about project status, only one is said to have been completed and the rest included the target date of completion.

There are two BWI-affiliated unions in Bangladesh. However, we were not able to find information about which union is or will be involved in any organizing drive targeting any BRI project. There is also no available information about the number of workers working in each of the projects, more so their situation and labor issues.

4. BRI projects in Myanmar We have listed 16 BRI projects in Myanmar. Ten of these projects are transport and logistics infrastructure, of which seven are railways, two are ports, and the others are industrial parks, crude oil and gas pipelines, and a dam. Among the six countries in our database, Myanmar recorded the highest estimated total project cost—a staggering US$ 61.15 billion. Based on available data, transport and logistics infrastructure projects are the most expensive totaling US$51.3 billion. The Sino-Myanmar Railway project, which is supposed to cost US$20billion, is yet to materialize.

Only one project—the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (a deep-sea port, an industrial park, and a housing project)—has information on the nature of funding. This project is being developed with a 70% stake by the state-owned CITIC Group Corporation Ltd.; the rest is shouldered by Myanmar (15% by the government and 15% by a citizen-owned public company). The Myitsone Dam and the Kunming to Kyaukphyu SEZ Railway will be totally owned by the Myanmar government after 50 years. Meanwhile, for both the China-Myanmar crude oil and China-Myanmar gas pipeline, the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) holds a 50.9% percent stake. The rest is owned by the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). We didn’t find data about the name of institutions funding the BRI projects.

Of the 16 projects in Myanmar, only three projects have been completed to date. Three projects are on- going, another three have been suspended, and one project has been cancelled.

As expected, information about the number of workers (to be) engaged in the projects, their situation, and other labour issues related to the BRI projects are wanting.

There is one union in Myanmar that is affiliated with BWI—the Building and Wood Workers Federation of Myanmar (BWFM). However, the union is currently not organising any of these BRI projects.

From cautious diplomacy to outright critique: BRI in Viet Nam and India To date, no new infrastructure project in Viet Nam has been officially labelled as BRI-funded, although the Cat Linh–Ha Dong metro line in Hanoi, which has been under construction since October 2011, has been quietly classified as such by both sides. According to Hiep, while the initial total cost for the project was US$552 million (of which US$419 million came from loans provided by China Eximbank), due to cost overruns, the total investment was increased to US$891 million later.48 China agreed to provide an additional loan of US$250 million for the project It is this new loan, which was released in 2017, that has unofficially been considered by both sides as part of the BRI.

48 Hiep (2018: 5). 15 Building and Wood Workers’ International

Although Viet Nam is offering diplomatic support to China’s BRI, it appears cautious to apply for loans from it. Such reservation is attributed to the following reasons: (a) its distrust of Beijing and concerns about the strategic implications of BRI in the context of the South China Sea disputes; (b) the unattractive commercial terms and conditions of Chinese loans; and (c) its access to other options, including loans from international financial institutions and ODA partners, especially Japan, and public-private partnerships.49 Some Vietnamese scholars highlighted other concerns, such as insufficient protection of labour rights, Chinese firms’ poor environmental record, lack of transparency, and China’s challenging of internationally recognized dispute settlement mechanisms.50

Nonetheless, Viet Nam has endorsed the BRI as well as the China-led AIIB. During President Xi’s visit to Hanoi in November 2017, the two countries signed an MOU on promoting connection between the “Two Corridors, One Belt” (TCOB) framework and the BRI.51 The TCOB framework was proposed by China in 2003 to promote bilateral economic cooperation. The two “economic corridors,” namely the Kunming-Lao Cai-Ha Noi-Hai Phong-Quang Ninh corridor and the Nanning-Lang Son-Ha Noi-Hai Phong-Quang Ninh corridor, were designed to improve connectivity between China’s Yunnan and Guangxi with 12 cities and provinces in North Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the Tonkin Gulf “economic belt” was meant to enhance economic cooperation between provinces of the two countries located around the Tonkin Gulf. The TCOB had not been implemented until it was revived and aligned with China’s newly proposed BRI.52 As Hiep stresses, the signing of the MOU (which took two years to negotiate) does not guarantee that the BRI will see breakthroughs in Viet Nam in the foreseeable future.53 He adds too that the title of the MOU—TCOB—is treated as a separate plan independent of the BRI, which suggests that “Viet Nam is keen to maintain control over the TCOB plan and is unwilling to brand it as part of the BRI, at least not publicly”.54 This, and rising anti-China sentiments in Viet Nam due to recent tensions over the South China Sea disputes, especially following the 2014 oil rig crisis, means that Viet Nam will be cautious, if not reluctant, in applying for BRI loans. Thus, the implementation of BRI in Viet Nam is likely to be slow.

In India, no BRI-related project has been reported so far. India boycotted the first high-profile Belt and Road Forum organized by Xi in May 2017, citing concerns over transparency of public procurement and social and environmental standards, but more importantly its displeasure at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which is planned to run through Kashmiri areas that India considers to be illegitimately occupied by Pakistan.55 In fact, India came out in open criticism of BRI, stating that China’s BRI violates sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries.56 India again was a no-show in Second Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing on April 25-28, 2019.

49 Hiep (2018: 1 & 4). 50 ibid: 4. 51 ibid: 3. 52 ibid. 53 ibid. 54 ibid 55 Nordin, A.H.M. and Weissman, M. (2018). Will Trump make China great again? The belt and road initiative and international order. International Affairs 94(2): 248. 56 Bagchil, I. (2017, May 14). India slams China’s one belt one road initiative, says it violates sovereignty. Times of India. Retrieved from timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/china-road-initiative-is-like-a-colonial-enterprise-india/articleshow/58664098.cms 16 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

Trade Union and Workers’ Rights Context

The acceleration of authoritarian regimes in Asia comes with an unfavourable environment for the exercise of trade union and workers’ rights. In Bangladesh, union formation has been prohibited in export processing zones. In Cambodia, strikes are repressed and union leaders and activists face legal harassments. The right to peaceful assembly has been curtailed as well. In India, the proposed reforms to the Labour Law are meant to ease regulations on retrenchment and restrict union membership and the organization of strikes. In the Philippines, a number of trade union leaders and activists have been victims of extra-judicial killings. Also, union-busting continues in export processing zones. In Thailand, the Public Assembly Act 2015 has been used to repress peaceful union protests and intimidate union leaders.

In this section, we focus on the landscape of workers’ and trade union rights in seven Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam.

Ratification of ILO core conventions Among the seven countries, only three—Cambodia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—have ratified all the eight core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), yet these countries are among the worst in terms of violations of workers’ rights. Bangladesh ratified nearly all the core conventions, except the Minimum Age Convention (C138). The countries that have the least number of ratifications are Myanmar and Viet Nam, countries that have been considered by The Economist as ruled by authoritarian regimes.

Table 5: Ratification of ILO Core Conventions

ILO core conventions Bangladesh Cambodia India Myanmar Pakistan Sri Lanka Viet Nam C029-Forced Labour Convention C087-Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize C098-Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining C100-Equal Remuneration C105-Abolition of Forced Labour C111-Discrimination C138-Minimum Age C182-Worst Forms of Child Labour

The Forced Labour Convention (C029) and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182) have been ratified by all seven countries. The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (C098) is the least ratified; only Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka ratified the said convention. Two countries—India and Viet Nam—have not ratified to date the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (C087).

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Table 6: Labour Rights Indicators: Violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining in law and in practice

Normalized scores Country 2012 2015 2016 Bangladesh 7.63 7.81 7.13 Cambodia 6.22 5.38 6.36 India 6.98 6.61 6.23 Myanmar 4.05 4.33 4.16 Pakistan 7.21 7.75 7.81 Sri Lanka 5.34 4.23 4.36 Viet Nam 10.0 10.0 10.0

Source: Data extracted from http://labour-rights-indicators.la.psu.edu/country/country/country/country/country/704

Violations on freedom of association and collective bargaining rights The Labour Rights Indicators (LRI)57 of the Pennsylvania State University provides a good yardstick on how the ratification of the core labour standards on freedom of association and collective bargaining has been translated in law and in practice in these countries. The LRI uses a normalized scoring range from 0 to 10, the best and worst score, respectively. Therefore, an increasing LRI score means cases of violations of the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining in law and in practice are increasing. Table 6 provides the LRI scores of the seven Asian countries in three years—2012, 2015 and 2016.

As can be seen in Table 6, Viet Nam Viet Nam received the worst possible score (10) in 2016 due to reported general prohibition of the right to establish and join organizations and/or collective bargaining in law and in practice. In fact, this has been the score of Viet Nam since 2012. As mentioned above, Viet Nam has not ratified either Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise or Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. Pakistan and Bangladesh followed Viet Nam, although in the case of Bangladesh, its score went down from 7.81 in 2015 to 7.16 in 2016. Recall that Pakistan ratified all the eight core ILO conventions while Bangladesh ratified seven.

Between 2015 and 2016, the LRI for Cambodia and Sri Lanka went up, suggesting an increase in violations. Note that both countries ratified all the core ILO conventions. India’s LRI for 2016 was still high at 6.23 although this was lower than the previous year’s 6.61. Myanmar’s LRI has been the lowest of the seven countries; between 2015 and 2016, its score declined suggesting fewer violations.

A difficult legal framework for unionization and collective bargaining The LRI also provides a picture of the legal frameworks on unionization and collective bargaining in various countries by providing indicators of violations of these rights in law, that is, existing labour laws bear provisions that are not aligned with international labour standards.

In 2016, the most common indicator of violation of the right of workers to establish and join organizations in law in the study countries, excluding Bangladesh, was the lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures in relation to hiring, during employment, and dismissal. Bangladesh nonetheless committed such violations in practice. From our analysis of the violations of the right of workers to establish and join organizations included in the LRI website, the following observations were noted:

57 The LRI indicators are based on coding the findings of nine sources that include the following: Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Applica- tion of Conventions and Recommendations, Reports of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Country baselines under the ILO Declaration Annual Review, Representations under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, Complaints under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association, National legislation, International Trade Union Confederation Survey of violations of Trade Union Rights, US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The non-normalized score for any given country and year is normalized to a range in value from 0 to 10, the best and worst possible score respectively. For more information about the LRI, see: Kucera D. and Sari D. (2016). New “Labour Rights Indicators”: Methods and Results. Center for Global Workers’ Rights Working Paper 002, Pennsylvania State University, April 2016. Retrieved from http://labour-rights-indicators.la.psu.edu/docs/Method_paper.pdf 18 The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia

‹‹In five countries, violations in law were noted in terms of: the exclusion of other workers from the right to establish and join organizations; previous authorization requirements; restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition; dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations; infringements of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations. ‹‹In terms of the number of specific types or indicators of violations of this right in law, Pakistan registered the highest at 10, and immediately followed by Bangladesh and India, both having nine types of violations in law. In terms of practice, Cambodia registered the most number of indicators of violation at six, followed by Bangladesh at five. ‹‹ In five to six countries, violations in practice of the right of workers to establish and join organizations were noted in terms of: allowing anti-union discriminatory measures in relation to hiring, during employment, and dismissal, including those committed against union officials; and allowing for acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities.

In terms of the right to collective bargaining in law and in practice, we observed the following: ‹‹Five to six countries committed violations in law in terms of: exclusion of other workers from the right to collective bargaining (in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam); and acts of interference in collective bargaining (in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka). Having provisions in law that impose excessive requirements and/or lack of objective, pre-established and precise criteria for the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining was also noted in four countries, namely, Cambodia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In terms of the most number of specific indicators of violations of this right in law, India and Pakistan were the topnotch in 2016, each having five indicators. Cambodia and Sri Lanka followed at four indicators each. ‹‹ In terms of violations in practice, Sri Lanka registered the highest number (4) of indicators among the seven countries. The four indicators include: insufficient promotion of collective bargaining; exclusion of other workers from the right to collective bargaining; excessive requirements and/or lack of objective, pre-established and precise criteria for the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining; and acts of interference in collective bargaining.

The above findings from our analysis of the LRI database paint a gloomy landscape for unionization and collective bargaining in the seven countries. They partly explain why union density rate in these countries, excluding Bangladesh, has remained low as shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Union density in the study countries based on available most recent data

Country Union density rate (%) Bangladesh 19 (2015) Cambodia 9.6 (2012) India 12.8 (2011) Myanmar 1.0 (2015) Pakistan 5.6 (2008) Sri Lanka 15.3 (2016) Viet Nam 14.6 (2011)

Source: The union density rates for all the countries, except Bangladesh, were drawn from the ILOSTAT website (Trade Union Density Rate). The union density rate for Bangladesh was drawn from LO/FTF Council (2016). 2016 Labour Market Profile: Bangladesh. Co- penhagen, Denmark: LO-FTF Council Analytical Unit. http://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/sites/default/files/uploads/public/PDF/LMP/ lmp_bangladesh_2016_final_version.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2q_YsjwYthmk8D7OdJ0gnrlne_ajVX7j3Nlv3X5In6USustCEgdf85oTU

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The lack of time series data on union density in the seven countries rules out the determination of unionization trend over time. Moreover, data on union density by sector, including construction, is lacking as well. The difficult politico-legal environment for unionization in these countries, combined with low union density rates, makes unionization a big challenge. BWI Presence in the Region

The Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) has presence, through its affiliates, in the seven study countries. It is also represented at the Asia and Pacific regional level through its regional office, headed by a Regional Representative (Apolinar Tolentino). The regional office is located in Subang Jaya, Malaysia. Table 8 lists the BWI’s affiliates in each of the study countries. Table 8: BWI affiliates in selected BRI countries

Country BWI affiliates Number of members Cambodia BWTUC - Building and Wood Workers Trade Union Federation of Cambodia 5,451 Viet Nam VFCU - Viet Nam Forestry Corporation Trade Union 1,000 Myanmar BWFM - Building and Wood Workers Federation of Myanmar 1,765 Pakistan ACEEU - Associated Consulting Engineers Employees Union 2,416 PCF – Pakistan Construction Federation 3,218 PFBWW - Pakistan Federation of Building and Wood Workers 15,925 Bangladesh BBWWF – Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers’ Federation 13,912

BSBWWF – Bangladesh Sanjukta Building and Wood Workers’ Federation 20,912 Sri Lanka NTUF - National Trade Union Federation 2,148

Source: BWI website: www.bwint.org/cms/address-book-9#

BWI has only one affiliate in four of the seven countries, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam. It has two and three affiliates in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. In India, where there has been no BRI project to date, BWI has the most number of affiliates (43). However, whether these BWI affiliates do or have done organizing drives in any of the BRI projects in their respective countries is yet to be determined. This could be a possible follow up study to this paper. Prospects of Unionization in BRI

A hostile politico-economic environment for unionization and low union density rates present a difficult context for organizing workers engaged in BRI projects in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

However, the massive employment generation impact of BRI in the construction and building sector presents a big potential for union organizing and/or member recruitment, particularly in countries where BWI has a union affiliate. The presence of social movements and opposition groups that have had organized protest actions against BRI projects in some of the study countries, as discussed earlier, may also be an important factor that may influence union organizing and/or make BRI projects more transparent. For example, in Sri Lanka, trade unions, together with other opposition groups, were successful in forcing the Sri Lankan government to reduce the China Merchants Port Holdings’ ownership of the US$1.5 billion Hambantota Port from 80% to 70% for a term of 99 years.

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The robustness of growth in the construction sector in Cambodia in recent years provides an example of the link between construction boom and union organizing. According to Serrano and Nuon (2018), union density in Cambodia’s construction sector, albeit still low, registered a significant increase from 0.9% in 2012 to 3.1% in 2016.58 From informal conversations of one of the authors with leaders of the Building and Wood Workers Trade Union Federation of Cambodia (BWTUC) sometime in 2016, the latter indeed confirmed that their union membership has been growing as a result of their organizing efforts amidst growth in the construction sector in the country.

About 3% of the Cambodia’s employed population work in the construction sector. In 2012, Cambodia’s labour force survey reported that there were 487,077 workers employed in this sector.59 From our database for Cambodia, two BRI projects alone—the 405-kilometer railway from Preah Vihear to Koh Kong Province and the expressway from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville—are expected to employ at least 30,000 workers. Findings from the Database

Our database recorded 136 BRI projects in six of the seven study countries in Asia. Pakistan and Cambodia are the top countries in terms of the most number of BRI projects.

At the time of preparing the database, Pakistan recorded the highest number of BRI projects at 54, followed by Cambodia with 32 projects. Viet Nam has only one BRI project, which, as mentioned earlier, pre-dates the BRI launching. There is no recorded BRI project in India.

By type of BRI projects, transport and logistics infrastructure tops the list in terms of the highest number of projects. Our database shows that there are 83 transport and logistics infrastructure projects in the six countries: 31 roads and highways; 16 railways; 15 ports; 14 bridges; four aviation projects, and two mass transit projects.

Among the six countries, Cambodia registered the highest number of transport and logistics infrastructure projects at 27 (i.e. 12 bridges, roads and highways, four railways, two ports, and two aviation). Pakistan followed with 22 projects (i.e. 15 roads and highways, four ports, two railways, two mass transit, and one aviation).

BRI projects related to energy and natural resources ranked second in terms of the most number. These projects comprise 26 power plants, five oil and gas, and two transmission lines. Again, Pakistan recorded the highest of this BRI project type with 22 power plants.

The project cost of BRI projects is often among the information that is not readily available. Of the 136 BRI projects in our database, only 103 had information about project cost. The total project cost of these BRI projects in six countries is nearly US$157 billion (Table 9). However, it is doubtful that the project costs per country indicated in the table are those of BRI projects that have been implemented after the official BRI launching in 2013. As mentioned earlier, many China-funded projects in the countries listed in Table 9 started (and some were even completed) before 2013. Table 9: Project cost of BRI projects in selected Asian countries

Country Project cost Number of projects with information on project cost Cambodia 17,830,419,699.00 24 out of 32 Sri Lanka 7,820,600,000.00 13 out of 15 Pakistan 57,049,993,851.00 46 out of 54 Viet Nam 891,000,000.00 1 out of 1 Myanmar 61,150,000,000.00 8 out of 16 Bangladesh 12,137,723,250.00 11 out of 18 Total project cost/Number of projects US$156,879,736,800.00 103 out of 136

Source: Various sources cited in our database.

58 Serrano, M.R. and Nuon, V. (2018). Unions and Development in Cambodia. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia, p. 101, Table 12. 59 ibid: 20. 21 Building and Wood Workers’ International

The nature or type of funding of BRI projects is another type of information that is often missing in articles, documents, and databases we searched in building our BRI database. As such, we were able to get only very few data on the nature of funding of BRI projects in the six countries. Based on our database, of the 47 projects which had information about the nature of funding, more than half (28) were concessional loans from China, two were non-concessional loans, two had zero interest loans, and three were grants, among others.

Only 22 of the 136 BRI projects in our database had information about the ownership or investment arrangement. Of this number, 11 projects are under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme ranging from 25 to 55 years, two have a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement, and two are on a 99-year lease to China.

Less than half (61) of the 136 projects in our database have information of the funding institutions. ‹‹In Cambodia, of the 14 BRI projects with identified funding institutions, nearly all (13) are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government. ‹‹In Sri Lanka, all of the nine BRI projects with identified funding institutions are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government. ‹‹In Pakistan, of the 28 projects with indicated funding institutions, 10 are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government and 16 are funded by independent power producers (IPP). ‹‹In Myanmar, only one project indicated a funding institution, which is a joint investment between China and Myanmar. ‹‹In Bangladesh, all the eight projects with identified funding institutions are funded by Chinese banks and the Chinese government. ‹‹ In Viet Nam, the lone BRI project draws funding from China Bank.

Finally, as pointed out earlier, available data on the number of workers involved in each BRI project seldom appeared in the documents and online sources we reviewed. Only nine BRI projects included information on the estimated number of workers or jobs needed for or would be generated from the projects. Also, the sources we reviewed did not present any information about the status of workers, their situations and labour issues, and even the involvement of unions, if any, in BRI projects.

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The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia Mapping Trade Union Context and Possibilities to Organise

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