Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru
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COCA, DRUGS AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN BOLIVIA AND PERU Latin America Report N°12 -- 3 March 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. COCA IN BOLIVIA AND PERU ................................................................................. 2 A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................................2 B. ILLEGAL COCA......................................................................................................................4 C. LEGAL COCA ........................................................................................................................9 1. Peru............................................................................................................................9 2. Bolivia......................................................................................................................10 D. COCALERO MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL PROTEST..................................................................11 1. Bolivia......................................................................................................................11 2. Peru..........................................................................................................................13 E. COCA AND ARMED ACTORS ................................................................................................15 III. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY .......................................................................... 17 A. THE ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE .........................................................................17 B. THE TERRORIST CONNECTION?...........................................................................................18 C. ERADICATION AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT ..............................................................19 D. INTERDICTION.....................................................................................................................22 IV. THE LURE OF THE ILLEGAL DRUGS TRADE: ENABLING FACTORS IN THE REGION............................................................................................................... 24 A. THE ECUADOR GATEWAY ...................................................................................................24 B. CONSUMER MARKETS.........................................................................................................25 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS ..........................................................................28 B. MAP OF BOLIVIA.................................................................................................................29 C. MAP OF PERU......................................................................................................................30 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................31 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN .........................32 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD MEMBERS........................................................................................33 Latin America Report N°12 3 March 2005 COCA, DRUGS AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN BOLIVIA AND PERU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Bolivia and Peru are becoming a second, though compared The ACI applies similar measures across the Andean to Colombia still relatively small-scale, pole of cocaine region, in geographic and political settings that show production in the Andes, feeding in particular a growing marked differences to Colombia. However, U.S. counter- Latin American market in addition to the traditional U.S. drug policies there also emphasise eradication and and European markets. At least as significantly, the downplay the legitimacy of traditional coca production policies emphasised there in pursuit of the U.S.-led war and have prompted mounting social protest by coca on drugs are aggravating social tensions with potentially farmers, particularly in Bolivia but also in Peru. explosive results for the extremely fragile democratic institutions of both countries. If these trends are to be There is no doubt that a large part of coca leaf grown reversed, new and better funded policies are needed that today in the two countries is sold for processing into put greater emphasis on alternative development and cocaine. The extremely weak governments and state institution building, less on forced eradication, and that institutions, which lack the capability to control their demonstrate more sensitivity to local culture. The proposed vast territories and enforce the law, have come under new U.S. budget, however, goes in the wrong direction. increasing pressure from social movements and populist opposition parties. The counterdrug policies impact on Anti-drug, law enforcement and alternative development coca farmers from poor indigenous communities with efforts in Bolivia and Peru over the last twenty years have historical grievances against the economic and political not achieved a lasting reduction of illicit coca crops. elites. The implementation and public perception of Since the large-scale eradication campaigns in the counterdrug policies add fuel to a political tinderbox that second half of the 1990s, coca cultivation has again already has seen a president forced from office in Bolivia. gained momentum in both countries, reaching 73,000 Democratic governance, prospects for equitable socio- hectares at the end of 2003 when the UN Office on Drugs economic development and social peace in Bolivia and and Crime (UNODC) estimated combined annual cocaine Peru are in serious jeopardy. production potential at 215 tons. Early indications are that there was another increase in 2004. The potential to add to already considerable instability in the Andean region is compounded by Counterdrug policies in Bolivia and Peru at the start of links between parts of the Bolivian and Peruvian coca the 1990s produced the now generally accepted "balloon grower movements and international drug trafficking effect": coca cultivation squeezed at the mid-point of the networks. The combination of expanded markets in Andes was shifted to Colombia at its northern end on a Europe and South America, particularly Brazil, and massive scale, transforming that country into the world's the emergence of small drug trafficking networks in largest producer of coca leaf and cocaine. In 2000 and part linked to political cocalero movements has led to 2001, respectively, two U.S.-sponsored anti-drug the expansion of Bolivian and Peruvian cultivation. strategies -- Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Porous borders, corruption and a much less intensive Initiative (ACI) -- were launched to counter drug interdiction effort compared to that in Colombia production in Colombia and dam spillover effects but (where there has been a significant reduction in also to prevent re-emergence of major drug cultivation cultivation) make it relatively easy for both local and in Bolivia and Peru. Policy emphasis has clearly been on international drug networks to move their product. Colombia, where a massive aerial spraying campaign and strong interdiction and law enforcement measures Restructuring those counterdrug policies to focus more produced a nearly 50 per cent reduction in coca crops -- resources on alternative and rural development strategies, to 86,000 hectares by late 2003 from the high of 163,000 law enforcement and interdiction as opposed to forced hectares in 2000. eradication is likely to be more successful and to avoid negative impacts on Bolivian and Peruvian democratic institutions. Unfortunately, the U.S. budget for FY2006 Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru Crisis Group Latin America Report N°12, 3 March 2005 Page ii just submitted by President Bush to the Congress (a) providing relevant communities with proposes cuts in funding for alternative development substantially increased alternative livelihood and institution building of nearly 20 per cent for Peru and rural development funding and more and 10 per cent for Bolivia. sustained presence of state services and law enforcement institutions; and While it is unconstructive and unwise to brand the Bolivian and Peruvian social movements and their (b) implementing manual eradication programs leaders as "narco-delinquents" or "narco-terrorists", but only after alternative livelihood and the coca grower organisations in those countries will rural development programs are in place. only gain greater international credibility if they sever 4. Increase efforts at interdicting shipments of all existing ties with drug trafficking networks and illegal drugs, controlling chemical precursors articulate democratically their legitimate demands for and otherwise enforcing the law against domestic socio-economic change, including legal coca cultivation drug processing facilities and drug trafficking for traditional purposes. At the same time, the U.S., networks. the European Union, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, the international financial institutions (IFI)s, the Organisation To the Bolivian political party MAS: of American States (OAS) and the UN should strongly support alternative and rural development strategies