Decolonizing the Drug War
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LARC Resources on Indigenous Languages and Peoples of the Andes Film
LARC Resources on Indigenous Languages and Peoples of the Andes The LARC Lending Library has an extensive collection of educational materials for teacher and classroom use such as videos, slides, units, books, games, curriculum units, and maps. They are available for free short term loan to any instructor in the United States. These materials can be found on the online searchable catalog: http://stonecenter.tulane.edu/pages/detail/48/Lending-Library Film Apaga y Vamonos The Mapuche people of South America survived conquest by the Incas and the Spanish, as well as assimilation by the state of Chile. But will they survive the construction of the Ralco hydroelectric power station? When ENDESA, a multinational company with roots in Spain, began the project in 1997, Mapuche families living along the Biobio River were offered land, animals, tools, and relocation assistance in return for the voluntary exchange of their land. However, many refused to leave; some alleged that they had been marooned in the Andean hinterlands with unsafe housing and, ironically, no electricity. Those who remained claim they have been sold out for progress; that Chile's Indigenous Law has been flouted by then-president Eduardo Frei, that Mapuches protesting the Ralco station have been rounded up and prosecuted for arson and conspiracy under Chile's anti-terrorist legislation, and that many have been forced into hiding to avoid unfair trials with dozens of anonymous informants testifying against them. Newspaper editor Pedro Cayuqueo says he was arrested and interrogated for participating in this documentary. Directed by Manel Mayol. 2006. Spanish w/ English subtitles, 80 min. -
Turning Over a New Leaf: Regional Applicability of Innovative Drug Crop Control Policy in the Andes
TURNING OVER A NEW LEAF: REGIONAL APPLICABILITY OF INNOVATIVE DRUG CROP CONTROL POLICY IN THE ANDES Thomas Grisaffi, The University of Reading Linda Farthing, The Andean Information Network Kathryn Ledebur, The Andean Information Network Maritza Paredes, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú Alvaro Pastor, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú ABSTRACT: This article considers coca control and development strategies in Bolivia and Peru through the intersection of participatory development, social control and the relationship between growers and the state. Bolivia has emerged as a world leader in formulating a participatory, non-violent model in confronting the cocaine trade. Between 2006-2019 the government limited coca production through community-level control. Our study finds that not only has Bolivia’s model proven more effective in reducing coca acreage than repression, but it has effectively expanded social and civil rights in hitherto marginal regions. In contrast, Peru has continued to conceptualize ‘drugs’ as a crime and security issue. This focus has led to U.S.-financed forced crop eradication, putting the burden of the ‘War on Drugs’ onto impoverished farmers, and generating violence and instability. At the request of farmers, the Peruvian government is currently considering the partial implementation of the Bolivian model in Peru. Could it work? We address this question by drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, interview data and focus group discussions in both countries, combined with secondary research drawn from government, NGO and international agency reports. We find that for community control to have a reasonable chance of success in Peru key areas need to be strengthened. These include the ability of grassroots organizations to self-police, building trust in the state through increased collaboration and incorporating coca growers into development and crop control institutions. -
Counterdrug Strategy - Illusive Victory: from Blast Furnace to Green Sweep
WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Counterdrug Strategy - Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green Sweep by William W. Mendel Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article originally published in Military Review December 1992, pp. 74-87 In Northern California, Bisqueen Castles mark the beginning of spring--and the start of a new campaign season for marijuana eradication operations.1 A continent away in the Chapare region of Bolivia, the rainy season is ending allowing the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to rekindle the flames of its campaign to eradicate Andean coca plants and disrupt the drug flow to the U.S. The past five years or so have witnessed numerous large counterdrug operations such as those conducted under the aegis of U.S. embassies, DEA, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, state governors' offices, and many more. Since Secretary Dick Cheney's staunch Department of Defense letter of September 1989, the military has been actively supporting drug law enforcement agencies at home and abroad.2 In the U.S. Southern Command area, a series of Operation Support Justice actions have provided continuing military support to U.S. ambassadors' counterdrug efforts and to the host nations' counterdrug infrastructures in order to attack drugs at the source. Forces Command, by way of its continental armies and Joint Task Force 6, has been supporting major marijuana eradication operations, while the state governors' National Guards have been especially active in countering drugs at the growing source. -
129142NCJRS.Pdf
If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. 1~9/q:;2 Union Calendar No. 584 • 101st Congress, 2d Session -- - - - ----- House Report 101-991 UNITED STATES ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES IN THE ANDEAN REGION THIRTY-EIGHTH REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS together with SEPARATE VIEWS • 129142 U.S. Department 01 Justice National Institute 01 Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this""l 'r: ,. material has been granted qy Public Domain/101 st Congress Committee on Government Operations to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permis sion 01 the~owner. NOVEMBER 30, 1990.-0rdered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 35-910 WASilImGTON : 1990 '. • t COMMI'ITEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman CARDISS COLLINS, lllinois FRANK HORTON, New York GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania HENRY A. WAXMAN, California AL McCANDLESS, California TED WEISS, New York HOW ARIJ C. NIELSON, Utah MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma RICHARD K. ARMEY, Texas ~TEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio DOUG BARNARD, JR., Georgia J. DENNIS HASTER'r, lllinois BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts JON L. KYL, Arizona TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHA YS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia PETER SMITH, Vermont BARBARA BOXER, California STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico MAJOR R. -
Drugs and Development: the Great Disconnect
ISSN 2054-2046 Drugs and Development: The Great Disconnect Julia Buxton Policy Report 2 | January 2015 Drugs and Development: The Great Disconnect Julia Buxton∗ Policy Report 2 | January 2015 Key Points • The 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) will see a strong lobby in support of development oriented responses to the problem of drug supply, including from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). • The promotion of Alternative Development (AD) programmes that provide legal, non-drug related economic opportunities for drug crop cultivators reflects the limited success of enforcement responses, greater awareness of the development dimensions of cultivation activities and the importance of drugs and development agencies working co-operatively in drug environments. • Evidence from thirty years of AD programming demonstrates limited success in supply reduction and that poorly monitored and weakly evaluated programmes cause more harm than good; there has been little uptake of best practice approaches, cultivators rarely benefit from AD programmes, the concept of AD is contested and there is no shared understanding of ‘development’. • AD was popularised in the 1990s when development discourse emphasised participatory approaches and human wellbeing. This is distinct from the development approaches of the 2000s, which have been ‘securitised’ in the aftermath of the Global War on Terror and which re-legitimise military participation in AD. • UNGASS 2016 provides an opportunity for critical scrutiny of AD and the constraints imposed by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs on innovative, rights based and nationally owned supply responses. Cultivation is a development not a crime and security issue. -
N 0'For Publication
N 0' FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT WRITER'S CONSENT INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS WLM-14 21 April 1989 La Paz, BOLIVIA Peter Bird Martin Executive Director Institute of Current World Affairs Wheelock House 4 West Wheelock Street Hanover, NH 03755 Dear Petei, In the days before the Andean Wars of Independence (1809--1826), when Bolivia was still known as Upper Peru, addressing Ferdinand VII, the King of Spain, was no simple matter. And in Upper Pet"u, %he center of Royalist support was the cap.ital La Plala. LocaTed in the Chuquisaca valley, La Plata was the seat of the Audiencia de Charcas that administered the royal edicts firsl tnder the ju'isdiction of the Viceroyalty of Lima-- and after 1776, under the jurisdict+/-on of the Viceroyalty in Buenos Aires. No long after silver mining began in Poosi in 545, La Plata became a principal crossroads of the Spanish Empire. Miners and landowners flocked to Chuquisaca to inves heir profits [n elegant homes and educate their children at one of the New World's finer institutions, the bniversiT.y de Sai Francisco Xavier (founded 16'74). For bola ininers and large landowners, there was no question of allegiance. The Spanish monarchy, despite feeble atempts to assure the rights of indigenous peoples after the Conquest, generelly tolerated the "mira" and the "pongo." The forner sent thousands of Aymaras and Quechuas to the Potoai mines and hei[ deaths. The allowed landowners, o "hacendados" to exploit Indian "co]ones" who already worked %he patron's lands 3-5 days a week, forcing the "pongo" to give up least one week a year to attend his master's needs in the ci%y of La Plata without pay. -
Turning Over a New Leaf: a Subnational Analysis of 'Coca Yes
Journal of Latin American Studies (2021), 53, 573–600 doi:10.1017/S0022216X21000456 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Turning Over a New Leaf: A Subnational Analysis of ‘Coca Yes, Cocaine No’ in Bolivia Susan Brewer-Osorio* Assistant Professor, Latin American Studies, University of Arizona *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] (Received 9 October 2019; revised 14 April 2021; accepted 19 April 2021; first published online 16 June 2021) Abstract International pressure to suppress cocaine trafficking sustained decades of harsh drug laws in Bolivia against cocaleros (coca producers), thus affecting coca production for traditional consumption and for manufacturing illicit cocaine. These harsh drug laws caused social unrest in cocalero communities outside traditional coca zones. President Evo Morales, leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS) party, implemented ‘Coca Yes, Cocaine No’ (CYCN), a harm-reduction strategy that authorised ‘non-traditional’ farmers to cultivate legal coca and self-police production. This article compares CYCN outcomes in Bolivia’s traditional and non-traditional coca regions and finds that strong cocalero organisations were vital to CYCN success in non-traditional areas. In contrast, organised resistance in traditional zones restricted CYCN success and added to regime instability in the lead-up to Morales’ forced resignation in 2019. Hence, while Morales harnessed state power to change drug policy, he was constrained by the rural grassroots organisations that brought him to power. -
Bolivia's Divisions
BOLIVIA'S DIVISIONS: TOO DEEP TO HEAL? 6 July 2004 Latin America Report N°7 Quito/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS ............................................................................................ 2 III. THE MESA ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................... 4 IV. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OPPOSITION ...................................................... 7 A. EVO'S EVOLUTION AND THE MAS TODAY...............................................................................7 B. LABOUR ORGANISATIONS: THE STREET-BASED OPPOSITION.................................................8 C. OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES...................................................................................................9 D. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NGOS ..................................................................................10 V. SPARKS THAT COULD SET THE COUNTRY AFLAME ................................... 11 A. NATURAL GAS ....................................................................................................................13 B. CAMBAS AND COLLAS ........................................................................................................14 C. THE COCA LEAF .................................................................................................................17 -
David Versus Goliath in Cochabamba Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia by Willem Assies
ARTICLE LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 10.1177/0094582X03252286Assies / DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH IN COCHABAMBA David versus Goliath in Cochabamba Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia by Willem Assies “Ours is a small country and it hardly owns anything any more. Our mines were privatized, the electrification company was privatized, and the airlines, the telecommunications, the railways, our oil and gas. The things we still own are the water and the air, and we have struggled to make sure that the water continues to be ours,” said Oscar Olivera, a trade-union leader from Cochabamba, Bolivia, addressing one of the assemblies protesting the annual spring meeting of the IMF/World Bank in Washington, DC, in April 2000. Olivera had been freshly flown in from the city that had been the scene of vio- lent protests that forced the transnational consortium Aguas del Tunari out of Cochabamba Department and called upon the Bolivian government to mod- ify Law 2029 on Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage, proclaimed only five months earlier. The assembly that protested the power of transnational capi- talism and neoliberal policies cheered him as a hero. “David has defeated Goliath,” claimed Olivera, and “thus set an example for the rest of the world.” From the early days of April Bolivia had been the scene of a wave of pro- tests such as it had not seen for several decades, prompting the Banzer gov- ernment, elected in 1997, to declare a state of siege. The day the state of siege was declared, 880 police mutinied to press wage demands and students pro- tested in La Paz, and later coca growers from the yunga region set up road- blocks to protest forced eradication. -
US Anti-Drug Policy and the Socialist Movement in Bolivia
Reisinger: The Unintended Revolution: U.S. Anti-Drug Policy and the Socialis CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOLUME 39 SPRING 2009 NUMBER 2 THE UNINTENDED REVOLUTION: U.S. ANTI-DRUG POLICY AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN BOLIVIA WILL REISINGER* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 239 II. COCA AND BOLIVIA .................................................................... 242 A. An Overview of Bolivian Culture and History.......................... 242 1. A Troubled H istory ............................................................ 243 2. The East-West D ivide ......................................................... 243 3. Natural Resources and Drugs ............................................ 245 B. The History of Coca Use and Cultivation ................................ 246 1. Uses ................................................................................... 24 8 2. Coca's Cultural Significance ............................................. 248 a. The "Divine Plant"...................................................... 249 b. To Be a "Real Person"................................................ 250 C. Coca and the Bolivian Economy .............................................. 251 1. TraditionalHighland Cultivation....................................... 251 * Staff Attorney, the Ohio Environmental Council, Columbus, Ohio. J.D., 2008, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law. B.A., 2005, Emory & Henry College. I would like to thank Professors -