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Coca Policies in Post-2005 Bolivia: the Effect on Cocalero Livelihoods in the Chapare

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Coca Policies In Post-2005 Bolivia: The Effect On Cocalero Livelihoods In The Chapare Item Type text; Electronic Thesis Authors Sharp, Bryn Deana Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 02/10/2021 10:23:51 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/632681 COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE By BRYN DEANA SHARP ____________________ A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree With Honors in Latin American Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA M A Y 2 0 1 9 Approved by: ____________________________ Dr. Susan Brewer-Osorio Department of Latin American Studies COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE Abstract After Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia’s President in 2005, the cultivation of the coca leaf, an important economic and cultural resource for the country, became legalized in the Chapare. In this region, Morales and his administration have enacted several policies that focus on improving the livelihoods of coca-growing families (cocaleros) through cooperative reduction of coca production and the diversification of their income base. The Bolivian government claims that these policy changes have resulted in substantial improvements in the well-being of these households. This study examines the changes in wealth, (un)employment, and food security levels of cocalero households to conclude that while there has been an improvement in their livelihoods, there has not been enough change to allow for socioeconomic mobility. i COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the assistance, support, and time dedicated by my adviser Dr. Susan Brewer-Osorio throughout the entire length of this project. I would also like to thank the University of Arizona Honors College and Department of Latin American Studies for providing me with the necessary resources throughout the past year. Lastly, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my parents, who have served as invaluable role models and supporters during this process. ii COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………i Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………...ii List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………iv Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………....1 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………..4 Argument……………………………………………………………………………………….11 Methodology……………………………………………………...........................................14 Analysis………………………………………………………………………………………....19 Bolivian Coca Policy: Illustrating Temporal Changes………………………………19 Bolivian Coca Policy: 1960s – 1997………………………………………….19 Bolivian Coca Policy: 1997 – 2004…………………………………………...21 Bolivian Coca Policy: 2005 – Present………………………………………..24 Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Cultivation in the Chapare…..28 Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Growers in the Chapare……..31 Poverty and Wealth in the Chapare………………………………………….32 Employment in the Chapare…………………………………………………..47 Food Security in the Chapare………………………………………………...52 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….……………..58 Index: Key Terms and Definitions……………………………………………….…………...62 Works Cited………………………………………………………………………….…………64 iii COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE List of Figures Figure 1: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (1999-2014)……………………………………...…..29 Figure 2: National and Regional (Chapare) Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (2003- 2017)………………………………………………………………………..….. 30 Figure 3: Poverty Rates in Bolivia: A 2005 and 2011 Comparison……………….……….37 Figure 4: Temporal Change of Extreme Poverty Levels in Bolivia (2005-2014)………...37 Figure 5: Average Household Income Earned through Coca Sales in the Chapare (2003-2017)………………………………………………………………….…39 Figure 6: Distribution of Bolivian Household Size and Composition (1976-2012)…..….41 Figure 7: Daily Household Income from Coca Growing in the Chapare………………….42 Figure 8: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (1999-2017)………………………………...…...50 Figure 9: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (2009-2017)………………………………..…...50 Figure 10: Projected Rates of Unemployment (Bolivia)………………………………..….51 Figure 11: Bolivian Crop Calendar……………………………………………………..……55 iv COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE Introduction Since the colonization of the Chapare, coca has had a very important economic role in the livelihoods of many of the region’s inhabitants. However, poor market conditions, heavy eradication, and violence plagued the coca industry throughout the 1900s, resulting in high levels of poverty in the region. Moreover, the classification of coca as equivalent to cocaine resulted in the criminalization of the crop and a shift away from the traditional discourse of coca use in Bolivian society. However, When Evo Morales, an ex-cocalero, strong advocate for the rights of coca growers, and president of the Chapare coca federations, became President of Bolivia in 2005, he insurmountably turned the national coca discourse in the opposite direction. With his “Coca yes, cocaine no” policy, Morales stressed the distinction between coca the crop, and cocaine the illicit drug. Morales has implemented policies of cooperative coca reduction, sustained interdiction, and alternative development as a means of respecting and legalizing the traditional uses of coca while diversifying the income base of cocaleros and cracking down on cocaine production in the country. Since 2005, there has been a claim by the Bolivian government and several academics that Morales’ new policies have substantially increased the well-being (livelihoods) of coca- growing households in the Chapare. This study aims to determine what has been the impact of coca policy change on cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare. Through a close examination of wealth, (un)employment, and food security trends, I argue that while there has been an increase in the general quality of cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare since 1 COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE 2005, there has not been a significant enough change to constitute cocalero socioeconomic mobility and stability. Only 12 percent (410,000 hectares of 3,379,000 ha) of the land in Bolivia’s Chapare region is suitable for cultivation, with poor soil qualities and large forests (forests cover more than 50% of the land) limiting crops’ ability to grow (Farthing and Kohl, p. 184). The region has a fragile ecosystem and receives high levels of rainfall every year (Farthing and Kohl, p. 184). Challenges for agriculture in the region include flooding and soil leaching during heavy rainfalls (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 258). The Chapare is one of the main coca-growing regions of Bolivia (South, p. 24). Due to the hardiness of the coca crop and its ability to be harvested three to four times per year, many households in the Chapare grew coca (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 260--261; South, p. 27). As will be discussed in the subsequent pages, coca has played a very important role in the rural economies of Bolivia (especially the Chapare) and in cocalero livelihoods. However, by the early 1900s North American progressives had illegalized cocaine and criminalized the coca leaf (which is used to make cocaine) (Grisaffi, p. 151). In 1961 the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs classified the coca leaf as a dangerous narcotic, similar to heroin and cocaine (“Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961”; Grisaffi, p. 151). The negative sentiment towards coca continued when the U.S. government began focusing on coca eradication as part of their “War on Drugs” (Ledebur, p. 2; Farthing and Kohl, p. 183). There was a heavy resistance to eradication (an act of collaboration between the United States and Bolivian governments) from coca growers due to the economic and cultural importance of coca in Bolivia. Apart from being a primary source of income for a 2 COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE large portion of the country’s population, coca use in the Andes dates back as far as 1,000 BC, was considered sacred by the Incas (“Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”; Biondich and Joslin), has been used in religious rituals (“Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”), as a medicine (coca alleviates altitude sickness, stomach aches, headaches, hunger, stress, drowsiness, and fatigue) (South, p. 22-23; “Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”; Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261; Biondich and Joslin; “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants”; Martin, p. 428), and as a flavoring agent in products such as tea and Coca Cola (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261; “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants”). As a result of cocalero resistance to eradication, which was particularly strong in the Chapare, poverty, malnutrition, violence, oppression, and human rights violations plagued Bolivia during the late 20th century. Since 2005,
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