Coca Policies in Post-2005 Bolivia: the Effect on Cocalero Livelihoods in the Chapare

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Coca Policies In Post-2005 Bolivia: The Effect On Cocalero Livelihoods In The Chapare

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Authors Sharp, Bryn Deana

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/632681 COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: THE EFFECT ON COCALERO

LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

BRYN DEANA SHARP

______

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree With Honors in

Latin American Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

M A Y 2 0 1 9

Approved by:

______

Dr. Susan Brewer-Osorio Department of Latin American Studies COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Abstract

After Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia’s President in 2005, the cultivation of the coca leaf, an important economic and cultural resource for the country, became legalized in the Chapare. In this region, Morales and his administration have enacted several policies that focus on improving the livelihoods of coca-growing families (cocaleros) through cooperative reduction of coca production and the diversification of their income base. The Bolivian government claims that these policy changes have resulted in substantial improvements in the well-being of these households. This study examines the changes in wealth, (un)employment, and food security levels of cocalero households to conclude that while there has been an improvement in their livelihoods, there has not been enough change to allow for socioeconomic mobility.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the assistance, support, and time dedicated by my adviser Dr. Susan Brewer-Osorio throughout the entire length of this project. I would also like to thank the University of Arizona Honors College and

Department of Latin American Studies for providing me with the necessary resources throughout the past year. Lastly, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my parents, who have served as invaluable role models and supporters during this process.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………i

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………...ii

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………iv

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………....1

Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………..4

Argument……………………………………………………………………………………….11

Methodology……………………………………………………...... 14

Analysis………………………………………………………………………………………....19

Bolivian Coca Policy: Illustrating Temporal Changes………………………………19

Bolivian Coca Policy: 1960s – 1997………………………………………….19

Bolivian Coca Policy: 1997 – 2004…………………………………………...21

Bolivian Coca Policy: 2005 – Present………………………………………..24

Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Cultivation in the Chapare…..28

Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Growers in the Chapare……..31

Poverty and Wealth in the Chapare………………………………………….32

Employment in the Chapare…………………………………………………..47

Food Security in the Chapare………………………………………………...52

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….……………..58

Index: Key Terms and Definitions……………………………………………….…………...62

Works Cited………………………………………………………………………….…………64

iii

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

List of Figures

Figure 1: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (1999-2014)……………………………………...…..29

Figure 2: National and Regional (Chapare) Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (2003-

2017)………………………………………………………………………..….. 30

Figure 3: Poverty Rates in Bolivia: A 2005 and 2011 Comparison……………….……….37

Figure 4: Temporal Change of Extreme Poverty Levels in Bolivia (2005-2014)………...37

Figure 5: Average Household Income Earned through Coca Sales in the Chapare

(2003-2017)………………………………………………………………….…39

Figure 6: Distribution of Bolivian Household Size and Composition (1976-2012)…..….41

Figure 7: Daily Household Income from Coca Growing in the Chapare………………….42

Figure 8: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (1999-2017)………………………………...…...50

Figure 9: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (2009-2017)………………………………..…...50

Figure 10: Projected Rates of Unemployment (Bolivia)………………………………..….51

Figure 11: Bolivian Crop Calendar……………………………………………………..……55

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Introduction

Since the colonization of the Chapare, coca has had a very important economic role in the livelihoods of many of the region’s inhabitants. However, poor market conditions, heavy eradication, and violence plagued the coca industry throughout the

1900s, resulting in high levels of poverty in the region. Moreover, the classification of coca as equivalent to cocaine resulted in the criminalization of the crop and a shift away from the traditional discourse of coca use in Bolivian society. However, When Evo Morales, an ex-cocalero, strong advocate for the rights of coca growers, and president of the Chapare coca federations, became President of Bolivia in 2005, he insurmountably turned the national coca discourse in the opposite direction.

With his “Coca yes, cocaine no” policy, Morales stressed the distinction between coca the crop, and cocaine the illicit drug. Morales has implemented policies of cooperative coca reduction, sustained interdiction, and alternative development as a means of respecting and legalizing the traditional uses of coca while diversifying the income base of cocaleros and cracking down on cocaine production in the country. Since

2005, there has been a claim by the Bolivian government and several academics that

Morales’ new policies have substantially increased the well-being (livelihoods) of coca- growing households in the Chapare. This study aims to determine what has been the impact of coca policy change on cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare. Through a close examination of wealth, (un)employment, and food security trends, I argue that while there has been an increase in the general quality of cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare since

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

2005, there has not been a significant enough change to constitute cocalero socioeconomic mobility and stability.

Only 12 percent (410,000 hectares of 3,379,000 ha) of the land in Bolivia’s

Chapare region is suitable for cultivation, with poor soil qualities and large forests (forests cover more than 50% of the land) limiting crops’ ability to grow (Farthing and Kohl, p.

184). The region has a fragile ecosystem and receives high levels of rainfall every year

(Farthing and Kohl, p. 184). Challenges for agriculture in the region include flooding and soil leaching during heavy rainfalls (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 258). The Chapare is one of the main coca-growing regions of Bolivia (South, p. 24). Due to the hardiness of the coca crop and its ability to be harvested three to four times per year, many households in the Chapare grew coca (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 260--261; South, p. 27).

As will be discussed in the subsequent pages, coca has played a very important role in the rural economies of Bolivia (especially the Chapare) and in cocalero livelihoods.

However, by the early 1900s North American progressives had illegalized cocaine and criminalized the coca leaf (which is used to make cocaine) (Grisaffi, p. 151). In 1961 the

United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs classified the coca leaf as a dangerous narcotic, similar to heroin and cocaine (“Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,

1961”; Grisaffi, p. 151). The negative sentiment towards coca continued when the U.S. government began focusing on coca eradication as part of their “War on Drugs” (Ledebur, p. 2; Farthing and Kohl, p. 183).

There was a heavy resistance to eradication (an act of collaboration between the

United States and Bolivian governments) from coca growers due to the economic and cultural importance of coca in Bolivia. Apart from being a primary source of income for a

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE large portion of the country’s population, coca use in the Andes dates back as far as 1,000

BC, was considered sacred by the Incas (“Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”; Biondich and Joslin), has been used in religious rituals (“Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”), as a medicine (coca alleviates altitude sickness, stomach aches, headaches, hunger, stress, drowsiness, and fatigue) (South, p. 22-23; “Bolivia: Legacy of Coca”; Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261;

Biondich and Joslin; “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants”; Martin, p.

428), and as a flavoring agent in products such as tea and Coca Cola (Eastwood and

Pollard, p. 261; “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants”). As a result of cocalero resistance to eradication, which was particularly strong in the Chapare, poverty, malnutrition, violence, oppression, and human rights violations plagued Bolivia during the late 20th century.

Since 2005, the livelihoods of cocaleros in the Chapare have somewhat improved.

This study will focus on the livelihood factors of income (wealth), employment, and food security to demonstrate this change. However, when factors such as household size, employment trends, and average rainfall are considered, one will find that there has not been a significant enough change in cocalero livelihoods to allow for socioeconomic mobility and stability.

In the subsequent sections, first I will discuss the changes Bolivian coca policy that have occurred since the mid-20th century. Next, I will explore the effects that these policy changes have had on coca cultivation in the Chapare. Then, an examination of how policy change has affected cocaleros in the region will be conducted through the following three factors: wealth (income), employment access, and food security. Each section will contribute an essential component to the overall argument that the changes in coca crop

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE cultivation that have occurred as a result of Morales’ 2005 reforms to Bolivian drug policy have not resulted in a significant improvement in the livelihood levels of coca-cultivating communities in the Chapare.

Literature Review

The rise of the use of coca for cocaine production in Bolivia has fallen under the focus of U.S. and Bolivian government eradication policies. As a result, several scholars have conducted research and written articles about the effects of various illicit crop elimination strategies. Furthermore, since Evo Morales was elected Bolivia’s president in

2005 and radically changed the government’s stance on coca cultivation, a conversation has appeared about how his policy changes regarding coca and cocaine eradication have transformed the country. The following literature addresses the question of how Morales’ new eradication strategies have affected communities where coca growing is a prominent element in their way of life. The scholarship on my research question can be divided into approximately three schools of thought: Improved Conditions, Worse Conditions, and

No Significant Improvement.

Research by several scholars substantiates the argument that the changes in drug policy since 2005 have improved the conditions of local communities1. I call this perspective “Improved Conditions”. However, as demonstrated under the school titled

“Worse Conditions”, other research supports the claim that these drug policy changes have in fact worsened the conditions of affected populations2. Furthermore, the third related argument falls more in the middle of the two extremes. Several scholars have

1 Babor et al., 2010; Garza, 2005; Grisaffi, 2016; Ledebur and Youngers, 2012 2 Boville, 2004; del Olmo, 1998; Kohl and Farthing, 2001; World Food Programme, 2010

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE published research that demonstrates the argument that while the election of Morales as

Bolivia’s president in 2005 and his changes in drug policy have proven to be effective in coca crop eradication and cocaine reduction, the conditions of local communities have not significantly improved nor worsened3. Due to the existence of data that supports the

No Significant Improvement school of thought, it is the most compelling school of thought to investigate.

The majority of the articles that support the Improved Conditions school of thought utilizes past trends (pre- and post-2005) to emphasize how Morales’ policy changes have improved, and will continue to improve, the situations in local communities.

Babor et al. (2010), for example, state that the election of Morales as Bolivia’s president demonstrates a shift in the country from heavy U.S.-backed coca eradication and violent political clashes to a fight against coca eradication and public support of the government

(p. 149). In this sense the authors note that Bolivia has experienced less violence since the government began supporting the cultivation of coca for non-illicit drug purposes.

Moreover, a lower level of violence represents an improvement in the conditions of affected populations, thus supporting the general argument made by the Improved

Conditions school of thought. Furthermore, Garza (2005) stresses the nutritional, medicinal and economic importance of the coca plant to many Bolivian communities.

According to Garza (2005), in the past the Bolivian government’s stance towards coca cultivation has caused social unrest and violence throughout the country: “Peasants of the [Chapare] region have accused the military of rape, physical abuse, human rights violations, and corruption and, in response, have organized marches and demonstrations

3 Farrell, 1998; Léons and Sanabria, 1997; Ming, 2007

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE to protest these practices” (p. 2) Additionally, Garza argues that “coca eradication policies do not make a great enough impact on drug trafficking to justify their social cost, specifically on the Bolivian poor and on indigenous cultures,” and that “coca within its cultural context is a valuable resource” which, if allowed to be grown, will allow peasant communities to thrive both economically and culturally (p. 3).

Grisaffi (2016) also discusses how Morales’ change in coca/cocaine policy since

2006, which has focused on controlling the amount of coca allowed to grow, has resulted in effective cocaine reduction and improved social conditions throughout the country:

“Morales’s approach has shrunk coca production and had immediate positive impacts, including cutting human rights abuses and allowing farmers to diversify their sources of income” (p. 149). In this manner, farming communities are less vulnerable to drastic change and have an added source of income to help them maintain their businesses and provide for their families. Additionally, according to Ledebur and Youngers (2012),

Morales’ new policies and their effects on coca paste and cocaine seizures have gained international attention, consequently decreasing social tension and political conflict in the country. However, despite the numerous scholars whose data suggests that Morales has improved community conditions in Bolivia, there is a near equal amount of literature that claims the opposite.

The scholarly research that supports the Worse Conditions school of thought typically focus on the negative environmental effects that coca production has (that have led to worse conditions for affected human populations), the negative cultural consequences that coca eradication has, and the Bolivian government’s failure to successfully improve these conditions. Boville (2004) claims that the continued limited

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE access in Bolivia to the industrial chemicals needed to turn coca into cocaine has resulted in shortages of onions, which can be used to create coca paste, and consequently negatively affecting the economy and local peasant populations’ access to onions

(decreasing the nutritional value of their meals, and causing issues with access to food)

(p. 74). Furthermore, del Olmo (1998) argues that Andean coca growth and eradication leads to deforestation, erosion, water contamination, and the destruction of other flora and fauna in the region (p. 271).4

All of these changes in the environment can further be accredited to changes in the conditions of affected human populations: deforestation causes increased erosion, which leads to less fertile soil for cultivating crops, which is an important endeavor in many of these farming communities; water contamination can lead to worse sanitation and health conditions; the destruction of flora and fauna can lead to less access to the natural supplies of plants and animals (used for food, medicine, etc.) in the affected region. Although del Olmo (1998) wrote this claim before 2005, coca eradication and deforestation have continued in Bolivia after 2005, so it can be argued that there continues to be a negative effect on communities. Additionally, del Olmo (1998) claims that despite the Bolivian government’s efforts to not use chemical eradication methods, human exposure to these chemicals has occurred, causing health-related issues such as burns, irritations, and bronchitis (p. 271). Moreover, Kohl and Farthing (2001) state in their article that although Bolivia is no longer on the list of main drug-producing countries, the consequence of this action has been the devastation of Bolivia’s economy and the worsening of the conditions of the poor.

4 Although this paper was published prior to Morals’ presidency, the connections between coca and the environment and human populations is still relevant post-2005

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

The 2010 Food Security Monitoring report by the World Food Programme argues that the heavy rains (2009-2010) that occurred after a long period of drought (2008-2009) destroyed thousands of hectares of crops, killed several livestock, and affected approximately 4,500 families in solely the Chapare region of Bolivia (p. 2). The World

Food Programme (2010) argues that Bolivia continues to be a country with a high risk of natural disasters (p. 4), meaning that despite Morales’ attempts to decrease poverty in the country, the majority of the population does not have the capacity to handle sudden shocks such as natural disasters. The risk analysis of the El Niño rainfalls is that beginning in 2010 there will be less food availability in markets due to loss of production and road damage, which will result in an increase in food prices and food insecurity levels throughout the country (World Food Programme, p. 5). The World Food Programme

(2010) further claims that “access is the main cause of food insecurity in Bolivia,” and that the income of approximately 38% of the total population (59% of the rural) does not allow households to meet their basic food needs (p. 5). Moreover, the World Food Programme’s

2010 report shows that between 2005 and 2009, nearly 50% of the country’s population was in a state of chronic hunger (p. 8). In this sense, poverty, malnutrition, and food insecurity (all factors that affect a household’s livelihood) continue to be prevalent throughout Bolivia.

The last and most convincing school of thought, known as No Significant

Improvement, is supported by the works of several authors that demonstrate that no significant change in human development levels has occurred, even though Morales’ policies have proven effective in coca crop eradication. Farrell (1998) claims that although

Bolivia has refrained from using chemicals to eradicate coca crops (p. 401), the

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE techniques that the government does employ do not effectively eliminate coca, but rather cause farmers to relocate and plant new crops (p. 395). This article provides important information about the situation of the environment and farming communities in Bolivia prior to Morales’ election.

On the other hand, Ledebur and Youngers (2006) argue that Morales’ new method of cooperative eradication, while proving to be more effective at crop elimination than previous strategies, cannot ensure a long-term solution to cocaine production in Bolivia.

Long-term, the government must also encourage alternative development in order to improve the quality of life and household incomes throughout Bolivia, which will also decrease the size of the role that coca plays in the country’s national economy (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006). Furthermore, Léons and Sanabria (1997) argue that coca and cocaine are the main stabilizers of Bolivia’s economy (p. 16), which can lead to the conclusion that these coca-dependent sectors of the country are highly vulnerable to large fluctuations in the Bolivian economy, particularly when the change is related to coca. In other words, communities’ dependency on coca for monetary income causes a dependency on coca for the provision of other necessary items, such as food and shelter, for survival.

Additionally, Ming (2007) argues that the end of the Andean Trade Promotion and

Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) between the United States and Bolivia will result in no further improvements to Bolivian livelihoods. According to Ming (2007), “The present situation in Bolivia can be compared with a similar situation between the United States and Cuba in 1959. When dealing with Castro, the United States’ failure to react properly resulted in years of confrontation and a nuclear catastrophe” (p. 409). Ming (2007) states

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE that the expiration of the ATPDEA will effect Bolivia both economically and regarding coca and cocaine production (p. 412). Economically, Bolivian exports to the United States will decrease substantially, and unemployment and poverty levels may increase (Ming, p.

413-414). Moreover, Ming (2007) argues that Morales’ attempt to convince the United

Nations to legalize coca internationally (so that his country can export coca products) would “provide a viable livelihood for farmers and promote economic growth while still addressing the drug trafficking problem” (p. 412). However, the United Nations has yet to legalize coca on the international scale. While only several sources are mentioned in this literature review, many others exist that lead to the conclusion that Morales has not made significant improvements to cocalero livelihoods despite his success at eradicating cocaine and controlling coca crop cultivation in Bolivia.

Due to the significant changes in Bolivian coca/cocaine policy since 2005, it is important to question how local populations have been affected. Associated scholarly research has led to the conclusion that three major schools of thought (mentioned in this paper) are associated with this question: Improved Conditions, Worse Conditions, and

No Significant Improvement. Improved Conditions claims that the election of Morales as president and his policy changes have improved the conditions of local communities.

Worse Conditions, however, argues that since 2005 the conditions of affected populations have worsened. Lastly, No Significant Improvement states that although

Morales’ policy changes have been effective in controlling and eradicating coca cultivation and cocaine production, the conditions of local populations have not significantly improved nor worsened. While the claims made by both the Improved Conditions and

Worse Conditions schools of thought are valid in the sense that the arguments the authors

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE make are logical and often times based off of data and trends, the final school of thought,

No Significant Improvement, remains the most convincing. This is a result of these authors’ analysis of the amount of change that has or has not been seen in certain communities’ human development levels since the coca/cocaine policy changes in 2005.

While many of the sources of this school of thought recognize that change has occurred, their data demonstrates that it is not significant (large) enough to constitute a legitimate claim of improved conditions. Thus, these scholars instead focus on how Morales’ policy changes have successfully mitigated coca cultivation for the use of cocaine production, and how the country needs to continue or start to implement strategies that ensure the protection of coca as a cultural resource and demonstrate a significant improvement in human development in coca-producing communities.

Argument

Upon the election of Evo Morales as Bolivia’s president in 2005, significant changes in the government’s policy on coca cultivation have occurred. The Morales administration has made efforts to redefine coca crop eradication strategies, an adjustment that has resulted in inquiries as to how these new policies have affected communities in which coca cultivation is a prominent element in their livelihood construct.

A livelihood “comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” (Chambers and Conway, 1991 from the United Nations Development

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Program, p. 1). The assets in examination here are those specifically related to income

(crops, livestock, etc.), access to employment, and food resources.

In this paper, I argue that many local populations in Bolivia rely heavily on coca to provide monetary income and food security. As a result, any changes to coca cultivation and eradication policies in Bolivia directly affect their livelihoods and levels of development. For the purposes of this paper, “development” is considered the substantial improvement in the livelihoods of a community’s households. Essentially, Morales’ policy adjustments on coca cultivation, which have proven to be effective (successful) in terms of coca crop eradication, have consequently affected the levels of development of coca- growing communities.

Bolivian drug policy → level of coca crop → livelihood levels of coca- cultivation growing communities

Although the diagram shows what the literature suggests the causal relationships I am considering to be, the effect on local groups does not constitute a significant change in said communities’ livelihood levels. In other words, the changes in coca crop cultivation that have resulted from Morales’ 2005 reforms to Bolivian drug policy have not resulted in a significant improvement nor decline in the livelihood levels of coca-cultivating communities in the Chapare. For the purpose of this study, “significant change” is defined as a change in a coca growing community’s development variable values (pre- and post-

2005) that is large enough to result in an increase or decrease in access to food security, employment levels, and wealth status (income) that constitutes sustainable social and economic mobility. Following this definition, my argument that there has been no significant change in the levels of development in coca growing communities is based on

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE the available data used to measure employment access, food security, and wealth/income level. Such data suggests that while there has been some amount of improvement, it is not enough to allow members of said communities neither social nor economic freedom.

The area of focus for this study is the Chapare due to its status as one of the largest coca-growing regions in Bolivia (Kurtz-Phelan, p. 103), and its position as one of the main regions of focus for Morales’ new coca eradication strategies (Ledebur and Youngers,

2006). Furthermore, despite Morales’ initiative to reduce the amount of coca grown in the

Chapare (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 2), coca cultivation in the region has steadily increased: In 2005, coca was produced on an estimated 7,000 hectares (ha) in the

Chapare, whereas in 2006 approximately 8,300 ha were used for cultivation, and about

8,800 hectares in 2007 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 32). This increasing trend in coca cultivation is a result of Morales legalizing additional levels of production in the Chapare, which reduces the amount of illegal coca produced rather than an actual decline in coca production.

For the purpose of this study, a household’s “livelihood” will be determined based on their levels of income, employment access, and food security. An examination of the pre- and post-2005 levels of these factors will be used to determine how Morales’ new coca policies have affected cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare. The argument of this study is that while there has been an improvement in livelihoods, the amount of change is not significant enough to constitute socioeconomic mobility and stability. For the considerations of this paper, socioeconomic mobility is defined as the ability for a given household to earn sufficient income to provide a comfortable and flexible way of living.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Socioeconomic stability is similar to the concept of a sustainable livelihood, in which the livelihood factors (in this case wealth, employment, and food security) of a given household are of great enough value to allow for a way of living that is sustainable over a long period of time, and highly resilient to the various shocks that may occur.

Methodology

This paper focuses on the Chapare region of Bolivia, as it is one of the main coca cultivating regions in the country – in 2006, 30% off Bolivian coca was grown in the

Chapare (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 15). Additionally, the Chapare region has been of particular focus to Morales and his new coca eradication strategies

(Ledebur and Youngers, 2006). Lastly, although Morales has continued to push for the controlled eradication of coca in Bolivia, since 2005 the amount of coca grown in the

Chapare has increased (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 32), causing us to question the effect that this change has on local communities.

When the current Bolivian President Evo Morales was first elected in 2005, he drastically changed the country’s policies towards cultivation of the coca plant. Before

2005, the Bolivian government focused on the eradication of all coca crops as a means of reducing the amount of cocaine produced (Babor, et al., p. 149). However, Morales shifted policies to be more comprehensive, recognizing the cultural, economic and medicinal importance of coca, and focusing on limiting the amount of coca cultivated, rather than eradicating it entirely (Babor, et al., p. 149). This change in policies has not occurred in other coca-producing countries (Peru and Colombia), making Bolivia the ideal case for studying the effects of coca policy changes on the livelihoods of coca growers.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Furthermore, unlike Colombia, Bolivia does not utilize aerial spraying as a method of coca eradication, a process that causes a large number of unique effects in the receiving areas.

The focus on Bolivia has stemmed from an interest as to how Morales’ 2005 drastic changes in coca policy and continuation of non-aerial eradication methods, which has not been seen in Peru and Colombia, have affected coca-growing communities.

In this study, the independent variable is coca policy change. “Coca policy change” is defined as the differences in Bolivian coca policy before and after 2005. The dependent variable for this study is the livelihood levels of coca-growing households in the Chapare.

The dependent variable will be measured through the examination of how coca policy changes have affected the levels of wealth (income), employment access, and food security for cocalero households in the Chapare.

For the purpose of this investigation, livelihood is used in reference to certain factors affected by coca cultivation that determine the well-being of a given household in the Chapare region. Livelihood is typically measured on a household scale. However, in this paper I will examine livelihood as it applies to individual households and the greater coca-growing community of the Chapare, as a means of determining more broadly how

Morales’ 2005 changes in coca policy have affected specific coca-growing populations in the region. In this sense, I will focus on the livelihood context (the way livelihoods are formed) of policy and policy processes, which are “the processes by which policy and legislation is determined and implemented and their effects on people’s livelihoods”

(United Nations Development Program, p. 2).

It is hypothesized that in a community where coca is the dominant form of income, changes in coca cultivation and eradication policies will affect the overall population’s

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE wealth/income levels, access to employment, and ability to consistently access enough food to live comfortably. More broadly, I will focus on three dimensions of livelihood assets: 1) Human capital, which includes the ability to work; 2) Natural capital, which measures natural resources including land, soil, and water; 3) Financial capital, or financial resources such as income from employment, trade and remittances (United

Nations Development Program, p. 2).

These three dimensions of livelihood assets will be applied to the Chapare region using particular measurements and data gathered by sources such as the United Nations

(including their Human Development Index), the World Bank, the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), the Bolivian Census, and published academic works. There is always the question as to whether or not data sources are reliable. For the purposes of this paper, the above-listed sources are considered reliable based on the fact that many peer- reviewed and scholarly accepted articles have used data from these sources.

Coca-growing communities’ overall wealth will be measured through Gross

Domestic Product (GDP), net worth (the sum of all assets of monetary value), income, investments, and other forms of financial claim. GDP has been elected as an appropriate measurement for wealth because it measures the monetary value of the goods and services “produced in a country in a given period of time” (Callen, 2018). However, solely using GDP to measure wealth creates several issues for this study. First, GDP is typically used to measure the production of a country as a whole, not specific communities.

Second, GDP per capita only measures average prosperity and does not consider disparities in the distribution of wealth, income, and resources within a given country.

Therefore, other measurements must be used in addition to GDP. By calculating the net

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE worth of various households in a community, one can then determine the average net worth of the community as a whole. This value can arguably be used to interpret part of the average wealth of the entire community. Furthermore, income is an important factor in determining a community’s wealth, as the amount of money a household makes often dictates which goods and services a family can afford. Similarly, investments and other forms of financial claims further demonstrate the financial security and average wealth of a community.

An employed person will be considered “someone in paid employment, including a family business… a formal job attachment is essential” (Brandolini and Viviano, p. 3).

Employment access will be examined in two ways: 1) Measuring the rate of employment, or the “proportion of the working-age population with a paid job” (Brandolini and Viviano, p. 3); 2) Measuring the rate of unemployment in a given community. Rate of employment will be measured by dividing the number of employed individuals by the population of the total labor force, and turning the resulting value into a percentage. Rate of unemployment

(a percentage) is calculated through the division of the number of unemployed individuals by the number of people employed at a particular point in time (United States Bureau of

Labor Statistics). An unemployed individual is considered a person who has “no occupation, [is] available to start work within the following two weeks, and [has] actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks” (Brandolini and Viviano, p. 6). One of the challenges of using employment access as measured here as a determinant of a community’s livelihood status is that these measurements of

(un)employment do not account for differences in working time, contract duration, and job qualification in the employment spectrum (Brandolini and Viviano, p. 3). However, by

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE examining both employment and unemployment rates as a means of identifying access to employment in a given community, one can loosely determine the number of jobs available in said community (not accounting for job requirements and employee background, of course). Additionally, by comparing the rates of employment and unemployment in the Bolivian Chapare before and after 2005, and if possible, looking particularly at the number of individuals growing/working in the coca-growing industry, the consequences of 2005 policy changes on employment in the Chapare can be better determined.

The third dimension, food security, is defined by the United Nations as “people having at all times, physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”

(Pérez-Escamilla and Segall-Corrêa, p. 16). For the purposes of this paper, food security will be measured in two ways: 1) Existing household income and expenditure surveys; 2)

Applicable food (in)security levels as already determined by other sources. As with the other two dimensions, pre-existing data will be used to measure and determine the level of food security in a community. A pre- and post-2005 comparison will also be conducted as a means of determining the connection between coca crop cultivation changes (and with it changes in policy) and food (in)security in communities in the Chapare region.

Conducting qualitative research in the social sciences is often challenging – it is rare that these investigations are based on the collection of raw data from the field that is then interpreted to determine the results. Instead, qualitative researchers in the social sciences more often than not must use pre-existing data that has been gathered by other individuals or organizations in their analysis of their research question, and then

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE determine the results. In this manner, it is crucial for researchers to investigate the way in which the data they use has been aggregated, and the legitimacy/validity of the sources from which the data come. For this investigation in particular, due to the constraints of funding and location, no research included in this paper has been gathered directly from personally designed surveys and other raw data collection methods. All data has been collected by other reliable sources, and then interpreted in this paper for the purpose of this investigation. Furthermore, the association of data gathered by dependable sources to the three chosen dimensions of livelihood is valid, as these measurements are widely accepted by scholars and researchers studying human development.

Analysis

Bolivian Coca Policy: Illustrating Temporal Changes

Coca cultivation has been a phenomenon in Bolivia for centuries. However, policy and control over where the plant is grown, how much is grown, and who grows it did not appear until the mid-1900s. Furthermore, significant implications of these policies did not appear until the late twentieth century. The following section illustrates key coca policy changes on behalf of the Bolivian Government since the 1960s, with a particular focus on the changes that occurred after Evo Morales’ presidential term began in early 2006.

Bolivian Coca Policy: 1960s - 1997

Beginning in the 1960s, those already living in the Chapare were allotted 20 hectares of land (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 259). Any individual arriving in the region after this time was given 10 hectares (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 259). These plots of land were

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE primarily linear, with only 100 meters of a plot adjacent to a road or track (Eastwood and

Pollard, p. 259). Due to the fact that coca was the main crop at the time, it can be presumed that a large portion of these landowners used their hectares for coca cultivation. Additionally, although there is little data suggesting whether or not at this time there was a limit to how much coca could be grown individually and country-wide, in 1962

President Paz Estenssoro created a policy focused on coca planting reduction and establishing the ability to substitute coca with other crops (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 263).

In the 1970s and early 1980s no definitive data exists for Bolivian coca cultivation limitations due to the fact that a coherent policy did not exist. However, estimates from

1977 and 1980 state that Bolivia’s legal restrictions for dried coca leaves were between

7,000 and 12,500 metric tons (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261). Nevertheless, data show that by 1980 coca production was well above Bolivian demand, resulting in the remaining crop being integrated into the production of cocaine (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261). In

1971 the United States had declared a “War on Drugs”, and the increased production of coca for illicit use in the 1980s resulted in a new U.S. eradication focus on the Chapare.

As of 1985, the Chapare was considered the main coca production region of Bolivia,

“accounting for 65% of the country’s crop and 80% of illicit output” (Eastwood and Pollard, p. 261). The systematic eradication of coca in the Chapare was furthered through Bolivia’s anti-drug law 1008 of 1988. This law determined that 12,000 hectares of coca could be legally cultivated nationally, but only in designated growing zones (Grisaffi, p. 152). The

Chapare was not included as a legal zone, and all coca cultivation in the region was illegalized and subject to complete eradication (Grisaffi, p. 152; Hellin, p. 142). However, cocaleros continued to grow their crop. Consequently, the U.S. began establishing

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE programs in Bolivia to combat coca and cocaine production while developing economic alternatives for cocaleros (Ledebur, p. 2; Farthing and Kohl, p. 183).

However, the U.S.-funded programs of the late 1980s were not sufficiently effective. Ledebur (2002) states that these initiatives were “plagued with poor coordination, corruption, and ineffective alternative development, [and] Bolivian government officials generally complied with minimum eradication goals… in order to maintain funding and access to international loans, but eradicated coca was quickly replaced” (p. 2). To combat these discrepancies between policy and reality, President

Jamie Paz Zamora (1989 – 1993) worked with coca unions to devise a plan of “coca diplomacy” in which growers were compensated $2,000 per hectare eradicated (Grisaffi, p. 154). The 1993 – 1997 administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada also adopted a strategy of both voluntary and forced eradication, but despite an increase in funding, U.S. eradication requirements were still not met (Ledebur, p. 2; Grisaffi, p. 154).

Bolivian Coca Policy: 1997 – 2004

The 1980s-1997 “hit-or-miss” approach to achieving U.S. coca eradication requirements while maintaining a stabilized nation was abandoned when the Bolivian ex- dictator Hugo Banzer took office in 1997 (Ledebur, p. 2). Under his new 5-year Plan

Dignidad (Plan Dignity), Banzer proposed an “all-out, no-holds-barred approach to eradication” and a strong emphasis on alternative development (Ledebur, p. 2; Ortuño;

Hellin, p. 143). The forced eradication policy almost reached its eradication goal in the

Chapare – complete coca elimination by 2002 (coca cultivation in the Chapare was illegalized by Law 1008 in 1988) (Grisaffi, p. 154; Ledebur, p. 5) – when by 2000 it

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE eradicated 45,000 hectares of coca (nearly the entire region’s production) (Farthing and

Kohl, p. 187). However, failure to provide alternate sources of income for coca-growing households resulted in destabilizing protests and confrontations (Grisaffi p. 154; Hellin, p. 139). In addition to an increase in violence and repression in the Chapare, the income- generating capacity of the region’s current alternative development programs was too small, resulting in a significant decrease in cocalero’s income and a further increase in protest and conflict (Ledebur, p. 2). Moreover, a key component of Bolivia’s U.S.-backed forced coca eradication policy of this time period was increased militarization of the

Chapare, and the use of military troops to ensure the compliance of coca-growers (Kurtz-

Phelan, p. 106). As a consequence, many human rights violations against coca advocates ensued (Ledebur, p. 9-17). Furthermore, the forced eradication efforts merely displaced coca cultivation to other regions of Bolivia and to other countries, resulting in little change in the total amount of coca produced nationally (Grisaffi, p. 154).

In 1998, the European Union program initiated its 5-year Plan de Apoyo a la

Estrategia de Desarrollo Alternativo en el Chapare (PRAEDAC in English) designed to

“support land titling, strengthening municipal administrative capacity, and natural resources and access to credit” (Farthing and Kohl, p. 191). A key difference between the

European Union’s alternative development strategy and that of President Banzer is that the Union implemented their plan with no coca-related conditions attached (Farthing and

Kohl, p. 191). In other words, rather than requiring farmers in the Chapare to give up growing coca in order to receive the benefits of the program, the European Union hoped that it could provide alternative development tools that would incentivize cocaleros to

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE voluntarily turn to growing other crops, thus reducing the amount of coca produced in the region.

Throughout the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s, the Bolivian government continued to implement its “no coca” forced eradication and alternative development policies with the support of the United States. However, the strategies implemented in the

Chapare led to deepening discontent amongst coca growers, with violence and repression often resulting as military forces were sent in to control rebellious cocaleros.

To try to cooperate with these individuals, in 2001 the Bolivian government proposed that in 2002 they would pay each Chapare family involved in one of their programs $930 to aid in the production of alternative crops (Ledebur, p. 4). The purpose of this monetary amount was to exceed the income generated in a year by the coca legally allowed to be planted (each household was allotted 1600 square meters of land to grow coca for traditional use only, as an incentive to give up coca cultivation) (Ledebur, p. 4).

Due to an increase in violence towards cocaleros, the coca federations began demanding new policies that were more cooperative and comprehensive. Furthermore, farmers often responded to forced eradication by planting more coca rather than growing alternative cash crops (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 1), which entirely contradicted the government’s purpose of the system – the complete eradication of coca in the

Chapare and the provision of income to ex-cocaleros through the cultivation of other crops. A year after he became president, Carlos Mesa legalized coca production for domestic consumption in 2004 (Tegel, 2016). Under this new system, a single family is allowed to grow up to 1,600 square meters of coca (Tegel, 2016). This plot became known as a “cato”, and farmers were required to sell their coca leaves at markets authorized by

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE the Bolivian government (Tegel, 2016). Another component of the Bolivian government’s new system was a transition from forced to cooperative eradication. The future of the country and this more comprehensive approach to coca was at stake during the 2005 presidential elections. However, ex-cocalero and president of the coca federations, Evo

Morales, won the election. Upon election, not only did Morales continue Mesa’s program, but he vowed to expand and improve it.

Bolivian Coca Policy: 2005 – Present

In 1992 Evo Morales was elected president of the six coca union federations of the

Chapare (Boggan, 2006). His position of power within the federations, and his background as an indigenous leader and cocalero, are two key factors that aided his rise to popularity and to the Bolivian presidency in 2005. Upon assuming office, Morales implemented a framework known as “coca yes, cocaine no”, with the main purpose of distinguishing between coca, a plant of extreme traditional and cultural value to the indigenous people of Bolivia, and cocaine, an illicit drug (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 1). Under “coca yes, cocaine no,” Morales has:

- Institutionalized the Cato Accord

- Decriminalized (but not legalized) all coca production

- Implemented social control

- Expanded legal coca production from 12,000 hectares (Law 1008) to 20,000

hectares (2015 Ley de Coca), with 7,000 of the additional hectares located in the

Chapare, and 1,000 hectares for the Yungas region

Morales has also expanded the anti-narcotics trafficking efforts and been relatively successful in this aspect, according to UN reports. As Morales said in an interview

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE conducted in 2006, “You have to [realize] that, for us, the coca leaf is not cocaine and as such growing coca is not narco-trafficking… The coca leaf has had an important role to play in our culture for thousands of years. It is used in may rituals… It plays an important role in many aspects of life… Coca is not cocaine… I am saying no to zero coca, but yes to zero cocaine” (Boggan, 2006). In other words, in 2005 the Bolivian government’s approach radically changed from the forced eradication of coca and cocaine, to a focus on regulating the amount of coca grown in order to eliminate the production of cocaine in the country.

Under Morales’ new strategy, the government sought controlled coca cultivation and illicit drug eradication, but in collaboration with local communities (further implemented through participatory development) and within a framework of respect for the law and human rights, two elements that had not been employed between 1997 and

2004 (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 8; Grisaffi, p. 149). Moreover, the new administration’s plan abided by the following pillars (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 2):

1) Implementation of cooperative coca reduction in the Chapare and other coca-

growing regions, while avoiding violence and conflict;

2) Recognition of the cultural attributes of the coca leaf;

3) Industrialization of coca for legal uses;

4) Increased interdiction of the production and distribution of cocaine and other

illicit drugs.

As such, Morales continued Mesa’s policy of permitting one cato (1600 sq. m) of coca to be grown per family in the Chapare, and any coca grown in addition to the legal amount was to be eradicated (Grisaffi, p. 149). Furthermore, on June 22, 2006, the Morales

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE administration reached an agreement with Chapare cocaleros to increase the reduction of coca crop to 20-25 hectares per day, or 7,200-9,125 hectares per year (Ledebur and

Youngers, 2006, p. 6). While Morales recognized the importance of coca for the socioeconomic and cultural well-being of Bolivia, his administration also encouraged farmers to plant other cash crops in addition to coca as a way of diversifying and increasing their resources and means of financial income. As part of this initiative,

Venezuela agreed to provide economic assistance for “the industrialization of coca and improving the living standards of those living in coca growing regions” (Ledebur and

Youngers, 2006, p. 7). One of the two financed factories was to be constructed in the

Chapare, and upon completion was to be designated for the production of coca flour

(Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 7).

Additionally, Morales has sought to incorporate coca into both the national and international economies: “I want to [industrialize] the production of coca and we will be asking the United Nations to remove coca leaf as a banned substance for export,” Morales stated in 2006 (Boggan, 2006). Nationally, the government began working towards the development of new legal coca products and uses (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 6-

7). Internationally, Morales and his administration have launched an international campaign requesting that the coca leaf be removed from Schedule 1 of the UN Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 7). In this document, the coca leaf is considered an illicit substance alongside drugs such as cocaine and heroin

(Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 7). Both Bolivia and Peru have stated that coca is not synonymous to cocaine, despite the claims of the 1961 Convention. In 2008, Morales met at the UN Vienna convention to request that coca be internationally legalized (Lasso), so

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE that Bolivia may export the coca leaf and other coca products, strengthening the country’s export economy and further integrating Bolivia into the international market system.

However, the UN has yet to accept this proposal, and coca remains a globally illicit substance.

Another significant action that Morales has made is the removal of DEA agents from the country in 2008, a consequence of several violent confrontations that had occurred (Tegel, 2016). By removing U.S. government agents from the country, Morales demonstrated the initiative of the Bolivian government to take charge in ensuring the destruction and prevention of all illicit drug related activities in the country. Morales also showed that violence would not be tolerated in any form, nor by anyone, which upheld his administration’s claim to end the violence and human rights violations that had occurred between 1997 and 2004.

In 2009 the Bolivian government (with Morales as President) wrote a new

Constitution that was passed after a 90% referendum approval rate. In this Constitution, the government re-wrote its stance on coca: Article 384 states that “the State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource of Bolivia’s biodiversity, and as a factor of social cohesion; in its natural state it is not a narcotic. Its revaluing, production, sale and industrialization shall be regulated by law” (Ledebur and

Youngers, 2013, p. 9; Grisaffi, p. 163). Due to opposition to Bolivia’s new Constitution, the country denounced the 1962 UN Convention and declared that it would re-accede only if the coca leaf was internationally recognized and permitted for traditional use within

Bolivian borders (Ledebur and Youngers, 2013, p. 9). This right was won by Morales at a

UN meeting in 2013 (Grisaffi, p. 163). Furthermore, despite the tension between the U.S.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE and Bolivia since 2004, in 2012 Bolivia, Brazil, and the United states signed a coca cultivation monitoring agreement (Ledebur and Youngers, 2013, p. 7).

There is no doubt that there have been radical changes to Bolivian coca policy since Morales took office in 2005. However, it is necessary to examine the effect that these implemented policies have had on coca cultivation and cocaleros in the Chapare, as well as in Bolivia as a whole. Has the amount cultivated changed significantly since

2005? Where is the majority of coca now produced? What have been the effects on cocalero livelihoods? In order to determine whether or not Morales’ policies have been effective, it is imperative to examine the changes to both coca cultivation and coca- growing communities.

Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Cultivation in the Chapare

The new policies that Morales and his predecessor Carlos Mesa implemented in

Bolivia have led to visible changes in coca cultivation in the country. Coca growing has changed not only numerically – meaning the quantity produced annually – but geographically – where it is grown. In order to examine the effects that the new coca pathways and quantities have had on cocalero livelihoods in the Chapare, one first must define these changes.

In 1985, the Chapare supplied 70% of Bolivia’s entire coca leaf crop (Healy, 1985).

Until 1999, this percentage steadily increased to 85% (Farthing and Kohl, p. 184).

However, as a result of the cooperative coca reduction strategies implemented in the

Chapare beginning in 2005, in 2012 the UNODC determined that the Yungas region now produces the majority of Bolivia’s coca (67%) (Ledebur and Youngers, 2012, p.11).

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Nationally, coca cultivation steadily increased between 2000 and 2009, and started to decrease again in 2010 (Ming). The following graph displays the UN estimates for coca cultivation (hectares) in Bolivia between 1999 and 2014.

Figure 1: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (1999-2014)

Figure from Youngers and Ledebur, 2015, p. 4

Just as the amount (hectares) of coca cultivated has changed nationally every year, the quantity grown in the Chapare has varied. The following table describes the relationship between the amount (hectares) of coca grown nationally (Bolivia) and regionally

(Chapare) over the period of time between 20035 and 2017 (the 1999 and 2001 values are UNODC estimates).

5 Official monitoring of Bolivia’s coca cultivation did not begin until 2003 (Tegel, 2016)

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Figure 2: National and Regional (Chapare) Coca Cultivation in Bolivia (2003-2017)

Year National Natio- National Regional % Regio- Regional Regio- % of Total: nal Total: Total nal Total nal Total Coca Total: Dry Coca (Chapa- Change (Chapare): Total Bolivi- Cultivation Dry Leaf re): Coca (Chapa- Dry Coca (Chap- an (ha) Coca Production Cultivati- re) Leaf Yield are): Coca Leaf (mt) on (ha) (kg/ha) Dry Crop Yield Coca Grown (kg/ha) Leaf in the Produc Chapa- -tion re (mt) 1999 21,800 ------6 2001 19,900 ------7 2003 23,600 1,510* 28,300 7,300 - 1,367* 9,487 31% 8 2005 25,400 1,832* 42,000 7,000 -4.11%* 2,764 19,348 28%* 9 2007 28,900 1,765 51,000 8,800 +25.71%* 2,764 24, 323 30%* 10 2009 30,900 1,767* 54,600 9,700 +10.23%* 2,764 23,635 31%* 11 2011 27,200 2,039* 48,100 8,600 -11.34%* 2,764 23,600 32%* 12 2013 23,000 1,773* 36,300 7,100 -17.44%* 2,764 14,500 31%* 13 2015 20,200 1,773* 32,500 6,000 -15.49%* 2,764 16,600 30%* 14 2017 24,500 1,773* 38,000 8,400 +40.0%* 2,764 17,300 34% 15 As dictated by policies enacted in 2005, each family in the Chapare is allowed to cultivate up to 1600 sq. m of coca (one cato) (Tegel, 2016), which is equivalent to 0.16 ha.

*Estimates made through calculations based on available report data.

6 UNODC, 2004 7 UNODC, 2004 8 UNODC, 2004 9 UNODC, 2006 10 UNODC, 2008 11 UNODC, 2012; UNODC 2010 12 UNODC, 2012 13 UNODC, 2014 14 UNODC, 2016 15 UNODC, 2018

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Prior to 2005, only 12,000 hectares were legally allowed to be grown nationally (Grisaffi, p. 158). In 2005, this number increased to 20,000 hectares, with 7,000 hectares of the additional 8,000 located in the Chapare (Grisaffi, p. 158). However, in only one year the total national coca cultivation (hectares) has been remotely close to the legal limit (2015); this is also the year in which total national coca growth was lowest since 2003. The rest of the years have a large margin of difference between the legal limit and the actual amount grown; it is presumable that this discrepancy is the amount of coca entering the illicit market every year. Similarly, merely two years after the 2015 drop in coca cultivation, the national and regional (Chapare) quantities spiked (+4,300 hectares nationally, +2,400 hectares regionally).

In the following sections, it will be important to keep in mind the rate of change in coca cultivation levels in the Chapare, as this value affects a household’s average income, access to employment, and level of health security. The quantity of dry coca leaf yield (kg/ha) produced is also important, as this dictates the average amount (kg) of dried coca leaf that is produced per hectare of land (0.16 hectares allotted per household). This value will become important when examining the prices of dried coca as they relate to a cocalero family’s average income.

Post-2005 Bolivian Coca Policy: Effects on Coca Growers in the Chapare

The following sections aim to examine how the changes in coca cultivation levels in the Chapare influence several livelihood factors. Of particular focus will be the following components: 1) Poverty and Wealth in the Chapare, as measured through income; 2)

Employment in the Chapare, as measured through job availability/access and (un)

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE employment levels; 3) Food Security in the Chapare, as measured through soil/land quality and income. The temporal comparison of the coca cultivation level and livelihood factor changes will be conducted using pre-2005 and post-2005 data (data from the years

2003 to 2017). Due to a lack of existing regional research and data, portions of this investigation will focus more broadly on changes throughout all of Bolivia as a means of making rational connections to the regional changes in the Chapare. As will be seen in the following sections, there is a noticeable improvement in the livelihoods of cocaleros in the Chapare. However, the numerical values of these increases are not sufficient to constitute a significant change in livelihood status for the majority of coca-growing households – a significant change is defined by an improvement in livelihood factors to an extent in which households are able to exhibit socio-economic freedom and mobility.

Poverty and Wealth in the Chapare

As will be demonstrated in the following section, since 2005 there has been a noticeable increase in the average income of cocalero households in the Chapare.

However, when household size is taken into account, I argue that there has been no significant change. Many families are still left with an income from coca growing that is not enough to achieve socioeconomic stability and mobility, and that leaves many households living in poverty.

Between 1983 and 1980, Bolivia’s GNP decreased by 17%, its consumption per capita by 30%, and its income per capita by 20% (Healy, 1985). By 1985, inflation had become so high that the cost for a slice of bread had risen to $1 USD (Healy, 1985).

Around this time, there were approximately 35,000 cocaleros in the Chapare, each of

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE whom was capable of netting up to $9,000 USD annually by cultivating 2.2 acres of coca

(Healy, 1985)16. In 1985, the average cocalero had 5+ times more land for growing coca than those cultivating after the Cato Accord of 2004, yet there was still a large portion of the population that did not make enough money to comfortably support themselves.

According to Healy (1985), in the years leading up to and including 1985, the daily cost of living ranged between $20 USD and $100 USD. Annually, the cost of living in this time period equated to $7,300 USD to $36,500 USD. By netting on average $9,000 USD from coca cultivation (unless a family cultivated more than 2.2 acres), cocaleros had a relatively small annual income compared to the average annual cost of living. Between

1989 and 1993, the Bolivian government compensated cocaleros for eradication at

$2,000 per hectare (Grisaffi, p. 154). 1 hectare is equal to 2.5 acres (2.2 acres provided approximately $9,000 annual income). Due to the greater profits from growing coca, cooperative eradication methods in the late 1980s and early 1990s had low success rates.

In 1997, Hugo Banzer introduced a new policy towards coca, known as Plan

Dignidad. However, his “policy generated widespread harms. The immediate impact of eradication was to wipe out the farmers’ main source of income, leaving them destitute and struggling to survive” (Farthing and Kohl, p. 186). As a consequence, many cocalero families in Bolivia plunged deeper into poverty. A study conducted in 1998 shows that the average annual income per capita for Bolivia at the time was approximately $560 USD

(Farthing and Kohl, p. 186). Furthermore, despite the high number of participants in

Chapare alternative development projects in the late 1990s (92%), 67% claimed to not have benefitted, and 90% said to have suffered losses (Ledebur, 2002).

16 2.2 acres = 0.89 ha = 8,903.08 sq. m = approx. 5.5 catos, in post-2005 terms

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

The USAID Program for Bolivia, active between 1998 and 2005, focused on developing export systems for the Chapare’s primary alternative crops – passion fruit, bananas, black pepper, palm hearts, and pineapple (Farthing and Kohl, p. 192). USAID helped various private investors establish agricultural processing facilities (Farthing and

Kohl, p. 192). However, “none of the new firms [were] headquartered in the Chapare, which [meant] that while they provide[d] some benefits to the Cochabamba region, there

[was] little direct impact on the livelihoods of coca growers” (Farthing and Kohl, p. 192).

Farthing and Kohl (2005) further argue that, “export agriculture, in a landlocked country with weak transportation infrastructure and farmers unaccustomed to growing for export, is a difficult proposition at best, and to date [2005] it has produced few tangible rewards for most Chapare farmers” (p. 192). The combination of the facilities’ location and lack of transportation infrastructure around the Chapare negatively affected the ability for

Chapare farmers to access the markets for their alternative crops. Due to a decrease in these sales, a farmer’s income would have decreased as well. Furthermore, Farthing and

Kohl (2005) state that only 10% of those programs benefited the local population. In other words, the majority of the revenue created by these new development strategies remained in the pockets of the private investors, with the local stake-holders receiving only a small portion.

Inequality and poverty in Bolivia continued into the 2000’s. According to Ledebur

(2002), in 2001 two-thirds of the Bolivian population, “many of whom [were] subsistence farmers, live[d] in poverty, with nearly thirty percent of the population subsisting on less than a dollar a day.” Living on less than $1 USD per day is living well below the poverty line, which, until 2005, was set by the World Bank at $1 USD per day. Furthermore, in

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

2002, “viable alternative development programs to provide subsistence income for the affected [coca-growing] population [did] not accompany[y] [the] massive eradication gains in the Chapare. Eradication of the coca crop also resulted in the loss of approximately

$500 million [USD] a year to the Bolivian economy, the poorest in Latin America after

Haiti” (Ledebur, 2002). In other words, the rate of eradication in the Chapare significantly outpaced the “income-generating capacity” of alternative crops and development

(Ledebur, 2002). Related to this issue, the General Accounting Office of Bolivia stated that, “the rapid pace of the Bolivian government’s eradication campaign has created gaps between eradication and alternative development assistance that can leave peasant farmers without livelihoods” (Ledebur, 2002). Not having a livelihood means that a person or family unit does not have the capacities (income, food security, etc.) required to be able to support their way of life. This disparity between eradication and alternative development worsened the extreme poverty in the Chapare region (Ledebur, 2002).

Moreover, in 2004 the average income in the Chapare decreased by 20% since the start of Plan Dignidad, although it was still slightly higher than Bolivia’s GDP per capita of approximately $900 USD (Kurtz-Phelan, p. 108). By the mid-2000s, the Chapare continued to be plagued by extreme poverty and income loss. However, things started to take a slightly more positive turn as President Mesa began to adopt new coca eradication policies, and the price of coca increased to five times its price in 1998 ($4.40 USD /kg in

2004) (Kurtz-Phelan, p. 108; UNODC, 2004).

Since 2005, Morales has made it a main part of his policy to help cocaleros willing to grow other crops. As Morales stated, “Families need support to diversify their crops, not prohibition – you can’t coerce families into not being hungry” (Tegel, 2016).

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Decreased sole dependency on a single cash crop (coca) for income can provide a more secure livelihoods framework, if the additional products sold have an existing market and provide sufficient income to accommodate the cost of living for the region in which a household lives. However, in order for a cocalero family to begin growing other crops, there must be enough existing financial stability to allow for this experimentation.

According to Youngers (2013), “The secure income generated from the cato of coca… allows for experimentation with other income-generating activities so that farmers can diversify their sources of income, reducing their dependence on income generated from coca” (p. 5-6). The argument that growing other crops in addition to coca increases household income is logical. However, it is critical to analyze whether this additional revenue is sufficient to provide comfortable living and socioeconomic mobility. Despite the decrease in extreme poverty in rural Bolivia (from 63.9% in 2007 to 36.1% in 2014)

(PAHO, p. 1), this “secure income” as stated by Youngers (2013) still places a large percentage of farmers below the poverty line. Therefore, unless there is significant income from other crops, the economic livelihoods of these cocalero families will remain low. The following two figures demonstrate the changes in poverty throughout Bolivia since 2005.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Figure 3: Poverty Rates in Bolivia: A 2005 Figure 4: Temporal Change of Extreme and 2011 Comparison Poverty Levels in Bolivia (2005-2014)

The percentages above represent the changes in poverty and extreme poverty at the national level in The graph above depicts the temporal change of Bolivia (2005-2011). rural, urban, and national extreme poverty levels in Figure from Johnston and Lefebvre (2014) Bolivia (2005-2014). Figure from PAHO (2017)

Despite the apparent decline in poverty levels since 2005, according to Figure 4, in 2014

36.1% of the rural population (which would constitute the majority of the Chapare) remained living off of less than $1.25 USD per day.

A 2011 UNODC coca monitoring survey demonstrated “significant agricultural diversification in the core area of the Chapare region… bananas [covered] the largest area cultivated in the Chapare, followed by citrus fruit and palm hearts and then coca”

(Ledebur and Youngers, 2012, p. 9). However, despite banana exports to Argentina being a main income-generating factor in the Chapare economy, there is still a large percentage of the population that lives beneath the international poverty line (Ledebur and Youngers,

2012, p. 10). In other words, despite the efforts of the government to aid and encourage the growth and sale of alternative cash crops, many families in the Chapare remain without sufficient income to provide socioeconomic security and mobility.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

In 2007, Bolivia had an annual per capita income of $940 (Ming, p. 381).

Additionally, approximately two thirds of Bolivia’s population earned its income through agriculture, yet this sector only accounted for 14.5% of the Gross National Product (GNP)

(Ming, p. 381). Ming (2007) states that before the implementation of widespread eradication, nearly 60,000 farmers grew coca, and thousands more were involved in other aspects of the crop’s production (p. 381). As a consequence of the harsh eradication measures, it is estimated that the Bolivian economy lost nearly $500 million USD in revenue (Ming, p. 381).

The lack of income provided by alternative cash crops has caused the coca plant to remain dominant in the agricultural industry (Ming, p. 381). Several factors have influenced the success of the coca plant over other crops: “[First,] the coca plant can survive the extreme conditions of the Bolivian Chapare region while other crops do not.

[Second,] coca is less predisposed to insects and disease than other cash crops such as coffee and rice. Finally, other crops fail to perform as successfully on the market as the coca plant” (Ming, p. 381). In 2007, growing bananas and grapefruit typically resulted in a farmer earning $35 USD to $250 USD annually ($0.10 USD to $0.68 USD per day), if the crops were in demand, which was not always the case (Ming, p. 381). In that same time period, one acre of coca could provide an annual income of anywhere between $475

USD to $2,291 USD (Ming, p. 381). This is equivalent to $190 USD to $916 USD annually per cato of coca cultivated.17 In 2007, one third of Bolivia’s population relied on the coca industry for its economic livelihood (Ming, p. 382). This means that approximately 33% of

Bolivians earned between $0.52 USD and $2.51 USD per day through the coca industry.

17 1 acre = 2.5 catos; 0.4 acres = 1 cato; approx. annual revenue for 1 cato = $190 USD to $916 USD

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

In 2007, the international poverty line was $1.25 USD per day, meaning that a significant number of Bolivian households were still living at or below the poverty line in at that time.

With coca still the main crop grown in the Chapare, it is imperative to investigate how the price and revenue trends of the crop have changed over time in order to determine its effect on the economic livelihoods of the regions’ cocalero families (see Figure 5). Figure

5 examines the average household income earned through coca sales between 2003 and

2017. The values represented in Figure 5 are derived from data available through the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and subsequent calculations.

Figure 5: Average Household Income Earned through Coca Sales in the Chapare (2003-2017)

Year Average Average Average Average Average Average Daily Price for Amount of Annual Daily Income Household Income Dried Coca Grown Income for a for a Coca- Size Allotment Per Coca per Cato in Coca- Growing (Nation- Person (based Leaves the Chapare Growing Household in wide on average (USD/kg) (kg/cato)18 Household in the Chapare Estimate)** household the Chapare (USD) size) (USD) (USD) 2003 5.419 218.72 1,181.09 3.24 4.2 0.77* 2005 4.120 442.24 1,813.18 4.97 4.1 1.21* 2007 3.821 442.24 1,680.51 4.60 3.9 1.17* 2009 4.822 442.24 2,122.75 5.82 3.9 1.49 2011 7.823 442.24 3,449.47 9.45 3.5 2.7 2013 7.824 442.24 3,449.47 9.45 3.5 2.7 2015 9.525 442.24 4,201.28 11.51 3.5 3.29 2017 9.426 442.24 4,157.06 11.39 3.5 3.25 *Below international absolute poverty line ($1 USD /day pre-2005; $1.25 USD/day 2005-2015; $1.90 USD/day 2015-present)

18 This value is calculated by converting the average amount of coca grown per hectare (kg/ha) (see Figure 2) to the equivalent value in catos (kg/cato). 1 cato = 1600 sq. m = 0.16 ha 19 UNODC, 2004 20 UNODC, 2006 21 UNODC, 2008 22 UNODC, 2010 23 UNODC, 2012 24 UNODC, 2014 25 UNODC, 2016 26 UNODC, 2018

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

**Estimates are based on data available from United Nations, “Household Size & Composition, 2018: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). Note: These calculations are averages and estimates; they do not take into account variation in soil quality, access to markets, nor amount of coca successfully sold per coca-growing family. There is a large difference on either side of these average values, but the data does not exist to express said differences numerically.

The Average Annual Income for a Coca-Growing Household in the Chapare is calculated by multiplying the Average Price for Dried Coca Leaves by the Average Amount of Coca Grown per Cato in the Chapare for each given year.

The Average Daily Income for a Coca-Growing Household in the Chapare is derived by dividing the Average Annual Income for a Coca-Growing Household in the Chapare by 365 (the number of days in a year).

The Average Daily Income Allotment per Person (based on the Average Household Size) is calculated by dividing the Average Daily Income for a Coca-Growing Household in the Chapare by the Average Household Size.

It is important to note that the calculations in Figure 5 are merely averages and estimates. They do not take into account variation in the amount of coca produced per cato (there will be some catos that produce more, but also others that produce less). This variation is due to factors such as variation in soil quality, rainfall quantity, and/or lost harvests/plants due to drought, disease, or other causes. Any of these losses would result in a smaller net yield of coca and therefore even less income earned than what is depicted in Figure 5. However, the Figure 5 estimates serve to allow us to examine wealth and income as it is for the majority of Chapare cocaleros.

Figure 6 shows the percentage distribution of households in Bolivia based on their size and composition during the years the surveys were conducted.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Figure 6: Distribution of Bolivian Household Size and Composition (1976-2012)

Figure from United Nations, “Household Size & Composition, 2018: Bolivia (Plurinational State of).

Through the examination of the values provided in Figure 5, it can be seen that after 2007, the average-sized coca-growing household in the Chapare has managed to derive an income greater than the international absolute poverty line. However, Figure 6 shows that there is still a large percentage of households that contain more members than the average (see Figure 5). The survivability of the income gained from coca growing in the

Chapare is dependent upon household size. By comparing the different lines in Figure 7 to the international poverty line, this becomes apparent. As demonstrated in Figure 7, when a household contains at least 6 individuals, the available income (which equates to the spending power) of each person drastically drops to below or equal to the poverty line.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Figure 7: Daily Household Income from Coca Growing in the Chapare 14

Per Household 12 Per Person (Average Household Size) 10 Per Person (6 Person Household) 8 International Poverty Line

Average Daily Average Daily Income(USD) 2

0 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Year

This figure shows the average daily income for a coca-growing household in the Chapare region of Bolivia. The average daily income value for a standard household (“per household”) does not take into account the number of individuals in each household, and is equivalent to the income allotment (spending power) for a one-person household. The average daily income per person (average household size) is calculated by dividing the average daily income per household by the average household size for that year (see Figure 5). The average daily income per person (6 person household) is based on the assumption that 6 individuals share a single household income derived from coca cultivation. This value is calculated by dividing the average daily income per household by 6.

It is important to note that the numerical values in Figure 7 are estimates based off of the average annual price for coca and the average annual coca yield per cato (see Figure 5). This does not account for numerical variation in either direction – some households may be doing better than the averages show, while others may be even worse off (due to variations in price and/or net yield). Moreover, the international poverty line is periodically adjusted by the World Bank to account for inflation (“Poverty Lines, p. 42).

The amount of land for coca cultivation that each household is allotted is the same (1600 sq. m, or one cato), no matter how many members are in the household. This restriction discounts the claim that having more able-bodied members of a household working the land will result in a higher level of income generated from coca. Moreover, in the majority of cases in which a household contains six individuals, not all members are able to work. While the amount of labor that each individual has may decrease in this case, the net yield of coca leaves will be more or less the same if there was one person or five working that plot of land. Factors other than household size, such as soil quality and rainfall, are better determinants of the variation in coca production per cato. The comparison of individual spending power for different household sizes has been conducted to demonstrate that while smaller cocalero households recently may be achieving a certain amount of economic success, in recent years, there is still a larger percentage of households in which the income achieved from a single cato of coca is not sufficient enough to achieve a high livelihood standard.

The data in Figure 7 show that while current trends for the average daily income for a standard household (which does not account for the number of individuals in a household that will have to survive off of that income) and for a one-person household

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE significantly exceeds the international poverty line ($1.45 USD higher in 2017), when the average household size (Bolivia) is taken into account, the spending power of each individual in a coca-growing household decreases to just above the poverty line.

Furthermore, when examining the spending power of each individual in a household of 6, between 2003 and 2017 this value only exceeded the international poverty line on one occasion ($1.92 USD in 2015). Even then, the estimate was only $0.02 USD greater.

While it is true that there has been an improvement in the income generated from coca growing since 2003, this change is only significantly beneficial to individuals of a single- person household. The majority of coca-growing households are still just barely making ends meet, and until the average daily income of households with several members increases to a value substantially above the international poverty line, it cannot be said that the changes in coca policy and market status have allowed socioeconomic stability and mobility to the majority of coca-growing families in the Chapare.

On the other hand, keeping in mind Figure 2 (p. 31), between 2003 and 2017 the total national cultivation of coca (ha) has been greater than the legally allotted amount, with the remaining coca finding its way to the illegal markets. However, a 2011 UNODC report shows that over the years, the price for coca in the licit and illicit markets has remained equal, “providing little comparative incentive to deviate from legal sales”

(Ledebur and Youngers, 2012, p. 6), and allowing the legal coca market to remain strong and stable. In 2006, one cato of coca provided a family with $70 to $110 USD of secure monthly income (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006, p. 3). This amount translates to between

$2.3 and $3.6 USD income per day. While these numbers in themselves are above the poverty line ($1.25 USD per day) and may constitute sufficient funds for a single individual

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE to survive, most coca-growers in Bolivia are members of a family whom they provide for, meaning that in some scenarios there is more than one person in a household who must live off the single income of $2.3 to $3.6 USD per day. For example, if a family in the

Chapare was comprised of a husband, wife, and three children, and coca was their only income source, the farming of one legal cato would provide “a living well below the poverty line” (Boggan, 2006), with the revenue from that cato equating to each individual living off of $0.46 to $0.72 USD per day. However, the income made from a single cato has increased substantially between 2006 and 2016. In 2016, the revenue from one cato was approximately $200 USD per month, which was slightly more than the minimum monthly wage in Bolivia (Grisaffi, p. 160). $200 USD per month equates to approximately $6 USD per day, a value which is much higher than the poverty line. However, when one takes into consideration family size, and that each family unit (not individual) is limited to the cultivation of one cato, in 2016 many families still live under the poverty line (this estimate also does not take into account variation in net coca yield and fluctuations in market prices). For example, the five-person household from the previous scenario would still live on less than $1.90 USD per day ($1.2 USD per day). In other words, there has clearly been an increase in income as a result of coca cultivation policy changes, allowing some households more socioeconomic freedom, but others continue to live below the poverty line, limiting their socioeconomic mobility and security.

However, the Bolivian government’s post-2005 alternative development projects have provided a large portion of cocalero families with increased annual income (although this income is relatively little). Grisaffi (2016) states that “most coca growers agree that, with the cato accord, their economic and social situation has improved enormously” (p.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

160). Moreover, the Bolivian government “now recognizes the importance of coca as a source of income for the family unit to ensure that basic consumption needs are met”

(Grisaffi, p. 160). Furthermore, these alternative development projects are continuing to reduce farmers’ dependency on coca, with many now viewing coca as a ‘savings account’ rather than their main income source (Grisaffi, p. 160). One must question, however, why so many family units in the Chapare still live below the poverty line, if these alternative crop cultivation projects are so successful. According to Grisaffi (2016),

“The benefits of government-backed projects have mostly accrued to

people who live close to roads in the main colonization area. Those who

live in isolated and hilly areas have found that they still face many of the

same challenges before… They demand the rights to cultivate two catos

of coca because, as a result of the poor soils, yields from the cato are far

lower than in the main colonization area. The government’s reticence on

this matter has caused some of the base level members to grumble” (p.

161).

Moreover, the coca-growing family units located in areas with poor soil are further limited in their income gain by their inability to cultivate the same quantity of alternative cash crops as cocaleros who are located in areas with more precipitation and better soil quality.

In 2016, Bolivia had a Gini coefficient of 47 (used to measure income inequality) and was the 28th most unequal country in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, “Country

Comparison”). As of 2018, Bolivia had the highest level of inequality in Latin America, and one of the highest in the entire world (Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook”).

Inequality amongst households can be easily overlooked in the examination of regional

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE and national averages, as the basic notion of an average is that it is the median value of a varying set of values. While some coca-growing families may be benefiting from the post-2005 alternative development and coca eradication strategies, there are many who are still struggling. Further improvements to transportation infrastructure, market development and access, and consideration of the terrain in which a cato is located, will be imperative in ensuring that all coca-growing families earn enough income to achieve socioeconomic mobility.

Issues surrounding land titling are also pertinent to the large disparity between the wealth of agricultural family units. Between 2008 and 2016, land prices increased by a factor of 10 (Grisaffi, p. 162). As a consequence,

“landless farmers have been priced out of the market; meanwhile, those

with more than one plot have been able to (illegally) register them under

different names and thus gain more catos of coca from which they can

derive significant income. The outcome is that inequality between coca

grower households has increased… At the moment [2016], the government

allows 7000 ha of coca to be grown in the Chapare. This means one cato

per union member, or just over 40,000 catos. Neither the Coca Union nor

the government will permit any more catos to be planted in the Chapare.

Hence, the only way to acquire a cato is if it is reallocated from another

person” (Grisaffi, p. 162).

Due to increased land prices and the low levels of income of many farm families, the purchasing of a pre-existing cato, which is the only way to start growing coca, is unaffordable for many household units. Furthermore, the possibility that cocalero families

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE are reporting an increase in revenue to their added income from illicit cultivation (of course, they won’t report it as such), calls into question the accuracy of reports claiming large increases in the income, wealth, and well-being of Chapare cocalero families in general.

While it can be seen that there has been a large increase in the average income of coca-growing households in the Chapare since 2005, this change has not been significant enough to provide all cocalero household units social and economic mobility.

Crop diversification has improved in the Chapare since 2005, but lack of transportation to markets, crop demand, and poor soil quality continue to hinder the amount of income generated from this trade. A large percentage of the region continues to live in extreme poverty. Moreover, the increase in land prices and restriction to land designated for coca cultivation has resulted in many families being unable to buy coca land and generate their income from its profits. These trends in poverty and inequality that continue despite the region’s improvements are further reflected in the access to employment and levels of food security in the Chapare.

Employment in the Chapare

Between 1980 and 1983, the rate of unemployment doubled in Bolivia (Healy,

1985). In the Chapare, the USAID program active between 1998 and 2005 further deepened the issue of employment access in the region. Through this program, agricultural markets were increased in size and number, and private investors established several agricultural processing facilities (Farthing and Kohl, p. 192). However, none of these facilities were located in the Chapare (Farthing and Kohl, p. 192). Furthermore,

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Chapare farmers were unaccustomed to exporting their crops (which was the focus of the newly developed markets), and many had limited ability to access the markets to sell their goods due to the weak transportation infrastructure of the region (Farthing and Kohl, p.

192). The location of the markets and processing facilities made employment a greater challenge for Chapare farmers in two main ways: 1) The difficulty accessing export markets decreased the incentive to grow alternative crops to coca, which consequently decreased the number of jobs available on a given farm, and decreased the number of markets in which a farmer can sell his product; 2) The development of new processing facilities results in the creation of new jobs; however, the combination of distant location and poor transportation infrastructure decreased the likelihood that members of Chapare households may seek employment in these facilities.

Boggan (2006) claims that due to the low income of coca-growing households, there is little room for the children of cocaleros to seek education and employment outside of the coca industry. In other words, the little money that a cocalero family makes is put towards the basic needs of the household – food, housing, clothes, etc. – with no additional money available to pay for children’s school education, which could provide them with the skills and tools to seek employment outside of the coca-farming industry, which would potentially increase their income, livelihood status, and chance of achieving socioeconomic mobility/stability.

However, as income for coca-growers has increased gradually since 2005, the opportunity for the younger generation of cocaleros to pursue secondary and post- secondary education has increased. In 2012, “a generation of children of Chapare coca growers… graduated from local universities, returning to the area with a range of technical

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE skills to offer” (Ledebur and Youngers, 2012, p. 10). The new skills that college graduates bring back to the Chapare can potentially create new innovative strategies and help implement new technologies into the agriculture industry, hypothetically increasing the productivity, revenue, and employment opportunities in the region. However, achieving these factors is a long, time-consuming process, and the region has yet to reach the ideal threshold in this regard.

On the other hand, a WOLA report from 2015 states that “economic development in the Chapare has provided new opportunities for coca growers’ children, who increasingly attend university” (Youngers and Ledebur, p. 7). Recently, 300 students in the region graduated from high school; ten years ago, only seven to eight students graduated every year (Youngers and Ledebur, p. 7). However, unlike the 2012 college students from the Chapare, who returned to the region hoping to share their technical skills with the farming communities, the 2015 high school graduates were set on attending colleges to become professionals (Youngers and Ledebur, p. 7). By becoming professionals, the children of Chapare cocaleros will be able to seek other forms of employment, develop new ways to generate income, and improve their livelihoods. Yet, this process is just beginning, and is also long and time-consuming; many years will still have to occur in order to begin seeing the socioeconomic effects of these changes in attitudes.

The following two figures display the changes in unemployment rates in Bolivia since 2005. In Bolivia, “the unemployment rate measures the number of people actively looking for a job as a percentage of the labour force” (Trading Economics).

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Figure 8: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (1999-2017)

Figure from National Statistics Institute, “Bolivia Unemployment Rate 1999-2017)

Figure 9: Unemployment Rate in Bolivia (2009-2017)

Figure from Trading Economics (2019)

As the data in Figures 8 and 9 show, the rate of unemployment has decreased since

Morales took office. However, In recent years the rate has increased slightly, calling into question what factors have caused this. In 2017, the average yearly minimum wage was

$2,060 USD, the national population was 11.15 million, 191,469 individuals were unemployed (5,396,338 employed), and the labor force participation rate was 62.4%

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

(Trading Economics, 2019). The 2017 data is the most recent available data for

unemployment in Bolivia. The 2017 numbers represent a slight change from the previous

year (2016), in which the unemployment rate was 3.4%, the average yearly minimum

wage was $2,000 USD, the total population was 10.99 million, 192,163 individuals were

unemployed (5,526,376 employed), and the labor force participation rate was 65.6%

(Trading Economics, 2019). Figure 10 shows the projected future rates of unemployment

in Bolivia.

Figure 10: Projected Rates of Unemployment (Bolivia)

Figure from Trading Economics (2019)

By the end of 2019, the unemployment rate in Bolivia is expected to be 3.6% (Trading

Economics). By 2020, the rate is projected to decrease to approximately 3.4% (Trading

Economics). If these future projections are accurate, Bolivia unemployment will continue

to fluctuate as it has since around 2010.

In order to see a significant improvement in the livelihoods of coca-growing families

in the Chapare, several changes in the field of employment will need to occur. First, the

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE future generations of cocaleros must find ways to diversify their employment opportunities, and develop the knowledge and tools needed to find employment and/or higher-paying jobs. Second, the trending rate of unemployment in all of Bolivia must decrease, which would signify the creation of and/or access to more jobs, which, given the right skills, the children of cocaleros may be able to fill.

Food Security in the Chapare

In 1985, “serious levels of infant mortality, malnutrition and gastrointestinal illnesses remain[ed] prevalent” (Healy, 1985). Between 1997 and 2003, Chapare farmers in particular suffered from increased malnutrition and preventable infectious diseases

(Grisaffi, p. 155). Food security as it relates to 2005 coca policy changes can be examined in two forms: 1) The ability to successfully grow alternative crops in such quantities that some of the product can be used to feed the farmer’s family; 2) Sufficient income from coca sales to provide food security for a given cocalero household.

The Chapare region of Bolivia encompasses 3,379,000 hectares, but only 12% of the land (410,000 hectares) contains soil adequate for cultivation (Farthing and Kohl, p.

184-185). Additionally, more than 50% of the region is covered in forest (Farthing and

Kohl, p. 184-185), further decreasing the amount of land ideal for growing crops. While coca, to an extent, is able to grow in environments with relatively poor soil quality, other cash crops need high quality soil in order to grow. Therefore, the geography of the

Chapare predisposes the region to challenges regarding alternative development strategies that focus on encouraging farmers to diversify their income by growing crops other than coca. Alternative development projects with this initiative have been implemented in the Chapare both before and after 2005, yet in both time periods the

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE farmers involved faced geographical limitations to the amount of alternative crops that they could grow. A farm in the Chapare region has an average of 10.5 acres (4.25 ha), which is “minimal at best for family survival, given the combination of fragile soils and limited agricultural technology” (Farthing and Kohl, p. 185). Furthermore, on average families grow less than 3 of their 4.25 hectares (Farthing and Kohl, p. 185). If a household is a coca-growing unit, then 1 of the less than 3 cultivatable hectares would be designated for coca, leaving less than 2 hectares of land with soil suitable for growing other crops. If a family was able to grow an amount of an alternative crop, such as bananas or pineapple, that surpassed the market demand for the product, they could use some of their product as food for the members of the household. In this sense, the inability to easily grow alternative crops in the Chapare not only affects the income of a household unit, but leaves out a component of sustenance that could potentially increase the average food security level of the region, particularly amongst cocalero families.

In 2001, 23% of Bolivia’s population was considered undernourished, according to the UN (Ledebur, 2002). Furthermore, by 2002 in the Chapare it was obvious that the aggressive eradication strategies occurred at a much higher rate than the income generated by the implemented alternative development programs (Ledebur, 2002). In

2002, the General Accounting Office stated that “the rapid pace of the Bolivian government’s eradication campaign has created gaps between eradiation and alternative development assistance that can leave peasant farmers without livelihoods… [Moreover,] this notable lag has greatly exacerbated the extreme poverty in the region and led to soaring malnutrition” (Ledebur, 2002). These trends demonstrate not only a decrease in income, but in food security as well.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Furthermore, predisposed geographical factors such as soil quality are not the only elements that have affected food security in the Chapare and in Bolivia as a whole. A

2009 food security report by the World Food Programme (WFP) has highlighted the effect that natural disasters have had on the food security levels and livelihoods of affected populations. Between 2006 and 2008, consecutive major natural disasters have

“devastated the livelihoods of thousands of families in a large part of the Bolivian territory… [causing] loss of lives, injury and displacements, as well as changes to housing, infrastructure and agriculture” (World Food Programme, p. 4). Between June and

November 2009, a report by the National Service of Meteorology and Hydrology

(SENAMHI) demonstrated a significant reduction in rain levels in comparison to previous years’ averages (World Food Programme, p. 3). In December of this same, year, El Niño caused large flooding in several regions, including the Chapare (World Food Programme, p. 3). The excess water has caused the destruction of many crop harvests (rice, yucca, bananas, citric fruits) in rural areas, with approximately 5,000 hectares of crops reported as lost, and 4,500 families affected (World Food Programme, p. 3). In the past couple of years, the weather brought by El Niño has significantly increased, and 70% of households in “food-insecure municipalities of Bolivia have very low capacity to respond to disasters and emergencies… Bolivia [is] a country with a high risk of natural disasters” (World Food

Programme, p. 4). The World Food Programme (2010) claims that amongst the most vulnerable populations are subsistence farmers, due to their lack of income, high rates of poverty, and previous experiences with natural disasters (p. 4).

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

In Bolivia, the rainy season lasts from December until February/March of the following year (World Food Programme, p. Figure 11: Bolivian Crop Calendar 3). The following figure shows the times of year in which various crops in Bolivia are sown, grown, and harvested. As can be seen in Figure 10, the majority of crops are sown between September and November.

Therefore, drastic changes in in rainfall

(both low and excessive) affects the sowing of crops (World Food Programme, p. 3). Figure from WFP (2009)

Between 2007 and 2009, during the global food price crisis, Bolivia’s Food

Consumer Price index value increased 37 points (World Food Programme, p. 4).

Furthermore, by the beginning of 2009, remittances had decreased by 7.5% since 2008

(World Food Programme, p. 5). Moreover, “the Central Bank of Bolivia (BCP) estimate around 4% inflation for the period 2010-2011” (World Food Programme, p. 5). The World

Food Programme (2010) predicted that food prices would increase in 2010, and that food availability in markets will decrease as a result of the loss of production and road damage caused by El Niño weather changes (p. 5). In addition to a reduction of food security for the entire population, as a result of increased food prices, food security levels would decrease particularly in households that generate less income.

Beginning in 2008, the Morales administration began taking affirmative action to increase food supplies in local markets and stimulate local production in response to the global increase in food prices, and the crisis that ensued (World Food Programme, p. 5).

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

In March 2008, exports were restricted “in order to prioritize the supply to the internal market. Afterwards, export restrictions became more flexible, although the prioritization of the internal market was maintained” (World Food Programme, p. 6). In other words, the Morales government took the strategy that requiring more food product to be sold for consumption in Bolivia itself, rather than abroad, would increase food availability and decrease food prices for the country’s inhabitants. Furthermore, the government supported and encouraged small farmers to grow local foods as a means of reducing dependency on imports (World Food Programme, p. 6), which were priced particularly high at the time, and were competing with the sales of domestically-produced crops.

According to the World Food Programme (2010), “access is the main cause of food insecurity in Bolivia” (p. 7). Moreover, in 2009, 38% of the total population and 59% of the rural population did not have an income sufficient to meet basic food needs (World Food

Programme, p. 7). Bolivia is a predominantly rurally-inhabited country, with more than

50% of the population living in rural communities with extremely high poverty rates

(Quelle). 72% of households in the most food-insecure regions lived in extreme poverty, according to 2009 estimates (World Food Programme, p. 7). The 2010 World Food

Programme Food Security and Nutrition Survey aimed to investigate,

“the changes suffered by most vulnerable municipalities as a consequence

of the last global crisis, [and] established that 6 out of 10 households were

covering less than 90% of the recommended energy level intake. Regarding

micronutrients… the report found the situation to be very critical, where

more than 80% of the population living in high vulnerable municipalities

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

were consuming less than 70% of the recommended rations” (World Food

Programme, p. 7).

Moreover, in 2009, households in vulnerable rural municipalities stated that 77% of the food they consumed was purchased, not produced (this value was 65% in 2005) (World

Food Programme, p. 7). While this trend confirms less of a reliance on food production for food consumption, the new strategy of food purchasing requires that families earn a high enough income to be able to buy the food necessary to eat comfortably and maintain proper nutrition. When examining this trend in relation to coca-growing families in the

Chapare, it has already been determined that the majority of households have yet to earn income sufficient to provide socioeconomic mobility and a comfortable way of life.

Furthermore, between 2005 and 2009 the average amount of household income used for food expenses increased from 56% to 65%, disclosing “the fact that households had to reduce the part of expenses destined to health” and other budget components (World

Food Programme, p. 7). Additionally, malnutrition in children has been especially prevalent in Bolivia. Over the period of 1999 to 2009, stunting in children under 5 has averaged to 32% nationally, according to the National Health and Nutrition Survey conducted by ENDSA in 2003 (World Food Programme, p. 8). In 2009, stunting in children under 5 has reached 47% in the most food insecure regions of Bolivia (World Food

Programme, p. 8). Lastly, chronic hunger approximated to 47% between 2005 and 2009 in Bolivia (World Food Programme, p. 8).

In reaction to the geographical and institutional challenges of growing and selling alternative crops as a means of increasing income and ensuring food security, Chapare cocaleros have expressed their desire to be able to grow more coca legally. As one coca-

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE grower stated, “It would help if we could grow more coca legally. We are all opposed to cocaine, but coca could be used in other things – medicine, teas, pomades, creams.

Without growing coca, my family would starve” (Boggan, 2006). One of the main incentives for growing coca rather than other crops is the high demand and relatively high value for the product in internal markets, as well as the leaf’s resilience to poor geographical cultivation conditions. However, despite the efforts of the Bolivian government and the Chapare cocaleros to expand and improve their income base, food insecurity and malnutrition levels remain high. In 2013, Bolivia was classified as the most food insecure country in Latin America, “with approximately one in four inhabitants categorized as hungry” (Sibley, et al.). Since 2009, stunting in children under 5 has averaged 27% nationally, 37% in rural regions, and more than 40% in the most food- insecure municipalities (World Food Programme, 2010). In 2018, 63% of Bolivian households did not earn enough income to afford sufficient amounts of food, leading to malnutrition and further stunting in children (Quelle). If alternative development programs and coca cultivation are going to succeed as providing the main sources of income for

Bolivian and Chapare households, serious consideration of the geographical and institutional challenges, as well as current issues and trends of malnutrition and food access, in the country must occur.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of coca policy change on cocalero livelihoods in the Bolivian Chapare. The theoretical debate surrounding this topic is that since 2005, the livelihoods of coca-growers in Bolivia have significantly improved

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE as a result of Morales’ changes in coca policy. Despite the notable policy changes that would theoretically benefit cocaleros, through the examination of trends in wealth

(income) status, employment access, and food security, this study argues that while there has been an increase in the general quality of life for Chapare cocaleros, there has not been a significant enough change to constitute cocalero socioeconomic mobility and stability. The progress that cocaleros have made thus far is fragile and can immediately be set back by factors such as economic shocks, climate change, and food insecurity. In order to have a greater resilience to these shocks and to develop a sustainable livelihood status, a diversification of cocalero income beyond cash crops must occur.

In terms of wealth, data shows that there has been an increase in the average income of coca-growing households since 2005. However, considering household size, continuing trends of poverty, and the geographical and economic limitations of these communities, there has not been a significant improvement in the wealth status for the majority of cocalero households in the Chapare. Moreover, while unemployment levels in

Bolivia have remained relatively the same for the past several years, the location of coca production facilities, the unreliable market demand for alternative crops, and the limit to farm sizes continue to be barriers for providing employment to cocalero households and other community members. Furthermore, while some of the younger generation of cocaleros have been able to seek higher education, the effects of access to more employment opportunities with higher wages has yet to be seen in the Chapare region.

Lastly, the geography (poor soil quality, large areas of land covered by forest, excessive rainfall) of the Chapare predisposes the region to challenges regarding alternative crop and coca cultivation. Moreover, despite the efforts of the Bolivian government to increase

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE their income derived from cash crops, a large percentage of the rural community remains with an income insufficient to meet basic food needs. Furthermore, Bolivia continues to be one of the most unequal (income-based) countries in Latin America and the world.

This study aims to take a more complex look at the argument derived by the

Bolivian government, various academics, and several agencies that the Morales coca policy changes have significantly impacted the livelihoods of cocaleros. It is easy to discount factors such as inequality and fluctuation in household size, soil quality, and market demand when making arguments based on average values. While this study has utilized these calculations as a means of discussing the average livelihood situation of a cocalero household in the Chapare, it has taken a more intimate approach to the argument by considering those households that are on either side of the average. The methodology, arguments, and findings of this study could be adapted to conduct a more in-depth examination to other case studies related to the effect of policy change on livelihoods.

Given the available resources and data, this study has attempted to evaluate the changes in livelihood statuses for cocaleros in the Chapare. However, all calculations were based off of data from other sources, and all values were estimates. Further limitations to this study occurred in the fact that some of the data used was reference to

“rural” populations, the entire Bolivian population, etc., and logical presumptions through analysis were used to relate these findings to the Chapare region specifically. In the future, field research in the Chapare would be an imperative step in confirming the arguments laid out in this study, as well as providing a more accurate assessment of the wealth, employment, and food security statuses of cocalero households in the Bolivian

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Chapare. Additionally, field research to determine the average amount of alternative crops grown by Chapare coca-growers would be important in determining the actual income of these households. Moreover, to provide an even more rounded analysis of these changes, it would be important to study other livelihood factors besides those already examined in this study.

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

Index: Key Terms and Definitions

Development = the substantial improvement in the livelihoods of a community’s Households (p. 12)

Cocalero = coca grower

Cato = the maximum amount of land (1600 sq. m) allotted to a single household to cultivate coca in the Chapare

1 cato = 1600 sq. m = 0.16 ha

Food Security = “people having at all times, physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Pérez- Escamilla and Segall-Corrêa, p. 16)

Ha = Hectare(s)

Inequality = “the state of not being equal, especially in status, rights, and opportunities” (“Concepts of Inequality”)

International Poverty Line = “minimum expenditure required by an individual to fulfill his or her basic food and non-food needs… [and] defines the level of consumption (or income) needed for a household to escape poverty” (“Poverty Lines”, p. 43)

Livelihood = “the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” (Chambers and Conway, 1991 from the United Nations Development Program, p. 1) (p. 12)

Poverty = a household “in poverty” is one that lives at or below the poverty line (“Poverty Lines”, p. 43)

Significant Change = a change in a coca growing community’s development variable values (pre- and post-2005) that is large enough to result in an increase or decrease in access to food security, employment levels, and wealth status (income) that constitutes sustainable social and economic mobility (p. 13)

Socioeconomic mobility = the ability for a given household to earn sufficient income to

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

provide a comfortable and flexible way of living (p. 14)

Socioeconomic stability = similar to the concept of a sustainable livelihood, in which the livelihood factors (in this case wealth, employment, and food security) of a given household are of great enough value to allow for a way of living that is sustainable over the long-term and highly resilient to the various shocks that may occur in the future (p. 14)

Sq. m = Square meter(s)

COCA POLICIES IN POST-2005 BOLIVIA: SHARP 2019 THE EFFECT ON COCALERO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CHAPARE

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