THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 47 01-15 April 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 In BAGHLAN major clashes against NGO presence. ties in KUNAR while the Northern Region 6-10 occurred in Pul-i-Khumri In KANDAHAR the IMF withdrawal from Eastern Region 10-12 and Baghlan-i-Jadid as poppy harvest creates a lull Korangal Valley is expected ANSF/IMF attempted to to improve security there. Southern Region 13-15 in activity. Three BBIEDs reclaim some territory from target NDS HQ in an un- In NANGAHAR clashes Western Region 16-18 AOG in those areas to lim- successful attacks while between empowered tribes- ited success. AOG alignment ANSO Info Page 19 other VBIEDs target the men and the ANP continue with the Pashtun side of a compound of a civilian con- in Sherzad and Khogani land dispute in Hussein Khel tractor and an IMF convoy. while land disputes result in area threatens to polarize An IMF Escalation of violence elsewhere. YOU NEED TO KNOW communities there. Force shooting kills four In NURISTAN road work- In KUNDUZ heavy clashes persons on a local bus and ers are abducted and re- • Heavy fighting in Baghlan, occurred in Chahar Dara escalates tension in the city. Kunduz and Jawzjan leased by AOG while and while AOG focussed their In HERAT and FARAH ANSF proposal to renter • Return of AOG to Marjah response on Kunduz City IEDs result in civilian fatali- Kamdesh district is antici- and significant suicide with IED and rocket strikes. ties while in BADGHIS the pated to deteriorate condi- attacks in Kandahar Local militia forces, in ANSF operation in tions there. Khanabad, continue to clash • IMF withdraw fro Koran- Murghab continues. AOG In PAKTYA Mangal and with AOG and each other clash with local militias gal Valley, Kunar while a case of fratricide Zardarn tribesmen con- groups in Jawand, Badghis. tinue to clash over land • Turkey to open PRT in killed 6 ANA in Tut Mazar. In GHOR criminal robbery disputes. Gen. Dostum stronghold Major ANSF operations turn violent and kills one came to inconclusive end in NGO worker. In LAGHMAN province Qushteppa, JAWZJAN while armed AOG enter an ANSO is supported by Multiple AOG arrests keep AOG attempt to consolidate NGO compound, advise KABUL City quiet this pe- the closure of the office and extend their reach in Jan- riod while two events cause gal, TAKHAR. and abduct a staff member concern that womens ac- who remains missing. In HELMAND AOGs re- tivities may be targeted in turn to Marjah to plant IED PARWAN. AOG cause On April 15 Sweden & and kill/intimidate locals co- civilian casualties in Turkey concluded an agree- operating with IMF while KAPISA, including school ment for Turkey to estab- Marjah residents demonstrate children, while heavy fight- lish two new PRT in Sar-i- against a lack of progress. ing continues in WAR- Pul and Jowzjan in a move Eradication efforts contrib- DAK, with IMF airstrikes, that is generally seen as ute to instability in other and LOGAR with a spate being in support of Mr. parts of the province while of IED’s. Abdul Rashid Dostum. the arrest of NGO staff in a AOG mortar and IED Lashgar Gah hospital results strikes cause civilian fatali- in a staged demonstration THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 5 KABUL 50 This Report Period 1 The regular monthly attack cycle 40 in the capital appears to have been tions. Recent arrest operations will 30 disrupted during the last reporting delay rather than eliminate the 20 AOG threat due to the perceived period as a result of numerous 10 arrests of AOG suspects both in value of striking the capital. A 0 the city and the outer lying dis- high profile attack in Kabul City is tricts of Kabul Province. For the worth several in the provinces due year-to-date there have been 69 the domestic and international AOG suspects arrested in Kabul attention it focuses and the propa- KABUL AOG KABUL ACG City compared to 29 for the same ganda value derived from high- around the area will impose significant delays period in 2009. In addition there lighting the security deficiencies of to travel times. have been several discoveries of the current government and inter- weapons, ammunition, IEDS, national forces. Two incidents in the Taimani Area of PD4, suicide vests, explosives and rock- The Peace Jirga, expected to con- where a large number of NGOs are clustered, ets found both during arrest op- vene at the beginning of May, will served as a reminder that criminality and per- erations as well as in caches, involve several thousand influen- sonal disputes involving the use of violence mainly centred around districts 5, tial tribal, religious, political and occur irregularly. On 3 and 4 April, a grenade 8 and 12 as well as Bagrami, security figures arriving in the was thrown against a private residence and an Paghman and Surobi. The entry capital for several days of negotia- individual was shot walking down street nine. points to Kabul City, especially tions and discussions. Security will No NGOs were involved in either incident. from the south and west, are be a distinct concern for ANSF Surobi hosted three separate AOG ambushes highly vulnerable to hosting AOG with hundreds of ANP, amongst of ANSF and IMF on 5, 11 and 15 April, injur- logistical cells as evidenced by the others, being drafted into the ing one civilian in the area. The attack on IMF number of arrests in those loca- capital prior to and during the was again in the Uzbeen Valley, far from the Jirga. The most obvious manifes- main road between Jalalabad and Kabul. At- KEY THREATS tation of the ANSF presence will tacks on ANSF generally occur on the isolated  SVBIED attacks around be in the form of an increased outposts littered along the main road. The highprofile GoA, IMF number of checkpoints around number of AOG initiated attacks have more and foreign representa- tion targets the city. As the main events will than doubled year-to-date to thirteen from  ACG abductions take place around the Loya Jirga 2009 levels, however all attacks have targeted  Car accidents Tent in the Kabul Polytechnic, it petrol tankers, ANSF, GoA or IMF with no can be expected that security civilian passenger vehicles affected.

NGO Incidents PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 The usually tranquil province of Panjshir was awoken on 7 April The most likely author of the at- following the detonation of an tack is a local faction attempting to - NO CHART AVAILABLE- IED after an IMF convoy had gain leverage from perceptions of passed in Bazarak, the provincial instability. Local leaders met fol- capital. Various rumours have lowing the incident and reaffirmed circulated since; however it their support for the PRT. Sepa- would be difficult to believe that rately, there have been no further the incident was AOG related. reports of tension following an exchange of SAF between the environment for NGOs with the latest events bodyguards of the former governor having no reported effect on operations. KEY THREATS and ANP at the end of March. Nil Panjshir remains a safe operating THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 An attack against an IMF convoy reported casualties and stands in extra checkpoints along the border which are involving RPGs and SAF in Esh- likely to remain in place for the near future. pushta Area of Kharmard again stark contrast to the rest of the province, where occasional land AOG attacks remain occasional and generally illustrated how vulnerable the dis- do not result in civilian casualties. trict is to occasional attacks disputes or petty crime are the against the security forces. The main issues. Other reports suggest Virtually all of the isolated NGO bases in the attack occurred on 9 April with no that AOG are intending to pene- province have been reopened following the trate Kharmard from neighbour- winter stoppages and there have been no re- KEY THREATS ing Tala Wa Barfak to possibly ports of any security concerns. Bamyan hosts  ACG/AOG activity in abduct individuals in exchange for numerous NGOs due to the safe operating the Shikari and Ghandak an AOG commander captured environment and local acceptance levels, Valleys during last summer. Since the in- whose number may increase as Yakawlang be-  ACG/AOG penetration tra-AOG clashes in Baghlan a comes more accessible. from Tala Wa Barfak month ago, ANSF have created

PARWAN NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 2 50

This Report Period 1 40

Although ostensibly a safe operat- 30

ing environment for NGOs, Par- level of criminality that is believed 20

wan is host to a complex security to be derived from the different 10

environment where the delinea- factions competing economically 0 tion between ACG and AOG is rather than militarily. Criminality all but clear. The province was on appears to be the main motivator the front line during the country’s behind most incidents in Chahari- PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG civil war and hosted various fac- kar; however tenuous links to deaths of two members of the same family as tions whose strengths waxed and AOG may also be a factor. There they exited the compound following seeing a waned during many years of con- have only been five publicly re- lit fuse. Three people have been arrested in flict. Following the fall of the Tali- ported AOG or ACG incidents in conjunction with the incident. It appears that ban regime in 2001, numerous the capital for 2010, which is half the incident may be the result of a personal commanders of all persuasions that of 2009. During the month of dispute, although the concern is that the NGO returned to the province preserv- April, three IEDs were planted in was involved in gender issues and such pro- ing their networks, which over Chaharikar, two of which deto- gramming in the past has attracted antagonism time became dormant. The fault nated. An IED was discovered by from the more conservative segments of the lines between the different fac- ANP in the vicinity of the Parwan population. The IED found near the tions were never geographically women’s park in Baghi Zanana women’s garden in the same week gave further divided, which has often resulted Area and subsequently defused on credence to the theory that the IED may be in personal disputes being settled 3 April. Another IED detonated related to the NGOs activities, however ANSF in the streets of Chaharikar and while a shopkeeper was attending are insistent the IED was the result of a dis- the valleys of Ghorband. The pro- to a pile of scrap metal in the Ba- pute and that the deaths of the two individuals vincial capital is known for a high zaar area on 6 April. were accidental. Of direct concern for NGOs was Separately, two weapons caches and two an IED deliberately left outside a KEY THREATS launch sites with primed rockets were found private residence which also  Low intensity AOG by ANSF in Jabalsarraj and Bagram and were housed a training room for an activity in the Ghorband most likely destined for the IMF airbase itself Valley NGO during the daytime. The or convoys leaving the base. A rocket attack  ACG activity in Chahari- incident occurred during the night kar was launched on the airbase on 5 April, with of 31 March and resulted in the no casualties incurred. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 The deterioration of the conflict 30 last reporting period three sepa- in the east of the province has 20 rate attacks have resulted in civil- again had a direct effect on the 10 ian casualties. An AOG ambush civilian population. In mid- 0 November, an AOG rocket at- of an IMF convoy on 31 March tack narrowly missed an IMF- led to a sustained exchange of convened shura and impacted in fire leaving three civilians KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG the Tagab Bazaar killing twelve wounded in Afghanya Area of and wounding dozens and may Nijrab. On 6 April, an AOG In the West of the province, where most have contributed to several hun- rocket attack on an IMF position NGO operations are based, there have been dred families seeking refuge on in Karamkhel Area of Tagab few reported incidents year to day. Of possi- the outskirts of Kabul City. In missed its target and struck a ble future, rather than immediate concern is the school killing five school children the growing number of students returning and wounding three others. An from madrassas in Pakistan. The students, KEY THREATS AOG ambush of IMF on the seemingly unaligned, have a dim view of  Secondary exposure to same day in Lagan Khel Area of ‘foreign’ organisations, women’s right to work clashes between AOG and Alasay resulted in six civilians and in some cases the legitimacy of the Af- ANSF/IMF in Tagab wounded. The growth of the ghan state. For the moment the returning stu-  Low intensity factional conflict in the coming weeks and dents do not pose a threat to NGO opera- disputes in Kohistan I & II months will most likely produce tions however an increasing level of conserva-  Decentralized AOG activity a corresponding increase in the tism may be expected in some segments of in Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab number of civilian casualties. the population.

WARDAK NGO Incidents Year to Date 1 WARDAK 50 This Report Period 0 40 This month, AOG incidents 30 have been increasing in number ANSF conducted a joint opera- but consistent in nature with tion against a location/building 20 incidents in recent months believed to be used by AOG. 10 namely attacks on military/ During the operation an IMF air 0 security convoys and attacks on strike was called in resulting in DACs. In the districts of Chaki the destruction of the building. Wardak, Nirkh, Jaghatu and Where previously AOG attacks WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG Saydabad there have been a total have not been marked by a sig- of fourteen ambushes or IED nificant ANA/IMF response, attacks in the last two weeks, the latest reporting period sug- erations. The districts of Saydabad, Nirkh, which included the injuries of gests that punitive IMF strikes Jaghatu and Chark represent the highest four PSC guards on 13 April. will rise significantly in the com- threat to NGO operations due to the risk of ing months. collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF/IMF. KEY THREATS The overwhelming number of The frequency of AOG and ANA/IMF en  ACG/AOG abductions incidents in Wardak comprise gagements in Wardak significantly raises the  AOG intimidation IEDs, ambushes and armed at- risk of travelling the already dangerous route to  Secondary exposure to IEDs tacks, against district centres and Ghazni. NGO are strongly advised to avoid and SAF ambushes targeting IMF /ANSF checkpoints. War- travel along the highway route and indeed IMF/ANSF and logistics convoys along Highway One dak remains a challenging secu- those districts in the southeast of the province. rity environment for NGO op- THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKONDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40

Daykundi experienced a quiet re- 30 Similar to most districts in porting period with only one real- 20 ized security incident. It appears Daykundi, Khadir remains lightly 10 that a ‘gunfight’ between two indi- policed with the majority of secu- viduals in Khadir district on 3 rity incidents in the centre and 0 April led to two other individuals north of the province derived either from isolated acts of banditry attempting to intervene, both of DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI ACG whom were subsequently shot and or land disputes between families or communities. wounded. The cause of the dis- witness further attacks in the coming weeks. pute is not known nor what hap- Gizab and Kijran remain a con- For the rest of the province, NGOs express pened to the two ‘gunfighters’. cern with some reports suggesting no particular security concerns beyond the that a significant number of AOG rather important issue of whether a former KEY THREATS fighters have arrived in Gizab af- commander, responsible in the past for an  ACG/AOG abduction ter seeking shelter from ANSF/ NGO abduction, will assume the post of dis- threat in Gizab IMF operations in Helmand and trict police chief in Gizab. If the post is ac-  Winter road travel Uruzgan. If confirmed, then the cepted, then ethnic relations could deteriorate  Occasional banditry on Tamazan Valley, south of Nili, south of Nili and short term instability may roads leaving from Nili and viewed as the border between result. AOG and GoA control, could

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 The volume of AOG incidents 40 this year is markedly higher than planted by AOG along district 30 roads. For the month of April last year. There was no slowdown 20 alone, there were eleven discover- in March and incidents have con- 10 tinued to climb in April. Baraki ies of IEDs/anti tank mines along Barak, Muhammad Agha, Charkh district roads in the province, with 0 hosts the majority of AOG initi- an additional AOG IED cell be- ated incidents in Logar with IED ing intercepted on 2 April that LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG attacks and ambushes, mainly di- allowed ANP to seize one com- rected at IMF and ANSF, being plex IED that the AOG were pre- the most frequently used tactics. paring to lay. The AOG managed to escape. And on 3 April an IED The main risk to NGO operations growing number of small arms, rocket, and struck an IMF vehicle on a district remains collateral exposure to RPG attacks on security forces/ police in road, leaving two IMF wounded. IMF/ANSF and AOG engage- Logar this year. Most incident areas are in the Furthermore on 5 April, three ments as well as from IEDs high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha and Puli rockets impacted near an ANP Alam, but the southern districts of Kwawar, check point. ANP located/ Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined KEY THREATS searched the firing point and ar- have borders with Paktya, Ghazni, and War-  ACG/AOG abductions rested three suspected AOG with dak) are likely the most heavily AOG infil-  IMF operations one AK-47 rifle and a pistol. This trated and dangerous areas for NGO.  AOG intimidation assessment in reinforced by the THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 The security situation in Baghlan attacks and possible abductions 40 Province has rapidly deteriorated along this road in the early eve- 30 in the past month and a half. ning hours. 20 AOG strongholds lie heavily to the west of the Pul-e Khumri- On 14 April, ANSF/IMF forces 10 Kunduz Main road, and encircle launched a second major opera- 0 the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar main tion in western Baghlani Jadid road to the north and south, a few District. Thus far, three IMF sol- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG kilometres west of Pul-e Khumri diers and an unknown number of City. While IMF/ANSF have fo- ANSF have been killed in action, cused their attention on AOG with several others wounded. In strongholds north of the Pul-e addition to engaging IMF/ANSF Khumri-Mazar Road, AOGs have forces, AOGs have retaliated by consolidated control of Dand-e striking targets further east and Ghori Area, south of the main south, such as the ANP headquar- road. Early in the reporting period ters in Baghlan Old City, and the ANSF suffered an embarrassing abovementioned strike on the loss when AOGs ambushed a ANA convoy. Prior to the ongo- convoy of nine ANP rangers en ing operation, ANSF/IMF per- route to Dahan-e Ghori District. formed search operations in After several hours of sporadic Pouza Ishan and Shahabudin Ar- SAF exchange, AOGs managed to eas of Pul-e Khumri District. The them by the previous Provincial Governor. abscond with seven of the nine operations met with little reported The clash ended when provincial government rangers, two of which may have resistance until 11 April, when leaders met with elders from Hussein Khel, been destroyed and five of which AOGs managed to attack and guaranteeing that the settlers from Andarab are confirmed to be at large. Fur- disable an IMF truck being trans- would temporarily cease construction until an ther more, in a much feared and ported on the main road leading official decision is made regarding the owner- anticipated offensive attack on the north, near Hussein Khel Area. At ship of the land. The land redistribution proc- Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Main road, around the same time, AOGs at- ess has evidently worked to alienate the popu- AOGs struck an ANA convoy in tacked a separate IMF/ANSF lation of Hussein Khel, and the evident ethnic the early evening, prompting a patrol in the adjacent area of dimension of the dispute may further polarize several-hour long fire fight which Dand-e Shahabudin, critically ethnic groups in the area along political lines, closed the main road for several wounding one IMF soldier. driving Pashtuns to solidify their support for hours. There have been several AOGs, while driving others to solidify their unconfirmed reports of AOG The AOG attacks on 11 April support for GOA. checkpoints along the Mazar-Pul- occurred immediately after a civil e Khumri main road, and evi- unrest erupted in Hussein Khel Pul-e Khumri City remains vulnerable to IED dence suggests that high profile Area. The clash was in relation to attacks, as two have been discovered and de- NGO and IO vehicles are vulner- a land dispute between the pri- fused by ANP in the past three weeks – one in able to marily Pashtun residents of Hus- front of girl’s high school, and one in front of sein Khel and government- private residence near the main road north of KEY THREATS supported settlers, primarily from Dand-e Ghori Area. Also in Pul-e Khumri  Attacks on main roads Andarab District. The residents of City, an attempted assassination attempt on a launched from AOG- Hussein Khel (who reportedly member of the provincial council left the controlled areas received AOG support) took up GOA official severely wounded. It is not clear  Threat of IEDs in Pul-e arms against the ANP who had whether the attack was perpetrated by AOGs Khumri City been deployed from throughout or ACGs in relation to an ongoing inter-  Missing ANP Rangers the province to assist the Anda- familial dispute.  IMF/ANSF Operation rabi people in securing the land which had been guaranteed to THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 1 NGOs operating in northern Tak- 40 har are faced with a rapidly chang- river crossing to Tajikistan, and 30 ing security dynamic in Darqad, has clashed with ANP in Khwaja 20 Yangi Qala and Khwaja Bawa- Bawahudin District twice this re- 10 hudin districts. The area’s domi- porting period. ANP are currently 0 nant AOG is consolidating con- too under-resourced to secure the trol over Jangal Area, and expand- area, and portions of the road TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG ing its presence southward to- between Jangal Area and Al wards Khwaja Bawahudin Dis- Qonaq Area of Khwaja Bawa- targeted for political capital by the opposing trict. The group appears to be hudin are assessed to be under groups. An abduction and subsequent release contesting ANP’s control of the AOG control. Illegal checkpoints of two engineers in Yangi Qala District was have been reported on this road, believed to have been carried out by a smaller, and have been confirmed in Al more criminally-oriented faction, perhaps in KEY THREATS Qonaq Area of Khwaja Bawa- order to undermine the authority of the domi-  Illegal checkpoints and AOG hudin and Jangal Area of Darqad nant Jangal-based group. The engineers were -ANSF clashes in northern District. While the dominant accompanied by armed guards, which may Takhar AOG has not been hostile thus have been a factor in their being targeted. The  Competing AOG and ACG far towards NGOs, the situation same two groups clashed last reporting period factions in northern Takhar is highly unpredictable. Multiple in Darqad District. Elsewhere in the province,  Armed clashes in Bangi AOGs and ACGs appear to be night time AOG-ANSF clashes have resurged Bridge Area vying for influence in the area, in Bangi District for the second consecutive and NGOs are at risk of being reporting period.

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN This Report Period 0 50 ANSF/IMF forces officially 40 ended the ANA-led operation in lage, along the road north of 30 Qush Tepa and Darzab districts Qush Tepa District Centre. as well as the surrounding areas of Throughout the operation AOGs 20 eastern Bilchiragh District in maintained a low profile; how- 10 Faryab Province and Sayyad Dis- ever, no significant arrests or 0 trict in Sari Pul Province. Immedi- AOG movements were reported, ately following the official conclu- indicating that AOGs remain in JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN ACG sion of the operation on 1 April, the area. Approximately 100 AOGs attacked an ANP check- ANSF remain in the area, and are point in Targhaly Afghaniya Vil- currently constructing an ANA ANA discovered and removed an anti-tank forward operating base north of mine along the road near Chaqmachoqur Vil- KEY THREATS Darzab District Centre. In addi- lage.  Continued AOG presence in tion to the continued threat of Darzab and Qush Tepa AOG attacks on ANSF forces,  Increase in ANSF presence there is a continued threat of IEDs along the main road, as THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 KUNDUZ 50 This Report Period 0 40 Kunduz saw an increase in inci- resulting in a number of IMF, dents throughout the province, ANSF and civilian casualties. In 30 including the provincial capital. As Tut Mazar area, a joint IMF/ 20 isolated IMF operations continue ANSF mine-clearing operation 10 to target AOG leadership was ambushed by a large group of 0 throughout Kunduz Province, AOGs. Three IMF soldiers were AOGs may focus retaliatory at- killed when their vehicles attacks on Kunduz City. Two suc- tempted to retreat and struck an KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG cessive IEDs detonated in Seda- IED. Shortly thereafter, IMF mis- rak Area in the west of the city, takenly opened fire on an ANA the first targeting an IMF convoy, vehicle driving towards the scene, and the second detonating against killing six ANA officers. The inci- an ANA vehicle which had been dent underscores the precarious deployed to block the road. Rock- relationship between IMF and tween several pro-government militias threaten ets were launched during the day GOA in Kunduz Province, as it is to destabilize the area north of the district cen- from Chahar Dara District toward the second case of ANSF deaths tre. In the first AOG close-range attack on pro the airport and adjacent ANP due to IMF “friendly fire” re- -government militias in Khanabad since Sep- Training Centers three days in a ported this year. High-ranking tember, AOGs infiltrated and attacked militias row, reminding NGOs that the GOA and IMF officials convened in three separate villages in Aqtash Area. The area is vulnerable to such attacks a public meeting in Kunduz City following day, the vehicle of the District Chief during the day. to reinforce good relations and of Police was struck with an RCIED in Qabuli publically display a unity of effort. Qeshlaq Area within Aqtash. Shortly thereaf- Heavy armed clashes were re- ter, an armed clash between two pro- ported between IMF/ANSF and There is reportedly an increased government militias erupted in which one mili- AOGs in Chahar Dara District, threat of NGO abduction in tia commander was killed and nine of his men Imam Sahib District, where two disarmed by the opposing militia. The series of KEY THREATS NGO staff members had been events suggests that one of the militias had  Threat of abduction in Imam abducted last reporting period. In been accused of or involved in assisting AOG Sahib District Archi District, a four-hour long infiltration of the area. These incidents have all  Competing pro-government fire fight in Archi District Centre occurred several kilometers north of the main militias in Khanabad District resulted in three civilian casualties. Kunduz-Taloqan road; however, AOG infiltra-  IED and rocket attacks in Kunduz City In Khanabad District, renewed tion and inter-militia rivalry could destabilize AOG activity and tensions be- the security of the main road in the future.

NGO Incidents BADAKSHAN Year to Date 0 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 0 50 While occasional incidents in 40 Badakhshan reveal the presence tacked the District Chief of Police 30 of AOG-ACG networks and local and an accompanying GOA con- political tensions, the province voy. The chief of police, who has 20 remains a respite compared to been notoriously proactive in ar- 10 other areas in the northern region. resting high-value AOGs through- 0 Local tensions erupted in Warduj out the province, escaped with District, where armed men at- injury; however, a district-level GOA member and ANP were BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG KEY THREATS killed in the attack. Attack on Warduj DCOP THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 1 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 40 No significant changes in the se- connection with the incident. curity dynamics were reported in AOGs continue to operate in Ki- 30 Balkh District; however, a highly shindeh District, where after a 20 unusual RPG attack was reported week of respite from AOG- 10 in Kaldar District, where two initiated incidents, AOGs 0 RPGs were launched toward the launched two RPGs towards an District Police Station during the ANP checkpoint in Kishindeh night. Kaldar District does not Bala during the night, and escaped BALKH AOG BALKH ACG have a known AOG presence, and after a brief fire fight. In Sholgara no suspects have been arrested in District, IEDs constructed from mortar rounds were discovered KEY THREATS emplaced along the road in Qizil Dehdadi District, and the resultant increase in  RPG strikes in Kaldar and Kent Village. This is the first out- IMF road movements through and around Kishindeh districts ward sign of AOG presence re- Mazar-e Sharif City may draw an increase in  IEDs in Sholgara ported in Sholgara District since AOG activity in the area.  Expansion of IMF base in November 2009. Also, the signifi- Dehdadi District cant expansion of an IMF base in

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 8 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50

40 Faryab Province saw an increase A campaign of AOG intimidation 30 in AOG activity outside of the seems to be brewing in a village typical areas under AOG control. south of Dawlatabad District 20 In northern Faryab, AOGs at- Center, where a large number of 10 tacked an ANSF/IMF patrol in AOGs have been reported 0 Khoshak Village, Qaramqol Dis- preaching against the presence of

trict. Close-range attacks on foreign troops and cooperation FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG ANSF in the area are very rare, with GOA. These incidents devi- and the attack may have been in ate from typical AOG activity in retaliation for an AOG arrest Dawlatabad, which has previously IMF clashes in this area have been sporadic made a few days prior to the at- consisted mainly of armed attacks. throughout the operation. AOGs have de- tack. AOG presence in northern AOGs may be attempting to con- creased their profile in these areas over the Faryab appears to be limited to a solidate presence in this area, as past two weeks; however, it is evident that they number of local religious extrem- the ongoing IMF/ANSF opera- remain present in the area. AOGs continue to ists; however, continued AOG tion ongoing in Jelayir Valley has exert de facto control in Qaysar and Almar activity may indicate that local encroached upon their traditional Districts outside of the district centres. AOGs elements are expanding their area of control. In response to ambushed ANSF patrols in both districts this breadth, potentially with the sup- this growing threat, ANSF ar- reporting period. port of outside groups. rested three AOGs in Dawlata- bad, one of whom is reportedly a In the first IED detonation reported in May- KEY THREATS mid-level leader in Faryab Prov- mana City since October 2009, an unknown  AOG activity in Northern ince. type of IED attached to a bicycle detonated near the police station in District #1, causing Faryab The operation in Jelayir Valley is no damage or casualties. South of Pashtun  ANSF/IMF Operation in ongoing, with the objective of Jilayir Valley Kot, AOGs reportedly maintain a presence in moving ANBP into a consoli-  the southern part of Myandara Valley, al- AOG-ANSF clashes in Al- dated position in Khwaja Na mar and Qaysar though no activity has been reported in the Musa Subdistrict. AOG-ANSF/ valley this period. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 Samangan Province has not reported any activity for the past known to migrate in small num- support does not pose an evident threat to month; however, AOGs are bers from Baghlan Province to NGO activities. Rather, AOGs will likely re- Hazarat-e Sultan District for safe frain from outward activity in this area, be- KEY THREATS haven and rest. The presence of cause it is not strategically important and only small numbers of migrating AOG migration from Baghlan advantageous as a safe haven. AOGs without significant local

SAR-E-PUL NGO Incidents Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 ANSF/IMF officially ended the ANA-led operation in Sayyad Dis- ince and Bilchiragh District of trict, as well as Qush Tepa and Faryab Province. No significant Darzab districts of Jawzjan Prov- arrests, armed clashes, or AOG AOGs have kept a markedly low profile movements were reported during throughout the operation, AOG attacks on ANSF positions may resume in the near fu- KEY THREATS or after the operation, and AOGs ture.  AOG presence in Sayyad Dis- likely remain present in Almalik trict Village and other areas. While

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 4 KUNAR This Report Period 0 140 With 46 AOG-initiated security 120 incidents reported in early April, the vicinity. 100 80 the security environment in Kunar Additionally, six IDF assaults Province remains very violent, 60 and four incidents related to ex- 40 with the highest level of recorded plosive devices were reported. 20 AOG activity in the Eastern Re- Most of them, both IDF strikes 0 gion. As reported previously, di- and IED assaults, are often inac- rect attacks against security forces curate, posing again a threat to and supply convoys continue to local population and civilians. KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG be AOG’s preferred tactic, ac- For example, in Wata Pur Dis- counting for 75 % of all recorded trict on 8 April, AOG fired four AOG incidents in early April. The mortars towards the District frequency and intensity of these Centre. The rounds missed and attacks inheres heightened risks impacted in a residential area, for bystanders, and civilians get injuring four civilians. harmed frequently. For instance, on 10 April in Nari District, AOG As part of an apparent shift in attacked an IMF/ANSF convoy, strategy, IMF announced that its injuring at least two children in withdrawal from Korengal Valley in Manogai District has been basis. With IMF’s withdrawal from such remote areas, it seems likely that the overall KEY THREATS completed by 14 April. During the last couple of years, Korengal amount of recorded incidents might decrease  Collateral damage from in the future due to decreased likeliness of AOG – ANSF/IMF clashes area was one of the most violent IMF-AOG confrontation.  IDF in Wata Pur and areas in the Eastern Region, with Sirkanay AOG-IMF clashes on a daily THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR Year to Date 3 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 With 14 ANSO-recorded AOG 50 incidents, the level of AOG activ- in remote areas such as Hisarak 40 ity remains high throughout Nan- has further deteriorated. In early 30 April, AOG again attacked garhar Province. In close connec- 20 tion to ongoing operations of the Hisarak’s DAC with at least ten Pakistani Military on the other mortars. At the same time, due to 10 side of the border, this activity the upcoming poppy season, at- 0 was concentrated in Nangarhar’s tacks against counter-narcotics southern and eastern bordering teams re-emerged. For instance, in region to Pakistan, with a particu- Pachir Wa Agam on 6 April, NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG lar increase in assaults against AOG attacked an ANP Anti Nar- ANBP in Lal Pur and Goshta re- cotics Team for at least fifteen throughout Nangarhar has increased in recent corded. minutes. weeks. Hitherto, these devices were rather un- IED deployment throughout As reported in previous periods, usual in the province. Sherzad and Khogyani witness Nangarhar remains high. In this The number of incidents related to violent increasing frequency and intensity reporting cycle, 15 explosive de- land disputes has decreased in early April, al- of AOG assaults against security vices were located or detonated though it is understood that most internal con- forces. In early April, Sherzad across the Province. Although flicts throughout the province are still brewing. District alone saw at least three most IEDs target security forces, During this reporting period, only two such AOG assaults against IMF/ the number of civilian casualties incident was reported. Namely, in Rodat on 1 ANSF. The security environment has increased in recent. For example, on 8 April in Jalalabad City, a April, about 400 local people - mainly illegal bicycle-borne RCIED targeted a occupiers of government land - staged a dem- KEY THREATS passing IMF convoy, killing three onstration in protest against the government's  AOG activity through- civilian and injuring thirteen. In handling of their land issue. In another inci- out the province another incident, in Khogyani dent, on 13 April in Pachir Wa Agam, a local  IEDs, particularly in land dispute ignited to armed violence, result- southern districts District on 9 April, an IED detonated against two civilians. Addi- ing into ANP intervention.  Brewing land disputes tionally, the use of magnetic IEDs

NURISTAN NGO Incidents Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan Province continues to be 40 inaccessible and isolated, with abductees were released, after 30 only little reports received from ANSF and the construction com- 20 there. In early April, only three pany’s local security guards at- 10 security incidents were recorded. tacked the armed group for several Namely, on 7 March in Nurgaram hours. The third incident, again on 0 District, an unidentified armed 7 March in Nurgaram, was related group abducted six employees of to a personal dispute. a private road construction com- Information indicates that ANSF NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN ACG pany and took them into the attempts to re-establish its presence mountains. Later that day, the throughout Kamdesh District. This district has been widely under ANSO ER would greatly appreciate any infor- KEY THREATS AOG control in recent months and mation, however trivial, regarding any known  AOG at large the new influx of ANSF might in- incidents, threats, or possible developments  Abductions in Nurgaram Dis- crease the potential of armed vio- from this province. trict lence and confrontation in that area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 50 This Report Period 0 In early April, AOG activity in- 40 creased significantly throughout rect attacks against security forces 30 Paktya, particularly in Zurmat and as well as two IED strikes against 20 IMF vehicles. Jaji districts. Around four AOG- 10 initiated incidents were recorded Still, the huge bulk of incidents in Zurmat, Jaji and Lija Ahmad reported from Paktya are related 0 Khel, with two of them being di- to a high level of security force operations, especially in Gardez PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG KEY THREATS and Zurmat. As seen in late  AOG activity in Zurmat and Jaji March, local disputes continue to  Local disputes in Chamkanay be of concern. For instance, on 12 pute between Mangal and Zadran tribesmen April in Chamkanay, a land dis- escalated into armed clash, injuring four locals.

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 1 On 4 April in Qarghayi District, a 40 obligations. Additionally, they group of at least 12 AOG ap- 30 proached the compound of a na- abducted one national staff mem- tional NGO. Seven AOG entered ber from the scene who remains 20 the compound, overwhelmed the in captivity. It remains unclear 10 why this NGO has been attacked guard, and then searched the 0 building. The group planted ex- specifically, and this incident plosives inside the office and par- marks the first direct attack against an NGO in Laghman tially damaged it, leaving a written LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG statement saying that the NGO Province since January 2009. Still, having in mind the recent influx should shut down all of its pro- security environment in Laghman Province of AOG into Qarghayi District, in jects because it is immoral and remains rather moderate and accessible with combination with the NGO’s ap- does not conform with religious five security incidents recorded. As seen in parent reliance on GoA-funding, previous periods, IEDs remain to be of con- it seems possible that this assault cern in the northern valleys of Alishing and KEY THREATS might be related to a perceived Alingar. During this reporting cycle, three IED  AOG presence in Qarghayi lack of the NGO’s impartiality -related incidents were reported, with one dis-  IEDs in Alishing and Alingar due to the nature of its projects. covery in Mihtarlam, one detonation in Alish- Next to this incident, the overall ing as well as one in Alingar.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 1 ZABUL This Report Period 0 50 Zabul Province had a large num- 40 as construction vehicles and their ber of security incidents during 30 the report period, however the PSC escorts. The majority of majority of them involved the IEDs were discovered in Qalat 20 discovery and disposal of IEDs. District, with several in the areas 10 IEDs and indirect attacks appear of Kakaran and Omakai. In the 0 to be the preferred type of AOG village of Mohammed Ali, located activity (as opposed to direct at- in Shahjoy District, an IED strike tacks) as the province sits astride managed to kill three civilians. In ZABUL AOG ZABUL ACG the Kabul – Kandahar Highway Jamal Khel village, also in Shahjoy and sees a great deal of traffic District, a roadside IED killed one from IMF / ANA convoys as well civilian and wounded two others. Lastly, Shahjoy District also wit- attacks in the areas of Pash Kanda, Bazargan, KEY THREATS nessed several rocket and mortar and Zafar Khel villages. IED strikes

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 3 HELMAND This Report Period 1 150 Helmand recorded an enormous 130 number of incidents during the following Operation Moshtarak, 110 last report period. Reports indi- and a small demonstration was 90 70 cate that AOG are re-entering the held in Marjah on 13 April against IMF and GoA. These types of 50 Marjah area in significant num- 30 bers, along with IED materials, protest will undoubted grow if no 10 IED experts and foreign fighters. progress is made with respect to ‐10 Elsewhere in the province AOG stability of the security situation. Compounding the serious prob- remain much more proactive in HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG their activities, launching direct lems of insecurity, the eradication attacks on IMF / ANA / ANP on campaign appears to be more ac- 32 separate occasions in the last tive in the province two weeks alone. Similarly, in- (corresponding to the harvest sea- timidation and outright assassina- son currently underway) and 15 tion of local leaders who appear separate eradication operations attacks and assassinate the provincial Gover- to be cooperating with IMF were recorded during this period nor. Regardless of the truth – and it is by no ‘Build’ efforts (within the doc- throughout the province. This means certain if the truth will be known – this trinal context of ‘Shape – Clear – jump in eradication efforts reflects incident has the potential to turn public opin- Hold – Build”) continue with the a level of confusion amongst ion against the international community, espe- deaths of a tribal elder and four of GOA and IMF actors, who have cially if it appears that the standards of justice his companions in Marjah on 8 at various times over the last two applied to the three ex-pats are markedly dif- April. Predictably, there is grow- months have stated that eradica- ferent from those applied to the six accused ing unrest amongst Afghan civil- tion would be suspended for this Afghans. A demonstration was held in Lash- ians at the lack of progress made season, or conducted in a selective kar Gah following this well-publicized incident manner to minimize the economic which demanded the removal of the INGO KEY THREATS effect on certain key communities. from the country, however reports indicate  Demonstrations / Popular Lastly, three international aid that this was well-planned, with participants sentiment against International workers and six other local staff Community bussed in to the city’s stadium, and not a spon- of an INGO in Lashkar Gah were taneous expression of popular discontent.  AOG attacks arrested on suspicion of plotting with AOG to conduct suicide THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 3 KANDAHAR This Report Period 0 140 Other than in Kandahar City, 120 launched against the NDS HQ in 100 AOG attacks in the province, 80 both direct and those involving Kandahar City on 12 April how- 60 IEDs, appeared to have leveled ever they failed to inflict major 40 casualties. A day later a female 20 off somewhat over the past two 0 weeks. The relative ‘lull’ in AOG- employee of a US-based aid con- initiated incidents can be attrib- tractor was killed as she left the office located in the city. Finally, uted to two main reasons: 1) the KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG poppy harvest currently underway on 15 April, the city was rocked is drawing low-level AOG back to by two large VBIED attacks. The the fields for the next several first targeted a passing IMF patrol weeks; and, 2) reports are that in the center of the city and re- AOG are using this period to sulted in at least one killed and build up stocks of personnel and three others wounded. The sec- operations and this is being made worse by equipment to challenge the in- ond attack was directed at a guest- several incidents where IMF have mistakenly creasing presence of IMF / ANA house compound used to house killed civilians while on patrol. At the begin- in Kandahar City and the districts international staff of several US- ning of the report period, IMF shot and killed of Arghandab, Zhari and Pan- based contractors and resulted in a civilian who failed to stop after several warn- jwayi, all key areas in the upcom- 7 Afghan nationals killed and 3 ings, and on 12 April IMF opened fire on a ing operations. Kandahar City internationals wounded, one criti- bus, killing at least four civilians and wounding however has seen a series of spec- cally. 18, including a number of women and chil- tacular attacks, most likely de- ANP units have been significantly dren. This incident led to vocal demonstra- signed as a show of strength and more active over the report pe- tions against IMF and statements by various defiance, in addition to causing riod, locating and disposing of Afghan officials demanding action be taken significant casualties. A suicide IEDs, conducting patrols in the against those responsible. Adding to this ten- attack involving three individuals City, and seizing increasing num- sion was an obvious discrepancy in the ac- equipped with BBIED was bers of suspected AOG and in- counts of the incident from IMF and local wit- creasing amounts of IED-making nesses. KEY THREATS materials. The population in the IMF/AOG operations province is clearly becoming more anxious in advance of expanded

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 50 The report period witnessed a mix trict, the seizure of a number of 40 of incidents initiated by AOG and RPGs in Qala-e-Qalati area of 30 IMF / ANA / ANP units. Dur- Ghazni District and the arrest of 20 ing the first half of the report pe- four AOG in the village of Dand riod, a series of IMF and ANP in Gelan District on 14 April. 10 operations captured a total of six AOG initiated attacks on 14 sepa- 0 AOG and 600 kg of explosives in rate occasions, targeting ANP six Ghazni City. Additional opera- times, PSC escorting IMF con- GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG tions later in the week resulted in voys two times, IMF patrols three the discovery of a cache of explo- times and the DACs of Waghaz, occurring 4 April in Ghazni City when an IED sives near the DAC of Gelan Dis- Rashidan and Muqur one time hit a civilian Mazda truck, killing four persons, including three women, and wounding five KEY THREATS each. Lastly, there were five sepa- others. IED and AOG Ops rate IED strikes in the province, with the most serious incident THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 50 Uruzgan was relatively calm over were killed in two separate inci- 40 the report period, with the major- 30 ity of incidents comprising of dents in Tirin Kot District when 20 IED discovery and disposal op- IEDs they were planting exploded erations in Chora and Dihrawud prematurely. Lastly, reflecting the 10 Districts. A total of six AOG complex tribal and community 0 dynamics of the province, a boys’ URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG KEY THREATS school was set afire by individuals initially thought to be AOG how- IED’s perhaps rival community groups were in- ever there are now reports that volved.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 50 Nimroz was characteristically 40 quiet during the report period ANP seized a significant amount however this is expected to of opium – over 100 kg – from a 30 change for two reasons. The end house in Zaranj District near the 20 of the poppy harvest may result in border on 13 April. Secondly, 10 more unprocessed opium moving AOG preparations to challenge through the province en route to upcoming IMF / ANA operations 0 Iran, and as a precursor to this in Kandahar may result in a increase in the movement of arms NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ ACG KEY THREATS from Iran destined for Kandahar  IED however at this point the increase in AOG and weapons is deemed to have  Criminal Activity mainly arrived from Pakistan, not Iran.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 AOG appeared to have step up 40 activity levels, including intimida- 30 Barmal District, Yosuf Khel and tion and assassination of local 20 Yahya Khel District witnessed officials, during the report period high levels of violence, including 10 with a significant number of inci- attacks on both DACs, an at- 0 dents occurring in Barmal Dis- tempt to kill the Provincial Gov- trict. These included the killing of ernor while he was holding a a tribal elder accused of support- meeting with the ANP Deputy PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG ing the GOA in Angor Ada, the Chief of Yahya Khel, and an killing of a local Mayor in the IED attack on the residence of Margha area and attacks on ANP the District Administrator of units near the DAC. Outside of Yosuf Khel. In two separate working. IEDs remain a very serious threat KEY THREATS incidents, two ANP appeared to in the province as well, with 13 incidents of  IED have abandoned their posts and strikes over the report period, four of them joined AOG, a possible sign that  Attacks on local officials resulting in civilian deaths and injuries. such intimidation tactics are THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 1 HERAT 50 This Report Period 0 Most of the security incidents in 40 Herat Province during this report- was the case on 9th April in Ku- 30 shki Kuhna district when a road- ing period were taking place in 20 Shindand, Kushk and Kushki Ku- side IED hit a local transport ve- hna Districts. hicle which was travelling on the 10 road leading to the Kushki Kuhna 0 The risk of collateral damage re- District Centre. The IED killed mains a concern for the local three civilians and wounding an- HERAT AOG HERAT ACG population as well as for NGOs other five. However, on 10th working and travelling in the April IEDs were safely defused are rare in the Western Region. So far AOG province. This risk was particu- and on 14 April an IED deto- attacks (five) on telecommunication facilities, larly visible in Kushki Kunha Dis- nated prematurely while being towers or antennas had been taken place in trict (Darzak area) and Kushk emplaced by AOG members. Of Herat Province mainly in Injil District in 2008 District (Sharekhalil and Chelduk- note, especially in Kushk District before. The last recorded incident on a tele- htar area) where the use of IEDs an increase of AOG activity is to communication tower in Herat City was on is visibly increasing since 9th be expected since a known and 23rd January 2009. April. All four IED related inci- influential AOG commander is dents during this reporting period The seizing of weapons was continuing during said to have returned from Paki- were reported in these districts. So the present reporting cycle throughout the stan. In regard to Kushk, it is also far there had been altogether only province. Of note, besides search operations in worth noting that on 4th April a seven IED related incidents be- Guzara and Shindand, a large quantity of ex- violent armed clash erupted before in Herat Province this year. plosive devices was seized on 4th April in tween locals over a tribal dispute, Two of the recent IED incidents Zinda Jan District (Shikh Zard area) including resulting in one killed and another in April were involving civilian BM1 rockets and mines. two civilians wounded. casualties, highlighting the risk of With two incidents during the reporting pe- being collaterally damaged. As it Unusual were two incidents in riod, Herat City itself remained relatively calm. Shindand District on 3rd and 9th Of note, on 4th April ANP arrested two indi- April when AOG attacked and KEY THREATS & CON- viduals carrying an unknown quantity of explo- CERNS damaged towers of private tele- sive devices (District 2) which indicates that communication companies. Even  IED/RCIED there is AOG activity in the city. However, the similar incidents are common-  AOG presence in Kushki second incident was personal dispute which Kunha, Kushk and Shindand place in the South and became turned violent (District 7).  Criminal activity more frequent for example in Kunduz Province last year they

THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 inces the local population is frequently the vic- This Report Period 0 tim of ongoing conflict. On 3rd April, a shep- Badghis Province continues to be herd was shot and injured by an AOG member assessed as volatile and unstable. Similar to previous cycles inci- in Ghormach. He apparently had refused to In Murghab and Muqur ANSF/ dents were concentrated around pay illegal taxes which AOG were collecting IMF operations are still in proc- the Murghab Valley and the sur- from villagers. On 11th April, AOG shot and ess. To counter the AOG pres- rounding districts of Muqur, killed a religious elder allegedly due to a dis- ence ANSF/IMF launched a large Murghab and Ghormach with pute. In addition, the trend of mainly AOG operation in Murghab District AOG ambushes and attacks on initiated abduction continued in the province (Sinyha area) on 6th April, result- ANSF/IMF convoys and check during the present cycle. For instance, on 3rd ing in numerous AOG fatalities. posts. It is worth noting that be- April AOG abducted three local civilians en Compared to the previous report- side these historic hotspots AOG route from Qala-i-Naw City to Muqur District ing period, the province has wit- activity continued to manifest it- Centre. They were released the following day nessed an increase in security inci- self also in Qadis District. In addi- in Chakarha area due to the intervention of dents from nine to twenty inci- tion, on 13th April there was also local elders. Of note, two GoA employees’ dents over the past two weeks. an armed clash in Jawand (Ghare relatives who were abducted on 29th March This increase is most probably Seyah Village area) allegedly be- were released on 1st April due to the interven- linked to the ongoing military op- tween AOG and pro-government tion of local elders again. militia. Furthermore, IED related erations since the vast majority of The killings as well as the abductions can be incidents are increasing visibly. incidents are armed clashes and seen as an AOG tactic to intimidate the local One-third of all IED related inci- IED related incidents. population. This is of course closely connected dents in Badghis took place after to the high level of AOG activity in the prov- 11th April. In addition, 80% of KEY THREATS ince which becomes increasingly a kind of base IED related incidents were re- AOG operations for AOGs (especially Murghab District) to ported in Murghab and Muqur IED operate in the North while having access to the Districts. Abduction South and Iran. As seen in other western prov-

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 Farah province remains unstable. way in Bakwa. The suicide attacker was killed During the current reporting pe- damaged especially while travel- and two PSC vehicles as well as a fuel tanker riod, armed clashes and roadside ling. On 7th April for example, a were damaged. The following day on the same IEDs continued to be the main roadside IED struck a local trans- road, a PSC convoy was attacked by AOG threats for the local population as port vehicle in Bakwa, wounding resulting in heavy fighting, claiming several well as the NGOs in Farah Prov- one local civilian. Three days later, casualties on both sides. As further military ince. AOGs were quite active. similar incident in Pusht Rod operations in the South (especially in Kanda- Nine of thirteen incidents were killed five civilians. The vast ma- har) have been announced, an increase in AOG initiated. Of note, all armed jority of casualties caused by IEDs AOG attacks on security forces and ‘affiliates’ clashes and IED related incidents this period were civilians. This can be expected particularly along IMF supply during the last two weeks took had already been the case in the roads. reporting period. place in Bakwa and Pusht Rod Another pattern that has already been ob- Districts according to ANSO In addition, attacks on ANSF/ served during the previous reporting cycle was data. These incidents are an indi- IMF as well as logistic convoys again evident in this period. Significant mili- cator for a significant AOG pres- remain frequent throughout the tary/police operations were going on in areas ence. In addition, they are increas- province. The latter are strategi- of significant AOG activities in the province, ing the risk of being collaterally cally important for AOGs, espe- especially in Bakwa and Pusht Rod. But also in cially on the Herat – Kandahar Lash Wa Juwayn District where ANP discov- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Highway. On 1st April, a suicide ered various munitions including two mortar IED & Ambush bomber on a motorbike detonated bombs, one RPG-7 and one BM1-rocket. Criminality his vest close to a convoy of fuel tankers on Herat-Kandahar High- THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 1 GHOR This Report Period 1 50 In the early morning of 10th 40 that a person in the private trans- 30 April, an armed roadside robbery port vehicle recognized the ACG. 20 directly involving two INGO staff At present, allegedly all three members (off duty) took place in ACG members were arrested. 10 Dawlat Yar District on the road Additional information indicates 0 from Dawlat Yar to Chaghcharan. that the respective three armed The course of events started when men are an ACG operating in GHOR AOG GHOR ACG three ACG members stopped one Ghor and are well known by lo- person on a motorcycle and cals. Of note, the INGO staff armed roadside robberies. With another three robbed him of his valuables in- members were travelling off duty armed roadside robberies during the last two cluding his motorcycle. As the and had no IDs, tags or similar weeks, this kind of incident seems to be in- two INGO staff members with items with them, that might have creasing. However, it remains to be seen if this their motorcycles arrived as well, identified them as INGO staff. trend continues. Nevertheless, it is important they were also robbed by the Therefore, it can be excluded that to plan road missions carefully and exercise ACG. Afterwards a private trans- the INGO itself was targeted. caution while travelling. In addition, as most port vehicle was approaching the Nevertheless, armed roadside rob- robberies take place in order to gain some kind scene. So far there is no clear in- bery remains one of the main of valuables, it is advisable to remain calm and formation what exactly happened threats to NGO operating in co-operate with the robbers, minimising the to the vehicle when it was arriv- Ghor Province. Another roadside risk of injury or retaliation. ing. The ACG left the scene on robbery occurred on the following AOG incidents worth mentioning took place the stolen motorcycles. However, day in Du Layna District. A group in Tulak and Charsdada Districts. On 4th the leader of the group turned of armed men stopped a local April, an AOG ambushed ANP who were on back again and opened fire, killing transport vehicle. They physically their way to arrest a local commander in Tulak. four civilians including one assaulted the driver and abducted Furthermore, on 10th April three RPGs were INGO staff member and wound- the passengers. Peripheral infor- fired towards the Charsada DAC which landed ing three persons including the mation suggests that it was a in an open area and therefore were neither second INGO staff member. The planned attack probably related to very precise nor effective. The last AOG attack reason for his action is not exactly a personal grievance. In addition, against a DACs recorded by ANSO in Ghor clear. At present it seems likely on 3rd April a roadside robbery Province (Tulak District) was in September involving a private transport vehi- 2009. Overall, AOG attacks on DACs in Ghor KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cle took place in the usually quiet were relatively rare so far. There had been only Armed Robberies on Road district of Lal Wa Sarjangal. Until four in the last 15 month according to ANSO AOG in Pasaband/Taiwara April 2010, three of twelve ACG data. Criminality related incidents in Ghor were THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116  NONE NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Elizabeth Detwiler - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we To Register with ANSO do not know enough contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to [email protected] Philipp Schweers - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- nificance of the inci- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 dents occurring there. ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Board. If you have any Peter Dimitroff—[email protected]—0796 688 416 feedback, good or bad, let Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us them know on: understand the province better, please [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) contact us. Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0799 322 192

ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Police / ANP-Afghan National Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu- tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device