The Failure of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates

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The Failure of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates THE FAILURE OF THE ORGANIC LAW ON THE INTEGRITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES The failure of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) Alphonse Gelu When the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Alphonse Gelu is a lecturer in Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) was introduced it the Political Science Strand, promised a new beginning for Papua New Guinea School of Humanities and politics. Its task was to address the problem of political Social Sciences, University of instability and to strengthen the party system. Its Papua New Guinea. failure to do so has meant that political parties in Papua New Guinea are now worse off in terms of their leadership and membership in parliament. This paper discusses the major features of the OLIPPAC and its failures. Papua New Guinea established its political parties. The first indigenous democratic institutions and processes in political party—the Pangu Party— the 1950s and 1960s, beginning with a appeared in 1967 and contested the second Legislative Council established in 1951 House of Assembly elections, held in 1968. with an appointed majority. The House of The party was made up of young Papua Assembly was established in 1964, with an New Guineans and some Europeans indigenous majority elected by universal (Woolford 1976; Hegarty 1979; and Moore suffrage. This development was important and Kooyman 1998), their policies were because it enabled the people—who were considered radical because they called for still overwhelmingly influenced by better conditions and independence for traditional allegiances—to choose their Papua New Guineans. The United Party, leaders. The second important political whose leadership was predominately development was the emergence of European, was formed around the same time 83 PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN and actively campaigned against the policies argued that ‘despite the existence of political of the Pangu Party. Its expatriate member- parties, no linkages can as yet be found ship—comprised of rich Europeans who between parties, voting and governance, owned large coffee plantations in the particularly with respect to policy outcomes’ Highlands of Papua New Guinea—did not (1996:5). According to Reilly, ‘most broad take Pangu’s call for self-government lightly indicators of party numbers and cohesion as the possibility of independence directly suggest steady decline in the strength and threatened their business interests. The party importance of political parties in Papua New branded Pangu as ‘ungrateful young Guinea since the introduction of self- hotheads who did not appreciate what the government in 1973’ (2002b:26). May also Europeans have done for their country’ argued that (Griffin et al. 1979). [d]espite some early predictions to the Six parties were formed in 1967 to contrary, Papua New Guinea has not contest the 1968 election, but it was only at developed a strong party system. While the 1972 election that a significant a few parties have maintained indigenous political group emerged to govern continuity, most still tend to come and the territory for the first time. The group was go between elections, and those which headed by the Pangu Party, and Pangu Party have survived generally lack a mass leader Michael Somare was elected chief base, an organisational structure, a minister. The 1972 elections also saw the coherent ideology, and firm party emergence of new political parties, the most discipline…With parties not sharply prominent of which were the People’s differentiated ideologically, almost Progress Party and the National Party. every party has been aligned, at some These parties formed a nascent party time, with every other. Individual system in a territory that was preparing itself attachment to parties is generally weak, for self-rule. Whether these parties played a with MPs commonly switching party major role in pushing or preparing Papua allegiance in return for political New Guinea for independence is debatable, rewards—a pattern of behaviour known but it was obvious that the party system that elsewhere as ‘party-hopping’ but emerged in 1967 was not well entrenched in increasingly referred to in Papua New society. This elucidates the nature of the party Guinea as ‘yo-yo politics’ (2002b:7). system that was inherited at independence. Since the emergence of Papua New Standish argued that Guinea political parties, various scholars Papua New Guinea’s parties are now have written about their characteristics or the personalised vehicles for gaining and nature of the party system in Papua New sharing power, with minimal policy Guinea. Woolford (1976) argued that the differences. They remain essentially parties could not maintain tight unity and factions within the national parliament, fellow members of a party would often hold centred upon a leader, even leaders who conflicting views about what the country may have lost their seats like the needed. Hegarty (1979) argued that the wealthy founders of two parties, such parties formed in the 1960s and early 1970s as former Prime Ministers Sir Julius remained weak and undeveloped, both Chan (People’s Progress Party, whose ideologically and organisationally. The term ended in 1997) and Paias Wingti parties remained parliamentary factions and (who was out of parliament between had no coherent programs for change. Saffu 1997–2002) (2004:10). 84 THE FAILURE OF THE ORGANIC LAW ON THE INTEGRITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES The Papua New Guniea party system in almost every parliamentary sitting since the the 2000s unfortunately still possesses many 1977 election, a motion of no-confidence in of these attributes. the government has been either mooted or The discussion of the Organic Law on moved. This practice has resulted in the the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates emergence of a new parliamentary culture, (OLIPPAC) relates to political parties and characterised by the prime minister being candidates, therefore a brief mention will be forced to make cabinet reshuffles, members made on the historical evolution of political of parliament being paid to join either the parties in Papua New Guinea. government or the opposition, MPs leaving their parties anytime they wish, usually by saying that their electorates want them to be Background either in the government or in the opposition depending on the circumstances. A party can The first election using the optional be left without any members through preferential voting was conducted in 1964, desertion of its members. Many candidates and, increasingly, parties emerged to contest prefer to run as independents and later join these elections until 1972. From 1972–75, the whichever parties seem likely to form political landscape in Papua New Guinea government, thus increasing their chances was relatively stable. But this was changed of being in power. by new disagreements on certain issues The fragmented coalitions between the relating to the Constitution, the secessionist different political parties, in conjunction movement on Bougainville, regional divisions with Section 145 of the Constitution, have (especially between the coastal and highland been responsible for creating and sustaining regions), and the introduction of the leader- political instability in the country. Section 145 ship code on 3 March 1978 (Hegarty 1998). allows parliamentarians to move a motion Political instability emerged, largely as a of no-confidence against the government result of the political parties’ actions, and after eighteen months. As a result, no was exacerbated by the fractious nature of government in Papua New Guinea has party politics in Papua New Guinea. As served its full term in office, and there has further noted by Okole, Sause and Gelu, been a number of changes of government [s]ince 1975, the different parties took through votes of no-confidence since 1977. on a new face that brought them away This instability has greatly affected the from the democratic political culture. governments’ capacity to implement their This new face of politics developed into policies and has also affected the delivery of a new political culture that bred government goods and services to the people unconventional practices, hence, (Table 1). political instability was one of these Coalition governments in Papua New practices (2004:15). Guinea can crumble at anytime. There is Political instability became part of a new usually nothing in place to maintain an political culture. It came to define the actions alliance between the political parties in of members of parliament (MPs), especially government. The collapse of a coalition those in the opposition, who became overtly usually occurs when parties and parliament- obsessed with using Section 145 of the arians desert their coalition partners because Constitution—dealing with motions of no- they have been promised a better deal with confidence in the prime minister or other groups in terms of ministerial ministry—to change the government. In portfolios, committee chairs and so forth. The 85 PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN Table 1 Changes of government through elections and votes of no-confidence Year Incumbent prime minister New prime minister Reason for change 1977 Michael Somare Michael Somare Election 1980 Michael Somare Julius Chan No-confidence vote 1982 Julius Chan Michael Somare Election 1985 Michael Somare Paias Wingti No-confidence vote 1987 Paias Wingti Paias Wingti Election 1988 Paias Wingti Rabbie Namaliu No-confidence vote 1992 Rabbie Namaliu Paias Wingti Election 1994 Paias Wingti Julius Chan Invalid re-election 1997 Julius Chan Bill Skate Election 1999 Bill Skate Mekere Morauta Skate resigned 2002 Mekere Morauta Michael Somare Election Source: Adapted from Reilly (2002b:30). Additions were made after the 1997 elections. The entry for 1994 has been amended to reflect the new election needed after Wingti’s snap re-election in 1993 was found to be illegal. 1997 national election provides a good government. Part of this executive illustration of this. Bill Skate’s party, the instability relates to the way in which People’s National Congress (PNC), won only parliamentary coalitions are put six seats.
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