THE FAILURE OF THE ORGANIC LAW ON THE INTEGRITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES

The failure of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC)

Alphonse Gelu

When the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Alphonse Gelu is a lecturer in Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) was introduced it the Political Science Strand, promised a new beginning for School of Humanities and politics. Its task was to address the problem of political Social Sciences, University of instability and to strengthen the party system. Its Papua New Guinea. failure to do so has meant that political parties in Papua New Guinea are now worse off in terms of their leadership and membership in parliament. This paper discusses the major features of the OLIPPAC and its failures.

Papua New Guinea established its political parties. The first indigenous democratic institutions and processes in political party—the Pangu Party— the 1950s and 1960s, beginning with a appeared in 1967 and contested the second Legislative Council established in 1951 House of Assembly elections, held in 1968. with an appointed majority. The House of The party was made up of young Papua Assembly was established in 1964, with an New Guineans and some Europeans indigenous majority elected by universal (Woolford 1976; Hegarty 1979; and Moore suffrage. This development was important and Kooyman 1998), their policies were because it enabled the people—who were considered radical because they called for still overwhelmingly influenced by better conditions and independence for traditional allegiances—to choose their Papua New Guineans. The United Party, leaders. The second important political whose leadership was predominately development was the emergence of European, was formed around the same time

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and actively campaigned against the policies argued that ‘despite the existence of political of the Pangu Party. Its expatriate member- parties, no linkages can as yet be found ship—comprised of rich Europeans who between parties, voting and governance, owned large coffee plantations in the particularly with respect to policy outcomes’ Highlands of Papua New Guinea—did not (1996:5). According to Reilly, ‘most broad take Pangu’s call for self-government lightly indicators of party numbers and cohesion as the possibility of independence directly suggest steady decline in the strength and threatened their business interests. The party importance of political parties in Papua New branded Pangu as ‘ungrateful young Guinea since the introduction of self- hotheads who did not appreciate what the government in 1973’ (2002b:26). May also Europeans have done for their country’ argued that (Griffin et al. 1979). [d]espite some early predictions to the Six parties were formed in 1967 to contrary, Papua New Guinea has not contest the 1968 election, but it was only at developed a strong party system. While the 1972 election that a significant a few parties have maintained indigenous political group emerged to govern continuity, most still tend to come and the territory for the first time. The group was go between elections, and those which headed by the Pangu Party, and Pangu Party have survived generally lack a mass leader was elected chief base, an organisational structure, a minister. The 1972 elections also saw the coherent ideology, and firm party emergence of new political parties, the most discipline…With parties not sharply prominent of which were the People’s differentiated ideologically, almost Progress Party and the National Party. every party has been aligned, at some These parties formed a nascent party time, with every other. Individual system in a territory that was preparing itself attachment to parties is generally weak, for self-rule. Whether these parties played a with MPs commonly switching party major role in pushing or preparing Papua allegiance in return for political New Guinea for independence is debatable, rewards—a pattern of behaviour known but it was obvious that the party system that elsewhere as ‘party-hopping’ but emerged in 1967 was not well entrenched in increasingly referred to in Papua New society. This elucidates the nature of the party Guinea as ‘yo-yo politics’ (2002b:7). system that was inherited at independence. Since the emergence of Papua New Standish argued that Guinea political parties, various scholars Papua New Guinea’s parties are now have written about their characteristics or the personalised vehicles for gaining and nature of the party system in Papua New sharing power, with minimal policy Guinea. Woolford (1976) argued that the differences. They remain essentially parties could not maintain tight unity and factions within the national parliament, fellow members of a party would often hold centred upon a leader, even leaders who conflicting views about what the country may have lost their seats like the needed. Hegarty (1979) argued that the wealthy founders of two parties, such parties formed in the 1960s and early 1970s as former Prime Ministers Sir Julius remained weak and undeveloped, both Chan (People’s Progress Party, whose ideologically and organisationally. The term ended in 1997) and parties remained parliamentary factions and (who was out of parliament between had no coherent programs for change. Saffu 1997–2002) (2004:10).

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The Papua New Guniea party system in almost every parliamentary sitting since the the 2000s unfortunately still possesses many 1977 election, a motion of no-confidence in of these attributes. the government has been either mooted or The discussion of the Organic Law on moved. This practice has resulted in the the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates emergence of a new parliamentary culture, (OLIPPAC) relates to political parties and characterised by the prime minister being candidates, therefore a brief mention will be forced to make cabinet reshuffles, members made on the historical evolution of political of parliament being paid to join either the parties in Papua New Guinea. government or the opposition, MPs leaving their parties anytime they wish, usually by saying that their electorates want them to be Background either in the government or in the opposition depending on the circumstances. A party can The first election using the optional be left without any members through preferential voting was conducted in 1964, desertion of its members. Many candidates and, increasingly, parties emerged to contest prefer to run as independents and later join these elections until 1972. From 1972–75, the whichever parties seem likely to form political landscape in Papua New Guinea government, thus increasing their chances was relatively stable. But this was changed of being in power. by new disagreements on certain issues The fragmented coalitions between the relating to the Constitution, the secessionist different political parties, in conjunction movement on Bougainville, regional divisions with Section 145 of the Constitution, have (especially between the coastal and highland been responsible for creating and sustaining regions), and the introduction of the leader- political instability in the country. Section 145 ship code on 3 March 1978 (Hegarty 1998). allows parliamentarians to move a motion Political instability emerged, largely as a of no-confidence against the government result of the political parties’ actions, and after eighteen months. As a result, no was exacerbated by the fractious nature of government in Papua New Guinea has party politics in Papua New Guinea. As served its full term in office, and there has further noted by Okole, Sause and Gelu, been a number of changes of government [s]ince 1975, the different parties took through votes of no-confidence since 1977. on a new face that brought them away This instability has greatly affected the from the democratic political culture. governments’ capacity to implement their This new face of politics developed into policies and has also affected the delivery of a new political culture that bred government goods and services to the people unconventional practices, hence, (Table 1). political instability was one of these Coalition governments in Papua New practices (2004:15). Guinea can crumble at anytime. There is Political instability became part of a new usually nothing in place to maintain an political culture. It came to define the actions alliance between the political parties in of members of parliament (MPs), especially government. The collapse of a coalition those in the opposition, who became overtly usually occurs when parties and parliament- obsessed with using Section 145 of the arians desert their coalition partners because Constitution—dealing with motions of no- they have been promised a better deal with confidence in the prime minister or other groups in terms of ministerial ministry—to change the government. In portfolios, committee chairs and so forth. The

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Table 1 Changes of government through elections and votes of no-confidence

Year Incumbent prime minister New prime minister Reason for change 1977 Michael Somare Michael Somare Election 1980 Michael Somare No-confidence vote 1982 Julius Chan Michael Somare Election 1985 Michael Somare Paias Wingti No-confidence vote 1987 Paias Wingti Paias Wingti Election 1988 Paias Wingti No-confidence vote 1992 Rabbie Namaliu Paias Wingti Election 1994 Paias Wingti Julius Chan Invalid re-election 1997 Julius Chan Election 1999 Bill Skate Skate resigned 2002 Mekere Morauta Michael Somare Election

Source: Adapted from Reilly (2002b:30). Additions were made after the 1997 elections. The entry for 1994 has been amended to reflect the new election needed after Wingti’s snap re-election in 1993 was found to be illegal.

1997 national election provides a good government. Part of this executive illustration of this. Bill Skate’s party, the instability relates to the way in which People’s National Congress (PNC), won only parliamentary coalitions are put six seats. After Skate was elected as prime together by the leading political actors minister, the party membership jumped to 44. after each general election (2002b:30). Just before Skate resigned on 7 July 1999, the Sir Michael Somare once said that PNC was left with only two members, four heading a coalition is like paddling two less than prior to his election as prime canoes—there is great difficulty in making minister. This is an indication of the fluidity sure that the two canoes go in the same of party politics in the country. direction at all times. Coalition governments Okole (2004) identified four key and in Papua New Guinea are like these mutually interacting factors: a firm voter– proverbial canoes. Open disagreements and member reciprocal relationship; the fluid backdoor politicking are always afoot in an party system; opportunism; and the inherent attempt to topple the prime minister. This can design of the unicameral legislature. Okole’s be attributed to a number of factors— factors of political instability are lumped dissatisfaction with the distribution of together in the discussion of instability ministerial portfolios, sacking of ministers, relating to the OLIPPAC, but it has been the suspicion of coalition partners, and lack of fluid party system that has had an enormous consultation. It seems, however, that self- effect on the formation of weak coalitions. interest has become the driving force behind Reilly (2002) also stressed the instability of many political moves. the party system in contributing to unstable In 1991 Rabbie Namaliu, prime minister governments. According to Reilly since 1988 (when he defeated Paias Wingti [t]he ongoing dissolution of the Papua in a vote of no-confidence), made and passed New Guinea party system has resulted an amendment to Section 145, extending the in extremely unstable executive grace period before a motion of no-confidence

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can be moved against the government from of the Constitution, which calls for the six to 18 months.1 The rationale behind this enactment of an Organic Law on the Integrity amendment was to allow the government of Political Parties and Candidates. The first enough time to implement some of its attempt was made in 1989 but failed due to policies. The amendment, however, did not the lack of political support. The second and deter the opposition or parliamentarians in third unsuccessful attempts occurred in 1993 general, from moving a vote against the prime and 1998. In 2000, under Prime Minister Sir minister. Mekere Morauta, a serious attempt was made In an attempt to avoid votes of no- with bipartisan support from all the factions confidence, the following practices have in parliament (Sepoe 2004). On 8 December proliferated, resulting in a new style of 2000, parliament passed Constitutional parliamentary democracy in the country. Amendment No. 22 and on 22 February • Frantic movement of parliamentarians 2001, the OLIPPAC was finally certified. jockeying to gain control of the govern- Further amendments were made on 15 ment. October 2003. • Numerous cabinet reshuffles. • Continual sacking of political parties The OLIPPAC and parliamentarians by the prime minister, taking on board of new parties The OLIPPAC is the implementing law for the and parliamentarians, or recalling Constitution’s Section 129, The Integrity of previously sacked parties and MPs. As Political Parties, and Section 130, Integrity of reported in the Post-Courier (26 January Candidates. The OLIPPAC has eight parts: 2005), Somare is thinking of recalling the Preliminary (definitions), Political Parties PNC into the government and sacking Generally, Registration of Political Parties, the PNG Party, three members of which Central Fund Board of Management, Funding are currently Ministers. Since the 2002 Political Parties, Financial Returns, Strength- election, the country has had three ening of Political Parties, and Miscellaneous. deputy prime ministers, and the office As the OLIPPAC promised a new has been vacant since mid-2004. The beginning in Papua New Guinea politics, its prime minister has announced recently task was to address the problem of instability that an appointment will be made soon and to strengthen the party system. Sir (Post-Courier, 10 January 2005). Michael Somare, the first, and current, Prime • Minister of Papua New Guinea, remarked Long adjournment of parliament in order then that it was time to introduce such a law to avoid the vote of no-confidence. Bill to bring about political stability Skate started this practice in 1998, (Constitutional Development Commission followed by Sir Mekere Morauta in 2000 Conference 2000). Sir Mekere Morauta, the and Sir Michael Somare in 2004. Prime Minister who instituted the reform, • Splits in political parties. This is usually said that it would instil discipline in initiated and sustained by the prime parliamentarians and political parties minister to maintain control over the (Papua New Guinea 2000). In describing the opposition. passing of the OLIPPAC, Reilly, quoting In order to address the problem of Morauta, stated that political instability, attempts were made by Papua New Guinea has been a strong successive governments to invoke Section 129 parliamentary democracy since it

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gained independence in 1975. But energy we as political leaders spend Parliament has not worked as well as on it are incalculable. The conseq- it should. In recent years, instability uences to the country as a whole: in within the system has brought about a the economy, social disorder and other paralysis in decision-making, and negative consequences that follow consequently a failure in policymaking, from instability affect the well being of in the implementation of policy, our people (Sepoe 2004:2). and in the delivery of basic services to Nonggorr summarised the four main the people. Many observers have objectives of the OLIPPAC in the Post-Courier commented that a basic reason for this (9 November 2004). These were is that politicians have demonstrated • to ensure that political parties were a lack of commitment to the people properly registered with appropriate who voted them into parliament and structures such as membership base, to the platforms and parties that they officers of a party outside and inside stood for in election campaigns parliament, with a constitution clearly (2002a:708). setting out the rules of a political party Professor John Nonggorr, the architect of • the law, argued in his numerous newspaper to require candidates who win elections commentaries that the OLIPPAC would and political parties that contest ensure political stability and this would elections to disclose their financial affairs bring about other positive political develop- in relation to contesting such elections ments in the country. • to set up an office to be in charge of The OLIPPAC, according to Sepoe, registration of political parties and to ‘provides the statutory basis for the administer its financial disclosure recognition of political parties as formal provision. A central fund board was public entities funded by the state as well as established for this purpose with the the instrument for regulation of political Registrar of Political Parties providing parties and candidates at all the stages of secretarial support the electoral process’ (2004:1). The importance • to provide some sense of order in the of the OLIPPAC was also made in a National running of the parliamentary wings of Executive Council policy submission of political parties. This would be achieved March 2000, which stated that by setting specific rules for MPs [a]part from the provisions on integrity belonging to political parties to abide by. of political parties and candidates, there is a need to address the serious According to Nonggorr, much progress problems facing PNG stemming from has been made on the first three objectives. the weak political system, leading to He noted, however, that the fourth objective the constant changes of governments was controversial because, by law, political and constant threats to any govern- parties were forced to do things that older ment governing the country meaning- democracies had developed gradually and fully. The phenomenon itself—of naturally. Indeed, the fourth objective is the constant changes of government and most controversial part of the OLIPPAC and threats to governance—is well known. the one that will be analysed most Also well known are the consequences thoroughly because of its contribution to the of this phenomenon. The time and failure of the OLIPPAC.

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The OLIPPAC set three specific measures encouragement of political parties and the to achieve this objective stabilising of executive government. Has the • to ensure a prime minister is appointed OLIPPAC been able to ensure political after a general election in an orderly way stability and strengthening of political with direct relationship to the way voters parties, particularly after the 2002 national expressed their wishes election? The answers to this question would enable us to identify the failures of the • to demand that parliamentarians wishing OLIPPAC, which is the main focus of the to leave a political party give substantive paper. reasons for doing so. The Ombudsman Commission must investigate these reasons. This measure is to stop members After the 2002 national election of parliament from resigning and joining other political parties The period after the 2002 national election • to force each registered political party to was supposed to be a new era for Papua New remain a single cohesive body in making Guinea politics because of the OLIPPAC. As decisions on the most critical areas noted by Standish (2004), however, parties impairing political stability: in the played a minor role in the 2002 election and election of a prime minister during a no- many new parliamentarians were elected as confidence vote; in voting on constit- independent candidates. utional amendments; and in voting on According to Section 63 of the OLIPPAC, the budget. The OLIPPAC does this by the party that wins the greatest number of requiring the parliamentary wing of each seats in parliament will be called on to form political party to decide how their the government. After the 2002 election, the parliamentarians will vote in these areas National Alliance Party, which won 19 seats, and by requiring further that members was called to form the government. Requiring of a particular party must vote in more members to form a majority, though, the accordance with the party resolution or National Alliance formed a coalition with may abstain but not vote against it. the smaller parties. Standish (2004), however, notes that some parliamentarians were Reilly has also written on the major coerced and hijacked into supporting objectives of the OLIPPAC, noting particular parties—a practiced used in earlier The reform package—popularly known Papua New Guinea elections. in Papua New Guinea as the Integrity Certain activities occurred during the Law—represents an ambitious attempt formation of the government that posed a to rework Papua New Guinea’s danger to the legitimacy of the OLIPPAC. The political system from the top down. It first was the attempt by some smaller parties focuses on changing the rules which and a group of independent MPs to form a govern the formation, composition and coalition and challenge the National funding of political parties; introducing Alliance, in contravening Section 63. new constitutional provisions aimed at The second was the formation of a new stabilising executive government, and political party by the man who strongly limiting no-confidence votes against the pushed the OLIPPAC through, Sir Mekere executive (2002:708). Morauta. He also threatened the effectiveness The two most important objectives of the of the OLIPPAC because political parties are OLIPPAC according to Reilly (2002a) are the supposed to be formed outside parliament

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and compete with other parties in an On the other hand, it could also be election. argued that the OLIPPAC has succeeded in The third was the increase in the number providing stability, as indicated in the of political parties. Almost 43 political parties longevity of the Somare government. It was were registered and contested the election. worrying, however, that so much confusion The large number of political parties brought was generated in 2004 when the opposition back bad memories—the one-man party, parties were striving to topple the govern- parties that contested an election and then ment through a vote of no-confidence. It was disappeared, parties winning only one or two anticipated that the Somare government seats and then disbanding to join other would turn to the OLIPPAC to protect itself, parties. but this did happen. Sepoe noted that ‘the Finally, there was the large number of constant shifting of camps by MPs as independent candidates, 17 of whom won individuals and parties has created much seats in the election. This group has been the confusion and uncertainties about the major source of instability in the past because sustainability of the current National of their ability to move from one group to Alliance-led coalition government’ (2004:7). another at anytime. The OLIPPAC did not provide an effective way to regulate this group with the exception of Section 69, which Failure of the OLIPPAC allows independent candidates to join political parties at any time. How has the OLIPPAC failed and what are Section 69 failed to recognise that this the reasons for this failure? The first area is group campaigns on an independent or on the vote of no-confidence stated in Section personal platform, so their platforms are not 145 of the Constitution. Sir Michael Somare compatible with any of the existing political realised that the use of Section 145 would parties. The ineffectiveness of Section 69 prevail, in spite of the guarantees offered in could and would result in independent Section 77(1) of the OLIPPAC. Somare saw candidates joining political parties and that this would affect his chances in staying leaving at their own prerogative. Thus, the in office, even though he was voted in as experience of the past persists in this case. prime minister by an overwhelming majority Some independent MPs have even become of 89 votes and those 89 are barred from leaders of political parties.2 The decline in voting against him unless a party resolution the number of successful independent directs them to do so or they abstain. candidates in the 2002 elections compared to As a result of the possible failure of the the 1992 and 1997 elections, in which OLIPPAC to protect the government against independents won 30 seats and 36 seats Section 145, in 2003 Somare introduced an respectively, may indicate that the OLIPPAC’s amendment to Section 145 to extend the grace financial disincentives to run as independent period from 18 to 36 months. Much of 2003 are having some effect. Nonetheless, the large was dominated by disagreements on this number of independents joining parties after issue, as well as a vote of no-confidence the 2002 elections follows the trend against the government being mooted. For established in previous elections. It seems the first time in the history of Papua New clear from this that the OLIPPAC has not had Guinea politics, most opposition members much of an impact in influencing candidates stayed away from the entire July–August to run as part of a party rather than 2004 parliamentary sitting (Post-Courier, 4 independently. August 2004).

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As a result of this, the government called opposition to the amendment despite the fact on all Papua New Guineans to look seriously that Section 70(1) and 73 does not allow them at the performance and conduct of their to do so, except to abstain from the vote. elected representatives. The call was aimed OLIPPAC’s second failure was in its at deterring renegade government MPs who inability to prevent divisions of political aligned themselves with the opposition (Post- parties in parliament and the confusion Courier, 7 July 2004). surrounding the rightful leaders of the In August 2004, the government political parties. A number of parties—the PPP, adjourned parliament until November to United Resources Party (URP), People’s avoid a vote of no-confidence, in keeping with Action Party (PAP) and the Pangu Party— previous practice. The OLIPPAC was not able each had two leaders, one of whom led a group prevent this. in the opposition while the other led a group Because of Sections 70(1) and 73, those in the government. Standish, observing these who voted for the prime minister in the first splits in various political parties, observed sitting of parliament could not vote against that ‘at present party stability looks elusive’ him in a vote of no-confidence and had to (2004:15). vote for any constitutional amendment he While tussles were going on about who proposed. was the legitimate leader of these parties, the To the layperson, the prime minister and OLIPPAC did not provide any explanation his government are protected by the or remedy for the confusion. The prime OLIPPAC. However, the actions of those MPs minister also manipulated this confusion by who voted for the prime minister but who splitting the parties for his own political then manoeuvred not to support his convenience. This brought back memories of constitutional amendment indicates that the Skate, who masterfully divided the political OLIPPAC is defective. It is defective in the parties to maintain his own position from sense that it left it wide open for the MPs to 1997–99. Again the OLIPPAC failed to offer decide, as usual, on their own whether to any guidance on whether the prime minister’s support an amendment or abstain. Somare actions were justified. At one stage, Bill reacted by sacking those ministers who Skate’s wife, Rarua Skate, even promised to publicly made their intentions not to support divorce Skate if his People’s National the amendment. The casualty of this was the Congress left the Somare-led coalition. People’s Progress Party (PPP), when its In sacking , the prime leader and the Deputy Prime Minister, minister did not sack the PAP only Maladina Andrew Baing, refused to support the himself. As a result, the PAP members who amendment and was sacked by the prime were ministers in the government sacked minister. He moved over to the opposition, Maladina as their leader and elected Brian despite the fact that some of the members of Pulayasi as the new leader in order to remain his party remained with the government. with the government (Post-Courier, 4 August Nonggorr, in his explanation of the 2004). When Somare sacked Deputy Prime OLIPPAC, stated that MPs must vote Minister Andrew Baing, Baing joined the according to the party resolution or abstain opposition while his fellow PPP members but cannot vote against it. As shown in the stayed with the government and elected a behaviour of the MPs, this is inadequate in new leader, Paul Tienstein. Sepoe expressed instilling a sense of discipline and loyalty. concern about Baing’s actions, noting that There was much confusion when MPs were [w]hen the second vote for the motion coming out in public and stating their on Section 145 (extension of grace

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period from 18 to 36 months) failed, independent MPs formed a group called the the leader of the government business Independent Bloc or the Kimbe Group. They should have exercised his powers to then held discussions with the groups direct Andrew Baing and Peter O’Neil intending to form government and decided NOT to move over to the opposition to join the URP, whose only MP, Sam Akoitai, side of the chamber. These dissenting supported Somare. A faction of the URP led MPs should have been directed to by Tim Neville moved to join the opposition remain in the backbenches…Upon and has since become been a major player in reflection, this is a typical behaviour attempts to move a vote of no-confidence reminiscent of yo-yo politics against the government. Neville now claims persistently displayed by politicians to be the rightful leader of URP, and has even over the years (2004:96). been arrested for allegedly bribing MPs to Only Alan Marat, sacked as Deputy support the vote of no-confidence. Prime Minister and leader of PPP in Despite regulating whether or not November 2003, made the correct decision independent MPs can vote for the prime in compliance with Section 70(1), moving to minister and join political parties, the the government backbenches rather than OLIPPAC has not been able to maintain joining the opposition. control over the independent candidates. The The confusion created by the MPs has actions of Tim Neville and his group are a angered the general public. As reported in clear indication of this. the Post-Courier (9 July 2004), the General The other area that has contributed to Assembly of the Catholic Church of Papua the failure of the OLIPPAC is the lack of strict New Guinea has had enough and is enforcement of its provisions. Responsibility thoroughly disgusted at the confusion for enforcing the OLIPPAC lies with the arising from the current political games in Registrar of Political Parties. Section 16 of Waigani. The Post-Courier, on 7 January 2005, the OLIPPAC provides for the creation of the reported another major split in the PAP and Office of the Registrar, whose main respons- the Peoples National Congress (PNC), with ibility is to ensure that political parties and factions from both parties moving over to the parliamentarians comply with the various government. provisions of the OLIPPAC. The functions OLIPPAC’s promise to strengthen the and duties of the registrar are outlined in party system has not been realised. In fact, Section 23. the opposite has occurred, making the parties Despite the confusion wrought by party worse off in terms of their leadership and splits and other matters relating to the membership in parliament. resolution of political parties, the Registrar The third area is the continued recognition of Political Parties has been silent. Parlia- of independent MPs beside MPs who belong mentarians and the speaker have thus to political parties. The independent MPs developed the impression that what they have been the major source of instability were doing complied with the OLIPPAC. because of their ability to join any group for The registrar’s lack of response has led their own convenience, a practice that many MPs to call for his resignation and continued after the 2002 national election allowed the speaker free rein to issue his own because Section 69 of OLIPPAC allowed them interpretations of the OLIPPAC on who the to join political parties. legal party leaders are and how MPs should Prior to formation of the government after sit in parliament. He continuously used the the 2002 national election, a group of Standing Orders of Parliament to suppress

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the political parties and factions in the The registrar has also not provided any opposition. The speaker’s action led the advice on moves to form a grand coalition opposition to bring no-confidence motions comprising parties in government and the against both the prime minister and the opposition. The OLIPPAC is quiet on this issue, speaker (Post-Courier, 4 November 2004). and advice is needed to clarify the legality of It was not until November 2004 that the this move (The National, 7 January 2005). registrar made some rulings, mostly against The final failing of the OLIPPAC is the the speaker’s decisions, particularly those culture of leaders breaching laws that they where the speaker refused to recognise the themselves have passed to satisfy their own rightful leaders of certain parties. The test interests. This is not unusual in Papua New case for this was the PPP’s leadership tussle Guinea—laws passed by parliament to between Andrew Baing and Paul Tienstein. address certain issues are either deliberately In this case, the registrar affirmed that abused, or the leaders find ways to overrule Tienstein had been expelled from the party, the legitimacy of the law. One such law in and he never appealed against the decision. particular is the Leadership Code, which the The registrar’s decision now requires the OLIPPAC is now trying to address. speaker to enforce the law by allowing MPs All the leaders know the rationale behind who have been wrongly placed in the the law, but they deliberately ignore its government benches to move to the opposition various provisions—as indicated by the benches (Post-Courier, 9 November 2004). But ongoing leadership tussles and party splits. the registrar’s rulings have not resolved the splits in the political parties. The opposition has now apparently fallen apart with the PAP Remedies returning to the government’s side and a faction of the PNC also moving over to the What remedies could be used to address these government (Post-Courier, 7 January 2005). The failures? registrar has made no rulings on two parties’ First, it is not politically viable to amend moves, especially the PNC’s resolution to Section 145 of the Constitution to extend the move to the opposition after being sacked by grace period. The intention of Section 145 is the Prime Minister in early 2004. Pangu highly democratic because it safeguards the party, the oldest political party in Papua New country from irresponsible and autocratic Guinea, has factions both in government and government. It is the OLIPPAC, especially the opposition. Its leadership was contested Sections 63, 70, 71, 72, and 73, that must be and the conflict ended up in the court, which tightened. Parliamentarians who vote for a ruled that was the lawful prime minister cannot vote against that prime leader of the party. This ruling, however, has minister in a vote of no-confidence (Section not resolved the differences among party 70), issues relating to the national budget members. (Section 72) or Constitutional law (Section The Integrity of Political Parties and 73). These provisions have to be strictly Candidates Commission has asserted that enforced to avoid the current situation, in factions within the parties are to be managed which those who voted for the prime minister by determining first the membership of these openly opposed the constitutional amend- parties and, second, the parliamentary leader ment and went further by allying with other for each party. A critical decision relates to groups to topple the government. specifying who is in the opposition (Sepoe It is important therefore to educate the 2004). MPs on these provisions of the OLIPPAC

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soon after they are elected into office. Most of do this will result in their being expelled and the confusion has arisen because many MPs investigated by the Ombudsman Commission had very little knowledge of what is required for misconduct. of them by the OLIPPAC. The sacking of a party leader or party As part of this remedy, Okole also argued members by the Prime Minister does not mean that the OLIPPAC should be reviewed. that that person should immediately join the There is a need to identify the weak opposition. He should either move to the back areas and make sure that this law stays benches, or the party as a group must pass a ahead of the types of insidious practices resolution that they no longer support the that we have just witnessed in recent Prime Minister and intend to join the months [referring to 2004]. To give one opposition. Members of parliament who potential problem, there is now ground breach this rule should be removed to fear that independent candidacy immediately and a by-election conducted. would be greatly abused in the next Related to this remedy is also the need to election. Something needs to be done strengthen parties’ constitutions and party before 2007 to address this constitutional members’ compliance with those constitutions right with a view of protecting it. But (Sepoe 2004). at the same time, the integrity of Third, once a vote of no-confidence Parliament should not be compromised against the government is successful, by free-floating MPs with devious parliament should be dissolved and a fresh tactics. Independents can unnecessarily election conducted. This idea was raised in sink or change a coalition formation by a report on overhauling the electoral system altering numbers on both sides of in the 1990s (Dorney 1990). Parliament (2004:2). Referring to a rampant lack of discipline Okole raised some important points to in the political arena, Dr Walter counter the non-committal nature of proposed, as a starting point for independent MPs and their influence on the reform, a constitutional change to give ‘numbers game’. While independent MPs’ the prime minister power to dissolve rights need to be clearly defined, the parliament at any time and call OLIPPAC should also attempt to address elections. Dr Walter argued that the the likelihood of independent MPs existing system was like a game in influencing the formation and overthrow of which the rules had become so warped governments. that all the players had lost sight of the Second, the need to strengthen political desired end result (Dorney 1990:81). parties through party resolution must be Section 145 of the Constitution would pursued. MPs have to be reminded that they have to be amended to allow this process. Sir can only vote according to the party Michael Somare proposed this idea after the resolution. Failure to abide by this would 2002 election, but no progress has been made result in their being expelled from the party because he received very little support from (Section 62). the Opposition and even from his coalition Parliamentarians who belong to political partners. This solution would force MPs to parties must sign a declaration of loyalty— consider carefully their attempts to move a something that the OLIPPAC does not vote of no-confidence. Papua New Guinea emphasise—stating that they will abide by MPs do not want to stay in office for just 18 the party’s resolution at all times. Failing to months, so they would have to have very

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strong reasons for removing a government it happened now when a law exists that from office. explicitly prohibits such practices? The The fourth solution is to resource the answer is simply that the culture of breaking Registrar of Political Parties adequately, in the law and later seeking redress in the Court order for him to carry out his duties effectively. still persists. Nonggorr noted that the Registrar’s Office has MPs have clearly breached the OLIPPAC not been adequately funded and this has and thus undermined its legitimacy. The affected its ability to respond swiftly to comments by the Governor of East New problems facing the political parties.3 Britain, Mr. Dion, that the OLIPPAC has The registrar has also failed to provide created stability (Post-Courier, 17 January information to the public regarding the 2005) cannot go unchallenged. This paper various provisions of the OLIPPAC. Judging has shown that the OLIPPAC is in trouble by letters to the two daily newspapers, many and that there is a real need to review and people are asking why the practices of the strengthen it. But there are some areas where past persist. The registrar needs to respond this paper agrees with him. MPs should to such queries in order to educate the people educate themselves about the basic about the OLIPPAC and explain whether requirements and procedures of the OLIPPAC. parliamentarians’ actions are within its The OLIPPAC needs to be reviewed and provisions. This would greatly promote the enforced strictly, and the OLIPPAC was third goal of the Registry of Political Parties designed to bring about positive develop- …to promote general involvement of ments. Dion’s comment that ‘laws are created and educate the people of Papua New and enacted for good intention, however, Guinea to cherish, enhance and people with ulterior motives were the ones sustain the values and principles of using them for their personal and self interest’ (Post-Courier, 17 January 2005). democratic constitutional system of Dion argues that, ultimately, the rule of government (Sepoe 2004:np). law must be maintained at all times. It is the The fifth solution is to ensure that responsibility of the leaders to do this. political parties, and independent candidates, contesting an election put forward platforms or manifestoes. If any Conclusion parties or candidates submit the same platform, that platform would be rejected This paper has discussed the major features and a new one requested. of the OLIPPAC and its current failures. The final remedy is to do more to Despite the claim that the current government maintain the rule of law and respect the of Sir Michael Somare has lasted much longer legitimacy of laws such as the OLIPPAC. in office (more than two years) than the Parliament passed the OLIPPAC with clear previous governments, this cannot be objectives. It is the responsibility of the MPs, attributed to the OLIPPAC. The main reason therefore, to make sure that they comply with is that political instability has taken a new it. This has not happened—MPs have twist through long adjournments of parlia- behaved, both inside and outside parliament, ment, lack of enforcement of the OLIPPAC by as if the OLIPPAC does not exist. Opposition the registrar and the government, and the MPs camped in Alotau and missed an entire speaker’s unilateral interpretations of the parliamentary sitting in July–August 2003. OLIPPAC. The year 2004 was one of chaos This has never happened before, so why has in parliament as MPs and political parties

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tried to find ways to circumvent the OLIPPAC References in order to topple the government. Parliament passed the OLIPPAC to Amarshi, A., Good, K. and Mortimer, R. achieve certain objectives, but the legislation (eds), 1979. Development and Dependency: has been hijacked by the existing political the political economy of Papua New culture, in which MPs’ interests come before Guinea, Oxford University Press, those of the people. The result is a lack of Melbourne. prudent leadership and ongoing suffering Dorney, S., 1990. Papua New Guinea: people, among the people. politics and history since 1975, Random The solutions identified here would go a House, Sydney. long way towards achieving the envisaged objectives of the OLIPPAC—maintaining Griffin, J., Nelson, H. and Firth, S., 1979. political stability and strengthening the party Papua New Guinea: a political history, system. The assertion that the OLIPPAC has Heinemann Educational , fostered stability is far from the truth, but its Richmond. objectives are noble and could go a long way Hegarty, D., 1979. ‘The political parties’, in in transforming the political environment in A. Amarshi, K. Good, and R. Mortimer the country. The responsibility for its success, (eds), Development and Dependency: the however, lies with the MPs and the Registrar political economy of Papua New Guinea, of Political Parties. Oxford University Press, Melbourne:187–204. Notes ——, 1998. ‘January–June’, in C. Moore and M. Kooyman (eds), A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle: 1967–1991, 1 Motions of No-Confidence (Amendment of Crawford House Publishing, Section 145). Section 145(4) of the Constitution is amended by repealing the words ‘six Bathurst:316–20. months’ and replacing them with the words May, R., 1982. Micronationalist Movements in ‘eighteen months’. Papua New Guinea, Political and Social 2 Peter O’Neil became the leader of the People’s Change Monograph 1, Department of National Congress and is currently the Political and Social Change, Research opposition leader. Moses Maladina was School of Pacific Studies, The appointed leader of the People’s Action Party and was once the deputy prime minister. Tim Australian National University, Neville, an independent, currently claims to Canberra. be the leader of the United Resources Party. —— and Anere, R., 2002a. Maintaining 3 A number of positions within the Registrar’s Democracy: the 1997 elections in Papua Office were recently advertised. If these are New Guinea, Department of Political filled, it will greatly enhance the capacity of Science, School of Humanities and the registrar to deal with problems facing Social Sciences, University of Papua the parties (The National, 19 January 2005). New Guinea, and State, Society and Governance In Melanesia Project, The Australian National University, Canberra.

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——, 2002b. ‘Election 1997: an overview’, Standish, B., 2004. Papua New Guinea’s in R. May and R. Anere (eds), Democracy, paper presented at the Maintaining Democracy: the 1997 elections Conference on Political Culture, in Papua New Guinea, Department of Representation and Electoral Systems Political Science, School of Humanities in the Pacific, University of the South and Social Sciences, University of Pacific, Port Vila, 10–12 July. Papua New Guinea and State, Society Sepoe, O., 2004. Challenges of and Governance in Melanesia Project, Strengthening the Political Party System The Australian National University, in Papua New Guinea, paper presented Canberra:1–16. at the Conference on Political Culture, Moore, C. and Kooyman, M. (eds), 1998. A Representation and Electoral Systems Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle: in the Pacific, University of the South 1967–1991, Crawford House Pacific, Port Vila, 10–12 July. Publishing, Bathurst. Woolford, D., 1976. Papua New Guinea: Okole, H., 2004a. ‘Dealing with coalition initiation and independence, University of instability’, The National, 18 August. Press, Brisbane. ——, 2004b. ‘Causes of parliamentary instability’, The National, 4 August. ——, Sause, L. and Gelu, A., 2004. The Yangoru By-Election Report, Study sponsored by the Electoral Commission and AusAID, Canberra. Reilly, B., 2002a. ‘Political engineering and party politics in Papua New Guinea’, Party Politics, 8(6):701–18. ——, 2002b. ‘Continuity and change in Papua New Guinea elections’, in R. May and R. Anere (eds), Maintaing Democracy: the 1997 elections in Papua New Guinea, Department of Political Science, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Papua New Guinea and State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The Australian National University, Canberra:17–38. Saffy, Y., (ed), 1996. The 1992 Papua New Guinea Elections: change and continuity in electoral politics, Department of Political and Social Change, The Australian National University, Canberra.

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