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REVIEW REPORT on MONITORING the INTERNAL DIALOGUE on KOSOVO July 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019

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REVIEW REPORT on MONITORING the INTERNAL DIALOGUE on KOSOVO July 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019 FONDACIJA ZA OTVORENO DRUŠTVO, SRBIJA OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION, SERBIA REVIEW REPORT ON MONITORING THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE ON KOSOVO July 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019 Belgrade, January 17, 2019 Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo1 July 24, 2017. - January 17, 2019. 1 In this report the term “Kosovo” is used both as a general and technical term, primarily because its use is common in today’s domestic and international literature and the public. But the use of this, as well as other appropriate terms, that is, for this part of Serbia, is one of the most illustrative examples of a general “ethnification” of public and political life and language. Both Serbs and Albanians have their own separate and often mutually exclusive narrative dominated by special “key words”, especially as regards the names of cities, villages, streets, etc. The name “Kosovo and Metohija” has been in use for a very long time in terms of constitution and linguistics. “Kosovo and Metohija” is a designation used in the first constitution after the Second World War. However, the second part – “Metohija” was later dropped, and reintroduced into the constitutional terminology in 1990 by the constitutions of Serbia and the FRY. The designation “Kosovo and Metohija” is now considered a synonym for the “Serbian viewpoint”. The name “Kosovo” is of Turkish-Albanian origin and marks the district of Kosovo which, before the Balkan wars of 1912, included the territories of Sandžak, Gornje Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, northern Macedonia to Veles and eastern Macedonia to Bregalnica. The name was associated with the idea of Greater Albania. Today, Albanians do not say “Kosovo” but “Kosova”. “Kosova” is synonymous with the Albanian standpoint regarding the status of Kosovo; it is synonymous for Albanian domination over this territory and the people who live there. Contents SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 NOTE .......................................................................................................................................................................... 7 CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................................................... 9 PART I: (NON) ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PROCLAIMED GOALS OF THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE ........17 PART II: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS ....................................................23 1. DELIMITATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS ........................................................................25 2. THE STATUS QUO POLICY AND „FROZEN CONFLICT“ .....................................................................43 3. NORMALIZATION OF SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS – A PATH TOWARD POSSIBLE SOLUTION ............................................................................................47 4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNBLOCK THE DIALOGUE .......................................................................51 5. APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................................................57 5.1. Appendix I: Forum for Ethnic Relation Reports on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo ....................................................................................................................57 5.2. Appendix II: A Chronology of the History of the Serb-Albanian Conflicts and Cooperation ........................................................................................................................................................58 5.3. Appendix III: A Chronology of the Internal Dialogue .........................................................................59 SUMMARY The Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo is the seventh in a series of reports prepared by a team of experts from the Forum for Ethnic Relations in the period between July 24, 2017 and January 17, 2019, within the framework of the project “Monitoring and Reporting on the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, supported by the Open Society Foundation. It is not possible to make a comprehensive assessment of the scope of the internal dialogue and to assess whether the internal dialogue has been used effectively, primarily by its initiator, Serbian President, because President Vučić has not yet acted on the announcement he had made to create a political platform and action plan on dialogue with Kosovo, and the Brussels dialogue has stalled. The internal dialogue responded to the set goals only partially, and it especially failed to meet one of its key objectives: reaching a broad social consensus on the issue of Kosovo. In the institutionalized dialogue, which was governed by the Serbian authorities, the issue of normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and its connection with Serbia’s EU integration was suppressed and neglected. The public of Serbia was placed before a false image that status quo and delimitation are preferred options. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was neglected in the internal dialogue, even though the findings of public opinion polls showed that this option was more preferred than ethnic delimitation. All this, with intensified propaganda and political activities of Serbian authorities had some side results of the internal dialogue, such as: strengthening ethnic nationalism in Serbia’s public, aggravating ideological and political divisions, and bringing security issues to the forefront. The biggest challenge for Serbia and attempts by its authorities to impose the policy of ethnic delimitation and swap of territories, due to failure to reach a social consensus. It is important that the internal dialogue and Brussels dialogue have raised the issue of status of Kosovo and Serb community in Kosovo and the issue of borders, which lie at the core of the crisis – in the circumstances where the effective control over the territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs is de facto and partly de jure shifted in favor of Kosovo’s government. The analysis also indicates complete absence of democratic framework in Serbia to address the issue of Kosovo. One argument in favor to this conclusion is that this policy was not formulated or carried out through legal institutions, nor was the public informed or invited in this serious venture. This finding is forewarning because the historical experience teaches that when there is no democratic framework, rule of law, functional institutions and influential public, the management of inter-ethnic relations can easily slip into the domain of ideological, political and armed conflicts. This brings the entire purpose of the initiative and of the internal dialogue into question. There are many reasons for that: firstly, the initiator of the dialogue, as well as the Working Group or the Government, did not create the conditions for successful development of this dialogue, and they especially they did not support the freedom of dialogue and debates based on arguments; the atmosphere of propagandistic and ill-intentioned political confrontations was prevailing in the media as well as the public; the existing political conflicts over other issues such as the exercise of 5 6 Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo power and the deep division and disagreements over the past, present and future of Serbia have been transferred on the issue of Kosovo. All this, and the crisis of dialogue indicate that Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo is at a crossroads. NOTE Between July 24, 2017 and January 17, 2019, the Forum for Ethnic Relations (hereinafter: Forum) published a series of six and this - seventh Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue (Attachment: Reports by the Forum for Ethnic Relations on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue) as the result of the project “Monitoring and Reporting on the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, supported by the Open Society Foundation. Members of the expert team of the Forum for the preparation of the Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo (hereinafter: Review Report) are: Dr Dušan Janjić, Head of Expert Team and experts: Izabela Kisić, Milivoje Mihajlović, Fayez Risheg, Dr Siniša Vuković and Verka Jovanović, young researcher. The Review Report includes the results of the analysis of the internal dialogue and Brussels dialogue on Kosovo. The internal dialogue consisted of two sets of activities: the institutionalized dialogue consisting of twenty-nine (29) round tables, public debates organized by the Working Group for Support to the Managing of the Internal Dialogue set up by the Serbian Government (hereinafter: Working Group) (Attachment: Chronology of the internal dialogue), and numerous activities of opposition political parties, civil society organizations etc. From the very beginning, this part of the internal dialogue was more vibrant (it included a large number of actors, the most diverse initiatives were launched and many proposals were put forward). The monitoring included collection, classification and analysis of data on the internal dialogue collected in various ways from reports and contributions in electronic and other media about events organized by the Government of the Republic of Serbia on behalf of the initiator of the dialogue (Serbian president), i.e. the Working Group; from events organized by civil society organizations, professional
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