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Marine Corps Intelligence Activity UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015 Information Cutoff Date: 1 July 2005 This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document Prepared by: Global Threats Branch Production and Analysis Company Marine Corps Intelligence Activity This publication supersedes the Midrange Threat Estimate: 2001-2010 (Unclassified), MCIA-1586-001-01, August 2001. COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the images in this publication is not authorized. MCIA-1586-001-05 (Reverse Blank) UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate 2005-2015 EXECUTIVE The degree to which the United States can maintain its security in the 21st century will be SUMMARY determined by how well the United States responds to a transitioning world. Marine Corps forces will be challenged by emerging technical, military, and geopolitical threats; by the growing resourcefulness and the ingenuity of non-state actors and terrorist networks; and by natural disasters. Globalization has both positive and negative effects on world dynamics. I States unable to keep pace with globalization will continue to grant increased powers to non-state actors (non-government organizations, private security/military organizations, criminals, gangs and terrorists). I Failing states heavily populated with a costly aging population and a highly unemployed youth provide breeding grounds for terrorist groups. I Demands of the modern and globalized state will continue to place increasing pressure on dwindling natural resources, including oil, water, and minerals. Unusual alliances will form to secure scarce resources. I Globalization has eroded national identity and unity through the expansion of media and communication systems, technology, and popular culture, resulting in a surge of global religious movements. I Globalization impacts characterization of modern warfare. Conventional war, while still a threat (Iran, North Korea, China) has taken a back seat to asymmetric and irregular types of warfare. Suicide bombings, child solders and acts of terrorism defy the rules of warfare. The ease of global transportation makes it easy for jihadists worldwide to infil- trate Iraq, while global communications have provided radicals with an ability to fund, network, and organize. Major natural and man-made disasters will continue to increase in frequency and severity throughout the world and will produce permanent changes to societies, ecosystems and environments, along with material damage, loss of life, distress and displacement. As a result, more complex humanitarian relief emergencies can be expected. Infectious diseases will likely remain the world’s leading cause of death. This is due, in part, to increased population density, poor sanitation, and increasing global transportation. The explosion of information and communications technology propels the evolution of political and social values, actions, and forms of organization. Global media and the internet provide adversaries the ability to shape global opinion and create an information operations force multiplier that the United States has yet to successfully counter. iii UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Threats in the 21st century will be unconventional, unforeseen, and unpredictable (U3) from adversaries using asymmetric approaches and irregular tactics. Potential adversaries, states and non-state actors, will be adaptive, creative and become increasingly sophisticated using lessons learned from encounters with American weapons and tactics and apply those les- sons learned with increasing complexity, adaptability, and skill by using non-linear, irregu- lar activities. Warfare in the 21st century has transitioned from conventional to asymmetric. Potential adversaries of the United States recognize their relative impotence in conventional, force- on-force operations; they instead seek to draw the United States into arenas where its con- ventional capabilities and technological edge are blunted. Asymmetric threats and irregular warfare are among the primary threats to U.S. Marine forces. Future warfare will be increasingly shaped by the following: I Strategically, war will not be defined by direct military-on-military attack; instead, vio- lence will focus asymmetrically on undermining deployed troops and U.S. policies. I Tactically, warfare will include attempts to disrupt order and distract U.S. forces and undermine popular support and legitimacy for U.S. intervention. The enemy’s goal is not to test the “three-block” Marine but to require a marine on every block. I Organizationally, warfare will move from the hierarchy of military command to a more cell-based, leaderless group structure that maximizes convenience and tactical adapta- tion, emphasizes and minimizes network vulnerability. I Ideologically, warfare will be driven by new identities outside basic nationalism. State, cultural, religious, and individual perspectives will combine to create evolving groups and objectives. Twenty-first century threats will be enhanced by adversaries’ cultural and geographic famil- iarity with their environments. Future adversaries to the Unites States will be driven by ide- ologies that do not restrict the nature of conflict and will be unfettered by borders, boundaries, or rules. They will assimilate with the local populations using the urban envi- ronment for cover and concealment. They will also pursue understanding of U.S. military tactics, techniques, and procedures to accumulate a modern, effective arsenal. Information operations (IO), terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are the dominant strategic and tactical asymmetrical threats of concern domestically and overseas. I Extremist organizations (including terrorists), intelligence services and criminal groups along with nation states are likely to continue pursuing IO capabilities, including attack and exploitation capabilities, and propaganda and media manipulation. I Terrorism is the most likely asymmetric threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Ter- rorist groups will continue to be decentralized, self-reliant, innovative, and networked. I Ten countries are believed to have nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups and other rogue ele- ments will seek to obtain and/or develop WMD, including chemical and biological agents. Potential adversaries will have increasing access to both low technology and high technol- ogy weapons, which used to be exclusive to nation-states. Future threats and strategies will employ a variety of technologies in both conventional and asymmetrical ways. U.S. supremacy in conventional warfare will remain unchallenged until possibly 2020. Of the iv UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY five principal operational dimensions that must be considered, the following technical threats are identified. I Maritime ❏ Availability of far-reaching reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) information will make it increasingly difficult for Marines to transit the seas undetected and untargeted. ❏ Shallow and restricted waters and adjacent areas provide an arena for mobile and static coastal defense guns, rockets, missiles, and mines. Most will have improved lethality because of advances in sensor, propulsion, stealth, digital computer, explo- sives, or fusing technologies. I Firepower ❏ Artillery will be more self-contained and mobile with much-improved complementary RSTA capabilities. ❏ Land-based artillery, missiles, and rockets will continue to outrange naval guns, and will be capable of delivering conventional high explosives, dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, weapons of mass destruction, mines, and/or precision-guided munitions (PGMs). ❏ PGMs will be deployed widely using an array of guidance systems that will allow increased engagement ranges and accuracy. ❏ Advances in laser and power technologies will transform today's sensor-blinder into a hard-kill weapon. I Maneuver ❏ A wide variety of ground weapons ranging from small arms to exotic or high-end sys- tems, namely non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or laser devices, highlighted with interjections of innovative or improvised systems, such as volumetric weapons or improvised explosive devices. ❏ Natural and man-made obstacles, urban infrastructure, harsh climates, and increased combat capabilities of conventional forces may complicate the execution of expedi- tionary operations. I Air ❏ Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and modern integrated air defense net- works will proliferate. SAM guidance systems will be increasingly difficult to jam or evade, and will use nontraditional portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. ❏ Many systems will be capable of simultaneously employing radar, optical, and thermal target detection and tracking sensors that will be difficult to detect and counter. Advanced or improved aircraft, many with low radar signatures, will also proliferate. ❏ Unconventional uses of older types of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) by irregular forces remain a key concern. Lasers capable of shooting down aircraft have already been fielded by some nations. I Information superiority ❏ Stealth technology and camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques will be maximized to hide potential targets and/or protect tactical movements. v UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ❏ Key military facilities and
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