Kosovo by Ilir Deda

Capital: Population: 1.8 million GNI/capita: n/a

Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2010.

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

Yugoslavia 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Electoral Process 4.75 3.75 3.75 5.25 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25 Civil Society 4.00 3.00 2.75 4.25 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 Independent Media 4.50 3.50 3.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 Governance* 5.25 4.25 4.25 6.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.50 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.25 5.00 Judicial Framework and Independence 5.50 4.25 4.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.25 5.25 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 Democracy Score 5.04 4.00 3.88 5.50 5.32 5.36 5.36 5.21 5.11 5.07

* Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.

NOTES: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 274 Nations in Transit 2010 Executive Summary

osovo continued to maintain internal stability and pursue international recognition in 2009. The number of countries recognizing its independence K rose to 64 during the year, with the pace slowing due to proceedings on the issue at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which began on December 1. Thirty states, including Kosovo, participated in the hearings at the court. The ICJ is expected to issue its advisory opinion in the first half of 2010. Meanwhile, in June 2009, Kosovo became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The country’s greatest achievement in 2009 was the implementation of decentralization, which was legitimized by sizeable Kosovo Serb participation in local elections in November and December, despite the strong objections of Belgrade. The elections—the first to be organized by Kosovo institutions—were mostly successful, although some violations were reported. While the effective recognition of newly created municipalities by Serb voters diminished the prospects for the partition of Kosovo, the northern part of the country remained beyond the control of Kosovo authorities. The process of building and strengthening Kosovo’s state institutions continued, but without considerable success. There has not been an improvement in the rule of law, though the Constitutional Court became functional in mid-2009, and the new Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) reached full capacity in the areas of police services, customs, and the judiciary. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which was responsible for overall security, began winding down, as did the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Negative trends were noted with respect to restrictions on freedom of speech and rising corruption; the government tightened its grip on the public broadcaster and independent media, the appointment of senior public servants became increasingly subject to political interference, and the state’s role in the economy grew dramatically. The international presence in Kosovo has not used its leverage over the domestic authorities to reverse the negative trends in governance. Instead, it has focused on implementation of the main provisions of the Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) and started plans for its further reconfiguration.

National Democratic Governance. Negative governance trends were noted for most of 2009, especially regarding restrictions on freedom of speech and the government’s dominant role in the economy. The consolidation of state institutions deepened divisions along the Ibar River, with the Serb-dominated territory to the north continuing to reject any direct cooperation with the authorities in Pristina. Kosovo 275

Meanwhile, Serbs in the rest of the country worked with the central government and began slowly integrating with the rest of the state. The international missions proceeded with their reconfiguration, with EULEX reaching full operational capacity in April, UNMIK and KFOR downsizing significantly, and the International Civilian Office focusing on implementation of the CSP. Due to the government’s worsening practices in 2009, Kosovo’s national democratic governance rating worsens from 5.25 to 5.50.

Electoral Process. The municipal elections held in November and December were the first elections to be managed by Kosovo’s Central Election Commission. Political parties representing Kosovo’s various ethnic groups were certified to participate. Some 45 percent of the 1.5 million eligible voters took part in the first round, and apart from those in northern Kosovo, Serb residents turned out in unexpectedly large numbers. Overall, Serb participation was about 10 times higher than in 2007. Over 22,000 local and international observers were registered to monitor the voting, which they deemed mostly free and fair. Political parties challenged some of the initial results, marking the first use of institutions such as the Supreme Court of Kosovo and the Constitutional Court for that purpose. Independent electoral institutions, such as the Election Complaints and Appeals Commission, took steps to ensure the integrity of the elections by annulling the runoff results in three municipalities amid evidence of , and rescheduling them for early 2010. In light of these positive developments, Kosovo’s electoral process rating improves from 4.50 to 4.25.

Civil Society. The civil society sector continued to develop in 2009 amid an ongoing proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These groups often struggled to develop their own agendas, secure stable funding, and fulfill their strategic visions. Moreover, they remained dependent on foreign donors, many of whom have their own priorities and are unwilling to consider and support local initiatives. However, despite these weaknesses, Kosovo’s NGOs have increased their activities beyond the capital and are much more vigorous in their monitoring and criticism of the government. As a result, Kosovo’s civil society rating improves from 4.00 to 3.75.

Independent Media. The sharp restrictions on freedom of press and freedom of expression in 2009, including government pressure on both public and private media, was met with open criticism by various international organizations. The International Steering Group, the European Commission, Reporters Without Borders, and the European Broadcasting Union all noted the problems and called for an improvement in this area. Among other flawed practices, the government continued to use state advertising allocations to favor outlets close to the ruling party. Because of these ongoing abuses, Kosovo’s independent media rating remains at 5.50. 276 Nations in Transit 2010

Local Democratic Governance. Kosovo’s local democratic governance improved in 2009. The number of municipalities increased to 36 after the local elections, with 2 more to be established in the spring of 2010. Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo have continued to function separately, but Serb residents in the south appeared to place some trust in the new Serb-majority municipalities created by Pristina. The Ministry of Local Government Administration found that the majority of municipalities complied with the Law on Local Self-Government. However, the development capacities of the municipalities remained weak. By June 2009, local governments had spent only 28 percent of funds earmarked for capital investment. Due to the overall improvement in municipal administration and representation, Kosovo’s local democratic governance rating improves from 5.25 to 5.00.

Judicial Framework and Independence. The justice system, Kosovo’s weakest institutional pillar, remains inefficient and vulnerable to political interference. There is a considerable backlog of cases, and coordination between the judiciary, prosecutors, and the police is inadequate. The rule of law suffers from the prosecutorial service’s structural problems and lack of independence. Both judges and prosecutors are subject to pressure and intimidation. EULEX’s presence has not yet resulted in improvements in these areas. Given this lack of progress, Kosovo’s judicial framework and independence rating remains at 5.75.

Corruption. The apparent level of corruption in Kosovo rose in 2009, partly due to better monitoring mechanisms. The implementation of a public procurement law that was not in line with EU standards raised serious concerns, as did rapid increases in single-source tendering and the overall value of public procurement contracts. The Office of the Auditor General found gross mismanagement of the Kosovo budget, and complained that there was no political will to address these shortcomings. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Anticorruption Agency (AKK) signed memorandums of understanding to improve cooperation with the Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial Commission and other local and international agencies. The number of corruption cases reported to the AKK rose significantly in 2009. Given the new indications of corruption and the absence of significant progress in combating it, Kosovo’s corruption rating remains at 5.75.

Outlook for 2010. Kosovo will face challenges in both international and domestic areas in 2010. Internationally, the advisory opinion of the ICJ may directly affect further recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the legitimacy of the state. Internally, concrete steps must be taken to fight corruption, ensure transparent privatization of profitable public companies, and end government pressure on public and private media. Furthermore, Kosovo’s governing coalition may collapse, which could in turn lead to national elections in the autumn. Kosovo 277 Main Report

National Democratic Governance 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia n/a 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.50

State-building efforts were the main focus of both Kosovo institutions and the international missions in 2009. Although the new European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) began operating at full capacity during the year, older international bodies, including the Kosovo Force and the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), significantly reduced their activities as Kosovo authorities shouldered most government responsibilities. Serb minority communities south of the Ibar River slowly improved their integration with state institutions, while the Serb-dominated areas north of the river remained a separate entity with no direct ties to Pristina. The decision-making process is centralized in the prime minister’s office, which hampers the role of the ministries. Furthermore, the Law on Government was not adopted by the Assembly during the year, meaning the government continued to function on the basis of the inherited UNMIK format. Similarly, the majority of recommendations produced by a functional review of the ministries—aimed at streamlining the system and improving the administrative capacities of the government—have not been implemented. Other reform laws that have yet to be adopted would address the civil service, public-sector salaries, and the organization of public institutions. As noted in the European Union (EU) progress report released in October 2009, these laws would provide a crucial foundation for the independence of the civil service. Under the current system, there is no clear distinction between civil servants and political appointees. Although the EU has pressed the government to establish a professional, accountable, accessible, and representative public administration, political inter- ference in the appointments of senior officials continued in 2009. This includes the top civil-service posts within ministries, the Ombudsperson Institution, the , the Constitutional Court, and the boards and staff at publicly owned enterprises such as Post-Telecom of Kosovo (PTK) and the International Airport of Pristina. For example, in violation of the previous hiring freeze at the company and without any public vacancy notice, 800 new employees were placed at PTK during 2009. Most of the new employees are loyal to Prime Minister ’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). A small portion are members of President ’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). These nontransparent hiring and appointment practices represent a growing culture of clientelism that has led to the creation of dysfunctional institutions staffed by unskilled and unprofessional public servants. The most drastic case of government 278 Nations in Transit 2010

interference was the selection of officials to serve in key Kosovo Police directorates dedicated to fighting crime, human trafficking, and the , raising doubts about the leadership’s commitment to combating organized crime and corruption. Shortly after the first round of local elections on November 15, the PDK announced that it was planning to reorganize its governing coalition by replacing the LDK with the (AKR) and the Democratic League of Dardania (LDD). AKR leader would become the new under the plan, and LDD leader would be the new Assembly speaker. The move was announced on the evening of November 19 via the public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Kosovo (RTK). The LDK deputy prime minister confirmed the information publicly, while senior PDK official Hajredin Kuçi stated that the LDK had violated the coalition agreement and the PDK was aiming to “reformat” the government. In the midst of this upheaval, both the AKR and the LDD announced that they had not been informed about the plan and rejected the PDK’s proposed reconfiguration. The LDD said it would not support the PDK, while the AKR called for the creation of a “technocratic government.” U.S. Ambassador Chris Dell and the head of the International Civilians Office (ICO), Pieter Feith, said that as long as the constitution was respected, they would not interfere in this process. However, the constitution presented an obstacle to the proposed replacement of the president, allowing the move only if the incumbent is terminally ill, under investigation for a serious crime, or determined by the Constitutional Court to have violated the charter. On November 20, both the PDK and the LDK issued statements to confirm that their coalition would continue to rule, and the PDK ultimately backtracked and claimed that all misunderstandings within the coalition had been resolved. Behind the disorderly affair was the PDK’s dissatisfaction with the LDK’s cooperation with former prime minister ’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) for the second round of municipal elections. Prime Minister Thaçi apparently hoped that by threatening to oust the smaller party from the government, he could force it to withdraw from its local pacts with the AAK. Instead he faced a reenergized LDK whose popular support had increased in the municipal elections. Although the two partners preserved their coalition after replacing individual ministers, the incident raised the possibility of early parliamentary elections in 2010. Throughout the year, civil society groups accused the Assembly of failing to fulfill its oversight role and allowing itself to be controlled by the government. Moreover, the embassies of the and Western European countries intervened to prevent the chamber from discussing controversial incidents in northern Mitrovica; the broader situation in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo; and a protocol between EULEX and on police cooperation. The debate was quashed due to fears that it could raise tensions in the country, but the move added to the Assembly’s poor reputation as a body where issues of public concern are not discussed and political accountability is lacking. Kosovo 279

To help increase its oversight capacities, the Assembly established committees responsible for intelligence matters, the , and monitoring of public finances. The last of the three was formed with the help of civil society, and both it and the intelligence panel are led by opposition parties. In general, the Assembly’s cooperation with civil society has increased, but dialogue between the two remains insufficient. The Assembly’s annual work plan has been in line with the government’s legislative strategy. As of late November, the Assembly had adopted 27 laws, with another 33 on their way to adoption. According to the EU progress report, the Assembly has successfully streamlined its working procedures, carried out its budget approval responsibilities, intervened to safeguard the funding allocated to institutions, and reviewed reports on expenditures. However, the chamber continued to suffer from weaknesses in its capacity to scrutinize legislation, monitor its implementation, oversee government activities, and operate administratively robust committees.

Electoral Process 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia 5.25 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25

The 2009 local elections, which entailed voting in 36 municipalities, were deemed free, fair, and in line with international standards by both domestic and international observers. The polls were the first to be organized by Kosovo’s Central Election Commission (CEC), although the commission was dependent on international assistance for the preparations. The two main organizations aiding the CEC were the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo, which provided technical advice, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which provided assistance with vote tabulation, a voter- information campaign, and the creation of mobile voting stations in the three, northern, Serb-majority municipalities. The main observer networks involved in the process were the Kosovo Civil Society Network, Democracy in Action, the European Network of Election Monitoring Organization (ENEMO), and the EU Election Expert Mission (EU EEM). Of the 74 political organizations certified to participate in the elections, 34 were Kosovo Albanian; 22 Kosovo Serb; 7 Bosniak; 4 Turkish; 4 Romany, Ashkali, and Egyptian; 2 Montenegrin; and 1 Gorani. The 45 percent voter turnout in the first round was 5 percent higher than in 2007. The voter list contained several hundred thousand living abroad, and over 100,000 Kosovo Serb refugees in Serbia. Apart from northern Kosovo, the Serb community participated in unexpectedly large numbers; roughly 10,000 out of approximately 80,000 Serb voters turned out, about 10 times the participation rate from 2007. Among Serb- majority municipalities, the turnout was 24 percent in Gračanica; 14 percent in 280 Nations in Transit 2010

Ranilug; 25 percent in Kllokot; 31 percent in Štrpce; and 26 percent in Novo Brdo. The Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS) won the mayoralties of Gračanica and Kllokot outright, and its candidate was elected in the December 13 runoff in Štrpce, with half of the Serb voters in the municipality participating. An independent won the mayor’s race in Ranilug. In Novo Brdo, the LDK won the mayoral post, as the Serb majority did not participate in large numbers due to pressure and intimidation by the parallel institutions loyal to Belgrade. The PDK won in 14 municipalities, and the AAK and LDK each won in 7. In terms of the national vote, the PDK won 32 percent (down from 34 percent in 2007), the LDK 25 percent (23 percent in 2007), the AAK 15 percent (10 percent in 2007), the AKR 9 percent (13 percent in 2007), and the LDD 6 percent (10 percent in 2007). The PDK, LDK, and AAK all increased their absolute number of votes, while the AKR and LDD lost supporters. Mayoral races in 21 municipalities were decided in the runoff elections on December 13. The runoff results in three municipalities—Prizren, Lipjan, and Gjilan—were annulled by the Election Complaints and Appeals Commission (ECAC). The CEC consequently scheduled repeat runoff votes in Prizren and Lipjan for January 31, 2010, but decided to recount the votes for Gjilan in early 2010 rather than holding a repeat vote as recommended by the ECAC. That raised suspicions of political pressure on the CEC. Nevertheless, the process marked the first time in Kosovo’s post-1999 history that independent institutions, namely the ECAC, had taken such remedial measures to ensure free and fair elections. Moreover, political parties addressed their concerns through the courts, which had not been done in the past. These mechanisms served to bolster public confidence in both the electoral process and the institutions responsible for its management. The votes in 23 out of 2,256 individual polling stations nationwide were annulled. The CEC did not organize repeat elections in those polling stations, and prosecutors did not take any measures against the local electoral officials who signed the forms verifying the problematic results. There were around 50,000 spoiled ballots out of approximately 710,000 cast, the highest number of spoiled ballots since the first elections were held in 2000. ENEMO gave positive assessments of voting in 93 percent of the polling stations it visited in the first round, and 96 percent of those it visited in the runoff. However, among other procedural problems, it noted lax safeguards against multiple or proxy voting in a small minority of stations; cases of group or family voting were observed in over a third of visited stations in the first round and over a quarter of visited stations in the runoff. ENEMO generally praised the vote counting and tabulation process, and noted that many of the problems observed in the first round were avoided in the runoff. All but one of the visited polling stations was assessed positively in the runoff. The organization noted that while 3 percent of the first- round mayoral ballots in the visited stations were deemed invalid, the figure for municipal assembly ballots was 11 percent, possibly due to voter confusion over a new voting technique.1 Kosovo 281

Civil Society 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia 4.25 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75

While Kosovo’s nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector remains structurally weak and dependent on foreign donors, it continued to develop in 2009, with individual organizations establishing clear identities and stepping up their activities outside the capital. In the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica, the local Kosovo Albanian and Serb NGOs created a joint anticrime network, pledging to carry out both separate and joint activities focused on the rule of law. Mitrovica NGOs, especially Community Building Mitrovica (CBM), were also instrumental in interethnic mediation to decrease tensions between the communities during the spring. Local NGOs increased their monitoring of the municipal assemblies in Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Peja, Ferizaj, and other cities, and assessed the transparency of local government decisions. There were several occasions on which NGOs united around common causes. In early 2009, a joint advocacy campaign was organized to push for the revision of the draft Law on Freedom of Association and Nongovernmental Organizations, aspects of which were seen as restrictive. After successful , the contested articles were removed from the draft, which was adopted in February. The final legislation was deemed to be in accordance with the constitution and best international practices. In May and June, civil society organizations, individuals, and activists voiced concerns about threats to freedom of speech, including a series of direct threats issued against the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and its director, Jeta Xharra. NGOs also objected to government interference in the selection of board members for the public broadcaster RTK. In September, civil society organizations led by the radical, pro-independence group Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) staged a protest against the signature of a protocol between EULEX and Serbia, gathering a few hundred demonstrators. The relatively small turnout represented a significant blow to Vetevendosje’s claims to be the only civil society organization capable of amassing a large number of protesters. It came on the heels of an August incident in which a few dozen of the group’s activists vandalized EULEX vehicles in downtown Pristina; 21 of the activists were detained and sentenced to 30 days in jail. Democracy in Action, a coalition of 11 Kosovo NGOs dedicated to voter education and promoting participation in the electoral process, monitored the municipal elections in November and December. However, the group was criticized for failing to monitor all polling stations and for collecting incomplete information which reduced its ability to prevent . Meanwhile, Vetevendosje campaigned against participation in the elections and the creation of new Serb- majority municipalities. 282 Nations in Transit 2010

Civil society groups have continued to monitor central government institutions, focusing mostly on the Assembly. While there has been a positive trend of cooperation between the Assembly and civil society, local NGOs often lack the capacity to help write legislation and scrutinize draft laws.

Independent Media 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50

Media freedom suffered in 2009 due to government pressure on both public and private outlets, and various international organizations openly criticized the trend. The International Steering Group on Kosovo, a bloc of countries that have recognized Kosovo’s independence and provide guidance to the ICO, stated in June 2009 that “freedom of expression and independent media acting within the law are indispensable elements in a democracy” and urged the government and other actors “to do their utmost to promote and strengthen freedom of expression in Kosovo.”2 The annual European Commission progress report on Kosovo stated that “the independence and impartiality of the publicly-owned Radio and Television of Kosovo (RTK) are not fully ensured,” and that the law governing RTK “is still not being adequately implemented.”3 The commission criticized the government for allowing the deputy prime minister, a PDK member, to serve in the Assembly committee responsible for selecting RTK’s board, which violated the Assembly’s rules of procedure. The RTK board was appointed in late October, but it has not reduced the government’s control over the broadcaster. The EU report concluded that freedom of expression in Kosovo is not fully guaranteed, and that cases of political intimidation call for more robust safeguards by the Kosovo authorities.4 Reporters Without Borders lowered Kosovo’s ranking in the 2009 Press Freedom Index from 58 in 2008, to 75.5 In its World Report, the organization states that some of the eight national dailies owned by the private sector in Kosovo “are linked to political parties or financial groups that develop in their sphere of influence.” It adds that the lack of foreign investment in the media sector allows such groups to “regularly practice ‘blackmail through advertising,’ in which they exchange their financial backing for advantageous media coverage.”6 The government has continued to distribute advertising purchases disproportionately, favoring friendly print outlets. The progovernment dailies Infopress, Express, and Epoka e Re, whose readers represent 11 percent of the market, receive 51 percent of the state’s total paid ads. Meanwhile, the independent Koha Ditore, whose readership is 38 percent, receives only 9 percent of paid ads from public institutions. In late May and early June, the PDK-aligned Infopress published death threats aimed at BIRN director Jeta Xharra. The apparent cause for this campaign was BIRN’s show on freedom of speech in Kosovo, and a short video piece featuring Kosovo 283 threats against BIRN journalists in the municipality of in the valley, the heartland of the PDK. For almost two weeks, Infopress conducted interviews and published articles and opinions full of threats and intimidation. The newspaper abruptly ended its campaign after sufficient pressure was applied to the PDK and the government by the international community. The government’s attempts to bar BIRN from RTK also failed, largely due to the interventions from foreign embassies. In October, the director general of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Jean Réveillon, sent an open letter to Prime Minister Thaçi, urging him to rethink the government’s pressure on RTK and restore the independence of the public broadcaster.7 The EBU argued that political influence had transformed RTK from a balanced supplier of news into a media arm of the PDK and the prime minister. Prime Minister Thaçi responded with a letter in which he restated the government’s commitment to independent media, and invited the EBU to increase its support for RTK and provide further training.8 The Press Council of Kosovo (PCK) and the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo (APJK) participated in public debates with a focus on cases of political interference in the work of the media. Nevertheless, these organizations and the Independent Media Commission (IMC) have failed to speak out against the diminishing freedom of expression in Kosovo. While the PCK is seeking ways to strengthen and enlarge the involvement of Kosovo’s press editors, most of the APJK board is close to the PDK.

Local Democratic Governance 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia n/a 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.25 5.00

The local elections held in November and December marked the creation of three new Serb-majority municipalities and the expansion of a fourth. An additional two Serb municipalities—North Mitrovica and Partes—were due to be established in the spring of 2010. Despite these accommodations, some Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo continued to function separately under Belgrade’s rule, deepening the divide along the Ibar River. The Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) produced a report on the functioning of municipalities from January to June. It examined the operations of municipal assemblies, the efficiency of the municipal administration, respect for human rights, and the collection of local revenues. Of the 27 municipalities and 3 pilot municipalities monitored by the MLGA, 24 completed the legal obligation to hold 5 municipal assembly meetings. A total of 29 had established mandatory committees and the committee for communities. Only 8 municipalities had formed consultative committees as required by the Law on Local Self-Government. Furthermore, only 16 municipalities had approved the 284 Nations in Transit 2010

regulation on the use of languages in keeping with the law, and 27 municipalities had established councils for community safety. The MLGA found that the municipalities expended only 28 percent of funds earmarked for capital investment during the first 6 months of the year, 42 percent of funds for goods and services and municipal expenditures, 51 percent of the funds for salaries and wages, and 67 percent of subsidies and transfers. Although the municipalities are responsible for fostering local economic development, they still lack capacities in this area and face considerable challenges in fulfilling their duties. While the parallel Serb municipalities in the north continued to reject official cooperation with the government of Kosovo, financial assistance from the budget of Kosovo stood at approximately €8 million (US$9.8 million) in 2009. There is no oversight on how these finances are spent, but it is estimated that several hundred Kosovo Serb civil servants in the education and health care sectors receive salaries from this amount, including social payments and pensions. The situation is different in the parallel Serb municipalities south of the Ibar, as they have established quiet cooperation with the government in Pristina, mostly in the areas of construction and local economic development. Given the successful legitimization of the decentralization process, Serb participation in the local elections, and the creation of three new Kosovo Serb municipalities in Gracanica, Kllokot, and Ranilug, the role of the parallel administrations in these settlements is expected to diminish as the new ones become functional and begin delivering local services to the population. However, the new municipalities will face public demands for services and the need for several simultaneous infrastructural investments. Moreover, the transfer of powers from the central to the local level, as well as from larger (mother) municipalities to newly created entities, will likely cause intergovernmental tensions, partly because the two sides differ on the time needed to complete the transition.

Judicial Framework and Independence 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75

Kosovo’s justice system is plagued by political interference and structural weaknesses that have resulted in a considerable backlog of cases. EULEX is dedicated to addressing these flaws, but it has been slow to organize, and political guidance from Brussels is hampered by a lack of unity within the EU on the issue of Kosovo’s independence. In late November 2009, Nazim Bllaca, who claimed to have been a member of an informal ethnic Albanian intelligence organization known as the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK), stated publicly that he had participated in 17 political murders and attempted murders in Kosovo since 1999. He accused a wide circle of senior political figures close to the PDK of masterminding political and economic Kosovo 285 crimes. Bllaca’s statements shook the political scene and revealed the weak rule of law in Kosovo. The local law enforcement agencies did not act on his allegations, and EULEX reacted sluggishly, placing Bllaca under house arrest some 48 hours after his press conference in downtown Pristina. The EU mission had been investigating Bllaca’s claims out of the public eye since May. The Constitutional Court began functioning in mid-2009. In June, the president of Kosovo appointed six judges, including two from minority communities, while the ICO appointed the panel’s three international judges. Kosovo adopted a number of important laws related to the judiciary in the past year covering notaries, civil procedure, the bar, mediation, criminal code amendments, and criminal procedure code amendments. However, the country has yet to adopt a package of four other reform laws on the courts, the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC), prosecution, and the Prosecutorial Council. The KJC was appointed in July based on the 2008 Law on the Temporary Composition of the KJC. However, the EU has deemed some provisions of that law in violation of European standards, primarily the sections referring to the composition of the KJC board. This has delayed implementation of the law and disrupted the activities of the council. The EU progress report concluded that the delay has affected the continuity of court management and the conduct of disciplinary investigations for sitting judges. The Office of the Disciplinary Council is the body responsible for addressing allegations of corruption and misconduct in the judiciary. However, proper investigation in this domain has been lacking. In August, EULEX charged a Pristina district court judge with accepting a bribe of €123,000 (US$150,773) and a vehicle in exchange for the release of two murder suspects. Most of the EULEX judges and prosecutors have been deployed, operating under the Law on Jurisdiction, Case Selection, and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo. By late 2009, they had issued verdicts in dozens of cases, most of them criminal. Strikes in the judiciary have delayed trials and exacerbated the backlog of civil and criminal cases. The Special Chamber of the Supreme Court dedicated to privatization cases is inoperative due to a lack of judges. Steps to seriously address this issue have not been taken, either by the Kosovo government or by EULEX. In a July report, EULEX concluded that compared with the police, the criminal justice system and judiciary as a whole are considerably weaker in their ability to uphold independent and effective prosecution and adjudication of cases.9 The report found that the appointment and promotion system for Kosovo judges is not adequate to safeguard their independence or ensure the highest standards of integrity. EULEX also noted the weak protection systems for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors, which expose them to external pressure and intimidation. However, there is no vision or political will to improve the situation and strengthen the independence of the judiciary.

286 Nations in Transit 2010

Corruption 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Yugoslavia 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75

Corruption remained a serious problem in 2009, fueled in part by the government’s increasing dominance of the economy. According to the annual EU progress report released in October, public investment had risen by 194 percent, while private investment declined by 10.2 percent, with foreign direct investment decreasing and the privatization process stagnating. The public sector’s outsized role has led to an unfriendly business environment in which politically connected groups and individuals establish ad hoc companies to seek public contracts, adding to suspicions about large-scale corruption. Despite improvements in the legal sector, the situation for public procurement worsened in 2009. All secondary legislation for the Law on Public Procurement was completed early in the year. According to the EC, however, the law does not meet European standards. Procurement and tendering procedures are not transparent in practice, and arbitrary application of selection criteria is prevalent. A high proportion of tenders are reportedly cancelled on grounds of noncompliance with administrative requirements. The EU progress report found that open procurement methods accounted for only 77 percent of the total value of signed contracts, and that the value of contracts awarded through single-source tenders had risen from €50 million (US$61.3 million) to €164 million (US$201 million). Meanwhile, the overall value of contracts awarded through public procurement has increased dramatically, representing almost 22 percent of Kosovo’s gross domestic product. Confronted with such practices, private-sector businesses often become involved in corrupt activities to ensure their own survival. Corruption was at the center of the political debate in 2009 between the government and opposition parties, principally the AAK. During the summer, former prime minister Haradinaj accused the government of using public revenues to finance the SHIK, while the deputy minister of transport and telecommunication accused Haradinaj of possessing ill-gotten properties in Kosovo, , , and Dubai, as well as having profited from the early stages of privatization. The debate ended abruptly and was seen by many as a prelude to the municipal election campaign. The Office of the Auditor General has found mismanagement affecting about €35 million (US$42.9 million) of the Kosovo budget, and criticized the government for lacking the political will to address such problems. Meanwhile, as noted in the EU progress report, the Kosovo Anticorruption Agency (AKK) has signed memorandums of understanding to improve cooperation with the Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial Commission, UNMIK’s Financial Intelligence Centre, the head of EULEX prosecutors, and the Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution. However, the European Commission reported that the institutional framework for Kosovo 287 combating corruption remains fragmented, and that the entities involved, like the Anticorruption Agency and the prosecutor’s office, have failed to coordinate their activities to date. Despite the obstacles, the number of corruption cases reported to the AKK rose by nearly 35 percent in 2009—175 cases in comparison to 130 cases during 2008.10 The EC also concluded that an inter-ministerial working group on anticorruption had so far been ineffective, and observed that Kosovo had yet to enact the Law on the Declaration and Control of Assets as well as amendments to the Law on Anticorruption and the Law on Conflicts of Interest.

Author: Ilir Deda Ilir Deda is the executive director of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) in Pristina.

1 ENEMO Election Observation Mission in Kosovo, Municipal Elections 2009: Final Report, : ENEMO, 2010, http://www.enemo.eu/press/Kosovo_EOM_Final_report_2009_. pdf. 2 ICO, “Eighth Meeting of the International Steering Group for Kosovo,” news release, June 15, 2009, http://www.ico-kos.org/d/090615%20Eighth%20ISG%20meeting%20ENG.pdf. 3 Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo Under UNSCR 1244/99 Progress Report, Brussels: European Commission, October 14, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ key_documents/2009/ks_rapport_2009_en.pdf. 4 Ibid. 5 Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2009, : Reporters Without Borders, 2009, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html. 6 Reporters Without Borders, World Report 2009, Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2009, http://en.rsf.org/report-kosovo,114.html. 7 Jean Réveillon, open letter to Hashim Thaçi, Prime Minister of Kosovo, October 26, 2009, http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/579_Thaci%20H_Prime%20Minister%20of%20 Kosovo_RTK_26.10.2009_tcm6-66518.pdf. 8 Office of the Prime Minister, “The Prime Minister Sends a Letter to the EBU Director General,” News release, October 28, 2009, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,968. 9 EULEX, Programme Report, Pristina: EULEX, July 2009, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/ Accountability/EULEX-PROGRAMME-REPORT-July-2009-new.pdf. 10 Kosovo Anticorruption Agency Annual Report January 1–December 31, 2009, p.7., http:// www.akk-ks.org/repository/docs/ENG_2009_akk-report.pdf.