SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS: A STUDY IN ETHNIC IDENTITY

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Anthropology University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

By Barbara E. Liss December 1978 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. Sol Brownstein, executive director of the Jew­ ish Family Service, Houston, Texas, for allowing me to interview the agency's immigrant clients. Also, I want to thank Ms. Barbara Meistrich, the social worker at the Jewish Family Service who first introduced me to the immigrant community and took a great interest in the study. SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS: A STUDY IN ETHNIC IDENTITY

An Abstract of a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Anthropology University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

By Barbara E. Liss December 1978

iv ABSTRACT

A definition of ethnic identity as proposed by Barth and modified by Levy is presented. A group of twenty-three Soviet Jews, recently resettled in Houston, Texas, was investigated to determine whether they fulfill the requirements of ethnic identity as defined in this study. A description of Soviet Jews and an historical overview from before the 1917 Rev­ olution through contemporary times show the cultural changes that have occurred in Soviet Jewish life. Informal interviews with the immigrants provide the data for the evaluation of their ethnic identity. The data show that the Soviet Jews in this study have an ethnic identity as defined, based on the features of ascription and adoption of cultural symbols that are socially effective.

v CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Chapter I. THE CONCEPT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY ...... 3 Narroll's Definition Barth's Revision Literature Review of the Concept of Ethnic Identity Definition of Ethnic Identity Used in Study II. METHODS...... 16 Problem of the Closed Society Two Approaches to the Investi­ gation III. THE SOVIET JEWS...... 23 Characteristics of the Subgroups The Soviet Jewish Migrant IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 32 Overview Before the Revolution of 1917 Lenin and the Jews 1917-1924 Stalin and the Jews 1924-1953 Krushchev and the Jews 1953-1964 Brezhnev and the Jews 1964- Implications of the Emigration Issue and the Jewish Question V. DATA PRESENTATION...... 54 Self-Ascription or Ascription Variable Cultural Forms—a Standard for Behavior Strategy and the Corporate Group

vi VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS...... 69 Discussion of Data Conclusions

LITERATURE CITED ...... 87

vii INTRODUCTION

The intention of this research is to put forth a definition of ethnic identity based on a modified ver­ sion of Barth's model and to investigate a unique group in the terms of this definition. The concept of ethnic identity will provide the framework in which to analyze whether the conditions of ethnic identity do or do not obtain for this particular group. In the past the study of ethnic groups primarily focused on the analysis of the shared cultural forms of the group members. The implications of this approach are that discrete boundaries separate one group from another and that an ethnic group is definable by a cul­ tural history that is continuous. This older ideal of ethnic identity, as that which distinguished one tribe from another, was useful when such populations were rel­ atively isolated from one another. In the contemporary world of intercommunication and movement of people from one place to another, this approach is no longer satis­ factory. When we look at ethnic groups that have emerged in the twentieth century, the flaws in such an analysis become evident. Ethnic groups in the modern world represent constructions of identity that are more dependent on cognitive, strategy-employing approaches 1 2 to group identification than on the culture-bearing aspects of cultural continuity. We see around us trans­ actions among groups that make the ethnic group a form of social organization. The area of concern for the groups is. What will be socially effective? The new identity of the ethnic group as described in the literature is based on a cognitive construction for both the individual and the group that uses tradi­ tional cultural symbols to define the group. Why and how people use such symbols is an important area of investigation if we are to understand what is going on in group interactions. This paper has two objectives. The first objec­ tive is to define the diacritica of the contemporary ethnic group. This will not be a new definition of ethnic identity, but, instead, an expansion of ideas already discussed in the literature of the ethnic group. The second objective of the study is to examine members of a group that historically and traditionally demon­ strated the culture-bearing attributes of the old "tribal" ethnic group. The Jewish people of pre-Soviet Russia constituted such a group. Today, in the Soviet Union these people generally have lost their traditional cultural symbols. Do they constitute an ethnic group according to the revised definition? I will try to answer this question using a small sample of Soviet Jewish immigrants who have recently resettled in Houston, Texas. CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Narroll’s Definition The term "ethnic group" as presented by Narroll (1964) was at one time generally accepted as the mean­ ingful definition. The criteria used by Narroll to define the ethnic group were the following: 1) it was biologically self-perpetuating; 2) it shared fundamental cultural values that were expressed in unified cultural forms; 3) it shared a language; and 4) it had a member­ ship which identified itself and was identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. The ascribed identity of the group resulted from an ancestry which shared cul­ tural values. The cultural forms were seen as particu­ lar behavioral traits, customs and patterns that embod­ ied the values and frequently created a social boundary around the group. At one time Narroll’s description was generally representative of many of the groups that were studied by anthropologists. Narroll’s definition is part of what Bennett (1975) calls the "old ethnicity." Although the substance of some of Narroll’s characteristics are 3 4 of value, the frame of reference is that a shared cul­ ture is the salient feature of the ethnic group.

Barth's Revision It is Barth's (1969) revised definition that transformed the idea of ethnic identity into a cogni­ tive and behavioral-strategy frame. Barth views ethnic identity as a component of social participation. It is his rethinking in the study of ethnic groups that lays the groundwork for what has been called the "new eth­ nicity," and it is Barth's concept that provides the baseline for the definition that will be used in this paper. Barth believes that Narroll's definition of the ethnic group is too narrow to explain the phenomenon of ethnic identity in present day society and culture. Narroll's definition is of the ideal type and does not represent the ethnic group in the contemporary real world. Barth thinks that Narroll's concept of the eth­ nic group suffers from preconceived ideas of the signif­ icant factors in the origin, structure, and function of these groups. Furthermore, Barth is critical of the assumption that there are discrete boundaries around the group, for this implies that ethnic groups develop their cultural and social forms in relative isolation and can be described as separate entities. Finally, Narroll's emphasis on the idea of a shared common culture 5 places too much importance on cultural continuity, on the analysis of culture, rather than on ethnic organiza­ tion. For Barth, the sharing of a common culture is the result of the ethnic group, not its definitional charac­ teristic. Barth's emphasis is not on the cultural, but on what is socially effective. The ethnic group is a form of social organization. It is Narroll's criterion of self-ascription or ascription by others that Barth views as the critical fea­ ture of the ethnic group. By emphasizing ascription as the critical element, we can better understand how the identity of the group is maintained. The characteristic of self-ascription or ascription by others provides the boundary that defines the group. This boundary mainte­ nance among groups is Barth's main subject of inquiry. The boundary is a social one. It depends upon who is perceived to be "inside" and who is "outside" the group. Even though cultural features that define the boundary may change and the cultural characteristics of the mem­ bers within the group may become transformed, what re­ mains is the social identification of who is considered as part of the group and who is not. Membership in the group does not depend on how similar members may appear to be. What is significant is the individual's percep­ tion of belonging to a particular group. Barth's main concern is with the "marking off," the way social boundaries are maintained. He states. 6 "If a group maintains its identity when members inter­ act with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclu­ sion" (1969 p.15). Within the boundary of the ethnic group is the prescription for behavior. Barth asserts that "ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked difference in behavior, i.e., per­ sisting cultural differences" (1969 pp.15-16). There­ fore, ethnic identity also delineates the kinds of roles a person may play, what statuses he may assume in group interactions. In Barth's analysis of inter-ethnic relations he focuses on what is needed to make ethnic distinctions emerge in a particular area. He describes two prerequi­ sites: 1) the categorization of a population into exclusive status categories, each with its own range of cultural values and 2) an acceptance that standards applied to one such category can be different from those applied to another. I would suggest an "awareness," rather than an "acceptance" that standards can be applied differentially. A group assumes a corporate nature pri­ marily because it rejects the principle that standards are indeed unequally applied. In multi-ethnic societies there are circumstances in which a particular identity will be moderately successful and a point beyond which it will not be as a result of these different standards. It is here that Barth's key idea of strategic choice is 7 recognized. Barth argues: ...allegiance to basic value standards will not be sustained where one’s own comparative performance is utterly inadequate.... What matters is how well the others, with whom one interacts and to whom one is compared, manage to perform, and what alternate identities and sets of standards are available to the individual (Barth 1969 p.25). Ethnic identity involves a set of cultural norms that are accepted or rejected by individuals according to the advantages they perceive. For Barth, a change in circumstances may produce a change in identity. If a situation is altered and one’s comparative performance is unsuccessful, one may decide to identify with another group, assuming there is such an option. Stra­ tegic choice operates on two levels: 1) it can be used within the ethnic group, identifying with the group to achieve a goal, or 2) it can be used to disassociate from a group identity that is perceived as ineffective. For Barth, the critical element in the concept of ethnic identity is the strategic choice of maintaining or dis­ solving one’s boundaries. Groups maintain their bound­ aries in multi-ethnic settings because of some conscious­ ness of advantage among the members of the group. These individuals are not passive reactors to their situations. They understand the alternatives that are available, and they make rational choices and utilize various strategies to achieve goals. Barth’s view of ethnic identity as a conscious choice, as a strategy for interaction in multi-ethnic 8 relations, is a major contribution to the concept of the ethnic group. He believes that persistence to eth­ nic boundaries and the organization of inter-ethnic relations are generally related to factors affecting the competition for environmental resources. Also, he suggests that minority groups are peripheral organiza­ tional groups that involve a special variant of inter­ ethnic relations. These ideas have been expanded or revised in the contributions that are discussed in the next section. The "new ethnicity" moves beyond mater­ ial considerations. It also regards minority ethnic group identity as a major focus of study. There is agreement with Barth that the cognitive choice of certain cultural norms, behaviors or values, is the primary way a group promotes an advantage. It is a different inter­ pretation of Barth’s "traditional cultural forms" that represent the cultural norms that provides the modifica­ tion of Barth's concept as used in this study. It will be explained under the subheading "The Strategic Use of Traditional Cultural Symbols."

Literature Review of the Concept of Ethnic Identity

Self-Ascription and Ascription In the literature of ethnic identity the discussion of self-ascription and ascription occupies a prominent position. What Weber (1961 p.3O6) calls the "subjective belief in their common descent," is stated this way by 9 Parsons (1975 p.56): "This is a group the members of which have, both with respect to their own sentiments and those of non-members, a distinctive identity which is rooted in some kind of a distinctive sense of its his­ tory." The prime requisite is subjective. It consists of the identification of a people with a group--its past, its present, and its destiny. The affective nature of an ethnic identity is emphasized. DeVos (1975) thinks that by defining oneself in ethnic terms, the individual finds the basic answer to the human needs to belong and to survive. The group represents continuity with the past, and this link to an historical continuity furnishes a sense of personal survival at the deepest psycholog­ ical level. Defining oneself in social terms gives the individual a sense of belonging and an ultimate loyalty. Levy (1975) believes that each successive generation of ethnic group members carries an ethnic designation by virtue of ancestry alone. Ultimately, the ascribed status persists, even though the associated cultural forms may be totally absent. Ascription represents a tradition and a social contract. What happens when identities which are self-ascribed do not necessarily correspond to the identities which others impose? This is a critical question in the concept of ethnic identity that is raised by Despres: 10 If individuals are accorded ethnic identities by others and these identities enjoin imperative statuses in the sense that such individuals are denied rights and privileges which others enjoy in the public domain, then it would seem to be a rather moot methodological point as to whether or not these individuals assert or otherwise subjec­ tively acquiesce in the status identities which are imposed upon them (Despres 1975b p.193). In the literature of ethnic identity self-ascription receives the greater emphasis. However, ascription by others must be considered as a salient factor in some cases, for it is often the ascription assigned to one by another that provides an individual with a social identity. Sartre illustrates this in his observation of who is a Jew: It is neither their past, their religion, nor their soil that unites the sons of Israel. If they have a common bond, if all of them deserve the name of Jew, it is because they have in common the situation of a Jew, that is, they live in a community which takes them for Jews (Sartre 1948 p.67). One may identify with a particular ethnic group as the result of rejection by other groups in a society. Barth does not confront this problem. He argues that identity is strategically adaptive. People move to change identities that prove to be disadvantageous. In Barth's description of the pariah group, the pariah may attempt to pass into the larger society (1969 p.31). The problem is reduced to a question of how well the pariah knows the host population. The better he knows the host group, the better is the pariah's chance to succeed in the larger group. Those who follow Barth main­ tain the same idea. Identification can change. One can 11 consider that he belongs to one group in certain situa­ tions, and in others, he may choose to identify with another group. Although Despres (1975b) believes that ethnic identities can be situationally determined, he recognizes the idea that exclusion can be the salient factor in group identity in certain cases.

The Strategic Use of Traditional Cultural Symbols What is being noted in the definition of the ethnic group is that people are adopting traditional cultural symbols as the definition of their own identity for vari­ able reasons. The definition here of "symbol" follows Geertz (1973 p.91): "any object, act, quality or rela­ tion which serves as a vehicle for a conception." Not only are people using cultural symbols to obtain the resources needed for survival, but they are manipulating them to assert the Self over and above the impersonal State. The emphasis here is on a cognitive construction of an identity for the individual and the group out of traditional cultural symbols. The symbolic or emblem­ atic use of any aspect of culture will be activated in order to differentiate one group from another when it fulfills a need. Despres (1975b) asserts that one eth­ nic identity differs from another in that its social definition will incorporate presumptive evidence of differential cultural origin. The diacritica by which such ascriptions are cognitively and symbolically expressed 12 are variable. He states that "ethnic populations dis­ close historical experience relevant to the circum­ stances affecting their identity, organization and system of relations" (1975b p.194). This closely fol­ lows Barth’s position that particular value orientations or standards are associated within the boundaries of a specific group, and that these cultural norms will be demonstrated by the social behavior of the group. How­ ever, social behavior will not always be diacritic, for social behavior will depend upon the particular sit­ uation. Goffman (1967) likens behavior to a theatrical act in the sense of "facework" or "performance"; indi­ viduals put up the front of ethnic identity whenever it suits them. This implies a consciousness of choice in identifying with a group. It is Levy's definition of ethnic identity that best characterizes how people act in real life situations in their attempts to meet the problems of life and to reach intended goals: Ethnicity is a symbol system which may be activated by members of a group as one of many strategic alternatives in the pursuit of a goal. By using selected cultural forms as charters and banners, group members may be extraordinarily flexible in their choice of behavioral alternatives. Particu­ lar cultural forms which express a group's bound­ aries are invoked as meaningful and appropriate behavior by individual members only at certain times (Levy 1975 p.28). Levy explains that cultural forms are variable, diffuse, and even non-existent. A cultural form, e.g., dietary law or kinship pattern, may have disappeared from common 13 use but still represent an ideal feature of the group. What is critical is not the particular symbol objects of the group but the social uses of these objects. Bell (1975) underscores this with his idea that ethnic identity is not a primordial phenomenon in which deeply held identities re-emerge. It is a strategic choice by individuals who in other circumstances might have chosen other group memberships as a way to gain power and privilege. The decision to employ ethnic identity is like other behaviors in that it is situationally defined, strategically determined, and goal oriented.

The Corporate Organization of the Ethnic Group Barth identified the conditions for the emergence of ethnic identity; exclusive status categories with a set of cultural values and the knowledge that standards are applied differentially to these categories. The recent literature examines the corporate nature of the ethnic group. Despres (1975b) does not think that it is the sole factor of ascription of a population sec­ tor to an ethnic group that makes of it a corporately organized group. His idea is that the corporate organization of the group derives its motivational force from the negative status claims that derive from such an association. It is this negative factor that may provide an ideological base for political organi­ zation. Safa reiterates this: 14 Where ethnic or racial groups have been systematic­ ally excluded from participation in the fruits of economic growth or from possibilities of upward mobility, we may expect revolutionary discontent which generally takes the form of ethnic national­ ism (Safa 1975 p.10). Although Glazer and Moynihan (1970) point out that eth­ nic groups are the strongholds of power, they concede (1975) that ethnic groups bring different norms to bear on common circumstances with consequent different levels of success. These are arguments that ethnic phenomena are best understood in terms of general theo­ ries of power. The ethnic group is organized out of the need to assert and maintain one's boundaries in the face of competition. Ethnic identity, in all its com­ plexities and varieties, is a strategy for achieving what is wanted and needed by the individuals in the group.

Definition of Ethnic Identity Used in Study The literature reviewed in this paper suggests an expanded definition of ethnic identity. Barth's con­ cept of strategy which involves the conscious choice to maintain or change one's self-ascriptive or ascrip- tive identity, to maintain or dissolve one's boundaries, marks a clear departure from Narroll's definition of the culture sharing, tribal-like, ethnic group. The use of traditional cultural symbols by a group to achieve a particular goal generally is regarded as characteristic of the modern ethnic group. Levy's understanding of the complexity and variability of the cultural forms 15 that can be used to invoke meaningful and appropriate behavior for group members is a valuable addition to the understanding of why and how cultural forms are used. In this study these are the criteria that will be used to describe the ethnic group: 1) it is recognized as a self-ascribed group that has a real or putative common ancestry or it is so ascribed by others; 2) it has extremely variable ideal cultural forms that repre­ sent a value standard and a prescription for behavior. Examples of these forms are marriage patterns, religious affiliations, language or dialect forms, dietary laws, or any other symbol that marks one off as belonging "inside" the group. These cultural forms are variable, diffuse, and, at times, not evident; 3) it may stra­ tegically activate these cultural forms in a given situ­ ation in order to obtain a perceived advantage. We will determine if the Soviet Jewish immigrants are members of an ethnic group following the conditions that have been proposed. CHAPTER II

METHODS

Problem of the Closed Society The Soviet Union is, in every nuance of the word, a "closed" society. From the 1920s until 1971 the Soviet Union did not permit large scale emigration of its citi­ zens. What we know about life in the USSR has been largely the result of what that government has allowed us to know. However, aside from highly structured diplo­ matic interactions and widely publicized visits and exchanges of experts in limited fields, there has been no access to Soviet culture and society. It has been possible for observers of the Soviet system to attempt explanations of Soviet official policy, but not of Sov­ iet life. Not since the Harvard Refugee Project in the 1940s (Inkeles and Bauer 1961) have we had access to the people. In the past thirty years official Soviet publi­ cations have become more informative. Statistical year­ books are now circulated, and a large volume of samizdat (unofficial publications) has reached the West. Gitel- man observes: While the formal structure of many Soviet institutions is described in the literature, much less is known about the informal structure of these institutions, about inter-organizational relations...We also lack simple factual information about such matters as the 16 17 standards and styles of living and of different groups, about social mobility and stratification, and about the cultural tastes and habits of Soviet citizens (Gitelman 1977b p.41).

Two Approaches to the Investigation The Soviet Jewish immigrants who have resettled in the Houston community until very recently were part of the described closed system. The opportunity to inter­ view former members of that society furnishes valuable insight into that system and access to a specific group within that society. To determine if this group meets the requirements of the ethnic group definition, it is necessary to understand their position in their former society. How did the Soviet government categorize these people? What were their own perceptions of their identity in Soviet life? The first approach used to better understand the informants was to place them in an historical context. A description of the Soviet Jewish population and an overview of their history from the pre-revolutionary period until the present Soviet period are included in this study. Events, both inside and outside of the USSR, have been instrumental in shaping the Jewish identity of this group. The attitudes and the official policies of the Soviet government to a large degree have supplied the content of that identity. The second approach used in the study was the informal interview. By telling me their life stories. 18 the immigrants helped to explain who they are. Three criteria were used in selecting the sample for the study. First, I was interested in interviewing those individuals who had been in Houston less than three months, and I was fortunate to meet six of the informants on the day they arrived. It was my hope that the most recent immigrants would have less Western experience to influence the con­ tent of their lives in the USSR. Second, it was necessary that the informants communicate in English. I had con­ ducted some earlier interviews with the assistance of an interpreter and had found the results were unsatisfactory. Along with the criteria of length of time in Houston and the ability to communicate in English, it was requisite to find people who wanted to take part in the study. Everyone I met, understandably, was guarded at first. Those who remained suspicious said they would talk to me, but they did not want to be included in the study. Those who were part of the sample were pleased with the idea that they could express their views in a university thesis. The immigrants who were interviewed for this study in several ways are a homogeneous group. The sample con­ sisted of twenty-three informants, twelve men and eleven women. All were between the ages of twenty-seven and forty-eight. Their geographic origin, with the exception of three individuals, was the Russian or the Ukrainian republic. The educational training of ten of the men and seven of the women had been in scientific fields. The 19 other six had received training in the humanities or fine arts. At the time of the study fifteen informants were married. Seven people had non-Jewish spouses or first degree relatives who were married to non-Jews. None of the informants had been married in religious ceremonies. None of the men had been circumcised, nor had they observed at thirteen years of age the traditional Bar Mitz­ vah ceremony. Of the group, sixteen had never been in a synagogue in the USSR, and no one had relatives or friends who regularly attended religious services in their home cities. No one described himself or herself as being religious. Jewish consciousness is considered to be greater outside the republics of Russia and the Ukraine. The three informants from the other areas believed that they had friends who were more religious than they were. Eight individuals spoke English fluently. Although two had studied English in the universities, the other six had learned the language outside of official channels. The others had varying degrees of competency but were able to make themselves understood. Most of them said that they could read technical books in English relating to their work. Of the group, five said that they understood a few Yiddish words but could not communicate in that language. The informants are not identified by age, sex, or geographic origin. As the group is small, these character­ istics would reveal the names of the informants fairly accurately to anyone who has been involved with them 20 either socially or professionally. The informants did not give their histories with any emphasis on sexual differences in socialization. The women in the study did not believe that women are educated or employed differently than men in Soviet society. The interview sessions were not highly struc­ tured. Although I had the specific question of ethnic identity in mind, I believed it could be answered best by allowing the informants to tell me in their own terms who they were in the USSR, rather than by pro­ viding the categories for them. I did ask, Who is a Jew in the USSR? I asked what Jewish holidays are celebrated. I did not ask if they had experienced dis­ crimination. As we talked, it became apparent that they were justifying their present situation in Houston in terms of their past life in the USSR, and they were self-consciously reflective. As one informant told me, "I have so much to tell. You Americans need to under­ stand us, what is going on in our lives in Russia" (Informant No.11). The interviews were conducted from May through August of 1978. The informants all lived in the same apartment complex, which facilitated our interactions. None were employed at the time of the interviews. This allowed us to meet and talk often. Most of their inter­ actions with the agencies in Rome that aided them before they entered the United States and with the resettlement 21 agency in Houston were of a problem solving nature. For example, how to find a job, how to obtain medical care were important considerations for them. Although they did ask me to take them to job interviews or to help them decide what kind of car to buy when they found work, they saw me primarily as a student, some­ one who wanted to learn about their lives in the Sov­ iet Union. The agencies were concerned with their future; I was interested in their past. We ate together, went shopping, unpacked their belongings. They showed me pictures of their families. We went to the librar­ ies. We listened to music and watched television, and we talked. I answered questions about how to do things in the United States, but mainly I listened carefully to what they told me. What they told me was a complex story of who they are. Their identity had been formed more by how others had labeled them than by any individual idea of Self. Immigration literature suggests that immigrants use two approaches in describing their former lives: 1) they paint the past in negative terms in order to justify the move they have made, or 2) they remember what they have left behind nostalgically when their expectations are not fulfilled in their new lives. Eisenstadt (1954) thinks that every migratory movement is motivated by the migrant’s feeling of some kind of insecurity and inadequacy in his social setting, though 22 the motive for migration is not necessarily a feeling of insecurity and inadequacy in every main sphere of life. This insecurity causes one to be unrealistic about the past and the future. Realism is not the issue here. The interviews tried to uncover people's perceptions of their identity. The study group, because of its extremely high level of technical education, is not intended as a representative sample of the general Jewish popula­ tion in the USSR, nor is it representative of the groups from the Russian and western border areas. Any sample of Soviet Jews who emigrate will be different from the Soviet Jewish population within that country, and, therefore, unrepresentative of it in some sense. However, any sample, no matter how it is drawn, shares certain features with the parent population. We can assume that consistent patterns displayed in thinking about abstract and conceptual issues can provide a substantial clue to values, attitudes, and ways of thinking even of the larger group. CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET JEWS

Characteristics of the Subgroups There is no typical Soviet Jew. There are, how­ ever, identifiable subgroups. For example, Voronel (1975), himself a Soviet Jew, identifies two catego­ ries: the Ashkenazi (Western) and the Oriental (Geor­ gian and Central Asian). The Ashkenazi can be further identified as either ’’traditional” Jews or as Russian Jews. The traditional Jews came under Soviet rule in the World War II era. They are from the Baltic coun­ tries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and from Mol­ davia, on the Rumanian border. Voronel calls the Jews from these areas traditional, because, until their annexation by the Soviet government, they openly fol­ lowed the customs and religious observances of Judaism. The first immigration to Israel in the late 1960s and 1970s came from this group. In contrast, Russian Jews have a three generational history under Soviet rule, beginning with the time of the Revolution of 1917. The Jews in this group are largely assimilated into Soviet society. Approximately 98% of them live in the urban centers, and 50% live either in Moscow or in Leningrad. In regard to language and culture, they are profoundly 23 24 Russian. As a group, they are highly educated. It is from this group in the 1970s that the prominent leaders of the Jewish Liberation Movement appeared. Voronel believes that in order to understand the Rus­ sian Jews, one must understand the outlook and mood of the Russian intelligentsia, for the two groups are closely associated socially. He thinks that the Rus­ sian intellectuals are dissatisfied with the super­ ficial internationalism and the general culture of Soviet society. This attitude is expressed by Solzhenitsyn (Rass and Brafman 1976 p.224): "All that Marxism has contributed to the world is a vast increase in terror and repression, 125 years of predictions that have never come true." Inter-marriage between Jews and non-Jews is high in the Russian area and in the Ukraine. In Russia, one Jewish man out of four marries a non-Jewish woman; in the Ukraine, one Jewish male out of three marries a non­ Jew. Children of mixed marriages may choose the nation­ ality of either parent in the Soviet Union, and Judaism is designated as an official nationality. Korey (1977) estimates that only 15% of the children of mixed mar­ riages between Jew and non-Jew choose a Jewish nation­ ality identification. In another article (1973), he argues that the majority of Russian Jews seek assimila­ tion. Inter-marriage can provide the opportunity for one’s children to assimilate. 25 Identified Jews are highly visible in science and medicine. In the Ukraine, 80% of the doctorates held by Jews are in the fields of physics, mathematics, medicine, and other technical sciences. Statistically they are insignificant in the humanities and the social sciences. Jews do not hold positions of leadership in the Communist Party or the foreign service, nor are they employed in important government institutions for defense. The Oriental Jews present an interesting con­ trast to the Western Jews as they have retained their cultural heritage. In the Stalin period, an extremely oppressive time for Soviet Jewry, they successfully resisted attempts by authorities to close their syna­ gogues. Their marriage pattern has remained endoga­ mous, and they live and work together in large, extended family groups. They have retained their tra­ ditional occupations as artisans and tradespeople-- non-industrial jobs. Their level of education is more closely in line with that of the general Soviet popu­ lation. As a group they are religious, and those who have left the Soviet Union have immigrated to Israel. Because of their strong family ties and its strict, patriarchal nature, entire family groups have emi­ grated, taking their community structure with them to Israel. Israel represents to them a religious-national ideal rather than a political system. How they have 26 retained this unique identity is an interesting ques­ tion, but one that is not explored here. They appear to be removed from the pressures that influence the Western Soviet Jews. It should be noted that many of the Oriental Jews live amidst anti-Russian minorities of Islamic heritage. The Jews may profit from this insulation in the Georgian and Asian environments. The Soviet 1970 census recorded the population of the USSR as 241,748,000. The Jews represent less than 1% of the total Soviet population. Millman (1971) estimates the total Jewish population at 2,151,000. This represents a probable decline of Jews of 5.2% from the figures in the official 1959 census. Observ­ ers of Jewish affairs can only estimate the number of Soviet Jews. Some believe it is close to Millman's estimate, but others, like Rass and Brafman (1976), think there are more than 3,000,000 Jews in the USSR. Although every person over the age of sixteen in the Soviet Union must carry a passport which includes a nationality identification, it is not required to show the passport to the census taker, and one simply may state a nationality in response to that question. The Soviet Union acknowledges the existence of almost 120 nationality groups under its jurisdiction. A nationality group is identified by the government primarily on the bases of language and territory. In 1926, 70% of the Soviet Jewish population designated Yiddish as their native language. In the 1970 census 'll (Millman 1971), 17.7% listed Yiddish as their first or native language. It is important to note that the traditional Jews come from an area where Yiddish was a feature of everyday life for them until recent times Pipes (1975) maintains that the Jews occupy a position sui generis in the Soviet Union. With the exception of the German and the Japanese nationals who were caught in the Soviet Union during World War II, the Jews are the only nationality group that lacks a spe­ cific territory and administrative organs of its own, although it represents the twelfth largest nationality group in the USSR. For the purpose of comparing the general Jewish population with the rest of the Soviet people, the following figures from Rass and Brafman (1976) are significant: virtually all Jewish adults have a high school education. The figure for the rest of the Soviet population is 22%. At the university or insti­ tute level, 33% of all Jews have a degree, while 4% of the rest of the population has an equivalent education. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Jews hold the degree of ’’candidate, ” the equivalent of an American Ph.D. , and between 4,000 and 5,000 are doctors of science, a designation higher than ’’candidate” and required in order to teach in the universities.

The Soviet Jewish Migrant For a better understanding of the experiences of 28 the Soviet Jews who have come to Houston, it is neces­ sary to examine the migration situation in general for these people. The conditions under which emigration from the Soviet Union takes place will be discussed in Chapter IV, under the subheading "Emigration from the USSR." This section will consider the important stages of transition and relocation. After an individual is granted permission to leave the Soviet Union, he is sent initially to Vienna. Here he is met by a representative of the Jewish Agency (a semi-official Israeli organization) and asked if he is going to Israel. Israel is the destination written on his exit visa, but all the Jews who leave the USSR do not intend to immigrate to Israel. Evidence sug­ gests that the Jews who come to the United States have chosen this country as their destination before leav­ ing the Soviet Union. Upon reaching Vienna, very few change their minds and go on to Israel. Those who are not going to Israel are assisted by a representative of HIAS (Hebrew Immigration Aid Society), a social service organization that has been aiding Jewish immi­ grants, principally to the United States, for more than seventy years. Within two weeks, the people not going to Israel are transferred from Vienna to Rome to await transit papers to the United States, Canada, England, Australia, and Latin America. The immigrants are admitted into 29 the United States under ’’parole refugee" status instead of under national quotas. Under parole refugee status, the immigrants have permission to work and the right to future citizenship. During the two to six month waiting period in Rome, the immigrants are encouraged to learn English, to write American style education and occupation resumes, and to learn about life in their receiving countries. Each immigrant is allowed to take 100 rubles, approximately $125, out of the Soviet Union, which limits the participation in Italian life. The immi­ grants are provided with an apartment and living ex­ penses on a modest level. Several families may share a small apartment, which contributes to feelings of discomfort, as they are usually strangers to each other. Some of the immigrants are able to find part time work in Rome, but only with HIAS, for the Italian government does not allow them to work in the public sector. Others may sell some of their possessions in the American Market. The goal is to earn some money in order to travel through Italy. The immigrants who wish to relocate in the United States must remain in Rome until a community in this country will accept them for resettlement. The receiv­ ing community takes the responsibility for the finan­ cial and physical welfare of the immigrants. There are approximately 150 Jewish communities with the 30 organizational facilities to participate in the reset­ tlement program. Over half of the immigrant group is sent to the New York area. The others are sent to com­ munities throughout the United States that can best accommodate them. Major factors in the resettlement destination are the economic climate of the area and the marketable skills of the immigrants; or, if they have family in a particular community, they are sent there to join their relatives. Those who have come to Houston, generally, have technical skills that can be employed locally. They are engineers and other scientific workers who have high expectations of employment success. The migration process is physically and psycho­ logically stressful for many individuals. It is a non-structured and incompletely defined situation, giving rise to feelings of insecurity and anxiety. The Soviet government makes it very clear that those who leave have relinquished their Soviet citizenship and will not be allowed to return. Yet, in Italy they are called "Russians.” They know very little about the United States and cannot be certain how far their various aspirations and expectations can be real­ ized. The migration is a critical experience for the Soviet Jews. During this period it is difficult to maintain Barth's (1969 p.30) "conventional definition of the situation.” The immigrants are not certain 31 which behaviors will bring success. In the next chapter we will review the historical Russian-Soviet strategies toward the Jewish people and their responses to the system. CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Overview Until the early part of the twentieth century the Jews in the Soviet Union were an ethnic group, using Narroll’s definition. Their marriage pattern was endogamous. They shared a common language, speak­ ing a dialect of Yiddish that was influenced by Slavic languages. By law, they were located in a distinct territory known as the Pale of Settlement. They were not allowed to live in the cities, residing for the most part in small towns or hamlets. They possessed a distinct value orientation that focused on a regard for traditional Jewish law, a devout adherence to the teachings of the Torah and the Talmud. A long his­ tory of Yiddish language, parochial education, and traditional observance of sacred holidays were part of their cultural heritage. Ceremonial rites of pas­ sage, for example, circumcision, Bar Mitzvah, wedding ceremonies, and prescribed burial rites, marked the group off from other Russians. The Jews were separated not only by law but also by their own ritual barriers. Events early in the twentieth century transformed the Russian nation from an agrarian, tsarist dominated 32 33 country into an industrial, modernizing society faced with the accompanying problems of such a transforma­ tion. The internal historical forces that changed the entire character of Russian life also pressed for the assimilation of the Jewish people. Exogamous marriages for the Jews were encouraged by the government. The institutions of Jewish education that formed the infra­ structure of Jewish self-awareness, the synagogues and the Yiddish language schools, were closed. Yiddish theaters, newspapers, and books were eliminated. Later, in the 1960s, historical events in the USSR and in Israel precipitated the emigration of a large number of Jews from their homeland. The following data provide a view of the treat­ ment of the Jews from pre-revolutionary times through the contemporary Soviet period.

Before the Revolution of 1917 Although the Jews had suffered political stric­ tures in the form of economic, social, and educational discrimination under the Russian tsars, the Jews in the Pale of Settlement had been allowed to follow their religious and cultural traditions. The Yiddish language, parochial schools, and Yiddish newspapers and books were much in evidence at the beginning of the twentieth century in Russia. However, at the turn of the century Russian Jewry was subjected to a new 34 series of pogroms, more vitriolic in nature than previ­ ous incidents. At least indirectly the tsarist govern­ ment could be indicted for sanctioning these attacks. In 1903 the pamphlet, "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," was disseminated. In the article international Jewry was accused of plotting a world takeover. Cohn (1967) argues that the pamphlet was a tsarist justifi­ cation of the pogroms. Since its first publication the pamphlet has been translated into numerous languages, and it is regarded as a major contribution to twentieth century anti-Semitism throughout the world. One hundred years ago the chief minister of Alexan­ der III, Konstantin Pobedonostev, predicted the disap­ pearance of Russian Jews. One-third would emigrate, one-third would be killed, and one-third would assimi­ late. Between 1881-1914, one-third of the entire Jewish population left Russia, mainly immigrating to the United States (Korey 1974). The Jews who remained in Russia were among those who embraced the ideas of the Revolution, seeing in it their own emancipation. A disproportionately high number of Jews was counted in the early leadership of the Bolshevik Party.

Lenin and the Jews 1917-1924 Lenin was opposed to all religious ideology, for it was not in harmony with the goals of the socialist state. During his regime all religious activity was 35 curtailed greatly. Theoretically, he was opposed to the principle of anti-Semitism; however, the anti- religious strictures of Lenin's government held signifi­ cance for the Jews. Judaism was a way of life based on strong traditional and cultural values, in which the synagogue played an instrumental role. The synagogue was the meeting place for both worship and study. Eliminating the Jewish religion in effect greatly re­ duced the chance for the survival of a Jewish identity. The Jewish people of Russia had been linked to all the other Jews in the Diaspora through religious rituals. A traditional theme of the Passover service, "Next year in Jerusalem," was expressed by Jews throughout the world during the Passover season. If the words were not interpreted literally, they served as a symbolic link for the Jewish people dispersed for more than two thousand years. Lenin’s government abolished other Jewish insti­ tutions. The Russian Zionist Movement, a group dedi­ cated to the resettlement of the Jewish people in the historical homeland, was eliminated. The Yeveseksia, the Jewish section of the Communist Party, was suppressed with the support of Jewish Party members. All Jewish schools were closed. Children who had studied in the Yiddish language were sent to secular schools. Lenin believed that the Jewish people would be compelled to assimilate with the closing of their 36 synagogues and other Jewish institutions. The Com­ munist regime promised a "fraternity of peoples," giving the Jews a degree of social equality that they had never experienced before in Russian history. The Jews were promised the chance to educate their children in Soviet universities. What was offered was the privi­ lege of citizenship. Gitelman (1972) maintains that historically the Jews have integrated into every modern-industrial society that has given them that option, adopting the cultural values of the larger society. In these societies the Jewish heritage has been perpetuated almost exclusively through synagogue affiliation. The option offered by the Soviet govern­ ment at Lenin's time was a different one. Lenin’s government practiced an atheistic ideology. The Jews could exchange their religious heritage for a place in the new society, and many of them did that. The strong Jewish value of reverence for knowledge was transformed into a desire for secular education and the promise it held for the future.

Stalin and the Jews 1924-1953 Stalin believed that the Jews represented a threat to the Soviet system and could not be assimi­ lated into the new Soviet society. He saw the Jews as Zionists, loyal to another country. He labeled them as "rootless cosmopolitans" who had to be watched 37 carefully and contained. During the twenty-nine years of Stalin’s regime there were periods in which purges of Jews were instigated. Mass executions of the Jew­ ish elite and the total suppression of Jewish cultural life dominated the Stalin era. Early in Stalin's rule, in 1928, a Jewish autono­ mous state, Birobidzhan, located on the Chinese border, was opened for colonization. The government sought to remove the Jews from urban settings and to place them in an agrarian one. There were Jews willing to accept the challenge to pioneer a Jewish state in the Soviet Union as an alternative to a Jewish homeland in Pales­ tine. The policy toward the new state was never con­ sistent, and the settlement failed. At one point Stalin charged that the leaders of the state were Trot­ skyites and Zionists. They were imprisoned, exiled or executed. By 1948 every trace of Jewish culture had been eradicated from the region, although it still bears the name of the Jewish Autonomous State. In 1932 a law was enacted compelling every Soviet citizen over the age of sixteen to carry an internal passport. At the time there was a severe housing short­ age in the Soviet Union, and the rationale for the pass­ port was to insure an equitable distribution by nation­ ality in the assignment of apartments. An individual's passport did not reflect his place of birth. The designations were of Soviet national ascription. 38 A person born in Georgia of parents deemed Ukrainian by the government was also a Ukrainian. A Jew born anywhere was a Jew. Children of mixed marriages were allowed to choose either parent's nationality as their own at the age of registration. This served as a strong incentive for Jewish alliances with non-Jews in a period of intense anti-Semitism. The years between 1948-1953 commonly have been called the "black years of Soviet Jewry." The era is marked by dramatic incidences, such as the "doctors' plot." A number of doctors, predominantly Jewish, was charged with planning the assassination of important members of Stalin's government. Stalin's death pre­ vented the execution of these men, and they later were absolved of the charges. During this period, quota systems were introduced for the admission of Jews to educational institutions. It was at this time that Jews systematically were excluded from high echelons of the Soviet Army, the foreign service, and leadership in the Communist Party. Stalin's Jewish policy was erratic. In 1948 the Soviet Union voted in the United Nations for statehood for Israel. Observers believe Stalin saw this as a mechanism to divide the United States and Great Britain on a volatile international issue. At the time of Stalin's death, the position of the Jewish people in the Soviet Union was precarious. 39 Khrushchev and the Jews 1953-1964 Khrushchev's rule in the USSR theoretically restored the equality of the Jews that Lenin had attempted to establish. The blatant anti-Semitism and the terror of Stalin's era were abolished. Formal quotas in institutions of higher education were re­ voked. Applications for entrance into universities did continue to reveal nationality identification: "Russian," "Ukrainian," "Jew," and "Other." Khrush­ chev closed approximately ten thousand places of wor­ ship. Although most of the synagogues in the Soviet Union remained closed, the synagogue in Moscow was allowed to hold services, and the rabbi was visible in official newspapers and journal publications. In 1961 a Yiddish language journal Das Sovietishe Heim- land first appeared. Its function, like that of other officially sanctioned publications, was to disseminate Soviet ideology that was socialistic in content and nationalistic in form. From the time of the Revolu­ tion this had been the government's policy of the function of national languages. The audience for the Yiddish language journal had become a limited one. By 1959, only 21.5% of the Jewish population desig­ nated Yiddish as its native language (Millman 1971). Certain features of Soviet life indicated that anti-Semitism had not disappeared. Between the years of 1961-1963 public trials of economic criminals were 40 a prominent element in Soviet life. A parallel econ­ omy to the official government economic system existed in the USSR, and, periodically, the government brought individuals to court on charges of dealing in the illegal market. Of the people tried and condemned to death 50% to 60% were Jewish or thought to be Jewish. The Soviet newspapers gave the trials wide coverage, citing the nationalities of those accused. If a news­ paper believed that an accused individual was Jewish but had a Russified name, the newspaper changed the name to an identifiable Yiddish one. In the same period the government attacked the practice of circum­ cision as a barbaric custom and a danger to health (Eckman 1974). It became illegal to have a male child circumcised, a tradition that the Jews had not aban­ doned even with their apparent assimilation. Khrush­ chev maintained that anti-Semitism was regarded by the government as a criminal act. In 1963 a book was published by a Ukrainian professor, Trofim Kitchko. The book, Judaism Without Embellishment, was denounced in intellectual circles throughout the world as a vicious attack on Judaism. The book was a source of embarrassment to the Soviet government. The author was reprimanded officially, but the book was not sup­ pressed (Eckman 1974). 41

Brezhnev and the Jews 1964- Suppression of Rights An important feature in Brezhnev’s policy has been the repression of dissident elements, many of whom are Jewish. This has attracted international attention for the Soviet government, as articulate members of the intelligentsia have gone or been sent into exile and have spoken out against conditions in the Soviet Union. The dissidents have spoken out against the suppression of human rights of Soviet cit­ izens . One area of dissident protest is the suppres­ sion of religious freedom. Brezhnev has reopened approximately five hundred of the ten thousand churches that had been closed during Khrushchev’s regime. In general, the Soviet religious believer does not know his status in relation to the authority structure. Treatment of all religious groups is arbitrary. The situation is variable, from uncertainty through threats to direct persecution. There are no legal churches for Eastern Rite Catholics, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Wit­ nesses, and some Baptist sects have not been permitted since 1973. There are legally registered synagogues in the Soviet Union. The synagogue is the only legal Jewish institution in the USSR today. In 1966 there were 62 synagogues in the Soviet Union as compared to 450 synagogues ten years earlier. There were fifteen 42 to twenty rabbis throughout the country in 1966, all over the age of seventy. Although minor concessions have been made on religious issues, there is no yeshivot to train rabbis. Currently, the government has allowed one Jewish man to go to Hungary to train for the rabbinate (Rothenberg 1971). There is other evidence of the suppression of rights of the Soviet Jewish population. No Jewish day schools for children have been allowed to reopen. The official claim is that the Soviet Jews have no interest in Jewish parochial schools as a result of their assim­ ilation into the larger Soviet society. The teaching of Yiddish or Jewish history is not allowed in the schools. Hebrew is taught only in the Russian Ortho­ dox seminaries. Since 1968 there has been a steady increase in restrictive quotas at the university level affecting Jewish students. According to a study published in the London Jewish Chronicle, February 2, 1977, Jews constitute 1.3% of Soviet university students, roughly comparable to their percentage of the population, con­ trasted with 13% in 1935. In less than a decade, from 1968-1976, the percentage of Jewish university students declined 40%. In the 1976-1977 academic year 3% of the Jewish students who applied to Moscow universities were accepted. Other institutions allowed 6% of the Jews who applied to enroll. No Jews at all were 43 accepted at the University of Moscow. Along with the restrictive quotas, Jews are not being admitted to certain prestigious universities. Between 1970-1973 all nationalities declined in postgraduate positions, but the Jewish number dropped most dramatically in an effort to bring the national composition of the intel­ ligentsia in line with the national composition of the population. The Soviet leadership uses this ration­ ale to justify the numerus clausus: places must be made available for the young who are leaving the rural areas where they were born and are moving to the cities to obtain a higher education. The similar trend in employ­ ment for Jews is noted by Altshuler (1973). In 1947, 18% of the scientific workers in the Soviet Union were Jewish; in 1970, 7%.

Emigration from the USSR Special attention must be given to the Soviet policy on emigration. This is a question that signifi­ cantly has affected the Jewish population in the Soviet system. Lowenthal (1973) thinks that the difference from the Soviet viewpoint between the Jews and other dissatisfied nationalities is that in principle the Jews can leave. Disaffected members of other groups —the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Armenians—cannot. On the Jewish issue, leaders vascillate, trying various tactics, sometimes using repression, at other times per­ mitting more people to leave. To appreciate the problem of emigration from the USSR, it must be understood that under Soviet law a citizen does not possess the right to emigrate at will. On the ideological plane emigration would tarnish the image of the Soviet Union as the world's most progres­ sive and attractive society, but it would also weaken the country in more practical ways as well. Following the tremendous losses of World War II, the Soviet Union has experienced a shortage of scientific-techni­ cal workers and specialized skilled laborers. Ginsburgs (1973) explains that although exit from the Soviet Union is both possible and legitimate, the average citizen wishing to leave has no idea how the system works. In cases not involving diplomatic passports, the individual must submit a written peti­ tion through certain official channels; and these administrative authorities approve the petitions, but they do not offer any guidelines as to who is eligible to exit. Ginsburgs states: Inasmuch then, as Soviet law has sanctioned the emigration of various people over the years, the phenomenon represents, and locally has always been perceived as, an incidence of political dis­ pensation, constituting a special privilege con­ ferred on the interested party by the State and not something that a person can claim unilaterally independent of or in opposition to the regime's express wishes (Ginsburgs 1973 p.4). There is no published emigration law that allows an individual information explaining how to obtain an exit permit, and there is no certain means of appeal to 45 higher administrative channels or through the court system if one has applied to emigrate and been denied the request. The government does make clear who is not eligi­ ble to emigrate. In this category are the following: those with advanced military training, those who are employed in positions regarded as involving a national security risk, and those who fulfill an important social service to the country. Because of the expense of technical training, individuals who have university degrees are restricted in the right to emigrate. People who have served in the military are barred from applying for exit papers until three years after their tour of service has elapsed. The Soviet authorities have announced that they will accept reunification of families separated by World War II and by geopolitical boundary changes in Europe as valid reasons for emigration. In 1960 Khrush­ chev had evaded the question of Jewish emigration. He had said that although Israeli relatives of Soviet Jews might urge the latter to go to Israel, the Soviet Jews were reluctant to do so. He denied that the Min­ istry of Soviet Affairs had ary requests for Jewish nationals to leave for Israel. In response, Golda Meir, Israel’s Foreign Minister, released a statement that almost ten thousand Israelis had requested of the Inter­ national Red Cross documents which would enable them 46 to obtain exit visas for their Russian relatives (Baron 1976) . In an internationally publicized press conference in Paris, December 1966, Kosygin stated that Soviet Jews who wished to join members of their families abroad were free to do so. Although there had been examples of emigration on the principle of family reunions of ethnic groups, as experienced in the situ­ ation of former Polish citizens who were permitted to return to Poland in the late 1940s and again in 1957, Kosygin’s statement was the first acknowledgment that a particular group had a special claim to emigration. Schroeter (1972) presents unofficial numbers for the emigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel for the period from 1967-71. Official statistics in this area are unavailable or unreliable.

Year No.Emigrants 1967 1,412 1968 231 1969 3,033 1970 999 1971 12,923

There are probably many reasons for such an uneven trend of emigration. One factor, according to Ginsburgs (1973), is that the status of law on emi­ gration verges on anarchy in the USSR. Also, the government has made the process of exit highly selec­ tive, difficult and demeaning, and very costly. The 47 Soviet Jew who wishes to leave first must submit a written certified invitation, a vyzov, from a relative in Israel. (There is an indication now that an Ameri­ can invitation may be acceptable. In the past few years only 600-700 Soviet Jews have been allowed exit permits based upon American invitations. Because the United States yearly immigration quota for Soviet citi­ zens is never filled, a Jewish applicant who is suc­ cessful in applying in this way would not have to experience the waiting period in Rome.) An applicant must produce an acknowledgment from his place of employment that he has discharged his obligations to his superior. Previously this took the form of a character reference that caused anxiety on the part of the employer. A written statement must be secured from parents, children, ex-spouses, and any dependents that they have no objections to the applicant’s depar­ ture, nor any past, present, or future financial claims on the potential emigrant. Soviet citizenship must be renounced formally, and a high fee is demanded for giving up this citizenship and for emigrating from the USSR to a capitalistic country. A person emigrating with the destination of a socialistic country pays a negligible fee for emigration. There is much evidence that the applicant suffers harassment in trying to com­ ply with the official paper work. Vyzovs do not arrive; employers fire potential emigrants because they 48 do not want to become involved with the official channels; and parents are hesitant to sign permission papers because they are not certain of the consequences for themselves, and they are distressed by the no-return condition of their children's desired emigration. Applicants have been recalled to active military serv­ ice upon submitting their exit papers. The hopes raised by Kosygin's speech were not realized immedi­ ately.

Corporate Organization and the Goal of Emigration The Six-Day War in the Middle East in June 1967 signalled the beginning of Jewish activism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev actively supported the Arab position and launched a massive anti-Zionist campaign in the Soviet newspapers. The strong pro-Arab, anti- Israel diplomacy and the internal propaganda of the government were issues that even apolitical Jewish individuals found difficult to ignore. Other events contributed to the raising of Jew­ ish consciousness and to the development of a Jewish movement within the country. Eleven people who had attempted the hijacking of a plane to go to Israel received severe penalties in the Leningrad Trial, December 1970. Two were sentenced to death, and the other nine received long prison terms. The sentences 49 provoked a massive Jewish protest against the govern­ ment (Korey 1973). It was the first time a "protest rally" had been staged in the USSR since the time of the Revolution. This was followed by a "sitdown strike" of twenty-four Moscow Jews at the Supreme Soviet in February 1971, another unheard of strategy which marked the beginning of an active emigration movement. The Jews found strong support from the intellectuals of the Democrat Movement, a dissident faction that Brezh­ nev had not succeeded in eliminating. The press for Jewish emigration also found sup­ port in the West. Earlier concern among Jews in the West had focused on the deprivation of religious free­ dom for the Soviet Jews. The scarcity of matzoh for the Passover ritual, the lack of prayer books, and the shortage of synagogues had furnished the content of Western Jewish concern. The emphasis changed. In the West the issue was seen now as the deprivation of the right of the Soviet Jews to exist as an ethnic group with association with other members of the group in other countries. The shift in Western public opin­ ion permitted a more directly ethnic formulation of the problem of the Soviet Jews, and the issue centered on the right of free emigration. The large scale emigration of Soviet Jews began in 1971. In 1972 the Soviet govenment imposed a diploma tax to prevent a "brain drain." Sums of money, from 50 four rubles to twelve thousand rubles, depending on the degree level one had obtained, were required to repay the Soviet Union for the free education that those who wished to leave had received. This tax attracted un­ favorable attention in the West. The Stevenson Amend­ ment to the Trade Reform Act of 1972 proposed a 300 million dollar reduction in trade credits to the Soviet Union unless freer emigration was permitted from that country. In March 1973 the tax was no longer collected, although it officially remains as a form of taxation. On the whole, the tendency has been to allow the emigration of the nuisance dissident element before it spreads to other groups, but the policy has been incon­ sistent. The following unofficial statistics on emigra­ tion from the USSR reported in the Houston Chronicle, June 18, 1978, demonstrate to some extent the incon­ sistency .

Year No. Emigrants 1973 34,933 1974 20,695 1975 13,459 1976 14,216 1977 16,737

The decline in numbers, especially between 1973-75, is viewed differently by sources in the USSR and in the West. The Soviet Union argues that there has been a decline in emigration partly as the result of disillusionment voiced in the letters written home from Israel by former 51 emigrants. The West interprets the decline as the result of active harassment by Soviet authorities to inhibit the number of applications through such tactics as job dismissals which bring charges of parasitism to those dismissed, pre-emptory conscription to military service, and detention in workhouses or psychiatric institutions. Some Western authorities believe that from 14% to 30% of the exit applications are denied when first presented (Ginsburgs 1976). Since 1971 over 150,000 Jews have emigrated from the Soviet Union. Currently the Soviet authorities are granting approximately twelve hundred exit visas each month. The Soviet officials are aware that all who are leaving that country are not immigrating to Israel. Gitelman (1977a) explains that since 1973 a steadily increasing number of Soviet Jewish emigrants from the USSR have chosen to relocate in the United States rather than in Israel. When the large emigration movement began in 1971>less than 1% of those leaving the Soviet Union did not immigrate to Israel. By 1978, 52% were not choosing Israel as their destination.

Implications of the Emigration Issue and the Jewish Question Officially the Soviet Union has accepted inter­ national opinion that emigration is a fundamental human right. Brezhnev's government endorsed the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, pledging to "deal in a positive 52 and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family." Governments signing the declaration agreed to handle applications for visas as expeditiously as possible and pledged to set exit fees at moderate levels. Exit visas were to be treated in such a manner that govern­ ments did not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family (Korey 1977). From the time of the Revolution of 1917 the cul­ tural practices of the Jews in the Soviet Union have undergone significant changes. Throughout most of the period since the Revolution the Jews have sought to identify with the larger Soviet system. Had Soviet policy on the nationality question served Jews well, there might not be a Jewish question in the USSR today; but, because of Soviet policy, identification as a Russified citizen provided greater social and economic advantages than identification as a Jew. Events both inside and outside of the Soviet Union since 1967 have brought about a change in strategy for the Soviet Jews. If they cannot realize their goals within Soviet society, perhaps they can leave the Soviet system through strong identification with the community of Jews throughout the world. What is happening in the Soviet Union regarding the Jews is an historically significant phenomenon for that country. It is the confrontation of a minority group 53 against the operative logic of a single party system that is structured along strict ideological lines. Few are willing to predict future official Soviet poli­ cies in the areas of human freedoms and the treatment of minority groups in the USSR, as there are critical gaps in our understanding of Soviet motives for the implementation of domestic and foreign policies. It is possible to speculate as to what best serves Soviet interest, and the Soviet government is not immune to the emergence of national consciousness among its own citizens. CHAPTER V

DATA PRESENTATION

The government of the USSR designates the Soviet Jewish people as a nationality group. This in itself does not categorize Soviet Jews as members of an ethnic group as defined in this study. The data presented here will validate or negate such an ethnic identity. The data is arranged within the framework of the cri­ teria by which an ethnic identification is evaluated.

Self-Ascription or Ascription The question was asked, Who is a Jew in the USSR? The informants' answers reflected their personal experi­ ences and those of their families. In the revolution­ ary period self-ascription or ascription as Jews did not appear to be a significant feature of an identity. One informant explained the situation this way: My parents were born in the times of the common enthusiasm. They were inspired to build the Com­ munist life. The poor people, which my parents were, didn't think about comfort. They were happy only to build a new life. They didn't think of themselves as Jews, only as Communists (Informant No. 7). Regarding the same time period another person told about his grandfather: 54 55 My grandfather told me that nobody thought anymore about being Jewish. It was only important to work for the new society. He never stepped one foot into the synagogue. He said his new religion was Lenin (Informant No. 19). Another informant explained that his father had been a member of the Communist Party and had no interest in being Jewish, that religion had become an insignifi­ cant matter. In explaining who is a Jew in contemporary times, the informants generally responded that a Jew was some­ one that the government said was Jewish. The idea of ascription by others was presented typically in this form: I didn't know that I was a Jew until I went to school. My teacher said each student's name and nationality. After my name she said, Yevreika. My parents told me it made no difference, but it did. None of my friends had "Jew" after their names (Informant No. 10). This idea was echoed strongly by another person: When I was a boy, I found out that being Jewish was not a nationality. It was an insult. I didn't even know when I was very young that I was Jewish. As a boy, I tried to be unnoticed as a Jew. There is a pain, a sickness, not to be close with your own people, but there is nothing in your mind, nothing that is Jewish, and still it is hard to try to disapp'ear. There are two ways to be a Jew. The first is written on your passport, the second is written on your face. If you are Jewish on your face, then you really have problems. I don’t look Jewish, and sometimes I could pass (Informant No. 4). Ascription as a Jew was seen as a limitation on the status one informant could attain: I left at the high point in my career, but it became clear that I would not be allowed to defend my dis­ sertation. I never considered myself Jewish, but I was told that I was an "other" person and couldn't 56 be a professor. People who did not know me or my reputation would come to the institute and say, "Who is K? He is a Jew and not a member of the Party. Why is he allowed?" (Informant No. 2). All of the informants said that they had experienced anti-Semitism at some time in their lives. One informant believed that it was anti-Semitism that caused them to be Jewish. Another said that he had been handicapped because of his Jewish name. He had been called a Zion­ ist because of his name, and it had been impossible to avoid the double stigma of Judaism and Zionism and live as others did. Only one informant told of a positive experience of feeling Jewish: The only time I ever felt Jewish was when I saw Golda [Meir]. It was Rosh Hashanah, and I was twelve years old. She was on the street outside the Moscow synagogue, and there were thousands of people scream­ ing and pushing and shoving. It was wonderful. I didn't know there were so many Jews in Moscow. My mother was crying, and I began to cry too (Informant No. 9). The informants told not only who is Jewish in the USSR but also what the intra-group attitudes and obliga­ tions are. Sixteen informants believed there was a bond among members of the Jewish group. One individual said that his family had no friends who were non-Jews. He described this as a case of "seif-isolation." Jews were afraid to speak freely to non-Jews. He viewed this as an intolerable situation. It was agreed generally that the Jews felt a responsibility for one another, that it was inherent in the condition of being Jewish. One told of such a "connection": 57 Among the Jewish people there is a connection. It is not an official network, but it just exists. We are all connected. If someone makes a wrong deci­ sion, it will concern others. Among my colleagues at work, only a few are Jewish. If I make a wrong decision, another Jew will not be hired by my chief. It is a political process and it is automatic. Everyone is very nice and anti-Semitism is not appar­ ent. The political situation is like a chess game. My chief reminded me when I went out that he would never receive another Jew. This is not an insult. It is only that there are special rules of play (Informant No. 4). All supported the idea that there should be a connection among the Jewish people, but three individuals mentioned that it was a Jewish superior at work who had been responsible for their failures. One explained that his Jewish chairman wanted to avoid the suspicion that he would give a promotion to a Jew before a non-Jew. The other two said that Jewish chiefs had fired them. The strongest negative expression toward other Jews was pre­ sented this way: The Jews are not friends to each other. Everyone is separate and jealous. It is very strange, for we are all in the same position. We are all equally unhappy. Jews are supposed to help each other. But they seem almost to hate one another. In Russia they studied this long enough. If all the Soviets hate the Jews, soon they will hate each other (Informant No. 10).

Variable Cultural Forms -- a Standard for Behavior The changes that have occurred in Soviet society since the 1917 Revolution have influenced the cultural practices of the Jewish people. As the Jews had been excluded from the cities in the earlier period, there was minimal interaction with other groups and very 58 limited opportunity for secular education. Now the Jews live predominantly in the cities and have nega­ tive attitudes toward the small towns. All of the informants explained that it is essential to live in the larger Soviet cities if one is to receive a super­ ior education and access to goods and services. They believed the cities offer better opportunities to participate in intellectual and artistic activities. The smaller towns are viewed as provincial. Yet one informant admitted that Jews could advance much farther in small towns than in the cities. He commented: There are different kinds of anti-Semitism, differ­ ent levels in different places. In the Ukraine, it is the highest; in middle Russia, it is lower; and in Siberia, by comparison, it doesn't exist at all. Perhaps because there are so few Jews there. In the small towns people are not active anti-Semites, except maybe in the Ukraine and in Byleorussia. There are no written rules about what can and cannot be done about the Jews. In a small town, a Jew can be the director of an institute. In the cities, the Central Committee would never accept it (Informant No. 6). Another informant had received his education in an Asian city and believed that he had encountered no anti-Jewish discrimination. He said that the common people in small towns do not think like the anti-Semites in the cities. Yiddish, a long associated cultural form for the Jews of the old Russian society, has disappeared in Soviet society. None of the informants speak Yiddish, and they understand very few words in that language. One informant commented, "Who knows Yiddish anymore?" Five of the informants said that their parents had spoken 59 Yiddish, but only with their friends, not with their children. One informant explained that the young Jews in the USSR were petitioning the government to allow the teaching of Hebrew, not Yiddish. None of the informants in this study had any knowledge of Hebrew. All of the informants told of the absence of syna­ gogues or of the non-attendance at worship services. One told about the closing of the synagogues in his home city: At one time there were three or four synagogues in K. One is now a warehouse, another a sports hall, another a cultural center, and, I think, there was a synagogue where the planetarium is now. Only the Jews know that these were once synagogues. The way they were closed was very smart on the government's side. The officials got people to write letters saying that the buildings could be put to better use, that no one went to the synagogues. They were closed very quietly. By 1932, they were all closed. I was never in a synagogue. Your name is taken if you go. It is not worth it. They say the one in Moscow is watched by the KGB (Informant No. 13). Another informant said that a synagogue that had been built in his city before the Revolution had been closed in 1939 and had remained empty—unconverted—from that time. Everyone, even non-Jews, knew that it had been a synagogue. Synagogue attendance was dismissed as an activity of the old by ten of the informants. One described the situ­ ation in this way: Only the old go to the synagogue in Moscow. Some say that the rabbi is part of the KGB. The synagogue is the only place to meet. It is a symbol. It doesn't matter what is happening inside (Informant No. 19). 60 None of the informants spoke of participating in ritual ceremonies. One informant explained that she had wanted her son to be circumcised, but there had been no one to perform the service. It was illegal. No one had attended a Bar Mitzvah service in the USSR. One inform­ ant recalled an early experience concerning that ritual: When I was twelve, from out of nowhere, my father took it into his head that I should be a Bar Mitzvah. My mother was entirely against it. I remember that she and my uncle argued with my father about this. My uncle kept saying that it would go against me at school, that I wouldn’t pass my examinations. My father kept arguing, "What has it to do with school?" I remember that this went on and on. Naturally, I was not Bar Mitzvah. As for me, I was relieved (Informant No. 18). The Jewish holidays that were identified by the informants as important were the holy days of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, and Passover. Seven had attended at some time a service for the New Year, and six had celebrated a Passover seder. Four had participated in both services. Hanukkah, a popular American Jewish cele­ bration that commemorates an historic military victory for the Jews, was not celebrated by any of the informants. Five had never heard of the holiday. Although the lit­ erature on Soviet Jewry describes large gatherings of Jews outside the major synagogues on the holiday of Sim- chat Torah, no one in this study had participated in such a gathering. On the larger question of religious belief the informants said that perhaps some people believed in God. As a group they were not very expressive on the subject, 61 and individually most of them were not certain what they believed about the existence of a deity. One informant, however, expressed this opinion: I am an atheist. I don't believe in God. I am a scientist. Knowledge interferes with religion. Very few in Russia believe in anything, not only against God. I have gone to synagogue here, but it is too late for believing in God. I believe in technology (Informant No. 1). Two informants who identified themselves as members of the intelligentsia thought that there has been a reac­ tion against the atheism of Communist Ideology. One thought that only religion gives moral principles, but the other one believed that the Jews go to the syna­ gogues only as a way to contact others and as an expres­ sion of nationalism. He said that it is a feeling of solidarity that religion brings to the educated people. Education, an important Jewish cultural value, was an area of concern for the Jews. All the inform­ ants talked at length about university and employment opportunities in the USSR. Incidences of discrimina­ tion or anxiety about that possibility were recounted by almost all of those interviewed. One informant explained his ideas of the government's policy toward the Jews: The policy is to condition the Jewish people to accepting a lower level of social position, to what was a fact before the Revolution. When Jewish peo­ ple do not try to advance themselves, when they do not try to enter the universities or the institutes, then there is very little discrimination against them. But when they try to achieve a high level of success, 62 then they meet with a wall of bayonets. Some, in spite of the difficulties, pass through the wall and take a good position. They cannot take a top level government or management position, but especially in science they can succeed (Informant No. 2). Without exception, all spoke of low quotas for Jews in the institutes and universities. They said that it was almost impossible for most Jewish students to pass the examinations, but four added that the lines for the institutes were long for everyone. The quota system affects all nationalities. Sometimes it is difficult to be a Russian, for there may be too many Russians, and it is better to be a Latvian or a Ukrainian. Still, all said it was always more difficult for a Jew. One informant acknowledged that he had secured a very respected position, but conditions were deteriorating, and his son would never be admitted to a prestigious institute. The Jewish value for education was expressed by one informant in this way: The Jewish people are not ambitious for money and special markets and shops. They are interested in research and education. It is here that they are being discriminated against. The government wants you to keep silent, to use no initiative (Inform­ ant No. 19). In the employment question all expressed the concern that even if Jews did obtain acceptable jobs, they were not allowed to advance in their field. Two informants brought up the point that it was not only their Jewish­ ness that limited their opportunities, but also their aggressive attitudes that are not acceptable in Soviet 63 society. They described themselves as too independent. One said, "If you like decisions made from the 'top,* then you will like living in Russia" (Informant No. 16). Three informants believed that the Jews were not the only ones who experience discrimination in employment. One expressed the situation this way: I was told not to think that I had not been hired because I am a Jew. The institute did not want any foreigner, Russian, Latvian, or anyone who was not a Ukrainian (Informant No. 13). One informant explained that it was not only the dis­ crimination in the work situation, but also the "cult of personality" and the presence of the KGB in all aspects of life that had turned him against Soviet life.

Strategy and the Corporate Group For all of the informants, with one exception, the Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967 marked the point at which they actively took steps to emigrate. Half said that until 1967 emigration had been only a dream. The others said that they had not considered emigration before the Six-Day War. Seven informants said that the incidence of anti-Semitism increased at the time of the War. One individual who, in June 1967, had been visit­ ing in Vilinus, an activist center, said he had been caught up in the excitement and had never thought of leaving before that visit. Three informants said that they began reading samizdat about Israel, and the litera­ ture helped them to develop a Jewish consciousness about the Israeli nation. 64 The one informant who did not cite the Six-Day War as the event that prompted his emigration, explained that it was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that made him ashamed to be a Russian. This same individual also believed that eight out of ten Soviet Jews experience no difficulty in emigrating. He thought that it is only "chance" that causes some exit visas to be denied. All believed that applying for an exit visa put a Jew in a special position that was sometimes precarious. One informant related the following: You are a hero if you try to leave, but you are caught between two fires. You can be proud of your­ self, but you can't work. You are insulted as a Jew. Now in Russia it is as if you are a foreigner in your own country. There is also envy. You are the only one who can get a letter or a parcel from abroad. Other Soviet citizens almost never can do this (Informant No. 22). One informant explained how the internal passport has become a strategically sensitive document: When I went to apply for a job, they wouldn't tell me the real reason that they wouldn't employ me. Sometimes someone would tell me, "Change your pass­ port, and I will hire you." I asked them how it is possible to change my passport, and they said that for money all is possible. But if one is to change his passport, then he gives up the chance to be able to leave (Informant No. 7). Another told of a new development in the passport issue. If one spouse is Jewish, now both will use the Jewish nationality on their passports to take advantage of the potential to leave. Each informant described his individual experience 65 in applying for an exit visa. These two accounts are representative generally of the experiences of the entire group. There are so many formal papers. It is very difficult, and people would confuse you with pulling the time [putting you off]. Your parents have to sign a paper that they have no money claim on you. You have a special work book, and you have to return to your last work for a signature. They have to receive you and give you a recommendation. There is no reason for this. It is only to harass you. There is no law that you must do this. Sometimes your superior will refuse. For some people, this is the only reason that they can't get permission to leave. The rental office at your apartment must give you a release. Your diploma has to be returned, and the university refuses to co-operate. They told me that they didn't want back my diploma. You see, from one side, it is offi­ cial policy to receive all this clearance, and, on the other side, no one will co-operate with it (Informant No. 7).

It is necessary to leave work if you apply for a visa. It is not written, but you will make trouble for your chief if you do not leave. According to the Consti­ tution a person has the right to work, and I wanted to stay. But OVIR sent a letter to my chief, telling him that I had applied to leave. A meeting was called of my colleagues, and I was pronounced a trai­ tor and expelled from my trade union. They wanted to send a letter to my institute to rescind my doctorate. It was impossible to work in such an atmosphere (Informant No. 3). All left work at least six weeks before emigrating with the exception of one person who worked until the day before he left and did not consider that an unusual sit­ uation . The informants told of contacts that are available for potential emigres. People they had not known prior to their applying to leave came forward with money and with "relatives" in Israel who would send them a vyzov. 66 Most had sent out two or more requests for invitations and had waited approximately two months for a vyzov to reach them. One described the highly publicized issue of the refusenik: Nobody who wants to emigrate can afford to stay at their work. Some have not worked for five years. They are the refuseniks, which means "to be in refuse." There is a good organization for them. There is money that comes from Israel and from the United States so they can live. All the refuseniks have good contacts (Informant No. 17). He added that "small Jews" have to make arrangements on their own. However, all agreed, with one exception, that those who had helped them had been Jews who had been directly involved with the emigration movement. The one exception said that a Russian official had done the most for her by approving her application. Without his help she believed that she would be waiting to leave still. An informant who identified himself as a dissident said he had been allowed to leave quite easily. He thought that the government was more afraid of its intelli­ gentsia than of any external enemy, and that the Soviets want the dissidents out. He said that members of the intelligentsia are often told to leave. Without having the proper papers processed, these people are sent to Israel, Jewish or not. Some told of relatives or friends who would not emigrate. Some were too old to give up their pensions and begin a new life. Others would not have the courage to leave, and some of their relatives and friends were 67 married to non-Jews who would not be allowed to go out of the country. The idea that Jews are the fifth column in every country and that only by organizing can they live as "human beings" was presented by one person who said that he had been outspoken in the USSR after years of being quiet. He said that he had realized finally that the Soviet government gambled and bluffed a lot, and that anyone who would stand up to the government had a good chance to succeed. While six people expressed fear toward the govern­ ment or, more directly, toward the KGB, eight others said that they had spoken out against the policies of the Soviet government. One said that the dogma that the government preached, to make life better, has failed, and the dogma is not even proclaimed anymore. As one informant observed, "Soviet propaganda says that every­ body is equal, but it is only the second class that is equal, not the privileged" (Informant No. 7). Another insisted that the "crumbs of anti-Semitism are spread around by the government, not the common people" (Inform­ ant No. 22). Twelve informants said that one could find a way around the Soviet policies, except the one on university quotas. Five of these individuals thought that perhaps quotas too could be overcome if a strong enough protest were to reach the officials. 68 The final chapter will analyze what the informants have described and explained. We will determine whether these people in their attitudes and perceptions display the characteristics of an ethnic identity. CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion of Data Certain characteristics and patterns can be delineated from the data. The informants define them­ selves in the context of the "inside-outside" boundary. Although other national groups may be penalized through the quota system, it is being Jewish that produces the most negative treatment. Anti-Semitism appears as the dominant theme in boundary maintenance. It is Barth’s thesis that boundary maintenance is the critical ele­ ment in the concept of ethnic groups. The informants in this study identify themselves as Jews. There is evidence that a Jewish identity was weak at the time of the Revolution of 1917. The humanistic ideals of internationalism were accepted by the Jews; they believed that these ideals applied to them, as well as to the rest of Soviet society. In the 1970s nothing remains of this internationalism. Identification as Jews is the result of ascription by the government. The ques­ tion for these informants is not whether they consider themselves Jews, but rather what conclusion they draw from being Jewish. 69 70 The common denominator of being Jewish is the cognitive one. It is not a primordial sentiment. It is the knowledge that anti-Semitism plays a role in their lives. This knowledge has produced a negative consciousness, a feeling of tension as a result of being different from others in the Soviet society. Anti-Israel propaganda also plays a role in shaping this negative Jewish consciousness. An important aspect in identifying with a group includes one's analysis of the attributes of the group. Herman (1977) cites three level of identifica­ tion with a group: 1) cognitive--When is group member­ ship a salient factor in consciousness? 2) affective— What attracts one to or repeals one from the group? and 3) behavioral—Does group membership include obli­ gations to action? The attitudes of the informants toward other members of the Jewish group, based on experiences in the Soviet Union, were variable. While some saw Jews as their only network of support, others did not. Several believed that in certain situations, for example, employment, other Jews could be adversar­ ies. Everyone believed that there should be a connec­ tion among Jews and that Jews have an obligation to each other. All of the informants come from urban ureas. The urban nature of the group is representative of Sov­ iet Jewry as a whole. The Jewish population is 71 concentrated in the larger communities: 98% live in urban areas, with 267O of all the Jews in the three largest cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. Those who inhabit large centers of population are the most exposed to a variety of cultural influences and come into contact with people of other nationalities. In the large cities more opportunities exist for attaining a higher education. These are strong factors for assimilation. Although LeVine (1963) does not believe that urbanization in itself leads to the dissolution of traditional cultures and to assimilation of ethnic minorities, Soviet urbanization had these consequences for the Jews. Soviet cities were focal points of revo­ lutionary, anti-traditional efforts and did not develop ethnic neighborhoods. At the time of the Revolution of 1917 the militant Bolshevik hero served as a new model. The Jewish Bolsheviks were alienated from their traditional culture. The young saw a chance to escape the stigma of shtetl image and to adopt a new role. The decline in Jewish culture at the time of the Revo­ lution was a part of a broader systematic change that was affecting all areas of Soviet life. Jews in stra­ tegic urban centers could not pursue a distinct develop­ ment. The Soviet system was committed to a new histor­ ical community, the Soviet people. Jewish culture had been discredited. Russian culture appeared to be of much greater practical value for most. Rass and Brafman 72 believe that the Jews applied their traditional values of education and high achievement motivation to the ideals of the socialist revolution (1976). It is language that the Soviet government regards as a basic component of nationality. The Soviets con­ tinue to disseminate information through national lan­ guage newspapers that remain nationalistic in form and socialistic in content. Here is a basic paradox for both the government and for the Jews. The informants are representative of the Soviet Jewish population, speaking Russian, not Yiddish. This is the basis of the official Soviet view that the Jews are completely assimilated linguistically and culturally with the Russians or with the dominant nationality of the repub­ lic in which they live, while continuing to classify them as a separate national group. Gitelman (1972) suggests that the Yiddish language might have been pre­ served if the Jews had settled their own territory. The Yiddish language, one component of a traditional Jewish identity, has disappeared among educated Jews in the Soviet Union. The outstanding feature of the informants* his­ tories is the absence of other traditional cultural forms that have identified the Jews from the time of the Diaspora. As a group, they share very few charac­ teristics with the Jewish community outside the Soviet Union. There is no regular attendance at the synagogues, 73 little celebration of the traditional Jewish holidays, and no ritual observance of the life cycle rites. Sixty years of atheistic Soviet rule have left their mark on the Jews. For many Western Jews it is difficult to separate out the religious component of their identity. For the Soviet Jews in this study, religion does not appear to be an important feature of their identity. Religious practices are weakest in urban areas of the Soviet Union, the areas in which the Soviet Jews are concentrated. The synagogue is seen as a ’'symbol.11 Most of the informants had never been inside a religious institution of any kind in the USSR. Atheism is one area in which the Soviet ideology appears to be generally successful. One informant spoke of a religious revival in Russia. It is too soon to evaluate the success of such a movement. Communism has in it­ self all the features of religion, promising its believers a messianic future. A leading Russian philos­ opher of religion, Berdyaev states: Communism, both as theory and as a practice, is not only a social phenomenon, but also a spiritual and religious phenomenon. And it is formidable precisely as a religion.... It has its dogmas and its dogmatic morals, has even the beginnings of its own cult; it takes possession of the whole soul and calls forth enthusiasm and self-sacrifice (Baron 1976 p.337). Baron (1976) explains why Communism appealed to the Jews, especially the young ones who had grown impatient with the narrow particularistic traditions of their own Orthodox Judaism. By emphasizing secularism, and by 74 refraining from demanding any religious initiation, which necessarily placed upon the convert the formal sign of betrayal of his former faith, Communism appeared as the ultimate liberation movement for all. It prom­ ised a civilization to which Jews, among others, could abandon their old identity. Some of the informants wear Jewish stars or the Hebrew word for "life" around their necks. These are Jewish symbols, but for this group they do not represent the expression of religious ideas. They are Levy's "selected cultural forms," the "flexible banners" by which group members express their choice of appropriate behavior and action. Soviet policy from the time of the Revolution, through positive and negative incentives, has encouraged the assimilation of the Jews. It was believed that Jewish consciousness would disappear if the Jewish institutional structure was dismantled. Inter-marriage provided the option to erase the Jewish nationality identity from children’s passports. Baron (1976) main­ tains that inter-marriage among ethnic groups, particu­ larly among Jews and non-Jews, was favorably viewed by the government as a way to overcome the nationalistic sentiments of either mate and to help create the ideal Soviet citizen. It was expected that in a short time such couples would raise completely Russified children and fit them into the new mold. The goal was a nation­ ally monolithic population. Korey (1973) observes that 75 the majority of Soviet Jews did and continue to choose assimilation into the larger Soviet system. However, the loss of distinctive cultural forms did not result in a complete loss of ethnic awareness, for the govern­ ment, through tactics such as passport identification, continued to remind this group that they were Jews. The informants expressed concern about their opportunities to advance in the areas of education and employment because of the discriminatory practices that they perceived. Voronel (1975) thinks that anti- Jewish discrimination in the Soviet Union today is subtle. He believes it is linked to social and occupa­ tional mobility. The informants spoke of low quotas for Jews in the universities. If one will accept an infe­ rior job and not try to advance, he will not suffer dis­ crimination; but if he wishes to introduce new ideas or reach a higher level in his work, he will face dis­ crimination. Altshuler (1970) indicates that high status is a concomitant of a respected work situation for the Soviet citizens. Any perceived barrier in work opportunities represents a loss of meaning to their lives. A negative consciousness inevitably emerges as a result of perceived discriminatory practices in the denial of access to institutions of higher education and the lack of promotional prospects at the place of work. 76 Since 1967 events have occurred that have fur­ nished positive content to Jewish identity. The Six- Day War provided a rallying point for cohesive group action. The Israelis demonstrated an assertive and heroic model of Jewish identity. Although the inform­ ants in this study did not want to immigrate to Israel, they did understand that Israel represented the way out of the perceived deadlock in Soviet society, for the Soviet government would allow such an immigration. All the informants, with the exception of one individual, cited the Six-Day War as the beginning of a new Jewish consciousness for them and for their friends. It was as a result of the War that they made an active deci­ sion to leave the Soviet Union. In order to gain per­ mission to emigrate they had to ’’announce" that they were Jews. Despres (1975b p.199) asserts that "ethnic boundaries express some organization of status identi­ ties to which status claims of one type or another are attached." The "claim" or right that the Jewish group was pressing was their right to go to Israel to join their families. In another article, Despres (1975a p.143) observes that "social identities can and do vary according to circumstance and situation." Until the Six-Day War there was no active, cohesive Jewish movement in the USSR. Although the announcement that one was Jewish pre­ sented the traditional and perhaps accelerated 77 disadvantages in contemporary Soviet life, for the first time being Jewish provided an advantage. Jacoby (Hirszowic 1977 p.6) comments, in regard to this situa­ tion, "For every Jew who was proud there must have been one who was scared and tried to declare himself as being of another nationality." This may be true in a general sense, but for the informants in this study, it does not apply. The individuals in this study made a conscious choice to identify as Jews in order to leave the Soviet Union. What is operating here is Barth's concept of a strategically invoked cultural form. In this case it is the symbol of aliyah, return to the ancient homeland, that is utilized to obtain a particular goal. The experiences of the informants in obtaining permission to emigrate from the USSR document the information provided by such observers as Korey (1974) and Schroeter (1972). Soviet policy is arbitrary and capricious, and all spoke of general harassment and confusion in obtaining the proper papers for exit visas. All told of the prohibitive cost of emigration, and, with one exception, all had left their work through voluntary resignations or dismissals at least one month prior to their emigration. They expressed a general sense of apprehension and anxiety for that period, but they were committed to the goal of leaving. It is interesting to note that while most migration 78 movements involve people who have been less successful in their home country, this group is composed of indi­ viduals who were successful, at least in the economic sphere. The informants believed they had been econom­ ically successful in Soviet life in comparison to other people, but they were pessimistic about their future or their children's opportunities in Soviet society. Eisenstadt (1954) views the migrant as unable to attain some level of aspiration, gratify expectations, or ful­ fill a particular role in his home community. Histor­ ically, Jewish migrations have not been prompted only by economic incentives but have been connected with feelings of lack of security and solidarity within a country. For the Jews, there has been almost no return migration. The prediction made by Pobedonostev concerning the future of the Jewish population in Russia, that one-third would assimilate, one-third would emigrate, and one-third would be annihilated, did not allow for an alternative possibility that has occurred. There is evidence that a corporate Jewish group has emerged in the Soviet Union. Although the informants in this study had suc­ cessfully achieved their demand for the right to emi­ grate, they spoke of relatives and friends who would not leave the USSR. The demands of the Jewish group in the Soviet Union are also focused on the human rights issues within the country. Some of the informants said that 79 the government could be forced to comply with the demands of individuals and groups if enough pressure is brought to bear on those who make policy. Regarding the emigration issue, it is evident that the Soviet Jewish immigrants in this study demon­ strated the determination to succeed. They were involved in networks that aided them in effecting their emigration, and some attributed their success to the efforts of people they had not known before they de­ cided to emigrate. There is evidence that the Jewish group has influenced Soviet policy. Since 1967 over 150,000 Soviet Jews have been allowed to leave the USSR. This represents a reversal of a Soviet internal policy. The extent of the Soviet Jewish influence is difficult to assess, but the group appears to be organized in an effort to promote the strategic advantage of emigration. The attitudes expressed by the group toward the Soviet system reflect the alienation one would expect to find from a group that chose to leave. The cyni­ cism toward government policy, the suspicion and the disillusionment concerning the government's motivation, and the self-interest served by the Soviet officials, are evidence of generalized hostility toward the system. The informants attribute anti-Semitic feelings of non­ Jews more to government initiative than to general atti­ tudes of the people. Shaffer observes: 80 ...under a totalitarian system there is not nec­ essarily a direct relationship between folk (emo­ tional) anti-Semitism. Under the conditions of a single party system, with a single dogma, preached by the Party and the State, official anti-Semitism or discrimination does not arise from the grass roots level and, therefore, needs no mass movement in order to succeed (Shaffer 1974 pp.147-48). In general, the informants indicated that the Soviet government lies to its people on all issues. As one informant commented, "If the government says it is 'black,* then I know it must be ’white,’ absolutely" (Informant No. 15).

Conclusions The object of this study was to investigate a group of Soviet Jewish immigrants to discover whether they represent an ethnic group according to a definition that incorporates criteria established by Barth and modified by Levy. Barth (1969) identifies the critical characteristics of such a group: 1) self-ascription or ascription by others, 2) a value orientation or stand­ ard for behavior represented by cultural forms that mark the group off from other groups, and 3) the stra­ tegic, cognitive employment of these cultural forms to obtain a desired goal. Levy (1975) modified this con­ cept, pointing out that the cultural forms utilized by a group could be extremely variable or diffuse. In certain situations, they could be absent. Each succeed­ ing generation of Jews in the Soviet Union has been faced with the increasingly more difficult problem 81 of relating to a traditional Jewish identity. The Jewish value orientation could not be retained intact, as the entire historical context in which it existed had been dissolved. The cultural forms employed by the group have been transformed, but they still repre­ sent a particular standard for behavior. The ideals of education and achievement can be recognized in the new context. The informants in this study demonstrate the characteristics of the ethnic group as delineated by Barth. In their case, self-ascription is the result of ascription by the Soviet government. Their identi­ fication as Jews is to a large extent the result of their rejection by the Soviet system. They are the ’’other" people in Soviet society. However, in regard to the Jews, there is no general agreement whether boundary maintenance is a deliberate marking off or otherwise imposed by the "outside" group. Ginsberg (1956) argues that as far as the Jews are concerned, it is their refusal to become Christians as much as their positive adherence to Judaism that throughout the history of the Diaspora has kept them separate. This is an echo of Weber and Parsons' (Parsons 1972 p.197) view that the Jewish case was one to a very large extent "the ritual self-exclusion rather than imposed exclusion by Gentile." There are other voices, in accord with Einstein (Goodman 1976), who believe 82 that more than on its own tradition, the Jewish group matured on the basis of the oppression and hatred it encountered in the world. Whichever view one maintains, the end is the same: a category of people who are called Jews. Barth believes that the ethnic identity is superordinate to other statuses and defines the per- missable constellations of statuses or social person­ alities a person may assume. Isaacs (1975) adds that any secondary sources of identity, such as class, edu­ cation, or occupation,serve only where basic group identity differences do not interfere. As a group, the informants reveal a particular value orientation. Einstein (Goodman 1976) delineates two characteristic features inherent in Jewish identity: 1) the democratic ideal of social justice and 2) high esteem for every form of intellectual striving. Aliena­ tion from the Soviet system can be viewed as the nega­ tive result of official exclusion, the result of margin­ ality, or it can be expressed positively. The Jews embraced the principles of the Revolution of 1917. The failure of the Soviet government to promote demo­ cratic institutions and equality and freedom for indi­ viduals and groups caused disillusionment and aliena­ tion. The Jews left the synagogues, but they did not abandon their traditional cultural values. They attempted to translate these values into the broader structure of the new society. The existence of a 83 definable community of over two million Jews in the Soviet Union sixty years after the Revolution is a contradiction to the ideals of the socialist state. The Jews tried to assimilate, but the process was slow even when the conditions were conducive. A former Soviet activist now living in Israel, Alex Feldman (Schroeter 1974 p.357), observes: "The reasons for this are probably to be found somewhere in the irrational, otherwise it is impossible to explain why the Jewish people, never very numerous, still exist." Park (1950) called the emancipated Jew historically and typically the marginal man. The Jew was a cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples, never quite willing to break, even if he were allowed to do so, with his past and his traditions and not quite accepted because of racial prejudice. He was the man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused. The informants in this study are people who have made a strategic choice, based on their perceptions of the situation in the Soviet Union. Evidence indicates that at specific periods in the life cycle the Jews in the USSR are more likely to encounter discrimination than at other times. In the areas of education and occupation, the opportunities for advancement appear limited. It is their perception of "narrow doors to 84 pass through" that has caused them to activate an altern­ ative strategy for a chance to succeed. A certain per­ centage of Jewish students always will be found in Soviet universities, but the percentage is diminishing as places must be found for other nationality groups seeking a higher education. According to Altshuler (1973) the message in employment is more subtle than that in the university quota system: Don't hire, don't fire, and don't promote. All Soviet Jews will not choose to emigrate. The growing militancy and activism of the Jewish group in the Soviet Union, a long silent people, is evidence that they have undertaken a new direction in their efforts to improve the quality of their lives within the system. They are manipulating and utilizing vari­ ous networks in the manner of a corporate group. Although the major press has been for emigration, it is possible that Jews will remain in the USSR, intent on pressuring the government on the issue of individual and group rights. The assertion of ethnic identity as a vehicle for political advantage has caught up with the Soviet situation. Observers believe that the Soviet regime is increasingly sensitive to this development, and this may be one reason why the government is willing to get rid of a nuisance element and also make conces­ sions to the dissidents who stir up agitation among the numerous national minorities in the Soviet society. 85 The individuals in this study can be described in the following way: 1) they are highly educated; 2) they lack a traditional Jewish consciousness; 3) they are not part of the Zionist movement; 4) they were in many ways assimilated or Russified in the USSR; and 5) they have made a discovery of ancient Jewish symbols as a definition of identity. Rass notes: ...these Soviet Jews remind us that in the midst of change, values can remain constant. They have cre­ ated a second exodus of the Jews and in so doing they project a continuum of ideas and human values that extend unbroken for thousands of years (Rass and Brafman 1976 p.225). When the Soviet Jews confront their government on the emi­ gration issue with the words, "Let my people go I" it does not matter whether or not they know the ancient story of the Jewish bondage in Egypt. They have invoked a tra­ ditional cultural symbol to effect a social organiza­ tion, and in doing this, they become part of an ethnic group. The concept of the ethnic group has moved away from Narroll's description of the biological self- perpetuating group that shares cultural traditions as a result of a common ancestry. The current view of the ethnic group as a strategy for solving problems, getting what is wanted and needed, emphasizes the cognitive construction of an identity for the individual and for the group out of variable, traditional cultural symbols. 86 It is this definition of an ethnic identity that this study of Soviet Jewish immigrants supports, and it is within this definition that the immigrants represent an ethnic group. LITERATURE CITED

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