BEYOND A CONTEST OF WILLS: A THEORY OF STATE SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN INSURGENT CONFLICTS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University BY Christopher David Moore, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2008 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Donald A. Sylvan, Advisor Professor Richard K. Herrmann, Advisor Professor John Mueller _______________________________ Professor Alexander Thompson Adviser Political Science Graduate Program ABSTRACT Within a large and growing literature on insurgencies, scholars have engaged in fierce debate about the determinants of conflict outcomes. Having noted that material capability is a poor predictor of conflict outcomes, intense disagreement has arisen over why this is the case. Some argue that insurgencies are defeated through military and police means of punishment and prosecution. This is referred to as the combat model. Others argue that insurgencies are ultimately defeated through political means, and I refer to this as the social model. Why each of these two processes is thought to be more effective is rarely well explained or specified by their proponents. Because each of these model yields different and competing expectations for the outcomes of insurgent conflicts, I evaluate their relative merits in this study. To evaluate these two competing schools of thought in the security studies literature, I present a conditional theory of insurgent outcomes that predicts when the combat and social models will be relevant. In order to do this, I approach insurgencies using scholarship from the study of terrorism, deriving three archetypical motivational logics of insurgency action: strategic, organizational, and extremist. From the scholarship on insurgencies, I also develop a typology of counterinsurgency strategies focusing on three broad but distinct strategic approaches: policing, accommodation, and reciprocal punishment. The ii combination of a particular insurgent motivation with a particular counterinsurgent strategy will result in an increase or decrease in insurgent violence. I hypothesize that this conditional model will better predict insurgent outcomes than either the combat model or the social model alone. However, even if it does not, its evaluation will still serve as a useful comparison of the relative merits of those two models. To test the model I code statements made by leaders of insurgencies to discern their motivations and compare these codings to the organizational dynamics and actions of the insurgency to arrive at a categorization of the group according to one of the dynamics I described. I also code statements and policies enacted by the government that make up its counterinsurgency strategy in order to arrive a coding of its strategic behavior. Based on the combination of these two codings, I predict either insurgent success or failure in that given time period. Then, I track insurgent incidents and insurgent-caused fatalities as a means of evaluating this prediction. I make predictions and evaluate their results in four case studies: The Chechen insurgency against Russia (1994-present), the PIRA insurgency against Great Britain (1969-1999), the LTTE insurgency against Sri Lanka (1976-present), and the Algerian insurgency against France (1954-1962). I find that the conditional model of insurgent conflict correctly predicts the change in insurgent violence in nine of 14 strategic periods, representing 75 of the total 97 years under analysis. The social model correctly predicts 10 of the 14 strategic periods, representing 70 of the 97 years. The combat model correctly predicts four of the 14 strategic periods, representing 27 of the 97 years. Overall, I found that the conditional iii performs as well as the social model in predicting insurgent conflict outcomes, and much better than the combat model. The results of this study indicate that scholars of insurgency and violence in general should give greater consideration to both the strategic choices of states and the motivations of the insurgents themselves. iv Dedicated to my amazing wife, Stacy. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply indebted to a vast number of people who have helped me see the completion of this dissertation. Writing might be a lonely business, but scholarship is not. I have been blessed to be in midst of number of people whose advice, encouragement, and direction have assisted me professionally and ultimately improved my work. Amongst the many, several deserve special mention. This dissertation would not be what it is, or possibly even anything at all, without the attention of Don Sylvan. Don has always been the ideal advisor: patient, caring, attentive, and selfless with his time and energy. I have continually benefited from Don’s willingness to pour over minor and iterative changes to this dissertation while continuing to think about their impact on the project as a whole. I have learned an immense amount from Don, not only about political science, but also about how I want to conduct myself as a scholar, a teacher, and a mentor. Don, I am so pleased to be number thirty-one. My other committee members have also been a great help in completing this project. Rick Herrmann provided consistently valuable advice and saved me from serious pitfalls on several occasions. Beyond this project, Rick has given me astute guidance in conduct of social science and profession of political science. I am grateful for both. John Mueller has been an energetic and encouraging source of ideas throughout my work on this project. I was inspired to study non-state actors because of his graduate vi seminars and this work is much improved because of his critiques and suggestions. Alex Thompson deserves special recognition for stepping into my committee very late in the process and contributing wonderful insight. I very much appreciate it. In addition to my committee, a large number of scholars have been generous with their time and resources. I apologize to those I have accidentally omitted, but I owe thanks to Bill Thomas, Warren Chin, William Zartman, Jack Kalpakian, Mark Hamilton, Timothy Hoyt, Richard Lacquement, Martha Crenshaw, Andrew Grossman, Mia Bloom, and James Dingley. I have been blessed to be in graduate school with a number of colleagues who have tried to make me a better scholar. Special thanks for their advice or input on this project go to Vaughn Shannon, Brent Strathman, Bridget Coggins, Yohanes Sulaiman, Jeff Martinson, Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Haftel, Paul Fritz, Tom Dolan, and Nathan Toronto. Thank-you all for making graduate school a more pleasant and rewarding experience for me. As this is my first acknowledge section, I would be remiss if I did not thank my family, starting with my parents, David and Cheryl. I am not sure that they ever imagined me growing up to be a political scientist, but they were instrumental in preparing me to be one. They could not have been more supportive and for that, I am truly grateful. I must also express appreciation to my wonderfully encouraging mother- in-law Gail and my brother-in-law Josh. Thank-you all so much for your love and prayers. Finally, I must thank the person to whom this dissertation is dedicated, my wife. Stacy has been a constant source of encouragement, love, and joy throughout the vii completion of this project. It was not her idea to become well acquainted with violent insurgencies, but she has gone along graciously with it anyway. I cannot imagine a better partner and that is why this project is dedicated to her. viii VITA January 26, 1978…………………………Born – Montpelier, Ohio 2000………………………………………B.A. Political Science Albion College 2003………………………………………M.A. Political Science The Ohio State University 2003 - Present….........................................Graduate Teaching and Research Associate The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations Minor Field: Political Psychology ix TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………v Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………….vi Vita………………………………………………………………………………………..ix List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………...xiv Chapters: 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...1 Roadmap to the Dissertation………………………………………………………2 The Historical Development of Insurgency Scholarship………………………….7 The Study of Civil Wars…………………………………………………………13 The Study of Ethnic Conflict…………………………………………………….16 The Study of Terrorism…………………………………………………………..21 Terrorists as Strategic Actors…………………………………………….24 Terrorists as Organizationally Motivated Actors………………………...25 Terrorists as Extremist Actors…………………………………………...28 Dominant Models of Counterinsurgency Warfare……………………………….30 Drawing Links from the Literature and the Puzzle In Brief…..............................40 Plan of the Study…………………………………………………………………44 2. The Puzzle of Insurgent Conflict…………………………………………………….46 Introduction………………………………………………………………………46 The Puzzle: Research Questions…………………………………………………48 The Model in Summary………………………………………………………….49 Hypotheses……………………………………………………………….53 Variable Specifications…………………………………………………..55 The Dependent Variable…………………………………………55 The Independent Variable: The Strategy of the State……………56 Independent Variable: The Motivation of the Non-State Group...61 Elucidating the Proposed Model…………………………………………………62 Types of State Strategies: A Typology of Bargains……………………..65 The Strategic Logic………………………………………………81