#257 Political Parties in Western Siberia, August 1991-0ctober 1993: A Comparative Analysis by Grigorii Golosov

Grigorii Golosov is an Associate Professor in the Department of Social and Political Theory at Novosibirsk State University in Russia. He was a Short-term Scholar at the Kennan Institute during the 1993-1994 program year. The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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©June 1994 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Edited by Peggy Mcinerny POUTICAL pARTIES IN WESTERN SIBERIA, AuGusT 1991-0croBER 1993: A CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS by Grigorii Golosov TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements 1

Introduction 1

Section 1 9

Section2 17

Section3 27

Section4 34

SectionS 40

Conculsion 47

Abbreviations 56 ACKNO~EDGEMENTS

would like to express my I deep gratitude to Peter Pulzer, who gave unstint- ingly of his knowledge in helping me to conceptualize the problems dealt with in this article, and to Gabor Toka, who helped me relate my material to the problems of transition to democracy. I would further like to thank Richard Rose, Richard Sakwa, and Stephen Whitefield for their valuable com­ ments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. In Russia, many friends and colleagues have helped me to gather the empirical data used in this paper. I would like to mention in particular Valerii Demidov, Aleksandr Li­ fanov, and Aleksandr Malyshev. I must also express my gratitude to the Kennan Institute for Ad­ vanced Russian Studies, which made both my work on this arti­ cle and its publication possible; to the Institute of Russian, Soviet and East European Studies of the University of Oxford, and to the Political Science Department of the Central European University, for letting me use their facilities while conducting my research. Grants from the British Council, the Soros Foundation, the East European Exchange Program of the University of Oslo, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars are gratefully acknowledged. Grigorii Golosov

Acknowledgements i POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN SIBERIA, AUGUST 1991-0CTOBER 1993: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS by Grigorii Golosov

INTRODUCTION

or the past three years, deed, Russia appears to have an Fspecialists on new Russian extremely anarchic and ineffective politics have been look- party system which hardly de­ ing at the emergence of new po­ serves to be so labelled. If the litical parties in the country with skeptics are basically right, then considerable-althou¥h not always does it make any sense to do re­ explicit-controversy. Some ana­ search on this subject? One can lysts assume that "nongovern­ answer in the affirmative for two mental forces, including political different, interconnected reasons. parties and movements," even if One hypothesis holds that one not yet developed, nevertheless of the most important factors ex­ "play an important role in chan­ plaining the physiognomy and neling political developments" in functioning of a well-established Russia. The predominant view, party system is the organizational however, is that new Russian po­ history of the parties which con­ litical parties, or, as Michael stitute it. According to Angelo McFaul has put it, "proto-parties" Panebianco, "the characteristics of have not "aggregated social inter­ a party's origin are in fact capable ests, represented specific constitu­ of exerting a weight on its organ­ encies, structured the vote during izational structure even decades elections, or consequently served later. Every organization bears the as intermediaries between state mark of its formation, of the cru­ and society."3 Some analysts go cial political-administrative deci­ even further, arguing that these sions made by its founders, the formations are not even proto­ decisions which molded the parties, but rather pseudo-parties organization."5 Secondly, another whose attempts to survive into argument, which holds that once the next phase of Russian political established, party systems tend to development, whatever that may be stable,6 is also compelling, and be, are doomed to failure.4 In- provides grounds for believing

1. For a brief bibliography on a Russian multiparty system, see Alexander Dallin, ed., Political Partzes in Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 95-7. 2. See Nina Belyaeva, "Russian Democracy: Crisis as Progress," in Washington Quarterly (Spring 1993): 5. 3. Michael McFaul, "Party Fom1ation after Revolutionary Transitions: The Russian Case," in Political Parties in Russia, 7. 4. See Richard Sakwa, "Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia," in RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 31 (July 1993): 14-15. 5. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 50. 6. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Sidney Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party

1 that the study of new political son for studying new Russian po­ parties, even if weak and fragile, litical parties. may contribute to a better under­ Since the early 1940s it has standing of future Russian politics. been almost universally assumed Of course, it may be argued, as that the study of political parties does Richard Sakwa, that Russia is virtually a prerequisite to a real­ is likely to fail to develop an effec­ istic understanding of the prob­ tive party system because the lems of democracy, both in theory country has missed the golden and in action.8 As Richard Katz age of party politics? In democra­ has put it, "modem democracy is cies, however, even ineffective party democracy; the political in­ party systems matter. Whether stitutions and practices that are Russia will be condemned to end­ the essence of democratic govern­ less conflicts between small par­ ment in the Western view were ties or, beyond all expectations, the creations of political parties develops stable party rule, de­ and would be unthinkable with­ pends on the present state of out them."9 It is widely hypothe­ party politics in the country. sized that contemporary Russia is The objective of this article is experiencing the process of a tran­ not to predict the future. It is diffi­ sition to democracy, therefore the cult to forget how poorly social study of Russian political parties scientists, especially those in­ may result in a better under­ volved in Russian studies, have standing of the nature of this fared at prediction. Students of process. new Russian politics, however, That, briefly, is the major ob­ may hope that their contributions jective of this article. This argu­ will be useful to those who will ment is not, however, based on study the party system of demo­ the assumption that consolidated cratic Russia in retrospect. True, it democracy is the only possible cannot be taken for granted that outcome of the breakdown of an anyone will study Russian politi­ authoritarian regime. The collapse cal parties, as prospects for Rus­ of dictatorship in Russia may well sian democracy are far from be reversed or lead to a new certain. This brings us to another authoritarianism.10 The uncertain and probably more important rea- present is thus not presumed to be

Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Sidney Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64. 7. See Sakwa, "Parties and the Multiparty System," 14. 8. See Avery Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," in Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, ed. Roy C. Macridis (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). For an early but still important and convincing argument strongly focused on the contribution made by political parties to the advancement of democracy, see Elmer E. Schattscluleider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 1942). 9. Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 1. 10. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms

2 a mere prologue to the democratic than as, say, clubs? It would not future.1 be too difficult to prove that some Even if it is more or less clear of them, at least under certain why it is important to study new conditions, do perform as "real Russian political parties, there is parties," even if others obviously another, thornier question: How do not. Yet this argument does not does one study political forma­ resolve the problem as such, for tions that have little in common the problem has to do with theory, with the well-established parties not empirical data alone. of the west? There is a strong ar­ In fact, there appears to be a gument that claims a party can be deep-seated tradition to treat the understood solely within the con­ Soviet system as Accord­ text of the particular society in sui generis. which it operates. This position is ing to Thomas Remington, "some held, for instance, by Macintyre. scholars, impressed by how In relation to the mass parties of greatly the Soviet system differed Africa, such as that which devel­ from traditional dictatorship ... oped in Ghana under Nkrumah, pursued their studies in relative the author asks: isolation from other branches of social science."13 The collapse of Why do we think of these as parties, the Soviet Union has contributed rather than as, say, churches? The an­ swer that they have some of the to the advancement of alterna­ marks of American political parties, tive--basically, more compara­ and that they call themselves parties tive--approaches to Russian does nothing to show that in fact the politics. It takes time, however, to meaning of 'party' is not radically changed when the cultural context is break with old traditions. Further­ radically changed, or that even if it is more, the failure of Sovietology not changed the description has not (that is, its inability to anticipate 12 become inapplicable. the fall of communism) is often Indeed, it makes complete explained by accusing it of misin­ sense to address a similar ques­ terpreting the realities of Russia in tion to students of new Russian rationalistic, optimistic terms in­ parties: why do we think of these vented by western social scien­ organizations as parties rather tists.14

in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51. 11. The disadvanta~es entailed by such an approach are discussed in Valerie Bunce and Mana Csanadi, "Uncertainty in Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," in East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 240-41. The hypothesis that contemporary Russia is a proto-democracy is, however, too important to be ignored and provides a theoretical perspective for further discussion. 12. A. Macintyre, "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 4th ser., ed. Peter Laslett, Walter G. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 14. 13. Thomas F. Remington, "Sovietology and System Stability," in Post-Soviet Affairs 8, no. 3 (1992): 242. 14. See Richard Pipes, "Russia's Chance," in Commentary 93, no. 3 (1992): 28-33.

3 For those who share this view, standing and even discourage fur­ it is the cultural and historical ther efforts to discover other po­ specificity of Russia that really litical causes."16 matters. For instance, John Lloyd There are strong reasons to ex­ states: pect that political studies in the Russia comes to democratic ways post-Soviet era will be more com­ very late, that being so, its political parative and, correspondingly, and intellectual elites can both ob­ less focused on the specificity of serve and participate in the demo­ Russia than studies of decades cratic forms and conferences of the Western, especially European, worlds; past. This article is intended to be can readily grasp the modalities of a comparatively oriented case free political practice-but cannot study. Although the data of com­ transfer the experience to the harsher parative social science is clearly soil of their own country, where the . tal 17 . . 'd 1 population has not undergone the cross-soc1e , 1t 1S W1 e y as- civic development which could sus­ sumed that comparative research tain democratic institutions.15 does not explicitly use data from different societies. According to This argument-based on the in­ Arend Lijphart, "the distinction ference that Russians believe in between the comparative and case strong leaders or czars-can be elaborated theoretically using the study methods in terms of the number of cases analyzed is not concept of political culture and re­ formulated thus: there are no po­ entirely satisfactory because the litical parties in Russia because single cases investigated in case the level (or nature) of mass politi­ studies are usually implicitly cal culture in the country does not viewed in the theoretical context correspond to this form of politi­ of a larger number of cases."18 cal organization. This is not to say Hence, comparatively oriented that the concept of political cul­ case studies are quite possible. If ture is not useful at all, but as Raymond Aron is right in his as­ Mattei Dogan and Dominique sumption that certain concepts are Pelassy have said, "it is undoubt­ com~arative by their very na­ edly necessary to renounce mak­ ture, 9 then the political party is ing 'political culture' a reservoir of definitely one such concept. In easy explanations, which would this paper, well-established politi­ make up for any lack of under- cal parties of the west will serve as

15. John Lloyd, "Democracy in Russia," in Political Quarterly 64, no. 2 (1993): 154-55. 16. Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1990), 73. 17. See Donald P. Warwick and Samuel Osherson,"Comparative Analysis in the Social Sciences," in Comparative Research Methods, eds. Donald P. Warwick and Samual Osherson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 8. 18. See Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," in Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975). 19. See Raymond Aron, "La theorie du developpement et !'interpretation historique de l'epoque contemporaine," in I.e developpement social, ed. Raymond Aron and Bert Hoselitz (Paris: Mouton, 1965), 89.

4 comparative referents for analyz­ political group identified by an of­ ing new political parties in Russia. ficial label that presents at elec­ Such a research strategy, however, tions, and is capable of placing entails a serious methodological through elections (free or unfree) problem. candidates for public office." i First, Alan Ware correctly as­ One could argue that this defini­ sumes that tion could even be applied to the with states in the same geographical former Communist Party of the region, or when there is a shared cul­ Soviet Union (CPSU). As of yet, tural heritage, it is likely that there however, it is inapplicable to new may be important features which the Russian political parties. All of parties share-and, in fact, two well­ established traditions of studying them are indeed so labelled, and parties have been analyses of parties without a doubt they will present in particular geographical areas at elections, beginning in December (such as Western Europe), and 1993. But their capability of plac­ analyses of parties which must oper­ ate in similar ways in order to con­ ing candidates in public service is trol the state (such as parties in debatable, to say the least, for the liberal democracies).20 simple reason that no elections have been held in the country Russian parties actually share few since 1991. Most of the specific features with their western counter­ features that characterize Russian parts. Even the problem of defin­ ing political parties in a way that political parties stem preciseley could embrace both kinds of from this fact. It is important to political organizations is unlikely, keep in mind, however, Philippe although the marketplace of Schmitter's reflection that all pe­ political science offers many such culiarities of the Russian political definitions. A number of defini­ process "have been the product of tions proposed by various authors strategic choices, not the inexora­ are lengthy and complex, yet the ble result of a 'revolutionary' more lengthy and complex the process."22 definition, the more it applies Definitions thus do not pro­ only to the political parties of vide an appropriate starting point western Europe and the United for analysis. Yet why is it so im­ States. portant to be definition-conscious An alternative approach is of­ in comparative studies in the first fered by Giovanni Sartori in his place? If we view the question Parties and Party Systems, where he from the methodological perspec­ briefly states that "a party is any tive, the answer should be: be-

20. Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties, and the State: A Reappraisal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 19-20. 21. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 63. For another very broad definition of political parties, see Kenneth Janda, Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey (New York: Free Press, 1980), 5. 22. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Revolutionary and Evolutionary Transitions: The Russian Case in Comparative Perspective," in Political Parties in Russia, 32.

5 cause definitions are one of the that corresponds to a given field most important means of provid­ of analysis. ing conceptual homogenization There is a great diversity of across research fields. As Roy comparative methods.25 In his Macridis has said, "comparison listing of would-be paradigms of­ involves abstraction; concrete fered by political science since the situations or processes can never 1950s, Harry Eckstein points out be compared as such. Every phe­ that the most conspicious is a po­ nomenon is unique... To compare, litical version of functionalism. 26 then, means to select certain types It might be added that this para­ or concepts, and in doing so we digm is also the most severely have to distort the unique and the criticized. Ware, for instance, concrete."23 The more heterogene­ rejects "the sociological approach, ous the field of research, the which was inspired by the struc­ clearer the effort to make it con­ tural functionalism of Talcott ceptually homogeneous and the Parsons, that assumed there were more rigorous the formalization certain functions which had to be of concepts. performed in any society and that As Pierre Bourdieu reminds we could compare parties with re­ us, however, "concepts have no spect to how they so performed definition other than systematic them."27 ones, and are designed to be put to Putting aside the usual accusa­ work empirically in systematic Jash­ tions of a static approach to the ion."24 In other words, definitions social-important but irrelevant are not ends in themselves, they to this discussion28-let us con­ are supported by theoretical sys­ centrate on another line of reasoning tems and methods. Concepts also that questions the validity of can be defined only within more structural functionalism. This cri­ general methodological frame­ tique is thoroughly elaborated by works, not in isolation. The most Giovanni Sartori in his influential crucial problem for any compara­ article on conceptual misforma­ tive social scientist is thus to iden­ tion in comparative politics.29 The tify his or her method in a manner fundamental assumptions of

23. Roy Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), 18. 24. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 96. [italics mine] 25. For an overview of recent developments in comparative political science, see Howard J. Wiarda, ed., New Directions in Comparative Politzcs, rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). 26. Harry Eckstein, Regardin$ Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 7. 27. Ware, Citizens, Parties, and the State, 19. 28. For an example of such criticism, see Karl W. Deutch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1963), 89-90. 29. See Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," in American Political Science Review 54 (1970): 1033-53.

6 structural functionalism may be ence notion of communication formulated thus: 1) no one struc­ nullifies the problem of function, ture is unifunctional, i.e., no one appears correct. structure performs only one func­ In general, researchers must tion, 2) the same structures can be find the level of generalization multifunctional, i.e., can perform that permits them to avoid sterile very different functions in differ­ theory on the one hand, and use­ ent countries and 3) the same less accumulation of data, on the function has structural alterna­ other.32 If we take communication tives, i.e., it can be performed by as the most general function of all very different structures. Sartori political parties, we may pose the identifies two major problems following question: Communica­ which inevitably arise when this tion from whom to whom? The approach is applied to the study answer to this question will iden­ of political parties. First, this para­ tify those political actors who play digm risks an enumeration of the the leading roles in political per­ functions of parties without any formance. There are, of course, clues as to their level and type. different-and even contrasting­ Political scientists and sociologists ways to identify political actors, provide us with an impressive list each of which corresponds not of the functions of "western only to a particular analytical ap­ democratic" political parties, 30 proach to politics, but to some most of which are obviously inap­ level of generalization as well. In plicable to transitional polities like selecting comparative referents Russia. Second, all parties can be for analyzing new Russian politi­ said to fulfill the function of com­ cal parties, it is reasonable to petition. The most inclusive an­ apply the model of communica­ swer to the question "what are tion between the elite and the parties?" might be that parties masses that encompasses all inter­ perform a communication func­ actions between those who rule tion. and those who are ruled. Although certain political sci­ Two major aspects of "mass­ entists have adopted an overall elite" communications may be cybernetic approach that perceives easily distinguished. First, parties parties as "communication net­ primarily enable the masses to work[s] that specializ[e] in the communicate to the elite by ex­ aggregation of political communi­ pressing and aggregating inter­ cations... for a polity,"31 every­ ests, as well as providing the thing in social life really boils means of political communication down to communication. Sartori's for those who do not belong to conclusion, that such no-differ- this elite. Second, parties enable

30. See, for example, Roy C. Macridis, "Introduction: The History, Functions, and Typology of Parties," in Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, 17-20. 31. Samuel H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 241. 32. See Alfred Grosser, L'explication politique: une introduction al' analyse comparative (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972), 55.

7 the elite to communicate to the as surrogates for them in a par­ masses by providing it a means of ticular role) cannot be avoided. mobilizing support. These two It cannot be assumed a priori functions may be defined as ex­ that those formations which call pression and integration, respec­ themselves parties in Russia per­ tively. It is widely assumed that form only the roles performed by there is no equilibrium between their western counterparts. Quite them. According to Sartori, "po­ the reverse, it may be hypothe­ litical communication is not a dia­ sized that their real functions are logue among equal partners for very different from those of west­ the sake of entertainment."33 Par­ ern parties, but equivalent to ties are expected to perform pri­ those of other groups or institu­ marily as agencies of expression tions. The notion of functional for the elite. equivalence, designed to make possible comparisons between ***** This paper is divided into six embryonic and highly structurally sections. The first presents some differentiated systems, is thus of general information about western crucial importance for the analytical Siberia and examines the origins approach employed in this article.34 of political parties active in the re­ The fifth and sixth sections of gion in 1991-1993. Section 1 also the paper will relate the major looks at these parties' organiza­ characteristics of new Russian tional histories within the context political parties to prospects for of overall political developments the country's transition to democ­ in Russia, particularly in Siberia, racy. The paper's central thesis on during the years 1990-1991. Three the nature of the new Russian subsequent sections present an polity is presented in the fifth sec­ analysis, framed in terms of tion, where it is suggested that expression and integration, of this polity is not a democracy, but Russian parties as agencies of a competitive oligarchy transi­ communication between the elite tional to democracy. The sixth sec­ and the masses ("vertical" com­ tion examines the view, expressed munication), within the elite, and by many observers, that the cur­ within the masses (the latter rent regime must be replaced by representing two different kinds an alternative form of govern­ of "horizontal" communication). ment. In this context, the section Although the discussion focuses briefly reviews western literature on political parties, the problem of on transitional regimes and iden­ functional equivalents (i.e., those tifies the kind of regime change institutions that are, in effect, most likely to take place in Russia usurping the typical functions of after the October events of 1993 to well-established parties or serving be a shift towards delegative de-

33. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, 57. 34. See Howard J. Wiarda, "The Etlmocentrism of the Social Sciences," in Review of Politics (April1981).

8 mocracy (or, more precisely, the discussion in this article proto-democracy). nevertheless focuses on previous The advantages and disadvan­ developments. Even the most re­ tages of such a regime change are cent events, whether or not they discussed in the conclusion, completely overshadow the past, which suggests that competitive can be understood only in historical oligarchy is more consistent with context. More important for this the purpose of a transition to de­ particular study, the description of mocracy than alternative paths of the past is intended to provide political development. generalizations that are expected The analysis presented here is to be useful for explaining the based on empirical data collected present. Thus the conclusion will by the sociopolitical research give some consideration to the group of the Siberian Personnel meaning of contemporary events Training Center and partially in Russia as they relate to its pros­ published in its bulletin, Political pects for a transition to democracy. Chronicles of Siberia. Those parts of The second question is some­ the article that deal with develop­ what more difficult. To begin ments in Moscow are based on with, the question should be refor­ analyses of post-communism in mulated as 'Why not Moscow?' Russia by western social scientists, Most researchers writing about among which Yithak Brudny's new Russian politics, both in the work on the history of the Demo­ cratic Russia movement proved country itself and abroad, rarely especially helpful.35 leave the capital for the vast pe­ riphery of the former inner em­ 1 pire, with the exception of St. Before we begin to examine Petersburg. There are important political parties in western Siberia, reasons for devoting special atten­ two questions must be answered: tion to Moscow. For more than six Why the time period August hundred years, the city shaped 1991-0ctober 1993? Why western the history of the country. Today, Siberia? The first answer is easy: the headquarters of the most im­ the two sieges of the Russian portant Russian parties are situ­ White House, in 1991 and 1993, ated there, whereas those parties are probably the greatest water­ that seek to represent regional sheds in contemporary Russian interests within the Russian Fed­ history, and the impact they have eration are of virtually no political and will have on the evolution of significance. It is logical, then, to a party system cannot be ignored. study larger formations like the Despite the fact that the outbreak Democratic Russia movement in of violence in October 1993 upset Moscow, where prominent leaders the balance of power in the coun­ may be interviewed and internal try and the vast majority of its re­ documents may be examined gions (including western Siberia), than, say, Novosibirsk.

35. See Yitzhak M. Brudny, "The Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,' 1990-1993," in Post-Soviet Affairs 9, no. 2 (1993).

9 An impressive example of There is also another reason thorough analysis based primarily for focusing attention on the Rus­ on Moscow sources is provided in sian periphery. Quite under­ the above-mentioned article of standabl)'t political life in the Yitzhak Brudny. While demon­ capital is excessively turbulent. strating the advantages of this ap­ Parties constantly emerge, hold proach, however, the article also congresses, change their names, suffers from its shortcomings. For propose programs and bylaws, instance, it is stated that "DR's form coalitions, split, reunite. contribution to Yeltsin' s victory in How does one judge the relative the referendum [in April 1993] significance of these events, was even more crucial than its taking into account that partici­ contribution to his 1991 presiden­ pants in such parties are not usu­ tial victory... This tactic, combined ally modest in their estimation of with excellent organization, suc­ the significance of these organiza­ ceeded remarkably in mobilizing tions? How can one distinguish what was presumed to be an in­ between those organizations seek­ different electorate."36 An ob­ ing to control the state, despite in­ server of the 1993 referendum sufficient resources, and those campaign in Novosibirsk, how­ noisy formations whose only goal ever, could easily conclude that is to attract some publicicy, prefer­ Democratic Russia contributed ably in the west, for their founder­ virtually nothing to Yeltsin' s vic­ members? tory. In fact, in the weeks prior to As far as the opposition is con­ the referendum there were almost cerned, how can we identify those no signs of the activity by the parties which are relatively influ­ movement in the region. ential in contrast to those whose On the other hand, the April strength is systematically overesti­ 1993 referendum results showed mated by the mass media simply that Yeltsin and his policies still in order to make negative exam­ mastered a reasonably high level ples of them (consider the typical of support among the region's case of Nina Andreeva's "All-Union population. Like everywhere else Communist Party of Bolshe­ in the world, the leaders and ac­ viks")? One possible resolution to tivists of Russian parties tend to these problems would be to look overestimate their own signifi­ at the periphery. If something that cance, attributing the success of occurs in Moscow exerts a signifi­ their political allies to their own cant impact on political life in, sa)'t efforts even if their contributions Novosibirsk, one has good reason to this success were very modest. to believe the phenomenon is This is not to say that it is abso­ worth studying. Of course, it goes lutely necessary to leave Moscow without saying that one can study or St. Petersburg in order to attain Moscow without reference to the a better perspective on Russian periphery, although such studies politics, but it is sometimes useful. are somewhat one-dimensional,

36. Ibid., 167--8.

10 but it is impossible to study west­ versified machine construction em Siberia without reference to and metalworking; a substantial Moscow. Thus the core of the dis­ part of its working population is, cussion in this paper is the pe­ in one capacity or another, em­ riphery, not Moscow, and, while ployed in the defense sector. Un­ no claim is made that western doubtedly the center of scientific Siberia is necessarily repre­ research in the region, the Siberian sentative of other Russian regions, branch of the Russian Academy of there is no apparent reason to con­ Sciences is situated in a special­ clude that it is so far from the ized suburb of Novosibirsk­ mainstream of provincial politics Akademgorodok (Academic town) as to constitute a unique case. -along with more than fifteen institutions of higher education. ****** Omsk, the second largest city Novosibirsk, a city in the in western Siberia, also owes its southern part of western Siberia origin to its strategic location on with a population of about 1.5 major transport lines, occupying million, is not only the adminis­ the rail crossing on the Irtysh trative center of a province (ob­ river. At present, industry in last'), the population of which is slightly less than twice the size, it Omsk is concentrated in machine also dominates the surrounding building, metal working (one-half regions of western Siberia, includ­ of all enterprises), chemicals (one­ ing the Tomsk, Omsk, 1iumen', quarter), and food industries and Kemerovo provinces, the (one-quarter). Kemerovo and a Altai territory (kraz) and the Altai dozen other cities (Novokuznetsk, republic. Novosibirsk claims to be Prokopievsk, Kiselevsk, Mezh­ the unofficial capital of Siberia. durechensk, Belovo, etc.) sit in the Although this claim may be con­ important coal mining area in the tested by Tomsk or Omsk, it is by Kuznetsk Basin, or Kuzbass. no means groundless. Western Siberia also includes the Being relatively young (it was oil-producing Tiumen' province founded one hundred years ago), and the Altai territory, the latter Novosibirsk has experienced being the only part of the region rapid industrial development that has a more or less developed since the early 1920s and espe­ agriculturalsectoL cially after the 1940s, when many It must be stressed that the enterprises together with their population of the city and region staffs were evacuated from Euro­ of Novosibirsk is virtually homo­ pean Russia. Since that time, genously Russian. The aborigines Novosibirsk has continued to take of the Altai republic and northern advantage of its location at the in­ Tiumen' province, as well as tersection of the Trans-Siberian Shors of southeast Kuzbass, are railway and the Ob river, as well politically passive minorities, as its proximity to the heavily in­ while the Crimean Tatars, Poles, dustrialized Kuznetsk Basin (in and western Ukrainians who Kemerovo province) and the met­ were exiled to Siberia have been allurgical plants of the Urals. The mostly assimilated. The political city's primary industries are di- activities of Volga Germans in the 11 region focus on the problem of were mainly aimed at exerting their return to the lost Vaterland political pressure on Yeltsin, not and are thus of no relevance to securing mass support for the current developments in the re­ idea of secession. No organized gion. There are practically no group has replaced the PIS in grounds for ethnic conflict, which separatist zeal; those political par­ tends to be widespread in post­ ties that do exist in the region are communist societies in the region. generally local chapters of Moscow Those few politicians who insist (or, so to speak, all-Russian) or­ on more independence for Siberia ganizations, thus the regional appeal to pragmatic rationality "party system" appears to be a rather than to the national identity simplified version of the central of the population. Even in system. September 1992, when tensions The earliest more or less inde­ between Moscow and the periph­ pendent political organizations in ery were approaching their apo­ western Siberia were formed by gee, only 35 percent of radical nationalists, whose move­ respondents polled in Novosi­ ment first emerged during the birsk were in favor of creating an 1970s in Moscow. In 1983, it ob­ autonomous (not independent) tained a kind of legal status tmder Siberian republic, while 47 per­ the Pamiat' (Memory) Society of cent rejected even autonomy. History and Literature Amateurs. Groups of Siberian secession­ In broad terms, Pamiat' hoped to ists are small, poorly organized, foster a resurrection of Russian and fractious. The most well­ national self-identity and pride so known, the Party for Inde­ that "each person could say 1 am pendence of Siberia (PIS), was a Russian' without embarrass­ dissolved in January 1993 by its ment and fear."37 In 1986 and leader and founder, Tomsk jour­ 1987, groups bearing the same nalist B. Perov. This party, whose name began to emerge in other activities were limited to Tomsk, Russian cities. The Pamiat' Histori­ strongly disapproved of national cal and Patriotic Association­ economic reform strategy and de­ Novosibirsk was founded on 19 Feb­ manded a halt to privatization ruruy 1986, the first non-rommunist and other forms of "plundering political group in the region since the natural riches of Siberia," in­ 1921. As such, it attracted some pub­ cluding foreign investments in the lic interest evidently kindled both by Siberian economy. Although simi­ certain restrictive (but limited) meas­ lar demands made at congresses ures and the hidden support of of Siberian deputies in Krasnoiarsk certain CPSU officials. in March 1992 and Novosibirsk in While most early activists of September 1993 attracted the at­ Pamiat' sought a just nationalities tention of the mass media, in both policy that addressed the impov­ cases it seems these demands erished state of the Russian peo-

37. For an overview of the ideological fOtmdations of Pamiat' and its activities in Leningrad in 1988-1991, see Robert W. Orttung, "The Russian Right and the Dilemmas of Party Organization," in Soviet Studies 44, no. 3 (1992).

12 ple, some of its xenophobic lead­ tions of this origin exist in the re­ ers (in Novosibirsk, A. Kazantsev gion, no one of which has more was the most notorious) depicted than ten members and each of Jewish domination as the princi­ which claims to be the true suc­ ple cause of all Russian troubles, cessor to Pamiat' (the Novosibirsk including the revolution of 1917, People's Assembly, Russian Na­ and regarded national propor­ tional Unity, the Russian Party of tional representation as the rem­ National Renewal, and others). edy. In 1987-1988, similar groups Certain of these organizations emerged all over the region, were banned after the October among them Otechestvo (Father­ 1993 events in Moscow. land) in 1iumen' and Vremia (Time) The "democratization" of Soviet in Novokuznetsk. In June 1988, political life in 1987-90, of which some of these groups, includ­ glasnost' was the most important ing Pamiat'- Novosibirsk joined part, was originally intended to the Union of Patriotic Organiza­ release human energies that, tions of the Urals and Siberia according to Mikhail Gorbachev, (UPOUS). had been strangled by the bureau­ Originally, Pamiat' had bene­ cratic centralism of the recent fited from its position of being the past. Democratization was never only non-system political group­ intended to create anything close ing in the region, but this position to multiparty democracy in the was substantially undermined in country. Yet as a result of the op­ 1988-91. As a result of a new con­ portunities created by glasnost', flict that shifted the politically there arose a number of societal relevant emotions of the popula­ pressure groups-nefonnaly (the tion from Pamiat' to Yeltsin, the in­ "informals")-and, later, various fluence of the former declined. democratic associations, fronts, UPOUS participated in the 1990 and clubs, who demanded political election campaign in the Bloc of change?8 In Novosibirsk, the larg­ Social and Patriotic Movements of est such group was the Memorial Russia, which suffered a total de­ Society. Originally formed to com­ feat. Between 1987 and 1990, memorate the victims of Stalin's Pamiat' split into several factions. terror, the Memorial Society Currently, some seven organiza- started making modest political

38. On the early stage of the formation of the multiparty system in Russia, see M.A. Bab.ki.ria, ed., New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union (New York: Nova Science, 1991); Steven Fish, "The Emergence of Independent Associations and the Transformation of Russian Political Society," in journal of Communist Studies 7, no. 3, (1991); Geoffrey A Hosking et al., The Road to Post-Communism (London: Pinter, 1992); Arkadii Meerovkh, "The Emergence of Russian Multi-Party Politics," in Report on the USSR 2, no. 34 (1990); Vera Tolz, The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990); Michael E. Urban, "Party Formation and Deformation on Russia's Democratic Left," in Perestroika-Era Politics, ed. Robert T. Huber and Donald R Kelley (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). For factual information on some 120 groups that have emerged across the Russian political spectrum since 1987, see Vladimir Pribylovskii, Dictionary of Political Parties and Organizations in Russia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992).

13 demands in 1989-90. At the same challenge the authority of the time, the most radical variety of CPSU first emerged in late 1989. neformaly in Novosibirsk was the The most important initiative to Democratic Union, which had create such a structure came from formed as early as May 1988, Nikolai Travkin, a prominent when it declared unbending op­ member of the CPSU Democratic position to the communist regime. Platform. The organizing commit­ The Democratic Union stood for tee of the DPR, chaired by Travkin, non-violent change of the coun­ was established in Moscow in May try's political system with the goal 1990 and the party soon had of constructing a representative strong support in the regions of parliamentary democracy at all Russia, where several branches levels. were created in the summer and Similar goals were advanced fall of 1990. Many local democratic by the Democratic Movement of organizations joined Travkin's Akademgorodok, a small but ac­ party. Consciously trying to ex­ tive group of scientists and educa­ pand beyond the party's original tors. In some cities and provinces base in the liberal intelligentsia, of western Siberia, local demo­ activists successfully recruited crats succeeded in creating into the DPR many low- and mid­ "popular fronts" patterned after dle-level managers and former coalitions like Sajudis in Lithuania: CPSU functionaries?9 the Society of Active Supporters of Travkin's attempt to create a Perestroika (Barnaul), the Tiumen' nationwide democratic party did People's Front, and the Union for not go unchallenged. At least two the Promotion of Revolutionary other major democratic groups Perestroika (Tomsk). In Kemerovo competed with the DPR for politi­ province a number of political cal influence and membership in groups originated in the workers' this effort-the Republican Party committees set up during the of the Russian Federation (RPRF) miners' strike of July 1989. Mem­ and the Social-Democratic Party bers of these committees took part of Russian Federation (SDPRF). in the establishment of the Union Yet by the fall of 1990, the DPR of Kuzbass Workers, which by was well in the lead. The local mid-1990 was the largest inde­ branch of the party in Novosi­ pendent political organization in birsk, for example, had five hun­ the region, with five to six thou­ dred members and was definitely sand members. In late 1990 and the largest and best organized po­ early 1991, certain political forma­ litical force in the city after the tions that emerged from worker CPSU. committees joined the Democratic The organizational structure of Party of Russia (DPR). the DPR was designed to fight a The idea of creating a large trench war against the CPSU. Al­ democratic organization that would though the party aimed to secure

39. The formation of the DPR is thoroughly discussed in Brudny, "The Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,"' 146--8.

14 multiparty elections at the earliest able to existing political condi­ possible moment, the DPR based tions in Russia. The most impor­ itself on democratic centralism tant advantage of such an and exercised strict discipline organizational scheme was that it over the activities of its members. mobilized those members of the The majority of democratic lead­ CPSU sympathetic to Yeltsin, but ers in Moscow and Leningrad, still reluctant to leave the Party. however, feared the emergence of The major target of the founders a populist dictatorship within the of the DRM, who felt themselves party and strongly criticized increasingly isolated from demo­ Travkin' s drive to create a new cratic activists in the periphery, "political vanguard." As Brudny turned out to be not the CPSU, but has noted, "Indeed, creation of the members of the DPR Not surpris­ social movement was a direct re­ ingly, the debate between Travkin sponse by those democrats who and his opponents in the organiz­ had participated in the formation ing committee was the main event of DPR and been alienated by the of the movement's first congress. result."40 The founding congress The committee's refusal to accept of the Democratic Russia move­ Travkin's proposals resulted in the ment (DRM), held in Moscow on DPR' s temporary withdrawal 20-21 October 1990, struck a from the movement. Bowing to heavy blow at Travkin's party. strong pressure from many pro­ Democratic Russia is a term vincial branches, who feared be­ that applies to several entities. The ing cut off from the mainstream of earliest was a body known as the the democratic movement, how­ Voters' Bloc, created in January ever, Travkin rejoined the DRM in 1990 at a conference of over 170 January 1991. democratic candidates for election The founding conference of to representative bodies of the the Novosibirsk provincial branch Russian Federation. Although of the DRM took place on 10 Feb­ Democratic Russia's electoral ruary 1991. The conference elected campaign-dominated by the a coordinating council chaired by antipolitics of opposing the com­ RSFSR People's Deputy A. munist regime-proved to be Manannikov, who combined his successful, it did not lead the previous experience in the dissi­ alliance to transform itself into a dent movement with close con­ stronger organization. In fact, it nections to leading democrats in effectively ceased to exist after the Moscow. The top leadership of the elections, only to be resurrected in provincial branch also included V. the fall of that year as a loosely­ Shirokov and Y. Savchenko of the structured coalition of democratic DPR as well as the representatives parties, groups, and individuals. of RPRF and SDPRF. On March 10, The founders of the DRM con­ the DRM brought 8,000 people to sidered this structure to be both Lenin Square in the center of more democratic and more suit- Novosibirsk, marking the begin-

40. Ibid., 148.

15 ning of mass demonstrations in chairman of the Novosibirsk city support of Yeltsin; the DRM con­ soviet, I. Indinok, who eventually tinued to be the most important became a member of the MDR organization at Yeltsin' s disposal Another option was the during his electoral campaign in Democratic Party of Russian the summer of 1991. Communists (DPRC), led by vice­ Yeltsin' s overwhelming vic­ president Aleksandr Rutskoi. Yelt­ tory in the presidential election of sin's trusted representative in the June 1991 did not, however, lead province during the electoral to the consolidation of the DRM. campaign, I. Vmogradova, joined Quite the reverse. Efforts to create the DPRC along with a relatively a strong party in place of the large group of low- and middle­ movement were renewed by ranking functionaries of the Travkin and his lieutenants in the CPSU. In Vmogradova's own periphery. A joint conference of words, she supported Yeltsin ''be­ the local branches of three parties­ cause he enjoyed confidence and the DPR the RPRE and the support of such remarkable peo­ SDPIW-took place in Novosi­ ple as Ruslan Khasbulatov, Sergei birsk in July 1991 with the official Shakhrai, and Aleksandr Rut­ purpose of creating a united party. skoi." Once formed, such a party could Despite this potentially frac­ literally embrace the entire mem­ tious situation, the summer of bership of the DRM in the prov­ 1991 was the golden age of Rus­ ince. sian political parties. They were The alliance never material­ expected to play an important ized. Moreover, soon after the role in undermining the strength conference, the DPR itself split of the CPSU; people forecast that a into two factions led by Shirokov strong and probably victorious and Savchenko, respectively. At coalition of well-established demo­ the same time, Yeltsin's victory cratic parties would challenge the helped him to garner the loyal CPSU during the next parliamen­ support of the old political, mana­ tary elections, probably sometime gerial, and administrative elites of in 1994. These hopes of party ac­ the region. Strongly reluctant to tivists were dispelled by the coup join the DRM, which appeared to attempt 19-22 August. This is not be too radical and irresponsible, to say that Russian parties proved they sought alternative political to be weak and useless in the organizations. One such alternative cause of democracy during the was the Movement for Demo­ crisis. Already in the first hours of cratic Reforms (MDR), created in the coup, democratic activists be­ Moscow by a group of prominent gan organizing demonstrations in politicians consisting of Gavriil support of Yeltsin. One such dem­ Popov, Eduard Shevardnadze, onstration, staged in front of the Aleksandr Yakovlev, and others. Russian White House, proved to An organizing group of the MDR be of crucial importance for the was established in Novosibirsk in ultimate defeat of the coup. In June 1991. From its inception, the western Siberia, prodemocratic group was patronized by the rallies took place in Novosibirsk, 16 Bamaul, Tomsk, Omsk, and other sory authorities, operating in cities. Yet even if Yeltsin scored a much the same way as had the success during the coup, his allies former provincial first Party secre­ did not. Democratic parties were taries. among the first to come out in DRM activists were chosen support of Yeltsin' s decree ban­ as Yeltsin' s representatives in ning the CPSU and confiscating Novosibirsk (A. Manokhin), Tomsk its property, yet the collapse of (S. Sulakshin), and Omsk (A. the CPSU meant that the task of Minzhurenko). In Kemerovo, M. its counterparts-in the form of Kisliuk, a prominent leader of the democratic parties-had been independent workers' movement, accomplished. These parties was appointed to the position of now had to redefine their politi­ head (glava) of the provincial ad­ cal goals, which turned out to be ministration. Other democrats an extremely difficult problem. entered the lower ranks of the new, postcommunist bureaucracy, 2 especially in Kemerovo province. The DRM was the only demo­ The drain of the most active and cratic organization to maintain a most able DRM members into the relatively large membership new administration hampered the during the period August 1991- organizational stability of the 0ctober 1993, appearing to be movement and contributed to its something of a mass party. It is decline. Finally, a large number of logical, therefore, to begin an previously active members ex­ examination of the role of new changed politics for business, parties in "mass-elite" communi­ while still others radically revised cation with the DRM. It must be their ideological convictions and stressed, however, that the mem­ joined parties in opposition to the bership of the DRM fell rapidly Yeltsin government. during this period, first and fore­ The DRM nevertheless re­ most due to the unpopularity of mained the largest of the demo­ the economic policy pursued by cratic parties. In the spring of Yeltsin' s administration after the 1993, its membership in each of autumn of 1991. Deep dissatisfac­ the provincial centers of the west­ tion with the consequences of the em Siberian region still numbered reform program was the predomi­ in the hundreds. This relatively nant attitude in Russian society large membership was not neces­ and DRM activists faced pressure sarily irrelevant to the actual po­ from their supporters. Some, it litical role of the DRM, as the appeared, simply could not stand movement was doing its best both the pressure; others were appointed to express the interests of its mem­ to positions in local govenment, bers and to mobilize support. But such as presidential repre­ was the DRM capable of perform­ sentatives (or, as they were re­ ing these important functions ef­ ferred to locally, namestniki) who fectively? were appointed to all provinces of Before answering this ques­ the country. Functionally, namestniki tion, one must note that the move­ could be viewed as new supervi- ment had long enjoyed an 17 ambivalent relationship with Yeltsin. enthusiastic about the new oppor­ On the one hand, the movement tunities created by the PCRRs, and completely supported Yeltsin' s it seemed that they had found it drive to promote economic and particularly attractive to demand political change. On the other the removal of those officials who hand, the policies implemented opposed or sabotaged the reform by Yeltsin in 1991-93 did not al­ effort. The chairman of the Altai ways meet the requirement of un­ territorial PCRR, P. Akelkin, dermining the power of the old claimed: "If somebody will be in nomenklatura. Realistic or not, this our way, if somebody will ob­ requirement was very important struct reforms, our committee will to the overwhelming majority of send the list of such people di­ democratic activists, especially in rectly to Moscow. We are sure that the periphery, which explains these people will never be able to why the leaders of the Democratic hinder us, because they will be Russia Movement alternated be­ removed and never again ap­ tween supporting and criticizing pointed chief executives." At­ Yeltsin. In retrospect it appears tempts by some of the PCRRs to that those observers who con­ influence the appointment of cluded that the movement's ca­ executive staffs were, however, pacity to pursue both policies remarkably fruitless. Literally no would in the end prove inade­ senior- or middle-level govern­ quate and the DRM would suffer ment executive was removed at a gradual decline, were essentially the demands of these newly es­ right.41 tablished bodies. S. Sulakshin One of the most impressive ef­ (Tomsk) commented that the most forts to transform the DRM into difficult problem was to find people an organization that could secure who could replace these bureau­ stable support for the policy of crats: "I was trying my best to radical reform was made in find people. But those democrats December 1991-January 1992, to whom I offered the job were when the Public Committees of hesitant and reluctant to take it. Russian Reforms (PCRR) came True, it is easy just to make noisy into existence. According to a de­ declarations, but the drudgery of cree signed by Gennadii Burbulis, management is very difficult." the heads of local administrations One could not deny that PCRR were obliged to support the pro­ activists themselves were, as a vincial PCRRs in their attempts to rule, highly incompetent in ad­ advance the pace of reform, most ministrative matters, so that their especially, that of privatization. demands had to be treated with a For this purpose, the committees grain of salt. Yet, for good or ill, were to be provided with offices the authorities in Moscow pre­ and communications equipment. ferred to maintain close ties with At first local DRM activists were regional administrative elites

41. See Michael McFaul, "Democrats in Disarray," in Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (1993); Julia Wishnevsky, "The Rise and Fall of 'Democratic Russia,"' in RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 22 (1992).

18 rather than an ideological cleans­ It may be argued, as does ing campaign. As early as Spring Brudny, that Yeltsin's surprise at­ 1992 it became clear that the tack against the parliament was PCRRs had failed to accomplish nothing more than a tactical ma­ their mission; almost nothing has neuver in pursuit of an intra-elite been heard about their activities deal. Even so, one could not deny since that time. that the DRM delivered an ex­ Let us now examine whether tremely poor performance. One the DRM was capable of doing can speculate that the failure of what it did best in the earlier pe­ the DRM to mobilize a campaign riod of its evolution--secure mass in support of Yeltsin contributed political mobilization in the face to the compromise which re­ of antidemocratic forces. Indeed, sulted, in particular, the replace­ confrontation generally energized ment of Egor Gaidar with Vlktor the DRM, yet no political crisis Chernomyrdin. (The latter's experienced by Russia between loyalty to Yeltsin was quite ques­ September 1991 and October 1993 tionable at that moment). As men­ provoked the storm of activity as­ tioned earlier, the DRM also sociated with early 1991. One of contributed little to Yeltsin' s the most serious confrontations victory in the April 1993 referen­ between Yeltsin and the Russian dum. Brudny rightly observes of parliament took place on 10 the referendum campaign that December 1992. Speaking before "contrary to 1991, Yeltsin did very the deputies, he denounced the little campaigning himself and, Congress as a bastion of reaction­ when he did so, his appearances ary forces attempting to carry out tended to be lethargic and ineffec­ a constitutional coup. Soon after­ tual."42 Does this mean, however, wards he called for a referendum that it was largely the task of to consider dissolution of the par­ DRM activists to spread Yeltsin' s liament. In this critical situation, it message and that of his economic was logical for him to call upon program? Although the referen­ the DRM to mobilize on his be­ dum campaign was marked by a half. Yet, the movement failed to reasonably high level of political organize an efficient campaign in activity at both ends of the politi­ support of "the sole guarantor of cal spectrum,43 the role of political successful democratic reforms in organizations seemed outweighed Russia." At most, roughly 2,000 by that of the mass media. Con­ people waving national banners sideration of this aspect of new gathered in front of the Kremlin Russian politics will follow below. walls. As for the periphery, it sim­ The DRM' s inability to express ply ignored these events. Two criticism in a way that could influ­ days later, Yeltsin and his antago­ ence public policy stemmed from nists announced a compromise. the ineffectiveness of its efforts to

42. Brudny, "Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,"' 167. 43. See Wendy Slater, "No Victors in the Russian Referendum," in RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 21 (1993): 13-14.

19 mobilize support. The relation­ demonstrated his readiness to ship between Yeltsin and the DRM sacrifice the movement whenever began to cool as early as Septem­ he thought an intra-elite compro­ ber 1991, but the movement as a mise possible.45 whole could never afford to re­ The decline of other demo­ main in opposition to Yeltsin for cratic parties in western Siberia very long. Certain prominent during the period August 1991- DRM leaders, however, accused 0ctober 1993 was even sharper the president of betraying the than that of the DRM. Obviously cause of democratization by pre­ these parties had failed to build serving the political and economic effective grassroots ties. In late power of the old nomenklatura. 1991, even the largest was rela­ Rather than supporting the gov­ tively small, counting its member­ ernment, these leaders wanted the ship in the tens rather than in the DRM to spearhead democratic op­ hundreds-the Novosibirsk branch position to it.44 of the DPR numbered 40; the Although these radicals were RPRF, some 100; the SDPRF, 30. ignored by the leaders of provin­ While these figures should be cial branches of the DRM, the treated with skepticism, there is movement's rank-and-file were little doubt that party member­ also not consistently loyal to Yeltsin. ship has fallen or, at best, re­ The regional conference of the mained the same since that time. DRMheld in Tomsk on 18 and 19 Provincial branches of demo­ February 1993, for example, cratic parties were generally rep­ turned into a conflict between the resented by local leaders who movement's local and Moscow followed instructions from Mos­ leaders (L. Ponomarev, Gleb cow in directing the activities of a Yakunin), on the one hand, and small number of supporters. Were local activists on the other, with such parties too small to play any the latter accusing the national significant role in communication leadership of following the "in­ between the masses and the elite? consistent and suicidal policy of It is within this framework that Yeltsin." These feeble attempts at Maurice Duverger developed the dissent within the DRM were un­ concept of the mass party as an al­ able to affect Russian politics in ternative to the "parti de cadres."46 general. Yeltsin' s position was By definition, a parti de cadres has stronger than that of the DRM, let neither a strong apparatus nor a alone its dissident factions. And, strong membership structure, but while the movement could not nevertheless acts as an important survive being abandoned to fate, channel for expressing the inter­ Yeltsin' s rather limited need of it ests and preferences of its sup-

44. For a thorough analysis of infighting within the DRM leadership in 1992, see Brudny, "Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,'" 158-59. 45. See Brudny, "Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,"' 16&--69. 46. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954).

20 porters. In comparative perspec­ elections have (not) played in tive, the political parties of the it."so United States are another such ex­ The CPSU was virtually the ample of non-mass parties which only party represented in the leg­ play a significant role in "mass­ islative elections of March 1990, elite" communications.47 It may but it was so divided by that time be also argued that major post­ (some of the most effective leaders war changes in the economy, of the opposition were still offi­ social structure, and communica­ cially members), that it would be tions network in western Europe fair to characterize those elections have severely damaged the tradi­ as nonparty elections. As a result, tional role of political pa~ mem­ those voting blocs which eventu­ bership in these countries. Some ally emerged in the Russian par­ analysts, such as Denis Dragunskii liament were neither organized and Martin Malia, go even fur­ nor effectively controlled by po­ ther, claiming that the time of litical parties. The largest party­ mass parties is passed.49 based faction in the parliament, Political parties may, of course, that of the SDPRF/RPRF, was adopt various organizational composed of over fifty members, structures that do not always cor­ but fewer than ten were actually respond to the given social and members of either of these parties. political conditions. Non-mass Local elections held in some parties, for example, are efficient provinces of Russia in late 1992 within the established framework and early 1993 also did not con­ of democratic institutions that tribute to the rise of political parties. provide the necessary prereq­ In fact, almost all democratic can­ uisites for interparty competition, didates lost to former apparatchiki. particularly under conditions of No elections for the positions of relative political stability. The latter head of local administration (glava helps politicians and citizens alike administratsii) have been held in to concentrate on the electoral western Siberia since August process. Yet none of these condi­ 1991, but additional elections to tions can be found in contempo­ the Congress of People's Deputies rary Russia. As Philippe C. in Tomsk province Ganuary 1992) Schmitter observes, "what defi­ provide some relevant data. There nitely is most peculiar about Rus­ P. Kohsel, the director of a state sia's transition is the role that agricultural enterprise (sovkhoz),

47. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 48. See Stefano Bartolini, "The Membership of Mass Parties: The Social-Democratic Experience, 1889-1978," in Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, eds. Hans Daalder and Peter Marr (London: SAGE Publications, 1983). 49. See Denis Dragunskii and Martin Malia, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," in Vek dvadtsatyi i mir 9 (1990): 20. 50. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Revolutionary and Evolutionary Transitions/' 31.

21 was elected over RPRF candidate with the Russian Federation as a Associate Professor 0. Popov by political reality. The party corre­ a wide margin-Koshel received spondingly followed a confronta­ 47 percent of the vote to Popov's 6 tional line dominated by the percent. Other democratic candi­ antipolitics of opposition to Yelt­ dates fared even worse. One can sin and, long before "the second thus conclude from the evidence October revolution," was de­ that parties like the RPRF were in­ scribed as the most ''battle-ready" capable of performing in a man­ of Russia's procommunist groups. ner reminiscent of Duverger's Together with the Working parti de cadres. People's Russia Movement, the It would be unfair not to men­ party organized "food line tion that several parties fared far marches" in Moscow on 22 I:hEmJ:a- better in creating relatively large 1991 and 15 January 1992 that in­ memberships than did democratic volved 100,000 people, as well as parties-namely, the successor an All-Union Popular Assembly parties to the CPSU. In early 1993, in February 1992, which attracted the largest of these successor parties more than 300,000 people. (All of in western Siberia was the Rus­ these figures are no doubt exag­ sian Communist Workers' Party gerated, but it cannot be denied (RCWP), with more than 4,000 that some rallies staged by this members in Kemerovo province party in Moscow attracted rela­ and 1,500-2,500 members in the tively large mobs of protesters). Altai krai and the Novosibirsk, The activities of the RCWP in Omsk, and Tomsk provinces. western Siberia, although not so Founded in November 1991, the well-organized as in Moscow, origins of the RCWP can be traced took on the same organizational to the Communist Initiative forms as those in the capitol­ movement, once the most radical mostly rallies, demonstrations, anti-Gorbachev faction inside the and pickets. CPSU.Sl Yet is it possible to describe The party's program aimed at these activities as meaningful po­ establishing a dictatorship of the litical participation? The most in­ proletariat based on workers' self­ fluential effort to provide a management, Marxist-Leninist conceptual framework for analyz­ ideology, and a planned economy. ing different forms of political RCWP leaders (A. Makashov, V. An­ participation and to examine pilov, V. Tiulkin) and activists both in them empirically is the seven-na­ Moscow and in the periphery refused tion comparative study conducted to attribute legitimacy to the existing by Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, political regime; for them, the cli$:>lu­ and Jae-on Kim, Participation and tion of the USSR in December 1991 Political Equality. There the authors was a state crime. As a matter of adopted the following working fact, the RCWP had nothing to do definition of political participa-

51. For a description of the Communist Initiative Movement, see Orttung, "The Russian Right," 461-73.

22 tion: "those legal activities by pri­ public policy."55 Despite its rela­ vate citizens that are more or less tively large membership then, the directly aimed at influencing the RCWP did not play any signifi­ selection of governmental person­ cant role in "mass-elite" commu­ nel and/ or the actions they nications. Its real functions will be take."52 The authors explicitly ex­ discussed later in this article. clude demonstrations, peaceful or It may be hypothesized that violent, from consideration. Al­ the channel of "vertical" political though the model has been criti­ communication between the elite cized for this reason,53 it is quite and the masses in Russia is pro­ applicable to the case under dis­ vided not by parties but, first and cussion. foremost, by the electronic mass Normally, those who partici­ media. The April 1993 referen­ pate in politics do not seek mo­ dum may be considered evidence mentous and/or drastic change, of this hypothesis. Despite deep even if they find it necessary. and widespread dissatisfaction Quite the reverse, participating in with the results of economic re­ politics means to virtually become form, dissatisfaction clearly indi­ a part of the established political cated in sociological surveys, the order. That is why participation majority of those who voted in the may be linked with the function referendum expressed their confi­ of political integration. If, how­ dence in Yeltsin. ever, political integration is de­ In western Siberia, the Altai fined as "the capacity of a political territory was the only exception to system to make groups and their this pattern. Of course, people members previously outside the voted for different reasons, yet it official fold full-fledged partici­ must be kept in mind that the pants in the political process,"54 it same surveys which showed dis­ would seem that the Russian satisfaction with economic reform Communist Workers' Party did also showed widespread negative not act in this capacity. As for the attitudes toward the prospect of a function of expression, the politi­ restoration of communism. And a cal protest campaigns run by the communist restoration was pre­ party in 1992 and early 1993 had cisely the focus of the propaganda absolutely no impact on the deci­ campaign conducted by the mass sion making process. The RCWP media in the weeks prior to the did not, in Key's words, even seek referendum: "If not Yeltsin, then "to translate mass preferences into the communists." The options fac-

52. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equallty: A Seven Nation Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978),48. 53. See William R. Schonfeld, "The Meaning of Democratic Participation," in World Politics 28 (October 1975). 54. Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 7th ed. (Pacific Grove, C.A.: Brooks/Cole, 1990), 238. 55. Valdimer 0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961),433.

23 ing Russian voters were por­ vived the collapse of communism? trayed as a stark choice between The answer to this question, it Yeltsin-meaning reform, pro­ would seem, would give us a better gress, and the new Russia-and understanding of the role played his opponents, whom the media by the media both in the fall of depicted as communists attempt­ communism and in the rise of ing to engineer a return to the new political order. past. The Congress of People's One should not conclude from Deputies was depicted as a pre­ the above analysis that no com­ dominantly communist body (in munication between the masses fact, the main political opposition and the elite is taking place in at the congress was a loose coali­ Russia. It appears that Russian tion of factions whose political po­ political parties were simply not sitions ranged from support for involved in this process during the restoration of the Soviet Union the period August 1991-0ctober to monarchist aspirations, with to­ 1993. According to the large vol­ tal membership representing one­ ume of transnational literature on third of all People's Deputies).56 It the significance of specific social was stressed that R. Khasbulatov cleavages in European party sys­ was a Chechen', a North Cauca­ tems and voting patterns,57 parties sian nationality that many Rus­ are expected to express clearly de­ sians associate with organized finable social interests. In contem­ crime. The strategy worked. porary Russia, they do not do so for Although a detailed discus­ two major reasons. First, the com­ sion of the role of the media in munist regime had an equalizing post-communist transitions would impact on the structure of social distract us from the major topic of and political attachments; every­ this article, one cannot reduce thing outside the party and state such a discussion to the question tended to be turned into an amor­ of who controls the broadcasting phous mass, with the entire country media in countries where private becoming, in the words of Moshe radio and television stations are Lewin, "declasse."58 Although offi­ emerging very slowly. This ques­ cially proclaimed an objective of tion, though topical in current the Communist Party, it proved politics, is of marginal significance impossible to eliminate the differ­ for the study of the transition to ence between skilled and unskilled democracy. From a theoretical workers or between workers and perspective, the real question is: intellectuals. Yet it was possible to What properties of the totalitarian prevent the translation of these mass media and its impact on cleavages into social interests, mass political behavior have sur- so that group political conscience

56. See Nina Belyaeva and Vladimir Lepekhin, "Factions, Groups, and Blocs in the Russian Parliament," in RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 20 (1993): 18--19. 57. The foundations of the developmental theory of cleavage structures and party systems are stated in Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, amd Voter Alignments," 1-64. 58. Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System (New York: Pantheon, 1985),265.

24 conscience was a rare phenome­ for the ideological scenery of their non in the former Soviet Union. youth, while others could be de­ Second, under contemporary fined as lumpenproletariat in Marxist Russian conditions, social cleav­ terms. ages observable today are not Originally, the RCWP was clearly defined, neither are they critical of nationalism. The Com­ likely to become increasingly stable. munist Party of the Russian Fed­ As Richard Sakwa has said, "in eration (CPRF), established at a postcommunist Russia the patch­ "revival-unification" congress of work pattern of social interests, communists in February 1993, groups, professions, strata, and became Russia's largest political classes remained desegregated," party overnight, claiming 600,000 thus resembling, rather ironically, members. The election of a promi­ an advanced "postmodern" social nent leader of nationalist forces, 9 structure. 5 As a result, it is practi­ Gennadii Ziuganov, former ideol­ cally impossible to establish close ogy secretary of the Russian Com­ ties between a party and a social munist Party, as chairman of the group in Russia today. CPRF' s Central Executive Com­ True, communist orgarciza­ mittee signaled the new party's tions claim to express the interests nationalist orientation. While a of the working class. The statute number of communist groups of the RCWP emphasizes that the (including the Socialist Party of membership must be mostly Working People (SPWP), the drawn from the workers and that Russian Party of Communists, party cells must be at the work­ place, not residential. According and the Leninist Socialist Party of to VIl

59. Sakwa, "Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia," 13. 60. Quoted in Political Parties and Movements: A Quarterly of the INTERLEGAL Center for Political and Legal Studies 1 (1992): 13.

25 leaders of the CPRF in Novosi­ the post-communist order in Rus­ birsk, was a Parniat' activist as sia. As Richard Rose reminds us, early as the mid-1980s. In general, [I]n the 1960s it was fashionable to the ideology of the expanding speak of parties competing for CPRF was much more nationalist popular support without any refer­ than that of the declining RCWP. ence to differences in principle or ideology. Instead, the parties were Other parties were even less believed to compete simply in terms definite in their social attachments of the personality of their leaders or than the communists. Their pro­ a more generalized image of compe­ grams accordingly did not appeal tence. Values were assumed to be 62 to specific constituencies and consensual. were essentially backward-look­ The concept of "catch-all" par­ ing-still fighting the one-party ties was designed to refer to par­ state and offering little in the way ties whose ideologies excluded of concrete programs for replacing virtually no one63 and is used by this state's political institutions certain authors to describe the po­ and de-socializing the economy. litical parties of eastern Central 64 R. Franklin applies the term Europe. But it would seem that "mainstream democratic" to the this concept is no more applicable ideas shared by these parties. to post-communist societies than Their declared common goal was is the concept of parti de cadres. Catch-all peoples' parties in the to dismantle the Soviet totalitarian West did not emerge overnight, system and replace it with a but as a result of a historical evo­ democratic, representative, and lution that gradually changed the accountable government; they appearance of former class/mass also supported a law-based state parties. The latter were by defini­ and a civil society with guaran­ tion not indifferent to specific ide­ tees of individual freedoms and ologies. Why? Because during the rights, and, of course, market re­ initial phase of party formation, forms.61 the leadership must select the key In fact, it was difficult to dis­ values of the party and then build tinguish between these parties. an organization that makes these One could, perhaps, interpret the values coherent. This process ex­ similarity in their programs as plains the crucial role that ideolo­ evidence of a profound political gies normally play in sha&ing consensus on the basic values of newly formed organizations. As

61. See R Franklin, "The Emerging Democratic Political Parties in the Russian Federation," in Vox Populi: Newsletter of Political Organizations and Parties 12, no. 1 (1993): 8. 62. Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, 2nd ed. (dlatham, N.J.: dlatham House, 1984), xiii. 63. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Political Parties and Political Development, eds. Joseph LclPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966). 64. See, for example, Barnabas Racz, "Political Pluralization in Hungary: The 1990 Elections," in Soviet Studies 43, no. 1 (1991): 130.

26 for the "mainstream democratic" (Kemerovo province, with its parties of Russia, they were close strong independent trade unions to being "catch-none" rather than and "democratic" administration, "catch-all" parties. Their inability would be a deviant case within to establish links with clearly this framework.) identifiable social groups whose Elites are usually defined as interests they would try to articu­ persons who by virtue of their late meant that they were not in­ strategic positions in powerful or­ volved in the process of political ganizations are able to affect po­ communication between the elite litical outcomes regularly and and the masses. As the crisis of substantially. Elites are the princi­ liberal reform intensified, such pal decision makers in the largest, crosscutting issues as economic or most resource-rich, political, reform, the powers of the presi­ governmental, economic, military, dency, and relations with the professional, communications, and "near abroad" undermined the cultural organizations and move­ apparent consensus among these ments of a society.66 Our examina­ parties, creating political cleav­ tion of western Siberia will ages that will be discussed below. therefore center on those decision makers who exercised authority 3 through membership in the ex­ The question remains: What ecutive and legislative branches of were the real functions of those power in Novosibirsk province. formations which called them­ During the period August 1991- selves parties during the period 0ctober 1993, both of these August 1991-0ctober 1993? Or, to branches were strongly domi­ put it in other words, were these nated by the former communist formations dys- or, at least non­ nomenklatura. The head of the pro­ functional agencies? Before we vincial administration, V. Mukha, answer this question, however, was the former first secretary of we need to examine the patterns the Novosibirsk city Communist of political communication within Party committee (gorkom). It the elite, an examination that will should come as no surprise, then, clear up the issue of which groups that neither the staff of the provin­ are most likely to rule in western cial nor city administration of Siberia. Since the region is not a Novosibirsk has changed greatly political unity, but a geographical since 1991. I. Indinok, head of the area, our discussion will focus on city administration, was also a Novosibirsk province, both be­ member of the Novosibirsk cause it is more or less typical and gorkom until August 1991. Most for purposes of coherence. provincial, city, and district peo-

65. See Panebianco, "Political Parties: Organization and Power," 53. 66. See Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America?: The Reagan Years, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1983); John Higley, Desley Deacon, and Don Smart, Elites in Australia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); and George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe, eds., Research Methods for Elite Studies (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

27 ple's deputies in the region were far in their attempt to utilize fash­ former communists, although a ionable "pluralist" interpretations few had joined the RCWP or the of Soviet politics as to forecast a CPRF. pragmatic, Western- oriented re­ It is necessary to draw some gime as a result of the rise to distinctions here; it would be power of industrial managers.68 highly misleading to depict most The real (not hypothetical) former Party officials as true be­ power of industrial managers, lievers. To be sure, they existed, however, stemmed from two but in the early eighties it was far sources: their right to administer more typical to consider a Party economic resources granted to card of the CPSU a key to power them by the ministries and the in­ which was exercised in two major ability of their labor forces to domains: state administration and question their authority. Thus industrial management. Corre­ their connections with the re­ spondingly, a striking majority of gional Party apparatus had al­ decision makers in Novosibirsk ways been extremely cozy, with were either professional civil ser­ some industrial administrators vants or the directors of industrial crossing back and forth between and agricultural enterprises. management and Party and local Given their common Party government (soviet) work. For background, it is important to as­ instance, V. Mukha ran the impor­ certain whether these groups tant "Sibsel'mash" machine building were virtually similar or consti­ plant until he was promoted to tuted two different kinds of politi­ Party work. As a result, both the cal actors. Indeed, industrial behavioral norms and political at­ managers had always been titudes of industrial managers among the most powerful forces and Party apparatchiki were so in the former Soviet Union, espe­ similar that one could hardly dis­ cially in the country's provinces. tinguish them from one another. As early as the 1970s, some stu­ If most Novosibirsk decision dents of Soviet politics suggested makers had a nomenklatura back­ that a kind of interest group poli­ ground, a minority of this elite tics was emerging in which tech­ were intellectuals who had joined nical elites would play a growing the democratic movement in role. There was no lack of evi­ 1988-90 or even earlier. These dence that industrial managers people were only slightly repre­ had recurrently tried to influence sented in the executive structures Party r,olicy, occasionally with of Novosibirsk; one, A. Manokhin, success.67 Some analysts went so held the position of presidential

67. See Jeremy R. Azrael, "The Managers," in Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. R. Ba~ Farrell (Chicago: Aldine, 1970); and H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). 68. See, for example, Alexander Yanov, Detente after Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy (Berkeley: Institute of international Studies, University of California, 1977).

28 representative to the province. munist" majorities that occasion­ Democratic groups in both pro­ ally played a significant role in the vincial and city soviets were decision making process at the strongly critical of Mukha and local level. Indinok, but they were not suffi­ A third group, underrepre­ ciently numerous to force the ex­ sented in the structures of power ecutives to resign. The ex­ but nevertheless influential, was communist majority, on the other the province's new elite: business­ hand, could not afford to ignore men. Their involvement in politics the democrats. Although weak on was stimulated by the process of the regional level, the democratic privatization and their major ac­ opposition had the advantage of cess to power was money, al­ direct links with the democrats in though personal contacts were power in Moscow. This connec­ also very important. A number of tion became institutionalized, as businessmen in Novosibirsk pro­ the presidential representative's vince had political backgrounds, job was to act as a liaison between being either former communists local administrations and Presi­ who chose wealth over power, or dent Yeltsin and to ensure that former participants of the demo­ presidential decrees were imple­ cratic movement who enjoyed the mented at the local level. Certain fruits of victory. democratic activists, such as A. This elit~omposed of the Manannikov, were also well three groups outlined above­ enough known to be able to rely needed some means of inner on Moscow authorities for sup­ communication. Let us begin with port and protection. the function of expression. The Not surprisingly, executives in function of expression, attributed the province were not interested to "horizontal" communication in engaging in direct confronta­ within an elite, may be linked to tion with their apparently weak the formulation of ideologies. It is opponents, and the state of rela­ widely assumed that elite beliefs tions between the two factions of are structured by partisan ideo­ the elite was not antagonistic. logical commitments.69 As Alan There was a good deal of coopera­ Arian has argued, tion: the presidential repre­ members of an elite not only pro­ sentative had to cooperate with duce ideology, they are also its larg­ the head of administration and est distributors and consumers. They the democrats (who were gener­ distribute it to their constituents in ally more active in political per­ their programs and statements; they formance than the ex-communists) consume ideological output because, trained in the language of ideologi­ often headed permanent commit­ cal discourse, they tend to communi­ tees and subcommittees of the cate with their peers in that idiom soviets-cooperating with "com- and they are the most alert and sen-

69. The structures of leaders' belief systems across nations are thoroughly discussed in Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), 87-105.

29 sitive to messa~es which have an fall of 1991, many former Com­ 0 ideological cast." munist Party leaders and local In the former Soviet Union, executives joined the :MDR Its Marxist-Leninist ideology was of founding congress in December crucial importance in maintaining 1991 appeared to be a great political a stable and consensual political success. The RPRE the People's order. This order was destroyed Party of Free Russia (PPFR, actu­ by reformers under Gorbachev ally the Democratic Party of Russian and replaced by pluralistic elites Communists, was renamed soon lacking ideological consensus.71 after the abortive coup of August Former communists, either bureau­ 1991, when Aleksandr Rutskoi de­ crats or industrial and/or agri­ clared that "we've had enough cultural managers, were espe­ communism"), and several smaller cially aware of the lack of groups were confirmed collective ideological means of expression members of the movement. vis-a-vis their democratic oppo­ As early as January 1992, how­ nents. Some of the new political ever, it became clear that "main­ parties were quick to attempt to stream democratic" ideology did satisfy this pressing need, not not provide solid ground for elite without success. It would be mis­ realignment. The MDR "Russian leading to underestimate the im­ branch" held its congress in Nizhnii portance of this process, which Novgorod on 15 and 16 February resulted in the elaboration of a 1992, where Gavrill Popov was new language, or new intellectual elected president and presented style, of political communication. the movement's new program. As mentioned above, the The program advocated limiting Movement for Democratic Re­ the functions of the legislative forms was a party deliberately branch and its interference in the created to unite prominent sup­ executive branch, as well as early porters of radical reforms from elections to all legislative bodies the old political, managerial, and "from top to bottom." Quite administrative elites with promi­ clearly, this program had nothing nent members of the new demo­ in common with the objectives of cratic elite on the basis of a local elites, who feared Yeltsin's "mainstream democratic" ideology. monopolistic domination of the Indonok, head of the Novosibirsk country and for whom the idea of city administration, was particu­ new elections was absolutely un­ larly enthusiastic about the pros­ acceptable. As a result of these pects of the MDR, which explains miscalculations, the MDR started why the movement was among to disintegrate. Its Novosibirsk the most influential political branch, for example, split into two groups in western Siberia. In the factions in late April 1992. One

70. Alan Arian, Ideological Change in Israel (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), 15. 71. See David Lane, "Soviet Elites, Monolithic or Polyarchic?" in Russia in Flux: The Political and Social Consequences of Reform, ed. David Lane (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1992).

30 faction, led by A. Plotnikov, policy of tight budgetary controls backed Popov in his attempt to pursued by the Yeltsin-Gaidar maintain the MDR as a "main­ government and argued that stream democratic" party, imple­ mass public privatization through menting a propaganda campaign a voucher system would not re­ about the advantages of "strong distribute ownership but, to the executive power." As Plotnikov contrary, concentrate it in the put it, "indeed, it is time to get rid hands of black marketeers, the of the system of soviets, to throw mafia, and foreigners. In October out all this rubbish." Another fac­ 1992, Civic Union of Siberia was tion, that supported by Indinok, created by the same parties that redefined its goals and joined the had created the Union in Moscow, Civic Union of Siberia. with the addition of Indinok's fac­ The Civic Union was created tion of the MDR Union branches in May-June 1992 to promote the were created not only in Novosi­ interests of industrial managers birsk, but in Bamaul, Tomsk, and during the privatization process. other cities of western Siberia. The main force behind the Civic For Volskii and his associates, Union was the All-Russian Union lobbying was more important of Industrialists and Entrepre­ than party building. Indeed, there neurs, a pressure group created were ample opportunities for lob­ by former high-level CPSU official bying throughout 1992 and early Arkadii Volskii.72 At the end of 1993, as Yeltsin sought an accom­ May 1992 Volskii and his associ­ modation with both the directors ates launched a political party, of state enterprises and the heads Obnovlenie (Renewal), which of local administrations. In late strictly limited its membership to October 1992, he publicly stated an exclusive circle of enterprise that he was ready to reach a com­ directors. Obnovlenie had no inten­ promise with the Civic Union on tion of becoming a mass electoral the government's economic pro­ party, but was soon joined by two gram; in November a joint pro­ parties that not only sought mass gram that had been drafted and membership, but possessed rela­ accepted by the government and tively strong regional networks: Civic Union was announced. Al­ the PPRF, led by Aleksandr Rutskoi, though the agreement collapsed and the DPR led by Nikolai on November 26th, it was in part Travkin. The Civic Union had one due to the lobbying of Volskii that goal in common with "main­ three industrialists-Vli

72. See Eric Lohr, "Arcadii Volsky's Political Base," in Europe-Asia Studies 45, no. 5 (1993).

31 Russia's government, however, of no less importance. Three ma­ the Civic Union had to become jor aspects of integration can be active in the political arena. Thus, identified here. First, segmenta­ public party building was genu­ tion among party politicians was inely important for Volskii and his evidently less than that within the clientele in the long run, as was elite as a whole. For instance, the the articulation of the interests of Civic Union was normally in op­ industrialists in a more or less co­ position to Yeltsin, but many of its herent ideology. Civic Union was constituent parties had previously not a pro-communist party, but it belonged to the democratic move­ deliberately detached its ideology ment. As early as September 1991, from the radical reformism that even the PPFR completely dis­ threatened the well-being of for­ tanced itself from Marxist ideol­ mer communists. Not surpris­ ogy. As for the DPR, it was once ingly, the latter found such a party the most influential and largest useful, as it helped them to ex­ group within the Democratic Russia press their interests in post-com­ movement. For these parties, the munist language. Civic Union functioned as a non­ It bears mentioning that the communist representative of Civic Union maintained that it those decision makers who felt sought to protect the labor force themselves burdened by their from radical market reform, communist backgrounds, thus thereby trying to forge an alliance helping them to cooperate with with the leaders of trade unions, colleagues of more democratic who shared the interest of indus­ origin. trial managers in assuring contin­ Second, parties were useful for ued operation of their enterprises businessmen who needed addi­ by means of government subsi­ tional channels to reach those in dies and contracts. Some analysts power. The case of the Party of even hypothesized that, provided Economic Freedom (PEF) is a case Russia followed a western model in point. The PEF, founded in of democracy building, the Civic May 1992 by Konstantin Borovoi, Union could become a viable was at that moment the only Rus­ social-democratic party.73 sian party which openly advo­ While this hypothesis was not cated the interests of new confirmed by later developments, businessmen. The main demand Civic Union did indeed have a of the party was that the govern­ certain capacity to deliver messages ment stop impeding the develop­ that had an easily identifiable ment of private business. ideological cast, and thus served Although the PEF was described the function of expression within by its leaders as "the first truly intra-elite communication. Western-type party in Russia," it The function of integration in would seem that the relatively this communication process was rapid expansion of the party's in-

73. See Vera Tolz, Wendy Slater, and Alexander Rahr, "Profiles of the Main Political Blocs," in RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 20 (1993): 24-5.

32 fluence owed more to the finan­ party system and not much came cial resources of Borovoi (who of Yeltsin' s promise to provide was subsequently joined by other such assistance at a 12 December self-made men and women) than 1991 meeting with the leaders of to political activities per se. In No­ fifteen of the largest parties. vosibirsk, the party was reported Some of Yeltsin' s rivals were to have provided "financial aid" not so indifferent to party politics. to journalists, social scientists, and The activities of Rutskoi' s PPFR, other opinion makers. Moreover, for example, were subsidized the provincial branch of the PEF by public funds provided by established the Businessmen De­ Vozrozhdenie Rossii (Russia's Revival) fense Committee. Although the bank, although the official goal of official objective of the committee this bank-controlled by Rutskoi's was to fight corruption, its own apparatus-was to promote activities were rather ambiguous agrarian reform in the country. in this respect because its well­ The Civic Union was strongly paid employees were also provin­ supported by the Russian Union cial and city soviet deputies. of Industrialists and Entrepre­ Many PEF activities reminded an neurs. Other financial support of observer of an interest group. In political parties came from Moscow­ its capacity as a political party, based foundations (e.g., the however, it joined the DRM; the Gorbachev Foundation, "Civic Ac­ local PEF leader, Yankovskii, was cord," "Reform") and influential even a member of the provincial business groups, such as Borovoi' s council of the DRM. stockbrokers. In the periphery, For the sake of analysis, let us there were neither powerful poli­ isolate peripheral elites from the ticians in opposition to Yeltsin nor central elite. Provincial elites also foundations, and local business­ need some means of communica­ men apparently lacked Borovoi' s tion. Previously, the CPSU per­ passion for party politics. As the formed as a channel that enabled chairman of the Novosibirsk local party officials to be in touch branch of the RPRF G. Chulinin, with the Kremlin. The necessity put it, "those entrepreneurs for such a channel could not be whose interests coincide with our abolished together with the com­ program think that it is ... cheaper munist regime, and, not surpris­ to bribe civil servants; they are not ingly, new parties tried to bridge mature enough to understand the communication gap between that it is necessary to cooperate Moscow and the periphery. As with democratic parties." mentioned above, almost all of Of course, dependence on these parties were headquartered financial support from Moscow in Moscow. There were several contributed to the weakness of reasons for this situation, but it local parties. On the other hand, would seem that dependence on national political parties were the material support of the center more likely to survive under these was most important. True, the conditions, despite the increas­ state did remarkably little to assist ingly regional character of the development of parties or a Russian politics. The existence of 33 such parties helped local decision and in the periphery (the most makers relate their political pref­ well-known, the National Security erences to those of competing fac­ Council, was somewhat reminis­ tions of the Moscow elite, thus cent of the old Politburo)7 4 Other structuring regional politics more types of informal political rela­ or less along national lines. For tionships should also be consid­ example, in early 1993 the provin­ ered for the completeness of our cial and city administrations of analysis?5 One could be forgiven Novosibirsk identified themselves for strongly doubting whether primarily with the Civic Union, new parties would be able to find while Yeltsin' s representative in a niche for themselves in this the province, along with a minor­ overcrowded segment of Russian ity of people's deputies, tended to politics, but it would seem that support "mainstream democratic" they had no choice. parties. New political parties did, 4 therefore, play a significant role in Let us take another "horizon­ "elit~lite" political communica­ tal" level of communication. This tion. Of course this role, even if case is actually much more diffi­ we speak of the well-established cult to analyze than the "vertical" parties of the west, is of marginal case. Communication is politically importance for democratic party relevant within the elite by defini­ politics. In the west, a communi­ tion. Within the masses it is not. cation function is performed by People discuss political questions think tanks (which formulate ide­ in everyday life even if they are ologies for communication within not politicians, yet political parties the elite), interest groups (who have virtually nothing to do with lobby), and other institutions that such intercourse--it does not either simply do not exist in need an organizational frame­ Russia or are still in embryo. On work. Moreover, such discourse the other hand, it is necessary to does not influence politics as such, stress that parties are by no means for the clear reason that the deci­ the only sort of institutions that sion making process involves not perform the function of intra-elite every kind of communication, communication in Russia. The only authoritative communica­ new stage of Russian politics, in tion. Despite theoretical argu­ sharp contrast to the period that ments, parties like the RCWP did preceded it, was literally crowded act as agencies of "mass-mass" with different forms of political communication, and their per­ and social aggregation: parlia­ formance of this function can be mentary factions, the mass media, interpreted in the same terms as and non-elected consultative bod­ that of "mainstream democratic" ies that abounded both in Moscow and "centrist" parties within the

74. See Alexander Dallin, "Alternative Forms of Political Representation and Advocacy," in Political Parties in Russia. 75. See John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

34 elite, that is, expression and inte­ membership from varied social gration. It goes without saying strata. The only cleavage likely to that these parties produced ideo­ characterize the communist move­ logies which their supporters ap­ ment in Russia as a whole has parently needed, as well as more to do with demography programs which shaped their atti­ than with politics-it is the move­ tudes towards the events they ment of the older generation. The found significant-not only political phenomenon also seems of a basi­ events. As we have seen, these cally cultural nature. parties also enabled their support­ By the early eighties, most ers to participate in political-or, specialists in Soviet studies had once this participation was no accepted the fact that the totalitar­ longer meaningful-quasipolitical ian model was no longer ade­ activities. But the question re­ quate for describing communist mains: did the existence of these regimes. Indeed, it could be sensi­ parties influence the actual politi­ bly argued that this model over­ cal process? In order to answer looked conflict within the system this question, it is necessary to and overemphasized the role of consider the question of their ideology both as a source of con­ membership. sensus among leaders and a re­ Sociological surveys, espe­ source for mobilizing the support cially those in which the respon­ of non-elites. It is this second role dent is asked to choose between of ideology that is especially sig­ socialist and non-socialist values, nificant in the context of this dis­ are helpful here. In such polls, cussion. Even the most severe "socialist values" were identified critics of the totalitarian model with such goals as "to restore the normally assumed that, in their territorial integrity of the Soviet early phases, when communist Union," "to prevent class inequal­ regimes most closely conformed ity,." "to stop exploitation," and to this model, they made massive "workers' and peasants' power." efforts to indoctrinate their popu­ A number of such surveys have lations. One of the most important been conducted in western Siberia peculiarities of these regimes was since early 1992, and the percentage their totalitarian ideology, charac­ of those who chose "socialist val­ terized by the attempt to entirely ues" turned out to be both low (4- penetrate and politicize life. Over 7.5 percent) and rather stable. It is time, however, communist re­ symptomatic that these respon­ gimes tended to change, often be­ dents usually expressed their will coming less totalitarian and more to take part in demonstrations (i.e. authoritarian. Correspondingly, in activities that are virtually mo­ the importance of ideology and nopolized by communist parties), mobilization declined. but did not want to vote or con­ As Adam Przeworski has re­ tact state officials. As we have al­ marked, "from the late 1950s, ideo­ ready seen, the supporters of logy was no longer the cement, communist parties did not belong to use Gramsci' s expression, that to any recognizable socioeconomic held these societies together."77 group; these parties drew their These developments were ex- 35 plained by the concept of the fare state authoritarianism" influ­ "social contract," i.e., an implicit ence mass political culture in the social pact in which elites offered USSR? the prospect of material welfare to It is generally assumed that the population in exchange for the one, political culture is not an easy latter's silence.77 subject of scientific research, and Not only did Western analysts two, Russian political culture has interpret the apparent stability of yet to be satisfactorily explained, the Brezhnev era according to its despite a number of studies that ability to manage and contain have called attention to the process popular expectations, defining the of change in the value system of regime as "welfare state authori­ the Soviet p~ulation during the tarianism,"78 the Communist party postwar era. I will take a some­ leadership itself appealed less to what roundabout approach to this ideological images of the radiant complicated problem. The con­ future and more to prosaic, practi­ cept of political culture as formu­ cal, and contemporary images of lated by Gabriel Almond and the "Soviet way of life." Sidney Verba81 is closely linked to Thus there were grounds for that of political participation. Stanislaw Ossowski' s observation Therefore, one may arrive at that the dominant values of the certain conclusions concerning USSR and the United States were political culture by studying par­ strangely similar: "the same meri­ ticipatory routines. Until the mid- tocratic context in the political cul­ 1970s, the prevailing view of mass ture, the same advocacy of political participation in commu­ mobility, the same 'religious' faith nist countries was that with few in an indefinite progress toward a exceptions, such participation was better future."79 The emergence of little more than window dressing "welfare state authoritarianism" used by Soviet leaders to obtain a profoundly affected all the aspects veneer of legitimacy and enhance of social life in the former Soviet their capability to mobilize support. Union. In this article, however, the The application of interest question of special importance is: group theory to Soviet politics How did the emergence of "wel- opened up the conceptual possi-

76. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 2. 77. See, for example, Peter A. Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract," in Soviet Economy 3, no. 1 (1987). 78. See George W. Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfar~State Authoritarianism," in Soviet Society and the Communist Party, ed. Karl W. Ryavec (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts l'ress, 1978). 79. See Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in Social Consciousness, rev. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). 80. See, for example, Brian D. Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizens: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," in Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR, ed. James R. Millar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 81. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

36 bility that policy-making in the aimed at demonstrating support Soviet Union could be influenced in exchange for receiving the by input from below, thus pro­ benefits of loyalty to the regime. voking, in Jeffrey Hahn's words, No one expected them to be "a kind of cottage industry of committed communists and they published works dealing with po­ certianly were not. This "sham litical participation in communist participation" was motivated by countries."82 Some scholars vigor­ very real material interests that ously believed in the utility of had nothing to do with ideology. studying politicalsfarticipation in The second mode of participation the Soviet Union; the absence of in the former Soviet Union was competitive elections, however­ once described as "covert partici­ the most frequently articulated pation," given that "meaningful" criticism of this analytic approach participation was almost exclu­ -united those who maintained sively limited to obtaining out­ that political participation in the puts of the system-through country was not really meaningfu1.84 personal connections if the citizen In particular, participation in or­ was educated, through bribery if ganizations that organized mass he was not. Zvi Gitelman termed activities, such as trade unions, this covert political behavior a local soviets, the Komsomol, and "second polity" that paralled the the like, was dismissed as "sham "second economy" of the Soviet participation" at best. Union.85 The diversity of analytic ap­ In fact, these two forms of proaches seeemed to reflect the political participation were closely genuine complexity of political interconnected and supplemented participation in the Soviet Union, one another. The benefits derived especially in the seventies. Basi­ from "sham participation" were cally, three major modes of partici­ merely potential benefits until pation could be distinguished. validated by 11 covert participation." First, "sham participation" in Every loyal citizen, apparently, public organizations which, while had a chance of receiving a better by no means obligatory, was never­ apartment from the state, but it theless very useful for a loyal was necessary to use personal Soviet citizen. In fact, this kind of connections in order not to miss participation may be interpreted this chance. The more connections in terms of the above-mentioned used in exercising this "right," the "social contract," participants better. Of course, it may be argued

82. Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 32. 83. See, for example, Jon S. Adams, Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee (New York: Praeger, 1977). 84. See Richard V. Burks, "Political Participation under Socialism," in Studies in Comparative Communism 15 (1982). 85. Zvi Gitleman, "Working the Soviet System: Citizens and Urban Bureaucracies," in The Contemporary Soviet City, eds. Henry W. Morton and Robert C. Stuart (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), 241.

37 that there were individuals who affect all strata of the population managed to avoid "sham partici­ equally. Even if "sham" and "covert'' pation" by having especially in­ forms of participation were of fluential patrons, or that, in some primary importance for the vast cases, it was enough simply to be majority of the population, there loyal in order to benefit from the was reason to anticipate that they system, but these exceptions only were not the primary forms of proved the rule. participation for certain signifi­ There was thus no difference cant minorities. It would simply between the value systems that be unrealistic to assume that the underlay the two modes of political regime's massive effort to indoc­ participation-both were highly trinate the population in the 1930s individualistic and materialistic. had no impact on mass conscious­ As Przeworski has noted, "It was ness and that the "support" par­ a society in which people uttered ticipation (which some analysts formulas they did not believe and identified as the predominant that they did not expect anyone form of political participation) else to believe."86 While the ideas which prevailed in the early that founded the system (equality, phase of communist regimes did social justice, mutual cooperation) not survive into their next gPhase became meaningless for the bulk of political development. 8 One of the population, the value of can hypothesize that this form of their consumption rose. By the political participation still existed 1970s, western Europe and the in the Soviet Union in the mid- USA had become the standard of 1980s, even if it had been margi­ comparison and these compari­ nalized by the process of value sons were increasingly humiliat­ change. ing. Not surprising!~ a number of The problem that often surveys conducted in the former seemed insurmountable for a Soviet Union in the perestroika student of Soviet politics was to years implicitly challenged the draw a clear-cut distinction view that support for capitalist between "sham" and "support" market institutions was specific to participation. To distinguish west European cultural communi- between these two forms of par­ ti.es. 87 ticipation meant to identify two Changes in the value system different sets of politically rele­ of the country did not, however, vant values, yet values cannot be

86. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 2. 87. See, for example, James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, "Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture," in Public Opinion and ReKime Change, ed. Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992). 88. See J.P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (London: Faber, 1967); James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, ed. Leonard Binder et al. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).

38 observed and described as such. what parties like the RCWP of­ In order to study these values, an fered their followers, a process analyst has to focus his or her at­ that enabled them to communi­ tention on political behavior. In cate with one another in a way the west, survey-based research customary to them. has proven useful for detecting Those communist successor politically relevant values. These parties in Russia whose activities two methods--observation of deviated from this model failed to political behavior and surveys­ mobilize significant membership. were not, however, applicable in The Socialist Party of Working the USSR. Surveys were not vi­ People, founded in October 1991 able for the obvious reasons: it and led by a former dissident, was very difficult (if possible at Roy Medvedev, is illustrative in all) to gather this kind of socio­ this respect. A party convention in logical data in the Soviet Union, December 1991 dropped the while interviewing emigrants ex­ phrase "dictatorship of proletar­ cluded those people involved in iat" from its program and "support" participation. Observa­ adopted a declaration of respect tion of political behavior was for human rights, a mixed econ­ complicated by the fact that there omy, and a multiparty system. was no observable difference be­ Medvedev called for a thorough tween the behavior of people who investigation into the past errors were genuinely eager to return to of the CPSU and was apparently the uncorrupted values of the past wary of the extremist leanings of and people who simply pre­ other communist successor parties. tended to cherish communist val­ Although the SPWP was over­ ues. It seems the difference represented at the Congress of between them became recogniz­ People's Deputies and had lim­ able only post factum, i.e., after the ited access to the media and fall of the communist regime, certain financial support, it could when "sham" participation van­ not compete with the RCWP at ished and "support" participation the grassroots level. A branch of survived by transforming itself the SPWP existed in Novosibirsk, into "protest" participation. but most of its members were pas­ In the world of totalitarian sive and the rest wanted nothing ideology, private life naturally be­ to do with the intentionally "euro­ comes overpoliticized and politi­ communist" ideology of the lead­ cally interpreted. Private histories ership. It would seem that the era become public, i.e. individuals of moderate socialist politics has and their pasts become part of the not yet arrived in Russia. collective entity, perceivable only The RCWP and the majority of in an ideological reconstruction of smaller communist parties in the path that led to their present. Russia thus performed an impor­ No events were isolated from tant function in the field of mass ideology-it would not be an ex­ culture. Yet the question remains: aggeration to say that ideology What were the political conse­ shaped private life itself. This quences of this situation? One is shaping of private life was exactly tempted to define these parties as 39 "antisystem." True, the concept of tion was instead performed in "antisystem parties" formulated part by the electronic media. by Giovanni Sartori is rather Parties enabled the masses to vague and too often used polemi­ speak to the elite, while the cally in order to stigmatize a media made the masses listen. democratic party that has no real Parties, then, were channels of intention of overthrowing a re­ participation, while the media gime, such as the way the Italian was not. In fact, no form of Christian Democrats used the meaningful mass participation term in relation to the Italian in politics has evolved in Russia Communist Party. The RCWP, since August 1991, when the however, never caused observers practice of "sham" participa­ to doubt its unequivocal opposi­ tion vanished. tion to the existing regime; the party not only regularly con­ 2) Political parties along with demned those in power and certain other institutions acted articulated a vision of the alterna­ as agencies of expression and tive regime it sought to establish, integration within the elite. it also tried to subvert existing po­ The dynamics of the new litical institutions. To be regarded Russian polity were rather un­ as an antisystem party, however, a usual: the less interest the political formation must combine masses had in politics, the opposition to the regime with more intensive was the politi­ meaningful political activity, and cal life of the elite. While the the activities of the RCWP were of public simply refused to be no relevance to the decision provoked into participating making process in Russia-its actively in disputes between members did not participate in their elected leaders, the acti­ politics. Rather, they isolated vities of the leaders them­ groups which under certain con­ selves-aimed either at reaching ditions would be antisystem in compromises with opponents the proper sense of the term. I or defeating them-tended to would define the RCWP, then, as a give the impression that parti­ "non-system" party. As such, it san politics was flourishing in was not dangerous to the system the country. and, furthermore, appeared to function within it. 3) Those parties that did mobi­ lize relatively large member­ 5 ships still differed sharply from their western counter­ The nature of the political sys­ parts because they functioned tem itself must be clarified here. to discourage, not encourage, To begin with, let us list some political participation, thus di­ properties of the new Russian pol­ verting the activity of poten­ ity that can be identified as a re­ tially dangerous groups from sult of our analysis: the real decision-making process. 1) There was no "mass-elite" communication intermediated Can such a polity be defined by political parties. This func- as a democratic polity? The an- 40 swer depends on what is meant phase over several generations. by democracy. For all the mean­ Britain's protodemocratic evolu­ ings "democracy" has acquired, tion can be traced at least to the there is broad scholarly agreement eighteenth century, when the cabi­ that it is best defined and applied net system and the tolerance of a in terms of the procedural criteria loyal opposition became firmly of Robert Dahl: a political regime established; in some respects, this characterized by free and open evolution goes back to the early elections, relatively low barriers to Middle Ages. In the case of the participation, genuine political United States, its entire colonial competition, and wide protection period of a century and a half was of civil liberties.89 None of these such a prepatory phase.92 Natu­ criteria could be attributed to the rally, one cannot expect evolving Russian polity during the period democracies to be exactly the August 1991-0ctober 1993, least same as well-established ones. of all protection of civilliberies. It Britain of the nineteenth century, can be argued that it makes no for example, is sometimes defined sense to describe and explain the as a "stable limited democracy." Russian polity in rigid procedural As Michael Burton, Richard Gun­ terms, as post-communism is, in ther, and John Higley have put it, the words of Laslo Bruszt "both "the absence of substantial mass genuinely transitional and truly participation means that democ­ transformational.''90 racy is limited to such an extent In the context of democratic that the requirements of our ideal­ transitions, it is possible that Russia type definition of democracy are has just entered what Dankwart not met."93 In the first years of Rustow calls the "preparatory Russia's proto-democracy, the ab­ phase" in which "a prolonged sence of meaningful mass partici­ and inconclusive struggle involv­ pation was accompanied by lack ing 'well-entrenched forces' is of electoral accountability. It is waged over issues of meaning for thus impossible to apply the them."91 Most mature democratic notion of limited democracy to countries experienced such a the Russian case.94

89. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 90. See Laslo Bruszt, "Transfom1ative Politics in East Central Europe" (paper presented at the Conference on Obstacles to the Transformation of Soviet-Type Societies in Eastern Europe, Institut fur Wissenschaft von Menschen, Vienna, July 1991.) 91. See Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," in Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 352-61. 92. See Robert Dahl, "Transition to Democracy," in Gyorgy Szoboszlai, ed., Democracy and Political Transjorrr111tion: Theories and East-Central European Realities (Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1991), 14. 93. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6.

41 The term that next comes to tional nature of post-communist mind is oligarchy. According to polities in a way that ~recludes William R Schonfeld, oligarchy "conceptual stretching." "is a form of domination where a From this theoretical perspec­ small coalition tends to exercise a tive, the question of Russia's pros­ disproportional influence over a pects for democratization is group's political decisions. "95 particularly loaded. Scholarship While it is by no means conven­ that preceded the wave of democ­ tional to define the new Russian ratization in the USSR in the 1980s polity in this manner,96 Thomas argued that a number of precondi­ H. Rigby described the former So­ tions were necessru:y for a stable viet Union as a "weakly institu­ democratic polity to emerge. Yet the tionalized oligarchy, with a search for the causes of such a polity potential, tragically actualized by -rooted in economic, social, Stalin, to collapse into a s~stem of cultural, or institutional factors--has personal dictatorship."9 This is not yet yielded a general law of de­ not to argue that no difference ex­ mocratization, nor it is likely to do ists between the contemporary so in the near future. 99 The no­ Russian polity and its communist tion of contingency, i.e., that out­ predecessor. Yet this difference re­ comes depend less on objective quires conceptualization. I assume conditions than subjective rules sur­ here that instead of the stable oli­ rounding strategic choices, stresses garchical order of the Soviet collective decisions and political in­ Union, a different political system teractions that have been underem­ has emerged in Russia, one I will phasized in the search for the refer to as "competitive oligar­ preconditions for democracy.100 If chy." The notion of competitive not explicitly placed within a frame­ oligarchy seems to have the ad­ work of structural constraints, how­ vantage of indicating the transi- ev~ this understanding of the

94. Electoral accountability is usually considered to be the most important feature of liberal democracy. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 28; and Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1947}, 269. 95. William R Schonfeld, "La stabilite des dirir;eants des partis politiques: 1a theorie de 1'oligarchie de Robert Michels,' in Revue Francazse de Science Politique 30 (1980): 858. %. The concept of "competitive oligarchy'' is applied to the new Russian polity in Grigorii V. Golosov, "New Russian Political Parties and the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Western Siberia," in Gavernment and Opposition, forthcoming. 97. See, for example, Thomas H. Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and l.iJcal Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1990),254. 98. See Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," 1034. 99. See Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," in Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 2-5. 100. See Guillermo O'Donnell and PhiliJ'pe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions al:iout Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

42 transition to democracy descends This strategic choice made it into excessive voluntarism. The impossible to maintain Marxism­ notion of competitive oligarchy Leninism as the regime's domi­ refers to those political institu­ nant ideology. In the first place, no tions, norms, and routines that to­ one faction of the elite could gether constitute such a afford to base its mobilization framework in Russia. By specify­ strategy on the claim that it repre­ ing the competitive character of a sented the interests of economi­ polity, we assume that the level of cally underprivileged strata of the elite integration is so low that in­ population partly because, in con­ tra-elite interactions tend to be de­ trast to the liberal intelligentsia, cisive in determining whether or the underprivileged were not a not a polity becomes democratic. significant political resource, and In this respect, competitive oligar­ partly because such a strategy chies are absolutely dissimilar to could be dangerous to the elite the limited democracies of the itself. It made no sense, therefore, ei~teenth and nineteenth centu- to revert to the uncorrupted values of the past. In the second place, it nes;. 101 therr . d'ISSlffil . "1 an'ty t o com- munist regimes is even sharper. made no sense to rely on the In the former Soviet Union, attractiveness of the latest version of Soviet ideology because the im­ value consensus was uniform in ages of the "Soviet way of life" the sense that different segments had faded along with the relative of the elite did not publicly ex­ efficiency of the regime. Marxism­ press ideological or policy dis­ Leninism could no longer provide agreements, confining their public Soviet society a shell of ideological utterances instead to a single, stability and elite cognition. explicit ideology. Members of the Gorbachev, who failed to under­ ruling bureaucracy enjoyed secu­ stand this in time, was thus rity and stability; non-elites shared doomed to fail in his struggle in the results of the country's eco­ against the radical opposition led nomic growth. Eventually the byYeltsin. political compact of the Brezhnev The characteristic feature of era was destroyed by intra-elite the system of competitive oligar­ conflict born of the poor economic chy that emerged in August 1991 performance of the early eighties. was acute intra-elite conflict. This At first, this conflict took place conflict, however, cannot be ex­ within the parameters of the exist­ plained by increased heterogeneity ing system, but in the late eighties of the elite. While a certain num­ competing factions of the elite ber of democratic activists did undertook several attempts to indeed flow into the structures of mobilize mass support for their power, the impact of this influx on positions (the earliest being the the political process was not as policy of glasnost' in 1987-88). serious in Russia as in say, most

101. For an interesting description of such a political system, see Nils S~emquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock," in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University= Press, 1966).

43 central European countries or need allies like the RCWP. These even in some of the former Soviet parties were thus marginalized, republics. The post-communist if not forced into political non­ elite in Russia appeared to lack existence. To be sure, the level of ideological consensus. In other elite integration was low and the words, factions of the elite dis­ system's lack of networks for agreed on major ideological issues communication and influence and it was this disagreement that contributed to its ineffectiveness. led to the collapse of the system of However, it would be an exag­ competitive oligarchy in October geration to claim that chaos pre­ 1993. Let us consider the strategic vailed in the country. In choices which contributed to this retrospect, the Russian polity as it outcome. existed between August 1991 and As several dimensions of ideo­ October 1993 was far from com­ logical consensus are possible, pletely ineffective, in fact, the situ­ consensus may be strong on one ation in the country was to some such dimension and weak on extent reminiscent of the "stable another. By the end of 1991, all instabilitY." of the French Fourth factions of the elite accepted the Republic.102 worth of the political order they This relatively stable political called democracy. Neither Yeltsin order was substantially under­ nor his political opponents saw mined in March 1993. The agree­ the existing regime solely as a ment reached between Yeltsin and vehicle through which rival fac­ Khasbulatov that month would tions promoted their own inter­ have cancelled the April referen­ ests, hence, no one sought to dum, abolished the Congress of destroy or cripple the regime. The People's Deputies, and organized dominant strategy of the major elections for a new parliament for political actors in the regime was the fall of 1993. Yet the deal was to search for intra-elite compro­ rejected by the majority of depu­ mise. As we have seen, "main­ ties, who were so infuriated that stream democratic" parties as they tried unsuccessfully to im­ well as the Civic Union were peach both "conspirators." As a among those formations which result, Yeltsin went on the political applied this strategy. Indeed, com­ offensive and aimed to defeat the promise seemed feasible even in parliament. late March 1993, when Yeltsin The implications of these de­ struck his last deal with Khasbu­ velopments for Russia's political latov. evolution were profound. It must With priority given to intra­ be stressed that the relative homo­ elite compromise, Yeltsin was not geneity of the political elite in really interested in alliance with, Russia had not been undermined or populist dependence on, the in August 1991. The former legis­ DRM, nor did his political rivals lature was composed of a mix of

102. See Andre Siegfried, "Stable Instability in France," in Foreign Affairs 34, no. 3 (1956).

44 apparatchiki, local Party members, and the communist opposition and Soviet-style industrial man­ was established when the so­ agers. As for Yeltsin, foreigners called Committees in Defence of sometimes forget that he emerged the Constitution were created all from the highest ranks of the over the country in March 1993. ancien regime and that his influen­ After that time, the RCWP played tial "Sverdlovsk mafia" was a an increasingly important role in patron-client group whose origin shaping intra-elite conflict; it goes could be traced to the communist without saying that the goal of the period of Yeltsin's career. Not sur­ communists was not to become a prisingly, both major political ac­ part of the system, but to destroy tors had authoritarian tendencies. it. Under the system of competitive This is not to say that either oligarchy, these tendencies were the DRM or the RCWP was par­ restricted by the competing fac­ ticularly successful in mobilizing tions' commitment to maintaining support for their allies. Quite the the status quo. Once this restric­ reverse, neither the "October tion was lifted, the situation revolution" of 1993 nor the changed radically. "counter-revolution" which fol­ The changed political situation lowed kindled any enthusiasm produced two major alterations in among the masses to support party politics. First, the number of either side in the escalating conflict parties involved in providing -the masses showed no desire to channels of intra-elite communi­ return to the streets and civil war cation declined. The Civic Union did not occur. Happily for Russia, split into several factions and at­ those parties which appeared to tempts to create a new political be mass parties, i.e., those parties center in Russia-intended to whose strategy was directed to­ play an appeasing role in the wards mass mobilization, experi­ power struggle between the enced miserable failure. The parliament and the president­ RCWP is currently banned and were fruitless. Second and more the DRM has become a minor significant, non-system parties partner in the governmental elec­ became accepted as participants toral coalition, Russia's Choice. in the political process. After Not only the composition of the March, both the parliament and party system but the entire politi­ Yeltsin engaged in an unrestricted, cal landscape of the country has potentially violent struggle for changed radically. But does this dominance which left them no mean that a different political re­ choice but to revert to populism. gime has emerged? If Yeltsin could appeal to the rem­ By mid-October 1993, the nants of the DRM (which claimed Russian parliament was dis­ to maintain some capacity for po­ solved, its most prominent mem­ litical mobilization) for support, bers and certain leaders of the only force capable of provid­ anti-Yeltsin forces were jailed, ing mass support to the parlia­ several political parties and news­ ment was the RCWP. The unholy papers were banned, censorship alliance between the parliament was introduced, and the country 45 was ruled by decree. The system such, however important they of competitive oligarchy seemed may be, are therefore not the only to have been replaced by a sort of factor worthy of consideration. As liberal autocracy, or dictablanda, to the experience of a number of use the term of Guillermo authoritarian regimes has shown, O'Donnell and Philippe C. electoral accountability stems not Schmitter.103 This regime might only from elections themselves, have survived in Russia if the but from effective mass participa­ West had not made it clear that tion in politics. Let us then exam­ Yeltsin' s supporters outside Rus­ ine the October-December 1993 sia strongly preferred new parlia­ electoral campaign (the only ob­ mentary elections to a liberal servable manifestation of mass autocracy. This was not the first political participation in contem­ and probably not the last time porary Russia) from this perspec­ that international influence on tive. Russian decision-makers had a Paradoxically, the electoral considerable impact on the coun­ campaign of 1993 was strongly try's development. At the time, reminiscent of the campaign one was tempted to ask: Provided which preceded elections for the that parliamentary elections take previous Russian legislature. Not place according to schedule and only did most political activity Russia has a new parliament by originate with "democratic forces" December, will the lack of electoral (simply because their opponents accountability in the political sys­ were in understandable disarray) tem be eliminated, thus making but, due to the recent confronta­ Russia a democracy in a conven­ tion that had threatened to put the tional sense? communists in charge once again, Before answering this ques­ the pre-electoral rhetoric of the tion, we must recall that a political reformers was backward looking, regime refers, in the words of still fighting the communist O'Donnell and Schmitter, to the regime and its "communist-fascist" entire "ensemble of patterns, ex­ legacies. Foremost among refor­ plicit or not, that determines the mist parties was Russia's Choice, forms and channels of access to a loose coalition of prominent principal governmental positions, individuals like Deputy Prime the characteristics of the actors Minister Yegor Gaidar and those who are admitted and excluded activists who entered the demo­ from such access and the re­ cratic movement in the late 1980s. sources or strategies that they can (In this respect Russia's Choice re­ use to gain access."104 Elections as sembled the former DRM.) The

103. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 13-14. 104. Ibid., 73. For different approaches to the problem of defining the political regime, see Gabriel Almona and G. Bingham Powell, eds., Comparative Politics, 2d ed. (Boston: Little & Brown, 1978); Samuel E. Finer, Comparative Government (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970); and Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Read'ing, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

46 most broadly publicized alterna­ ency election with party list elec­ tive to Russia's Choice, the Party tion) was a very useful, but insuf­ of Russian Unity and Concord, ficient prerequisite for changing was founded by Sergei Shakhrai, this situation. who claimed that his party repre­ sented the "real interests" of Conclusion Russia's regions. Given that Prime The role of mass participation Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in­ in politics in the process of transi­ itially agreed to stand for this tion to democracy needs to be re­ party, and that Shakhrai himself examined. While mass partici­ was another Deputy Prime Minis~ pation proved to be of crucial it would seem that these regional importance in crippling commu­ interests were expected to coin­ nist regimes, there is no signifi­ cide with the program of the gov­ cant evidence that mass ernment. democracy has emerged any­ Just as in 1990, no serious pro­ where in the post-communist grammatic differences existed be­ world. This fact contradicts the tween the proreform parties widespread assumption that participating in the elections. To democratic transitions primarily use the words of Elmer Hank.iss, produce increasingly active citi­ their ideology was "nineteenth­ zenship. From this theoretical per­ century conservative liberalism."105 spective, Attila Agh is correct in At the same time, the tendency of claiming that "to avoid the sepa­ political parties to fracture around ration of politics and people, par­ dominant personalities appeared to have reasserted itself, a realign­ ticipation by the people is now much more important. .. than in ment that threatened to make 106 parliamentary representation in­ the consolidated democracies." creasingly irrelevant in terms of Yet this approach implicitly un­ public support and inducing the deremphasizes the level of mass lack of electoral accountability participation that existed in com­ so typical of the former Russian munist regimes. As was reason­ parliament. Indeed, during the ably argued by students of Soviet period of competitive oligarchy in politics, political participation in Russia, the masses were demobi­ the country was substantial on the lized partly because deputies basis of numbers alone and had came to Parliament representing grown steadily in the post-Stalin ultimately no one but themselves period, often exceeding in quanti­ and were thus responsible to no tative terms standard measures of one. The new electoral system conventional participation used to (which combined direct constitu- describe Western democracies.107

105. Elmer Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 247. 106. Attila Agh, "Transitions to Democracy in East-Central Europe: A Comparative View," in Democracy and Political Transfonnation, 119. 107. See, for example, Jerry Hough, "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies 28 (January 1976); and D. Richard Little, "Mass Political

47 Neither "sham" (in conjuction grounds for expecting the early with "covert") nor "support" par­ phases of post-communist devel­ ticipation was equivalent, even in opment, whatever they may be, to functional terms, to mass partici­ involve mass political participa­ pation in democratic politics. tion. Nevertheless, these forms of po­ It would seem that the choice litical activity were meaningful faced by the Russian polity today within the context of a communist is not between competitive oligar­ regime. Moreover, it may be ar­ chy and full-scale democracy, but gued that the routines of "support between competitive oligarchy participation" shaped the activi­ and another type of protode­ ties of anti-communist protesters mocratic regime. It is a difficult during the period 1989-1991. task to define the latter. Drawing Assuming that both communist comparisons between the pro­ regimes and democracies are basi­ todemocratic evolution of Russia cally participatory forms of gov­ and, say, Britain would make little ernment, we can conclude that the sense. Aside from the fact that transition from the former to the asynchronic comparisons of such latter can neither be described nor scale lead to erroneous perspec­ explained as a process of extending tives, it is quite clear that linear participation in politics in quanti­ models of democratization based tative terms. Quite the reverse, on the European experience of the democratization makes old forms nineteenth century are inapplica­ of political participation meaning­ ble to Russia. less, and new forms do not One "law of democratization" emerge overnight. derived from this model is, how­ First, a significant minority of ever, worth mentioning-namely, the Russian population remain the assumption that an expansion committed to old routines that of competition within the political function to channel their activities elite must precede an expansion out of the real political process. of mass participation in politics.108 Second, for the vast majority of On the other hand, the sequential the population political participa­ model elaborated by a number of tion has been invalidated by authors implies that Russia must "sham" practices of the recent first define its national identity, past. Third, Russian citizens lack then develop effective institutions the civic political culture usually of authority, and, finally, initiate a considered a necessary prereq­ gradual progression from civil to uisite for democratic participa­ political rights.109 Russia simply tion. All in all, there are no cannot afford to follow such a se-

Participation in the US and USSR: A Conceptual Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 8 (January 1976). 108. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),32-59, 78-92. 109. See Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," in World Politics 20 (1968); and Binder et al., eds., Crises and Sequences in Polztical Development.

48 quence. Transitional polities that placed on who may vote or hold have recently emerged in Latin office, the parties that may com­ America, Central Europe, and, pete, how votes are counted and historically, Southern Europe, thus ag~egated into districts, and so appear to be more appropriate on. 13 Neither dictablanda nor de­ comparative referents for analyz­ mocradura, however, can be fruit­ ing the new Russian polity. fully compared to a system of One can object that incorporat­ competitive oligarchy. As com­ ing the study of post-communist parisons should be judged by developments within the general their theoretical utility, the corpus of "transitional regimes" question of primary importance occurs at the expense of the cul­ is: According to what parameters hrral, ideological, and national pe­ did O'Donnell and Schmitter culiarities of the post-communist classify regimes into these catego­ case.U0 I would argue, however, ries? If a political system meets that those authors who do not certain procedural norms it is usu­ categorically reject research on ally identified as a democracy.114 other transitional regimes are in As we have seen, the restrictions the right.111 There is, after all, no characteristic of a competitive oli­ other way to exit the "conceptual garchy are not of a procedural na­ ghetto" in which, as some critics ture. Rather, they stem from the allege, Sovietology still prevails.U2 social context of the new politics On the other hand, generaliza­ in Russia. Democradura is thus not tions drawn from previous transi­ a valid category because when tional experiences are not always compared to it, competitive oli­ useful. garchy appears to be a democracy. In their ''Tentative Conclusions Another conceptualization pro­ about Uncertain Democracies," posed by O'Donnell is "delegative O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest democracy," a concept grounded two intermediary types of transi­ on one basic premise: he who tional regimes: dictablanda and de­ wins a presidential election is en­ mocradura. Civic rights and abled to govern the country as he partisan competition are permit­ sees fit (to the extent that existing ted in both, but restrictions are power relations allow) for the

110. See, for example, Kenneth Jowitt, "The Leninist Extinction," in The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left, ed. Daniel Chirot (Seattle: University of Wasrungton Press, 1991). 111. See Genaro Arriagada, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Comparative Politics, Workin~ Paper of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson Intemationaf Center for Scholars, no. 193 (1991). 112. Francis Fukuyama, "The Modernizing Imperative: The USSR as an Ordinary Country," in National Interest (Spring 1993): 18. 113. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 9. 114. For a listing of these norms, see Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). A couple of additional items are added in Philli_pe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy is ... and is not," in journal of Democracy (Summer 1991 ).

49 term to which he has been oligarchy. For instance, Yeltsin has elected..U6 In contrast to de­ consistently presented himself as mocradura, the notion of delega­ above political parties or specific tive democracy does not imply political groups, explicitly claim­ that any formal or informal re­ ing to be the main custodian of strictions have been imposed on the national interest. In his view, civil rights or partisan competi­ other institutions-such as the tion. O'Donnell himself envisions parliament and the judiciary­ this type of regime as one form of were nuisances that accompanied democracy, yet the truth of his the domestic and international interpretation may be seriously advantages of being a democrati­ questioned. First and foremost, it cally elected president. The idea is representation that introduces of being accountable to these insti­ the idea of accountability and dis­ tutions was absolutely alien to tinguishes democracies from non­ him. The new constitution of Rus­ democracies. While it cannot be sia, drafted by Yeltsin' s team, em­ denied that some elements of rep­ bodies this image of democracy. It resentation are present in "delega­ is quite possible, therefore, to in­ tive democracies," it is clear that terpret recent developments in these elements are too weak to Russia as a shift from competitive provide efficient control over deci­ oligarchy to delegative proto-de­ sions made by elected officials. As mocracy. Yet for the purposes of O'Donnell has written, "[A]fter this discussion, however heuristic the election, voters/delegators are it may, such an interpretation expected to return to the condi­ must be related to the prospects tion of passive, but hopefully for a transition to democracy, cheering, spectators of what the which calls for additional concep­ President does."117 Although lack tualization. of electoral accountability makes A simple dichotomy (for ex­ "delegative democracies" strongly ample, the dichotomy of competi­ dissimilar to the well-established tive oligarchy versus delegative polyarchies of the West, they are proto-democracy) has the advan­ similar to the kind of competitive tage of providing an immediate oligarchy identified in this discus­ and easy typology. Typologies, sion. however, construct ideal types on Indeed, Russian President the basis of one or more distinc­ Yeltsin has persistently tried to re­ tive features, a process that results place parliamentarism with presi­ in presenting objects for further dential rule, and not without inquiry, rather than explaining the success. His political behavior has causes of the phenomena so iden­ often been more consistent with tified. In contrast to typologies, the norms of "delegative democ­ models are specifically oriented racy" than those of competitive toward analyzing causality.118

116. Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy?, a Hellen Kellogg Institute Working Paper, no. 172 (March 1992), 6. 117. Ibid., 7.

50 This is not to say that an un­ Lijphart identifies a "consocia­ bridgeable gap separates these tional" type of democracy as two tools of social analysis, as something different from, and to a typologies may 5erve as the basis certain extent contrary to, the for models. Yet in order to de­ dominant "pluralist" type. Ac­ velop a model, one must over­ cording to him, consociational de­ come the methodological diffi­ mocracy has two peculiarities: culties inherent in the static nature verticalsegmentationofthepopu­ of typologies, which often requires lation into religious, linguistic, use of rigorous methodology ethnic, or ideological communi­ based on formal logic or mathe­ ties, and institutionalization of a matical analysis. One of the most process of negotiation at the elite beaten tracks in the history of level of these communities. The political science (indeed, Aristotle experiences of nations such as the invented this analytical tool) is to Netherlands are sometimes con­ use the idea of a dynamic contin­ sidered empirical referents for the uum and to develop a system of consociational type of democ­ classification that corresponds to racy.121 Whereas the "pluralist" this continuum. H both competi­ type of democracy is usually at­ tive oligarchy and delegative tributed to the United States, proto-democracy are protode­ Britain, and a number of other mocratic political regimes, then, polities, the hypothesis of pri­ their basic characteristics may be mary importance for our discus­ discovered by examining those sion is that a correspondence political forms that are attributed exists between types of proto­ to democracy as such. democratic polities and types of The literature on "kinds" or democracy. "~" of democracy is abun­ Let us for a moment assume dant.119 For the purposes of this that a high level of social segmen­ discussion, the work of Arend tation is shared by all transitional Lijphart is of special interest.120 polities. The criterion equally

118. See Raymond Boudon, L'analyse mathhnatique des factes sociaux (Paris: Plon, 1967). 119. See, for example, Peter Lange and Hudson Meadwell, ''Typo~ of Democratic ~stems: From Political Inputs to Political Economy," m New Directions in COmparative Politics, 80-111. 120. See Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy_ in the NetherlandS (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). In another book, the author draws a complex, multivariate distinction between "majoritarian" and "consensus" democracy. See Arend 'Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Gcioernment in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). While the later distinction is better elaborated than that of the initial work listed here, it does not suit the purposes of this discussion. 121. See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Kenneth D. McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in SegmetJted Societies (foronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); Jurg Steiner, Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (Chapel Hill, University of North CarOlina Press, 1974).

51 applicable to democracies and Even if we limit our inquiry to proto-democracies is the role these major models, it is still far played by intra-elite negotiation from clear what path Russia will in the political process. In both follow to democracy. Some ob­ competitive oligarchy and conso­ servers insist that the system of ciational democracy, intra-elite competitive oligarchy no longer negotiation plays an extremely exists because it was too ineffi­ important political role. This fea­ cient to provide the strong politi­ ture distinguishes regimes of both cal leadership required by reform. types from delegative protode­ According to this line of argment, mocracies as well as pluralist de­ the Congress of People's Deputies mocracies. It can be argued that, and the Supreme Soviet is blamed whereas the role of negotiation is for having slowed the pace of highly institutionalized in conso­ radical market reforms. True, their ciational democracy, in competi­ support of Yeltsin' s strategy was tive oligarchy it is not. This equivocal, yet it must be kept in argument would be somewhat mind that the government ran al­ tautological, however, as transi­ most solely on the basis of presi­ tional polities are weakly institu­ dential decrees, not laws passed by the parliament. In fact, the Su­ tionalized by definition. On the preme Soviet itself granted Yeltsin other hand, social scientists work­ the right to rule by decree on 1 ing from an institutionalist per­ November 1991. Despite several spective assume that social life is attempts, it never managed to re­ shaped by institutions and do not voke this right. Decrees appeared exclude informal rules, conven­ without warning or prior discus­ tions..~_ and norms from their analy­ sion, typically making unreason­ sesY2 able demands for immediate Even should this hypothesis action and then often disappear­ be correct, what advantages does ing without a trace in the labyrin­ it entail for our discussion? It en­ thine government bureaucracy. ables us to speculate that there are VIrtually omnipotent on pa­ two major models of transition to per, the Yeltsin-Gaidar govern­ democracy: from competitive oli­ ment barely controlled the garchy to consociational democ­ executive apparatus throughout racy and from delegative the country. It was weak and simply proto-democracy to pluralist de­ could not be efficient; the parlia­ mocracy. This is not to say that in­ ment thus had little to do with the direct transitions (say, from administration's poor perform­ competitive oligarchy to pluralist ance. Although effectively democracy) are impossible, but deprived of its legislative respon­ from the perspective of our con­ sibilities, the parliament neverthe­ ceptualization they are of less in­ less constituted an important terest. arena of intra-elite negotiation. In

122. See, for instance, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life" in American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984).

52 politics, those who negotiate have never experienced anything remi­ to have power. If, in the Spring of niscent of delegative proto-de­ 1993, it turned out that the only mocracy. To the contrary, in the power available to the parliament earliest stages of transitions in was the power to impeach Yeltsin, these countries, especially Portu­ it was logical to expect that this gal and to some extent Spain, re­ right would be exercised. sembled competitive oligarchies. The collapse of competitive Although these observations can­ oligarchy in Russia was not, there­ not be ignored by students of con­ fore, simply a result of its absolute temporary Russian politics, it inefficiency. Rather, it was the would be senseless to see in Por­ logical consequence of strategies tugal the model for Russia's de­ pursued by the major political ac­ velopment in the near future. The tors in the country in 1993. That fact that delegative proto-democ­ being so, it is important to ascer­ racy does not work in Argentina, tain whether a system of delega­ moreover, counts for little to those tive proto-democracy is likely to who find that model consistent create conditions that will allow with Russian political conditions. for the strengthening of demo­ In other words, in order to make cratic institutions. O'Donnell is empirical evidence of transitional rightfully very skeptical about regimes valuable for this discus­ this prospect. According to him, sion, such evidence must be theo­ the purest Latin American cases retically elaborated. of "delegative democracy"­ Transitions to democracy are Argentina, Brazil, and Peru-face primarily democratic consolida­ deep social and economic crises tions. It is widely assumed that which stem not only from the leg­ consolidated democracies encom­ acy of the past authoritarian re­ pass specific elite and mass fea­ gimes, but the incapability of tures, in particular, all important contemporary regimes in these elite groups and factions in such countries to provide efficient gov­ democracies are structurally uni­ ernment. He concludes that the fied and share a consensus con­ only optimistic possibility "would cerning the rules of political be that a predominant segment of conduct.124 While democratic con­ the political leadership ... agrees to solidation cannot be reduced to change the terms by which they elite consolidation, the latter may comEete electorally and gov­ be regarded as the necessary pre­ em."123 condition for the former. The On the other hand, those ability of a certain model of countries (particularly in South­ democratic transition to promote em Europe) that are usually con­ elite consolidation, then, gives us sidered success stories in the an idea of its probable success as a transition to democracy have model.

123. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 16. 124. See John Higley and Gwen Moore, "Elite Integration in the United States and Australia," in American Political Science Review 75, no. 3 (1981).

53 Michael Burton, Richard Gun­ but strongly committed to demo­ ther, and John Higley contend cratic rules of the game. If the first that the transformation from elite condition is not fulfilled, the disunity to elite consensual unity dominant faction will sooner or takes two principal forms: settle­ later lose its domination to an an­ ment and convergence. Elite set­ tidemocratic faction. If the second tlements, they claim, are "events condition is not fulfilled, sooner in which warring elite factions or later it will reject the idea of suddenly and deliberately reor­ transition to democracy because ganize their relations by negotiat­ authoritarianism is the easiest po­ ing compromises on their most litical game for those in power. basic disagreements." Elite con­ Neither of these conditions vergences take place when certain can apparently be met in Russia. opposing factions within a disuni­ Yeltsin began his reform without fied elite eventually acknowledge any significant social backing­ the legitimacy of an existing re­ the reform process had yet to gime and become trustworthy create entities such as a middle competitors for electoral support class with a clear and growing after experiencing successive elec­ stake in a marketizing economy toral defeats.126 Elite settlement and political democracy. True, cer­ focuses on the process of negotia­ tain analysts argue that "what tion, corresponding to a transition may account for individuals' po­ from competitive oligarchy to litical orientation within the post­ consociational democracy. Elite communist setting is not their past convergence, however, presup­ location in the collapsing socialist poses that certain factions of the economy but their ability to con­ elite strongly dominate the arena vert the resources and capabilities of intra-elite competition, thus that they controlled under the old forcing rival factions to abandon regime into new resources and semi-loyal stances. This second capabilities in what they expect to form of elite consolidation corre­ become the new socioeconomic re­ sponds to a transition from gime."127 However, the stability of delegative proto-democracy to the bases of support created by pluralist democracy. such expectations is questionable. Within this framework we can An electoral mobilization strategy now ask: What kind of transition based on expectations about the is Russia likely to choose? Before future socioeconomic system answering, we must recall that works only as long as the domi­ the progression from delegative nant faction of the elite claims to proto-democracy to pluralist demo­ be the only political force effec­ cracy is possible only if the domi­ tively opposed to the restoration nant faction of the elite is not only of the old regime, thus directly stronger than any other faction, appealing to the expectations of

126. See Burton, Gunther, and Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," 13-30. 127. Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," in Politics and Society 20, no. 1 (1992): 21.

54 the majority. Such a strategy can­ even when no faction of the elite not be pursued perpetually. In takes this purpose seriously, be­ contemporary Russia, some fac­ cause the process of negotiation as tions that oppose Yeltsin claim to such necessarily involves some be more anticommunist than Yeltsin elements of democratic politics himself, and even the communists (for example, the effective separa­ (at least the CPRF) recognize that tion of powers, virtually alien to there is no way to return to the delegative proto-democracy). past. One cannot conclude from the One of the greatest resources analysis presented here whether a of political support for the domi­ system of competitive oligarchy is nant faction may very well be the likely to re-emerge in Russia, al­ personal charisma of its leader. though there are some grounds Yeltsin' s charisma from the very for thinking so, or whether this outset of his anti-Gorbachev cru­ system will be replaced by an­ sade was, however, to use Robert other kind of political regime. C. Tucker's words, a "situational" What is clear, however, is that an rather than "pure" charisma.128 alternative regime would be a After the first period of reform his kind of authoritarian rule rather leadership could hardly be per­ than a form of government that ceived as a means of salvation, could lead to democracy. Delega­ and it is unlikely that a new char­ tive proto-democracy, for exam­ ismatic leader will emerge within ple, is unlikely to be used the currently dominant faction. As effectively in Russia. The transi­ for the dominant faction's com­ tion to democracy is a compli­ mitment to the ideal of democ­ cated process that involves racy, this seems somewhat intermediate phases of political ambiguous after the siege of the development which are not Russian White House. democratic themselves. The con­ The system of competitive oli­ ditions under which such transi­ garchy has many disadvantages, tional political regimes are likely but from the point of view of to survive and provide a basis for those who regard democracy as democratic development differ the best option for Russia, it has from the social and institutional the important feature of provid­ requisites for stable democracy ing political space for elite settle­ and will vary from country to ment, encouraging the process of country. It thus appears that the intra-elite negotiation and dis­ choice of the form of political couraging radical-even anti­ transition is what really matters, democratic-decisions. More as this form may or may not be importantly, this regime makes a consistent with a strategy of de­ transition to democracy possible mocratization.

128. See Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," in Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership, ed. Dankwart Rustow (New York: Braziller, 1970).

55 ABBREVIATIONS

CPRF: Communist Party of the PIS: Party for Independence of Russian Federation, Siberia, Partiia nezavisimosti Sibiri Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii PPFR: People's Party "Free Russia," Narodnaia partiia CPSU: Communist Party of the "Svobodnaia Rossiia" Soviet Union, Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza RCWP: Russian Communist DPR: Democratic Party of Russia, Workers' Party, Rossiiskaia Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii kommunisticheskaia rabochaia partiia DPRC: Democratic Party of RPRF: Republican Party of the Russian Communists, Russian Federation, Demokraticheskaia Partiia Respublikanskaia partiia Rossiiskoi kommunistov Rossii Federatsii DRM: Democratic Russia SDPRF: Social-Democratic Party Movement, Dvizhenie of the Russian Federation, "Democraticheskaia Rossiia" Sotsial-demokraticheskaia partiia MDR: Movement for Democratic Rossiiskoi Federatsii Reforms, Dvizhenie demokraticheskikh reform SPWP: Socialist Party of Working People, Sotsialisticheskaia partiia PCRR: Public Committees of trudiashchikhsia Russian Reforms, Obshchestvennye komitety rossiiskih UPOUS: Union of Patriotic reform Organizations of the Urals and PEF: Party of Economic Freedom, Siberia, Soiuz patrioticheskikh Partiia ekonomicheskoi svobody organizatsii Urala i Sibiri

56