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Dams, Drugs, & Democracy

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Dams, Drugs, & Democracy Dams, Drugs, and Democracy The Struggle for Resources in Kachin State 2013 • Running time 83 minutes • Directed by Andrew Limon and Jack Aung • Distributed by damsdrugsanddemocracy.com This compelling documentary places Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam in the context of the Kachin insurgency, which has ravaged the country for more than five decades in the struggle to control the region’s rich resources. Over the course of four years, a team of local journalists lived with villagers displaced by the dam project. They followed dam protesters and interviewed key players: local politicians, insurgent leaders, independent observers, and those behind the delayed Myitsone Dam project. All this comes at a time of significant political and societal change in Myanmar. 1 WHY I SELECTED THIS FILM I selected this film because it shows the interrelations between religion and many other facets of global development: hydropower projects, resource extraction, population displacement, drug addiction, war, venture capital efforts, military rule, and democracy, as well as Myanmar’s foreign relations, especially with China. I am struck by how well the documentary integrates all these themes. SUGGESTED SUBJECT AREAS Jason A. Carbine Activism Development Mining C. Milo Connick Chair of Asian Government Political Religious Studies, Whittier Studies Environmental Science College Buddhism Studies Religion Christianity Ethnography Water Management Dams Insurgency SYNOPSIS Dams, Drugs, and Democracy: The Struggle for Resources in Kachin State tells the story of a controversial plan to dam the Irrawaddy River at its origin, the convergence of two rivers in Myanmar’s northern Kachin state. Local villagers have been forcibly relocated, disrupting their traditional way of life. The impact on downstream areas in the rest of the country is potentially enormous, prompting popular protest. Most of the electricity from the gigantic hydropower project was intended for neighboring China, so a sudden halt in construction has geopolitical ramifications. The film places the Myitsone Dam in the context of the Kachin insurgency, which has ravaged the country for more than five decades in the struggle to control the region’s rich resources. Over the course of four years, a team of local journalists lived with villagers displaced by the dam project, followed dam protesters, and interviewed key players, including local politicians, insurgent leaders, independent observers, and those behind the delayed Myitsone Dam project. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOCUS OF THE FILM Different environmental, social, and political impacts, both on ethnic Kachin people and others, are woven together to show how, as a result of a large- scale hydroelectric project, people are relocated, are led into financial dispossession, and fall into drug addiction. 2 A COMMENT FROM THE FILMMAKERS The co-director of the film, Andrew Limon, provided the following observation about environmental justice in Myanmar: “In the film, we mention various resources that have been exploited in Kachin in the past and present, including jade, gold, timber—and even people. China, along with the Burmese military and other powerful players, has historically extracted these resources by force. In China’s case, a lot of these resources were carried across the border with very little thought about the social and environmental impacts on the local area. Water and hydropower are also resources, but they are much harder to exploit by force or coercion because the consent of the sovereign nation and, to a certain extent, the local communities, is required to successfully build and operate a dam." BACKGROUND Contemporary Myanmar is bordered to the west by Bangladesh and India, by China to the north, by Laos to the northeast, and by Thailand to the east and south. Its population of about 55 million people speaks dozens of languages, mostly belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language family. Myanmar is home to just as many ethnic groups, many of whom live in the hill regions surrounding the fertile lowland river valleys. Ethnic Burmans, living mostly in the lowland areas, are predominantly Buddhist and constitute about 80% to 85% of the population. The remainder of Myanmar’s population includes a great diversity of ethnic groups, such as the Mon, Shan, Karen, Pa’O, Chin, Kachin, Wa, Naga, Rakhine, and Rohingya, as well as diverse groups of Indian and Chinese descent. Since independence from colonial rule after World War II, the country’s national development and integration have remained fraught with tensions and fault lines, as many groups—Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Burmese and non-Burmese— have sought greater autonomy and/or continue to feel excluded from equal access to power and resources, both natural and economic. The documentary about the Myitsone Dam project and how it was stopped highlights one of the flashpoints the country has faced in its attempts to develop economically and emerge from decades of ethnic insurgency and conflict, military rule, and economic stagnation. KEY LOCATIONS AND PEOPLE Myitsone Dam (a project of China Power Investment Corporation, or CPI) Kachin state, Northern Myanmar Tang Hpre village, northern Kachin state Aung Myin Thar, a resettlement village in northern Kachin state Myitkyina, capital of Kachin state Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) headquarters in Laiza, Myanmar, on the China-Myanmar border 3 Kachin IDP (internally displaced person) camp, location unspecified Yangon, former capital of Myanmar Shwedagon Pagoda, Yangon Daw Seng Hkawng – a woman who runs a restaurant Share Gum Ja – an older man whose mother and wife have died Gum An Tu – a gold miner Ye Htut Kaung – a leader of the protest from Yangon to Myitsone Lamai Gum Mai – a Kachin IDP Maran Seng Li, Awng Lum –“ Blast” band anti-dam activists and musicians Manual laborer – an unnamed heroin addict Brang Nu – a Baptist pastor in Tang Hpre U Tay Seinna – the abbot of a Buddhist temple in Aung Myin Thar Dr. Nicholas Farrelly – a fellow in Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific Professor U Maung Maung Aye – the chief advisor at the Myanmar Environmental Institute Dr. Manam Tu Ja – a politician and former leader of the KIO Professor U Hkapara Khun Awng – a Peace-Talk Creation Group representative General Gun Maw – the vice-chief of staff of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Li Guanghua – the president of the Upstream Ayeyawady Confluence Basin Hydropower FILM CHAPTERS OR SEQUENCES 00:00 Opening Comments by Hillary Clinton, President Obama, U Thein Sein (president of Myanmar), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Nobel Prize laureate), and a narrator. A Burmese proverb dealing with what gets trampled (myeza grass) when water buffalo fight is also provided. Here, the myeza grass seems to be a reference to the common people. 02:25 Myitsone, Tang Hpre Village, Northern Kachin State Three snapshots of daily life from the perspectives of Daw Seng Hkawng, Share Gum Ja, and Gum An Tu, who are featured at various points in the film. 09:45 Contextualizing the Problem A discussion of China, the Irrawaddy River, Myanmar’s resources and cultures, and assessments of the project’s impact. Featured are Dr. Nicholas Farrelly, Professor U Maung Maung Aye, and Li Guanghua, plus a promotional video courtesy of CPI. 4 15:55 Aung Myin Thar, Resettlement Village Commentary by Li Guanghua. Shift to scene at one of the five churches constructed for the community, Seng Hkawng’s new house, and footage of a neighboring house in the rainy season. The narrator and then Dr. Farrelly contextualize the postponement of the dam’s construction. 20:20 Myitkyina, Capital of Kachin State “Blast” band anti-dam activists and musicians Maran Seng Li and Awng Lum discuss a song that reveals the truth of the situation. They sing the song and then comment on their roles in helping to stop the dam. 23:15 Resettlement Villages/Tang Hpre Because of hardships many people moved back to Tang Hpre, even though it was illegal to do so. Scenes of local villagers starting to pan for gold, which is also illegal and potentially harmful to their health. At a Baptist church in Tang Hpre, a teacher and students recite nationalistic verses in honor of National Day. A pastor highlights the connections between the dam, gold mining, and drugs. 32:45 A Wasteland Near Myitkyina A manual laborer shoots heroin and talks with the film crew. Scene turns to Seng Hkwang, who talks about her husband’s heroin use and the downturn for her family. A narrator notes Myanmar’s place in the global production of heroin. 35:10 China’s Energy Security Dr. Farrelly discusses China’s energy security concerns and how they loom large relative to Kachin state. Attention turns to a conference in Yangon, Myanmar’s former capital, where Li Guanghua of CPI makes a case for continuing the dam project, calling attention to the 10 principles of the UN Global Compact, among other matters. 37:30 A Protest Gathering and March A protest gathering against the dam at the Shwedagon Pagoda, Myanmar’s holiest site. Since colonial times, the temple has been at times the site of political protest and expression. The protesters then march from Yangon to the site of the Myitsone Dam, 1,200 kilometers away. Featured is a protest song emphasizing the writing of “a new history with our blood” and chants against the Asia World Company and CPI. Ye Htut Kaung, a leader of the protest march, was later arrested and sentenced to 12 months in jail. 5 40:55 Aung Myin Thar, Resettlement Village The film cuts to alms for a Buddhist monk and the building of a “Kachin peace-making world pagoda,” being led by Buddhist abbot U Tay Seinna. 42:05 The Kachin Conflict A narrator provides a brief history of contemporary Myanmar, with special emphasis on the ongoing war and strife in Kachin state, which has continued for much of the last century.
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