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Harnessing Myanmar's Hydropower and Negotiating Conflict

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Harnessing Myanmar's Hydropower and Negotiating Conflict Perspective & Analysis Focus Asia No. 7 February 2014 Harnessing Myanmar’s Hydropower and Negotiating Conflict Elliot Brennan & Stefan Döring As the country develops, Myanmar urgently needs to in- crease electricity generating capacity. In order to do so Naypyidaw must continue to develop the country’s hy- dropower sector if it hopes to meet ambitious develop- ment targets pressed by demands placed on it by new investment projects. This Focus Asia paper looks at the perilous process of harnessing Myanmar’s hydropower, with a particular focus on the volatile developments along the Salween River and their already very present ability to create conflict. any of Myanmar’s rivers are highly suitable This is further complicated by, what many believe, is for hydroelectric power generation. Many an overrepresentation of Chinese companies engaged of them already help provide the base load to construct hydropower plants in Myanmar.1 This has Mof the country’s electricity needs. As the country devel- the potential to affect relations with other countries ops it is not surprising that dozens of dam projects are such as Thailand, but also, through diminished com- planned for construction around Myanmar. mercial competition, hinder the quality of constructed However, constructing dams often alters the natural dams. environment and usually requires a relocation of lo- Access to water has long been a source of conflict. cal populations; moreover, with the country being in Multiple stakeholders – from farmers to factories – the midst of a nationwide ceasefire process – the next often stretched across national borders make water a round of nationwide ceasefire talks are due in March – difficult resource to manage. For Myanmar’s nascent dam sites have the potential to stir latent or suspended legal environment, still governed largely by old struc- conflicts. The planned and future projects also have tures of nepotism and patronage, regulating water-use the potential to cause diplomatic incidents with neigh- boring countries, as currently the majority of the elec- tricity generated from these projects ultimately ends Elliot Brennan is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at up outside of Myanmar’s borders, as was shown in ISDP and is currently based in Myanmar. Stefan Döring the recent government shutdown of the Chinese-led is a former intern at the Institute and is pursuing an hydropower dam in Myitsone in northern Myanmar. M.A. at Uppsala University. Institute for Security & Development Policy 2 – No. 7 February 2014 is particularly difficult and will continue to be difficult as the country’s economy adds new industry on ripar- TheFocus Asia Series of the Institute for Security ian land. The lack of roads and infrastructure means and Development Policy provides accessible, in- that transporting goods by water will remain an im- sightful commentary and analysis of the contem- portant transport route for at least a decade to come. porary challenges facing Asia in the twenty-first Similarly, Myanmar’s water will be crucial in providing century. It also serves as a forum for the Institute’s the country’s base load of power generation through visiting researchers to provide their viewpoints on hydropower dams. the security and development issues affecting their countries, which add a much needed Asian per- Energy Hungry, Infrastructure Poor spective to the policy and research debate. In order to support its development, Myanmar has a Cover photo: The Ayeyarwaddy River at sunset growing need to generate electricity. According to me- taken by Elliot Brennan. dia sources, the country is planning to build around 45 new hydropower dams.2 The need for development For editorial correspondence please contact of infrastructure in Myanmar’s energy sector is ap- Alec Forss at: [email protected] parent with frequent power shortages. According to World Bank data, the present-day electricity output Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this paper only reaches 25 percent of the country’s population.3 are those of the authors only and do not reflect Furthermore, power shortages significantly impinge those of ISDP or its sponsors. on Myanmar’s economic development as businesses necessitate consistent supply and a reliable infrastruc- ture. For the next 20 The Salween River years, a business as “... regulating water-use is usual estimation by The Salween River, a largely under utilized river that particularly difficult and the Asian Develop- runs along the countries eastern border, exemplifies will continue to be difficult ment Bank forecasts the huge potential for Myanmar’s hydropower future. a 3.1 percent annual Depending on the source, there are currently between as the country’s economy growth of the coun- six and twelve dam projects planned for hydropower adds new industry on try’s energy demand.4 use on the Salween. riparian land.” Within the same timeframe, about one Facts on the Salween: fifth of the generated electricity will come from hydropower, which is antici- - Also known as Nu in China and Thanlwin in pated to have the fastest annual growth rate of all ener- Myanmar gy sectors. Nonetheless, much of the newly generated - 2400 km long (second longest river in South East energy is set for export to China and Thailand.5 The Asia) regulations for planned dam projects on the Salween - Originates at an altitude of 4 000 m in Tibet River reserve only 25 percent6 of the produced energy (China) to Myanmar, while the Kunlong hydropower project, - A transboundary basin with a total area of 320,000 for instance, will reportedly only transmit 15 percent7 square kilometers. China (53 percent), Myanmar (42 of the produced energy into the domestic grid system. percent), and Thailand (5 percent) It is on the Salween River, one of the country’s main - Annual flow from China (Nu River) to Myanmar rivers, that many of these projects, such as the Kun- (Thanlwin River) is 68.74 cubic kilometers long project, have been planned. - Predominantly not navigable because of strong rapids - Among the ten most polluted rivers in the world The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu Elliot Brennan & Stefan Döring – 3 Map 1. Salween dam projects of at least 1,000 MW 1,000 MW or more (compare map). Thus far, feasi- bility studies have been concluded for the dams near Kunlong, Naung Pha as well as a smaller project near Manntaung.9 The most ambitious project is the Ta- sang hydropower dam, which is projected to generate more than 7,000 MW. Standing 228 meters/ 750 feet high, the Tasang will be South Asia’s highest dam, even exceeding the Three Gorges Dam in China. Table 1. Principal Salween dam projects *Given the difficulties of triangulating this data to reliable sources, the authors note that this should offer an indication, rather than exact figures, capacities may vary. Dams: Bartering Tools in the Peace Process As the Salween runs through Shan, Kayah, Karen and Mon states, all planned dam sites are situated in ethnic Compiled by the authors. Abbreviations: KIA (Kachin Independence minority areas home Organization/ Army); KNU (Karen National Union); RCSS (Shan to armed groups. As State Army South/ Restoration Council of Shan State); SSPP (Shan such, the construc- State Army South/ Shan State Progress Party); TNLA (Ta’ang Na- tion sites are within “According to media sourc- tional Liberation Army). Conflict zones according to armed ethnic or near recent con- es, the country is planning group clashes with government forces in proximity to the Salween. flict zones (see map to build around 45 new hy- Conflict data based on Myanmar Peace Monitor archive, May 2013 in left panel). Thus, dropower dams ... present- to December 2013, available online: http://www.mmpeacemonitor. some of the construc- day electricity output only org/conflict/conflict-overview tion plans have been reaches 25 percent of the indirectly or directly country’s population.” In September 2013, U Maw Tha Htwe, the director- interlinked with the general of the Hydropower Implementation Depart- ceasefire and peace ment, disclosed that feasibility studies are ongoing agreement processes. for six hydropower-generating projects on the Sal- This applies especially to those armed ethnic groups ween.8 Five of those projects are targeted to generate who demand economic concessions as part of upcom- The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 4 – No. 7 February 2014 ing peace agreements. This emerging peace economy Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts in Myanmar has been explored in a previous ISDP Fo- cus Asia paper10 on mineral resources, and unsurpris- In addition to land acquisition, much of the local ingly it appears that similar concessions and conflicts protest focuses on the environmental impact of the surround water resources in the country. For instance, hydropower projects and consequences for people’s a portion of the area surrounding the proposed Hut- livelihoods. Indeed, it remains difficult to measure gyi dam site had long the impact of the planned constructions beforehand. been under control of The Salween River is still quite under-researched and “some of the construction the Democratic Ka- comprehensive analysis from the hitherto conducted plans have been indirectly ren Benevolent Army feasibility studies is not available. Thus, in trying to or directly interlinked with Brigade 5 (DKBA- predict the environmental impact, one can currently 5; a splinter of the only refer to studies from other comparable river ba- the ceasefire and peace DKBA, an armed eth- sins. Some research
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