Elections & the Management of Diversity

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AFRICAN GOVERNANCE REPORT III

The African Governance Report, the most comprehensive report on governance in Africa, assesses and monitors the progress of African countries on governance, identifies African Governance Report III capacity gaps in governance institutions and proposes policies and strategic interventions Elections & the to improve governance on the continent. This third edition of the Report, while continuing to monitor governance trends, adopts Management a thematic approach: elections and the management of diversity in Africa. Elections are central to democratic governance and the political management of diversity in plural societies. While elections are held with greater regularity in Africa, their content and quality of Diversity remains suspect in many countries, with Africa’s rich diversity deployed as a combustive tool in electoral conflicts. Elections have often triggered conflict, with violence, tensions, acrimonies and sharp elite divisions surrounding electoral processes and outcomes—a worrying trend for Africa’s democratic future.

This Report investigates elections in the face of managing diversity in Africa. It recom mends major electoral, institutional, political and constitutional reforms to enable elections to facilitate the democratic management of diversity, while significantly improving their quality and credibility. These include reform of the party system to make it more inclusive and democratic, a move to more proportional electoral systems, and an increase in the autonomy and effectiveness of election management boards. The Report argues that regional and subregional initiatives and frameworks for elections, democracy and governance have to be implemented and monitored to improve electoral performance and promote democratic consolidation and stability.

List Price: USD $ 45.00 ISBN: 9789211251203

United Nations Publication E.13.II.K.2 July 2013

AGR III Cover_190 X 235_UNHQ_FIN.indd 1 9/5/13 3:00 PM

African Governance Report III 2013

Economic Commission for Africa

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 1 6/25/13 8:33 PM Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © UNECA 2013 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2013 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available ISBN UNECA 978–92–1–125120–3 ISBN Oxford University Press 978–0–19–964505–3 Typeset by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, D.C. Printed in Great Britain by Bell and Bain, Glasgow Cover photos: United Nations Photo Library; Staton Winter (top), Eskinder Debebe (middle) and Martine Perret (bottom) Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 2 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table of Foreword ix contents Acknowledgements xi Abbreviations xiv

Executive Summary 1 Monitoring governance trends: Marginal progress 1 Elections and diversity management 1 Note 15

1 Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 17 Diversity in Africa 18 Pre-colonial and colonial political systems 22 The post-colonial state 25 The reform period: Renegotiated architecture and recurrent issues 32 Conclusions 42 Notes 43 References 44

2 Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 47 Background to democratic transition 48 Patterns of democratic transition 49 Democratizing trends 51 Leadership 59 Diversity issues in the democratic transition 60 Conclusions and recommendations 70 Annex 2.1 Alternation of presidential power in Africa, 2007–2012 73 Notes 76 References 76

3 Diversity and the Electoral Process 79 Managing diversity 80 Elections 81 Electoral systems’ strengths and weaknesses 84 Tackling diversity issues in the electoral process 88 Representation of women and minorities 96 Religion and diversity management 102 Challenges for managing diversity 103 Conclusions and recommendations 104 Annex 3.1 Prevalence of electoral systems 107 Annex 3.2 W omen holding cabinet appointments in African countries, January 2010 109 Notes 110 References 110

4 Electoral Management Boards 113 Evolution 113

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 3 6/25/13 8:33 PM Powers and functions 116 Autonomy 120 Performance 126 Promoting electoral integrity 126 Oversight of political parties 132 Conclusions and recommendations 134 Annex 4.1 Structure and composition of EMBs: Southern Africa, July 2010 137 Notes 139 References 139

5 Competitive Elections and Conflict 143 Electoral competition 143 Electoral systems and violent conflict 145 Election-related conflicts 146 Party democracy and conflict 150 Role of media in election conflicts 156 Managing electoral conflict—state mechanisms 157 Managing electoral conflict—other approaches 163 Conclusions and recommendations 167 Annex 5.1 Inter-party violence in six African countries 171 Notes 173 References 173

6 The Economics of Elections 179 Election resources and political competition 179 Election spending and effect on GDP 181 Funding electoral institutions and parties 183 Campaign finance and corruption 191 Regulating political finance 193 External funding and assistance 194 Conclusions and recommendations 198 Notes 201 References 201

7 Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 205 Dynamic links among electoral, constitutional and political reforms 205 Electoral reforms 206 Constitutional and political reform issues 215 Conclusions and recommendations 222 References 225

8 Policy Recommendations 227 The political system 227 Electoral institutions, processes and finance 230 Managing electoral conflicts and disputes 233

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 4 6/25/13 8:33 PM Regional and international organizations and promotion of electoral integrity 236 Policy dialogue, training and research 237

Appendix UNECA Project on Good Governance: Background, Methodology and Calculating the Indices 239 Rationale and objectives 240 Methodology 241 Project implementation 243 Note 244

Boxes 1 Africa’s elections, 1996–2012 3 1.1 Examples of identity and politics 19 1.2 Diversity and conflict in Africa 21 1.3 A difficult graft 26 1.4 The tyranny of the majority 29 1.5 Ethnicity and party support 31 1.6 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 34 1.7 Devolution in practice, Ghana 35 1.8 Failure and success in extending term limits 40 1.9 National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Kenya 40 2.1 Four transition trends 50 2.2 Social media promoting democratic change in Nigeria 51 2.3 Guaranteeing Nigeria’s federal character 61 2.4 Ethnic overlays on political parties 64 2.5 Ethnic diversity as an asset rather than a liability 65 2.6 Shifting citizenships 69 2.7 Culture and constitution favour men in Botswana 70 3.1 Managing diversity in Africa 81 3.2 Grievance lay just below the surface in Côte d’Ivoire 82 3.3 Mali’s recent conflict 84 3.4 Constitutional provisions on diversity 89 3.5 Diversity in electoral management boards 90 3.6 Gender balance on Malawi’s Electoral Commission 90 3.7 Educating voters on diversity 94 3.8 African Governance Forum workshop, Accra 102 3.9 Some disabilities overcome in Sierra Leone 103 4.1 Origins of electoral management boards in Africa 114 4.2 Interlocking electoral management board responsibilities, Sierra Leone 119 4.3 Two approaches to appointing and removing electoral commissioners 122 4.4 Heavy staff demand around elections 126 4.5 Factors in the independence and effectiveness of Africa’s electoral commissions 128

Table of contents v

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 5 6/25/13 8:33 PM 4.6 Good and bad practices in election administration and management in Africa 132 4.7 Electoral integrity 133 4.8 Party liaison committees in Lesotho and South Africa 134 5.1 The African Union and the 2011 Elections Year: Challenges and successes 148 5.2 Freedom marred by violence, South Africa 1994 149 5.3 Electoral violence and the indigenous–settler divide in Nigeria 149 5.4 From electoral violence to civil war in the Congo 150 5.5 Commendable practices in Cape Verde, Namibia and Senegal 156 5.6 Youth and political violence in Sierra Leone 157 5.7 Potential areas of electoral conflict 158 5.8 Managing electoral appeals in Tunisia 158 5.9 Malawi’s reform of adjudication 161 5.10 Party liaison committees in South Africa 163 5.11 KwaZulu-Natal Democracy and Elections Forum, South Africa 164 5.12 The Continental Early Warning System 165 5.13 Key lessons from past election crises in Africa 168 6.1 Reaching out to voters 180 6.2 Electoral outcomes 181 6.3 Per voter election costs 185 6.4 Challenges of election funding in Africa 186 6.5 Grass-roots view on incumbent advantage in Uganda 189 6.6 Candidate funding in Nigeria 190 6.7 Banho in São Tomé and Príncipe 193 6.8 Kickbacks and donations to campaigns funds 193 6.9 Four gains from regulating political finance 194 6.10 Foreign funding and campaign spending in Tunisia 196 6.11 Are all governments convinced by democracy? 197 6.12 Donor-dependence concerns 198 7.1 Pressures from below 206 7.2 Three strategies of electoral reform 207 7.3 Constitutional bans on ethnic-based political parties: Ghana and Kenya 214

Figures 1 Governance indicators, AGR I, II and III 2 2.1 Mass media—completely free or only infrequently violated by the government or ruling party 52 2.2 Legislative control of the executive branch—usually or always effective 54 2.3 Respect for human rights 55 2.4 Government respect for due process and the rule of law—mostly or fully 56 2.5 Role of civil society organizations in promoting transparency and accountability 57 2.6 Tripartite breakdown of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1988–2011 60

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 6 6/25/13 8:33 PM 2.7 The government and leadership represent all segments and diverse interests 62 2.8 Sectarian groups have a heavy influence on a country’s political process 66 2.9 The constitution promotes diversity and minority interests 67 3.1 Voter registration is credible and accepted 92 3.2 Women play a major role in the electoral process—mostly or always 101 4.1 Adequacy of the electoral law for managing diversity at elections—mostly or fully 121 4.2 The procedure for appointing and removing the electoral commission is open, transparent and credible—mostly or always 123 4.3 The electoral commission is independent and fairly or fully competent 127 4.4 Performance of electoral commissions 129 4.5 National elections are free, fair and generally transparent—mostly or always 130 4.6 Local elections are free, fair and generally transparent—mostly or always 131 5.1 Electoral violence is a recurring phenomenon at general elections—agree or strongly agree 147 5.2 Violence is a major feature of political campaigns—agree or strongly agree 151 5.3 Security forces are fair and non-partisan in their role in the electoral process 155 5.4 Election disputes are usually well managed to the satisfaction of the political parties 162 6.1 Political parties have equal access to electoral resources—mostly or always 182 7.1 Proportional representation promotes electoral stability and diversity management—agree or strongly agree 208 7.2 Appointing and removing electoral commissioners should be handled by an independent non-partisan body—agree or strongly agree 210 7.3 Positions of electoral commissioners should be advertised for national competition 211 7.4 Electoral management boards should have relative autonomy in political, administrative and financial independence—agree or strongly agree 212 7.5 Political parties practise internal democracy in electing party officials and party candidates for national elections 216 7.6 A quota system should be adopted for appointing women to executive positions and parliament—agree or strongly agree 217 7.7 Significant or full constitutional checks and balances among the different branches of government exist in most countries 218 7.8 Judicial corruption remains daunting 220 7.9 Formation of coalition or national unity government is a viable option— agree or strongly agree 221 7.10 Access to public services remains a major challenge 223

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 7 6/25/13 8:33 PM 7.11 States have weak capacity for managing intra-state conflicts in most countries 224

Tables 1 Overall index of governance trends in Africa, AGR III 3 1.1 Diversity-related factors for conflicts and tensions in countries that have completed the African Peer Review Mechanism 20 1.2 Party systems in Africa, 2004–2006 37 1.3 Presidential term limits in Africa 39 1.4 Horizontal democracy-promoting institutions, selected African countries 41 2.1 Relationship among constitutional diversity guarantees, composition of government and sectarian identity 68 3.1 Women in African parliaments, lower or single house, October 2012 98 3.2 Women in African parliaments, upper house or senate, October 2012 100 3.3 Female presiding officers in African parliaments, January 2010 100 4.1 Models of African electoral management boards 117 5.1 Electoral systems and violent conflicts 146 6.1 State funding for parties, 2011 187 6.2 Countries that ban or allow foreign donations to political parties and campaigns 195 6.3 Examples of external sources of funding, 2007–2010 196 Appendix table AGR III collaborating research institutions 245

viii African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 8 6/25/13 8:33 PM Foreword mproved governance remains differences among countries, some central to Africa’s peace and general policy conclusions can be I security and to its economic drawn. transformation. This is reflected in the strong interface between bet- First is the need to avoid the “winter governance and economic pro- ner takes all” syndrome. The surveys gress on the continent and in the revealed a broad preference for pro- increased demands by citizens for portional representation. democracy, accountability, civil liberties and the rule of law. How these Second is preserving the integrity of issues are resolved will shape pub- electoral processes by ensuring the lic policies and influence economic administrative and financial auton- performance. omy of election management bodies from the executive branch. A major message of this third edition of the African Governance Third, governments could consider Report (AGR III) is that there has constitutional and legislative reforms been some progress on governance to ensure that minorities and hith- in Africa, with the political nar- erto excluded sections of society take ratives shifting positively. Many part in political decisions—women, African countries have more regu- the disabled, youth and the poor lar elections, more political parties should have voice beyond voting in and greater political space. But these elections. trends do not mean that democracy is fully fledged. Indeed, electoral A fourth conclusion relates to term processes are still a concern because limits. The power of incumbency they may become instruments for can subvert fair electoral compe- exclusion rather than inclusion. This tition. Countries might seriously concern and the diversity of pop- consider adopting term limits to ulations in many African coun- increase the chances of changes in tries made it essential to examine government and inject new ideas in the dynamics surrounding Elections leadership and governance. and the Management of Diversity in Africa. Finally, elections by themselves will not promote democratic values The report’s key question: How do and practices, nor will they guar- Africa’s electoral systems respond antee political stability. The judi- to plural African societies? Put ciary, anticorruption bodies, pub- differently, do African elections lic accounts regulators, parliaments promote inclusiveness and partic- and political parties all have to be ipation and improve the quality strengthened. of governance? To uncover some answers, we conducted extensive The United Nations Economic research, including surveys and Commission for Africa and the focus group discussions in 40 Afri- United Nations Development Pro- can countries. Despite the expected gramme have worked closely in

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 9 6/25/13 8:33 PM producing this report. We com- that its findings will contribute to mend it to governments and other consolidating the democratic pro- stakeholders committed to improv- ject in Africa and to enhancing the ing governance in Africa. We hope quality of elections and governance.

Carlos Lopes Tegegnework Gettu

United Nations Under-Secretary-General United Nations Assistant and Executive Secretary, Secretary-General and Director, United Nations Economic United Nations Development Programme Commission for Africa Regional Bureau for Africa

Addis Ababa New York

February 2013

x African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 10 6/25/13 8:33 PM Acknowledge- he preparation of this report Mr. Said Adejumobi, who is also ments was a long and painstaking the coordinator of the African Gov- T process of roughly three ernance Report (AGR) project. A years. The long process arose from team comprising Said Adejumobi, the complexity and comprehensive- Lloyd Sachikonye, Adele Jinadu ness of the project, in which national and Godfrey Assinwe prepared the research institutions were engaged chapters. Useful background papers that conducted field-based research were prepared by George Kieh, and desk studies in 40 African coun- Godwin Murunga and Mohamed tries. Given the sensitivity of elec- Salih. Francis Ikome provided useful tions and diversity management in background inputs, while Gedion many African countries, against the Gamora, Christian Mahillet and backdrop of varying levels of democ- Anita Wanki provided excellent ratization and political tolerance, the research support. Legesse Ayane, United Nations Economic Commis- GPAD statistician on the AGR III sion for Africa (UNECA), United project, offered remarkable statistical Nations Development Programme services and prepared the methodol- (UNDP) and the national research ogy chapter. institutions had to negotiate the process carefully in some countries Special appreciation goes to the to undertake the country studies. 40 national research institu- Overall, most African governments tions that undertook the AGR III and political authorities lent their national country reports. The dili- support to the project, without any gence and commitment with which attempt to unduly influence or con- they carried out the task is most trol it, for which we are immensely commendable. grateful. While preparing the report, sev- This report benefited from the eral technical meetings and work- institutional leadership and guid- shops were organized including ance of two UNECA Executive three methodology workshops and Secretaries—Mr. Abdoulie Janneh two expert review meetings. The and Mr. Carlos Lopes. Also, the two expert meetings were held in support of the Director of the Pretoria, South Africa, in May UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, 2011, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Mr. Tegegnework Gettu, is most on 1–2 October 2012. UNECA and appreciated. The Deputy Executive UNDP are grateful to the follow- Secretary of UNECA, Mr. Abdalla ing people who served as reviewers, Hamdok, offered invaluable support panellists and participants at those in preparing the report. technical meetings and workshops: Ademola Abass, Musa Abutudu, This report was prepared under the Wale Adebanwi, Adigun Agbaje, direct intellectual and administra- Emmanuel Akwetey, Yusuf Ban- tive leadership of the Director of the gura, Asmalash Beyene, Abdalla Governance and Public Administra- Bujra, Sheila Bunware, Louis Ame- tion Division (GPAD) of UNECA, dee Darga, Joseph Brian Diescho,

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 11 6/25/13 8:33 PM Mamadou Diouf, Kole Godana, preparing the country reports, which Karuti Kayinga, Abdul Rahman Valerio Bosco and Guy Ranaivoma- Lamin, Pascal Mihyo, Winnie Mit- nana diligently managed as focal ullah, Ahmed Mohiddin, Patrick points. Other staff who provided Molutsi, Mustaq Moraad, Rachel technical review and administra- Mukamunana, Royson Mukwena, tive support to the process include Florence Mutesi, Regina Mwatha, Jalal Abdel-Latif, Kojo Busia, Sam Janah Ncube, Ebenezer Obadare, Cho, Guillermo Mangue, Kaleb Oka Obono, Adebayo Olukoshi, Demeksa, Hodane Yousuf, Gamal Shola Omotola, Selowani Onalenna, Ibrahim, Emebet Mesfin, Gonsalves Okey Onyejekwe, Eghosa Osaghae, Juliana, Constanze Westervoss, Liepollo Pheko, Severine Rugum- Grace Chisamya, Yeshimebet Araya, amu, Simon Rutabajuuka, Mohamed Misrak Worku, Loule Baltcha, Tsig- Salih, Ebrima Sall, Getachew ereda Assayehegn, Abijah Yeshaneh, Demeke Shefarew, Wahab Shehu, Bethlehem Teshager, Gebremed Issaka Souare, Tegegne Teka, Chris- hin Tadesse, Lia Yeshitila, Meaza tiana Thorpe, Ilona Tip, Ibrahim Molla, Genet Beyene, Bilisson Has- Wani and Charlotte Wonani. san, Monica Bonfanti, Saba Kassa and Kassahun Shiferaw. The staff of UNECA and UNDP also provided invaluable support The UNECA division of adminis- in undertaking the country reports tration including Doreen Bongoy- and the AGR III continental report. Mawalla (the division’s former The UNDP country offices pro- director), Etienne Kabou, Charles vided administrative oversight of Ndungu and others assisted in the the national research institutions administrative and technical pro- in some countries, while UNECA cesses of the report. Bruce Ross- directly managed the project in oth- Larson and Jack Harlow at Commu- ers. Siphosami Malunga and Kha- nications Development Incorporated bele Matlosa from UNDP were deserve our special commenda- quite instrumental and supportive in tion for their commitment to excel- producing the country reports and lence in the editing process. We the continental AGR. Other col- also thank Oxford University Press leagues from UNDP who supported for their support in publishing the the AGR III project include the report. UNDP Resident Representatives, Country Directors and Governance The development partners and sis- Advisers in some countries and also ter African institutions that sup- Evlynne Change, Brian Kagoro, ported the AGR III project include Ken Lewis and Arthur Phiri of the Norway, Sweden, the African UNDP Regional Bureau office in Governance Institute, the Afri- South Africa. can Union Commission, the Coun- cil for the Development of Social The GPAD-UNECA team pro- Science Research in Africa, the vided substantive planning, tech- U.K. Department for International nical and administrative support in Development, the International

xii African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 12 6/25/13 8:33 PM Development Research Centre, may not have been mentioned but International Institute for Democ- contributed to the report and the racy and Electoral Assistance, the entire AGR III project. It is hoped Organization for Social Science that the report will contribute sig- Research in Eastern and Southern nificantly to understanding and Africa, United Nations University resolving the challenges of conduct- Institute on Comparative Regional ing free, fair and transparent elec- Integration Studies, and Trust tions in Africa and promoting inclu- Africa. siveness, participation, respect for diversity and violence-free elections UNECA and UNDP are immensely that are necessary for engineering grateful to the above people and democratic stability and consolida- institutions and to some others who tion on the continent.

Acknowledgements xiii

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 13 6/25/13 8:33 PM Abbreviations AGR African Governance Report

AU African Union

CEWS Continental Early Warning System

CSO Civil society organization

EAC East African Community

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa

EMB Electoral management board

FPTP First past the post

GPAD Governance and Public Administration Division of UNECA

INEC Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria

SADC Southern African Development Community

SAP Structural adjustment programme

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 14 6/25/13 8:33 PM Executive his summary is in two parts: ombudsman, anti-corruption insti- Summary the first is on trends in gov- tutions and other public agencies; T ernance in Africa against enacting freedom of information the background of the first Afri- laws that grant to citizens and the can Governance Report (AGR I) of media greater access to informa- 2005 and the second (AGR II) of tion; meeting demands for account- 2009; the second is on the theme of ability from the political leadership; elections and diversity management and providing better public ser- in Africa. vices, social infrastructure and public security. Monitoring governance trends: Marginal progress Although performances differ, the Africa’s democratization remains challenge for African countries is to fragile and contestable. Although raise governance outcomes so that the continent has recorded a 1 per- the democratic project has tangible centage point gain in its governance meaning in the lives of their citizens indicators overall since AGR II, that (table 1). falls short of the 2 percentage point improvement made between AGR I Elections and diversity and AGR II (figure 1).1 Mali—a management country previously regarded as a suc- While diversity may be a source of cre- cess story but that has succumbed to ativity and positive growth, when a military coup and conflict—attests poorly managed, diversity often becomes to this fragility. a source of unhealthy competition, conflict and instability Still, the democratic transition in Ban Ki-moon, United Nations North Africa—starting with Tuni- Secretary-General, 2011 sia in 2010 with effects on other countries in the region including Since democratization begun in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and (partly) Africa in the 1990s, elections have Morocco—shows the complexity become more regular on the con- of the continent’s democratic tra- tinent (box 1), as a mechanism for jectory, as confirmed by the 2012 popular expression, leadership selec- governance-tracking data. tion (and change) and political accountability. The slight improvement in governance challenges African countries However, these elections have dif- to intensify their efforts in deep- fered in form, content and quality, ening democratic culture and prac- and greater regularity has not nec- tices and in upscaling their govern- essarily enhanced their value. Sec- ance performance. Steps include: tarian mobilization, intimidation enhancing the institutional capacity and violence are major features of of democratic structures like parlia- some African countries’ elections, ment and the judiciary and of hori- which have become conflict trig- zontal accountability bodies like gers rather than instruments for the office of the auditor general, resolving differences, as in Côte

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 1 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 1 Governance indicators, AGR I, II and III Scores, average across project countries (%)

AGR I AGR II AGR III

Overall

Political representation

Political system

Power distribution

Political party freedom and security

Electoral process independence and credibility

Institutional effectiveness and accountability

Legislature's effectiveness

Judiciary's effectiveness

Executive's effectiveness

Effectiveness in state structure management

Civil service transparency and accountability

Government services efﬁciency

Decentralization of structures

Human rights and rule of law

Human rights

Respect for rule of law

Law enforcement organizations

Civil society organization and media independence

Economic management

Investment policies attractiveness

Pro-investment tax policies

Corruption control

0 25 50 75 100

Source: Expert Opinion Surveys, AGR I (2005), II (2009) and III (2012).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 2 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 1 Overall index of governance trends in Africa, AGR III

Overall Overall Country index Country index Rwanda 72 Ethiopia 51 Seychelles 71 Kenya 51 Cape Verde 69 Mauritania 51 Algeria 66 Mozambique 51 South Africa 65 São Tomé and Príncipe 51 Mauritius 63 Tanzania 51 Namibia 63 Angola 50 Botswana 62 Congo 50 Ghana 62 Guinea 50 Liberia 59 Uganda 50 Senegal 59 Egypt 49 Benin 56 Zambia 49 Mali 56 Lesotho 47 Tunisia 55 Nigeria 47 Cameroon 54 Burkina Faso 44 Sierra Leone 54 Madagascar 44 Comoros 52 Togo 44 Gabon 52 Gambia 43 Malawi 52 Chad 42 Djibouti 51 Zimbabwe 38

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012. Note: The countries cannot be directly compared because of contextual differences in the economic, social and political environment in which the survey was conducted.

Box 1 Africa’s elections, 1996–2012

In recent years the following national elections have been held: • 1996–2006: 44 elections in Sub-Saharan Africa; • 2005–2007: 26 presidential and 28 parliamentary elections in Africa; • 2011: 15 presidential and 20 parliamentary elections; and • 2012: 10 presidential and 13 parliamentary elections.

d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic Rather than unite, elections can of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria and divide people, undermining the Zimbabwe. very essence of elections, which is

Executive Summary 3

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 3 6/25/13 8:33 PM to peacefully aggregate preferences elections in Africa. It also maps the in the choice of political leadership. political geography of Africa and the Diversity as a resource for govern- evolution of Africa’s political archi- ance and development then becomes tecture in the colonial and immedi- a political liability among acute elec- ate post-colonial eras. toral deficits. Switching this liability to an asset—so that elections pro- The main argument is that although mote social cohesion, grant political African countries are essentially legitimacy and manage diversity— plural societies—of diverse identi- requires answers to the following ties, groups, classes and professional questions, tackled in this report: interests—state formation and the emergent political architecture • How can elections be sensitive exacerbated the challenge of man- to diversity in ensuring inclu- aging diversity in Africa. Diver- siveness and participation of sity is best managed in an enabling diverse groups, communities democratic framework, in which all Diversity is and interests? people are at liberty to choose their best managed leaders and programmes through in an enabling • What kind of electoral systems free, fair, credible and regular elec- democratic should African countries adopt tions. Yet at the time, authoritar- framework, in which for democratically managing ian political structures were grafted all people are at diversity? onto previous policies of ethnic and social fragmentation that had aimed liberty to choose • What are the good practices in to divide groups and generate antag- their leaders and Africa in managing diversity in onism, necessary for colonial eco- programmes the electoral process? nomic exploitation and political dominance. • How can electoral governance and the quality of elections be Colonialism did not aim to create enhanced to reduce electoral a common citizenship—an identity and political conflict? for all. Citizenship was in fact multi- layered and group based: on higher • What unique electoral products rungs were white colonialists—“first can Africa develop to promote class” citizens of the colonial state; social cohesion and electoral among the “natives” were privileged integrity? groups in the “second class”; while the others were lumped as “third • What legal, political and insti- class”. tutional reforms are necessary to facilitate credible elections and The colonial regime’s electoral man- consolidate democracy? agement was rarely impartial. On the contrary, it took great interest Chapter 1—Political architecture: in the emergent local political elite State-building and diversity in Africa and the successor regime, to which Chapter 1 focuses on diversity in political power was to be gradually relation to political processes and devolved.

4 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 4 6/25/13 8:33 PM The gradual introduction of the channelled into democratization in elective principle under colonial the 1980s. This tide enabled people rule (which arose largely as a result to exercise their right to organize in of African agitation and resistance) associational relations, at last open- was based on an autocratic and divi- ing the space for diversity aspirations sive political framework, which pro- and interests. It also engendered a duced bitter ethnic politics—embed- gradual but significant renegotiation ding the roots of electoral failure in of the political architecture—includ- Africa. The colonial heritage and ing issues surrounding the separa- the character of the successor leader- tion of powers (executive, legislative ship thus framed post-independence and judicial), decentralization, term politics. limits and horizontal accountability- promoting institutions (“watch- As the successors embarked on dogs”)—geared to entrenching the complex task of building their democratic governance and better nations, they pursued authoritar- managing diversity in Africa. ian strategies like centralization and Since the early single-party systems that stifled Chapter 2—Democratic transition, 1990s, most democracy and democratic diver- elections and diversity African countries sity management. They regarded management have witnessed ethno-linguistic diversities or diver- Chapter 2 focuses on how dem- democratic gent political opinion as detrimental ocratic transitions—which most transition in which to unity and inimical to the nation- African countries have undergone building project, and strangled them at different periods and to varying popular agitation under common-identity, single- degrees—affect democratic diver- and struggle for nation and one-party systems. The sity management. Elections are cen- political reform successor elites reconfigured liberal tral to these transitions and facili- have ousted democracy and its electoral systems tate such management in four main authoritarian and as instruments for themselves and ways: participation, representation, despotic regimes their party’s rule—into the foreseea- rotation of leaders and fulfilment of ble future. local needs and aspirations. Alone they are not enough to address all These strategies stymied any moves the demands of diversity manage- to deepen democracy through multi- ment in a plural society, but when party systems that would have cre- backed up by constitutional and ated the political space in which political reforms they may ensure diverse identity interests could play efficient and democratic diversity out. With no alternatives for the management. smooth transfer of power, military intervention became common, push- Since the early 1990s, most African ing post-colonial states deeper into countries have witnessed democratic autocratic rule. transition in which popular agitation and struggle for political reform Authoritarianism in Africa gen- have ousted authoritarian and des- erated opposition and struggle, potic regimes. The process cli- which liberal democratic reforms maxed with North African political

Executive Summary 5

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 5 6/25/13 8:33 PM uprisings that started in Tunis in religion in the state and that of mar- December 2010, with knock-on ginalized groups in politics stands effects in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. out. In addressing the challenge of diversity management, govern- Freedom, human rights and eco- ments have built (or reformed) insti- nomic opportunities were severely tutions, passed laws and put in place constrained in many Sub-Saharan policies—yet issues linger in many countries and made worse by finan- countries. cial austerity and structural adjustment programmes, which were Central to consolidating the demo- major factors that triggered political cratic transition are resolving issues protests for democratic reforms. like the quality of elections, how the constitution promotes diversity, how Countries differ in the patterns, pro- deeply embedded diversity is in pub- cesses and outcomes of democratic lic and democratic institutions, and transition, although four modes of the capacity of the state to mediate Elections can transition can be delineated: civil and rise above sectarian interests. gradually lead society–inspired; state-led; pacted; to credible and stalled. Hence, while some Chapter 3—Diversity and the processes that countries managed to consolidate electoral process in Africa resolve contests the democratic process to a degree as Even at the best of times, elections for power and elections became more credible, reg- are hard to organize in societies with ular and generally accepted by the deep-rooted diversity, and this chap- other resources people, some others used elections ter argues why diversity in African only to reinforce autocracy and con- societies is key to explaining the ten- firm civilian dictatorships. sions and conflicts that often accompany elections. Elections on their Overall, Africa has made pro- own do not resolve these issues. The gress, with some indicators—such as distribution of wealth and power, for respect for human rights and the rule example, as well as an end to pov- of law, legislative capacity, civil soci- erty, cannot be decided in a single ety engagement and civil liberties— election. Indeed, if improperly han- generally increasing. However, dled, elections can turn diversity into democracy remains vulnerable, and a tinder box. However, elections can requires greater institutional and pro- gradually lead to credible processes cedural certainty to be consolidated. that resolve contests for power and other resources at national, regional Almost all democratic transitions and local levels, transparently. have had to navigate serious diversity challenges, including power Drawing on the AGR III coun- distribution and the nature of the try reports, this chapter reviews political structure; ethnicity and each stage of the electoral process— religion; citizenship; and margin- boundary delimitation, voter regis- alized groups of women, youth and tration and education, campaigning, people with disabilities. In North voting, tallying and adjudication— Africa, for example, the role of to see how diversity is ignored or

6 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 6 6/25/13 8:33 PM addressed. At most stages, mar- Given the high stakes in elections, ginalization of some social groups one of the most contentious issues remains a challenge (although some is deliberately inflating—or under- countries have seen positive results counting—numbers on registra- from their efforts). tion lists: the majority of experts do not believe that voter registration is The debate over which is the most credible in Chad, Gambia, Lesotho, suitable electoral system has not Nigeria and Zimbabwe, for example. abated. While the chapter avoids a “one size fits all” approach, it weighs Most countries’ respondents feel that the merits of first past the post, pro- their countries pay particular atten- portional representation and mixed- tion to voter education, in an attempt member proportional systems. The to spread information about peo- trend of expert opinion in Africa ple’s need to claim and exercise the favours proportional representation: right to vote; to increase voter turn- the majority of respondents in 35 of out during elections; and to reduce 40 countries in the AGR III Expert the number of spoilt ballots. Still, The rule of Opinion Survey “agreed or strongly most country reports acknowledge electoral law agreed” with the view that “electoral that much ground has to be covered is becoming a stability and diversity management before voter education is accessible preferred alternative can be attained through the propor- to all who require it. This is an area to resorting tional representation as opposed to where complementary roles between to violence majoritarian system.” EMBs and civil society organizations would ensure wider reach. The extent to which electoral management boards (EMBs)—also called Few elections are perfect: disputes electoral commissions—are sensi- are common and the adjudica- tive to diversity is crucial, especially tion system should deal with them how much their composition reflects quickly and effectively, especially diversity in wider society. Matters as even where elections are quite have been gradually improving with orderly, citizens may have little con- the appointment of women as EMB fidence in the courts to resolve them members or chair in Cape Verde, promptly. In some countries, though, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, South the expert respondents believe that Africa and Zimbabwe, for example, disputes are “usually managed to the although the number of women and satisfaction of the political parties”, members of other minority groups among them Algeria, Botswana, should also increase among profes- Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles sional staff of EMB secretariats. and South Africa. Encouragingly, in most countries the rule of electoral Delimitation, voter registration and law is becoming a preferred alterna- education should be comprehen- tive to resorting to violence. sive, transparent and fair. The bodies responsible for these processes How do women fare in the elec- should be seen to be independent, toral process? Although unevenly, non-partisan and not manipulative. they have made real progress in

Executive Summary 7

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 7 6/25/13 8:33 PM parliamentary representation (and as independence, the inherited quasi- seen, in electoral institutions). Coun- autonomous EMBs came under tries with more than 20% of female greater control of successor regimes Members of Parliament include as instruments for retaining power, Burundi, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mau- so that, from the 1960s to the 1990s, ritania, Mozambique, Namibia, a combination of a weak EMB, leg- Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, islature and judiciary versus a strong South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia executive was fatal for electoral gov- and Uganda, and women have been ernance and democracy in most elected presiding officers of parlia- countries. However, popular and ment in Botswana, Gabon, Gambia, social movements enabled consti- Ghana, Lesotho, Rwanda and Zim- tutional and political reforms lead- babwe. But there is still a long way to ing to incremental improvements in go to secure significant female par- EMBs’ status and performance. ticipation, and then consolidate it, in the electoral process. The same The challenges that African EMBs Electoral can be said about the participation encounter are daunting, especially in management of youth and people with disabilities, conditions of diversity where their boards which remains paltry. role becomes even more sensitive are central to as the epicentre of electoral man- democratic Religion does not feature as a major agement. Given the history in most development factor in most countries. Some African countries of seriously flawed exceptions are in West and North elections—owing mainly to electoral in Africa Africa as well as the Horn of Africa, maladministration, manipulations including Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nige- and mismanagement—legitimate, ria and Senegal, and Algeria, Egypt, independent and credible EMBs are Sudan and Tunisia (less so in Kenya instrumental for administering free and Tanzania). Religious diversity and fair democratic elections. In this represents a challenge to electoral guise, they can mitigate electoral politics that should be sensitively violence and deepen democratiza- managed in these countries. tion, which is crucial to harnessing diversity. Other diversities that electoral systems should address include margin- Electoral integrity entails a set of alized indigenous peoples like the norms and regulations to be estab- Basarwa in Southern Africa and the lished and enforced, in order to Batwa in Central and East Africa. ensure professionalism, ethics, They should be enfranchised and accountability and transparency. represented in parliament and other Concerns remain over the following: institutions of state. EMBs’ independence, especially the method of appointing and remov- Chapter 4—Electoral management ing members as well as their funding boards and costs; involvement of the execu- EMBs are central to the elective and civil service in elections (and toral process—and thus demo- forms of EMB embeddedness in cratic development in Africa. After their countries’ political processes);

8 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 8 6/25/13 8:33 PM limited power of EMBs over polit- be funded by the state, such financ- ical parties; professionalization and ing is inadequate and often delayed, powers of EMBs; the role of stake- thus promoting dependence on holders as partners; electoral-dispute donors and government. This heav- adjudication; security for elections; ily undermines EMBs’ performance, and elections’ steep costs. which is why most country reports recommended independent budgets EMBs in Africa have two major for EMBs. models: independent, and “hybrid” or mixed. Whatever the model, Yet despite these concerns, citizens’ EMBs need to be strengthened by perceptions of EMBs have improved ensuring their independence, pri- in some countries since 1980, and marily by entrenching them in expert respondents rated most constitutions or other statutory EMBs as fair in their performance provisions and improving their insti- (and in Ghana, Mauritius, Sey- tutional professionalism and opera- chelles and South Africa, good or tional efficiency. very good), pointing to sharp gains Citizens’ in democratic institutions since the perceptions The perceived lack of independ- 1980s’ wave of democratization. of electoral ence appears strongly among the management respondents, who did not consider Chapter 5—Competitive elections and conflict boards have 77% of EMBs independent and improved competent. Most countries’ experts Elections in Africa are not always did not regard the procedure of violent (despite the stereotype): in since 1980 appointing and removing electoral the past 10 years most elections commissioners as open, transparent have improved hugely, with peace- and credible. They pinpointed exec- ful and satisfactory outcomes the utives and ruling party–dominated norm, and only about 20% of elec- legislatures as the major political tions in 1990–2008 involved signifi- forces compromising EMBs’ auton- cant levels of violence. Interestingly, omy, underlining the need to review evidence points to greater likelihood the procedure and guarantee offi- of conflict with first past the post cials’ security of tenure, in order to than proportional representation, insulate them from undue political a view backed up by expert panels influence and interference. An over- in Angola, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, whelming number of country reports Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Nige- recommended an independent body ria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa be responsible for appointing (and and Zimbabwe, where the majority removing) EMB officials in a com- of respondents believe that electoral petitive job-selection process. stability and diversity management are better promoted through propor- Administrative and financial auton- tional representation. omy of EMBs is an issue particularly because, although in most countries Electoral systems are entwined with these bodies (and the electoral pro- their environments. The causes cess) should under the constitution of election-related violence lie in

Executive Summary 9

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 9 6/25/13 8:33 PM deep- rooted structural factors and disputes. These include joint oper- short-term conjunctural “triggers” ation committees and party liaison during the electoral process itself. committees in South Africa (which Structural factors relate to politi- have had marked success), conflict cal and economic diversities based management panels in some coun- on ethnic, regional, racial and class tries in Southern Africa and adju- competition for resources, including dication of disputes through the wealth and power. Triggers relate courts. Unlike other mechanisms, to conflicts—sometimes serious party liaison committees are main- clashes between parties—through- tained throughout the electoral out the campaign, during balloting cycle. In Sierra Leone, the Political and counting, and when results are Parties Registration Commission, announced on election day. Con- with members from registered par- flicts within parties can also break ties, serves as a vehicle for consul- out, especially during party prima- tation and cooperation between the ries in the run-up to national elec- Independent Election Commission tions. Such conflicts are an indica- and parties on all electoral matters. tor of factionalism and low levels of internal party democracy. Some good practices for managing electoral conflicts stand out. They In some countries, the partisan- include the EISA model (named ship of state agencies (police, intel- after the Electoral Institute for the ligence forces and the army) fuels Sustainability of Democracy in electoral conflict. The agencies Africa), which is based on conflict often promote the incumbent party mediation panels—grass-roots units by repressing other parties during in the Democratic Republic of the elections. Where such state agencies Congo, Lesotho, South Africa and and party-linked militia combine, Zambia, among other countries, capacity to deal with electoral vio- have been effective. Civil society lence is further undermined. Elec- initiatives, like that in KwaZulu- tion rigging becomes more likely if Natal in South Africa, which helped state agencies support the incumbent to heavily cut electoral violence in party. that province, are others. In Nige- ria, the National Campaign on Such violence may draw on youth Reduction of Electoral Violence was and militia groups during cam- set up in the 2007 election campaigning and post-election periods. paign as an early warning system on Owing to high unemployment, violence. youth are easy to lure into violence, which often goes beyond the parties Regional organizations such as involved. And women and children the African Union, the Economic are often caught in the melee, and Community of West African may be displaced. States (ECOWAS) and the South- ern African Development Com- Countries have tried various munity (SADC) have mediated to approaches to defuse electoral resolve electoral conflicts in several

10 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 10 6/25/13 8:33 PM countries including Kenya and Zim- to command more resources (than babwe. Other cases include medi- other parties) owing to their access ation in Togo where a wide range to state resources. Access to cam- of human rights activities such as paign resources in parties is also training, sensitization, advocacy, skewed, and women, minorities and capacity building and monitoring youth are usually at a disadvantage. programmes for six months before Disparities in electoral resources the 2010 election were conducted— between parties, candidates, men and no major violence occurred dur- and women, classes and age groups, ing the election. In West Africa, as well as within parties, militate the ECOWAS Conflict Preven- against the ability of many citi- tion Framework and Supplementary zens to compete fairly for power and Protocol on Democracy and Good leadership. Governance have been used to provide technical and financial assis- The new era of competitive politics tance to member states to organ- from the 1990s not only increased ize credible elections. In Southern the regularity of elections but also Strategic tools Africa, SADC has been involved in their cost—exponentially over the for preventing election-related mediation in Mad- past two decades—making elec- violence should agascar and Zimbabwe within the tion campaigning affordable mainly be woven into framework of the SADC Principles to wealthy candidates and well- each stage of the and Guidelines Governing Demo- endowed parties. All types of elec- electoral cycle cratic Elections. tion resources—money, logistics, campaign paraphernalia and media Finally, technical assistance for elec- coverage—are critical to shaping toral processes has been fairly effec- the electoral playing field and ulti- tive in providing compliance stand- mately the outcome. Only in 4 of ards and capacity for EMBs, and the 40 surveyed countries did half should therefore be encouraged. or more of respondents believe that But most countries have yet to fully parties have equal access to electoral institutionalize their election dis- resources. pute settlement mechanisms, and still show a tendency for last-minute In the run-up to elections, ruling attention to conflict prevention. parties through their control of gov- Strategic tools for preventing vio- ernment are tempted to splash out lence should be woven into each on thinly disguised buy-offs that stage of the electoral cycle. may include new infrastructure (roads, dams, clinics and houses) to Chapter 6—The economics of attract voters. This is a misuse of elections incumbency power and tends to cor- Resources—especially financial— rupt the electoral process. are vital to electoral competition. But while they can enable parties Electoral risks also slow business and candidates to be competitive in and investment, especially in manu- elections, they can also distort the facturing, as fear of conflict around electoral process. Ruling parties tend elections often makes investors wait

Executive Summary 11

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 11 6/25/13 8:33 PM and see, discouraging investment (as The increasing costs of campaign- borne out in Kenya). ing mean that only individuals willing to invest large sums of money Funding for EMBs is largely from can become candidates. Another the government, for operational outcome is that, with no rigorous expenses (outside election periods) expenditure-monitoring systems in and for elections. EMB allocations place, candidates with deep pock- in a country often depend on factors ets can spend far in excess of that like geography and population size, allowed by campaign regulations. and while some states can fund their EMBs fully, some cannot. Some countries that are not self- sufficient resort to foreign funding The funding for political par- for their elections—including the ties is critical to their preparedness Democratic Republic of the Congo, for elections: a party’s presence— Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, São nationally, regionally and locally— Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, The funding for gives an indication of its capacity South Sudan and Tanzania. This political parties to compete. The principal funding helps to reinforce the authoritarian is critical to sources for most parties are inter- proclivity that portrays elections as their preparedness nal party resources as well as pub- a Western imposition in some polit- for elections lic, diaspora and external (donor) ical cultures, with the effect of a funding. While some countries seemingly half-hearted commitment base a party’s funding according to to elections as integral to democra- the seats it has in parliament, oth- tization. (Some countries, though, ers base it on the proportion of votes ban foreign donations to parties and that it received in the last election. candidates.)

Campaign funding shows three Political finance remains under major patterns: ruling parties tend regulated in Africa—and fund- to command greater resources; a few raising by parties and candidates opposition parties now also com- is fully unregulated self-help. Two mand considerable resources; but countries have all four constituent most parties in opposition still have elements of a regulatory regime, and few resources (it is also a challenge 15 others have one to four of the for them to maintain a national or elements—thus slightly fewer than media presence). half the AGR III countries have some form of regulation for political Some countries provide both party finance. and campaign funding, to various degrees and for different elections. Although resources shape political Benin, for instance, grants public competition, they do not automat- funding to candidates and parties ically lead to victory. Ruling par- in presidential and legislative cam- ties have sometimes had the greater paigns. On the whole, however, self- resources but lost the election. Other funding is the principal resource for variables also have a role, like coa- election campaigns. lition building among opposition

12 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 12 6/25/13 8:33 PM parties, popularity and quality of • redesigning the electoral sys- candidates and organizational capac- tem to achieve a more demo- ity of the parties. cratic management of diversity by combining elements of first Chapter 7—Electoral, past the post and proportional constitutional and political reforms representation; and Born out of pressures for liberal democratic space, reforms in these • making provisions in national three interrelated areas have gen- constitutions and electoral erally made significant progress laws or specific legislation for in Africa—although depth and the regulation and oversight scope are uneven. Such reforms of party activities (including are embedded in a state–society financing). dynamic in which reform seeks to respond to changes in the relation- The country reports and AGR III ship and demands by society on the Expert Opinion Survey suggest that state. further reforms may be necessary in Electoral, seven broad areas. First is modify- constitutional Several countries have undertaken ing the electoral system, particularly and political key constitutional reforms (such first past the post: mixed or pro- reforms have as Kenya and South Africa) while portional representation systems are generally made political reforms have included becoming more popular and gen- significant progress greater decentralization, estab- erally accepted as better for man- lishment of watchdogs like human aging and promoting diversity in rights and anti-corruption bodies, plural African countries. Second is and invigoration of democratic insti- strengthening the independence of tutions like parliament. EMBs via constitutional guarantees and transparency (as discussed in With an underlying design to chapter 4). improve and democratize electoral governance in Africa, elec- The third area is improving and toral reforms have centred on the democratizing the legal framework following: for election administration, management, EMB accountability and pro- • redesigning EMBs by entrench- fessionalization for increased effi- ing them in constitutions and by ciency. Fourth is strengthening the diminishing the influence of the election-adjudication and dispute- executive; resolution mechanism and providing remedies for electoral irregularities • unbundling the powers and (a reform closely related to judicial functions of the EMBs (in some independence, which is generally countries) through creating lacking). Fifth is levelling the dem- two (or more) EMBs to under- ocratic playing field through guar- take the major components of antees of equitable access to electoral electoral administration and resources by political parties (includ- management; ing the media). Sixth is reforming

Executive Summary 13

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 13 6/25/13 8:33 PM the role of the security forces. Sev- Chapter 8—Policy enth is promoting internal democ- recommendations racy in political parties—a wide The concluding chapter synthesizes deficit in most African countries. the policy recommendations flagged in earlier chapters. They are drawn In the areas of constitutional and from 40 country reports, views of political reforms, action for margin- expert panels, focus group discus- alized groups of women, youth and sions and analysis of these sources. the physically challenged should The recommendations are grouped be more affirmative. For women, into five categories. it has already spawned encouraging results in many countries, but The political system not for youth and the physically Most expert panels did not believe challenged: their issues have to be that the constitutions of their coun- internalized in political and con- tries adequately promote diver- stitutional processes. And even sity and inclusive governance or Institutional affirmative action for women var- protect minority interests, and capacity, relative ies—Rwanda for one stands out for that at best the constitutional pro- autonomy, its remarkable progress. Reforms tection of diversity was uneven resources and to bring marginalized groups into among countries, engendering two the quality and the governance mainstream require recommendations. integrity of judicial upscaling. First, constitutions should have spe- officers need to Judicial reform is generally slow, cific provisions on the tolerance be addressed improvised and out of tune with and protection of diversity as well continental democratization, pre- as a national mechanism to monitor venting this branch from playing its implementation of these provisions. proper role in regulating and ensur- Second, for the constitution to better ing justice in political and elec- protect diversity, the voices and aspi- toral processes. Specifically, insti- rations of the people should resonate tutional capacity, relative autonomy, in the constitution. The best way resources and the quality and integ- to achieve this is a bottom-up and rity of judicial officers need to be people-driven approach in constitu- addressed in many countries. tional engineering and reform.

Finally, the state’s capacity to deliver Electoral institutions, processes services is central to promoting cit- and finance izens’ approval and support for The institutional and finan- democracy—the democratic divi- cial autonomy of EMBs should be dend. But most African countries’ enshrined in national constitutions. service delivery remains abysmal, Reinforcing this position, most as the Expert Opinion Survey con- country reports recommended that firms. African governments should the appointment of EMB mem- greatly enhance their capacity to bers should not be the prerogative deliver services if the democratic of the national president but should project is not to founder. follow either a mechanism of open

14 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 14 6/25/13 8:33 PM advertisement or a vetted process in Regional and international which civil society organizations and organizations and promotion of parties are involved. electoral integrity Regional and international organi- Because most country reports indi- zations, as well as development part- cated that intra-party democracy was ners, should apply peer pressure on rare, sometimes leading to splits, those states that do not respect basic parties should be required to regis- norms of electoral integrity. In par- ter and have appropriate democratic ticular, the African Union should governance mechanisms. Other rec- continue to push for speedy imple- ommendations relate to a more inclu- mentation of the African Charter sive electoral system—most expert on Democracy, Elections and Gov- panels believed that proportional ernance while the regional economic representation (or some hybrid) has communities should do the same a clear advantage over other systems, with their regional protocols on including greater balance in the leg- democracy and good governance. islature among ethno-regional par- Relevant ties and among women and other Policy dialogue, training and research training and groups. More generally, if democracy Given the vacuum in capacity of policy-oriented is to set down firm roots in Africa, key stakeholders (such as EMBs, research should governments must make elec- political parties, state institutions be conducted tion funding a priority and reduce and civil society organizations) to to help further dependency on external funding. administer and shape the election process, countries need to expand build electoral Managing electoral conflicts and EMBs’ professional know-how, institutions’ disputes inculcate internal democratic values capacity, This set of recommendations relates and practices in political parties and professionalism to pre-empting or managing election- encourage regular inter-party dia- and effectiveness related violence, defusing (or fanning) logue and consultations with other electoral conflicts by state agencies, key stakeholders. Relevant training managing conflict (including early and policy-oriented research should warning systems) and adjudicating be conducted to help further build election disputes transparently and electoral institutions’ capacity, pro- quickly. The recommendations take fessionalism and effectiveness. on a special resonance given the persistence of election-related violence in Note some countries—despite the overall 1. The methodology is outlined in the declining trend. appendix.

Executive Summary 15

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 15 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 16 6/25/13 8:33 PM 1 frican countries are plural African countries have attempted and diverse societies. The to deal with the legacy of colonial- A continent’s political geogra- ism and re-engineer their nation- phy has been shaped by its history, building project by renegotiating Political and shows diverse groups, commu- their political architecture on the Architecture: nities, regions and societies that basis of liberal-democratic practice, State-building were not necessarily coterminous, especially in the last three decades. and Diversity forcibly merged together, accentu- These efforts include promoting ating the plurality of Africa’s social the separation of powers among the formations. Constructed on an three arms of government; engag- authoritarian political infrastruc- ing the issue of term limits in exec- ture, the colonial era’s model of gov- utive political office, especially the ernance had implications for state– presidency; ensuring representation society relations, the management of through elections; redesigning insti- diversity and the electoral process. tutions to promote inclusiveness and This background heavily influenced participation; reforming the party the character of the immediate post- system to respect diversity; and colonial state and governance, lead- establishing horizontal democracy- ing to a crisis of identity and disem- promoting institutions (or “watch- powerment, of which traces remain dogs”). These renegotiations have, today. to a degree, improved the design of Africa’s electoral and political sys- In British colonial Africa, for exam- tems, and how they function. ple, the divide-and-rule policy framed state organization, the power Four main conclusions emerge from structure, intergroup relations, iden- this chapter. First, an understand- tity and citizenship, the founding of ing of Africa’s electoral crisis in the political parties and electoral pro- post-independence era has to be sit- cesses. As Mahmood Mamdani uated in the context of the political (1996) noted, colonialism created a geography and architecture of the form of decentralized despotism, in African state—the colonialists used which people were contained in eth- diversity as an instrument of politi- nic closets, and their power bases, cal manipulation, exacerbating dif- political identity and allegiance, as ferences and stultifying the sub- well as their electoral horizon, were sequent nation-building project in defined by those ethnic formations. many countries. Second, the largely Such closeting largely accounts for one-party model in the immedi- the pervasiveness of ethnicity in ate post-colonial era, though meant Africa’s political relations and dis- to negate political differences and course, and in its electoral processes cohere groups in that project, unfor- and bargaining. Beyond ethnic- tunately reinforced authoritarianism ity, the way in which other identi- and deepened the pains of diversity. ties, such as gender, youth and dis- Third, Africa has made tremendous ability, were handled during the progress in renegotiating its political colonial period shaped the post- architecture, reflecting protracted independence experience. political struggles by different

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 17 6/25/13 8:33 PM sectors of society, but much remains Africa contains some 3,315 ethnic to be done. Fourth, transforma- groups,2 and Nigeria has the most, tive leadership is required, to fin- with 455. Some African ethnic ish renegotiating the democratic and groups, spread over more than one diversity-promoting political archi- country, are larger than some coun- tecture of Africa. tries’ populations: about 40–50 million Oromo in Ethiopia and Kenya; Diversity in Africa 30 million Hausa in Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Côte Very few countries or societies are d’Ivoire and Sudan; 30 million Igbo completely homogeneous. Their in Cameroon and Nigeria; 20 mil- diversity relates to the broad range of lion Akan in Ghana; 10 million associational or group relations that Fulani (Pule or Fulbe) in Guinea, individuals are organized in or the Nigeria, Niger and Senegal; and certain identity markers, including roughly similar numbers of Shona in ethnicity, language, race and reli- Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and of c lass and gion, they are classified by. Zulu in South Africa (Lewis 2009). income diversities are Contemporary patterns In no African country is the whole more than identity In Africa, diversity refers to the population of only one or even two markers—they also plurality of identity groups that religions, or only one denomina- have a bearing inhabit a country. African states are tion (for example, Sunni or Shi’a, commonly linguistically, ethnically or Catholic or Protestant). In eight on democracy and religiously divided.1 The conti- countries—Benin, Cameroon, Cen- nent has 2,110 living languages, or tral African Republic, the Congo, more than 30% of the world’s total. Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Libe- The average number of speakers per ria and Swaziland—traditional Afri- language is only 344,291, and Afri- can religions and systems of belief can countries’ official languages are practised by 25–50% of the pop- belong not only to the Afro-Asiatic ulation. Christianity and Islam are or Niger-Congo language fami- almost evenly distributed in Côte lies, but also to English, French and d’Ivoire, Eritrea and Ethiopia, while Portuguese. A survey of 40 African 30 countries have Christian major- countries revealed 14–40 linguis- ities and 21 Muslim. In Mauri- tic groups in 21 countries, 41–90 in tius, the population is divided into 11 and 91–134 in 7. For example, 48% Hindu, 32% Muslim and 17% 279 languages are spoken in Cam- Christians (Lewis 2009). eroon, 134 in Sudan, 132 in Chad, 127 in Tanzania, and 79 each in Although the markers of identity Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (Lewis groups are fluid, they can be classi- 2009). Linguistic diversity usu- fied into primordial and social. Pri- ally indicates ethnic diversity, but mordial identities themselves fall not always—the Nuba of the Nuba into two main categories: exclusive Mountains of Sudan, for exam- (people are born with them), such ple, speak more than 39 languages as race, ethnicity, language, kinship, (Salih 1989). clan and gender; and non-exclusive

18 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 18 6/25/13 8:33 PM (they can be changed or overlap different identities, institutional the exclusive markers), such as reli- systems and cultural values, even gion, region, nationality or citizen- when they belong to the same eth- ship (which distinguish citizens of a nic or religious group. Diverse but given country from those of others, interlocking modes of production while binding together the diverse create different economic, politi- identities within that country as a cal and cultural spaces within coun- community of citizens; UNECA tries, as well as within ethnic and 2011). religious identities, besides perpet- uating diverse institutional systems According to this conceptualization, (UNECA 2011). many of the primordial markers of a given identity group overlap with Class is another social identity those of other, perhaps linguistic or marker, often in successful econ- religious groups, often extending omies like Botswana and South beyond kinship or ethnicity, such Africa that have very unequal that race, ethnic, kinship and clan wealth distributions (AGR III identities do not necessarily consti- Botswana Country Report 2012; tute homogeneous groups because AGR III South Africa Country such groups may, for example, prac- Report 2012).3 But class and income tise different religions. diversities are more than identity markers—they also have a bearing The social identity markers are on democracy (box 1.1). expansive in that they can be formed across primordial identities as well The more social identity markers as across national citizenships develop, the tighter the interdepend- (UNECA 2011). They are usually ence and networks of interaction acquired, and often based on pur- posive choices, tactical necessity and common interests or incurred moral Box 1.1 E xamples of identity and politics obligations (UNECA 2011). Such markers include occupational asso- Persistent poverty and inequality have potentially deleterious effects on the ciations, political affiliation, media quality and sustainability of democracy in South Africa (AGR III South Africa groups, business organizations, Country Report 2012). trade unions, academic associations, human rights bodies and civil soci- In some countries, political parties are more associated with the urban than ety groups. rural population, reflecting the settlement divide. The AGR III Mozambique Country Report 2012, for instance, reiterates the observation in Sitoe et al. Other important social identity (2005, 20) that with few exceptions, “Mozambique’s parties other than Frelimo markers are modes of production and Renamo had not yet succeeded in building an organizational structure that and institutional systems of gov- covered a significant proportion of the country. Instead, these parties remained ernance. Diversity appears in eco- largely based on their leadership and in the environs of the city of Maputo”. nomic systems (from pastoral- ism to capitalism) and settlement African societies also embody other identity markers such as those based on types (rural or urban). Urban busi- gender, age and origin (indigenous and migrants). nesses and rural communities have

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 19

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 19 6/25/13 8:33 PM among primordial groups grow. than one. But they require care- Africa is still at an early stage along ful strategic management if they this trajectory though, and most are not to be conflictual. Histori- social markers are weaker than pri- cal factors like colonialism, as well mordial markers—many political as geographical and linguistic pat- parties, for example, are organized terns, have left an indelible imprint along primordial dimensions such as of both primordial and social iden- ethnicity, religion or region. tity markers on most African states and societies. Although pointers of diversity in society, identities generally overlap, The labours to build states and allowing individuals to bear more cement social cohesion have therefore been Herculean. Organiz- Table 1.1 Diversity-related factors for conflicts and ing elections against a backdrop of tensions in countries that have completed the ethnic, racial and regional diversi- African Peer Review Mechanism ties proved very challenging after Diversity factors leading to independence, and the legacies of conflicts and tension Causes of the diversity factors that challenge persist to the pres- Historical legacy Pre-colonial and colonial legacies of ent day. Competition among par- uneven development ties can lead to problems of relations Institutional fragmentation left behind by among sectarian identities, fanning the colonial state the flames of electoral violence and Grievances Uneven access to resources political instability, which are not Uneven access to cultural rights like themselves necessarily caused by religion and language rights ethnic, religious or regional diversi- Absence or uneven access to political ties: the socio-economic and politi- representation cal contexts of politics must also be Divisive politics Manipulation by the elite of primordial considered. identities Organization of political parties along Table 1.1 summarizes the major primordial-identity lines factors and their causes that under- State and governance Lack of autonomy of state organs from lie diversity and lead to tension, structures the executive, and lack of genuine as identified in the African Peer decentralization of power Review Mechanism.

Structural and institutional Fragmented modes of production, Electoral competition problems marginalizing rural communities Fragmented institutions of governance The essence of electoral competi- Poor relations between traditional tion is that political parties compete authorities and government for power through the public vote, administrators and are expected to comply with Conflict between indigenous Citizenship rights the rules of the “electoral game”. and immigrant populations Access to land rights Because of the strength of ethnic, Access to jobs religious and other primordial ties, most African societies are at vari- Source: UNECA 2011. ance with the individualism inher- ent in liberal-democratic institutions

20 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 20 6/25/13 8:33 PM in which the individual vote takes precedence over group interests. In Box 1.2 Diversity and conflict in Africa some African countries, however, the political party is a collective rep- Africa since the 1960s has witnessed protracted ethnic-related conflicts— resentation of interest groups, which national and international—in almost half its countries: Algeria, Burundi, Chad, use it—and sometimes abuse it—in the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethi- electoral and broad political compe- opia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, tition to serve their interests. As part Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Afri- of the structure of the governing ca, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. political institutions, political parties are capable of being guiding beacons These conflicts were fuelled by “a combination of potent identity-based factors for political stability—or major con- with wider perceptions of economic and social justice” over the distribution of tributors to violence. economic, political and public resources by the state (Jinadu 2010, 16).

Political parties serve as mediating They were also related to the inability or ineffectiveness of the electoral pro- institutions that stimulate and then cess to ensure regime change or political succession in ways that managed channel people’s political activity. diversity democratically by ensuring that ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society They are therefore central to how had fair and equal access to the state. electoral competition is organized, conducted and mediated in multicul- Although the strength of a nation can be derived from its diversity, badly man- tural societies. In Africa, given the aged, it can also be a source of conflict. historical formation of parties along ethnic lines, they generate mainly Source: Jinadu 2010. identity-based conflicts (box 1.2). Claims to power, resources and other social goods often seek expres- economically and politically— sion through identity-based mecha- perhaps most significant were the nisms with serious implications for attempts to wrench nation-states the nation-building project and for out of multiple ethnic groups, some national cohesion and stability. of which did not share a common history and culture. After inde- What these conflicts illustrate is pendence, most of the multi-ethnic the character of the state as a parti- states displayed diversities that were san ethno-hegemonizing entity, an a challenge to weave into national instrument of the dominant ethnic unity. Elections were contested group or groups over other ethnic fiercely as subnational ethnic groups groups, a function extended—with vied for power. It was little surprise the electoral process—to using state that most of these states suffered resources to overwhelm opposition election-linked conflict, includ- parties and their candidates (Jinadu ing Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic 2010). Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and such Africa’s election context has its own small states as Burundi and Rwanda. characteristics. Many countries experienced a colonialism that indel- The management of social and ibly marked their societies culturally, political diversity proved a colossal

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 21

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 21 6/25/13 8:33 PM challenge that the newly inde- Traditional mechanisms for coex- pendent states were ill equipped istence and interaction, including to undertake. They had inherited co-option, assimilation, integration, a political strait-jacket endorsed exchange relations, intermarriage by the Organization of African and blood brotherhoods, operated Unity, whose founding charter alongside conquest and subjuga- stated that colonially derived terri- tion through annexation as central- torial boundaries were inviolable. ized political entities formed and Some analysts have indeed argued expanded. By the 16th century, most that post-independence governance African societies had come into con- frameworks contributed to what they tact with the outside world during have termed a “crisis of identity” and the mercantile era, with plunder for disempowerment in much of Africa slaves particularly affecting the evo- (Deng 2008). Legal frameworks that lution of most societies. stressed unity through suppression of diversity left many Africans feel- Colonial diversity designs and Colonialism ing disenfranchised. management fundamentally The 19th century witnessed the transformed Pre- colonial and colonial scramble for Africa, through mil- political systems the continent, itary conquest, occupation and suzerain treaties that invariably interrupting Africa’s Pre-colonial organizations “natural” processes led to loss of sovereignty. Coloni- Pre- colonial Africa had a very alism fundamentally transformed diverse social and political land- the continent, integrating it with scape. Beyond its ethno-linguistic the new world order and interrupt- heterogeneity, communities had ing Africa’s “natural” processes. It a variegated landscape of socio- was repressive, undemocratic, divi- political organizations, at different sive and above all extractive, for stages of development. capitalism’s benefit. Of particular concern was the political architec- They ranged from units like ture used to reconfigure and create extended families, clans, commu- modern African countries: it bal- nal and age-set systems at the micro kanized groups, arbitrarily lumping level, to different levels of segmen- together distinct pre-colonial com- tary, quasi-centralized and central- munities or splitting groups across ized polities like chiefdoms, king- new borders.4 doms, states and empires. Political institutions and systems evolved The colonial powers designed these from various African traditions, boundaries with utter disregard for drawing on other sources in design the diversities and (some of) the and operation (Hodgkin 1961). positive traditional institutions and Organizational architecture varied, mechanisms for managing diversity, as some had fluid structures with as alien rule and political institu- adaptability, responsiveness, inclu- tions were superimposed on previ- siveness and accountability (Ayitteh ously self-governing societies (Ajayi 1991). 1969). Pre-colonial societies were

22 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 22 6/25/13 8:33 PM realigned to suit the administrative, Indians were placed in intermedi- political and economic interests of ary administrative positions and in the powers, leading to new diversi- commerce. Yet indirect rule fur- ties, including citizenship. ther alienated Indians from traditional institutions and citizenship, Colonial statecraft managed these and so they were conveniently posi- diversities by coercion, of course, as tioned as “aliens” to forestall inte- well as by manipulation and other gration for a united front against subjugating policies. Divide and rule colonialism. enhanced separation of the different societies or regions to under- The notion of citizenship was mine shared experiences and com- designed to overlap primordial iden- monality, thus forestalling unity tities, thus reinforcing the new against colonial rule. Indirect rule country structures. In settler colo- allowed each society its tradi- nies, a privileged white minority was tional institutions. And assimilation placed at the top of the hierarchy, ground down diversities and (in the which precipitated pre-independence The colonial colonialists’ eyes) “unworthy” sys- pan-ethnic responses among state deepened tems through association or inte- Africans. diversity and gration into, for example, French reified polarization citizenship. Colonialism often reinforced gender and contradictions asymmetries in mainly patriarchal in many African These policies severed some of the systems. Migrant-labour policies, inter-ethnic linkages and relations coupled with taxes on men, justified countries and fostered ethno-regional fragmen’s pursuit of wage employment mentation. New territorial con- and stressed constructs of women fines propelled ethnic consciousness as the “weaker” gender, marginaliz- and attendant political mobilization ing them for many years from labour along ethno-parochial platforms and markets and demonetarizing their identity lines, nurturing a long-term labour. Women were to play a sup- bias towards ethnic division from portive role of staying at home to common citizenship and social iden- cheaply reproduce households of tity markers. their bread-winning absentee hus- bands. In peasant economies, sub- Still, classes like peasants, workers sistence food crops were gendered and the elite came into greater vis- female and the introduced cash ibility through colonial patterns of crops male, giving men control of production, division of labour, dis- household income. tribution and formal education. The elites pushed through the policies The colonial state therefore deep- of the colonial establishment and ened diversity and reified polari- supervised those below them. Con- zation and contradictions in many sistent with divide and rule, Afri- African countries, heightening eth- cans were largely confined to pro- nic differences, complicating citizen- ducing raw materials, at the bottom ship and preventing national cohe- of the hierarchy, while groups like sion and identity from emerging.

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 23

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 23 6/25/13 8:33 PM Colonial governance and history of the councils in the late 1940s aimed elections to mollify increasing postwar mili- In the colonial period, governance tant nationalism. was neither democratic nor participatory, but top-down, centralized or Nationalist pressure and ethnicized (Ndege 2009). Through introduction of liberal democracy, a hierarchical administrative struc- 1945 to mid-1950s ture, comprador traditional lead- The Second World War accelerated ers and appointed warrant chiefs African nationalism, with militancy implemented policies and kept law against a backdrop of war-weary and order. Francophone Africa saw colonial powers and economic reces- some exceptions, as its assimilation sion. The powers were compelled to policy occasionally allowed Afri- transfer liberal democracy intended cans to take part in elections (Golder to prepare their colonies for a smooth and Wantchekon 2004). After transition to democratic governance. 1848, the four communes in Sene- They introduced some concessions gal were allowed to elect a député to and reforms, including more widely the French parliament (Cowen and enfranchising electoral systems— Laakso 1997; Ellis 2000). It was not Africans increased their representa- until 1914 that the first African, tion in legislative councils—and Blaise Diagne, the mayor of Dakar, allowed political organizations. They was elected as Senegal’s represent- also accelerated formal education ative to the French Chamber of for nurturing what they viewed as a Deputies. “desirable” indigenous successor elite, to defuse radical nationalist elements. The British colonies offered no electoral experience for Africans Although the British aimed to trans- over much of the period (Wiseman fer power eventually, the French did 1990). Keeping major decisions at not, and envisaged continuing to home, Britain introduced consulta- administer their colonies as exten- tive bodies called legislative councils sions of France (such as départe- in many colonies between 1900 and ments and territoires). They hoped the 1920s, but these represented the to maintain their influence through main non-African interest groups a French-dominated federal com- like planters, settlers and businesses. munity (Golder and Wantchekon Membership was largely by nomina- 2004). In 1945, France increased tion. The first elections were held in representation for its West African the 1920s in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, colonies to 10 seats in the new Con- Sierra Leone and Zambia (Lindberg stituent Assembly. From 1946, Afri- 2006), exclusive to the small elites cans who met tight criteria voted for in a few major cities (Collier 1982). both the French National Assembly Although some traditional leaders and for local government councils in could be unofficial members, Afri- Africa. The reforms did not, though, cans were admitted to the legislative fundamentally transform the polit- councils usually only after agitation. ical landscape, and still reflected Greater African representation in colonial control.

24 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 24 6/25/13 8:33 PM Transition to independence long term and to manage the diversi- Facing persistent agitation for self- ties. The resultant competitive elec- rule, the colonial powers offered toral processes, political parties and greater democracy in the late 1950s electioneering were invariably shaped to prepare the transition to self-rule: by ethno-sectarianism that domi- they widened the African franchise, nated the new citizenship. Liberal- allowing direct elections to legisla- democratic institutions, including tive bodies. It was therefore only just political parties, were often reconfig- before independence that the first ured to serve sectarian interests and African elections with universal suf- preserve identities and aspirations in frage and unrestricted party forma- the new “nation” states. tion were held (Cowen and Laakso 1997). Further, some of these institutions were foreign to African societies. Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda in As Adejumobi (2000, 62) notes on Anglophone Africa held legisla- African democratic principles and tive council elections. To manage practices: “Consensus, dialogue and diversity, they adopted federalism the political collective were empha- and other decentralization models, sized, as opposed to individualism, intended to protect the interests of atomization and the majoritarian- ethnic minorities. However, federalism of the Western capitalist polit- ism usually had the reverse effect of ical system”. Concepts like vot- solidifying ethno-parochialism, as it ing and political majority/minority was within the broader framework were foreign (Buijtenhuijs and Rij- of indirect rule. nierse 1993; Albert 1992; Adeju- mobi 2000). France arranged a referendum in 1958 for the colonies to approve Four countries serve to highlight the staying in the newly designed contradictions in imported liberal French Community, in which only democracy on the eve of independ- Guinea voted for full independence (box 1.3). ence (the others voting to stay in). In Lusophone countries, with Portugal The post-colonial state undertaking no substantive reforms, Although the contradictions of colo- unconventional national liberation nialism ultimately led to independ- came to the fore through armed ence, the consequences of colonial resistance in Angola, Guinea-Bissau rule persist. In post-colonial Africa, and Mozambique. South Africa had the state-building project has been already brought in apartheid, osten- particularly challenging, partly sibly to preserve identity interests explaining the continent’s failure to and racial diversity. extricate itself from the clutches of poverty and underdevelopment. The Liberal democracy was grafted onto complexity largely derives from the the colonial architecture of fraction- dual legacies of colonialism (as seen) alized countries, rendering it compli- and the post-independence, often cated to establish democracy for the autocratic, successor leadership.

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 25

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 25 6/25/13 8:33 PM political space open up and democ- Box 1.3 A difficult graft racy gain ground. The second—running until today—marks the reform In Nigeria at independence, the three regions that made up the federation period (see next section). Although broadly coincided with the three dominant ethnic groupings: Hausa-Fulani, Africa’s political landscape shows Igbos and Yorubas. Political parties thus evolved with regional identities, in real progress, a final flowering of effect creating a dominant one-party system in each region (AGR III Nigeria democracy and diversity manage- Country Report 2012). ment is a work in progress.

Kenya’s colonial administration had restricted political parties to the district In the earlier period, the first prob- (ethnic) level to prevent inter-ethnic political coalitions from forming. At inde- lem confronting the successor lead- pendence, it was these ethnic-based political organizations that transformed ership was the complexity of the themselves into two national parties—the Kenyan African National Union, which artificial, colonialist-crafted new mainly represented the large ethnic groups, and the Kenyan African Demo- African state. Independence lead- cratic Union, which largely represented the small nomadic ethnic groups of the ers sought to engineer that frac- Rift Valley, the Luhyia of Western Kenya and the coastal regions (AGR III Kenya tured entity towards a nation-state, Country Report 2012). or common-citizenship, project, but their efforts were hampered by the Uganda’s major independence political parties interlaced ethnicity with reli- mutual antagonisms and fears of gious factionalism, which emanated from early colonial competition between domination among the various social the British Anglicans and the French Catholics (AGR III Uganda Country Report entities. According to Ajayi (1984), 2012). the effect of the colonialists’ ethno- cultural stratification was to dimin- In Namibia, apartheid-era legacies versus national unity have been described thus: ish “existing intercultural linkages”, while strengthening and consolidat- While the policy of national reconciliation was supposed to [bring] and ing “the sense of internal cohesion to a large extent has brought the different ethnic and cultural groups within the component polities and together, beneath the national rallying cry of “One Namibia, One language group”. Nation”, the integration experiment has not come to full fruition . . . as it is apparent that pre-independence ethnic and tribal prejudices Subsequently, the post-independence stoked by apartheid authorities still remain. What this points to is that body politic was punctuated either the effects of apartheid are still rippling through Namibian society and by attempts to renegotiate and ethnicity still [affects] overall human development in the country (AGR III reconstitute the state or by ethno- Namibia Country Report 2012, 25). political wars and attempts to secede. Given the interwoven ethnic and citizenship question that Post- independence Africa can was unresolved before independence, be divided into two periods. The Jinadu (2007, 16) notes: first—for 25 years after independence to the democratic reforms of The departure of the colo- the 1980s—was dominated by the nial powers was consequently, twin trajectories of nation-state in several African countries, building and autocratic rule, which accompanied by internecine, both stifled diversity. Together armed ethno-political con- they engendered the struggles flicts between majority, or and reforms of the 1980s that saw “favoured” ethnic groups,

26 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 26 6/25/13 8:33 PM which wanted to maintain political-regional, party-political, control of the inherited state, racial, religious, rich, poor, urban, and “disadvantaged”, usu- rural, women, and youth—does ally but not always numeri- common citizenship promote? cally minority ethnic groups, Reducing the question further: To which wanted to capture or whom does the state belong? reconstitute the inherited state on more favourable terms, or, Pondering ethnic diversity in post- failing which, to secede from colonial Africa, Asia and the Middle it. This much is clear from East, Wimmer (1997, 635) observed the post-colonial histories of that “Ethnic conflicts arise dur- Angola, Burundi, Chad, the ing the process of state formation, Democratic Republic of the when a fight erupts over ‘which peo- Congo, Djibouti, Nigeria, ple’ the state should belong to”. The Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and state is therefore the primary con- Uganda. tested terrain for politically mobilized group demands and conflicts The rainbow coalition of ethno- based on identity markers: Who is to regional nationalist political parties control or be excluded from the state that struggled for independence usu- and its vast resources and patronage ally disappeared quite quickly, to be machine? replaced by fragmented and regionally or ethnically anchored par- The second problem facing the suc- ties. At the extreme, colonialism in cessor leadership stemmed from the Rwanda—having exacerbated inter- common citizenship and nation- group diversities—ultimately led to state project. Across much of the extremism that precipitated refugee continent, leaders increasingly per- outflows and genocide. ceived political pluralism and diversity as inimical to nation building The rationale for managing diver- and as potent sources of division and sity tended to serve as justification conflict for new-born states, caus- for forcing different entities into the ing them to repress diversity, con- nation-state’s common citizenship. strict political space, and consoli- This approach tried to resolve the date authoritarian and personal rule. diversity question by dissolving it Military intervention often became in the myth of common citizenship a fashionable remedy to the post- and individual rights, but it failed in independence nationalist dictator- this—generally reinforcing identity- ships, but it usually embedded autoc- group consciousness—because it racy, compounding the misrule. raised, then as now, the question of identity in a practical manner that The first 25 years after independ- the concept of common citizenship ence saw many centralizing and could not adequately answer. control models at work—military or political—which counter- But whose interests among the productively sought to dissolve diverse identity groups—ethnic, diversity. Very few countries had

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 27

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 27 6/25/13 8:33 PM multi- party politics and opposition had an absolute monarch (Swaziland) parties, and electoral processes were or a constitutional monarchy (Leso- reduced to a sham, leading to a sim- tho). Apartheid in South Africa was ulacrum of democracy. a unique form of internal colonialism and dictatorship, premised on insti- Authoritarianism tutionalized racial segregation and After independence, many national- domination. The struggle against ist leaders attempted to consolidate apartheid was waged by internal their hold on power, usually in one forces, led by the African National of two ways. Congress, and external forces. It was not only a quest for equality and The first entailed consolidating the a non-racial society, but also for a ruling party’s political dominance political transition to democracy. via development ideology, artic- ulated around notions of nation Electoral processes in building and progress. This ideology authoritarian political systems called for national unity (essentially, In the post-colonial period, acquir- unanimity) and silenced dissent of ing and monopolizing political any kind. Under this umbrella, alter- power as a force for repressing and native sites and forums for conduct- eliminating political opponents— ing politics, like opposition parties, and thus the control and redistri- trade unions, farmers’ associa- bution of resources—formed part tions, or student and faculty move- of electoral politics. This strat- ments, were silenced or eliminated. egy was helped by the inherited In Egypt, for instance, President first-past-the-post electoral sys- Nasser dissolved political parties by tem and its winner-takes-all conse- decree on 16 January 1953 (AGR III quences, which tended to perpetuate Egypt Country Report 2012). the political hegemony of ethno- communal majorities, exacerbating Presidents concentrated power. violent majority–minority conflicts Although some leaders submit- (box 1.4). Some countries (including ted themselves to periodic elections, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa) these only served as cover for an attempted to design political and enduring presidency. Most presidents constitutional measures to assuage became elevated above the law and fears and protect interests of eth- enjoyed unlimited terms of office, as nic minorities through arrangements in Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, like proportional representation and Senegal and Tunisia. They often federalism, but these measures often legitimized this authoritarianism in threw up new challenges. the name of managing diversity. After the founding elections at inde- The second approach took various pendence in the 1960s, the electoral forms. Military rule or outright dic- process in most countries became tatorship appeared in the Central irregular and opaque, and largely African Republic, Malawi, Nigeria, remained so through the 1970s and Uganda and Zaire. Other countries 1980s (chapter 2). Most polities were

28 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 28 6/25/13 8:33 PM either one-party states or military regimes. Other parties were system- Box 1.4 T he tyranny of the majority atically proscribed, generating widespread voter apathy as the utility of Minority ethnic groups—reduced to a perpetual electoral minority; treated as the electoral process itself was called second-class citizens; underrepresented in central and local bureaucracies into question (Hayward 1987). The and in the public services generally; their heartlands neglected, denied of infra- only multi-party states were those structure development and social services and turned into blighted oases of with smaller populations like Bot- internal colonialism; and seeing no prospect through the ballot box for captur- swana, Mauritius and Senegal. ing political power—have in some countries sought and used various voice and exit options, including non-constitutional ones, to challenge the hegemonic The absence or proscription of polit- ethnic groups. As Ivo Duchacek observed, commenting on the situation more ical competition and democratic than 30 years ago: practices strengthened authoritarian tendencies in civilian regimes The problem for most ethnic minorities is that they are permanent minor- but also provoked resistance from ities and the ruling group a permanent majority. In inter-ethnic relations other institutions of the state, which therefore, the convenient democratic game of numbers does not work explained the bias towards military since the unalterable power symmetry between permanent majority and coups for changing leaders—who permanent minorities impedes the formation of a consensual community rarely left office after elections any- (Duchacek 1977, 23, quoted in Thomas-Woolley and Keller 1994, 414). way: out of 101 political successions in 1963–1987, some 57% were fostered by the military, 31% by civilian democratic elections and competitive incumbents and only 8% by elections politics as a waste of time: (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Before too long, these regimes The electoral systems under one- suspended rules of succession party states and military regimes through competitive electoral did not encourage or accommodate politics, proscribed opposi- competitive politics. Most electoral tional politics and declared the management boards (often called state a one-party state, alleg- electoral commissions) were sub- edly or ostensibly for reasons ordinated to state structures such of state, including notably the as the ministry of home affairs or claims that elections (a) tended interior, and lacked adequate fund- to “politicize” ethnicity and ing and staff as well as autonomy. related identity differences, in Elections in one-party states con- ways that encourage or lead sisted of intra-party contests with to ethno-political violence, few choices, generating voter apathy thereby undermining national and diminishing interest. The cred- unity; and (b) were expensive ibility of the electoral process was and a drain on scarce resources tarnished, and national or interna- available for development tional observation and monitoring (Jinadu 2010, 14). of elections before the early 1990s was rare (AGR III Gabon Country The structures and leadership of one- Report 2012). One interpretation is party states and military regimes may that successor regimes began to view have differed, but they both stifled

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 29

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 29 6/25/13 8:33 PM pluralism, the autonomy of electoral crucial in maintaining diversity with bodies and the institutional mecha- some modicum of national unity. nisms for political change, as author- Such men included Julius Nyer- itarian rulers weakened parliamen- ere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in tary prerogatives, granted themselves Kenya and Houphouet Boigny in extended terms of office, introduced Côte d’Ivoire. Nyerere is “still con- one-party state constitutions and sidered by many as not only an icon intimidated or imprisoned opponents. of national identity but almost a syn- onym to it. It was under his lead- People disengaged from activist pol- ership when the country developed itics, as seen in low voter turn-out, into a unified nation with remarka- a trend that regimes took advantage ble achievements in the management of to narrow political space and abet of diversity” (AGR III Tanzania public cynicism. By the 1980s, most Country Report 2012, 112). authoritarian regimes faced a crisis of legitimacy: The challenge of pre-reform The opening of diversity management political space This crisis was manifest in a Authoritarian regimes’ iron fist and and rebirth of loss of faith among African coercive methods had disastrous multi-party politics citizens that state elites were consequences. Conflicts in Burundi, ushered in political capable of solving basic prob- Chad, the Democratic Republic of power struggles lems of socio-economic and the Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra political development. Leaders Leone and Sudan led to civil wars had damaged their own claim costing many hundreds of thousands to rule by engaging in nepo- of lives. Conflicts in Ethiopia and tism and corruption, which Somalia had different origins and led to popular perceptions that affected many tens of thousands of those with access to political people. Some of these conflicts per- office were living high on the sisted well into the 1990s, after the hog while ordinary people suf- democratic wave had swept across fered. The erosion of political the continent. legitimacy built on crisis pro- portions because authoritarian Because the one-party or military-led regimes did not provide proce- unitary projects that became common dures for citizens to peacefully after independence failed to eradi- express such grievances and, cate ethnic identities (Olukoshi and especially, to turn unpopular Laakso 1996), addressing multiple leaders out of office (Bratton diversities remained a major challenge and van de Walle 1997, 99). in most post-colonial states. But this did not stop most of those in power Any overview of this period must from using inter-ethnic relations, or refer to the “strong leaders”—mainly at times equally diverse linguistic, the founding fathers of their coun- religious and regional cleavages, for tries at independence. Their skills narrow political interests, especially and charisma in holding together political leaders gaining and retaining ethnic and group interests were political power (box 1.5).

30 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 30 6/25/13 8:33 PM Box 1.5 Eth nicity and party support

The opening of political space and rebirth of multi-party politics ushered in political power struggles, with power brokers appeal- ing to their ethnic bases and taking advantage of social inequality and exclusion (Ngenge 1999).

Ethnic mobilization, whether for party formation, electoral campaigns or patronage, was common, and when combined with economic disparity and inequitable access to political power became a source of long-drawn-out conflicts with far-reaching destabi- lizing effects (Salih and Nordlund 2007).

Research in 12 African states into the impact of ethno-linguistic and ethno-racial characteristics on support for the ruling party confirmed (though with a small sample) a common assumption that ethnic-linguistic cleavages often structure party identification (Norris and Mattes 2003). In national models, ethnicity remained significant in 8 of the 12 sample countries but was not necessarily the primary cleavage.

Other structural factors important for partisanship—if less consistent—included a rural–urban cleavage in Mali, Namibia and Tanzania; age and generation in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia; and education in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Moreover, in most of the sample countries, support—far from being an automatic expression of group loyalties—also reflected how well governments delivered services to citizens.

Related studies pointed to the continuing significance of religious, regional and linguistic manifestations of identities such as the north–south divide (with variations) in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, and a linguistic divide (Amhara and Oromo) in Ethiopia. In addition:

• countries with strong ethnic majorities are not politically more, or less, stable than countries with smaller ethnic groups;

• although elections are fought partly on the basis of the support that traditional authorities such as chiefs lend to a party, after the elections political coalitions are forged without reference to the constituencies; and

• African parties are modern, but their appeal to ethnicity—and to linguistic, religious and regional cleavages—is exploited and mobilized in a classic populist fashion (Salih and Nordlund 2007).

An indispensable first step towards diversity management would be to ensure that the electoral framework in each state was designed in a way sensitive to countries’ diversity (Salih and Nordlund 2007). This means creating a framework for greater participation in the political system and decisions, and seriously exploring options like federalism, local administration and proportional representation.

Challenges often arise, as elsewhere in the world, when particular groups face discrimination and when ethnic identities align with patterns of inequality or repression. To deal with what appear to be ethnic disputes therefore requires policy makers to address underlying questions of economic and political marginalization, and to find acceptable ways to redistribute resources.

In view of these embedded and competing identities and loyalties, it is unrealistic to assume that the electoral process on its own can resolve these diversities. Structural reforms combined with electoral reforms are imperative—as one set without the other will fail to resolve the negative features of diversity.

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 31

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 31 6/25/13 8:33 PM The reform period: representation and public politi- Renegotiated architecture cal appointments reflect diversity in and recurrent issues particular. Authoritarian rule triggered popular resistance, as African politics Ensuring the second outcome was descended into violent political suc- designed to be achieved through cession conflicts and to palace and three approaches: making the share military coups against “sit-tight” of seats won by political parties in rulers. The 1980s witnessed a wave parliaments reflect more closely that of democratic reforms across the of the valid votes in parliamentary continent, in the form of debates elections; enhancing female rep- about redesigning the post-colonial resentation in parliaments and public state and of direct struggles against political appointments; and sharing authoritarianism. power, especially in central government, among political parties. A general consensus has now The 1980s emerged for renegotiating the Separation of powers witnessed political architecture of the Afri- Constitutional provisions on the a wave of can state through strengthen- separation of powers among the democratic ing democracy as well as promot- executive, legislative and judicial reforms across ing and protecting diversity. One branches of government, backed by the continent aim of these moves is to make it checks and balances, are now essen- difficult or impossible to abro- tial building blocks in Africa’s rene- gate entrenched provisions through gotiated political architecture. The ordinary legislation. The debates provisions are designed to limit have focused on recurrent strategic excessive power in the executive and reform in six main areas. the gross abuse and impunity that typically accompany it. Separation Electoral representation of powers is a compass for rebalanc- Electoral systems, elections and ing the relationship among the three their implications for electoral out- branches in the African state, away comes and diversity management from the concentration of powers remain crucial in this consensus, in the executive during the years of despite recent progress in constitu- authoritarian rule. tional provisions for greater inclusiveness and participation in elec- This objective has typically taken tions and the electoral process in the form of vesting entrenched several African countries. The issue countervailing powers in the leg- has been addressed from different islature, judiciary and independent angles, including, first, special con- horizontal institutions (the last dis- stitutional provisions to modify the cussed under Horizontal democracy- principle of universal adult suffrage, promoting institutions below). especially in elections to legislative chambers, and second, reform of The extent and forms of separation the electoral system to make elec- of powers vary between presidential, toral outcomes and thus legislative semi-presidential and parliamentary

32 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 32 6/25/13 8:33 PM systems of government; and between and a strong legislative bureaucracy, unitary, devolved and federal forms. as in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South But results have been mixed, so Africa and Zambia, although asser- that some commentators still refer tions of independence tend to be to the “imperial” or “monarchical” spasmodic. presidency. The general picture, however, is of Legislative independence historically deep-rooted debilitat- Pointing to the importance of the ing capacity and resource deficits, legislature in many African states partly due to long years of dissolu- under the presidential system, Prem- tion, neglect, proscription or suspen- peh (2008) concluded that many sion of legislatures, and partly due to African countries are yet to be free the structural problem of economic from executive control, because of underdevelopment. poor institutional capacity of the legislature, weak constitutional Judicial independence design and, sometimes, timidity and The renegotiated architecture has Separation of abdication of responsibility by the typically sought to strengthen judi- powers is a legislature. cial independence as part of the compass for separation of powers. Doing this rebalancing the One target of legislative independ- has involved entrenching constitu- relationship among ence is the enormous power of presi- tional provisions, subject to checks the three branches dential appointments and patronage and balances, that largely vest judi- disposal, which African presidents cial powers and functions, including of government in have learned to use to strengthen the judicial review of the action of the the African state presidency, despite constitutional other branches of government, in powers of appropriation, investiga- the judiciary; that grant correspond- tion, oversight, confirmation and ing fiscal autonomy of the judiciary, impeachment vested in many par- usually as a first charge on consoli- liaments. Still, some countries dated revenue funds, to enable it to show hopeful trends: parliaments exercise its powers and perform its in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa functions under the constitution; have exercised their wide powers as that guarantee the independence of strategic bargaining ploys to put the judicial appointments through the executive in check. establishment of independent judicial service commissions or judi- Separation of powers under pres- cial councils to vet and process such idential form of government has appointments; and that make it hard strengthened the independence of to remove judges (to ensure judges’ parliaments by making it harder security of tenure until retirement). for presidents to dissolve or sus- pend them, except during emergency If this is the typical constitutional rule, and in such cases under con- arrangement, the practice var- stitutional provisions. Another fac- ies by country, in an ebb and flow tor buttressing their independence is of independence. This back and a forceful parliamentary opposition forth reflects the judiciary’s ability

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 33

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 33 6/25/13 8:33 PM to resist encroachments on its pow- converges with new global think- ers by other branches of governing on modes of governance, which ment, to dispense justice fairly, to emphasizes political devolution and provide easy access to justice by all, subsidiarity. A landmark develop- or to protect and provide redress ment in this new thinking is the for assault on diversity by the other African Charter on Human and branches of government or other Peoples’ Rights (box 1.6). groups or forces in state and society. Federalism Some African judiciaries, like the Historically, federalism was unpop- legislature, suffer from weak capac- ular in Africa and remains so, as ity and resources—more so among only Ethiopia and Nigeria declare lower courts—impairing judicial themselves federal. South Africa and independence and threatening access Tanzania have federal constitutions, to justice (and its rapid delivery). but they are not usually formally referred to as federal. Kenya’s 2010 Federalism, devolution and Constitution has federal features centralization in providing entrenched provisions Tinged with the residue of pre- for devolved government, including colonial and colonial political sys- the Fourth Schedule, which distrib- tems, debates on renegotiating the utes legislative competences between political architecture have looked national and county governments closely at political devolution— that the central government can- transferring power from higher to not unilaterally take away (except by lower levels—and decentralization— referendum and under conditions in reorganizing into smaller, more the constitution). independent governance units closer to the people through constitutional Devolution provisions for multiple (polycentric) The continuing unpopularity of fed- layers of political authority. eralism has brought into focus the relevance of political devolution— Here, the approach of Africa’s pre- beyond political decentralization— colonial federative political systems as a constitutional mechanism for managing diversity. Devolution creates new subnational structures and Box 1.6 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights centres of authority that grant limited autonomy and self-government Article 20 (1): All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the to subnational (regional, district, unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely local) groups and communities, determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social short of creating two sovereign development according to the policy they have freely chosen. authorities with direct legal impact on citizens. Countries such as Alge- Article 22 (1): All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and ria, Benin, Ghana, Sierra Leone cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the and Uganda now have constitu- equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. tional clauses for political devolution, which provide for—at least in

34 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 34 6/25/13 8:33 PM theory (box 1.7)—contested terrains and opportunities for redefining Box 1.7 Devolution in practice, Ghana the role of local traditional institutions and communities in national The Ghanaian political state, although decentralized administratively, is still governance. very much centralized.

Political devolution offers a half- The essence of decentralization is delegation of powers and resources from way house between federalism and central government to the district assemblies. The extent to which they have unitary government.5 Although been able to exercise powers is not easy to assess as some ministries and the division of powers under fed- departments in central government do not appreciate the import of true devo- eralism is entrenched and requires lution. Merely opening offices of a ministry or department in a district is not special procedures for amendment, devolution, unless they are under the control of the district assembly. which precludes unilateral amendment by either level of government, The reluctance of those in central government to let go of power is a potent political devolution involves dele- obstacle to devolution and the success of decentralization in Ghana. gation of powers and functions to lower levels of government from Source: AGR III Ghana Country Report 2012, box V. the central government, generally through ordinary legislation, which means that the central government state governments, a recurring chal- can, again through ordinary legisla- lenge is how to arrest the recentral- tion, unilaterally recentralize those izing trend, which may well hinder powers. the states’ effectiveness in managing ethno-regional and other forms Recentralizing trends of diversity. In Tanzania, ques- Devolution remains problematic in tions have recurred since the found- Africa, and in both unitary and fed- ing Acts of the Union and the 1977 eral states recentralizing moves still Constitution over the extent and provoke public debate. Devolved limits of the division of legislative subnational units of government are competences between the United typically still under the strangle- Republic and Zanzibar, and over the hold of the central government. The constitutional dominance of the for- African Peer Review Mechanism mer over the latter. country reports of Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda provide In these federal countries, a top- detailed illustrations of how power down approach to governance as has recentralized, with devolved well as constitutional, fiscal and authorities in practice no more than political asymmetries between the appendages of central government, federal and lower governments and which has invasive powers of polit- among regional or state governments ical, administrative and financial continues to severely diminish feder- control. alism as a mechanism for managing diversity. Nigeria and Tanzania are In Ethiopia and Nigeria, where fed- undergoing constitutional reforms to eralism divides or shares sovereignty renegotiate the nature of federalism between federal and regional or being practised.

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 35

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 35 6/25/13 8:33 PM Political party systems promotion, especially among marginalized groups such as women; Party reform ensuring public financing and reg- Reform of the party system con- ulation, including audits of party tinues to generate interest because political financing; and promoting of its centrality to democratic poli- inter-party dialogue and helping to tics, and generally to constructively negotiate political parties’ codes of managing diversity. Since the end conduct to guide inter-party rela- of the one-party era, the majority tions and to forestall violence, espe- of African countries permit mul- cially that related to elections. tiple political parties and allow them to field candidates for elec- Countries’ requirements revolve tive office. essentially around ensuring internal democracy within political par- In several countries, though, polit- ties. They are intended to create an ical associations seeking to become environment of party competition political parties have to apply for that will mitigate intra- and inter- recognition and registration as party violence, reduce pre- and post- political parties, meeting the pro- election adjudication and strengthen visions of national constitutions, democracy. the electoral law and regulations handed down by parliaments and The maintenance of fair and electoral management boards. In equal procedures in the selec- Uganda, for instance, the formation of executive officers as tion, registration and general reg- well as its presidential and ulation of political parties is gov- parliamentary candidates is, erned by the Political Parties and therefore, a microcosm of Organisations Act 2005 (AGR III efforts towards enhancing Uganda Country Report 2012). democratic national elections. The power to register recognized A political party whose dele- political parties usually lies with gates’ congress and primaries each country’s electoral manage- are characterized by antidem- ment board, which also has over- ocratic practices or worse still sight and monitoring powers over factional violence has already party political activities, including failed in its duty to foster a their finances. violence-free election and build a culture of tolerance and Party reform has sought to peaceful resolution of conflict strengthen the party system as a among its followers (AGR III mechanism for constructive diver- Ghana Country Report 2012). sity management along four main axes: preventing the formation of Types of party system ethnic-based political parties; writ- Three main party systems were ing provisions in national consti- operating in the early years of tutions or electoral laws for inter- this century (table 1.2, and see nal democracy and for diversity chapter 5).

36 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 36 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 1.2 Party systems in Africa, 2004–2006

Dominant-party system Two-party system Multi-party system Angola Benin Algeria Botswana Cape Verde Burundi Burkina Faso Ghana Central African Republic Cameroon Seychelles Congo, Dem. Rep. Chad Sierra Leone Liberia Côte d’Ivoire Zimbabwe Malawi Djibouti Mali Equatorial Guinea Mauritius Ethiopia Niger Gambia São Tomé and Príncipe Mozambique Senegal Namibia Zambia Nigeria Rwanda South Africa Tanzania Uganda

Source: Based on Salih and Nordlund (2007).

Yet many political parties them- electoral advantage turned the selves have failed to live up to hopes, searchlight on another reform: con- because they lack internal democ- stitutional entrenchment of presi- racy, fail to reflect and promote dential term limits. diversity, and do not reflect democratic governance and diversity Afrobarometer surveys conducted management in their constitutions. in 2000–2006 in West, East and Other problems are a failure to Southern Africa showed that about extend their presence beyond urban 90% of about 56,000 surveyed areas, a lack of ideological distinc- respondents expressed a preference tiveness, absence of internal demo- for presidential term limits.6 They cratic culture and politics, and inad- rejected “autocracy in general and equate resources. perpetual incumbency in particular” (IDASA et al. 2006). Political succession and term limits Despite the forms discussed above, In 2010, national human rights bod- continued abuse of incumbency ies in East Africa proposed a draft power to gain unfair political and regional Bill of Rights, requiring

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 37

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 37 6/25/13 8:33 PM heads of government in the region of the president to two five-year to serve only two terms of five years terms”, from the current four years each.7 In Equatorial Guinea, prelim- (AGR III Ghana Country Report inary results from a referendum on a 2012). The AGR III Nigeria Coun- proposal to introduce constitutional try Report 2012 referred to respond- change and effect presidential term ents’ suggestions to reduce presiden- limits of two consecutive seven-year tial and governorship term limits terms showed that more than 99% from two to one. A single term, they of Equatorial Guineans favoured the argued, would make for faster rota- change.8 tion of power among zones, while eliminating the rancorous politics Thirty- five African countries have usually associated with chief exec- adopted presidential term limits, utives seeking a second term at the most of them two consecutive terms state or federal level. of four to seven years (table 1.3). Strong popular resistance in state Thirty-five Generally, term limits have been and society across Africa now seems African countries respected, even if reluctantly by to stand against attempts by presi- have adopted presidential incumbents enjoying dents to extend their tenure though presidential unlimited tenure. In Cape Verde, for constitutional amendments. In the term limits example: wake of term limits, presidents cannot, it seems, arbitrarily extend— Given the strong cultural sometimes for life—their tenure. homogeneity and the trajec- They now have to go through a tory of political and adminis- rigorous and contested process of trative elites, and the signif- amending the constitution if they icant regional representation want to prolong their tenure beyond within the political elite, the term limits. This process offers rules of electoral [political] an opportunity for party mem- succession have been respected bers or ambitious associates, and for and negotiated in an open pro- other groups, to drum up support cess of consolidating the insti- against any such move and defeat tutions of electoral governance it, although some presidents have (AGR III Cape Verde Coun- still managed to extend their term try Report 2012). (box 1.8).

In countries where term lim- Of the 204 African presidents in its have worked fairly well and power over 1960–2004, more than enjoyed popular support, there have 50% were overthrown. Of the 25 been calls to strengthen them. For who left office voluntarily, 17 did instance, “While political succes- so in 1990–2004, and 8 did in sion in Ghana under the current 2004–2008. Of the presidents who fourth republic has been largely were entitled to serve two consec- stable and done by the rule, there utive terms, two (Nelson Man- have been calls for constitutional dela in South Africa in 1999 and reforms to extend the term limits Joaquim Chissano in Mozambique

38 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 38 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 1.3 Presidential term limits in Africa

Number Number Maximum of years Maximum of years number of each number of each Country terms term Country terms term Algeria Two Five Kenya Two Five Angola Three Fivea Liberia Two Six Benin Two Five Madagascar Three Five Botswana Two Five Malawi Two Five Burkina Faso Two Seven Mali Two Five Burundi Two Five Mauritania Two Five Cameroon Two Seven Mauritius Two Five Cape Verde Two Five Mozambique Two c Five Central Africa Republic Two Six Namibia Two Five Comoros Unlimited Five Niger Two Five non‑consecutive Nigeria Two Four Congo Two Seven Rwanda Two Seven Dem. Rep. Congo Two Five São Tomé and Príncipe Two Five Djibouti Two Six Seychelles Three Five b Egypt Two Four Sierra Leone Two Five Ethiopia Two Six South Africa Two Five Ghana Two Four Tanzania Two Five Guinea Two Five Zambia Two Five

a. Two further terms of five years each provided for incumbent after first term. b. From the 2011 presidential election. c. After two consecutive terms, a former president can stand for election after a five-year break. Source: Compiled from AGR III Country Reports 2012.

in 2005) declined to run for a sec- constitutional cover for extend- ond time. ing presidential term limits. Some provisions of the electoral law also More than constitutional provi- serve to distort presidential elec- sions for presidential term limits tions, as with those introduced by are required to strengthen compet- the Togolese parliament in 2002 to itive and credible elections. Consti- bar the popular opposition leader tutional provisions on declarations Gilchrist Olympio from contest- of emergency, such as those con- ing the presidential election against tained in the constitutional amend- President Gnassingbé Eyadema, on ment by Gabon’s parliament in the grounds that he had not lived in December 2010, might even provide Togo in the year before the poll.

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 39

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 39 6/25/13 8:33 PM making for weak separation of pow- Box 1.8 F ailure and success in extending term limits ers; and controversies that trailed attempts to change not only consti- Failed attempts to change the constitution for third terms include those by tutional provisions for presidential Frederick Chiluba (Zambia in 2001), Bakili Muluzi (Malawi in 2002) and Oluse- term limits in recent years in Cam- gun Obasanjo (Nigeria in 2006). eroon, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and In Nigeria, Obasanjo tried to amend the constitution to approve a third term but Uganda, but also the electoral rules was fiercely resisted by civil society. The move was eventually scuttled by the for political succession in presiden- National Assembly—even though it was under his party’s control—in one of its tial and parliamentary elections in few successes in standing up to the executive. An earlier attempt in Malawi to some other countries. amend the constitution to extend Muluzi’s rule foundered because of concert- ed opposition (AGR III Malawi Country Report 2012). All these examples underscore the need to deepen the process of polit- Presidents who managed to override such opposition include Sam Nujoma ical reforms and address challenges (Namibia in 1998), Blaise Campaoré (Burkina Faso in 1997 and 2000), Lansana confronting the renegotiated politi- Conté (Guinea in 2001), Gnassingbé Eyadema (Togo in 2002), Omar Bongo cal architecture. (Gabon in 2003), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda in 2005), Idris Déby (Chad in 2006) and Paul Biya (Cameroon in 2008). Horizontal democracy-promoting institutions Source: AGR III Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia Country Reports 2012. A common feature of that architecture is the introduction of horizontal democracy-promoting institutions (or watchdogs), which, as in Box 1.9 National Cohesion and Integration Commission, effect the fourth branch of govern- Kenya ment, aim to promote democracy and diversity and to ensure account- The National Cohesion and Integration Commission was set up in Kenya under ability and transparency in politi- a 2008 act that makes both discrimination (on ethnic or racial grounds) and cal life. These bodies are typically hate speech (to arouse and ignite ethno-racial prejudices and animosities) entrenched in constitutions, mak- criminal offences. ing it hard to remove them, and are designed to be insulated from the It oversees the implementation of laws, investigates complaints of discrimina- executive in particular (box 1.9 and tion and makes recommendations to the attorney-general or other authorities table 1.4). for further action, including the prosecution of offenders. The institutions’ independence from executive control varies among Other challenges to the effective- countries, depending on the means ness of provisions for presidential of appointing and removing their limits include a winner-takes-all or members; their sources of finance; violent psychology that still anchors the support of critical civil soci- the approach of the political elite ety groups and other key stakehold- towards elections and competitive ers; the character of their leadership; parties; docility of parliaments and and the political will of the national the judiciary in the face of impe- leadership to keep faith with the rial presidencies in some countries, spirit permeating them.

40 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 40 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 1.4 Horizontal democracy-promoting institutions, selected African countries

Country Institution Algeria • National Human Rights Commission, Algeria • National Body for Preventing & Combating Corruption • National Commission on Governance Benin • Independent National Electoral Commission • National Organization Front for the Fight Against Corruption • The Benin Commission for Human Rights Ethiopia • Human Rights Commission • National Electoral Board of Ethiopia • The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Ghana • Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice • National Commission for Civic Education • National Electoral Commission Kenya • Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission • Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission • Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission • National Cohesion and Integration Commission Rwanda • Ombudsman • Electoral Commission • National Human Rights Commission Senegal • Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Non-transparence, la Corruption et la Concussion • Médiateur de la République South Africa • The South African Human Rights Commission • Commission for the Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities • The Independent Electoral Commission

Source: National constitutions and African Peer Review Mechanism country reports.

Truth and reconciliation commissions have been set up in One type of independent body, Chad, the Democratic Republic of usually set up ad hoc, is the truth the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Libe- and reconciliation commission. It ria, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South aims to provide an unusual public Africa and Uganda. forum to air grievances and alle- gations of historical and current Electoral management boards abuses as well as group discrim- Despite handicaps, there is a general ination and violations of human perception among the expert panels rights. It is usually designed to pro- that electoral management boards vide opportunities for more con- are making an impact in many coun- structive and democratic man- tries. In Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, agement of diversity through Sierra Leone and South Africa, reconciliation and restitution. Such they have helped to engender public

Political Architecture: State-building and Diversity 41

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 41 6/25/13 8:33 PM confidence in the conduct of elec- functions, so that they may not too tions and in their results. readily grant them powers that may then be turned against these same Anti-corruption commissions politicians. In some countries, such as Sierra Leone, anti-co rruption commis- It is here that pressures from sions have been given prosecutorial national stakeholders, Afri- powers to strengthen their inde- can regional and continental pendence, especially from execu- institutions—such as regional eco- tive branch ministries and depart- nomic commissions, the African ments. In others, such as Ghana, Peer Review Mechanism, the Eco- Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and nomic Commission for Africa and Tanzania, commissions have secured the African Union—as well as inter- conviction of high-profile public national donors can force the hand officers, including ministers, as well of the executive and legislature to as business people. In Ghana, Nige- pass laws to bolster these institu- The obstacles ria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and tions’ independence and empower along the reform Tanzania, for example, several min- them, so as to better pursue their path require isters have been dismissed for com- statutory functions. deft navigation plicity (or suspected complicity) in Conclusions and determined corruption, in an apparent response political will from by the president to national and Colonialism fundamentally trans- international public pressure. formed the African state. The effect a transformative was to fractionalize societies, ulti- leadership Constraints mately triggering nationalism and These horizontal institutions are agitation for self-rule and a transfer still fragile and often constrained in of liberal democracy. But precisely performing their mandates by cul- because the new system was grafted tural, human resource, financial and onto a complex architecture of frag- logistical problems, which may relate mented diversity, it failed to guar- to economic underdevelopment and antee democratic rule or to manage residual, but serious, anti-democratic diversity, as the post-independence political tendencies among the polit- successor elite sought to perpet- ical elite. Another constraint stems uate their leadership. As military from weaknesses and ambigui- interventions reinforced dictator- ties in their founding statutes, and ship in many countries, suppression their overlapping functions among of democracy precipitated struggles themselves and with other public that ushered in democratic reforms agencies. during the 1980s. In the aftermath of the third wave of democratiza- Another problem is that the exec- tion, Africa has made impressive utive branch and the legislature— progress in renegotiating its political made up of politicians—over whom architecture. these institutions are to exercise oversight have a conflict of inter- To manage diversity, the new archi- est in exercising their legislative tecture requires solid foundations:

42 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 42 6/25/13 8:33 PM entrenched constitutional provi- by David Barrett, mission report, sions for democratic political suc- published in the Africa Mission cession, in the form of competitive Resource Centre, 2003. party and electoral politics and free, 3. The African Governance Report fair and credible elections, managed (AGR) III has 40 project countries. by independent electoral manage- More detail on the background and ment boards; separation of powers, methodology to the AGR reports can to enable the legislature and judi- be found in the appendix. ciary to counterbalance the power 4. Most ethnic groups were split among of an overbearing executive; term different countries and colonial pow- limits for elected heads of state and ers. A few examples are the Somali government; democratic instru- who were divided among British, ments to promote political devolu- French and Italian colonies; the tion to multiple centres of power and Yoruba and the Aja each divided to ensure cultural, ethno-regional, among Nigeria, Benin and Togo; gender, political-party, religious and the Wolof and the Serers between other identity-based diversity in rep- Senegal and Gambia; the Oromo resentation; and independent, hori- in Ethiopia and Kenya; and the zontal governance institutions. Banyarwanda in Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, The trajectory of each country’s Burundi and others. renegotiated architecture—varied 5. Federalism deconcentrates powers and complex as it is—has traversed through the constitutional provision tortuous and difficult terrain, slow- of “legislative lists”, and therefore ing institutional reform as support- shared sovereignty, which divide leg- ers and opponents battle. This is islative competences between two or why the obstacles along the reform more levels of public authority within path—deep-rooted in the colonial a federation, each with direct legal and post-colonial inheritance of the impact on citizens. The unitary sys- African state alongside the over- tem is characterized by political cen- powering impact of g lobalization— tralization, with its decentralization require deft navigation and deter- of powers to subordinate, lower levels mined political will from a of authority. transformative leadership. If the 6. Surveyed countries include Benin, unfolding political architecture rep- Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and resents the navigational instruments, Senegal; Kenya, Tanzania and the political will to demonstrate such Uganda; and Botswana, Lesotho, leadership remains its lodestar. Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Notes Zimbabwe. 1. Somalia has the fewest ethnic 7. See “Regional Rights Bodies Push groups—the Somali majority and for Uniform Presidential Term the Bantu minority (Benadiri and Limits,” The East African, www. Gaboye). See Abby (2005). theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/ 2. According to the listing of African 848436/-/.../-/index.html, accessed ethnic groups per country made 27 January 2013.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 43 6/25/13 8:33 PM 8. See “Equatorial Guinea: A Move 1993/51. Leiden, the Netherlands: to Consolidate Power: Secrecy, African Studies Centre. Intimidation Ahead of Vote for Collier, Ruth. 1982. Regimes in Tropical Constitutional Change,” Human Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/ 1945–1975. Berkeley, CA: University news/2011/11/11/equatorial-guinea of California Press. -move-consolidate-power, accessed Cowen, Michael, and Liisa Laakso. 1997. 27 January 2013. “An Overview of Election Studies in Africa.” Journal of Modern African References Studies 35: 717–44. Abby, Abdi. 2005. “Field Research Proj- Deng, Francis. 2008. Identity, Diversity ect on Minorities in Somalia.” Oxford and Constitutionalism in Africa. Wash- House, London. http://oxfarmhouse. ington, DC: United States Institute org.uk/download/Minorities_report/ for Peace. PDF. Duchacek, Ivo. 1977. “Antagonistic Adejumobi, Said. 2000. “Elections in Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democ- Communities.” PUBLIUS: The Jour- racy.” In Government and Politics in nal of Federalism 7 (4): 3–29. Africa: A Reader, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli, Ellis, S. 2000. “Elections in Africa in 242–61. Harare: AAPS Books. Historical Context.” In Election Ajayi, G. B. 1969. Industrial Development Observation and Democratization in in West Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: Eco- Africa, ed. Jon Abbink and Gerti Hes- nomic Research Bureau. seling. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ajayi, J. F. Ade. 1984. The Problem of Golder, Matt, and Leonard Wantchekon. National Integration in Nigeria, No. 11, 2004. “Africa: Dictatorial and Demo- Distinguished Lecture Series. Ibadan, cratic Electoral Systems since 1946.” Nigeria: Nigerian Institute of Social In Handbook of Electoral System & Economic Research. Design, ed. Colomer Joseph. London: Albert, Isaac O. 1992. “Contemporary Palgrave. Problems of Democracy in Nige- Hayward, Fred M. 1987. “Introduction.” ria: The Pre-colonial and Colonial In Elections in Independent Africa, ed. Antecedents.” Paper presented to Fred M. Hayward, 1–23. Boulder, the CODESRIA General Assembly, CO: Westview Press. 10–14 February, Dakar. Hodgkin, Thomas L. 1961. African Ayitteh, George B. N. 1991. Indigenous Political Parties: An Introductory Guide. African Institutions. New York: Trans- Penguin African Series No. WA12. actional Publishers. London: Penguin Books. Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas van de IDASA (Institute for Democracy in Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments South Africa), CDD (Ghana Centre in Africa: Regime Transitions. Cam- for Democratic Development), and bridge, UK: Cambridge University Michigan State University. 2006. Press. “Afrobarometer Research Project, Buijtenhuijs, Rob, and Elly Rijnierse. Media Briefing (26 May 2006).” 1993. Democratization in Sub-S aharan IDASA, Pretoria. Africa (1989–1992): An Overview Jinadu, L. Adele. 2007. “Explaining of the Literature. Research Reports & Managing Ethnic Conflict in

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 44 6/25/13 8:33 PM Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory the Institute of Development Studies, of Democracy.” Claude Ake Memo- University of Helsinki. rial Paper No.1, Uppsala University, Prempeh, H. Kwasi. 2008. “Presidents Department of Peace and Conflict Untamed.” Journal of Democracy 19 Research, Nordica Africa Institute, (2): 109–23. Uppsala. Salih, M. A. 1989. “Africanism and ———. 2010. “Elections and Manage- Islamism in the Nuba Mountains.” In ment of Diversity in Africa.” Concept Ethnicity, Conflict and National Inte- Paper for United Nations Economic gration in the Sudan, ed. Sayed H. A. Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa. Hurriez and Elfatih A. Abdelsalam, Lewis, M. Paul, ed. 2009. Ethnologue: 208–30. Khartoum: Khartoum Uni- Languages of the World, Sixteenth edi- versity Press. tion. Dallas, TX: SIL International. Salih, M. A., and Per Nordlund. 2007. Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. Democracy and Political Parties in Africa: Challenges Elections in Africa. Baltimore, MD: for Sustainable Multiparty Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press. Stockholm: International Institute for Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Sitoe, Eduardo J., Zefanias Matsimbe, Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, and Amilcar F. Pereira. 2005. Parties NJ: Princeton University Press. and Political Development in Mozam- Ndege, Peter O. 2009. “Colonialism and bique. EISA Research Report No 22. Its Legacies in Kenya.” Lecture deliv- Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for ered during Fulbright–Hays Group Sustainable Development in Africa. project abroad program, 5 July–6 Thomas-Woolley, Barbara, and Edmond August, Moi University, Eldoret, J. Keller. 1994. “Majority Rule and Kenya. Minority Rights: American Federal- Ngenge, T. Simon. 1999. “Ethnicity, ism and African Experience.” The Violence and Multi-party Democracy Journal of Modern African Studies 32 in Africa since 1989.” In Anthropol- (3): 411–27. ogy of Africa and the Challenges of the UNECA (United Nations Economic Third Millennium—Ethnicity and Commission for Africa). 2011. Diver- Ethnic Conflicts. Paris: United Nations sity Management in Africa: Findings Educational, Scientific and Cultural from the African Peer Review Mecha- Organization, Ethno-N et Africa. nism and a Framework for Analysis and Norris, Pippa, and Robert Mattes. 2003. Policy-Making. Addis Ababa. “Does Ethnicity Determine Support Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. “Who Owns for the Governing Party?” Afrobarom- the State? Understanding Ethnic eter Paper 26, Institute for Democracy Conflict in Post-Colonial States.” in South Africa, Cape Town. Nations and Nationalism 3 (4): Olukoshi, Adebayo, and Liisa Laakso, 631–65. eds. 1996. Challenges to the Nation- Wiseman, John. 1990. Democracy in Black state in Africa. Helsinki: Nordiska Africa: Survival and Revival. New Afrikainstitutet, in cooperation with York: Paragon House Publishers.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 45 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 46 6/25/13 8:33 PM 2 he recent political uprisings political opposition, promoting civil in North Africa manifested a liberties and conducting multi-party T demand for democracy, and elections. The outcomes have been seem to have completed the regional mixed, while broader issues of diver- Democratic trend in the democratic transition, sity management—often volatile and Transition, one that began in the 1990s south of controversial—linger or have arisen Elections the Sahara. But the North African in the transition. These diversity and Diversity experience—given its profundity, issues, though germane to consoli- Management especially in Egypt and Tunisia— dating democracy, may not have been may provide renewed impetus for planned, expected or incorporated in reforms across the continent. the transition project, and generate frequent political tension and occa- Although democratization dif- sional violence. The issues include the fers in many aspects among coun- nature of the political structure and tries, with push-backs in some such power distribution; identity issues of as Guinea-Bissau and Mali, most of ethnicity, race, religion, citizenship, Africa shares a consensus on demo- youth and gender; and diversity man- cratic norms and practices, in which agement in the electoral process (see regional, subregional and national chapter 1). instruments and frameworks emphasize democracy as the only accept- Elections are central to democratic able mode of governance. transition and help to democratically manage diversity in four main Democratization is a never-finished ways—participation, representation, business. It is a process through leadership rotation and fulfilment of which countries—democratic and local needs and aspirations. But they semi-democratic—seek to build, are not enough to address all the refine and strengthen their insti- demands of diversity management tutions, processes and frameworks. in a plural society. Also required is As a contested political project, it structural and constitutional reengi- is often marked by crises, contours, neering to promote political and breakthroughs, reversals and resolu- social accommodation and to douse tions. It is a process of change char- fears of domination by groups pre- acterized by political contestations viously sidelined (or suppressed) in involving the political leadership, governing the country. civil society, political organizations and forces as well as other social This chapter raises several critical actors (Adejumobi 2010; Denk and questions: What is the background Silander 2012). In short, it is work in to democratic transition in Africa, progress in Africa, especially among and what role did the media play emerging democratic societies. in the transition processes? What clear trends in the steps to democ- Democratic transitions have made racy have emerged? What is the role tremendous gains on the continent. of leadership? And how have Afri- Most have stressed opening the polit- can countries managed key diversity ical arena, including legitimizing the issues in the democratic transition?

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 47 6/25/13 8:33 PM It also offers six key messages. Background to democratic transition • The struggle for democratic Democratic transition is the process transition has been embedded by which a society, nation or state mainly in domestic economic moves from an authoritarian, dicta- and political conditions and has torial and statist political system to a taken different trajectories, with more inclusive, open and democratic different outcomes. system. It is not a monolithic or tel- eological process; it is often complex • Sectarian groups (ethnic, racial and variegated, in which the inter- or religious) continue to hold play of social forces influences tra- great leverage over the state and jectories and outcomes. public policy in many countries, limiting the state’s autonomy. Africa’s context for the democratic renewal has been complex, and • Populations in many countries firmly rooted in domestic polit- Africa’s do not consider their constitution ical and economic conditions. context for the to adequately protect, let alone Demands for democratic reform democratic promote, diversity and minor- were grounded in the system of rule renewal has been ity interests (few countries have of the immediate post-independence complex, and revised or rewritten them in a leadership, where the centraliz- firmly rooted in people driven and centred way). ing tendency was strong, border- ing on civil autocracy or military domestic political • Elections have become more and quasi-military dictatorships, and economic regular on the continent as has as political space was closed, basic conditions the alternation of power, but rights were denied and living con- the quality of elections differs ditions stayed unimpressive. These greatly. domestic dynamics continued after the end of the Cold War, which pro- • Elections as a political transi- vided dictatorships with a basis for tion mechanism are relevant to political manoeuvres. Internal strug- democratically managing diver- gles blended with the structural sity, but need to be backed up adjustment reforms that favoured by legal, institutional and politi- entrenching liberal democracy. cal reforms to ensure consensual politics and inclusive governance. The worsening economic situation in many countries was a major • Many experiments in Africa contributor to mass agitation that are continuing to devise meth- drove popular demands for democ- ods for managing diversity in racy both in the 1990s in Sub- the structure and distribution Saharan Africa and from 2010 in of power and in sectarian and North Africa. In the former, mat- minority identities as steps to ters were not helped by donor pres- achieving the ideals of equal, sure as many foreign countries began non-discriminatory and inclu- to demand austerity measures. They sive democratic systems. gelled in the demand for neo-liberal

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 48 6/25/13 8:33 PM structural adjustment programmes. better terms of service. In Zambia, With time, many donor institutions the gains from copper had begun and countries made the implemen- to dwindle, giving vent to pro- tation of these programmes a con- democracy movements organized dition for further disbursement of around the labour unions. bilateral and multilateral aid. The austerity measures hit the core of the More recently, before the uprisings survival needs of many people. in North Africa average unemployment for those ages 15–24 was about The programmes were designed 30% against a world average of to put in place cost-cutting meas- 14%, and worse still in Egypt and ures for many African governments Tunisia—in the latter, unemploy- (Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; ment among young university grad- Adejumobi 1995). The aim was to uates was 40% in 2007 (AfDB rescue African economic and gov- 2012). High commodity prices, ris- ernance policies from the neo- ing costs of housing and hunger and patrimonial networks that limited crime in many countries generated The patterns the free operation of the mar- popular calls for reform, expressed of democratic ket, skewed development towards in Algeria in food and bread riots. transition are favoured clients, sanctioned author- diverse, as are their itarianism that silenced peoples’ The essence of the struggle for dem- driving social forces voices and manipulated elections ocratic transition over the years is to defeat the people’s right to freely well captured in the recent North choose their leaders. But the meas- African experience and in citi- ures weighed heavily on the weak zens’ demands for “bread, freedom and vulnerable. In their wake, and dignity”. It is a quest for polit- unemployment rose and the costs of ical and economic freedom, a pro- basic commodities rose, and when cess of renegotiating the social pact exchange rate and price controls between leaders and led. were removed, inflation skyrocketed. Even those aspiring to middle-class Patterns of democratic status were hit. In public universities, transition for example, students were required The patterns of democratic transi- to pay school fees for the first time. tion (in the 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa and from 2010 in North The all too predictable conse- Africa) are diverse, as are their driv- quences were seen in several coun- ing social forces (box 2.1).1 Politi- tries (Adejumobi 1996): riots over cal opposition to authoritarian rule youth joblessness, evictions from was at times organized from exile or informal city dwellings, peasant underground, aimed at subverting demands for lower prices for farm the regime through armed strug- inputs and better prices for their gle or other militant acts. Where products. In Kenya and Nigeria, authoritarian regimes were less the middle classes, such as doctors, oppressive, opposition was organ- nurses, teachers and university lec- ized internally, as pro-democracy turers, went on strike demanding civil society organizations (CSOs).2

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 49

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 49 6/25/13 8:33 PM media—have provided new platforms Box 2.1 Four transition trends for expanding the frontiers of democratic change. In 2000–2006, the Four main trends are discernible in Africa’s democratic transition (Adejumobi number of licensed commercial radio 2000). stations in Africa shot up by 360%, while in 2000–2009 access to mobile • Inspired by civil society. In this transition, civil society was vociferous, phones surged from 2% of the pop- persistent and organized, took the initiative for political reforms, engaged ulation to 39% (ACSS 2011). Mod- the state in fierce political battles and stamped its will on the course of the ern tools like mobile phones and text transition. Countries marked by this trend include Benin, Mali and Zambia messaging, and social media networks (and subsequently Cape Verde, Egypt, Malawi and Tunisia). including Facebook and Twitter, offer new channels to spread information • State led. Although civil society might have championed the cause of polit- fast, and are catalysts for political ical change, the state took the initiative for political reforms and carefully action among young people, as seen in guided the transition. Countries affected include Algeria, Cameroon, Gam- the Arab Spring. Social media plat- bia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles and Uganda. forms based in or focused on Africa, like Indaba Ziyafika, Ushahidi and • Pacted. This involved intense negotiation and a political pact by contending Sahara Reporters have assumed a forces in society. South Africa in 1994 is perhaps the best example. powerful role in demanding accountability, assuaging political violence and • Stalled. This transition has not, apparently, produced political reforms but politically mobilizing young people has maintained autocratic regimes in power, with little or no institutional or as they report in a more critical, open procedural change. and fearless way than the traditional print and electronic media.

These bodies mounted opposition Social media networks have intro- to the one-party state, demand- duced what is now called “citizens’ ing political concessions. Regimes journalism” into political discourse reacted differently—immediate and media practice. Citizen jour- concession, procrastination, firm nalists use a range of tools such as guidance or outright resistance to mobile phones, cameras, comput- change—usually leading to pro- ers and audio recorders as well as tracted struggles. The struggles were pen and paper to monitor events fought on the streets, in courtrooms and report quickly to a social net- and at work. It is these struggles that work (Sarrazin 2011). This system culminated in demands for the sec- has enabled young people to mon- ond uhuru (freedom),3 a call made itor elections in Kenya, Nigeria louder by recourse to modern media. (box 2.2), and Sierra Leone.

Impact of modern media Relationship between modern The information technology revolu- media and democracy tion has had a profound effect on the Media support for democratization democratic transition in Africa. The has not been without costs. In some abundance of information sources— countries, social media networks initially radio, then television, mobile (and even traditional media) have phones, the Internet and now social been frequently intercepted online,

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 50 6/25/13 8:33 PM jammed, monitored or outright banned by the government to censor Box 2.2 Social media promoting democratic change in them, limiting political interaction Nigeria and people’s mobilization. Govern- ments’ attempts to suppress social Two months before the 2007 general election, a group of young professionals, media is obviously a race against the Human Emancipation Lead Project, sought to increase citizens’ participa- time—and facing an ever-changing tion, especially of young people, in the elections and to promote transparent, global information space they will free and fair elections. It formed a network of mobile election monitors, aiming need to waste more resources to cage to democratize the monitoring, gathering, collation and tallying of election new media forms. results so as to reduce the fraud often associated with the process in Nigeria (and some other African countries). Thus the media are not just a vehicle for disseminating democratic These practical steps may not have radically reduced election rigging, but they ideas, they are also a marker of dem- undoubtedly had an impact, broadcasting the powerful message that young ocratic progress, as quantified in people will no longer accept “business as usual” in Nigeria’s elections. the 2012 Expert Opinion Survey of the 40 African Governance Report (AGR) III project countries.4 Of the frequently, legislative authority is countries where 70% or more of the asserted more, respect for human respondents rated the mass media free rights and the rule of law are ascend- (figure 2.1), Ghana, Sierra Leone, ing, CSOs are gaining more influ- South Africa, Cape Verde and Mali ence and the separation of powers had alternations of presidential power among the three branches of govern- in 2007–2012 (annex 2.1) and Ghana, ment is gradually being entrenched South Africa, Cape Verde and Alge- (UNECA 2009; Lynch and Craw- ria were rated by 50% and more of the ford 2011; ACSS 2011). respondents both as observing human rights (see figure 2.3 below) and as In 1991–1994, legally mandated respecting due process and the rule of one-party states shrank from 38 to law (see figure 2.4 below). zero (ACSS 2011). In 1996–2006, 44 elections were held in Sub- In 17 of the 40 countries, more than Saharan Africa. In 2005–2007, 26 half the respondents considered the presidential and 28 parliamentary media to be operating in a relatively elections were held (UNECA 2009); free environment, showing the pro- in 2011, 15 and 20, and in 2012, 10 gress Africa has made in promot- and 13, respectively.5 ing media rights and freedom, which feeds back into the democratic loop. The alternation of presidential power through elections has now Democratizing trends become fairly common. Presiden- Over the last decade and a half, tial power alternated in no less than Africa has shown political gains in 27 African countries in 2007–2012 the governance landscape: one-party (annex 2.1), voluntarily or not. It is regimes are becoming outmoded, perhaps in the Central African sub- elections are becoming more reg- region that the alternation of power ular, presidential power alternates remains most a challenge.

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 51

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 51 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.1 Mass media—completely free or only infrequently violated by the government or ruling party Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Ghana Sierra Leone South Africa Liberia Cape Verde Mali Algeria Namibia Seychelles Rwanda Kenya Mauritius Mozambique Comoros Gambia Senegal Benin Guinea Togo Mauritania Tanzania Botswana Burkina Faso Egypt Lesotho Nigeria Cameroon Tunisia Congo Ethiopia Uganda Zambia Djibouti Chad Angola Gabon São Tomé & Príncipe Malawi Madagascar Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 52 6/25/13 8:33 PM Expert Opinion Survey civil society to moderately or effec- The 40 c ountry survey shows that, tively help to promote transparency although the legislature may still be and accountability in governance weak in several countries, parlia- the most (figure 2.5). Cape Verde, ments seem to be showing greater for example, had around 13 non- capacity and commitment to have a governmental organizations in 1990 law-making and oversight role over but has about 80 today, not to men- the executive arm. The major prob- tion more than 600 local organiza- lem is when the legislature is dom- tions (AGR III Cape Verde Country inated by the ruling party, which Report 2012). Mauritius has shown tends to weaken its capacity to con- similar sharp growth of CSOs, but trol the executive. Barkan (2008), they “remain weak in governance in a case study of six African coun- advocacy except with respect to gen- tries, noted that the legislature was der equality activism, and growing increasingly emerging as important on environmental concerns. Certain in governance, a point largely cor- high political governance advocacy roborated by the AGR III coun- concerns such as the fight against The civil society try surveys (figure 2.2): more than corruption or human rights have has been a half the expert respondents in been spearheaded by branches of major driver of eight countries consider their par- foreign [non-governmental organ- democratic change liament to have (usually or always) izations] such as Transparency effective legislative control of the International” (AGR III Mauritius executive. Country Report 2012, 46).

Respect for human rights is on the Liberia still needs to build govern- rise in Africa, but there is still a ance based on democratic elections way to go: in only 11 countries did and to provide socio-economic pro- more than half the respondents con- grammes that benefit all the popu- sider that their governments usually lation. The knowledge that politi- or always respected human rights cal parties and other CSOs play an (figure 2.3). effective role in governance is critical for developing democracy, and A similar picture emerges on gov- the country has made incremental ernment respect for due process and achievements, including an increase the rule of law: in only 10 countries in the number of opposition polit- did the majority of expert respond- ical parties, the birth of CSOs and ents consider that their governments a more vibrant press corps. Also, mostly or fully respected due process the character of political parties is and the rule of law (figure 2.4). changing from passivity to engagement, making it virtually impossi- The civil society has been a major ble for the government to ignore the driver of democratic change in many interests of the people and render- African countries, continuing to ing the government more responsive insist on transparency and account- to these needs, for which its officials ability. In 18 countries, more than are accountable (AGR III Liberia half the respondents considered Country Report 2012).

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 53

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 53 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.2 Legislative control of the executive branch—usually or always effective Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Cape Verde Rwanda Benin Seychelles São Tomé & Príncipe Mauritius Tunisia Guinea Mali Mauritania Madagascar Senegal Congo Gambia Angola Comoros Ethiopia Gabon Sierra Leone Djibouti Egypt Botswana Cameroon Mozambique South Africa Namibia Liberia Kenya Ghana Chad Togo Tanzania Zambia Malawi Nigeria Uganda Burkina Faso Lesotho Zimbabwe Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 54 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.3 Respect for human rights Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Usually or always respected Sometimes respected Never or rarely respected

Cape Verde Seychelles Algeria Rwanda Botswana Mauritius South Africa Namibia Ghana Benin Senegal Ethiopia Mali Djibouti Mauritania Tunisia Egypt Cameroon São Tomé & Príncipe Tanzania Liberia Gambia Comoros Zambia Mozambique Gabon Lesotho Sierra Leone Angola Congo Uganda Burkina Faso Togo Malawi Kenya Guinea Zimbabwe Nigeria Chad Madagascar 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 55

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 55 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.4 Government respect for due process and the rule of law—mostly or fully Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Cape Verde Seychelles Rwanda Botswana Mauritius Ghana South Africa Benin Algeria Namibia Ethiopia Mali Mauritania Tunisia Tanzania São Tomé & Príncipe Liberia Djibouti Sierra Leone Mozambique Angola Cameroon Zambia Comoros Uganda Egypt Lesotho Gabon Congo Guinea Togo Chad Senegal Burkina Faso Gambia Madagascar Malawi Kenya Nigeria Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 56 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.5 Role of civil society organizations in promoting transparency and accountability Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Moderately or effectively contributes Fairly contributes Does not contribute or rarely contributes

South Africa Senegal Zambia Ghana Rwanda Malawi Seychelles Liberia Kenya Nigeria Tanzania Guinea Chad Algeria Cameroon Benin Tunisia Burkina Faso Zimbabwe Namibia Angola Mali Mozambique Gabon Congo Togo Uganda Sierra Leone Mauritius Madagascar Comoros Mauritania Lesotho Egypt Cape Verde Botswana São Tomé & Príncipe Djibouti Ethiopia Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 57

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 57 6/25/13 8:33 PM Elections • proxy succession—when a leader Despite overall progress, coun- manipulates the internal party tries are at different stages—elec- and electoral processes to install tions are a case in point. Elections his successor in power, often have often become “routinized” against the wishes of the people; and woven into the political culture, with many countries passing • hereditary trends—when the off- Samuel Huntington’s criterion of spring of the leader assumes the “two elections” test necessary power, usually after the death of for democratic growth and passage the leader, in which the norms of the democratic transition (Hun- and standards of credible elec- tington 1991). However, their qual- tions are either sidestepped or ity often casts doubt that many completed distorted; and countries have gone beyond the transition phase. • emerging regimes of free and fair elections—where free, fair and Flawed elections rarely advance the transparent elections are held cause of democratization, undermin- and the leadership and regime ing Staffan Lindberg’s thesis that are considered legal and legiti- the more elections are routinized— mate (Nwosu 2012). even if flawed—the more democratization is achieved (Lindberg 2009). The credibility of elections, which Flawed elections have helped legit- lies in “procedural certainty and the imize authoritarian rule in some substantive uncertainty of outcomes” African countries, which some ana- (Jinadu 2010, 8), are often compro- lysts refer to as “autocratization by mised in the first three trends as elections”. Indeed, such elections the chances of electoral manipula- often clothe despotic regimes in tion and predetermination of out- democratic garb and weaken the comes are real. When this happens, prospects of meaningful political it deepens social fault lines, exacer- change as appearances are used to bates intergroup tensions and may deflect regional and international trigger political and electoral con- pressure and open the possibility flicts and violence in society, com- of repressing CSOs that are agitat- pounding the challenge of managing ing for political reforms, some of political diversity in plural societies. which the regime cynically brands as terrorists. Grouping countries’ progress Flawed elections, weak political par- Four trends of election outcomes, ties, persistent executive dominance especially presidential, can be dis- and a trend towards militarism in cerned in Africa: some countries (such as the Demo- cratic Republic of the Congo, Gam- • illegitimate/unpopular bia, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and self‑succession—when a leader Zimbabwe) make it impossible to succeeds himself through rough offer general findings on how much election tactics; countries are moving to democracy.

58 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 58 6/25/13 8:33 PM Some analysts have sought to dis- influence political outcomes based aggregate outcomes by classifying on rules, procedures and democratic countries into three groups—strong values. democratizers, hybrid and defective democratizers. Strong democratizers In uncertain periods, leadership is conduct regular free and fair elec- central to democratization in Africa, tions, grant considerable civil and projecting the needs of the elector- political rights and largely observe ate into a clearly defined vision and the rule of law; hybrid regimes oscil- respecting the rules of the dem- late between democratic and author- ocratic game. It entails growth itarian tendencies; and the defec- in the structures and institutions tive democratizers are democratizing of accountability, responsiveness, in name only—they are pure civil norms of political tolerance, consoci- dictatorships. ational politics and the rule of law.

This classification and a similar tri- Yet some African countries have partite breakdown for governance seen leadership deficits in the transi- trends—showing more democracies tion, and even when civil society and and intermediate regimes, and fewer democratic forces have waged polit- autocracies (figure 2.6)—are at best ical struggles for democratic change, indicative, and must necessarily the new leaders differ little from the fail to capture nuances. The figure former set. shows progress along Africa’s path to democracy, but also that formi- The trends in electoral outcomes dable challenges remain, requiring outlined in the preceding section institutional reforms and norms to are largely related to the nature be reset for a solid democratic foun- of political leadership. In some dation to be laid. countries, political leaders have respected the rules of the electoral Leadership process, the outcome of elections The role of leadership underscores and term limits, as in South Africa the interface between structures and (Nelson Mandela refused to run agency in democratic transition.6 for a second term) and Tanzania. Leadership may be conceived as a These two countries stand in sharp “reciprocal process of mobilizing, contrast to Senegal, with a frantic by persons with certain motives and but botched attempt by the former values, various economic, political leadership to change the consti- and other resources, in the context tutional provision on presiden- of competition and conflict, in order tial elections,7 and Nigeria, with a to realize the goals independently failed attempt to change the con- or mutually held by both leaders stitutional provision on presidential and followers” (Burns 1978, 425). term limits.8 Democratic leadership is not seen as creating a “big man” syndrome Because leadership is grounded in or personalizing political power, but a social context, one challenge for deploying power in a rational way to Africa’s transition is to enhance the

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 59

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 59 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.6 Tripartite breakdown of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1988–2011 Number of states

30 Autocracies Intermediate regimes

10 Democracies

0 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011

Source: ACSS 2011.

social and political milieu for lead- brinksmanship—play out during ership recruitment and training, political discourse and bargaining. including the party system and civil Some of these challenges—old, new society. and often interrelated—are now discussed. Diversity issues in the democratic transition Power distribution, political African countries are essentially structure and diversity plural societies, and so diversity It is a major undertaking to recon- presents ubiquitous challenges for figure power among elites and other political governance and manage- groups so as to achieve social cohe- ment of society. Under authoritarian sion, inclusiveness and political sta- regimes, most diversity issues were bility. It requires a move from the suppressed and contained by force concentrated power system of the of arms. But the move to democ- old authoritarian order to a dif- racy prised loose the lid, giving fused structure, and democratizing vent to social and political differ- societies have addressed it in three ences and letting diversities—even approaches.

60 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 60 6/25/13 8:33 PM First, the structural approach real- locates power among the tiers of Box 2.3 Guaranteeing Nigeria’s federal character government either through a federal arrangement or decentraliza- The “federal character principle”, part of the constitution, requires that every tion. Although Ethiopia, Kenya, state should be represented in all federal establishments. Nigeria, South Africa and Tanza- nia have opted for federal or quasi- To manage the spatial diversity of the federation, every federal government in federal political formulas, others like the country’s recent history has appointed at least one minister from each state Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Uganda of the federation. have somewhat decentralized power to local authorities (see chapter 1). The objective for both groups is the political conflict, which countries same—creating avenues of partici- then have to manage. pation, power and pressure to manage diversity sustainably. Power sharing Most arrangements to share power Second, using the institutional have emerged from the dynamics of approach, some countries, including crisis, tension and conflict that are Kenya, Nigeria (box 2.3) and South usually associated with the after- Africa, have passed laws and reg- math of peace agreements by war- ulations on equal representation of ring parties, with post-election groups in national institutions like political deadlock and with part of the national public service, police a political pact in a structural polit- and military forces, parastatals and ical transition. Whatever the back- government agencies in an attempt ground, power sharing is a formula to create national cohesion and a for managing diversity, and usually sense of national belonging. for moving to democracy.

Such steps have had some success: Power sharing as a temporary con- respondents in more than half the sociational arrangement can suc- 40 countries in the Expert Opin- ceed in three situations: when the ion Survey felt that their govern- political elite shows some consensus ment’s composition represented all and commitment to making things segments and diverse interests of the work—the “politics of trust” (Chee- country (figure 2.7). seman 2011; Mehler 2009); when the goals of the arrangement are Third, the circumstantial tempo- clear and accepted by all; and when rary arrangement is an elite-based external, including foreign, interfer- approach for managing power in a ence and mediation do not override politically expedient way, especially and dictate the terms and condi- during political and electoral con- tions of the power-sharing formula. flict. This is the formula of power But it has rarely been successful in sharing, which is put in place either midwifing the transition to democ- to forestall political conflicts by racy because it is too often marred dousing fear of sectional elite-group by deep-seated animosities and sus- domination or as a result of a major picion, irreconcilable interests and

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 61

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 61 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.7 The government and leadership represent all segments and diverse interests Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Agree or strongly agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly disagree or disagree

Seychelles Rwanda Liberia Senegal São Tomé & Príncipe Djibouti Ethiopia Angola Ghana South Africa Algeria Cape Verde Mauritania Gabon Guinea Tanzania Mali Congo Cameroon Benin Mozambique Nigeria Mauritius Zambia Sierra Leone Egypt Uganda Namibia Botswana Malawi Comoros Madagascar Burkina Faso Lesotho Togo Tunisia Chad Zimbabwe Kenya Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

62 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 62 6/25/13 8:33 PM excessive external (but covert) con- strongly in the political process and trol of negotiations. affecting the trajectory of democratic transitions (see chapter 1). South Africa presents a fairly successful case of power sharing in its tran- Ethnicity sition from apartheid to democracy, The importance of ethnicity is his- partly because it treated power shar- torically rooted in the colonial policy ing as a process, not an event. Also, of state bifurcation based on ethnic the burden placed on the arrange- ideology (Adejumobi 2001; Mam- ment was limited and short term. dani 1996). Colonialism reified eth- The stability of the state resulting nic identities, constructed “ethnic from the process did not depend on citizens” and intensified ethnic com- the fact that power was shared, but petition and rivalry in many coun- on an inclusive governance process. tries. Post-colonial Africa has been Power sharing was a practical strat- shaped by its colonial inheritance egy to midwife a transition and with such that the formation of politi- luck to deliver a new South Africa cal parties, electioneering and polit- Ethnicity and in which institutions of governance ical mobilization have been heavily religion are would be imbued with a tolerant and tainted with ethnic colours. Many two socio- inclusive culture. Acknowledging the countries’ political parties, for exam- political identities terrible past, the task of power shar- ple, have a “home base” or domicile manifested very ing was to prevent total collapse of in an ethnic group, even if they have strongly in the the state and society when majority some support in other ethnic bases rule came in—in a sense, it entailed (box 2.4). political process sacrificing justice for peace by persuading the minority whites that they Religion could coexist in a multiracial society. In many North African countries, This has so far worked well. religion is the fault line that has dogged the recent transition. Polit- Similarly, the Kenyan National ical discourse has centred on what Accord and Reconciliation of 2008 the role of Islam should be in the was modelled on a limited and state and governance, and what short-term power-sharing mandate. kind of political parties should be Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe also allowed to exist and govern. The illustrate the range of possible out- role of the Islamic Brotherhood as comes: power sharing did not work a social movement that has trans- in Côte d’Ivoire and paved way to formed itself into a political party serious electoral conflicts in 2011, has come under so much scrutiny, but in Zimbabwe, despite all the particularly in Egypt, that it almost challenges, it has prevented systemic borders on Islamophobia. The argu- breakdown and possible large-scale ments over the Egyptian consti- political violence and even civil war. tution between the forces of secu- larism and of Islamism, as well as Ethnicity and religion the country’s identity with Africa, Ethnicity and religion are two socio- remain unresolved. The final draft political identities manifested very of the Egyptian Constitution of

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 63

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 63 6/25/13 8:33 PM Religion in Sudan fuelled a civil war Box 2.4 Ethnic overlays on political parties along an ethno-regional line that led to an independent South Sudan In Kenya, ethnicized politics is believed to be disguised as party politics largely in 2011. Nigeria’s Boko Haram dominated by regional hegemons (Wanyande 2006; AGR III Kenya Country sect, claiming that its mission is to Report 2012). In Uganda, too, politics is a never-ending game of “ethnic musi- reconstitute the Nigerian state as an cal chairs”. In the run-up to each election, rival ethnic coalitions form and Islamic entity, has been waging a reform among the largest groups, dividing the country—often deeply—as they terrorist insurgency against the gov- play a zero-sum game (Barkan 2012). And in Sierra Leone, party symbols, col- ernment. Radical groups in Mali’s ours and slogans hint at the parties’ ethnic base. north, especially among the Tuareg, seek to Islamicize the whole country Ethnic parties are outlawed in Nigeria, but ethnic groups still claim informal through force of arms, puncturing proprietorship of political parties (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006). In Ethiopia, the country’s much-celebrated steps ethnic identity is the official basis of party formation and defines intergroup to democracy. political relations. In South Africa, race and ethnicity—both products of a divisive history—influence party loyalty and voting behaviour. Ethnicity and religion—drain or gain? Ethnic and religious diversity should The AGR III Namibia Country Report 2012 (65) notes that “Ethnicity remains a be rich political resources for any strong factor in Namibia’s political culture. There is a widely held perception society or nation as they elicit mul- among the electorate that leaders are there to pursue sectional and personal tiple perspectives on governance interests”. As in South Africa—another country that experienced settler colo- (box 2.5). And as Beissinger (2008) nialism—race in Namibia lies just below the surface of political allegiance, and observed, history offers examples still has the power to divide, even in focus group discussions. According to the of democracy blooming amid eth- same report (44) “What emerged from the entire focus group discussion was nic variety. But ethnic diversity may that regardless of the topic discussed, ethnic or tribal identity inevitably came affect democratization when it inter- into the discussion, sometimes heatedly so”. acts with poor government performance, state capture, corruption, Competitive party politics in Mauritius is directed by four main factors: ethnic- lopsided economic growth, skewed base support, identity of the leader, incumbency and material endowment income distribution and poor insti- (AGR III Mauritius Country Report 2012). In Burundi, the legacy of ethnicized tutional and constitutional design, civil war lingers on, shaping political conduct. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and bringing closer the potential for Niger, although ethnic cleavage plays a role in the party system, it does not ethnic (and religious) diversity to strictly determine it (Basedau 2011). become a tool of social and political conflict. On a brighter note, Tanzania’s political parties are mostly multi-ethnic, benefit- ing from the legacy of national unity based on the selfless leadership of Julius Perceptions of sectarianism Nyerere (AGR III Tanzania Country Report 2012). The same is true for Botswana The response to sectarian pressures and Cape Verde, which have pan-national party organizations (AGR III Botswa- (ethnic, racial or religious) has been na Country Report 2012; AGR III Cape Verde Country Report 2012). a challenge for many countries transitioning to democracy, and is a large part of the contestation among social 2012 (Part 1, Article 1) noted that, forces in influencing the trajec- while “The Egyptian people are tory and form of the evolving polit- part of the Arab world and Islamic ical regime. Most countries have nations”, they are “proud of belong- adopted a constitutional approach, ing to the Nile Valley and Africa”. which insists on non-discrimination

64 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 64 6/25/13 8:33 PM among these identities, and attempts to protect minority identity groups. Box 2.5 Ethnic diversity as an asset rather than a liability But the outcomes have not been uniform, with varying degrees of suc- Ethnic affiliation by human communities is a natural condition and not a social cess (figure 2.8). The perception in pathology, and can provide a sense of community in the face of a globalizing most AGR III project countries is marketplace. that sectarian identity groups have considerable influence on the polit- Yet it becomes a challenge to broader societal harmony when it becomes ical process—reflecting the limited mobilized in hostile confrontation with the “other”. In such moments of ethnic autonomy of the state for political crisis, the collective psyche is prone to dehumanize that other in ways that pro- action—and that they are a likely duce singular conflict intensities and brutalities. source of political conflict. Conflict—class, interest and ethnic—is a natural aspect of social existence; the Prominence of sectarian identity is heart of the matter is that it is conducted by civil process, by equitable rules, also related to protecting and pro- through dialogue and bargaining, in a framework of governance facilitating moting diversity. In only a few cooperation and reconciliation. countries did more than half the expert respondents consider that Source: UNRISD 1994. their country’s constitution protected and promoted diversity and minority interests (figure 2.9), and process.9 In South Africa, citizen- in some countries a large majority of ship politics centres on the deadly respondents felt that their constitu- trend of xenophobia in which those tion rarely did that. regarded as non–South Africans (blacks from other African coun- There are indications of a correla- tries) are blamed, vilified and even tion between the views encapsulated attacked for all the country’s ills, in figures 2.7–2.9 (table 2.1). Among economic and political. the nine countries where the majority of respondents felt the consti- The general problem arises because tution did not protect and promote citizenship is usually defined not diversity and minority interests, by birth or residence but by ances- the majority also maintained that try and heredity. It often also has the composition of government and a gender bias, where women mar- leadership failed to represent all seg- ried to nationals do not automati- ments and diverse interests in five cally enjoy citizenship in the country of them; also in those five countries, of marriage (but men do, the other sectarian identity had considerable way round). Discrimination can also influence on the country’s political extend to immigrants who, no mat- process. ter how long they have been domi- ciled and paying taxes, do not enjoy Citizenship citizenship rights (Adejumobi 2001, In the democratic transition, citizen- 2004; Manby 2009). (Some of these ship has been used to deny the fran- issues are not peculiar to Africa chise to individuals and groups and of course. They are global, seen so exclude them from the political not only in the West, particularly

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 65

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 65 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.8 Sectarian groups have a heavy influence on a country’s political process Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Agree or strongly agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly disagree or disagree

Mauritius Nigeria Malawi Kenya Guinea Benin Chad Sierra Leone Zambia Uganda Togo Ghana Mauritania Gabon Liberia Senegal Madagascar Tanzania Ethiopia Cameroon Burkina Faso Namibia Zimbabwe Congo Angola Djibouti South Africa Mozambique Comoros Egypt Mali Lesotho Tunisia São Tomé & Príncipe Seychelles Botswana Gambia Rwanda Cape Verde Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

66 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 66 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 2.9 The constitution promotes diversity and minority interests Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Protects diversity and mostly or always respects it Protects diversity and sometimes respects it Does not protect diversity at all or protects diversity and rarely respects it

Seychelles Rwanda Cape Verde Algeria Namibia Senegal Mali South Africa Mauritius Ethiopia Tunisia Djibouti Mauritania Botswana Sierra Leone Ghana Comoros Egypt São Tomé & Príncipe Liberia Mozambique Tanzania Cameroon Gabon Zambia Angola Lesotho Malawi Congo Chad Guinea Togo Burkina Faso Madagascar Benin Zimbabwe Uganda Kenya Gambia Nigeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 67 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 2.1 Relationship among constitutional diversity guarantees, composition of government and sectarian identity

Constitution does not Composition of government Sectarian identity has protect and promote and leadership not considerable influence diversity and minority representative of on the country’s political interests (more than diversity (more than process (more than Country 40% of respondents) 40% of respondents) 60% of respondents) Category A Burkina Faso ✔ ✔ ✔ Chad ✔ ✔ ✔ Madagascar ✔ ✔ ✔ Togo ✔ ✔ ✔ Zimbabwe ✔ ✔ ✔ Category B Nigeria ✔ ✔ Egypt ✔ ✔ Gambia ✔ ✔ Category C Kenya ✔ ✔ Malawi ✔ ✔ Uganda ✔ ✔ Category D Benin ✔ Cameroon ✔ Comoros ✔ Congo ✔ Ethiopia ✔ Gabon ✔ Ghana ✔ Guinea ✔ Lesotho ✔ Liberia ✔ Mauritania ✔ Namibia ✔ Nigeria ✔ Senegal ✔ Sierra Leone ✔ Tanzania ✔ Tunisia ✔ Zambia ✔

Source: AGR III Country Reports 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 68 6/25/13 8:33 PM Europe, spurred by the global economic crisis, but also in South Box 2.6 Shifting citizenships America and parts of Asia.) In Zambia, a founding father of the country and its former president, Kenneth The citizenship challenge in Afri- Kaunda, was declared persona non grata and suddenly classified as a “for- ca’s democratic transition lies in how eigner” (Malawian) during the 1996 presidential election and so disqualified it has been made hostage to politics, from running for president. shrinking the political space, silenc- ing or marginalizing political oppo- In Côte d’Ivoire, a former prime minister, Alassane Ouattara (now president), nents and compromising the elec- was redefined as a non-Ivorian (allegedly Burkinabe) and disqualified from toral process (box 2.6). running for the presidency in 1995, for which the electoral law was changed so that only individuals whose parents are of “Ivorian origin” can stand for the Thus instead of harnessing the presidency. This law was eventually overturned, but at a great cost of protract- diverse human and spatial resources ed political conflicts and civil war. of the country, the politics of citizenship usually comes down to In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Bayarwanda remain an enduring the contest for power and access part of the citizenship politics in the country. Although generations of them to resources, deepening exclusion, have lived in the country, their citizenship remains unsettled, seemingly unre- aggravating social discord and pro- solved by the 2004 citizenship law. moting political conflicts. In some East and Southern African countries, the citizenship rights of the “set- Marginalized groups of women tler” population (whites and Asians) are often contested and even denied either Several countries have evolved polit- on the grounds that the state does not recognize dual citizenship or that the ical frameworks to accommodate claimants do not fulfil the ancestry requirement. marginalized groups, especially women. like Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania As a means to enable women to fully and Uganda. participate in a country’s political life, female representation in legisla- Second are constitutionalized tures has prompted animated debate, requirements in Angola, Djibouti, frequently between supporters of the Liberia, Kenya, Niger and Seychelles majoritarian/plurality system and for all political parties to nominate proportional representation. Its con- a certain share of women for the clusion seems to be that the latter national assembly and related pub- ensures greater female representation lic office. In Kenya, for instance, given that it has a higher possibility the next Senate (upper house), to be of district representation with gen- elected in March 2013, is to have der inclusion (Tripp et al. 2009). 67 members with one elected representative for each of the newly cre- Most African countries have taken ated 47 counties, two youth repre- steps towards writing affirmative sentatives, two representatives of action clauses into their constitu- people living with disabilities and tions, including quotas, and fall into 16 women (Saturday Nation News- several main groupings. In the lead paper 2012). (Compare this with are countries with reserved quotas Botswana—box 2.7.)

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 69 6/25/13 8:33 PM Yet despite these measures, the lan- Box 2.7 Culture and constitution favour men in Botswana guage in the constitution may be subdued to ensure that women par- Botswana has a relatively conservative culture, and women are not expected liamentarians are not seen to rep- to lead. The Tswana culture even has a saying, “Women cannot take lead- resent women’s interests (Tamale ership positions”. So women do not believe in themselves as leaders, to the 1999). In South Africa, one degree that they vote against other women, discouraging them from running for upshot of such descriptive—not election. There is need for more effort to empower women to give them equal substantive—representation is opportunities. female representatives eventually acknowledging that they have num- A report by the Parliamentary Development Unit (2009) argues that the consti- bers but lack the power to make any tution of Botswana could be linked to women’s underrepresentation in politics. major difference for women. First, the language itself is masculine: the constitution does not use the word “women” nor “she”, repeatedly using “he”. Second, it makes no provision for In many other cases, as in Burkina quotas ensuring women’s representation in publicly elected institutions at any Faso, Cameroon and Gabon, the level. old constitution has remained in force and is thus a stumbling block Women from various political parties during an AGR III 2012 focus group dis- to inclusive government. In other cussion suggested that the constitution should be amended to include gender words, while the political system has issues. They also felt a review of legislation was needed, to ensure women’s been reformed, the content of reform inclusion. and the substantive outcome for women are still minimal, and con- Source: AGR III Botswana Country Report 2012. tested by patriarchal forces. Conclusions and In Seychelles, the state has long recommendations given attention to pro-women pol- Diversity is about difference, in icies. Apart from a clear affirma- the social, economic and political tive action policy in governance, the spheres. Political diversity is about rights of women to land, property political pluralism—groups, indi- and protection against violence have viduals and communities being part been legally affirmed. In the current of the political process, contesting National Assembly, 8 of the 34 mem- and competing with ideas, visions bers are women. A 2011 Royal Com- and spaces, and respecting the rules monwealth Society Survey ranked of the game. Diversity interacts Seychelles fourth of 50 Common- with the democratic transition in a wealth countries for gender equal- symmetrical way: the pressures for ity and support to women (AGR III expressing diversity often give rise Seychelles Country Report 2012). to the transition—and the transition has to deal, practically, with man- Third, some countries leave it to aging diversity in a way that pro- political parties to decide, while motes peace, inclusiveness and social others leave it to executive preroga- cohesion. tive to appoint women to legislative seats. Nigeria is an example of this Elections as a mechanism and a com- category (Tripp et al. 2009). ponent of the democratic transition

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 70 6/25/13 8:33 PM support the democratic manage- and political consensus is still being ment of diversity in four important navigated. respects: through participation, representation, rotation of leaders and Elections meeting local needs and aspirations. Elections are a major feature of the But the architectural design of elec- democratic transition and are central tions and its processes must be inclu- to its success. Where they are well sive and participatory, and comple- organized, free, fair and credible, mented by diversity-sensitive legal, the transition may well succeed. But institutional and policy reforms. where they fail, transitions are likely to falter. Thus electoral processes in Africa’s democratic transition has had the transition must be accompanied mixed results, and the evolving insti- by strong electoral administration tutions and processes have responded and management and close involve- in different ways, also with varying ment of civil society. degrees of success. However, deep political changes, as Widner (2005) Media freedom observed, do not happen overnight. Media freedom is an integral part of Africa is in an ambiguous transition civil liberties that should accompany period with signs of optimism and the transition. Where they are free grounds for concern. Sectarian pres- and people can gather and spread sures, despite good constitutional information quickly and accurately, frameworks, continue to undermine a fruitful exchange of ideas becomes democratization. Moves to main- possible between leaders and led— stream voices and create political necessary for political renewal and space for marginalized groups are government legitimacy. still contested in many countries. Transformative leadership Leadership is central to the demo- Leadership is central to the course of cratic transition in promoting conso- the democratic transition, as demon- ciational politics, in upholding eth- strated by the case of Nelson Man- ics and morality in governance and dela’s government in South Africa. in respecting constitutional provi- Good leadership seeks not only to sions on diversity. Regrettably, some build democratic institutions, but leaders have reneged on their earlier also to create opportunities for all democratic commitments, attempt- interest groups in society. A leader- ing to amend the constitution (or ship that inspires, guides and gov- circumvent it) to cement their hold erns by the rule of law is fundamen- on power. The political costs have tal to managing the uncertainties of often been heavy for their countries. the democratic transition.

Africa’s democratic transition and Constitutional reforms its diversity challenges should be The democratic transition should be viewed as part of state formation and paced by inclusive and people-driven political engineering, in which the constitutional reforms to accommo- quest for democratic accommodation date the interests of diverse groups,

Democratic Transition, Elections and Diversity Management 71

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 71 6/25/13 8:33 PM communities and social categories, Authoritarian structures have to be and to create space for political and dismantled to give way to institu- economic freedom where democracy tions that will safeguard the inter- can thrive. Citizenship should be ests and aspirations of the people. redefined to emphasize birth, resi- These new structures will no doubt dency, tax obligations and civic and constitute sites of political contes- national values rather than ancestry tation by groups and social forces, and ethnicity. but the more independent they are, the better they will be able to rep- Institutional changes resent, accommodate and mediate Institutional reengineering is cen- between society’s different interest tral to the democratic transition. groups.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 72 6/25/13 8:33 PM Annex 2.1 Alternation of presidential power in Africa, 2007–2012

Current Date of Remarks on the Country president Former president accession current president Mauritius Kailash Purryag Sir Anerood Jugnauth July 2012 Egypt Mohamed Morsi Hosni Mubarak June 2012 His accession to power was Isa al-Ayyat preceded by the ousting of former President Hosni Mubarak, through popular protests in February 2011, leaving the office vacant. His election followed an extended period of transition Lesotho Tom Thabane Pakalitha Mosisili June 2012 Guinea-Bissau Manuel Serifo Mamadu Ture Kuruma May 2012 Following an April 2012 military Nhamadjo coup, he was designated acting president in a transitional arrangement Malawi Joyce Banda Bingu wa Mutharika April 2012 The vice-president became president on 7 April in a constitutional succession following the death in office of the former president Senegal Abdoulaye Wade Macky Sall February 2012 Macky Sall won the election after an aborted attempt by the former president Abdoulaye Wade to amend the constitution on provisions for presidential elections Tunisia Moncef Marzouki Fouad Mebazaa December 2011 Following the ousting of Zine (served as President El Abidine Ben Ali in January from January 2011 to 2011, Mohamed Ghannouchi December 2011) and Fouad Mebazaa served terms as acting president. On 12 December 2011, Moncef Marzouki was elected by the Constituent Assembly as the interim president Morocco Abdelilah Benkirane Abbas El Fassi November 2011 The prime minister is the head of government, and is appointed by the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI Zambia Michael Sata Rupiah Banda September 2011 Cape Verde Jorge Carlos Pedro Pires September 2011 Fonseca São Tomé and Manuel Pinto Fradique de Menezes September 2011 Príncipe da Costa

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 73 6/25/13 8:33 PM Current Date of Remarks on the Country president Former president accession current president South Sudan Salva Kiir July 2011 The first president of the new country Comoros Ikililou Dhoinine Ahmed Abdallah May 2011 Mohamed Sambi Niger Mahamadou Mamadou Tandja, April 2011 The election followed a military Issoufou overthrown in a military coup in February 2010 that coup and succeeded removed President Mamadou by Salou Djibo, the de Tandja. Salou Djibo became facto leader from 19 head of the Supreme Council for February 2010 to 7 the Restoration of Democracy. April 2011 Presidential elections were later held, resulting in the victory and accession to power of President Issoufou Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan Umaru Musa Yar’Adua April 2011 The former president died on 5 May 2010, and Goodluck Jonathan (then vice-president) was sworn in as his successor the following day. He was elected in April 2011 as president Côte d’Ivoire Alassane Dramane Laurent Gbagbo December 2010 Ouattara Guinea Alpha Condé Sékouba Konaté December 2010 He was elected president in (Acting President a second round of voting. between December The 2010 election was widely 2009 and December considered the first credible 2010, following election in Guinea the attempted assassination of Moussa Dadis Camara) Mali Dioncounda Traoré Amadou Toumani April 2010 He assumed the presidency (acting president) Touré (deposed in in an interim capacity, until an a coup by Amadou election to be held in 2012 (under Sanogo) the 1992 Constitution, which has a four-year cycle). However, the election schedule is uncertain Gabon Ali-ben Bongo Rose Francine October 2009 Rogombé was interim president Rogombé from June 2009 to October 2009, following the death of President Omar Bongo. She constitutionally succeeded Bongo due to her role as Senate president. Presidential elections were held, which Ali Bongo won

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 74 6/25/13 8:33 PM Current Date of Remarks on the Country president Former president accession current president Mauritania Mohamed Ould Ba Mamadou Mbaré August 2009 Abdel Aziz was a leading figure Abdel Aziz (interim president from in the August 2005 coup that April 2009 to August deposed President Maaouya 2009) Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, and in August 2008 he led another coup, that toppled President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. Following the latter coup, Abdel Aziz became President of the High Council of State as part of a political transition leading to a new election. He resigned from that post in April 2009 to stand as a candidate in the July 2009 presidential election, which he won South Africa Jacob Zuma Thabo Mbebi May 2009 He was elected by parliament following his party’s victory in the 2009 general election. Like his predecessor, he headed the African National Congress Madagascar Andry Rajoelina Marc Ravalomanana March 2009 He became president on 21 March 2009 during the 2009 political crisis that saw the resignation of President Ravalomanana and his installation as President of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar Ghana John Atta Mills John Kufuor January 2009 Swaziland Barnabas Sibusiso Bheki Dlamini (acting October 2008 He was reappointed prime Dlamini prime minister from minister by King Mswati III 18 September to 23 October 2008) Botswana Ian Khama Festus Mogae April 2008 Khama and his predecessor were members of the Botswana Democratic Party Sierra Leone Ernest Bai Koroma Ahmad Tejan Kabbah September Ernest Koroma was re-elected 2007 as president in December 2012

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 75 6/25/13 8:33 PM Notes References 1. Although the transition’s pattern is ACSS (African Centre for Strategic important in the electoral process Studies). 2011. Africa and the Arab in the nascent democratic era, other Spring: A New Era of Democratic factors include the nature of politi- Expectations. ACSS Special Report 1. cal parties, the quality of leadership Washington, DC. in the transition phase, commitment Adejumobi, Said. 1995. “Structural to institution building and consensus Reform and Its Impact of State and among the political elite for demo- Society.” In The Political Economy of cratic practices. Nigeria under Military Rule: 1983– 2. These included trade unions, pro- 1993 ed. Said Adejumobi and Abuba- fessional associations, student and kar Momoh. Harare: SAPES Trust. women’s movements, faith-based ———. 1996. “The Structural Adjust- groups, farmers’ associations and ment Programme and Democratic non-governmental organizations. Transition in Africa.” Verfassung Und 3. The first freedom struggles were Recht in Ubersee. Law and Politics in during decolonization. Uhuru means Africa, Asia and Latin America 29 (4): freedom in Khiswahili, a language 415–33. widely spoken in Eastern Africa. ———. 2000. “Elections in Africa: A 4. Discussed further in the appendix on Fading Shadow of Democracy?” background, methodology and calcu- International Political Science Review lating the indices. 21 (1): 59–73. 5. For information on elections in 2011 ———. 2001. “Citizenship, Rights and and 2012, see “Tentative Elections the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Calendar,” African Union, http:// Wars in Africa.” Human Rights Quar- pa.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ terly 23 (1): 148–69. Tentative_Elections_Calender_2012 ———. 2004. “Antinomy of Citizen- +[1]_0.pdf, accessed January 2013. ship: Negotiating Power or Social 6. Agency in this case means actors Existence?” Development and Democ- especially in the political process. racy—Journal of West African Affairs 4 7. In June 2011, President Abdoulaye (1): 3–8. Wade of Senegal tried to change the ———. 2010. “Democracy and Gover- constitutional provision on presiden- nance in Nigeria: Between Consoli- tial elections but was resisted through dation and Reversal.” In Governance violent mass protests and demonstra- and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: tions organized by civil society and Changes and Challenges, ed. Said opposition political parties. Adejumobi. New York: Palgrave 8. In Nigeria in 2006, President Macmillan. Olusegun Obasanjo wanted to AfDB (African Development Bank). change the constitutional provisions 2012. Job, Justice and the Arab Spring: on term limits in order to run for a Inclusive Growth in North Africa. third term, but failed. Tunis. 9. As in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Agbaje, Adigun, and Said Adejumobi. Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, 2006. “Do Votes Count? The Travails Sudan, Uganda and Zambia, among of Electoral Politics in Nigeria.” Africa others. Development 31 (3): 25–44.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 76 6/25/13 8:33 PM Barkan, Joel D. 2008. “Legislature on Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizens and the Rise?” Journal of Democracy 19: Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the 124–37. Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, ———. 2012. “Ethnic Fractionalisation NJ: Princeton University Press. and the Propensity for Conflict in Manby, Bronwen. 2009. Struggles for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.” In On Citizenship in Africa. London: Zed the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Books. Divisions within Societies, ed. Jeffrey Mehler, Andreas. 2009. “Introduction: Herbst, Terence McNamee, and Greg Power Sharing in Africa.” Africa Spec- Mills. London: Profile Books. trum 44 (3): 2–10. Basedau, Matthias. 2011. “How Ethnic Mkandawire, P. Thandika, and Adebayo are African Parties Really? Evidence O. Olukoshi, eds. 1995. Between Lib- from Four Francophone Countries.” eralisation and Oppression: The Politics International Political Science Review of Structural Adjustment in Africa. 33 (1): 5–24. Dakar: CODESRIA. Beissinger, Mark. 2008. “A New Look Nwosu, Bernard U. 2012. “Tracks of the at Ethnicity and Democratization.” Third Wave: Democracy Theory, Journal of Democracy 19 (3): 85–97. Democratisation and the Dilemma Burns, James M. 1978. Leadership. New of Political Succession in Africa.” York: Harper Torchbooks. Review of African Political Economy 39 Cheeseman, Nic. 2011. “The Internal (131): 11–25. Dynamics of Power Sharing in Afri- Parliamentary Development Unit. 2009. ca.” Democratization 18 (2): 336–65. “Report on the African Charter on Denk, Thomas, and Daniel Silander. Democracy, Governance and Elec- 2012. “Problems in Paradise? Chal- tions: A Case Study of 12 African lenges to Future Democratization Countries.” AusAid, Canberra. in Democratic States.” International Sarrazin, Tom. 2011. Texting, Tweet- Political Science Review 33 (1): 25–40. ing, Mobile Internet: New Platforms Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third for Democratic Debate in Africa. Wave Democratization in the Late Nambia: Fesmedia Africa, Friedrich Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: Ebert-Stiftung. University of Oklahoma. Saturday Nation Newspaper. 2012. “At Jinadu, L. Adele. 2010. “Managing Elec- a Glance: Parliament by Numbers.” tions: The Winner-Take-All Rule, Nairobi, 11 August 2012, p. 17. Democracy and Development.” Tamale, Sylvia. 1999. When Hens Begin Ghana Speaks Lecture Series No. 2, to Crow: Gender and Parliamentary Institute of Democratic Governance, Politics in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Accra. Publishers. Lindberg, Staffan. 2009. “Democratiza- Tripp, Aili M., Isabel Casimiro, Joy tion by Elections?” Journal of Democ- Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa. 2009. racy 20 (3): 86–92. African Women’s Movements: Changing Lynch, Gabrielle, and Gordon Crawford. Political Landscape. Cambridge, UK: 2011. “Democratization in Africa Cambridge University Press. 1990–2010: An Assessment.” Democ- UNECA (United Nations Economic ratization 18 (2): 275–310. Commission for Africa). 2009.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 77 6/25/13 8:33 PM African Governance Report II. Addis Wanyande, Peter. 2006. “Electoral Poli- Ababa. tics and Election Outcome in Kenya.” UNRISD (United Nations Research African Development 31 (3): 62–80. Institute for Social Development). Widner, Jennifer. 2005. “Africa’s Democ- 1994. Ethnic Diversity and Public ratization: A Work in Progress.” Cur- Policy: An Overview. Geneva. rent History 104 (682): 216–21.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 78 6/25/13 8:33 PM 3 While one can have elections with- identities in polities that were arbi- out democracy, it is not possible to trarily carved out during the colo- have genuine democracy without nial era. elections (Kadima 2009, 2) Diversity This chapter explores the issue of and the Elections are the principal and nec- diversity in the electoral process in Electoral essary condition of democracy, the Africa. It underlines how African Process first step without which democracy countries have sought to accommo- cannot otherwise be born (Bratton date diversity and pluralism in their and van de Walle 1997, 13) electoral institutions, processes and electoral cycle to promote integrity Elections are not straightforward as and public confidence, and how the tools for conflict resolution. . . . An electoral process in its interface with election can bring to a head the very diversity generates tension and con- conflict that it is supposed to sort out flicts in some contexts. (Leonard 2010, 37) This chapter also shows that elec- Managing politics in a society with tions require sensitive, efficient and deep-rooted diversity is compli- timely management of diversity- cated at the best of times. Organ- related challenges. Where these are izing elections in such a social and missing, the consequences have been national context is more complex bad, even disastrous. Elections on still. Most countries in Africa are their own, however, do not resolve characterized by various forms of the issues that arise from diversity, diversities ranging from ethnicity to because it is often deeply rooted his- language, race to religion, culture torically. Structural issues relating to class, and gender to generation. to social inequalities, discrimination Diversity poses both an opportunity and marginalization, for instance, and a challenge to a society and a cannot be settled through a single country. It can be valuable asset—as election—nor can the distribution of in development and “unity in diver- wealth and power. Indeed, improp- sity”. But it can also be threat to a erly handled, elections can turn society’s stability and prosperity, diversity into a tinder box. especially where unity is imposed for the sake of “unity in conformity”. Several key messages emerge. Although elections on their own Developing societies, such as most do not fully resolve issues that arise in Africa, experience greater chal- from diversity, over time, fair and lenges and tensions than in most transparent elections can mitigate developed societies in forging a and help resolve diversity-based strong sense of cohesive nation- contests for power and resources at hood. Post-colonial states shoulder national, regional and local levels. the Herculean task and responsibil- Mixed forms of proportional rep- ity of forging a new collective con- resentation are generally considered sciousness and identity out of a wel- more accommodative of diversity ter of various primordial and social management than other electoral

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 79 6/25/13 8:33 PM systems, but every stage of the elec- benefits accrue from trade and other toral process, including constitu- exchanges. It was the revered states- ency delimitation, voter registration man Nelson Mandela who said that and education, the voting process, “once we won power, we chose to and dispute handling and adjudica- regard the diversity of colours and tion, need their diversity to be man- languages that had once been used aged. This entails making the elec- against us as a source of strength”. toral process sensitive to the interests The stability that South Africa has and concerns of marginalized social experienced since its democratic groups, drawing on those good prac- transition in 1994 disproved the ste- tices already followed by African reotype that a region or continent countries. rich in diversity experiences political and development challenges simply Finally, leaders need to eradicate the as a consequence of that diversity. structural roots of diversity-related conflicts, strengthen the ability of Challenges arise not because diverse Diversity can electoral institutions and political groups live together, or share the be an enriching parties to address diversity in the same national territory. They arise asset, especially electoral process, and manage and when tensions among groups lead to if harnessed for defuse conflicts before they get out inefficient political decision making development, of hand. as well as to disproportionate access innovation and unity to material resources and patron- Managing diversity age (UNDP 2004). So, if ethnic From the conceptual discussion groups are to coexist peacefully with in chapter 1, it might appear that each other, they need to know that diversity is an unfortunate inher- their views are fairly represented in itance. Yet although a source of ten- national decision making, usually sion, it need not lead to violent con- through systems of power sharing flict. Nearly all countries worldwide (UNRISD 1995). are marked by diversity, and most of them do not experience diversity- Challenges also appear when groups related violent conflict. are discriminated against, and when ethnic identities align with patterns In fact, diversity can be an enrich- of inequality or repression. For dealing asset, especially if harnessed ing with what appear to be ethnic for development, innovation and disputes, state institutions therefore unity. There are plentiful examples need to address underlying questions of diverse societies that have reaped of economic and political marginali- large gains from the dynamism and zation, and to find acceptable ways creativity from interactions of dif- to redistribute resources. ferent cultural, social and ethnic groups, including Ghana, Mauri- Diversity, then, cannot be ignored, tius, Tanzania and Zambia (UNDP and must be addressed squarely and 2004). These effects are some- managed innovatively (box 3.1). times not easy to capture but are Force or assimilation has proved more visible internationally, where inadequate. This chapter focuses on

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 80 6/25/13 8:33 PM how to positively manage diversity to achieve a transparent, free and Box 3.1 M anaging diversity in Africa fair electoral process. Managing diversity has become a public policy issue partly owing to the need In assessing how diversity impinges to resolve conflicts from two sources: the demand of historically marginalized on the electoral process, one should or excluded cultural, political, regional and socio-economic groups in the state bear in mind that structural eco- for participation in governance; and internal migration and resulting issues of nomic and social conditions and citizenship and identity. access to power shape both the actions and perceptions of political These conflicts place democratic management of diversity at the centre of leaders and voters. These conditions recent debates over national identity and the range of permissible cultural mould attitudes towards elections diversity, as well as the best way to combine the needs of these two aspects. in particular, and to the electoral system in general. Thus structural Framed this way, public policy concerns with such management rest on the issues of wealth, poverty and power realization that diversity can be a source of strength as well as a problem distribution determine the orien- for the African state. How the state is designed and constructed, as well as tation of the political system and how it stands on the questions of diversity, is at the heart of diversity-related electoral agenda. Experiences and conflicts—and how to diminish them. perceptions of unfairness and discrimination can become conflict Source: Jinadu 2010. triggers around election time, allowing some politicians and parties to exploit diversity for their own ends. a historical dimension, in that the Historical and structural factors that crisis of identity is not a product have exacerbated inequality, insecu- of contemporary events but rather rity or suspicion throw fuel on the one with deep roots (Deng 2008). fire. The African state was carved out of diverse entities that gave the state a Elections pluralistic configuration, making it The administration of elections and a composite of distinct ethnic units, tone of election campaigns assume many of which would likely describe a special resonance where diversity themselves at the time of coloniza- is based on ethnic, racial, religious, tion as nations in their own right regional or class lines. They become (Deng 2008). highly charged “do or die” affairs for a host of reasons. A legacy remains of the former colonial powers’ preferential treatment of Structure some indigenous groups and regions How wealth is created and distrib- in political and economic policies uted between groups, as well as the (which led to wide disparities among level of development, influence the ethnic groups in power, wealth, country’s politics. Massive inequal- social services and development ities and marginalized or excluded opportunities), sowing the seeds of groups can let a sense of grievance intergroup conflict. At independ- fester, which can explode, often ence, most states failed to address around elections. This danger has these disparities, choosing instead to

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 81 6/25/13 8:33 PM violence that fed on ethnic griev- Box 3.2 G rievance lay just below the surface in Côte ances and competition for power. d’Ivoire During elections, the ethnic and regional factors provided combustion Elections alone do not create anything but winners and losers, and in a place to long-festering inter-ethnic and such as Côte d’Ivoire, they may be as conflict-enhancing as conflict-reduc- interregional tensions (box 3.2). ing. This is not an argument against democratic elections, but elections in such a country can only be one of several measures to ensure peace and Religion and race reconciliation. These can be potent factors in politics, especially around elections. Côte d’Ivoire was for a long time seen as a haven of political and economic Sudan before partition in 2011 stability in the conflict-prone West Africa region. However, contradictions, was, for example, mired in one of tensions and serious economic and political problems were simmering under the longest civil wars in memory in the surface, and contested questions on citizenship and land rights played an Africa, based on religion and race important part in this history. between the north and south. In the end, self-determination of South What unfolded in Côte d’Ivoire was a classic example of a conflict over basic Sudan was the solution. Before that, political and economic rights within the borders of the country. Who are full elections had not been meaning- citizens, and who are not? Laurent Gbagbo received support in the south on ful in a polity with sharp disparities, the basis of an exclusionary populist rhetoric in which groups living in the north regional differences and tensions. were portrayed as migrants or descendants of migrants who had settled on land at the expense of the original inhabitants. Naturally, the part of the popula- In Algeria in 1992, the election tion targeted by this rhetoric supported Alassane Ouattara. debacle in which Islamic fundamen- talists seemed poised to gain victory Source: Boas 2011. triggered a vicious internal conflict, while in Nigeria the religious factor remains potent, sometimes flaring adopt wholesale constitutional and up around election time. governance models prescribed by their colonizers. This uncritical bor- Race and culture underlay the ten- rowing haunts many countries’ polit- sions that periodically broke out ical and electoral systems. in Mauritania. Its society has been described as “not homoge- Inter-ethnic competition and neous but relatively compartmen- mistrust talized, at least among people of Large and small African states face African descent and those of Arab- this issue. Larger states such as the Berber descent” (AGR III Mauri- Democratic Republic of the Congo, tania Country Report 2012). This Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan have racial and ethnic cleavage has cre- suffered from civil wars partly caused ated conflict over how the “national by ethno-regional conflicts. Smaller question” should be addressed. For- countries have not been spared tunately, however, competition either, notably Burundi, Lesotho and between political parties in recent Rwanda. More recently, states such years has not been influenced by as Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya have suf- sectarianism because the parties take fered considerable election-related into account “the diversity factor

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 82 6/25/13 8:33 PM and ensure balanced representation, Identity and access to resources especially during the preparation of Identity and access to resources have lists of candidates” (AGR III Mauri- fanned conflicts in at least three tania Country Report 2012). countries. In Senegal, owing to a separatist feelings stemming from mar- In South Africa, apartheid had ginalization, the Casamance region barred voting to the majority for has long been a thorn in the side of many decades, leading to armed the state. In Burkina Faso, latent insurrection until the democratic social and political tensions, under- transition in 1994. Although the pinned by ethnicity, relate to access racial factor is somewhat down- to land and other natural resources played these days, a residue of race as well as to economic opportuni- remains in voting patterns at local ties. Mali, touted as a model of an and provincial elections. Wealth dis- emergent democracy in the past dec- tribution, too, is still racially skewed, ade, saw long-simmering separa- raising the prospect of political and tism among the Tuareg in the north social tensions in the future. come to a head in early 2012, when, after coup in Bamako, the separa- Geography tists and the Maghreb branch of Remote areas tend to be marginal- Al Qaeda exploited the power vac- ized during elections. Communities uum to declare a separate state of in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and “Azawad”, which has, however, failed swathes of the Democratic Repub- to win international recognition lic of the Congo and Ethiopia, for (box 3.3). French military interven- example, are vulnerable to electoral tion, together with Malian forces and manipulation. Weak infrastructure various countries of the Economic and communications are a disadvan- Community of West African States, tage to peripheral communities in beat back the rebel forces in February most African countries. 2013. It is now possible that the next elections in Mali will be conducted Failure to grant citizenship during the second half of 2013. Citizenship is important for access to voting rights. As in Côte d’Ivoire, Marginalized women and youth some citizens do not have access to These two groups are politi- this right because they are not orig- cally sidelined in most of Africa. inal citizens of a particular region Although there are more women or area (see box 3.2). Autochthons than men, their participation as versus settlers and migrants is a election candidates is generally fault-line in most African countries, lower. But because political partici- limiting access to political participa- pation is often discussed in general tion and especially the right to vote. terms, the absence or low visibil- Internal and external varieties of ity of women often goes unnoticed xenophobia persist in some states— (Poluha 2002). Similarly, youth face only a few countries have granted conditions that discourage them the right to vote to migrants (and to from registering as voters and stand- those in the diaspora). ing as election candidates.1 Peoples

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 83 6/25/13 8:33 PM be coherent and autonomous enough Box 3.3 Mali’s recent conflict in planning and administering elections. Bodies charged with running Regional imbalances explain the latest conflict in 2012, with the roots dating and supervising the electoral pro- back to the 1960s. cess, for example, should be independent of the executive and from The first Tuareg rebellion (1962–1964) was accompanied by bloodshed and state security institutions like the the exile of thousands of Tuareg to Algeria and Libya. Discriminatory develop- police and military. State institutions ment policies towards the Tuareg in the 1970s deepened the malaise, and a should at most play a limited facili- revolt shook the north, which was provisionally settled under the Tamanrasset tative role, rather than a direct one. agreement in 1991 when the Malian government granted quasi-autonomy to the region. Electoral systems’ strengths and weaknesses In 2012, the Tuareg rebellion escalated into a push for independence. The Africa has seen intense debate National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad took control of some ter- on the nature of an electoral sys- ritory in the north-east, causing the presidential election scheduled for April tem that is more representative and 2012 to be delayed. accommodating of diversity. The debate centres on which of the prin- Source: AGR III Mali Country Report 2012. cipal systems—first past the post (FPTP), proportional representation or a hybrid model of the two— with disabilities are another margin- is more suitable to better promote alized social group in the electoral democratic management of diversity process. in the electoral process (annex 3.1). Lewis (1965, 71) noted that: Civil society organizations’ reflection of society The surest way to kill the idea Mirroring society’s diversities, civil of democracy in a plural soci- society organizations (CSOs) are not ety is to adopt the Anglo- homogeneous but rooted in a range American system of first past of backgrounds, and are thus not the post. If you belong to a immune to the wider political and minority in a new state, and social currents in society. They can are being asked to accept par- play a constructive role in moderat- liamentary democracy, you ing diversity-based conflict, but they can hardly build much faith in can also be accomplices in inciting the system if you win 30% of them. those votes and only 20% of the seats, or no seats at all. If Incoherent role of state institutions minorities are to accept Parlia- in elections ment, they must be adequately State institutions could play a stra- represented in Parliament. tegic role in addressing issues concerning diversity-related matters. If To correct distortions by FPTP, they have effective checks and bal- Lesotho and South Africa have ances, their accountability and cred- adopted alternative systems that ibility will improve, but they need to combine FPTP features with those

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 84 6/25/13 8:33 PM of variants of proportional rep- their representatives, which helps resentation. For the same reason, to make representatives’ more Nigeria’s Electoral Reform Commit- accountable to their voters. The tee recommended in 2008 that the voting process is simple, because country adopt a combination of the voters are required to choose only two systems’ variants (although this one candidate in each electoral dis- approach has yet to be adopted). trict. Another benefit is that the system ensures that all geograph- What comes clear in the African ical areas of a country are repre- Governance Report (AGR) III sented, which works against the country reports is the preference party system and government frag- for proportional representation: the mentation (ACE Electoral Knowl- overwhelming majority of respond- edge Network 2011). FPTP also ents in 34 of the 40 countries sur- gives independent candidates veyed in the AGR III Expert Opin- the opportunity to get elected, ion Survey agreed or strongly agreed and pressures political parties to with the view that electoral stabil- broaden their scope beyond ethnic Africa has seen ity and diversity management can be and other cleavages, especially in intense debate attained through proportional rep- presidential elections. on the nature resentation as opposed to the majori- of an electoral tarian electoral system. The main disadvantage is that system that is more the winning candidate does not representative and The reform of the electoral system, need to receive the majority of particularly to promote diversity votes, so that his or her mandate accommodating through affirmative action to favour could come from the minority—as of diversity women in the legislature and public Navrat (2003, 6) notes “The win- appointments, has also featured in ning party bases its support on the the wider discourse on diversity (dis- biggest minority among the vot- cussed in Representation of women ers”. A related drawback is that the and minorities below). number of seats a party has in parliament may not reflect its share First past the post of votes cast. Malawi’s 2004 par- The FPTP system, especially in for- liamentary elections, for exam- mer British colonies in Africa, has ple, “yielded parliamentary results come under close scrutiny. African that [were] not in tandem with the countries that use the system divide share of the national votes received the country into single-member elec- by the parties. . . . The landscape toral districts. The winner in each could have been very different if district is the candidate with the most the country had used a different votes (a plurality). The name comes electoral system, such as propor- from the analogy to a horse race in tional representation” (AGR III which the winner merely needs to Malawi Country Report 2012, 50). edge out the next closest competitor. FPTP also tends to create a system This system has several advan- dominated by two parties, marginal- tages. The voters directly choose izing third parties, and cannot easily

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 85 6/25/13 8:33 PM ensure ethnic and female representa- This system allows representation tion in parliament, as it is prone to across the political, ethnic and gen- creating disincentives for accommo- der spectra (especially women in dation and inclusiveness. parliament). In Burundi, for example, the system is based on ethnic On this ground, Ghanaian partici- quotas: the Hutus are allotted 60% pants in the focus group discussions of the seats, the Tutsis get 40% and felt that the country’s FPTP system the Twas receive three seats. Women gives too much power to the winning should receive a minimum of 30% of candidate, thus failing to promote the seats. In addition, 6 of the 100 diversity in parliament. In the Expert seats in the parliament are reserved Opinion Survey, however, two-thirds for ethnic balancing. of respondents held the opposite view—that Ghana’s electoral system Proportional representation has two promoted inclusion and representa- major disadvantages in Africa. It tion of diverse groups (AGR III makes political parties rather than Proportional Ghana Country Report 2012). voters the political centre, rendering representation parliamentarians more accountable is anchored Proportional representation to their party than to their constitu- on the “concept Proportional representation is encies (because they know that their of numbers”, and anchored on the “concept of num- political fortunes depend on pleasing when executed well, bers”, and when executed well, every their party leader). vote counts (Testa 2011). Opera- every vote counts tionally, African systems (exclud- Two-round system ing South Africa’s) have established The winner must garner 50% plus thresholds for determining the min- one of the votes in the two-round imum share of the votes a party system. If no candidate achieves needs to win a seat in parliament. this, a run-off (second round) is held The system has open or closed party between the two candidates with the lists: in the former, the party reveals most votes in the first round. its ranking of candidates to voters, but not in the latter. The two-round system has several benefits. It provides voters with a Proportional representation offers second choice after the first round. several benefits, primarily that the Linked to this is the opportunity for number of seats a party has in par- voters to change their minds about liament is proportional to the sup- their choice of candidate. It also port (share of votes) it receives in an encourages bargaining, accommoda- election (Drogus and Orvis 2008). tion and coalescing among political Another advantage, in theory at parties, especially when the top two least, is that smaller parties have a candidates seek support in the sec- chance to be represented in parlia- ond round. ment, but given the ruling parties’ domination in Africa, it is hard for Some of the system’s drawbacks are smaller parties to garner the votes to that it increases the cost of an elec- cross the representation threshold. tion in holding a second round of

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 86 6/25/13 8:33 PM voting, it places an extra burden Parallel voting on people to vote for a second time Parallel voting is based on the notion (lowering voter turnout) and its elec- of two elections for parliament—that tion results may not fully reflect paris, the seats in the parliaments of the ties’ support among the electorate. African states that use it are grouped. Some seats are based on single- Party block voting member constituencies through The party block voting system (as FPTP while the rest are based on with block voting) is based on multi- the list proportional representation member electoral districts, although system. However, the proportion of voters have a single vote and choose seats a party wins is limited to the between party lists of candidates listed seats, not the overall share of rather than individual candidates. the votes it wins nationally. The party that wins the most votes takes all seats in the district, and its The system has some potential ben- entire list of candidates is elected efits. Smaller and opposition parties (ACE Electoral Knowledge Net- could gain from the proportional The parallel work 2011). representation dimension, but given voting system the suzerainty of the ruling parties is well suited It has many benefits, and is quite in the countries that use it, the ben- to minimize party suitable for Cameroon, Chad and efits are small. The system is well fragmentation Djibouti, given their history of eth- suited to minimize party fragmen- nic and regional tensions. Well exe- tation (ACE Electoral Knowledge cuted, it can help address ethnic Network 2011). and regional problems by providing parliamentary balance, although The core weakness is that the sys- the ruling-party hegemony in Cam- tem does not guarantee overall pro- eroon and Chad makes that hard portionality (ACE Electoral Knowl- there. Another benefit is that the edge Network 2011). Consequently, system encourages political parties some parties are usually shut out of in the three countries to broaden representation, and smaller parties their membership beyond ethnic can at most only garner small shares and regional constituencies. If this is of seats. Moreover, the ruling parties done, political parties in these coun- can use the power of incumbency to tries could then field candidates “gerrymander” the electoral districts from divergent backgrounds (Navrat in their favour. It is also a complex 2003). electoral system that leaves voters confused about its aims and oper- The three countries’ experience ation (ACE Electoral Knowledge points to some major drawbacks. Network 2011), exposing them to Because the party that wins takes manipulation by the ruling party. all votes in a district, election results have been disproportional. Equally, Mixed-member proportional system because the system restricts voters to This combines features of FPTP voting for parties only, it favours the and proportional representa- ruling parties. tion, and parliamentary seats are

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 87 6/25/13 8:33 PM apportioned based on the two sys- parties in each district, that the systems. In Lesotho—the only African tem rewards well-organized political state using it—80 of the 120 seats are parties (ACE Electoral Knowledge based on FPTP and 40 on propor- Network 2011) and that small par- tional representation.2 ties can play important roles, especially if no party wins an overall As used in Lesotho, the system has majority of seats. two major advantages. It allows for geographical representation, thus Two disadvantages stand out. One is partly facilitating vertical account- that many votes can be wasted, par- ability between some of the parlia- ticularly if they are not relevant to mentarians and their constituents. determining the election of a candi- And it gives voters essentially two date or party. Another is that in the votes—party and locality, the former 1982 and 1995 elections, the party for political parties and the latter for in opposition won every seat in the representatives. legislature with only 64% and 65% Electoral of the votes, creating difficulties for campaigns The disadvantages are that it creates effective parliamentary functioning. can take on two classes of parliamentarians— Even the “best loser” formula has a special but one accountable to political parties only partly addressed this weakness negative resonance (those elected by proportional rep- (ACE Electoral Knowledge Net- where diversity resentation) and the other to voters work 2011). (those elected under FPTP)—and draws on ethnic, that FPTP is constrained because Tackling diversity issues racial, regional or the votes cast under it are not major in the electoral process religious divisions determinants of the seats a party gets. Constitutional provisions Block voting Most African states are aware of the In Mauritius—the only Afri- challenges in the political system can country with the block voting and electoral process, and most con- system—62 of the 70 parliamen- stitutions have provisions to address tary seats are allotted on the basis of diversity-related issues in govern- block votes. The remaining eight are ance, especially on representation in assigned by the election commission decision-making bodies, parliament following a complex formula to “best and electoral institutions (box 3.4). losers” to ensure “fair and adequate” representation of each community.3 States are concerned about diversity Each electoral district has multiple and potential harmful consequences, members, and voters have as many which can make the electoral pro- votes as there are parliamentarians cess even more highly contested in each district. Candidates with the than usual. Electoral campaigns can most votes (a plurality) win the seats take on a special but negative reso- in an electoral district. nance where diversity draws on ethnic, racial, regional or religious divi- The advantages are that voters can sions, underlining the importance vote for candidates from various of sensitivity to diversity in electoral

88 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 88 6/25/13 8:33 PM management boards and at each stage of the electoral process. Box 3.4 Constitutional provisions on diversity

Strengthening diversity sensitivity Ghana’s Constitution states that “the state shall actively promote the integra- in electoral management boards tion of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the The pivotal institution in the elec- grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or reli- toral process is the electoral manage- gion, creed or other beliefs” (AGR III Ghana Country Report 2012, 50). ment board (EMB).4 How alert it is to diversity issues is crucial, and this Ghana’s governance institutions and public policies have been generally sensi- often reflects its composition, which tive to the complex challenges presented by society’s heterogeneity, and they in turn should mirror wider society manage ethnic diversity through electoral rules, decentralization programmes, (box 3.5). affirmative action and other social policies, public service recruitment, security services enlistments and political appointments. Before the democratic transitions in the 1990s, most EMBs were pre- The patterns of appointments to the public service and to political positions dominantly male and most appoin- fostered by constitutional provisions also promote political inclusiveness tees were selected by the head of and national unity. Although there is no formal requirement to factor ethno- state—and so they did not reflect regionalism into public sector recruitment, successive governments have been diversity in society. This has grad- sensitive to imbalances in that area and have in practice adopted something of ually changed in the past decade. an “ethnic mixing” formula, giving representation to all the major ethnic groups For instance, women’s representa- in cabinet and, to some extent, to other key public sector institutions (AGR III tion is no longer ignored: in Ghana, Ghana Country Report 2012). the Electoral Commission is made up of three women and four men, The Constitution of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic specifically prohibits political all with college and university edu- parties with regional, ethnic or religious colouration. Names and party symbols cation and from a variety of pro- must not reflect primordial identities, and parties should not base their elec- fessional and ethnic backgrounds toral platforms on ethnic or sectarian agendas (AGR III Nigeria Country Report (AGR III Ghana Country Report 2012). Parties should have executive committees whose composition reflects 2012). the federal character of the country, and members should belong to no less than two-thirds of the states in the federation. African countries have also tried to reflect significant national diver- Kenya’s Constitution specifies that political parties should have a “national sities in the composition of EMB character”. Before a party can be fully registered, it should recruit as members members, as part of the wider gov- no fewer than 1,000 registered voters from each of more than half the counties ernance processes of managing (AGR III Kenya Country Report 2012). Further, those 1,000 members should diversity, even when, as in the rare reflect regional and ethnic diversity, gender balance and representation of case of South Africa, members’ posi- minorities and marginalized groups. tions at the EMB are open to competition based on merit, through In a more radical attempt to tackle diversity issues, Rwanda banned the use of public advertisements. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities. The post-genocide government set up mechanisms aiming to preserve national identity and citizenship by abolishing former Some countries’ constitutional ethnic identities (AGR III Rwanda Country Report 2012). Whether this goal will provisions—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nige- be met is yet to be seen, but the move reflects Rwanda’s attempt to build a ria, South Africa and Tanzania, for post-genocide society in which diversity does not tear apart the polity again. example—require appointments to public political office to reflect

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 89 6/25/13 8:33 PM Women form half of Malawi’s Box 3.5 D iversity in electoral management boards Electoral Commission (box 3.6), and similar female representation Diversity—more specifically, ethnicity—is important in organizing multi-party can be found in EMBs in Cape elections in many emerging democracies, and in some has raised public Verde, Mauritius and South Africa. expectations of the body. If selection and appointment of its members and Women have chaired EMBs in senior staff reflect a balance of key socio-demographic characteristics, the Malawi, Sierra Leone and South body can convey a positive signal about its inclusiveness. This approach is Africa in recent years. The same more likely to gain the support of all ethnic and other groups for its credibility progress cannot be claimed for eth- and even-handedness, and to help lead to all groups eventually accepting the nic and racial minority groups, election results. youth and the disabled, however.

Equally important is gender balance. Whether required by electoral legislation Managing diversity in the electoral or government policy, such balance will also promote its credibility, allowing cycle the body to fully tap resources for its membership and staffing needs. Delimiting constituencies Source: IDEA 2012. One element in the transparency and fairness of the electoral process is how constituencies are delimited. Since that entails creating constit- Box 3.6 Gender balance on Malawi’s Electoral Commission uencies or redrawing boundaries, it should be done transparently, to pre- No law obliges the president of Malawi to ensure that different sections of the vent political manipulation and con- population are appointed to the Electoral Commission, which could explain troversy. The Electoral Commission why the previous commissions were male dominated. of Kenya, for instance, was believed to have gerrymandered constituency However, the current commission (2011) is chaired by a woman and has 50% boundaries to the disadvantage of female representation. It is not known whether this was a conscious decision or communities it saw as opposing the accidental. There is increasing agreement, though, that the commission should Kenya African National Union in reflect political representation and regional diversity. the 1997 election (AGR III Kenya Country Report 2012). This allowed Although Malawi is a multi-ethnic country divided into three administrative it, with 38% of the votes, to secure regions, the commission has no ethnic or other minority representation. In the 107 seats to the opposition’s 103— worst-case scenario, it is feared that the president could fill it with members with 62% of the votes. Gerryman- of his tribe or political party, which could be dangerous, given that Malawians dering has also been recorded in often vote along regional and ethnic lines. Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda.

Source: AGR III Malawi Country Report 2012. Safeguards are needed to prohibit or pre-empt manipulative delimitation, and underline why the body diversity. However, countries with charged with this task should be no specific constitutional or statu- guaranteed its independence, and tory provisions for diversity in EMB why it should be non-partisan. It membership reflect it in appointing should also be sensitive to the inter- members, more as conventions than ests of minorities and social groups the law. such as the poor, youth and smaller

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 90 6/25/13 8:33 PM linguistic groups. The latter groups Deliberately inflating voter registra- include the poor who live in slums tion lists or undercounting numbers on the margins of cities—they risk registered are common practices, being excluded when boundaries and some authorities make it hard are drawn or redrawn, as are pasto- for certain sections of the popula- ralists, who move their livestock for tion to register at all, such as people sustenance for part of the year. in remote areas and slums, the displaced and refugees. Opposition and In Sierra Leone, constituency youth parties often struggle to over- demarcations have produced dif- come the antics of incumbents and ferent election results even if the register. underlying voting patterns remain the same, ruining the credibility of Incumbents in some countries such the delimitation process (AGR III as Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and Sierra Leone Country Report 2012). Uganda have twisted voter registration in various ways. Cameroon, A consensus is needed on the min- for example, saw a steep increase in Electoral imum and maximum numbers of voters in the 2002 election, largely management voters per constituency. But unless owing to a voter-registration cam- boards should that draws on a recent population paign undertaken by the ruling be sensitive to census or official estimates, delimi- party, which offered to waive the fee the interests of tation can become guesswork, even for people’s voting cards in (largely minorities and sparking controversy by reducing, rural) supportive regions (Albaugh maintaining or increasing the num- 2011). social groups ber of constituencies. Ghana, for instance, had 200 constituencies in Other challenges include multi- 1987 based on a population estimate ple registrations and dead people of 13.5 million; the 2004 demarca- (“ghost voters”) on the rolls. The tion was based on a population of Uganda country report noted that about 18.9 million (AGR III Ghana it is complicated to update and dis- Country Report 2012). Indeed, the play registers, quoting an expert decision of the Election Commis- respondent who observed that in sion to add 30 more constituencies areas with widespread support for to reflect this greater population the ruling party, many new peo- generated much interest and even ple are registered and the registers controversy over the criteria used, are not properly cleaned. Thus for but given the transparency of the any party to “rig” the rolls, “it does exercise, expert opinion was positive it properly where it has an upper on how the commission handled the hand and the people to rig for it” matter. (AGR III Uganda Country Report 2012, 66). And in only 22 countries Registering voters did most expert respondents believe Registering voters is one of the that voter registration was “mostly most contentious in Africa, given or always” credible and accepted, the high stakes in elections. It, too, pointing to widespread scepticism can be manipulated and abused. (figure 3.1).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 91 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 3.1 Voter registration is credible and accepted Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Mostly or always Sometimes Not at all or rarely

South Africa Mauritius Rwanda Algeria Seychelles Botswana Cape Verde São Tomé & Príncipe Tunisia Ghana Senegal Mauritania Malawi Ethiopia Liberia Sierra Leone Djibouti Zambia Kenya Guinea Comoros Namibia Mozambique Tanzania Togo Cameroon Mali Angola Congo Uganda Egypt Madagascar Benin Burkina Faso Gabon Chad Lesotho Gambia Nigeria Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 92 6/25/13 8:33 PM More than 90% of expert respond- Country Report 2012). These tech- ents in Mauritius considered the nologies are positive for extensive exercise credible, transparent and voter registration, but the reach well conducted (AGR III Mauri- towards rural and disadvantaged tius Country Report 2012). This communities will remain a longer view may well come from good prac- journey for some time. tices: voter registration is a continuous process open to anyone qualified Educating voters at any time. The voters’ list should be Beyond the construction of effec- first advertised in the Government tive and transparent electoral sys- Gazette and at least three recognized tems, democracy building entails daily journals before being published inculcation of democratic values, at the time and places mentioned in which rests on a strong civic cul- the advertisement (AGR III Mau- ture. Voter education is an attempt ritius Country Report 2012). This to spread the message of the need to secures the widest publicity, and claim and exercise the right to vote, objections can be brought by any and so contribute to governance by Electoral member of the public on names and selecting representatives. It also aims management other information in the list. to increase turnout during elections boards bear the and to reduce spoilt ballots. responsibility for Turnout in the Tunisian election in voter education in 2011 was impressive. For the first EMBs bear the responsibility for most African states time, the diaspora, accounting for voter education in most states, often 10% of the country’s population, backed by CSOs. The Malawi Elec- could vote (AGR III Tunisia Coun- toral Commission admits that it has try Report 2012). And countries too few resources and so relies heav- that do not give a vote to diaspora ily on CSOs, while playing a coor- members should, as well as to inter- dinating function (AGR III Malawi nally displaced people and refugees Country Report 2012). Yet the of long-time residence. A denial of CSOs tend to concentrate their pro- the vote is a denial of the right to grammes in urban centres, which diversity. offer better facilities and transport, but it is the rural areas that have The technology for voter registra- greater need for voter education, tion has opened new avenues. For owing to lower literacy rates there. instance, since 2010 voter registration in Rwanda has been conducted The Electoral Commission of Kenya electronically via mobile phone and has made a systematic attempt to the Internet. Registration and cor- educate voters among internally rection of errors are preceded and displaced people, pastoralist com- accompanied by mass communica- munities, women, youth and reli- tion methods such as radio and TV gious leaders (AGR III Kenya shows, debates and public announce- Country Report 2012), but as else- ments, as well as many field vis- where on the continent, the drive its by officials of the National Elec- failed to meet the needs of illit- tion Commission (AGR III Rwanda erate voters. In Cape Verde, civic

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 93 6/25/13 8:33 PM education is crucial for rural popu- As the electorate consists of different lations, the elderly and those with groups, campaigning methods neces- little education—they needed to sarily vary, for example, among rural be informed “where and how to and less literate voters or sophisti- vote and why voting is important” cated urbanites. Similarly, access to (AGR III Cape Verde Country potential women voters may vary Report 2012). CSOs’ efforts were according to the wider social and also thinly spread out in Nigeria, religious context, which may make it and not sustained (AGR III Nigeria hard to reach women, especially out- Country Report 2012). side working hours. How to reach out to youth voters like students may Voter education is often conducted require more innovative approaches. too close to an election to have much of an impact. Lack of cooperation Still, the public meeting or rally is can also stymie it: in Ghana, its two the most common format in both major providers are the Electoral rural and urban areas, heating par- Commission and the National Com- ties’ competition for venues such mission for Civic Education, but they as stadiums, halls and urban open have not worked well together, as spaces. Some ruling parties attempt hinted at by the 2% spoilt and invalid to deny other parties access to these ballots in the 2008 election (AGR III venues, prompting violence at times. Ghana Country Report 2012). But such meetings (and similar events) do not cater to people living Campaigning with disabilities, and if held outside Campaign rules are usually spelt working hours they may also dis- out in electoral laws or codes, which courage women from attending. often stipulate penalties for infringing them as well as the length of the Most inter-party violence occurs campaign, though not many have during campaigning (chapter 5), provisions on addressing diversity usually as minor scuffles but poten- (box 3.7). tially becoming an iterative cycle of violence. Politicians may make matters worse with rhetoric to drum up Box 3.7 E ducating voters on diversity ethnic sentiment in areas with large settler populations, for example. Vital as information about the technical aspects of voting can be, there is a compelling need to include the issue of diversity, and political and social toler- A party’s access to the media is one ance, in voter education programmes. of its most crucial assets, and electoral law should allow access to pub- Not only should efforts be made to reach out to marginalized groups—as coun- licly owned media especially, which try reports advocate—the themes of unity in diversity, responsible citizenship should observe such access in letter and peaceful conduct of politics should also be infused. This would have an and spirit. But because most coun- empowering effect on those receiving voter education. tries’ public media do not provide fair coverage to diverse groups and Source: AGR III Country Reports 2012. voices during campaigns, reasonably fair coverage is needed of campaign

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 94 6/25/13 8:33 PM activities and messages by all regis- space or are located far [away]. tered contending parties. The EMB The ones in populated areas and inter-party liaison committees do not have adequate stream to should deal with cases that block the facilitate the voting process. In “levelling of the campaign playing the arid and semi-arid areas, field”, and resolve them before they voters are forced to walk for explode into serious violence. long distances to reach polling stations. For the pastoral com- Integrity of the voting process munities it becomes unpre- The integrity of voting on election dictable where they would vote day depends crucially on whether from (AGR III Kenya Coun- electoral law is followed, and whether try Report 2012, 82). procedures are properly carried out (from observing polling-station Disabled or illiterate people should opening and closing times, opening also be given assistance to reach the and sealing ballot boxes, to count- polling station to cast their vote. ing and announcing results). If some They should not be influenced or Election stage in this process is compromised, commandeered by electoral author- observation and the result is tainted. Most disputes ities or party agents. In some coun- monitoring are about elections relate to tampering tries, other groups that have access vital for promoting with ballot boxes, and many elections in law to voting include prisoners, elections’ integrity have foundered on these disputes, and facilities should therefore be some of them triggering conflict and available to them. violence. Some of the challenges are genuine and not orchestrated to facil- Election observation and monitoring itate rigging, but inordinate delays Election observation and monitor- in announcing election results cause ing are vital for promoting elections’ suspicions among contenders over the integrity. In 1990–2005, interna- EMB and the incumbent, undermin- tional election observation became a ing the election’s credibility. global norm as the number of missions expanded hugely (Global Com- On a positive note, some country mission on Elections, Democracy reports observe orderly and peaceful and Security 2012), and the propor- voting—in Cape Verde, for example, tion of authoritarian incumbents who over four parliamentary and pres- were re-elected fell by almost 40%. idential elections (AGR III Cape Verde Country Report 2012). Domestic monitors have a special role. Unlike international observ- Common challenges to voting in ers who tend to come into a country Kenya include distance and lack of a few days before the election and facilities: leave shortly afterwards, they are the real local watchdogs (AGR III The majority of primary Malawi Country Report 2012). In schools, secondary schools the 2007 election in Kenya, some and polytechnics gazetted as 24,063 domestic observers were polling stations lack adequate deployed out of suspicion that the

Diversity and the Electoral Process 95

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 95 6/25/13 8:33 PM incumbent regime might manipu- voting numbers had been fal- late the election outcome (AGR III sified by looking for give-away Kenya Country Report 2012). number-patterns. They found that vote tampering and ballot- Before the advent of new technol- box tampering were much ogy and social media, many states lower among polling stations had a monopoly on information. that had received warning that This power sometimes restricted or a photo would be taken of their delayed information on vote counting, tally than among those that and helped to rig elections through did not (The Economist 2012). “stuffed” ballot boxes. Mobile phones and cameras have made it possible to These experiments and recent expe- communicate posted results instantly rience in Kenya, Senegal and Zim- by voice, picture and video. Party babwe show encouraging results agents, observers and monitors can of how new technology and social communicate results as fast as state media can quickly spot and dissemi- Women agencies and can report discrepancies nate electoral fraud. have greatly immediately. Similarly, information increased their about numbers of voters per voting Representation of women and minorities representation station is no longer a monopoly of an EMB and incumbent party. in electoral Women—commitments still to be met institutions, Such technology has gone some way Women have greatly increased their parliaments and to deter brazen rigging of results. representation in electoral institutions, governments Experiments in Uganda (and Afghan- parliaments and governments, includ- istan) suggest that it could cut elec- ing the cabinet. For example, in 2003 toral fraud by up to 60% (The Econ- Rwanda adopted gender equity in its omist 2012). In those experiments, governance system, and women held local researchers were deployed to 56% of the seats in its Chamber of polling stations, with digital cameras Deputies, 35% of the Senate and 27% and smart phones to take photographs in the government (AGR III Rwanda of the publicly posted election tallies. Country Report 2012). Women also In the Ugandan experiment, the sam- accounted for 35% of permanent sec- ple consisted of 1,000 polling stations retaries, 61% of supreme court judges around the country: and 32% of mayors and deputy mayors, suggesting that gender bal- Letters were again sent to half ance has made progress. Mauritania, the sample reminding them too, since 2007 has made progress, about the requirement to dis- through new appointments of women play vote tallies and telling as regional governors, and the crea- them that a photo would be tion of a quota for women in public taken of their count. . . . The service posts (AGR III Mauritania researchers were able imme- Country Report 2012). diately to send their data to a server. . . . Academics there Burkina Faso’s parliament passed a could then check to see if the law in 2009 to strengthen women’s

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 96 6/25/13 8:33 PM representation by setting quotas some parties’ political regula- for legislative and local elections, tions require them to nominate a requiring any list of candidates sub- proportion of female candidates mitted by a political party for par- for parliamentary elections.5 liamentary and local elections to be at least 30% for the benefit of one or The AGR III Sierra Leone Coun- the other sex. Kenya’s constitution, try Report 2012 found that although approved a year later, has provisions “there are no affirmative action pro- for affirmative action on representa- visions in the country’s laws”, 85% of tion of women, youth, minorities expert survey respondents supported and people with disabilities, and such laws or quotas to enhance wom- workers. It specifies, for instance, en’s representation. It also found that that the National Assembly of 350 a coalition of political-party women’s members is to consist of 47 women groups has been engaged in advocacy elected by registered voters of the to achieve the 30% legislation for counties and 12 members nomi- women’s parliamentary representa- nated by parliamentary political par- tion (Sierra Leone Truth & Recon- ties, according to their proportion of ciliation Commission 2004). members of the National Assembly. Yet despite such commitments, most The Tunisian electoral system pro- governments have registered slow motes gender participation. Decree progress. In Cape Verde, where indi- 35, Article 16 states that “candidates cators point to democratic advances shall file their candidacy applications overall, the presence of women in on the basis of parity between men parties’ key decision-making bodies and women”. Lists that do not fol- is only 15–22%, and their representa- low the principle of gender parity will tion in local and national assemblies is only be admitted when there is an odd 18% (AGR III Cape Verde Country number of seats in the relevant con- Report 2012). Similarly in Mauritius, stituency. In addition, women have the proportion of seats held by women benefited from the rule of alternation. in parliament was only 18% in 2010, although this marked more than a Other reform measures include the doubling from 7% in 1990 (AGR III following: Mauritius Country Report 2012).

• the constitutions of Burkina Faso, Tables 3.1–3.3 give recent data on Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and women’s representation in parlia- Uganda contain provisions for ment and where women serve as pre- women’s quotas in parliament; siding officers of parliaments. Only one country has more than half its • the electoral laws of Sudan and lower house of parliament filled by Tanzania have parliamentary women—and none has for the upper quotas for women; and house.

• in Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Executive branch elections have Mozambique and South Africa, made women head of state and of

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 97 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 3.1 Women in African parliaments, lower or single house, October 2012

Share of women in Country Election Seatsa Women national parliaments (%) Rwanda 2008 80 45 56.3 Senegal 2012 150 64 42.7 South Africa 2009 400 169 42.3 Mozambique 2009 250 98 39.2 Tanzania 2010 350 126 36.0 Uganda 2011 386 135 35.0 Angola 2012 220 75 34.1 Algeria 2012 462 146 31.6 Burundi 2010 105 32 30.5 Ethiopia 2010 547 152 27.8 Tunisia 2011 217 58 26.7 South Sudan 2011 332 88 26.5 Sudan 2010 354 87 24.6 Namibia 2009 78 19 24.4 Malawi 2009 193 43 22.3 Mauritania 2006 95 21 22.1 Eritrea 1994 150 33 22.0 Cape Verde 2011 72 15 20.8 Mauritius 2010 69 13 18.8 Madagascar 2010 365 64 17.5 Morocco 2011 395 67 17.0 Libya 2012 200 33 16.5 Gabon 2011 114 18 15.8 Burkina Faso 2007 111 17 15.3 Zimbabwe 2008 214 32 15.0 Chad 2011 188 28 14.9 Cameroon 2007 180 25 13.9 Djibouti 2008 65 9 13.8 Somalia 2012 275 38 13.8 Swaziland 2008 66 9 13.6 Niger 2011 113 15 13.3 Sierra Leone 2007 124 16 12.9 Central African Republic 2011 104 13 12.5 Zambia 2011 157 18 11.5 Togo 2007 81 9 11.1 Côte d’Ivoire 2011 254 28 11.0 Liberia 2011 73 8 11.0 Mali 2007 147 15 10.2 (continued)

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 98 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 3.1 Women in African parliaments, lower or single house, October 2012 (continued)

Share of women in Country Election Seatsa Women national parliaments (%) Equatorial Guinea 2008 100 10 10.0 Guinea-Bissau 2008 100 10 10.0 Kenya 2007 224 22 9.8 Dem. Rep. Congo 2011 492 44 8.9 Benin 2011 83 7 8.4 Ghana 2008 230 19 8.3 Botswana 2009 63 5 7.9 Gambia 2012 53 4 7.5 Congo 2012 136 10 7.4 Nigeria 2011 352 24 6.8 Comoros 2009 33 1 3.0 Egypt 2011 508 10 2.0

a. Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in parliament. Source: “Women in National Parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm, accessed 29 January 2013.

government in Liberia and Malawi, progress has been slow in prac- and head of state in Mozambique. tice. In Ghana, exclusion of youth Twenty-two countries have more than in governance and decision mak- 20% of women in the cabinet, headed ing is deeply rooted in the coun- by Cape Verde, São Tomé and Prínc- try’s politics and traditional practice ipe and South Africa (annex 3.2). (AGR III Ghana Country Report 2012). Yet most parties there, as Still, the journey ahead to ensure elsewhere in Africa, identify youth gender equity in representation is as the nucleus of their support, and long and much remains to be done. have sought to consolidate this sup- This point was spelt out by recom- port by setting up youth leagues. mendations of the Eighth African Rwanda and Uganda have also taken Governance Forum in 2011 and in steps to increase youth representa- the expert panels: in only 14 coun- tion in politics, including affir- tries did at least half the respondents mation action seats for youth and believe that women mostly or always people with disabilities (AGR III played a major role in the electoral Uganda Country Report 2012). An process in their country (figure 3.2). African Governance Forum workshop made several resolutions on Youth, people with disabilities and youth participation (box 3.8). the diaspora Although most states profess a com- The broad impact of youth in pol- mitment to upgrading youth par- itics goes further than seats in participation in the political process, liament. Events in North Africa

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 99 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 3.2 Women in African parliaments, upper house or senate, October 2012

Share of women in Country Elections Seatsa Women national parliaments (%) Burundi 2010 41 19 46.3 Swaziland 2008 30 12 40.0 Rwanda 2011 26 10 38.5 South Africa 2009 53 17 32.1 Namibia 2010 26 7 26.9 Zimbabwe 2008 99 24 24.2 Sudan 2010 28 5 17.9 Gabon 2009 102 18 17.6 Ethiopia 2010 135 22 16.3 Mauritania 2009 56 8 14.3 Congo 2011 72 10 13.9 Liberia 2011 30 4 13.3 Madagascar 2010 164 20 12.2 South Sudan 2011 50 5 10.0 Nigeria 2011 109 7 6.4 Algeria 2009 136 7 5.1 Dem. Rep. Congo 2007 108 5 4.6 Egypt 2012 180 5 2.8 Morocco 2009 270 6 2.2

a. Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in parliament. Source: “Women in National Parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm, accessed 29 January 2013.

Table 3.3 F emale presiding officers in African parliaments, January 2010

Country Women as presiding officers of parliaments Botswana National Assembly Gabon Senate Gambia National Assembly Ghana Parliament Lesotho National Assembly Rwanda Chamber of Deputies Swaziland Senate Zimbabwe Senate

Source: “Women in Politics: 2010,” United Nations, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/womeninpolitics2010/wmnmap10_en.pdf, accessed 29 January 2013.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 100 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 3.2 Women play a major role in the electoral process—mostly or always Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Seychelles Rwanda Cape Verde Senegal Guinea South Africa Mozambique Mali São Tomé & Príncipe Angola Lesotho Malawi Zambia Sierra Leone Botswana Togo Tanzania Gabon Cameroon Djibouti Ghana Mauritania Zimbabwe Liberia Egypt Namibia Uganda Ethiopia Tunisia Chad Kenya Mauritius Congo Burkina Faso Nigeria Benin Comoros Madagascar Gambia Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 101 6/25/13 8:33 PM a third term, and the major force in Box 3.8 A frican Governance Forum workshop, Accra forming a coalition of CSOs and parties called the June 23 Movement The workshop made the following resolutions on youth participation in demo- (named after the day when the peo- cratic governance. ple of Senegal forced the National Assembly to cancel a proposal to African Union (AU) Member States must mainstream youth participation in all amend the constitution). The move- decision making at community, district or provincial and national levels in gov- ment was also very active in moni- ernment, civil society, private sector and other important governance domains toring the electoral process in March and processes. and April 2012 that saw Wade’s defeat, and the ascendancy of a new AU Member States should take steps to ensure youth empowerment and par- president, Macky Sall. ticipation in all key state organs including the executive, judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy, security establishment and parastatals. For people with disabilities, opportunities remain very limited. AU Member States must inculcate a culture of democracy and peace in line Although some have taken part in with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance through electioneering with CSOs, only civic, human rights and peace education targeting particularly the youth with a three people with disabilities have view to promote political tolerance and the spirit of unity in diversity. ever contested parliamentary seats in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, for exam- AU Member States must ensure that political party laws and electoral laws pro- ple. Sierra Leone, though, provides a vide for greater and sustainable youth empowerment and development espe- stirring example of a country trying cially in relation to electoral processes and diversity management. to remove electoral barriers for those with disabilities (box 3.9). AU Member States and civil society should promote more research on youth generally and in particular in their role in elections and management of diversity Another group that reflects social and assist in building the capacity of youth related policy think-tanks. diversity in Africa is the diaspora. Although its numbers have AU Member States and development partners must promote youth exchanges expanded in the past decade, only a and networking programmes, internships and fellowships through established few countries give voting rights to youth formations at national, regional and subregional levels. diaspora members. In Cape Verde, the diaspora vote is becoming Source: UNDP and UNECA 2011. increasingly influential and their 8 reserved seats (out of 72) can make an impact, especially in a presiden- and Senegal in 2011 and 2012 tial election (AGR III Cape Verde demonstrate how youth can be cat- Country Report 2012). alysts in the democratic transition and defenders of constitutionalism. Religion and diversity Youths were in the forefront of cam- management paigns for change in such countries Religion is not a decisive factor in as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia (see the politics of many Sub-Saharan chapter 2). In Senegal, they were the countries, but where it is, it can add focal points of protests against Pres- to tensions and even lead to civil ident Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to war—as in Sudan, which saw the change the constitution and run for creation of South Sudan in 2011.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 102 6/25/13 8:33 PM In Somalia, too, religious extremism has contributed to internal divi- Box 3.9 S ome disabilities overcome in Sierra Leone sions and civil war. In Nigeria, the religious factor has underlain the Years of civil war, including a campaign by the rebel Revolutionary United Front North–South fault-line, and more to amputate the hands and feet of citizens to discourage participation in the recently a version of fundamental- 1996 elections, produced a large disabled population. Elections since have ist Islam (represented by the Boko seen numerous efforts to include people with disabilities. Haram sect) has threatened peace and unity. Bombings of Christian Some simple but effective steps include using polling places without stairs or churches and property as well as allowing disabled voters to skip lines, which can often be hours long. killings of believers heighten the political temperature in that country. Without more efforts like these, people with disabilities in countries around And religion cannot be completely the world will continue to face great difficulties in being part of the electoral ignored in the politics of Cameroon, process. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, for instance. Source: Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security 2012.

In North Africa, however, religion is a potent force in national poli- political system allows for inclu- tics. After the Arab Spring, Islamic sion and representation in political parties such as the Moslem Broth- parties, managing diversity of the erhood made large parliamentary different political groups was only gains, as in Egypt and Tunisia, partial (AGR III Liberia Coun- which will have major repercussions. try Report 2012). Representatives These parties will, though, have to in parliament had not made suffi- coexist with important minorities, cient effort to set up a channel for such as Coptic Christians in Egypt. bringing to the fore issues of managing diversity among the different Challenges for managing constituencies. diversity Africa’s challenges for managing its Regionalism in Sierra Leone failed diversity cannot be underestimated. to strengthen diversity manage- Many governments acknowledge its ment against a background of magnitude and complexity, but they claims that the ruling party sought still have much to do. Uganda, for to strengthen identity politics that example, caters to ethnic and reli- links them to certain ethnic groups gious diversities with universal adult (AGR III Sierra Leone Country suffrage but offers no special govern- Report 2012). In Ethiopia, some ment positions for ethnic and reli- focus group participants mentioned gious minorities (AGR III Uganda “unhealthy inter-ethnic relations, Country Report 2012). Some reli- disputes over borders and territo- gious (Moslem) and ethnic (Batwa) ries, religious issues, competition minorities are still marginalized. over scarce resources, group disputes over various issues, and differ- In Liberia, focus group discussions ences on the issue of right to self- in 2011 indicated that although the determination as factors that often

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 103 6/25/13 8:33 PM lead to conflicts” (AGR III Ethiopia and regulations to ensure that Country Report 2012, xii). the full scope of diversity is included (for example, disabil- Encouraging attempts at diversity ity, race and gender). management came from some other countries, however. In Ghana, major Conclusions and political parties took steps regionally recommendations to encourage competitive and inclu- How diversity issues are addressed sive party politics and governance. at each stage of the electoral process Both the National Democratic Con- contributes to its overall quality and gress party and the New Patriotic thus integrity, underlining the need Party have shown a preference for a to address these issues sensitively north–south joint presidential–vice- and comprehensively, and so pre- presidential ticket in an effort to empt conflict. show some balance and have broader appeal (AGR III Ghana Country Addressing structural imbalances Medium- and Report 2012). (The same balancing As the structural factors that shape long-term of regional interests and appeal has diversity are varied, the political policies and characterized the presidential and economy of diversity has to be programmes are vice-presidential tickets in Nigeria understood. Uneven development, necessary to tackle over the decades.) the rural–urban divide, and centre– poverty reduction periphery relationships create ine- Most countries, though, do not have qualities and grievances, which are and redress statutory electoral quotas for any often expressed around election regional and diversities. Most attempts are vol- time. But a single electoral cycle social economic untary, lacking coordination and is not long enough to address the imbalances strategy. Three suggestions are to political-economy challenges. (AGR III Namibia Country Report 2012): Medium- and long-term policies and programmes are necessary to • monitor composition of the tackle poverty reduction, move to public service according to dis- an equitable distribution of public aggregated data on the basis of goods and services such as educa- race, ethnicity, colour, religion, tion, and redress regional and social gender, disability and sexual economic imbalances. They should orientation; be sensitive and comprehensive, formulated with groups representing • adopt policies and measures the beneficiaries. (including staff training) that promote tolerance, and that Attenuating inequitable political affirm and celebrate diversity representation and inclusiveness, such as spe- Most studies have shown that cial days; and women, minority groups and people with disabilities are poorly rep- • introduce equal-opportunity resented in parliament and elec- and affirmative-action laws toral institutions. Special measures

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 104 6/25/13 8:33 PM should be considered to raise their executive interference. Further, representation. There is a reason- EMBs should be endowed with able case for affirmative action to the necessary power and authority encourage their members to run for to create mechanisms to promote office or to serve in EMBs. These cooperation among political par- groups need to be empowered eco- ties, relevant CSOs and candidates, nomically, to provide a basis for with the objective of building trust their capacity to enter the political and consensus among those par- system. ticipating in the electoral process, and preventing or defusing electoral Most of the country reports pro- disputes. duced under the auspices of the African Peer Review Mecha- EMBs’ funding and staffing should nism recommend measures such as be strengthened, the latter particu- devolving power from the centre larly to ensure that the composi- and setting up bodies for minority tion reflects society’s wider diversity. protection. Most AGR III country Women, members of ethnic groups Countries reports advocated electoral reforms and various religious faiths with req- that have such as proportional representa- uisite skills and experience should be promoted and tion. Both these sets of reforms encouraged to serve. strengthened should be buttressed by measures Ensuring responsible media electoral institutions that transform the state to ensure have been more autonomy of its various organs Newspapers and radio sometimes from excessive dominance by the broadcast “hate language,” trigger- successful in executive. ing sectarian clashes. The media addressing should be trained to be more sen- diversity than those Strengthening electoral institutions sitive and professional in handling that have not Electoral institutions like EMBs diversity-related conflicts during and delimitation commissions are election periods. frontline institutions providing the “face” of the electoral process. Their The media should also ventilate credibility hinges on their transpar- issues on voter registration and edu- ency and accountability. Countries cation as well as diversity, striv- that have promoted and strength- ing to reach beyond a narrow par- ened such institutions appear to have tisan agenda. Many controversies been more successful in address- about the electoral process relate to ing diversity than those that have the credibility of voter registration, not. They have, among other things, and the media’s handling of this granted their electoral institutions matter can inflame passions. Sober some autonomy, cultivating public and accurate reporting is therefore trust in them. imperative.

Other countries have work to do, The public media should grant fair so that their EMBs should have coverage of campaign activities and enough autonomy to become non- messages by all registered contend- partisan institutions, free from ing parties.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 105 6/25/13 8:33 PM Building capacity process. Their unfettered develop- Just as it is vital to strengthen EMBs ment will be fundamentally useful to make them more autonomous for developing social identities across and effective, so it is imperative that primordial identities. stakeholders in the electoral process increase their monitoring capac- Managing and resolving conflict ity. Political parties, the media, Elections cannot hope to avoid dis- CSOs and other stakeholders should putes or conflict completely, but develop a professional approach for strong conflict-resolution mech- inter-party dialogue and consulta- anisms can forestall or manage tions with EMBs at all stages of the them. Thus they should be built or electoral process. strengthened at local, regional and national levels. Electoral institu- CSOs can play an important tions should explore and identify medium- and long-term role as such mechanisms, and strengthen mechanisms for holding govern- them. Traditional institutions of ments, parties and relevant stake- reconciliation can be used, espe- holders accountable in the electoral cially locally.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 106 6/25/13 8:33 PM Annex 3.1 Prevalence of electoral systems Country Presidential election Parliamentary election Algeria Two-round system List proportional representation Angola Two-round system List proportional representation Benin Two-round system List proportional representation Botswana First past the post First past the post Burkina Faso Two-round system List proportional representation Burundi Absolute majority (two-round system) List proportional representation Cameroon Two-round system Party block voting Cape Verde Two-round system List proportional representation Central African Republic Two-round system Two-round system Chad Two-round system Party block voting Comoros First past the post Two-round system Congo Two-round system Two-round system Côte d’Ivoire Two-round system Parallel (party block voting and first past the post) Dem. Rep. Congo Two-round system Parallel (party block voting and first past the post) Djibouti Two-round system Party block voting Egypt Two-round system Two-round system Equatorial Guinea First past the post List proportional representation Eritrea Elected by parliament First past the post Ethiopia n.a. First past the post Gabon Two-round system Two-round system Gambia Two-round system First past the post Ghana Two-round system First past the post Guinea Two-round system Parallel (party block voting and first past the post) Guinea-Bissau Two-round system List proportional representation Kenya Two-round system First past the post Lesotho King (hereditary) Mixed member proportional Liberia Two-round system Two-round system Libya n.a. n.a. Madagascar Two-round system Mixed member proportional Malawi First past the post First past the post Mali Two-round system Two-round system Mauritania Two-round system Two-round system Mauritius n.a. Block voting Morocco King (hereditary) List proportional representation Mozambique Two-round system List proportional representation Namibia Two-round system Mixed member proportional Niger Two-round system List proportional representation Nigeria Two-round system First past the post

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 107 6/25/13 8:33 PM Country Presidential election Parliamentary election Rwanda First past the post List proportional representation São Tomé and Príncipe Two-round system List proportional representation Senegal Two-round system Parallel (party block voting and list proportional representation) Seychelles Two-round system Parallel (party block voting and list proportional representation) Sierra Leone Two-round system List proportional representation Somalia n.a. n.a. South Africa n.a. Closed proportional representation Sudan Two-round system First past the post Swaziland King (hereditary) First past the post Tanzania Two-round system First past the post Togo Two-round system Two-round system Tunisia First past the post Parallel (party block voting and list proportional representation) Uganda Two-round system First past the post Zambia First past the post First past the post Zimbabwe Two-round system First past the post

n.a. = not applicable. Source: Compiled from Reynolds et al. (1995) and Salih and Norlund (2007).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 108 6/25/13 8:33 PM Annex 3.2 W omen holding cabinet appointments in African countries, January 2010 Country Share of women in cabinet (%) Cape Verde 53.5 São Tomé and Príncipe 38.5 South Africa 34.3 Rwanda 33.3 Uganda 32.0 Lesotho 31.6 Gambia 31.3 Liberia 30.4 Burundi 28.6 Angola 27.8 Malawi 27.3 Tanzania 26.9 Swaziland 26.3 Mozambique 25.9 Eritrea 25.0 Namibia 24.0 Guinea-Bissau 23.5 Mauritania 23.1 Niger 22.6 Ghana 21.6 Mali 21.4 Seychelles 20.0

Source: “Women in Politics: 2010,” United Nations, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/womeninpolitics 2010/wmnmap10_en.pdf, accessed 29 January 2013.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 109 6/25/13 8:33 PM Notes Concepts and Cases in Context. Wash- 1. Some countries define youth as those ington, DC: Congressional Quarterly younger than age 21. Press. 2. “Lesotho: Electoral System,” The Economist. 2012. “African Elec- Electoral Institute for Sustainable tions: How to Save Votes.” Baobab Democracy in Africa, updated Africa blog, 28 February. www.econo- November 2006, www.eisa.org.za/ mist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/02/ WEP/les4.htm. african-elections. 3. “Mauritius: Electoral System,” Global Commission on Elections, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy and Security. 2012. Democracy in Africa, updated May Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for 2010, www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mau4. Improving the Integrity of Elections htm. Worldwide. Stockholm: International 4. Chapter 4 analyses EMBs in greater Institute for Democracy and Electoral detail. Assistance. 5. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Ivorian Public IDEA (International Institute Democ- Front; in Malawi, the United racy and Electoral Assistance). 2012. Democratic Front; in Mozambique, Electoral Management during Transi- Frelimo; and in South Africa, the tion: Challenges and Opportunities. African National Congress. Stockholm. Jinadu, L. Adele. 2010. “Managing Elec- References tions: The Winner-Take-All Rule, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Democracy and Development.” 2011. “Electoral Systems.” http:// Ghana Speaks Lecture Series No. 2, aceproject.org/main/english/st, Institute of Democratic Governance, accessed 20 February 2011. Accra. Albaugh, Ericka A. 2011. “An Autocrat’s Kadima, Denis. 2009. “Overview.” In Toolkit: Adaptation and manipulation Compendium of Elections in Southern in ‘democratic’ Cameroon.” Democra- Africa 1989–2009, ed. Denis Kadima tization 18 (2): 388–414. and Susan Booysen. Johannesburg: Boas, P. 2011. “Côte d’Ivoire: The Politics Electoral Institute for Sustainable of Land, Autochthony and Elections.” Development in Africa. Paper presented to a conference orga- Leonard, David. 2010. “Elections and nized by Christian Michelsen Insti- Conflict Resolution in Africa.” In tute and Makerere University, June When Elephants Fight: Preventing and 2011, Jinja, Uganda. Resolving Election-related Conflicts in Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas van de Africa, ed. Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in M. Khadigala, and Victor Shale. Africa: Regime Transitions. Cambridge, Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for UK: Cambridge University Press. Sustainable Development in Africa. Deng, Francis. 2008. Identity, Diversity Lewis, W. Arthur. 1965. Politics in West and Constitutionalism in Africa. Wash- Africa. London: George Allen & ington, DC: United States Institute Unwin. for Peace. Navrat, Petr. 2003. “Comparative Study Drogus, Carol A., and Stephen Orvis. of Electoral Systems and their Fea- 2008. Introducing Comparative Politics: tures.” Working Paper. Lok Satta,

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 110 6/25/13 8:33 PM Foundation for Democratic Reforms, Testa, R. 2011. “Proportional Represen- Hyderabad, India. tation versus First-Past-the-Post.” Poluha, Eva. 2002. “Beyond the Silence http://economics.about.com/cs/ of Women in Ethiopian Politics.” issues/a/proportionalrep.htm. In Multiparty Elections in Africa, ed. UNDP (United Nations Development Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso. Programme). 2004. Human Develop- London: Palgrave MacMillan. ment Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Today’s Diverse World. New York. Andrew Ellis. 1995. Electoral System UNDP (United Nations Development Design: The New International IDEA Programme) and UNECA (United Handbook. Stockholm: International Nations Economic Commission for Institute for Democracy and Electoral Africa). 2011. “The Eighth African Assistance. Governance Forum (AGF-VIII) Salih, M. A., and Per Norlund. 2007. Proceedings Report: Gender Equal- Political Parties in Africa: Challenges ity, Elections and the Management of for Sustainable Multiparty Democracy. Diversity in Africa.” Eighth African London: International Institute for Governance Forum, 1–2 November Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2011, Kigali. Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation UNRISD (United Nations Research Commission. 2004. Witness to Truth: Institute for Social Development). Report of the Sierra Leone Truth & 1995. Ethnic Diversity and Public Reconciliation Commission. Accra: Policy: An Overview. Geneva. Graphic Packaging Ltd.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 111 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 112 6/25/13 8:33 PM 4 erhaps no other institution The key messages of the chapter are is as pivotal to the electoral that performance varies in Africa, P process in Africa as the elec- but the main pointer to good per- toral management board (EMB).1 formance is an EMB’s independ- Electoral An independent EMB is the ful- ence from the executive, which Management crum of electoral governance—the requires—ideally stipulated in the Boards broad institutional legal and political constitution—security of tenure framework of regulations for com- for commissioners, adequate vol- petitive party and electoral process ume of assured funding and trans- in the post-transition modern dem- parent appointment and removal ocratic state. Succinctly: “The key of commissioners. Also crucial for element of the democratic process is the democratic outcome of elections the periodic holding of free and fair are professional, non-partisan staff elections . . . for which the existence at EMBs, a good relationship with of EMBs, which are politically legit- other institutions, and a composi- imate and technically efficient, is a tion of commissioners that reflects necessary condition”.2 society.

As part of the process, electoral Evolution administration and management cover the tasks and processes for The colonial period conducting credible, free and fair EMBs’ powers and composition elections in accord with domestic, show notable heterogeneity among African and international codes. countries and even from one elec- Given the diversity and complex- toral cycle to another, reflecting the ity of African states and the volatil- complexities of national and regional ity of elections, no other comparable culture, history and law (annex 4.1). institution plays such a sensitive and Senegal, for example, has more than front-line role. 150 years of parliamentary elections officially dating back to 1848 This chapter examines the evolu- with the initial electoral system lim- tion, powers and function of EMBs ited to the four communes of Rufis- in Africa, reviews their autonomy que, Gorée, Saint-Louis and Dakar and performance and analyses the (Hayward and Grovogui 1987). In challenges they face in consolidat- the British colonies in West Africa, ing democracy. It underlines—as key indirect elections with limited suf- to credible and transparent elections frage to legislative councils began in Africa—the integrity, impar- in the early 1920s. The period from tiality and sheer professionalism of the mid-1940s saw increased agi- EMBs. Although there is usually a tation for independence, hence the wide gap between precepts and prac- attempts to prepare the colonies for a tices, African EMBs are intended to smooth transfer of power and dem- be independent of partisan political ocratic self-rule. The decolonization control and to ensure that elections process climaxed in the late 1950s, serve as strategic mechanisms for with wider direct franchises and democratically managing diversity. elections for Africans.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 113 6/25/13 8:33 PM Britain and France, whose own elec- the late 1950s, aiming to moder- tions were directly administered by ate internal tensions ignited by the their civil services, created electoral introduction of party politics. The commissions during decolonization, underlying principle was separation which had a weighty impact on the of politics and administration: the electoral politics of most African organization and conduct of elec- countries during the first decades of tions was delegated either to career independence (box 4.1). civil servants with protected tenure of office (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Britain established semi-autonomous Uganda and then Tanganyika) or electoral commissions to adminis- specially appointed electoral com- ter pre-independence elections in missioners (Mauritius and the 1956 regional elections in western Nige- ria; Smith 1960; Mozaffar 2002). Box 4.1 O rigins of electoral management boards in Africa In contrast, Francophone and Luso- The idea that electoral management should be carried out by honest and com- phone Africa integrated politics and petent public servants, outside the influence of politics, dates from the colonial administration. In Francophone period. But there were different trajectories. Africa, electoral governance was vested in the ministry of the interior In some cases, the public servants were recruited from among the colonial or territorial administration. Multi- administration itself; in others, eminent personalities independent from the party electoral committees sat at the administration led the process. In the Francophone countries during the last local level, under designated admin- years of colonialism, elections were carried out within the framework of the istration officials who supervised colonial project, with the aim of consolidating its legitimacy (as in Benin and routine activities like revision of Senegal). In the Anglophone countries, elections took place within the context electoral lists, distribution of voters’ of challenging colonization and preparing the elites for independent govern- cards and poll monitoring. Almost ment (as in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, among others). all Francophone countries in Africa inherited these non-autonomous These differences partly explain how in the Francophone countries the elec- EMBs (Holleaux 1956; Nicholas toral management systems in place during colonization were maintained after 1956; Smith 1960; Mozaffar 2002). independence, consolidating the new regimes. In the Anglophone countries, the role of electoral management boards was among the issues contested in To the development of party poli- the political turmoil of the first decade of independence. tics and the electoral process must be added the stunted and fragile They may also account for the different levels of electoral violence along lan- electoral machinery, including the guage lines. Elections just before independence were part of the decolonizing EMBs, bequeathed to the independ- process in Anglophone countries, partly explaining the violence there, while ent African countries. The machin- in Benin and Senegal, elections bordered on a routine administrative formality ery was generally rudimentary and and contests were for colonial offices among African candidates who were improvised. The franchise had for already part of the colonial elite. Violence in most Francophone countries is a long been narrow and restrictive, relatively recent phenomenon that came with the wave of democratization in and progressively enlarged. Colonial the early 1990s. electoral processes, including elections, were not necessarily devoid Source: Kambale 2011. of fraudulent manipulation because in most cases they were intended to

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 114 6/25/13 8:33 PM serve specific interests, like ensur- Indeed, such politicization was ing succession of the favourable elite symptomatic of a wider process of a to the colonial administration. This grave assault on democratic institu- objective was not always achieved, tions and of the narrowing of polit- however, as seen with the victory of ical space, which whittled away the the Nkrumah-led Convention Peo- separation of politics from admin- ple’s Party in the Gold Coast (now istration, allowed a strong executive Ghana) and Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya to emerge and weakened the coun- African National Union party in tervailing powers of the legislature, Kenya. judiciary and civil society (Jinadu 1997). In Francophone Africa, Fred M. Hayward (1987, 8) points out that: While quasi-autonomous electoral commissions have been the tradition Elections . . . were much less since independence in most African open [than in the British colo- Anglophone countries, they are rel- nies] and were frequently sub- atively new in the Francophone and ject to extensive manipulation Lusophone states (Kambale 2011). by colonial officials. Elections The fate of EMBs over 1960–1990 in both Guinea and Senegal, was largely tied to constitutional for example, were sometimes and political reforms. The combina- rigged by the colonial authori- tion of weak EMBs, legislatures and ties. In this respect, the French judiciaries was fatal to electoral gov- colonial electoral experience ernance in most African countries created a legacy of abuse that in this period. This combination lived on after independence. endures in some African countries and constitutes the less whole- The post-colonial era some residue of the political legacy In the immediate post-colonial of Africa’s colonial and immediate period, the general tendency was for post-colonial period. successor governments to replicate the electoral manipulation of former Since the 1960s, electoral adminis- colonial administrations, through tration and management have fea- the power of incumbency. Notably, tured protracted ethnic-related vio- the inherited EMB—where they lent political conflicts, fuelled by already existed as part of the execu- the political mobilization of eth- tive branch or were newly created— nicity and “a combination of potent were subject to outright control or identity-based factors with wider intimidation by these successors. perceptions of economic and social This was part of their bid to retain injustice” over access to and distri- power, thus they had no need for bution of the state’s economic and strong, independent boards that political resources (Harris and Reilly would serve to strengthen competi- 1998, 9).3 Elections thus accentu- tive party politics and open the pos- ated ethnic differences and proved sibility of their being voted out of ineffective as mechanisms for demo- power in free and fair elections. cratic governance. Drowning in the

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 115 6/25/13 8:33 PM cauldron of political ethnicity and the rest of the world in the 1990s related primordial identities, EMBs brought a strong revival of interest in became ineffectual mechanisms for democratically managing diversity in democratically managing diversity the African state. The revival took (Ake 1976, 2001). the form of heated debate and struggle over how competitive party and Successor regimes began to view electoral politics, as well as the rules democratic elections and competi- of electoral governance—particu- tive electoral politics as a threat to larly constitutional provisions and their power (Hayward 1987). They legislation—should be structured also came to regard independent and institutionalized. judiciaries and the rule of law the same way—as encumbrances worth Powers and functions eliminating. This view had danger- The powers and functions vested ous implications for electoral admin- in African EMBs underscore their istration and management, which design as democracy-promoting Since the on the contrary needed successor institutions. They typically include late 1980s, regimes to build confidence in elec- voter registration; voter education; constitutional, toral governance among the citi- constituency delimitation; registra- electoral and zens that their votes would count, tion of political parties; monitor- political reforms to ensure the “ex ante indetermi- ing, oversight and supervision of have been nacy” of elections and to ensure party activities and financing; bal- fair and non-partisan adjudication lot design; design, procurement and increasingly of election-related disputes (Jinadu securing of ballot boxes; printing designed to 2010). and securing of ballot papers; con- strengthen African duct of elections; and declaration electoral boards If elections became a charade under of election results. Of course they the single-party dominant state, vary from country to country. Some EMBs and the judiciary were used EMBs have restricted functions, as pawns that also generated a back- others have far-ranging powers. lash and fuelled agitational politics. The pressures so released precipi- Since the late 1980s, constitu- tated military rule but also, in the tional, electoral and political reforms medium term, contributed to the have been increasingly designed to rebounding or deepening of social strengthen African EMBs, not only movements as well as the politics of to improve election management re-democratization (see chapters 1 but also to insulate them from party and 2). These pressures were an political or government interference. important factor in convoking several The reforms have sought to pro- African countries’ national sovereign fessionalize and remove the EMBs conferences or constituent assem- from the ambit of their historical blies, as critical milestones in demo- location within the civil service and cratic transitions from the 1980s. to make some of them horizontal institutions, or the fourth branch of The third wave of democratiza- government, with varying degrees of tion sweeping through Africa and autonomy.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 116 6/25/13 8:33 PM Models designation is important, especially The different models of EMBs in countries where national consti- reflect the country’s history, these tutions provide for them to be set up bodies’ relationship with the exec- this way. It involves making a dis- utive, their powers and functions tinction between, on the one hand, and their autonomy (table 4.1). Four the EMB as a permanent institution broad trends in the constitutional or whose existence is guaranteed by legal design of EMBs in Africa have the constitution and that cannot be emerged: independent single track, dissolved through the ordinary pro- independent multi-pronged, hybrid/ cess of legislation, and on the other, mixed and government-controlled some members of the commission models. are political appointees tasked with policy making. Independent single track There has been a trend towards With administrative independence establishing one (or more) inde- also comes the imperative of finan- pendent EMB. This has turned cial independence. Accordingly, the EMBs into horizontal institutions, independent EMBs are also gener- as implied in “independent”. This ally endowed with constitutional or

Table 4.1 Models of African electoral management boards

Model Characteristics Country examples Independent single track Independent of the executive. Full responsibility for Angola, Botswana, Central administration and management of elections, with African Republic, Ethiopia, members chosen on personal merit and integrity, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, professional background and party political affiliation Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe Independent multi-pronged Two (occasionally more) bodies, independent Sierra Leone and Tanzania of the executive, responsible for administration and management of elections. Usually one body responsible for administration and management, one serving as a regulatory and supervisory body Hybrid/mixed Government manages the election under the Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, supervision of an independent body comprising Democratic Republic of the judges, members of the legal and other professions, Congo, Guinea and Senegal and party representatives Government controlled—full Management and administration of elections are solely — under the control of government Government controlled— Limited control, coordination and supervision by a — decentralized national authority, independent of government

— = not available. Source: Abstracted from Lopez-Pintor (2000), Hounkpe and Fall (2011) and Kambale (2011).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 117 6/25/13 8:33 PM other statutory guarantees of sep- conflict, between the chairperson of arate budgetary appropriations, in the EMB and the head of the sec- some cases (Nigeria, for instance) as retariat, as to where the ultimate a first charge on their country’s con- authority and final accountability solidated revenue fund. lie over the deployment of election- related resources and logistics, unless Their enabling legislation, in other clearly spelt out in the enabling leg- words, grants them powers to hire islation, as the experience of Nige- and fire their own permanent ria’s Independent National Electoral bureaucracy based at national head- Commission (INEC) has shown quarters, but also in the regions or (Jinadu 2011a). provinces, and usually at district and local government levels. For Independent multi-pronged example, Sierra Leone’s National The multi-pronged model stemmed Electoral Commission Act 2002 from the complexity and enormity vests the commission with powers of the powers and functions of the to recruit its own staff, with a view independent single-track model. to professionalizing its bureaucracy Some African countries shared these and activities. Since the act, the duties between two (sometimes commission has gradually moved to more) bodies, to make for more detach itself from its inherited civil effective and streamlined operations. service apron-strings by establishing its own secretariat headed by In Sierra Leone, the country’s an executive secretary. Other elec- 1991 Constitution and the Polit- toral commissions under this EMB ical Parties Act 2002 unbundled model have similarly established the National Electoral Commission their own secretariats with their by transferring the party registra- own head. tion and regulation to the Political Parties Registration Commission, An atypical administrative struc- a regulatory and supervisory body ture among independent EMBs is with oversight powers and functions that of Ghana’s electoral commission for party political activities finan- where its chairman and two deputy cial issues under Section 34 of the chairmen perform the “managerial Constitution of 1991 (box 4.2). The functions” assisted by coordinating National Electoral Commission per- directors, one for each of the com- forms only election-related func- mission’s organizational divisions. tions like registering voters, delimiting constituencies and conducting In most of the EMBs with this elections. Tanzania has the same model, the heads of secretariat are arrangement in which the Registrar appointed by the EMB, and they of Political Parties is separate from serve as the EMBs’ chief account- the electoral commission. However, ing officers (as in South Africa). unlike Sierra Leone, it is not a body The designation of the head of the established by the constitution, but independent EMBs’ secretariat as by legislation. Still, given interlock- chief accounting officer can lead to ing responsibilities, they are forced

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 118 6/25/13 8:33 PM to work with each other and with other bodies. Box 4.2 I nterlocking electoral management board responsibilities, Sierra Leone Although categorized as different independent models, Nigeria and The National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Com- Tanzania have two levels of elec- mission have interlocking electoral responsibilities, compelling them to coop- toral administration. In Nigeria, the erate. Thus the Chief Electoral Commissioner (of the electoral commission) is INEC conducts elections at national a member of the registration commission, which in turn is represented on the and state levels, and the Independ- Electoral Commission’s Political Party Liaison Committee, a forum for con- ent State Electoral Commission at sultation and communication between the electoral commission and political the local level. In Tanzania, Main- parties. land Tanzania and Zanzibar both have their own electoral commission The operational areas in which the two bodies collaborate include meetings (for historical reasons, reflecting the with political parties on strategies for credible and violence-free elections, merger of the two separate territo- on declarations of political parties’ pre-election assets and liabilities and ries—Tanganyika and Zanzibar). post-election expenditures, and on campaign schedules. They also collaborate Dual electoral administration can with the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, raise coordination issues, however. the Law Reform Commission and the National Commission for Democracy, all constitutionally established bodies. These other commissions supplement What both the independent mod- funding from the electoral commission and registration commission through els show is the need to turn a crit- their own budgeted democracy-promotion activities. ical searchlight on the powers and functions of the electoral body— The registration commission has poorer funding, staffing and logistical support including the mode of appointing than the electoral commission. and removing its members—and its fiscal empowerment. The aim would The dominant perception among the people is that the registration commission be to turn EMBs into a horizontal is a suitable complement to the electoral commission, although there is no branch of government, restructured consensus whether their functions had to be unbundled. to make it independent of political influence. This is critical for EMBs Source: Jinadu 2011b. where the same party controls the executive and the legislature, where the legislature and judiciary are ministry, department or agency weak, and where countervailing vested with the core electoral func- pressures from other actors have lit- tions also serves as the secretariat, tle impact. which is tasked with implementation. But the independent EMB, Hybrid/mixed vested with oversight powers over The third trend has been towards the elections, has its own secretariat. establishing “hybrid” or “mixed” EMBs, in which the main or core Government controlled—full and electoral functions are performed decentralized by a ministry or department or Africa has seen movement from agency within the executive, super- both full and decentralized vised by an independent body.4 With government-controlled variants, this model, the executive branch to different degrees. This trend

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 119 6/25/13 8:33 PM reflects new African and global entrenched their EMBs in their thinking, but is also informed by constitutions as democracy- the sad African experience of the promoting institutions, others6 fully government-controlled model have created them through ordinary that was inherited at independence. laws. The advantage of the former The post-independence conflation is that it is much harder to amend of politics with administration in the constitution than laws, which many African countries gave rise to buttresses the EMBs’ independ- the view that the state bureaucracy ence. Abolishing constitutionally was unreliable for conducting free entrenched EMBs would require, and fair elections, which explains in some national constitutions such the current trend in Africa “almost as those of Kenya and Nigeria, invariably in the direction of estab- super majorities, and in Kenya, a lishing independent electoral com- referendum. missions independently of historical political traditions” (Mozaffar and However, even in some countries Electoral laws Schedler 2002, 15). where EMBs are written into the remain an constitution, the executive and leg- issue of major Whichever form the design takes, islature have sometimes amended controversy in many the objective is to strengthen the the original electoral law to whit- African countries EMBs by entrenching them in con- tle down or frustrate the EMBs. stitutions (as is generally the case Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2010 as in Anglophone Africa) or in other amended, for example, has provi- statutory provisions (such as elec- sions diminishing the oversight and toral laws as in much of Franco- supervisory role of INEC over party phone Africa) and to provide them nomination—an apparent violation with an independent administrative of the 1999 Constitution. structure or secretariat. This would insulate them from executive control Electoral laws remain an issue of or to minimize such control over major controversy in many Afri- them. can countries. They are rarely inclusive, and many expert respondents Legal foundations regarded them as favouring the rul- The constitution, legislation or a ing party and seldom providing a combination usually provides the basis for managing diversity. Only legal basis for founding an EMB. 14 of the 40 surveyed countries did The relevant item often specifies the at least half the respondents consider EMB’s duties, powers, functions and the electoral law to be mostly or funding—in short (ideally) provid- fully adequate for managing diver- ing a basis for autonomy. Drafting sity, suggesting some dissatisfaction should be as consultative as possible, among the people (figure 4.1). reflecting society’s diverse interests. Autonomy The African Governance Report The autonomy of EMBs is endan- (AGR) III country reports show gered from several angles, and many that, while some countries5 have EMBs suffer from serious deficits.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 120 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.1 Adequacy of the electoral law for managing diversity at elections—mostly or fully Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Rwanda São Tomé & Príncipe Seychelles South Africa Guinea Algeria Cape Verde Liberia Senegal Comoros Ghana Gabon Angola Benin Botswana Mali Ethiopia Congo Chad Sierra Leone Namibia Djibouti Tunisia Malawi Mauritania Mozambique Cameroon Nigeria Egypt Togo Lesotho Uganda Mauritius Madagascar Burkina Faso Zambia Gambia Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 121 6/25/13 8:33 PM Appointing and removing electoral Committee led by Justice Moham- commissioners med Lawal Uwais in its report of The procedure differs from coun- December 2008 proposed that the try to country, though two main National Judicial Council play a role approaches are apparent (box 4.3). in appointing members of INEC. In Senegal, the debate focused on Four elements are important: the expanding the number of institu- procedure should be codified in law tions of the Autonomous National or the constitution, and must be Electoral Commission to break the clear; it must not be the sole prerog- monopoly held by the president in ative of any individual—president or the nomination process. And in otherwise—as this is prone to abuse; Sierra Leone, the power of the pres- it must be open, transparent, inclu- ident to dismiss members of the sive, consultative and based largely National Electoral Commission has on merit; and it must specify and been challenged as it might under- guarantee tenure of office and pro- mine the independence of the com- cedure for removal. mission (Kambale 2011). Also in Sierra Leone, the opposition Sierra Public debate and even contro- Leone People’s Party, still feel- versy have focused on this proce- ing “cheated” of victory in the 2007 dure in many countries. In Nigeria presidential runoff election, opposed for example, the Electoral Review the nominated chairperson to the National Electoral Commission for a second term in June 2010. Box 4.3 T wo approaches to appointing and removing electoral commissioners These public feelings show through in the Expert Opinion Survey: in The politically based approach includes the following: only 10 of the 40 countries did more • the president exercises the sole prerogative in appointing and removing than half the respondents consider commissioners; the procedure to be mostly or always • commissioners are appointed by the president, but nominees are vetted open, transparent and credible (fig- and approved by parliament; and ure 4.2). This finding has serious • the composition of the electoral commission is a completely partisan pro- implications for the integrity of elec- cess, in which political parties nominate senior commission officials. Such tions in Africa (see Promoting elec- composition often reflects the balance of power among the political parties. toral integrity, below).

The technically driven method includes: Respondents were no doubt aware • an independent body initially selects the commissioners and recommends of several examples where electoral a few to the political authorities (parliament and/or president) to make the commissioners had been removed final decision; and in questionable circumstances. • the positions are treated as competitive public service positions, openly In December 2011, for instance, advertised, competed for, and filled on the basis of set criteria including the President of Malawi unilater- merit and integrity. ally issued an order “to close the [Malawi Electoral Commission] These two approaches may overlap on appointing commissioners. immediately, on the grounds of mismanaging 1.4 billion kwacha”

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 122 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.2 The procedure for appointing and removing the electoral commission is open, transparent and credible—mostly or always Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

South Africa Ghana Cape Verde Mauritius Seychelles Tunisia Gambia São Tomé & Príncipe Botswana Rwanda Benin Mali Namibia Senegal Comoros Egypt Sierra Leone Gabon Ethiopia Mauritania Guinea Djibouti Lesotho Cameroon Congo Mozambique Togo Angola Algeria Liberia Madagascar Chad Kenya Nigeria Uganda Zambia Tanzania Burkina Faso Malawi Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 123 6/25/13 8:33 PM before the constitutional expiry of appointments. This was a repeat the tenure of its members (AGR III of the president’s unconstitutional Malawi Country Report 2012, 47). removal of commission officials During the 1996 presidential elec- in 1992. tions, the president of Niger dismissed members of the National Members of EMBs removed without Independent Electoral Commission. due process tend to regard recourse And in 2009, the president of Sen- to the courts to enforce their right as egal virtually forced the chairper- “medicine after death”. Their person of the Autonomous National ception that the judiciary is under Electoral Commission, Moustapha the control of the presidency, com- Touré, to resign, contravening his bined with that office’s overbearing security of tenure under the law. power and the usually long course Touré was quoted as saying: of litigation, sometimes discourages them from seeking judicial redress. The president of the Repub- Electoral lic asked me to come in for an A more insidious way to undermine management audience, which took place the independence of EMBs is the board top on 5 November 2009 at the power of reappointment vested in officials need to presidential palace. When I the executive by most constitutions be appointed and arrived at his office, he clearly or laws establishing EMBs. It seems dismissed by an explained to me that he no that the spirit of such a provision is longer had confidence in me. that of reappointment to ensure con- independent body He repeated several times: tinuity, unless there is “cause” not to “You are against me; you are reappoint. Yet the power of the exec- fighting against my party. utive (the president) to reappoint in Since you no longer have my this case is also in effect a power of confidence,” he added, “I am removal “without cause”. This can be asking for restitution of the waived to reward compliant mem- mandate I entrusted in you in bers of electoral commissions by the days before you lost my nominating them for reappointment, confidence” (Fall 2011, 188). to punish uncooperative ones or to destabilize the commission by not In Sierra Leone, the president nominating them for reappointment removed two members of the and making new appointments. National Electoral Commission in the wake of a crisis over the results These new appointments usu- of the 2007 presidential runoff elec- ally destabilize commission operations, without following constitutions, a factor highlighted by the late tionally provided due process. Addi- chairman of Nigeria’s INEC, Abel tionally, some senior administrative Guobadia: staff members, whose “loyalty” was in doubt, were allegedly deployed or The commission in September “demoted” to other positions within 2003, with 10 new members, the electoral commission’s secretar- was a different commission iat. In protest, they resigned their from the earlier commission . . .

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 124 6/25/13 8:33 PM There was a loss of momentum many African countries, apart from as a result of the large turn- removal for official misconduct). over of the membership. Val- uable time was lost in allow- Finally, EMBs should be granted ing the new members who much more flexibility than the civil now constituted the major- service in accounting and procure- ity to settle down and learn on ment procedures, because of the the job. . . . A permanent body sensitive nature and security impli- with as large a membership cations of elections. However, this as the commission ought not must not compromise financial to . . . have such a large mem- accountability and due process. bership turnover at any point in time. The commission should Financial autonomy always have a sizeable num- The level and security of EMB fund- ber of members who are abreast ing is another key issue. Although with current activities and most EMBs and electoral processes development within the com- are supposed to be funded by the Electoral mission (Guobadia 2009, 128). state, such funding is often inad- management equate and delayed, forcing many boards should What these examples underline is EMBs to turn to development part- be granted more 7 that a residual issue arising from ners. For these partners, such assis- flexibility in the constitutional provisions to tance constitutes part of their democ- accounting and strengthen the independence of racy- and governance-support EMBs is that of ensuring the secu- activities on the continent. For exam- procurement rity of tenure of their members. The ple, since 1996 the donor community procedures overriding problem is that when in Sierra Leone has contributed about appointment is made on loyalty to 75% of the budget for the National the appointing authority—often the Electoral Commission—about 85% executive—this could be revoked for the 2008 local government elec- unless the appointee maintains his tions (National Electoral Commis- or her loyalty. sion of Sierra Leone 2008, 18).

So, EMB top officials need to be Most AGR III country reports appointed and dismissed by an inde- expressed concerns about this finan- pendent body in an open and trans- cial dependence (chapter 6), because parent process in order for them it can compromise ownership of the to be insulated from interference electoral process, distort planning in by the executive in their duties. A the electoral cycle, compromise the more powerful check on the execu- integrity of elections and, politically, tive might be to extend the Ghana- undermine national sovereignty. In ian model, which grants security of Nigeria, where the election budget is tenure to the chairperson and dep- largely funded by the federal govern- uties of the EMB until their retirement, INEC has had disagreements ment, and to all members of EMBs with donors over their attempts to (as is generally the case with High influence how their technical sup- Court and Supreme Court judges in port should be used.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 125 6/25/13 8:33 PM Increasingly, African countries are countries did more than half the learning to bear a large part of their expert respondents consider their EMB budgets. Tanzania’s fund- EMB to be independent and fairly or ing, including that for the elec- fully competent (figure 4.3). Under- toral commission, rose from 57% lying reasons that render them inde- of the total election cost in 1995 to pendent and effective are in box 4.5. 86% in 2000 and then to 95% in 2005. Namibia fully funds its EMB. The overall performance of EMBs And to strengthen INEC’s finan- is uneven in Africa. In Cape Verde, cial independence in Nigeria, recent Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa, constitutional and electoral reforms they are credited with organizing free, have provided for that body’s fund- fair and credible elections, unlike the ing to be a first-line charge on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, country’s consolidated revenue fund, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zim- although it remains unclear how babwe, where controversy and liti- much INEC would still be subject to gation have dogged the performance standard civil service administrative of electoral commissions. Only in and financial procedures. 11 countries did more than half the experts rate it good or very good (fig- Still, recruitment, staffing and ure 4.4). Similarly, only in 12 (fig- human capacity are major con- ure 4.5) and 14 (figure 4.6) coun- straints for most EMBs, which often tries did more than half the experts resort to short-term staff for elec- rate their national and local elections, toral duties (box 4.4). respectively, mostly or always free, fair and generally transparent. Performance The above issues of autonomy In short, the performance of most affect opinions: in only 17 of the 40 EMBs in Africa is not too encouraging—but with a few bright spots (box 4.6)—and needs to pick up Box 4.4 H eavy staff demand around elections substantially for them to earn credibility and public confidence. The staff strength of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission in 2009 was about 12,000, of whom not more than 9,000–10,000 could be Promoting electoral deployed for election or voter registration, yet both these activities require integrity some 36,000–48,000 temporary staff. Electoral integrity is ultimately about protecting free and fair elec- In Sierra Leone, the National Electoral Commission recruited 35,175 short-term tions (box 4.7). A major issue of pol- polling staff for the 2008 local government elections (Jinadu 2011b). icy discourse is on how to strengthen the integrity of election administra- Rwanda’s National Electoral Commission for the September 2008 legislative tion and management. elections created 15,429 polling stations at 2,103 polling centres. It recruited and trained 64,233 people, in addition to 61,492 volunteer staff at the stations, Concerns about ensuring and pro- 2,103 to coordinate the centres and 638 staff to deal with election matters in tecting electoral integrity persist districts and provinces (European Union Election Observation Mission 2008) in Africa because flawed elections have featured prominently on the

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 126 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.3 The electoral commission is independent and fairly or fully competent Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

It is independent and fairly or fully competent It is not independent but fairly competent It is not independent and not competent or rarely competent

Ghana South Africa Mauritius Tunisia Cape Verde Seychelles Rwanda Liberia Algeria Sierra Leone São Tomé & Príncipe Kenya Angola Botswana Senegal Mali Mauritania Comoros Congo Egypt Guinea Namibia Nigeria Ethiopia Cameroon Benin Lesotho Malawi Uganda Tanzania Djibouti Zambia Gabon Togo Mozambique Madagascar Gambia Chad Burkina Faso Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 127 6/25/13 8:33 PM continent, even before independ- Box 4.5 F actors in the independence and effectiveness of ence. But citizens’ perceptions of Africa’s electoral commissions electoral integrity have improved appreciably in various countries since The following elements are among the more important in the independence the 1980s, largely owing to reform and effectiveness of electoral commissions: measures to strengthen EMBs, the electorate’s aggressive protection of Strength and character of electoral management board (EMB) officials, espe- their votes, intense voter education, cially the chairperson. In both Ghana and Sierra Leone, that person is credited active networks of pro-democracy with ensuring the quality of elections and resisting pressure from parties. In civil society organizations and the contrast, until a new chairperson of Nigeria’s commission was appointed in calibre of EMB leadership. Ghana 2010, there was no trust in its leadership, regarded as under the influence of stands out: referring to key electoral the ruling party. transparency measures introduced since the flawed presidential polls of Security of tenure of EMB officials. This is as important as the appoint- 1992, the AGR III Ghana Country ment process. In Ghana, the appointment of the chairperson and two vice- Report 2012 (111) observed: chairpersons is largely at the president’s discretion, but tenure is until retirement. In Senegal, however, even legal guarantees of security of tenure did These reforms ensured that not prevent the president from dismissing the chairperson of the Autonomous the subsequent elections have National Electoral Commission. been progressively free and fairer, with the third and fifth Stability of administrative personnel. The more temporary staff have to be ones in 2000 and 2008 pro- recruited at election time the worse for election management and the greater ducing peaceful electoral turn- the opportunity for influencing these staff inappropriately. overs and democratic alternation of power. Large majorities Security of funding. Lack of guaranteed and predictable funding, from central of the experts surveyed consid- government or international donors, creates huge challenges. ered national and local elections (81% and 74%, respec- Clear demarcation of responsibilities. The degree to which the EMB has effectively) to be free, fair and tive control over all tasks in the electoral process should be clearly delimited generally transparent. Simi- and understood by all, so that there is no attempt at duplicating or challenging larly, participants in the focus that authority. EMB performance is often proportional to the extent to which it group discussions opined that controls the whole process. elections in Ghana are generally fair and credible oppor- Mandate for internal party management. How much the EMB has this man- tunities for all stakeholders in date—and exercises it—is particularly important. In Francophone countries, the process to contest as well an EMB rarely has such a role. In Ghana, by contrast, the commission fully as vote in periodic elections. supervises internal party elections, and on its own set up the Inter-Party Advi- sory Committee in 1994, a trust-building institution without a formal role in the The AGR III Malawi Coun- electoral process. try Report 2012 (84) also showed a favourable perception of pro- Quality of collaboration between the EMB and the other institutions and gress towards electoral integrity, in stakeholders. observing that “when asked about integrity of national elections, 31% Source: Abstracted from Kambale (2011). of the respondents said the elections were sometimes free and fair, 29%

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 128 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.4 Performance of electoral commissions Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Good or very good Fair Poor or very poor

Ghana Mauritius South Africa Seychelles Cape Verde Botswana Liberia Rwanda São Tomé & Príncipe Senegal Sierra Leone Algeria Tunisia Guinea Angola Kenya Comoros Ethiopia Malawi Mauritania Egypt Congo Cameroon Mozambique Djibouti Namibia Benin Gabon Madagascar Tanzania Zambia Mali Lesotho Uganda Gambia Togo Nigeria Zimbabwe Chad Burkina Faso 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 129 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.5 National elections are free, fair and generally transparent—mostly or always Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

South Africa Seychelles Cape Verde Mauritius Botswana Ghana São Tomé & Príncipe Algeria Senegal Rwanda Tunisia Liberia Namibia Benin Mozambique Comoros Sierra Leone Djibouti Mali Mauritania Ethiopia Angola Malawi Lesotho Guinea Cameroon Tanzania Burkina Faso Egypt Gambia Madagascar Zambia Gabon Congo Uganda Togo Kenya Chad Zimbabwe Nigeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 130 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 4.6 Local elections are free, fair and generally transparent—mostly or always Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

South Africa Cape Verde Seychelles Botswana Ghana São Tomé & Príncipe Mauritius Senegal Algeria Sierra Leone Djibouti Namibia Benin Mozambique Rwanda Liberia Mali Comoros Lesotho Mauritania Uganda Egypt Ethiopia Gabon Guinea Cameroon Madagascar Togo Congo Tanzania Malawi Tunisia Burkina Faso Chad Gambia Kenya Zambia Nigeria Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Note: Angola does not conduct local elections. Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 131 6/25/13 8:33 PM threatened by the practice of Box 4.6 Good and bad practices in election administration incumbent political elites dur- and management in Africa ing presidential elections or on the countdown to presi- The specific tasks of some countries’ electoral management boards (EMBs) dential elections, to want to merit highlighting. alter the political system with the aim of aborting the suc- Voter registration and credibility. The EMBs of Botswana and South Africa were cession and hence perpetuate regarded as very good, followed by those of Ghana and Liberia; Lesotho and its stay in power, or expand- Nigeria were rated fair. ing the political space to allow it room for negotiation with Voter education. South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission was rated the emerging successor group. very good, followed by Zambia, where respondents particularly credited the This practice is a result of the Electoral Commission of Zambia for its outreach initiatives of the Voter Edu- symbiosis in Kenyan politics cation Unit, National Voter Education Committee, District Voter Education between the process of accu- Committee and employment of voter education facilitators. Next came Ghana. mulation and political succes- Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria were rated poor. sion (AGR III Kenya Country Report 2012, 93). Management of electoral disputes and conflicts. South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission was regarded as very good, followed by the EMBs in Electoral integrity is crucial in vol- Botswana and Seychelles; those in Kenya and Nigeria were rated poor. One atile and hotly contested elections, respondent in Kenya said: “People have no confidence in post-election adju- particularly in multi-ethnic states, dication mechanisms. It tends to be influenced and manipulated by the incum- making the role of African EMBs bent or some powerful men in and out of government”. in building general confidence even more important. If EMBs fail to act Free, fair and generally transparent elections. The EMBs of Botswana, Cape in a professional, non-partisan man- Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles and South Africa ner independent of government, the emerged as very good performers. At the other extreme, respondents in Leso- elections will lose credibility, risk- tho were particularly unsatisfied with the way the commission demarcated con- ing pre- and post-election violence, stituencies. The EMBs of Nigeria and Zimbabwe were rated poor. as seen in Zanzibar (2000), Nigeria (2007, 2011), Kenya (2007), Zim- Source: AGR III Country Reports 2012. babwe (2008) and Côte d’Ivoire (2010).

said they were mostly free and fair, Oversight of political while 7% said they were always free parties and fair”.8 Most EMBs have few means of enforcing their rules and decisions, However, serious doubts remain and of exercising their oversight about electoral integrity and its powers over party electoral activities, implications for democratic man- including party financing. “In Benin, agement of diversity in several coun- the [Autonomous National Elec- tries, typified by the following: toral Commission] can only report electoral irregularities to the judicial The integrity of elections system since it has no power of sanc- in Kenya has always been tion” (Kambale 2011, 8). In Sierra

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 132 6/25/13 8:33 PM Leone, although the National Elec- toral Commission has issued regu- Box 4.7 Electoral integrity lations to declare invalid any result with more than 100% turnout, dis- We define an election with integrity as any election that is based on the dem- gruntled political parties have chal- ocratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in lenged its ability to apply this rule. international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial and There is also a question whether such transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle. regulations have to be enacted into law (Kambale 2011). Unless they are Elections with integrity are important to human rights and democratic prin- endowed with sufficient powers of ciples. Elections give life to rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of sanction, EMBs risk being toothless. Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly The main issues of oversight of and association, the right to take part in the government of one’s country party-political activities are ensuring through freely elected representatives, the right of equal access to public compliance by parties with internal service in one’s country and the recognition that the authority of government democracy in their internal nomina- derives from the will of the people, expressed in “genuine periodic elections tion processes for party offices and that shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot”. elective public political offices; sub- mitting the audit of their finances in For elections to uphold human rights and democratic principles, they must be a timely manner, as required by law; conducted with integrity. When elections lack integrity, electoral officials are enforcing compliance with election- not accountable to the public, and political candidates and voters are denied eering campaign regulations; and equal opportunity to participate in and influence the political process. Citizens creating a political environment con- lose confidence in democratic processes when elections are not inclusive, ducive to reducing violent inter- and transparent and accountable. When elections have integrity, they bolster intra-party conflicts and violence, democracy, respect fundamental rights and produce elected officials who are through adopting an agreed code of more likely to represent their citizens’ interests. conduct. Source: Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security 2012. Some EMBs have set up working relations with political parties through platforms for inter-party (box 4.8) as well as Burundi, the dialogue, such as Sierra Leone’s Democratic Republic of the Congo, National Code of Conduct Monitor- Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zam- ing Committee—which has helped bia. Many of these initiatives draw introduce major reforms, including on or complement existing informal transparent ballot boxes and count- platforms for inter-party dialogue. ing and declaring election results on the spot at polling stations— The Zambian Centre for Inter-Party and Ghana’s Inter-Party Advisory Dialogue, for example, provides a Committee. platform for political parties to forge cross-party consensus on national Similar initiatives involving collabo- issues. In Rwanda, the Constitu- ration between EMBs and political tion (Article 56) provides that “The parties (and sometimes civil soci- political will consistently recognizes ety organizations) have been intro- the Rwanda Consultative Forum . . . duced in Lesotho and South Africa to enable political parties to discuss

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 133 6/25/13 8:33 PM inter-party dialogue, lest they not Box 4.8 Pa rty liaison committees in Lesotho and South only become embroiled in inter- Africa party disputes and intra-party factionalism, but also risk accusations Lesotho and South Africa have institutionalized party liaison committees, which of bias. In Ghana, inter-party dia- serve as vehicles for consultation and cooperation between the electoral man- logue has been relatively success- agement board (EMB) and the political parties on electoral matters with the aim ful, largely because the parties have of delivering free and fair elections. a sense of ownership. The Inter- Party Advisory Committee works These committees have been established nationally, provincially and locally. well, securing parties’ agreement to Each registered political party has the right to appoint two representatives to a code of conduct facilitated by the each committee. The committees meet frequently, and their administration is National Electoral Commission, in entrusted with the EMB. conjunction with the National Com- mission for Civic Education and They have helped identify and resolve electoral disputes, and their deliberations the Institute of Economic Affairs, are regarded mostly by the people as open and honest. The committees take a a non-governmental organization consultative and constructive approach and seek to reach consensus among (Hounkpe and Fall 2011). the political parties and their candidates. In South Africa, the tribunals appointed by the Electoral Court generally endorse the conclusions of the committees. But elsewhere, international donors have sometimes had to broker inter- Source: Orozco-Henríquez 2010. party dialogue and parties’ codes of conduct, as in Sierra Leone in 2009 when the Executive Repre- the major political issues of national sentative of the Secretary-General of interest, consolidate national unity the United Nations in Sierra Leone [and offer] advisory opinion on played a central role in securing national politics, serving as medi- agreement to a joint communiqué by ators in cases of conflict within a the two major political parties, the political party, at the request of the All Peoples’ Congress and the Sierra latter” (AGR III Rwanda Country Leone People’s Party (Jinadu 2011b). Report 2012). Conclusions and Some countries have moved towards recommendations alternative dispute resolution mech- Africa has seen the ebb and flow of anisms. They take the form of non- electoral administration and man- formal mechanisms to back up con- agement since the 1990s, but some ventional approaches in Ghana and EMBs—notably in Benin, Bot- South Africa, for instance. They swana, Ghana, Mauritius, Sierra adopt indigenous dispute resolu- Leone and South Africa—have per- tion practices to election disputes, formed reasonably well. They have emphasizing conciliation rather had real input in enhancing general than litigation, thus saving time and confidence in their countries’ elec- money. toral administration and management. Other countries whose EMBs EMBs have to negotiate a slippery have progressed include Cape Verde, political terrain when encouraging Liberia and Namibia.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 134 6/25/13 8:33 PM Nigeria’s INEC was allowed to run stakeholders in state and society as the 2011 elections much better than partners in working towards credible in 2003 and 2007. The federal polit- electoral administration and man- ical leadership kept its distance from agement. Without such sensitivity, it, and INEC’s leadership and over- they will find it difficult to be tact- all competence were stronger. ful, impartial or credible. EMBs cannot afford an image of favourit- Where an election yields a close ism or dismissiveness towards cer- vote between parties—particularly tain ethnic groups, regions and presidential candidates as in Sierra minorities. They should be pro- Leone (2007), Kenya (2007), Ghana fessional in their dealings with all (2008, 2012), Zimbabwe (2008), groups and parties, rich and poor, Côte d’Ivoire (2010) and Sene- the advantaged and disadvantaged. gal (2012)—the situation may well get out of hand, turning into eth- Diversity in composition nic, ethno-regional or religious con- Efforts should be taken to ensure flict. The EMBs themselves may that EMB membership reflects Electoral boards be attacked, as in Nigeria (2007), the composition of wider society, should be Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008) including women, minorities, eth- professional and Côte d’Ivoire (2010). nic groups, religious groups, regions in their dealings and all political shades. The criteria with all groups EMBs’ challenges therefore remain and process of appointing or select- and parties, rich daunting, especially with diversity ing members need to be transparent where their role becomes even more at every stage. and poor, the sensitive. It is the task of African advantaged and EMBs to engineer broad-based coa- Political and financial autonomy disadvantaged litions for strengthening electoral The political class and ruling party administration and management, generally seek to influence an EMB and for engendering electoral integ- by, for instance, “pulling finan- rity, as momentous investments in cial strings” especially during elec- democratic consolidation and sus- tion year. The provisions setting up tainable development in Africa. This an EMB should therefore not only is the overall enduring challenge for guarantee financial autonomy (for the EMBs. example, as an annual subvention from the national budget) but also Sensitivity to diversity EMB members’ security of tenure, African EMBs need to be particu- to protect their independence. larly sensitive to the needs and challenges of various categories of voters Many country reports expressed as part of their diversity manage- the need for an independent non- ment role and voter education. They partisan body to be responsible for need to continue building bridges appointing and removing EMB of understanding and collabora- commissioners.9 Relatedly, others tion across the treacherous and thin called for the positions of commis- divide between maintaining their sioners to be advertised and com- autonomy and engaging various peted for nationally.10

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 135 6/25/13 8:33 PM Electoral integrity be spelt out and protected by con- Electoral integrity is central to the stitutional provisions, reinforcing mission of EMBs, and unless they the current trend. Such provisions are seen to have it, their role and should guarantee the permanence of reputation crumble. Election integ- the EMB, giving to it a legal per- rity is a set of standards based on sonality in perpetuity. They should democratic principles, measures also grant the EMB an independ- and mechanisms for protecting free ent and professional bureaucracy and fair elections, but unless these that serves as its secretariat. Fur- standards are enforced, they remain ther, election-related laws, including merely good intentions. amendments to the EMB’s mandate and functions, should require special EMBs in Africa need to raise the bar, consensus-building measures. and codes of conduct are useful. Some studies have gone further and recom- Collaboration with other institutions mended that EMBs organize a global EMBs need to work with other certification process to evaluate and stakeholders, including political par- grade EMBs on their professional- ties, civil society organizations and ism, independence and competence, state agencies like ministries and the including a voluntary declaration police. They should strive to create a of principles and code of conduct framework for mutually cooperative (Global Commission on Elections, links based on professionalism and Democracy and Security 2012). impartiality, enabling them to iron out any disputes during the electoral Constitutional grounding process, thus strengthening elec- Autonomy, integrity and profes- toral administration and manage- sionalism are so fundamental to ment as investments for consolidat- EMB operations that they should ing democracy in Africa.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 136 6/25/13 8:33 PM Annex 4.1 Structure and composition of EMBs: Southern Africa, July 2010 Country or area Structure Angola National Electoral Commission 11 members, 4-year term, renewable once • 2 nominated by president • 3 nominated by ruling party • 3 nominated by opposition parties in National Assembly • 1 Justice of the Supreme Court • 1 representative of Ministry of Territorial Administration • 1 elected by National Council of Social Communication • National Electoral Commission president elected from these by the National Assembly Botswana Independent Electoral Commission 7 members with 10-year term Nominated at an all-party conference and appointed by the Judicial Service Commission Dem. Rep. Congo Independent Electoral Commission Not yet constituted, governing organic law yet to be passed Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission 3 members, 6-year term, renewable once Appointed by the King on advice of the State Council; chairperson must be a judge Malawi Malawi Electoral Commission 7 members, 4-year term renewable • Chairperson is a judge nominated by the Judicial Service Commission • 6 appointed by the president in consultation with leaders of political parties in the National Assembly Madagascar National Independent Electoral Commission 19 members, 12 with voting rights • 10 nominated by civil society bodies • 2 representatives of administration, 1 each from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Decentralization • 7 non-voting representatives from political parties: 3 governing, 3 opposition and 1 other Mauritius Electoral Supervisory Commission Supervisory body, 7 members, 5-year term Appointed by president on advice of prime minister after consultation with leader of the opposition Mozambique National Electoral Commission 13 members, 5-year term • 5 members designated by parties/coalitions in Assembly of the Republic • 8 members are chosen by 5 from nominees by civil society bodies • president is elected by 13 from among the 8 civil society representatives Namibia Electoral Commission of Namibia 5 members, 5-year term Appointed by president from shortlist compiled by Selection Committee (a nominee of the Chief Justice, a nominee of the Law Society and a nominee of the Ombudsman); chairperson must be a judge Seychelles Electoral Commissioner 7-year term, renewable Appointed by the president from candidates proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 137 6/25/13 8:33 PM Country or area Structure South Africa Independent Electoral Commission 5 members, 7-year term, renewable Appointed by president on recommendation of National Assembly, following nominations by a National Assembly inter-party committee. One commissioner must be a judge Swaziland Elections and Boundaries Commission 5 members, 12-year term, non-renewable • Chairperson and deputy-chairperson appointed by the King on advice of Judicial Service Commission • 3 members appointed by King on consultation with ministers responsible for elections and local government Tanzania National Election Commission 7 members, 4-year term Appointed by president, according to complex legislative requirements. Chairperson and vice‑chairperson have to be judges of the High Court or the Court of Appeal Zambia Electoral Commission of Zambia 5 members, 7-year term, renewable Appointed by president, subject to ratification by the National Assembly Zanzibar Zanzibar Electoral Commission 7 members, 5-year term Appointed by president, according to complex legislative requirements Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 7 members, 5-year term, renewable once • Chairperson must be a judge and is appointed by president after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission • 6 members (at least 3 women) appointed by president from 9 nominees supplied by Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders

Source: “Electoral Management Bodies: Composition,” Electoral Institute for Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, updated June 2010, www.eisa. org.za/WEP/comemb1.htm.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 138 6/25/13 8:33 PM Notes 5. Such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 1. Also known as electoral Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra commissions. Leone, South Africa, Zambia and 2. See proceedings of the international Zimbabwe. workshop on Electoral Management 6. Such as Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Bodies as Institutions of Governance, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Statement with conclusions, Mexico Mali, Mozambique, Niger and City, 26–29 May 1999. Senegal. 3. This has been the case in coun- 7. Major contributors through the tries as varied as Algeria, Burundi, Joint Donor Basket Fund are the Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the European Union, Department Democratic Republic of the Congo, for International Development, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Canadian International Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Development Agency and United Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Nations Development Programme. Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Others include the United South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and States Agency for International Zimbabwe (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987; Development, International Harbom 2004; Douma 2003). Republican Institute, International 4. To cite some examples: in Senegal, Federation of Electoral Systems and the Ministry of Interior, super- National Democratic Institute. vised by the Autonomous National 8. But the AGR III Malawi Country Electoral Commission, and to some Report 2012 also stated that the extent the National Council for the response “reflects that the respond- Regulation of Broadcasting, which ents treated the classification with is in charge of ballot counting, per- caution, often [choosing] the mid- forms the core electoral functions. dle point and not the extremes of In Cape Verde, three bodies—the the scale. . . . A further exploration National Electoral Commission, the of this question in qualitative inter- Directorate General for Electoral views revealed that national elec- Process Support (in the Ministry tions are generally viewed to be free of Internal Administration) but not necessarily fair as the elec- and the electoral registration toral process is marred by a lot of committees—share the functions. irregularities, hence compromising In the Democratic Republic of the the integrity”. Congo, national elections have been 9. Including Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, under the supervision of two suc- Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South cessive bodies since the early 1990s: Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. the National Elections Organizing 10. Including Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Committee and its successor, the Ghana, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. National Electoral Commission. Electoral preparations are under References the responsibility of the Ministry Ake, Claude. 1976. “Explanatory Notes of Interior, while organization and on the Political Economy of Africa.” oversight of elections are vested in Journal of Modern African Studies 14 the National Electoral Commission. (1): 1–23.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 139 6/25/13 8:33 PM ———. 2001. Democracy and Develop- Senegalese Electoral Processes.” In ment in Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: Spec- Elections in Independent Africa, ed. trum Books. Fred M. Hayward, 239–70. Boulder, Douma, P. S. 2003. The Origins of Con- CO: Westview Press. temporary Conflict: A Comparison of Holleaux, André. 1956. “Les elections Violence in Three World Regions. The aux assemblées des territoires d’outre- Hague: Netherlands Institute of mer.” Revue juridique et politique de International Relations Clingendael. l’Union française 10 (1): 1–54. European Union Election Observation Hounkpe, Mathias, and Ismaila Madior Mission. 2008. “Rwanda, 2008: Final Fall. 2011. Electoral Commissions in Report on the Legislative Elections, West Africa: A Comparative Study. 15–18 September 2008.” European Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. External Action Service, Brussels. Jinadu, Adele L. 1997. “Matters Arising: Fall, Ismaila Madior. 2011. “Senegal.” African Elections and the Problem In Election Management Bodies in of Electoral Administration.” African West Africa: A Comparative Study of Journal of Political Science, Special Issue: the Contribution of Electoral Commis- Elections in Africa 2 (1): 1–11. sions to the Strengthening of Democracy, ———. 2010. “Managing Elections: The Ismaila Madior Fall, Mathias Hounk- Winner-Takes-All Rule, Democracy pe, Adele L. Jinadu and Pascal Kam- and Development.” Ghana Speaks bale, 162–208. Dakar: Open Society Lecture Series 2. Institute of Demo- Foundations. cratic Governance, Accra. Global Commission on Elections, ———. 2011a. “Nigeria.” In Election Democracy and Security. 2012. Deep- Management Bodies in West Africa: A ening Democracy: A Strategy for Improv- Comparative Study of the Contribu- ing the Integrity of Elections Worldwide. tion of Electoral Commissions to the Geneva: Kofi Annan Foundation. Strengthening of Democracy, ed. Ismaila Guobadia, Abel I. 2009. Reflections of a Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L. Nigerian Electoral Umpire. Benin City, Jinadu and Pascal Kambale, 108–61. Nigeria: Mindex Publishing Com- Dakar: Open Society Foundations. pany Limited. ———. 2011b. “Sierra Leone.” In Elec- Harbom, Lotta, ed. 2004. States in Armed tion Management Bodies in West Conflict 2003. Uppsala: University of Africa: A Comparative Study of the Uppsala, Department of Peace and Contribution of Electoral Commissions Conflict Research. to the Strengthening of Democracy, Harris, Peter, and Ben Reilly, eds. 1998. ed. Ismaila Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Adele L. Jinadu and Pascal Kam- Options for Negotiators. Stockholm: bale, 209–44. Dakar: Open Society International Institute for Democracy Foundations. and Electoral Assistance. Kambale, Pascal. 2011. “Overview: The Hayward M. Fred. 1987. “Introduction.” Contribution of Electoral Manage- In Elections in Independent Africa, ed. ment Bodies to Credible Elections in Fred M. Hayward, 1–23. Boulder, West Africa.” In Election Management CO: Westview Press. Bodies in West Africa: A Comparative Hayward, Fred M., and S. N. Grovogui. Study of the Contribution of Electoral 1987. “Persistence and Change in Commissions to the Strengthening of

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 140 6/25/13 8:33 PM Democracy, ed. Ismaila Fall, Mathias National Electoral Commission of Sierra Hounkpe, Adele L. Jinadu, and Pascal Leone. 2008. Annual Report 2008. Kambale, 1–11. Dakar: Open Society Freetown. Foundations. Nicholas, H. G. 1956. “The French Election Lopez-Pintor, Rafael. 2000. Electoral of 1956: Electoral Law and Machinery.” Management Bodies as Institutions Political Studies 4 (2): 139–50. of Governance. New York: United Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges, ed. 1987. Nations Development Programme, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bureau for Development Policy. Africa: Essays in Contemporary Politics. Mozaffar, Shaheen. 2002. “Patterns of London: Zed Books. Electoral Governance in Africa’s Orozco-Henríquez, Jesús. 2010. Electoral Emerging Democracies.” Interna- Justice: The International Idea Handbook. tional Political Science Review 23 (85): Stockholm: International Institute for 85–101. Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Mozaffar, Shaheen, and Andreas Smith, T. E. 1960. Elections in Developing Schedler. 2002. “The Comparative Countries: A Study of Electoral Proce- Study of Electoral Governance— dures Used in Tropical Africa, Southeast Introduction.” International Political Asia and the British Caribbean. Lon- Science Review 25 (1): 5–27. don: Macmillan.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 141 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 142 6/25/13 8:33 PM 5 ost African elections acrimonious and violent elections have improved, reshap- than other systems; countries with M ing the stereotype that previous civil wars or other pro- they are perverse and conflict based. longed conflicts tend to be more Competitive Only about 20% of elections held prone to electoral conflict; political Elections and in Africa between 1990 and 2008 parties are potential agencies of elec- Conflict involved significant levels of violence toral conflict, both within a party (Goldsmith 2010; Straus 2012). Yet and between them; people regard outbreaks of conflict remain wor- many state security agencies as par- rying, and take on a high profile. tisan in elections; many countries Since 2007, conflict-ridden elections still have weak conflict management in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic frameworks and strategies (though Republic of the Congo, Guinea, there are some outstanding exam- Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe show ples of good practices); and struc- the distance that Africa still needs tural socio-economic factors, includ- to cover in improving its elections. ing friction over access to resources, Conflicts undermine the legitimacy exacerbate electoral conflicts. of elections and their outcomes, and devalue the democratic process. Electoral competition The essence of electoral competi- Nevertheless, the strides that Africa tion is that political parties compete has made in making elections more for power through the public vote, competitive in the past 25 years have and are expected to comply with been very encouraging. It was not the rules of the electoral game. So, long ago that a one-party system political parties enter into complex was ascendant in most countries, relations with each other, competing and authoritarianism generally the to overtake each other or forming order of the day. In some countries, alliances. Through negotiations and voting was supervised through the debates, political parties engage each queuing system: instead of casting a other. These are crucial ingredients secret ballot, voters were required to of competitive democratic politics. queue behind their candidate. Fur- As part of the structure of the gov- ther, most media were under the erning political institutions, par- monopoly control of the incumbent ties are capable of being beacons of party and regime, making it hard for political stability—or major contrib- diverse party agendas and candidates utors to violent conflict. to generate support during election campaigns. Most governments have Political parties serve as mediat- embraced the multi-party system ing institutions that facilitate and and organized regular elections over channel people’s political activi- the past quarter century, when elec- ties. Determining whether par- tions have proliferated impressively. tisan competition is desirable or conflict ridden is in the domain This chapter’s key messages are of party systems, mainly because that the proportional representa- such systems—how many par- tion electoral system is less prone to ties, how large and diverse and how

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 143 6/25/13 8:33 PM autonomous—make a critical dif- party–state relations had become ference in organizing a democratic a hindrance to plurality and power society (Magarian 2003). sharing.

While party competition for votes Dominant party could be regulated by, for instance, Dominant-party systems at times electoral law or election reforms, the show similar characteristics to one- exact number of political parties that party systems. Several parties com- will be represented in the legislature pete for power in elections, but this will not be known until the elec- system is dominated by a single tions are contested, votes counted major party that ascends to power and winners declared. The num- through non-democratic means and ber of political parties that contest thus enjoys long periods in power. is very important for determining Of 16 dominant-party systems in the extent to which the elections are Africa in the early 2000s, 8 had competitive, because it reflects the either experienced conflict or active Most of Africa’s socio-political, ethnic and regional armed opposition (Salih 2003). civil wars contexts—hence the need for ana- and conflicts lysts to distinguish among differ- Two parties during the late ent types of party system (see also Two- party systems are duopolis- 1980s and 1990s table 1.2). tic in that two major parties have are attributable to roughly equal prospects of win- One party ning elections and controlling gov- popular struggles Historically, one-party systems were ernment. In its classic form, it can against hegemonic associated with post-colonial nation- be identified by three criteria: only one-party states alism and state consolidation. Thus two parties enjoy sufficient elec- they enjoyed a monopoly of power toral and legislative strength to using political or constitutional have a realistic prospect of winning means, in effect functioning as per- elections; the larger party can rule manent governments. They had no alone with the remaining politi- institutionalized mechanisms for cal parties providing the opposi- peaceful transfer of power through tion; and power alternates between competitive elections short of a mili- these two parties. Both are elect- tary coup, revolution or popular agi- able, the opposition serving not tation. The fusion of the party–state only as a shadow government, but apparatus also implied entrenched also as a government in the wings party–state relations, with the one- (Ozler 2008). party system enjoying the financial and administrative support of the This system is associated in African state. countries less with ideological polarization and more with ethnic affil- Most of Africa’s civil wars and con- iation and competition. Despite its flicts during the late 1980s and association with adversarial politics, 1990s are attributable to popu- violent conflicts have prevailed in lar struggles against hegemonic only one country (Sierra Leone) of one-party states or states in which six two-party countries.1

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 144 6/25/13 8:33 PM Multiple parties to introduce policies that serve the A multi-party system is character- public good or improve the quality ized by competition among more life for citizens. It should be non- than two parties, reducing the violent. And it is not an event—it is chances of single-party government a process that influences how dem- and increasing the likelihood of coa- ocratic processes and party politics litions. It is hard to define multi- unfold, determining what party will party systems by number of parties govern and the type of government or party supporters’ social back- (majority, minority, coalition). ground. Conflict could also be one consequence of party democratiza- Yet incumbent governments are tion whereby internal squabbles for under tremendous pressure to hold party leadership engender conflict. on to power by all means. The pressure emanates from their support Of 15 countries with multi-party base, because of its fear and uncer- systems, 9 have experienced some tainty of what would happen if a form of violent conflict before or new government were to win power Electoral after the transition to democracy.2 and to secure access to the resources systems should that come with winning state power. be considered Polarized pluralism is characteristic Elections therefore become highly instruments of multi-party systems in countries charged, approached with a deadly for conflict where more marked social, ethnic or serious and aggressive mentality management other severe cleavages separate major designed to defeat political oppo- parties or where ethnically based nents and thus capture state power. political parties lose faith in the electoral process and opt for other Electoral systems—elections in means (such as military or electoral particular—weigh citizens’ pref- violence) to ensure the representa- erences and should be considered tion of their ethnic groups in parlia- instruments for conflict management and thus then form the gov- ment. They can of course contribute ernment, either alone or in coalition to violence, but are not the main fac- (Hague et al. 1998; Heywood 2002). tor for it. Most election-related violence subsides once election results Electoral systems and are published, and winners and violent conflict losers declared, as in Burundi, the The difference between countries Democratic Republic of the Congo where elections take place peacefully and Togo. It is only when struc- and otherwise is, in essence, the tural issues are unresolved by elec- depth to which they have institution time that conflicts may persist, tionalized and consolidated democ- as in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique racy, and internalized democratic (in the immediate post-liberation values. period) and Sierra Leone.

An election is a mechanism for call- Does the type of electoral system ing politicians to account and forc- have an association with violence?3 ing them out of office when they fail Among the 19 countries covered

Competitive Elections and Conflict 145

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 145 6/25/13 8:33 PM in table 5.1, the first past the post than half the respondents agree (FPTP) electoral system was the or strongly agree that violence is most conflict ridden. But despite the a recurring phenomenon in gen- association, the system alone can- eral elections in their countries, not explain why conflict is more with Kenya and Zimbabwe at one likely with FPTP. Still, the propor- extreme and Seychelles and Algeria tional representation system is less at the other (figure 5.1). conflictual and makes for inclusiveness in representation—a point As suggested by respondents’ atti- backed up by the majority of expert tudes, the scale varies widely among respondents in the African Gov- countries. For example, after the ernance Report (AGR) III Expert 2007 Kenyan election, an estimated Opinion Survey, who felt that elec- 1,500 were killed and 600,000 dis- toral stability and diversity manage- placed (Leonard et al. 2009; Kag- ment are better promoted through wanja and Southall 2009). About proportional representation. 1,000 people were killed around the time of South Africa’s found- Thus electoral reforms cannot guar- ing elections in 1994. In Zimbabwe, antee preventing violent conflict, as most elections since 2000 have seen electoral systems are entwined with violence, with about 200 killed in their manifold contexts. Violent 2002 and about 300 in 2008 (Com- conflicts associated with elections monwealth Secretariat 2002; Zim- are symptoms of other deeper social babwe Election Support Network problems that cannot be resolved 2008). In 2005 in Ethiopia, nearly by reforms to the electoral system, 200 people were killed during an either alone or alongside reforms to election (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009). party regulations. The unofficial death toll in Nige- ria was put as high as 200 during Election-related conflicts the 2007 general election (Zasha Few African states have entirely et al. 2007; Egwu et al. 2009) and escaped political conflict, includ- about 800 in post-election vio- ing election-related violence. In 17 lence in 2011—the “Elections Year” of the 40 project countries more (box 5.1). Côte d’Ivoire’s disputed

Table 5.1 Electoral systems and violent conflicts

Countries with political or electoral violence System Family Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone List proportional representation Proportional representation Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia Party block vote/list proportional Mixed representation and first past the post Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe First past the post Plurality/majority Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Two-round system the Congo, Guinea and Togo

Source: IDEA 2006; Hamdok and Salih 2007.

146 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 146 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 5.1 Electoral violence is a recurring phenomenon at general elections—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Kenya Zimbabwe Nigeria Guinea Sierra Leone Togo Senegal Zambia Gabon Uganda Gambia Chad Congo Malawi Mozambique Ghana Liberia Ethiopia Namibia Egypt Lesotho Madagascar Benin Tanzania Comoros São Tomé & Príncipe Mali Mauritius Angola Tunisia Burkina Faso Cameroon Mauritania Djibouti South Africa Cape Verde Rwanda Botswana Seychelles Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 147 6/25/13 8:33 PM causes relate to deep-rooted socio- Box 5.1 T he African Union and the 2011 Elections Year: economic concerns related to diver- Challenges and successes sity, or perceived unfairness or discrimination by certain structures in The 2011 Elections Year in Africa came to a close with the parliamentary elec- the electoral system. These causes tions in Gabon in December 2011. In all, 28 elections were organized on the are amplified where levels of diver- continent—a sign that democracy is gaining ground, against all odds, on a con- sity along ethnic, racial, religious or tinent where recourse to inclusive electoral systems has become the norm and regional lines are high. instrument for democratic governance. Conflict usually breaks out because It should be pointed out that electoral disputes and conflicts erupt before and of failure to resolve political and after the actual vote. One can in the light of this reality note the criticisms lev- economic discrimination, as compe- elled against African Union (AU) observers to the extent that their statements tition for resources, including power, and reports do not take into consideration such important elements for a intensifies along these lines during more comprehensive evaluation of the electoral process. The AU is deploying elections (boxes 5.2 and 5.3). In the pre-election assessment teams, although for very short periods, to identify worst case, this failure deepens soci- potential challenges and to recommend appropriate preventive measures. ety’s fault-lines, leading to civil war (box 5.4). The Elections Year in Africa has been generally positive. The cases of Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo indeed call on leaders, peo- The misery of such wars does not ples and stakeholders at all levels to deal with the numerous obstacles facing end with the postwar political settle- the democratic processes in Africa and to look for effective means of resolving ment: Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic them. Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have all experienced The majority of the polls were conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. election-related violence, signs that There have been winners and losers shaking hands, despite difficulties, for the earlier wounds had not completely sake of the larger interest of their peoples, thus paving the way for continuity healed, or that the settlements were of democratic change, according to the will of these same peoples who them- not well managed. selves are increasingly crowning the democratic culture that is developing. Worse, controversy in Angola over Source: AU 2012. the outcome of the September 1992 presidential election ignited a resumption of the civil war, which election in 2010 saw about 3,000 was fought for another 10 years. The killed, with many more displaced outcome had been 49.6% for the (Campbell 2011; Sane 2011). incumbent Eduardo dos Santos and 40% for Jonas Savimbi. After dis- The causes of election-related vio- agreement on the outcome, a run- lence lie partly in short-term or “trig- off was not held. Savimbi pulled out ger” factors and partly in deeply his UNITA forces from the national rooted structural factors. Short-term army and fighting resumed, caus- causes relate to conjunctural issues ing thousands of casualties until his pertaining to disputes about unfair- death in 2002. ness, disadvantage or misunderstand- ings about processes, mechanisms or Post-conflict states are prone to decisions in an election. Long-term election-related violence where

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 148 6/25/13 8:33 PM social and economic conditions have not improved significantly. In Libe- Box 5.2 F reedom marred by violence, South Africa 1994 ria, for example, a significant portion of those at focus group dis- In 1994, South Africa experienced election-related violence that claimed cussions felt that violence was still more than 1,000 lives (Booysen 2009). It was the culmination of a decade of a major feature of political cam- widespread political violence in KwaZulu-Natal province, where an estimated paigning (AGR III Liberia Coun- 20,000 people had lost their lives (Taylor 2002). try Report 2012). Historically rooted inequalities or grievances can also The roots lay in the contest for the province between the groups linked to the fan separatist demands, as in East- African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. While the former ern Africa, for separate states such drew its support from a wider national base, the latter under Chief Gatsha as Eritrea, Somaliland and South Buthelezi drew from the ethno-regional base of the Zulus, one of the most pop- Sudan. Where there is a large pre- ulous sections of South African society. mium on resources like oil as in the Niger delta, violence is employed to Owing to the suspected hand of apartheid security forces, the contest for ter- press demands for wider redistribu- ritory was especially sharp before 1994. Ethno-regional tensions were fanned, tion of revenues. exacerbating the conflict between the two parties. The legacy of that contest was the violence of 1994. In Kenya, competition for access to land was a major factor in conflicts Election-related violence has, though, fallen steeply in later elections, reflecting during the 2002 and 2007 elec- steps to prevent and manage conflict (see Managing electoral conflict—other tions (Kanyinga 2009). The Rift approaches). Valley was the epicentre of violence in elections in 1992 and 1997, and the heartland of violence in 2007– 2008. The Rift Valley is important Box 5.3 Electoral violence and the indigenous–settler divide because: in Nigeria

It is multi-ethnic with several The November 2008 violence in Jos was some of the worst ever seen in the ethnic groups settled in the country: 200 (official) or 634 (other sources) killed. What was particularly fright- province. Numerically, signifi- ening was that the violence had been increasing around elections since April cant groups include the Kalen- 1994. jin, Masai, Kikuyu and Luhya. [And] the region has the larg- At its core was the battle for “ownership” of the city between the indigenous est share of total national votes people of the Jos environs and the Hausa-Fulani community who had settled and parliamentary constitu- in the city. encies, making it attractive because of the share of total It was a battle beyond the material gains of who became local government national votes and constitu- chairman or councillors. It was the symbolic meaning of ethnic origin of those encies that parties can obtain elected, since that is directly linked to the issue of ownership. Religious identity from ethnic blocs in the area. was also implicated in the Jos crisis—while most Hausa-Fulani are Muslim, The use of the Westminster most indigenous groups are Christian. style, first past the post electoral system makes this par- Source: Egwu 2010. ticularly alluring (Kanyinga 2009, 326).

Competitive Elections and Conflict 149

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 149 6/25/13 8:33 PM Party democracy and Box 5.4 F rom electoral violence to civil war in the Congo conflict

The post-election violence in 1993–1994 arguably laid the groundwork for the Internal party democracy civil war in 1997 in the Congo. Internal party democracy can benefit parties by strengthening parti- After the result of the May 1993 legislative election, which gave President san attachments, mobilizing mem- Lissouba’s party a majority, was disputed by the other contenders (Dennis bers and supporters for participation Sassou-Nguesso and Bernard Kolelas), violence erupted between their militias. in party activities, providing mech- The election was rerun in October 1993, and although the opposition picked up anisms for internal dispute settle- a few more seats, Lissouba’s party retained its majority. The opposition agreed ment and nurturing a popular image to participate in the Assembly, but violent clashes resumed by November. for the party. It can also enhance the Between then and January 1994, as many as 2,000 people were killed. participatory and representational quality of democracy in the general In 1997, clashes between militia loyal to Sassou-Nguesso and President polity (Bojinova 2007). Lissouba broke out as a result of disputes over electoral rules. During May– October when Sassou-Nguesso captured the presidential palace, as many as Applied to Africa, such democracy 15,000 people lost their lives. Clashes continued for the next two years, claim- is in short supply for the following ing the lives of 20,000 more. reasons:

Source: Bekoe 2010. • Political party functions— other than as bodies for contesting elections to control Further, most of the former “white government—are poorly under- highlands” are in the Rift Valley, stood by the African public. where groups compete to secure land rights. • Most parties are associated with the “big man” phenomenon Land-based conflicts were also in which parties become their prominent in Zimbabwe’s elections fiefdoms. in 2000 and 2002. Although the racial factor was a major element in • Most parties have no sys- land politics, the incumbent gov- tematic registration of mem- ernment manipulated the conflict bership or fee collection, and to displace black farmworkers and so depend on a few interest intimidate them from voting for the groups, mostly educated elite opposition (Hammar et al. 2003; supported by traditional lead- Sachikonye 2003). ers and chiefs, particularly during elections. More than half the experts surveyed in 10 countries agree or strongly • The previous point also hin- agree that violence is a major feature ders party supporters’ ability to of political campaigns in their coun- hold the leadership accounta- try. In only four countries did fewer ble for finance and for selection than 10% of respondents consider of candidates at party prima- violence such a feature (figure 5.2).4 ries. When the party depends

150 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 150 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 5.2 Violence is a major feature of political campaigns—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Zimbabwe Guinea Sierra Leone Kenya Nigeria Senegal Togo Gambia Zambia Uganda Congo Liberia Chad Malawi Ethiopia Egypt Mozambique São Tomé & Príncipe Namibia Tanzania Madagascar Gabon Benin Tunisia Angola Comoros Mauritius Cameroon Ghana Lesotho Djibouti Mali Burkina Faso South Africa Mauritania Cape Verde Rwanda Seychelles Botswana Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Competitive Elections and Conflict 151

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 151 6/25/13 8:33 PM on a tycoon as a financier, party in what seemed internal party con- democracy shrinks greatly. flict during the party primaries (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). The lack of internal party democ- Zimbabwe, too, saw pre-election racy shows that the dominant inter- intra-party violence in both the est group can manipulate intra-party Zimbabwe African National Union– democracy. It thus makes party lead- Patriotic Front and the Movement ers all the more important when for Democratic Change. they discuss both major issues that concern their party and the broader Such violence is symbolic of low lev- concerns of citizens and the state. els of tolerance and democratic culture in parties more generally. Few Internal disputes often spill over countries ensure that primaries are to party members and create divi- beyond manipulation, and impunity sion that either contributes to the is widespread. And intra-party vio- split of the party and a new off- lence feeds into the inter-party form, Patrons and shoot or weakens the party’s resolve producing a lethal combination. godfathers play to address public issues. The more a central role a political party is consumed by Inter-party violence in party primary its own internal squabbles, the Democratic stability is threat- election contests more unable its leaders are to gov- ened when ethno-political cleav- ern or pay attention to managing ages reflect “the configuration of it or to muster the goodwill of its deeply divided societies in which membership. two or more internally cohesive, sharply polarized, and spatially As with public elections, party pri- mixed groups are implacably arrayed maries can be highly contested against each other” (Mozaffar et al. affairs, particularly when they are 2003, 380–81), although there is no the gateway to state power and causal relationship between ethnic wealth. Election irregularities, diversity and democratic instability. including rigging, are not uncom- mon, and other procedures are Party systems, instead of treating flouted. Competing candidates may ethnicity as a resource, sometimes mobilize groups, often among youth, foster ethnic exclusion. According to to campaign for them, including Horowitz (2003, 118–19), pooling through intimidation, bribery and electoral systems that: violence (Tijjani 2003). Patrons and “godfathers” play a central role in require candidates to achieve party primary election contests, pit- a regional distribution of votes ting their immense resources behind in addition to a national plu- a candidate in the hope of exerting rality may foster conciliatory control once they win (chapter 6). behaviour if territory is a proxy of ethnicity because groups In Nigeria, in the build-up to the are regionally concentrated. 2007 general elections, two gover- However, systems that do not norship candidates were assassinated provide incentives for vote

152 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 152 6/25/13 8:33 PM pooling and reaching out to The effects of election-related vio- other ethnic groups may make lence are not confined to contest- post-election reconciliation ing parties. When such violence difficult, if not impossible. spreads, it engulfs communities, as during the post-election period Some scholars have put their faith in Kenya in 2007–2008 and Côte in centripetalism, through political d’Ivoire in 2010 (annex 5.1). Dis- systems that promote inter-ethnic placement causes major disruption accommodation, multi-ethnic politi- to economic and social lives of com- cal parties and centre-based politics. munities. A great deal of trauma A representative argument is: and post-stress disorder is generated, especially among victims, Divisive, zero-sum outcomes including many women and chil- are not inevitable characteris- dren (more than 1 million in Côte tics of politics in divided soci- d’Ivoire in 2010–2011). Thus the eties, but often a reaction to multiple consequences of election- institutional rules of the game related violence are felt far beyond Party systems, under which democratic com- the parties and actors directly instead of petition of electoral processes involved. treating ethnicity takes place. Changes to these as a resource, institutional rules, for exam- State security agencies, militias and youth gangs sometimes foster ple, by the introduction of ethnic exclusion electoral systems that facil- Ruling political parties can influ- itate cross-communal com- ence election campaigns and intim- munication, bargaining and idate political opponents through interdependence between rival state security agencies, party militias politicians and the groups and youth groups. they represent can have a major impact on the promo- State agencies tion of moderate politics and The police, army and intelligence thus prospects for democracy forces make a real difference in in divided societies (Reilly promoting—or negating—free and 2001, 2). fair elections. They may fan election conflict and are often prominent In ethnically divided countries, in rigging results and engendering democracy tends to suffer, and under disputes and even violence. In the- the usual types of electoral system, ory, they thus tarnish their reputa- ethnic parties are likely to form, tion, becoming partisan bodies that which can exacerbate the ethnic cannot be trusted to run elections. conflict (Chapman 2004). How- When this happens, election-related ever, it is possible to design elec- conflicts can spread and explode. toral systems that encourage mod- Such political bias within the secu- erate pan-ethnic parties responsive rity forces is evidenced in the failure to all ethnic groups and able to get to apprehend and prosecute offend- these groups’ votes, as in Botswana, ers, resulting in a culture of impu- Ghana and Senegal. nity (Egwu 2010).

Competitive Elections and Conflict 153

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 153 6/25/13 8:33 PM Although Egwu’s observation covers EISA 2008). The compromise was just Nigeria’s experience, it has clear a “Government of National Unity” relevance to other countries such in September 2008, brokered by as Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Thabo Mbeki, with the Southern Republic of the Congo, Kenya and African Development Community Zimbabwe. It is tempting for incum- (SADC) and African Union (AU) bent regimes to use state agencies as guarantors. such as the police to tilt the electoral process in their favour. In other Kenya provides an example where instances, the military is also oppor- ethnic-based militias and private tunistically used to buttress a regime armies mushroomed, eroding the that would have lost the election, as state’s monopoly of violence.5 They Côte d’Ivoire under former Presi- were part of the post-election vio- dent Gbagbo suggested. lence of 2007–2008 (AGR III Kenya Country Report 2012), each fight- In the AGR III Expert Opinion ing for their ethnic group’s cause. Survey, in fewer than half the coun- Similarly in Nigeria, that particu- tries (19) did more than half the lar state monopoly is challenged by expert respondents consider their ethnic militias, “area boys” and vig- security agencies mostly or always ilante groups. Political actors some- fair and non-partisan in the electoral times take control of these groups, process (figure 5.3). But some coun- as in the Rivers, Anambra and Kat- tries’ security forces have shown real sina states (AGR III Nigeria Coun- professionalism (box 5.5). try Report 2012). Militia groups are part of the political landscape in that Militias country—arms in political parties’ Some militia groups of political negotiations for power (Adejumobi parties camouflage themselves as and Kehinde 2007). youth wings; others are overtly militant with political affiliations. In State-linked militia in Côte d’Ivoire Zimbabwe’s elections in 2002 and were linked to post-election violence 2008, sections of war veterans and in 2010 and early 2011. state security groups were linked to the Zimbabwe African National Youth gangs Union–Patriotic Front, and fanned In states that experience election- violence against the opposition par- related violence regularly, some of ties (Zimbabwe Election Support the principal actors are young peo- Network 2002; Commonwealth ple. Although they are not usually Secretariat 2002). In the 2008 run- the initiators of the strategy, they off, state-backed forces raised the play a major role in the violence level of violence, which ultimately itself at the behest of party lead- dissuaded the Movement for Dem- ers. In much pre- and post-election ocratic Change leader, Morgan violence, youths are recruited and Tsvangirai, from standing (Zim- unleashed as “foot soldiers” by party babwe Election Support Network leaders or patrons. Predominantly 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008; young males, they are weaned on

154 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 154 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 5.3 Security forces are fair and non-partisan in their role in the electoral process Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Mostly or always Sometimes Not at all or rarely

South Africa Botswana Algeria Cape Verde São Tomé & Príncipe Mauritius Benin Namibia Rwanda Seychelles Senegal Mali Tunisia Burkina Faso Ghana Gambia Lesotho Djibouti Mauritania Guinea Malawi Cameroon Comoros Mozambique Gabon Madagascar Liberia Angola Zambia Ethiopia Congo Egypt Sierra Leone Chad Kenya Togo Tanzania Uganda Nigeria Zimbabwe 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Competitive Elections and Conflict 155

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 155 6/25/13 8:33 PM no ideological training to act with Box 5.5 C ommendable practices in Cape Verde, Namibia restraint, which explains the chilling and Senegal and mindless violence against opponents in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Cape Verde—electoral harmony Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Election periods are dynamic opportunities with large social movements in the Zimbabwe (box 5.6). country, thus creating space for confrontation, yet there have been no documented cases of mass violence associated with elections. The deployment of Role of media in election police and electoral authorities, as well as party leaders’ encouragement, have conflicts helped to maintain peace. The role of the media is strategic: it has the power and influence Three-quarters of the expert panellists believe in the absence of recurrent vio- to inflame the situation or to lower lence in the country’s general elections. Focus group discussions suggest that the political temperature through violence is more verbal than physical (AGR III Cape Verde Country Report 2012). impartial reporting. In some instances of violence, the media fan Namibia—strong policing the embers of hate and revenge, as seen in the Rwandan genocide The Namibian police has demonstrated a commendable degree of neutrality and Kenyan post-election violence. and professionalism in dealing with the political violence and intimidation drawn Elsewhere, as in Zimbabwe’s post- to its attention. In the Expert Opinion Survey, 72% of survey respondents felt election violence, some sections of that security forces were mostly or always fair and non-partisan (see figure 5.3). the media play a disinformation and partisan campaign to shore up the Still, now may well be the time for dedicated mechanisms, if not the Electoral incumbent party. Commission of Namibia, to be empowered to manage electoral and political disputes (AGR III Namibian Country Report 2012). During electoral conflict in particular, the media are expected to behave Senegal—peaceful elections more responsibly and not deliberately inflame matters. In Rwanda, Despite worries about violence during 2000–2009, Senegal has held regular for example, a legal provision states elections with a stability emanating from a long political evolution. Security that no party or candidate should forces have been a major contributory factor to peace, as in the 2012 presi- threaten or commit violence on dential election campaign. The homogeneity of the population is also a factor another or candidate, or invite any- (AGR III Senegal Country Report 2012). one to do this or otherwise impede the freedom to campaign (AGR III Rwanda Country Report 2012). party propaganda and hate speech before they are set upon opponents The media should also form inde- (of the same or a different party). pendent and diverse views while at the same time avoiding comments High unemployment and poverty that exacerbate conflict, and ensure turn youth into fertile ground for that their information is correct and participants in violence. Cash, alco- timely so as to mitigate the possibil- hol, food and promises for work ity of misinformation in the electoral and positions in party and govern- process (AGR III Kenya Country ment are baits. There is little or Report 2012). In Kenya, the media

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 156 6/25/13 8:33 PM handled around two-thirds of the information on political and elec- Box 5.6 Y outh and political violence in Sierra Leone toral issues. During the 2007 general election, vernacular radio sta- At the root of the decade-long civil war lay a class of marginalized young peo- tions especially had a large impact ple, especially from rural areas, lacking education and jobs. Sierra Leone has a on the outcome, and were linked to very high population of unemployed youth who are susceptible to recruitment. inciting election-related violence. In Because of their involvement in the conflict, their situation—especially the Sierra Leone, party-owned radios under- or unemployed—is a major concern for policy makers: there are more were accused of degenerating into than 30,000 youth ex-combatants, sometimes used in violence. “hate and propaganda mongering” (AGR III Sierra Leone Country Youth are becoming an ever-growing army of unemployed, socially alienated Report 2012, 130). Owned at the and a perennial threat to security, as seen in the political tensions before the time by the ruling and main oppo- 2012 elections. sition party, they were subsequently closed. Source: AGR III Sierra Leone Country Report 2012.

In Zimbabwe, the biased reporting on political and electoral processes point, noting that the most impor- by the state broadcaster has gener- tant of the violence-mitigating fea- ated calls for it to turn into a genu- tures needed to make elections free inely public broadcaster that would and fair in Africa include: cover elections on a “fair and balanced” basis (AGR III Zimbabwe an independent electoral man- Country Report 2012). The Zim- agement body, . . . prompt and babwe Electoral Commission was substantially fair judicial res- enjoined to use its authority under olution of election disputes, the Electoral Act to ensure the effective and non-partisan broadcaster did not use hate speech oversight of the security of the during the campaign. electoral process (non-partisan police and an uninvolved Electoral codes and media regula- army), and the assurance that tions need to contain provisions that losing parties will not be per- guard against party and state media manently disadvantaged. being inflammatory during electoral conflict. This calls for mechanisms to speed- ily resolve the conflicts when they Managing electoral arise (as in Tunisia, box 5.8). Such conflict—state mechanisms mechanisms should include repre- Conflicts or disputes can arise at sentatives of parties and contest- any stage of the electoral process ants in the shape of committees that (box 5.7). The critical point is how have authority to investigate causes to prevent, manage and then resolve of conflicts and prescribe solutions them, preventing them from fes- to them. In South Africa, for exam- tering, as that deepens mistrust ple, the mechanisms include con- between parties and candidates. flict management panellists, law Leonard (2010, 49) makes this enforcement structures (such as joint

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 157 6/25/13 8:33 PM up and can quickly become vio- Box 5.7 P otential areas of electoral conflict lent. Delays in announcing election results often raise the political tem- Five types of conflict can occur during elections: perature and fuel suspicion of ballot • Identity conflict during the registration process when refugees or other tampering. conflict-forced migrants cannot establish or re-establish their officially recognized identities. Conflicts and especially vio- • Campaign conflict as rivals seek to disrupt the opponents’ campaigns, lence at the counting and results- intimidate voters and candidates and use threats and violence to influence announcement stage harm the integ- participation in voting. rity of the process, and once it has • Balloting conflict on election day when rivalries are played out at the polling been damaged, it is extremely hard station. to restore confidence in the process • Results conflict on election day when rivalries are played out at the polling in the face of electoral disputes and station. violence. It is therefore vital to watch • Representation conflict when elections are organized as zero-sum events out for potential triggers of conflict. and losers are left out of participation in governance. These include suspicions about the Source: Fischer 2002. handling of ballots, including their movement to and from counting centres, their collation and the timing of the results announcement. Box 5.8 M anaging electoral appeals in Tunisia This phase of the electoral process in Africa—balloting and declaring Although tough challenges were experienced during the 2011 presidential results—can take two to four days, election, the electoral process was relatively peaceful. A sizeable military and sometimes more, and is a period of police presence at polling stations helped. very high tension. Handling this phase in a professional, transpar- Although the appeal period established by Decree Law No. 35 was very short, ent and even-handed manner would candidates filed 132 appeals against decisions of regional electoral bodies. greatly reduce that tension and More than half succeeded. The appeal procedure had previously been simpli- potential for conflict. fied, which helped to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the proclamation of results. An electoral process cannot, however, always avoid genuine mistakes. Source: AGR III Tunisia Country Report 2012. There should be a built-in mechanism to enable a transparent process of recounting ballots or organiz- operation committees), party liaison ing a rerun in the affected constit- committees and the courts (Moepya uency or district. Such was the case 2010). in Ghana’s 2008 election, which was widely judged to have been free and The most sensitive conflicts relate fair (Kelly 2009). Even in that case, to ballot handling, and count- the election results showed that eth- ing and announcing results. When nic rivalries had not disappeared there is little trust in how elec- but, thankfully, “the key Akan–Ewe toral management boards (EMBs) divide only manifests itself in elec- handle these stages, disputes flare toral rather than violent rivalry, and

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 158 6/25/13 8:33 PM regime changes enable this to be Constitutional and legal basis of contained with each ethnic group dispute adjudication having an opportunity to benefit African constitutions and elec- from periods of being in govern- toral law typically provide for adju- ment” (Kelly 2009, 446). dication mechanisms to resolve pre- and post-election disputes. Adjudicating disputes The importance of such provi- The more efficient and effective an sions is that the mechanisms would electoral system is, the fewer the help reduce or eliminate the inci- electoral disputes requiring adju- dence of such disputes and pre- dication by courts or other bodies. vent them from erupting into Still, few elections are so perfect violence. In other words, with- that they do not generate disputes. out such provisions and mecha- They can occur between parliamen- nisms alongside other democratic tary candidates, competing parties diversity-management provisions and rival presidential candidates. and mechanisms, African elections The United States in 2000 attracted will become mechanisms not for African the eyes of the world with the dis- conflict prevention or resolution, constitutions pute between George Bush and Al but for conflict precipitation and and electoral law Gore, the Republican and Dem- aggravation. typically provide ocratic candidates. Africa more for adjudication recently has seen heated disputes Where there are provisions for mechanisms to in Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007), adjudication, it is common for the Nigeria (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), EMBs and the courts to share the resolve pre-and Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea (2010) powers. While pre-election disputes post-election and the Democratic Republic of the are generally handled through inter- disputes Congo (2011). nal party-adjudication mechanisms or the normal law courts (or both), Most electoral disputes in Africa post-election disputes in a number arise from the following malprac- of countries such as Nigeria and tices: violations of electoral law or Sierra Leone are handled in special party electoral regulations; admin- courts (or election tribunals). Both istrative inefficiency; procedural types usually come under provisions flaws; and corruption in the electoral for reviewing their decisions—by process.6 the EMBs, for review by the courts; by courts, for review by higher While disputes are not preventable, courts. what is crucial is whether mechanisms are in place to resolve them A general principle for reviewing peacefully and satisfactorily (see decisions in electoral disputes adju- chapter 4). The EMB, for exam- dicated by EMBs is that aggrieved ple, needs to have certain principles candidates and parties must have for handling disputes, and its proce- recourse to the courts because dures should be known to everyone, EMBs, embedded as they often are rule based and predictable (AGR III in the political “thicket”, should not Kenya Country Report 2012). be judge or jury in their own case.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 159 6/25/13 8:33 PM In Ethiopia, Electoral Law Procla- impartiality is also sometimes con- mation No. 53 grants the National tested. For example in Sierra Leone, Electoral Board powers to “inves- corruption was believed to under- tigate, cancel election results, order mine the independence of judges re-election or order injunction (AGR III Sierra Leone Country of the act and bring perpetrators Report 2012). before the court of law where it has received information about violation Delays are also an issue. Election of law in the election process”. In petitions have all too commonly South Africa, Electoral Commis- dragged out in court, hurting pub- sion Act No. 15 of 1996 empowers lic confidence and government legit- the Independent Electoral Commis- imacy. Tardiness by the Supreme sion to adjudicate election-related Court to rule on a case between disputes arising from the organiza- the National Electoral Commis- tion, administration and conduct of sion and the main opposition party elections, if they are of an adminis- in Sierra Leone over cancellation of trative nature, and to resolve issues 477 polling stations produced ten- that are a subject of objection or sion between the Chief Electoral appeal to it by conciliation. The law Commissioner and the opposition also provides for appeal against the for more than four years. Delays in decisions of the electoral commis- dealing with 2007’s electoral com- sion on disputes to the Electoral plaints created a legitimacy crisis for Court, which acts as the final court government in opposition strong- of appeal on such matters and which holds in the Southern and East- has the same status as the Supreme ern regions (AGR III Sierra Leone Court. Country Report 2012).

In Nigeria, in cases decided by the Responding to delays, Ghana has Supreme Court, the jurisprudence instituted a mechanism to pro- of election dispute adjudication vide timely electoral dispute reso- has shifted from a position of non- lution. In 2008, the Chief Justice interference in what was described of Ghana issued a policy directive as “a domestic affair” of politi- to designated judges and courts to cal parties regarding their nomi- hear election disputes and peti- nation processes for elective public tions as well as electoral offences office to one of accepting and adju- that would be brought before them dicating election-related party dis- (AGR III Ghana Country Report putes brought by aggrieved party 2012). Election disputes and peti- members. tions would be heard by supervising High Court judges and designated The credibility of the election courts judges in the regions. In Mauritius, is not always high. In 2007 after election-related disputes are usually Kenya’s disputed presidential elec- monitored at the judicial level, where tion, one of the contenders declined results of elections can be challenged to apply for an election petition over through election petitions (AGR III ineffective judicial procedures. Their Mauritius Country Report 2012).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 160 6/25/13 8:33 PM Malawi too has risen to the challenge (box 5.9). Box 5.9 Malawi’s reform of adjudication

Unflattering perceptions of dispute Because of weak deadlines to deal with election-related cases, most cases management before the high court in Malawi drag on way beyond the election period and The general picture from the most of them turn purely academic. Expert Opinion Survey is that election disputes are not well managed Noting that justice delayed is justice denied, the Chief Justice issued a Practice (figure 5.4). Only in eight countries Direction (No. 2) in February 2009 abridging the time periods for the cases to did at least half the respondents be dealt with. The document stipulates steps and time-frames for proceedings agree or strongly agree that election to be respected by the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal as well as the disputes are well managed to the parties involved to avoid unnecessary delays. It provides for 24 days between satisfaction of the political parties. the time an application is made and the time the High Court should rule. These In 15 countries more than half the steps were needed: Malawians are generally dissatisfied with how electoral respondents disagreed or strongly disputes are managed (see figure 5.4). disagreed. These findings point to a serious vacuum in institutional Source: AGR III Malawi Country Report 2012. mechanisms for handling election disputes. cost-effectiveness, accessibility and States should therefore devise appro- swiftness during the electoral pro- priate mechanisms—election courts cess. Mauritius, Namibia and South or tribunals. The mechanism must Africa usually take their disputes be rooted within the judicial system, to election tribunals and courts and work closely with the EMB. (Kadima 2009), although the Dem- ocratic Republic of the Congo (and High costs South Africa) uses other mecha- As processing election disputes and nisms, too. petitions is expensive, only parties and candidates with deep pockets Conflict management panels are “need apply”. Those with limited appropriate, especially where even resources will struggle, so a legal courts are not seen as impartial, assistance fund to assist them to file and in rural areas where courts are and sustain their petitions may be scarce. The creation of multi-party needed, for example. This would liaison committees in some coun- help dispute mechanisms cater to the tries has enabled EMBs to consult diversity of players in the electoral stakeholders regularly and address process. issues as they arise. In South Africa, party liaison committees have been Experiences in managing electoral a major force in reducing electoral conflicts deaths by defusing electoral disputes In Southern Africa, mechanisms of (box 5.10). mediation, arbitration and conciliation are being increasingly used A recent attempt in Sierra Leone to in conflict prevention and man- address inter-party strife is a 2012 agement. Their merit lies in their amendment to the Political Parties

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 161 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 5.4 Election disputes are usually well managed to the satisfaction of the political parties Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Agree or strongly agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly disagree or disagree

South Africa Algeria Mauritius Cape Verde Botswana Seychelles Rwanda Gambia Ghana Tunisia Senegal Angola São Tomé & Príncipe Namibia Comoros Egypt Tanzania Cameroon Liberia Ethiopia Guinea Uganda Congo Djibouti Zambia Mali Gabon Mauritania Malawi Madagascar Benin Sierra Leone Mozambique Kenya Lesotho Nigeria Chad Togo Zimbabwe Burkina Faso 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 162 6/25/13 8:33 PM Registration Commission, which seeks to strengthen the commission’s Box 5.10 Party liaison committees in South Africa regulatory powers over political parties. The amendment has been Created in 1998 with membership drawn from two representatives of each reg- described as “remarkable in that it is istered party, the party liaison committees serve as a vehicle for consultation the first of its kind in the region and and cooperation between the Independent Electoral Commission and political provides extensive oversight powers parties on electoral matters. on political party activities” (Fort- ier 2012). They have played a direct and crucial role in ensuring that the immediate and direct contestants in an election regularly consult each other and the commis- Managing electoral sion on any matter that may harm the credibility, freeness and fairness of any conflict—other approaches legislative election. These committees keep up their activities, unlike other con- The discourse on conflict man- flict resolution mechanisms, throughout the electoral cycle. agement and resolution needs further development. For one thing, One example: to avoid the issue of boundary disputes, the commission con- good practices are too rarely sults party liaison committees in all spheres of government, on the time-frames disseminated—not all election con- and principles for each cycle of delimiting voting districts, and the approval flicts turn violent and displace peo- system to be followed. ple. For another, electoral policy makers need to learn from and build Source: Moepya 2010. on those experiences that have not only successfully defused electoral conflicts but have established elec- 1998 to ensure a provincial electoral toral systems that minimize griev- environment that would accommo- ances grounded in diversity and date free and peaceful participation unfairness. Some good practices— (Mottiar 2010). Five subcommittees from civil society and international were set up on democracy and voter and regional organizations—that education, violence monitoring, have helped to prevent or resolve mediation and conflict resolution, election-related conflicts are now election observation, and legal com- highlighted. pliance and litigation (box 5.11).

Civil society initiatives The CSOs succeeded in defusing political violence in the most volatile South Africa. Election deaths fell province in South Africa. Election- from more than 1,000 in 1994 to related violence across the country zero in the 2004 and 2009 elections. also fell heavily over the 15 years This sterling achievement stems after 1994. These CSO initiatives largely from pre-emptive work by were complemented by the Elec- civil society organizations (CSOs) toral Act (1998), which contains a and the Independent Electoral binding Code of Conduct for parties Commission, as well as party liaison and candidates, and by an Electoral committees. Tackling political intol- Court (Booysen 2009). erance, the KwaZulu-Natal Democ- racy and Elections Forum—a net- The Electoral Institute for Sustain- work of 17 CSOs—was formed in able Development in Africa (EISA)

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 163 6/25/13 8:33 PM especially in North and South Kivu Box 5.11 K waZulu-Natal Democracy and Elections Forum, and Maniema, where the potential South Africa for violence was high (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009). The main focus of the violence-monitoring subcommittee was to monitor traditional hot spots and communicate information to the Independent Electoral Nigeria. The National Campaign on Commission and to the police. It became an early warning mechanism that Reduction of Electoral Violence was highlighted areas and incidents of violence, and that attempted to enable the introduced in 2007 as a systematic relevant bodies to mitigate such violence before it escalated (Mottiar 2010). The approach to tracking election vio- visibility of violence monitors went some way in curtailing violence. lence and making information available in the form of an early warning The mediation and conflict resolution subcommittee and the legal compliance system to stakeholders, police and and litigation subcommittee helped promote peace during elections as they state authorities, and creating chan- convened stakeholders while targeting and representing the grass roots, nels for responding to violence as it involving them more fully in the process. Mediators received respect, partly developed (Egwu 2010). because: “Mediators are generally expected to intervene and mediate in cases where the Electoral Code of Conduct is violated. Mediators at both levels Election-related mediation by [mediation and conflict resolution, and legal compliance and litigation] are international and regional recruited with regard to their previous experience in mediation and conflict res- organizations olution, and their familiarity with electoral processes, and they are also required Mediation in election disputes by to be neutral and therefore may not hold rank in a party” (Mottiar 2010, 121). international and regional organizations has grown recently, including that by the United Nations (UN), model helped assuage election- AU, Economic Community of West related conflict through community- African States (ECOWAS) and based mediation panels. Named SADC. It proved critical in Guinea, after the regional EISA, which con- Kenya and Zimbabwe. These efforts ceived and propagated it, the model should be made sustainable to provide emerged out of the institute’s prac- a sufficient basis for those countries tical experiences in assisting coun- to wean themselves off such assis- tries. Starting in South Africa, it tance in the medium to long term. has been replicated in Lesotho and Zambia. Some traditional chiefs, The challenge now is to set up an security forces and even the judici- early warning system through which ary have joined the effort (Kadima these organizations can intervene to 2009). pre-empt conflict in the first place. Their protocols on governance and Democratic Republic of the Congo. elections should therefore be rat- EISA helped to set up panels with ified so that they can begin to get the EMB, political parties and involved more closely in managing CSOs. Grass-roots initiatives were conflict (AU 2007; SADC 2004). used to prevent and manage conflicts (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009). Already, the AU’s innovative Con- The mediators played a crucial role tinental Early Warning System is in defusing and managing conflicts an attempt to forestall diversity- that emerged among the grass roots, related conflicts, especially related to

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 164 6/25/13 8:33 PM elections (box 5.12). It needs further strengthening. The same applies to Box 5.12 The Continental Early Warning System the commitment of the AU to EMBs when they require such support. Article 12 of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Secu- Elections should be transformed into rity Council of the African Union (AU) provides for the establishment of the conflict management tools rather Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) whose primary purpose is the “pro- than conflict and instability triggers vision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security (AU Panel of the Wise 2010). to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa”. An even larger issue is tackling the very structure—of diversity and The CEWS consists of two parts: inequality—that incubates election • an observation and monitoring centre known as “the situation room” at the conflict. As seen, its conditions are Conflict Management Directorate of the AU, and responsible for data col- historically rooted, and only con- lection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators certed political action by national module; and governments, parties and CSOs will • observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms to be linked suffice. The root problems must be directly through appropriate means of communications to the situation eradicated—it is not enough to deal room, and to collect and process data at their level and transmit them to with their manifestations during the situation room. election time. Since 2006, efforts have been made to get the CEWS up and running, although African countries have already much more needs to be done to ensure that it effectively deals with election- developed regional and subregional related conflicts. mechanisms. At the pan-African level, the AU’s African Charter on Source: AU Panel of the Wise 2010, 46–47. Democracy, Governance and Elec- tions stipulates that state parties to the Charter shall (AU 2007): legally recognized political stakeholders, government and • establish and strengthen inde- other political actors before, pendent and impartial national during and after elections. The electoral bodies responsible for code shall include a commit- the management of elections; ment by political stakeholders to accept the results of the elec- • establish and strengthen tion or challenge them through national mechanisms that exclusively legal channels. redress election-related disputes in a timely manner; The AU and subregional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC • ensure fair and equitable access have mounted election observa- by contesting parties and candi- tion missions in almost all elections dates to state controlled media where countries allow them. Fur- during elections; and ther, Article 19 of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework • ensure that there is a bind- stipulates the grouping’s responsibil- ing code of conduct governing ity towards conflict prevention, that

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 165 6/25/13 8:33 PM is, early warning, mediation, concil- platforms that bring together iation, preventive disarmament and electoral management boards, preventive deployment, such as the political parties, security ser- ECOWAS mediating arm and its vices, the media and civil soci- Standby Force (ECOWAS 2008). ety for the exchange of views, formulation of electoral codes of At the subregional level, ECOWAS conduct and modalities for the has also set a solid track record in peaceful resolution of election- bringing to bear its Conflict Preven- related disagreements. tion Framework (which should be read alongside “The Supplementary ECOWAS has used intervention Protocol on Democracy and Good (Sierra Leone and Liberia), media- Governance”; ECOWAS 2001). tion and reconciliation approaches (Gambia, Guinea and Togo), as • Article 38 advocates for the well as the threat of force (Burkina strict adherence to constitutional Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali) in The African norms in electoral practices that some West African countries where Union’s reject unconstitutional acces- national mechanisms had failed. innovative sion to or maintenance of power, Continental Early and sets the parameters for the The East African Community Warning System conduct of peaceful and credible (EAC) and SADC have also estab- is an attempt to elections that are free, fair and lished mechanisms in their member transparent. The Protocol further states. The SADC Principles and forestall diversity- tasks ECOWAS to assist mem- Guidelines Governing Democratic related conflicts ber states in electoral matters. Elections have been tested twice (Matlosa 2005). Although SADC’s • Article 53 outlines mechanisms efforts have not managed to gain for ensuring the efficacy of the more than a government of national Democracy and Governance unity in Zimbabwe, it did remove Protocol by outlining activities Madagascar’s president, who staged such that ECOWAS shall facil- a coup in March 2009. In that itate the provision of assistance instance, SADC not only refused to to member states and local con- recognize the usurpers but also sus- stituencies in the preparations pended the country from all SADC for credible elections, including institutions (Møller 2009).7 technical and financial support for the conduct of census, voter Coalitions of SADC countries have education, enactment of credible intervened—with UN or SADC electoral codes, compilation of mandates—to restore democracy voters’ registers and training of in countries under political stress. electoral officials, monitors and In response to the joint Rwandan observers. and Ugandan military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the • Article 53 also urges mem- Congo in 1998, Angola, Namibia ber states to encourage the and Zimbabwe sent forces to protect establishment of permanent the regime of Laurent Kabila, which

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 166 6/25/13 8:33 PM might be seen as collective defence which is sometimes manifested in the sense of the UN Charter’s in clashes between contend- article 51. Even though the mission ers’ supporters. More ominous, initially had no formal SADC man- however, is inter-party conflict date, it was later endorsed, after the during election campaigns and fact. Earlier in 1998, South Africa over disputed election outcomes. and Botswana launched an intervention in Lesotho, officially to pre- • Party liaison committees have vent a military coup, which likewise been potent in defusing disputes received an SADC mandate of sorts during elections. (Møller 2009). • Successful mediation by inter- The EAC is developing its election national and regional organiza- observation guidelines and the long- tions has increased. Although awaited EAC Protocol on Good positive in Kenya and Zim- Governance. However, the sub- babwe, the challenge remains to regional community has put to good remove the root causes of these Successful use the AU Declaration on the Prin- conflicts, as well as their con- mediation by ciples Governing Democratic Elec- junctural triggers. international tions in Africa, the UN Declaration and regional on Human Rights and the Interna- • Dispute-settlement mechanisms organizations tional Covenant on Civil and Polit- are still not properly institution- has increased ical Rights. It is under these guide- alized in most countries—too lines that the EAC launched several little is done, too late. election observation missions to Kenya in 2007 and Burundi in 2010. • The tools for preventing violence should be woven into each These actions by the AU illus- stage of the electoral cycle. trate the strong role it is playing in mediation—though some conflicts EISA (2010) sums up some les- still need urgent defusing work. sons from Africa’s election crises (box 5.13), which, along with the Conclusions and above conclusions, set the stage for recommendations the following recommendations. This chapter tentatively draws the following conclusions: A holistic approach In situations of diversity, as in much • Party systems and electoral sys- of Africa, elections should not be tems are invariably linked to pro- viewed as a quick fix to challenges pensity for conflict, with propor- of access to power, development and tional representation associated peace and stability. The conditions with less acrimonious and violent should be suitable and appropriate, elections than other systems. and it inadvisable to rush an election before enough preparation has • Most political parties have a been carried out. The legal, con- deficit in intra-party democracy, stitutional and electoral framework

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 167 6/25/13 8:33 PM Elections as a conflict Box 5.13 Key lessons from past election crises in Africa management tool Free, fair and peaceful elections There are key lessons to be drawn from past election crises on the continent, contribute towards resolving com- which may provide some insight into ways of instituting a new ethos of electoral petition for power and succession. management. They give citizens an opportunity to choose between different ideologies • Election-related violence is a particular type of political violence that occurs and programmes at local, regional within the context of the overall process of democratization. Although it and national levels. The best par- may occur within countries that are putatively “consolidated”, it can also ties, candidates and programmes happen in less consolidated democratic systems. should win. Elections should be transformed into conflict manage- • Electoral violence may be a subtype of political violence in which actors ment tools rather than triggers for employ coercion as a strategic instrument to advance their interests or conflict and instability (AU Panel of achieve specific political goals. the Wise 2010), and thus structures should be set up to ensure that elec- • Electoral dispute settlement mechanisms are not properly institutionalized toral disputes are handled amicably in most countries. Failure to resolve problems raised in petitions relating to and early so that they do not escalate electoral processes promptly may serve as a catalyst for conflict. into violence.

• The tendency for last minute or ex post facto attention to conflict preven- Early warning system on elections tion is un-strategic and insufficient for managing the complex dynamics Those charged with election and causes of electoral conflict. Tools for preventing violence must be administration should set up an woven into each stage of the electoral cycle. early warning system that identifies areas prone to election-related • Lack of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government insti- conflict, so that contesting parties, tutions as a whole sows seeds of mistrust and discontent. the EMB, state security agencies and CSOs work together to defuse • Although regulatory legal arrangements exist at national and continental disputes. Their work may well be levels, they are not always enforced, and there is often an interval between front-loaded to the early stages of the acceptance and signature of an instrument and the point at which the the electoral cycle before grievances stipulated ratifications are effected. develop further. Information from national and regional research bod- • Technical assistance with electoral processes has been effective in pro- ies, the African Peer Review Mech- viding compliance standards and capacity building for EMBs, political anism and the media should form parties and non-governmental and media organizations. This should be the basis of the collective knowledge encouraged. on these hot spots (AU Panel of the Wise 2010). Source: EISA 2010. Electoral codes of conduct and party liaison committees should be clear, transparent and In addition to formal electoral regu- strictly followed by contestants, lations, also important are electoral as disputes among them about the codes of conduct endorsed by con- framework and time-frame do not testing parties, the EMB and state augur well. authorities involved in elections.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 168 6/25/13 8:33 PM These codes place an obligation, Mediating role of regional particularly on contesting parties organizations and candidates, to desist from activi- Countries should be encouraged to ties such as hate speech and violence. ratify protocols that relate to elec- Penalties for infringing such codes tions and democratic governance. should be specified and enforced. Africa’s regional and subregional initiatives on democracy and good Party liaison committees can play a governance, and dispute manage- valuable role during election cam- ment of elections, should be har- paigns by providing a channel for monized and coordinated to main- airing grievances and misunder- tain pan-African policy coherence. standings during campaigns. Con- AU (2007) provides a laudable pol- stant communication between com- icy framework, which should be put mittee members, the EMB and state into practice and implemented by agencies such as the police can help the subregional integration organi- to defuse tension. zations in an active rather than reac- tive manner. Africa’s regional Professional and non-partisan role and subregional of state security agencies Election observation and monitoring initiatives on Some state security agencies move Contesting parties may be deterred democracy and good beyond their professional and non- from electoral abuse if they know governance should partisan boundaries during elec- that they are being watched and be harmonized tions. This amounts to an abuse of their activities documented. There power, which skews the electoral should therefore be unrestricted and coordinated to playing field and can generate con- scope of their observation and mon- maintain pan-African siderable violence. Many agen- itoring during elections by groups policy coherence cies can act with impunity, dissolv- that meet the criteria in the electoral ing respect for them. It is absolutely law. imperative that state agencies remain non-partisan and professional, and Research those that do not should be judged Africa’s research base on elections in the appropriate courts. and related violence, dispute management, EMBs and the increasing role Policies towards youth of regional and subregional organ- Some of the worst election vio- izations is far too small. Research lence has been committed by gangs centres and institutions need sup- of unemployed youths, recruited by port to analyse the processes of dem- unscrupulous politicians. Strate- ocratic governance, including the gies to address election-related vio- role of political parties, EMBs and lence should therefore include ways elections. to gainfully occupy or rehabilitate youth so that they do not fall prey Research should be conducted to to such approaches. Programmes reconsider the factors influenc- should also be launched for them to ing the relationship among party be exposed to civic education so as systems, electoral systems and to dissuade them from violence. diversity, and should examine the

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 169 6/25/13 8:33 PM circumstances in which diversity is malpractices. A review of them is a factor of stability rather than vio- therefore needed. lence and instability. There is an urgent need to redress The linkages between electoral sys- the intra- and inter-party democratic tems and conflict should also be deficit and to establish credible researched further, to find out the mechanisms for managing internal extent to which a particular electoral party disputes. Owing to common system reduces prospects of conflict. factors that propel inter- and intra- (For instance, how much more capa- party disputes, it is important that ble of defusing election-related con- these two processes are treated as an flict is the proportional representa- integral part of promotion efforts for tion system?) internal democracy. Platforms for party-to-party dialogue are needed Policy dialogue for responding to national, non- Legal and administrative dispute- partisan issues. management instruments are plentiful, but a chasm yawns Training between principle and practice. Programmes are needed to develop Some of them are too imperfect the capacity of election administra- to stymie the more sophisticated tion staff.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 170 6/25/13 8:33 PM Annex 5.1 Inter-party violence in six African countries

Burundi (2010) A presidential election was held in In April 2009, the Party of the Lib- two rounds. The first was held on eration of the Hutu People aban- 31 October 2010, and a second, in doned armed struggle and formed which President Laurent Gbagbo a political party. Pierre Nkurun- faced opposition leader Alassane ziza, former leader of the Hutu rebel Ouattara, was held on 28 Novem- group, National Council for the ber 2010. Former president Gbagbo Defence of Democracy–Forces for refused to step down after Afri- the Defence of Democracy, became can and Western countries declared president in August 2005 after the that his rival, Alassane Ouattara, group swept local and parliamentary won the election. Gbagbo, backed elections—a coalition of 17 opposi- by the army and youth militias, tion groups. hung onto power, while Ouattara set up a rival power centre from a In line with the new constitution, local hotel, protected by UN troops the government consists of a 60/40 and soldiers from a former north- Hutu–Tutsi ratio. Yet in May 2010 ern rebel group. The stalemate was the situation began deteriorating ended with the capture of Gbagbo when 13 opposition parties rejected in April 2011. the results of Burundi’s landmark district elections, claiming mas- Guinea (2010) sive fraud. Twelve of them formed In elections of 27 June 2010, Cel- a coalition, the Alliance of Demo- lou Diallo, Prime Minister and can- crats for Change, in early June and didate of the Union of Democratic announced a boycott of the presi- Forces of Guinea, obtained 44% of dential elections of 28 June 2010. the votes, setting up a run-off with The elections were further marred the veteran opposition politician and by political violence that escalated leader of the Rally of the Guinean with the start of the presidential People, Alpha Condé, who emerged campaign on 12 June. as the runner-up of the contest with 18% of the votes. Following the first Côte d’Ivoire (2010) round of voting, Condé lodged a In April 2008, political party leaders complaint with the courts, accus- signed a landmark code of conduct ing officials of the electoral commis- in a high-profile ceremony attended sion of defrauding his candidacy of by UN Secretary General Ban Ki- 600,000 votes. The courts upheld moon. On 12 February 2010, Pres- Condé’s accusations and sentenced ident Gbagbo dissolved both the the head of the Independent Elec- government and the Independent toral Commission of Guinea and Electoral Commission, in which he another top official to one year in accused the head of the commission, jail. The conviction sparked a week Robert Mambé, of adding names of violence between supporters of to the electoral register to boost the the two remaining contestants for opposition vote. the presidency.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 171 6/25/13 8:33 PM Kenya (2007–2008) ban on the rally because President The 27 December 2007 elec- Muluzi was holding another rally tions pitted President Mwai Kibaki in Bangwe Township, about 8 kilo- and his Party of National Unity metres away. In a separate incident, against Raila Odinga, leader of National Democratic Alliance leader the Orange Democratic Move- Brown Mpinganjira and members of ment, and Kalonzo Musyoka, head his entourage escaped unhurt when of the Orange Democratic Move- about 20 Young Democrats armed ment–Kenya. The Electoral Com- with stones and machetes alleg- mission of Kenya announced Kibaki edly deployed by the United Demo- the winner, with 4,584,721 votes cratic Front Director of Youth pelted against Odinga’s 4,352,993 votes. stones at their vehicles while a ser- In the parliamentary elections that vice was in progress. In all these took place at the same time as the incidents, there were confrontations presidential elections, Kibaki’s party between the various youth militias. won 43 of 210 parliamentary seats, Odinga’s party won 99, and small Zimbabwe (2008) parties won the other seats. In the Violence continued after the election local government elections, Kiba- as talks between Zimbabwe Afri- ki’s party won 437 of 2,484 seats can National Union–Patriotic Front while Odinga’s party won 1,037 and the Movement for Democratic seats. Fighting between support- Change failed to stem their tide. For ers of Mwai Kibaki and the Party of example, three opposition activists National Unity—mainly members of were killed since the talks began. In the Kikuyu tribe—and supporters of Buhera South, more than 17 Move- Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic ment for Democratic Change activ- Movement Party—mainly members ists were badly beaten by militia of the Luo and the Kalenjin tribes— around 17 July. Widespread political occurred in Nairobi, the Rift Valley rather than limited electoral violence and Kisumu. has been the hallmark of Zimba- bwean politics over the last decade. Malawi (2009) About 30 armed police officers Source: ECOWAS 2010; EAC 2010; stormed Njaba Freedom Park to Human Rights Watch 2010; Jus- stop the first Mgwirizano Coalition tice 2010; Zimbabwe Human Rights rally after the Blantyre City Assem- NGOs Forum 2008; Omotosho bly had issued an eleventh-hour 2008.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 172 6/25/13 8:33 PM Notes police and security agents; inadequacy 1. Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, of polling stations/units; nature of the Sierra Leone and Seychelles. The franchise; nomination processes; poll- 2011 elections indicate that Nigeria ing procedures; and residency require- is drifting towards a dominant-party ments for voters and candidates system through the capacity of the (Leonard 2010). governing People’s Democratic Party 7. See also Matlosa and Zounmenou to manipulate elections. (2011). 2. Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Egypt, Liberia, Mali, References Morocco, Niger and Tunisia. Aalen, Lovise, and Kjetil Tronvoll. 2009. Although Egypt and Tunisia are “The End of Democracy? Curtail- classified as multi-party democracies, ing Political and Civil Rights in their electoral systems were designed Ethiopia.” Review of African Political such that the authoritarian National Economy 36 (120): 193–207. Democratic Party in Egypt and Adejumobi, Said, and Michael Kehinde. the Constitutional Party in Tunisia 2007. “Building Democracy without remained unchallenged and governed Democrats? Political Parties and unopposed. Both parties were dis- Threats of Democratic Reversal in solved after the revolutions in 2011. Nigeria.” Journal of African Elections 6 3. A subtle concept of violence would (2): 95–114. factor in psychological dimen- Albert, Isaac O. 2007. “Reconceptualis- sions, including intimidating, harm- ing Electoral Violence in Nigeria.” In ing or blackmailing political oppo- Perspectives on the 2003 Elections in nents around elections with a view Nigeria, ed. Isaac O. Albert, Derrick to influencing the electoral process Marco, and Victoria A. O. Adetula. (Albert 2007; Ochoche 1997). Abuja: Stirling-Holding Publishers. 4. Algeria, Botswana, Seychelles and, AU (African Union). 2007. “African encouragingly, Rwanda. Charter on Democracy, Governance 5. By 2007, militia groups were coun- and Election.” Adopted by the Eighth trywide, including Mungiki, Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys, the African Union, 30 January 2007, Amachuma, Sungu Sungu and Jeshi Addis Ababa. la Mzee. ———. 2012. “Note on the Elections 6. Corruption in the electoral process Year and Elections Observation in includes abuse of power of incum- Africa.” Addis Ababa. bency to gain allegedly unfair political AU Panel of the Wise. 2010. Election- advantage and to distort the electoral related Disputes and Political Violence: process; ballot design; ballot stuffing; Strengthening the Role of the AU in ballot snatching; candidate substitu- Preventing, Managing and Resolv- tion; contested declaration of elec- ing Conflict. New York: International tion results; disappearance/abduction Peace Institute. of polling officials; election financ- Bekoe, Dorina. 2010. “Trends in Elector- ing; electioneering campaigns; elec- al Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.” toral violence; establishment of illegal Peace Brief 13, United States Institute polling stations/units; harassment by of Peace, Washington, DC.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 173 6/25/13 8:33 PM Bojinova, Denitza. 2007. “Internal Party ———. 2010. “Observer Mission for Democracy in the European Old and the Second Round of the 2010 Presi- New Democracies: Causes and Con- dential Election in Guinea.” Abuja, 8 sequences.” Paper presented at the November. annual meeting of the Southern Polit- Egwu, Sam. 2010. “Elections and Vio- ical Science Association, 3 January lence in Nigeria.” In When Elephants 2007, New Orleans. www.allacademic. Fight: Preventing and Resolving com/meta/p143496_index.html, Election-related Conflicts in Africa, ed. accessed 20 December 2010. Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert M. Khadia- Booysen, Susan. 2009. “The Politi- gala, and Victor Shale. Johannesburg: cal Environment of Election 2009: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy Contestation.” In Election Development in Africa. Update South Africa: February–July Egwu, Sam, David Leonard, and Khabele 2009, 8–12. Johannesburg: Electoral Matlosa. 2009. “Nigerian Elections Institute for Sustainable Develop- since 1999: What Does Democracy ment in Africa. Mean?” Journal of African Elections 8 Campbell, Horace. 2011. “Gbagbo and (1): 108–44. the Ivorian Test: Moving Beyond EISA (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Anti-imperialist Rhetoric.” Pambu- Development in Africa). 2008. The zuka News, 13 January, issue 512. Zimbabwe Harmonized Elections of 29 Chapman, David. 2004. “The Role of the March 2008. EISA Election Observa- Electoral System in the Resolution tion Report 28. Johannesburg. of Ethnic Conflict.” Published in the ———. 2010. When Elections Become Compendium of the Workshop on a Curse: Redressing Electoral Vio- Analysing Conflict and its Resolu- lence in Africa. EISA Policy Brief 1. tion, Institute of Mathematics and Johannesburg. its Applications, 28–30 June 2004, Fischer, Jeff. 2002. “Electoral Conflict Oxford, UK. and Violence: A Strategy for Study Commonwealth Secretariat. 2002. The and Prevention.” IFES White Paper Zimbabwe Presidential Election, 9–11 2002-01, International Federation of March 2002: The Report of the Com- Electoral Systems, New York. monwealth Observer Group. London. Fortier, A. 2012. Sierra Leone: Making EAC (East African Community). 2010. the Votes Count. Dakar: Open Society Preliminary Report of the EAC Election Initiative for West Africa. Observation Mission for the Legislative Goldsmith, Arthur A. 2010. “Mixed Elections in the Republic of Burundi. Regimes and Political Violence in Arusha, Tanzania: African Press Africa.” Journal of Modern African Organization. Studies 48 (3): 413–33. ECOWAS (Economic Community of Hague, Rod, Martin Harrop, and Shaun West African States). 2001. “The Breslin. 1998. Comparative Govern- Supplementary Protocol on Democ- ment and Politics: An Introduction. racy and Good Governance.” Abuja, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. 21 December 2001. Hamdok, Abdalla, and M. A. Salih. 2007. ———. 2008. “The ECOWAS Conflict “A Preface to an Inclusive African Prevention Framework.” Regulation Electoral Reform Agenda.” Journal of MSC/Reg.1/01/08. Abuja. African Elections 6 (1): 118–33.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 174 6/25/13 8:33 PM Hammar, Amanda, Brian Raftopoulos, Contemporary African Affairs 27 (3): and Stig Jensen, eds. 2003. Zimba- 259–77. bwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Kanyinga, Karuti. 2009. “The Legacy of Land, State and Nation in the Context the White Highlands: Land Rights, of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press. Ethnicity and the Post–2007 Elec- Heywood, Andrew. 2002. Politics: An tion Violence in Kenya.” Journal of Introduction, second edition. New Contemporary African Affairs 27 (3): York: Palgrave Macmillan. 325–44. Horowitz, Donald L. 2003. “Electoral Kelly, Bob. 2009. “The Ghanaian Elec- Systems: A Premier for Decision tion of 2008.” Review of African Polit- Making.” Journal of Democracy 14 (4): ical Economy 36 (121): 441–59. 115–27. Leonard, David K. 2010. “Elections and Human Rights Watch. 2010. “Burundi: Conflict Resolution in Africa.” In Crackdown on Rights Follow- When Elephants Fight: Preventing and ing Elections.” News Release, 23 Resolving Election-related Conflicts in November 2010. www.hrw.org/ Africa, ed. Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert en/news/2010/11/23/burundi- M. Khadiagala, and Victor Shale. crackdown-rights-following-elections. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for IDEA (International Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa. Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Leonard, David K., Felix O. Ouwor, and 2006. Electoral Management Design: Katherine George. 2009. “The Politi- The International IDEA Handbook. cal and Institutional Context of the Stockholm. www.idea.int/publications/ 2007 Kenyan Elections and Reforms emd/upload/EMD_inlay_final.pdf. Needed for the Future.” Journal of Justice, William Ouko. 2010. Final African Elections 8 (1): 71–107. Report of the Task Force on Judicial Magarian, Gregory P. 2003. “Regulat- Reforms. Nairobi: Government ing Political Parties under a ‘Public Printers. Rights’ First Amendment.” Wil- Kadima, Dennis. 2009. “Overview.” In liam and Mary Law Review 4 (5): Compendium of Elections in Southern 1939–2061. Africa 1989–2009: 20 Years of Multi- Matlosa, Khabele. 2005. “Managing party Democracy, ed. Dennis Kadima Democracy: A Review of the SADC and Susan Booysen. Johannesburg: Principles and Guidelines Govern- Electoral Institute for Sustainable ing Democratic Elections.” In People, Development in Africa. States and Regions: Building a Col- Kadima, Dennis, and Dieudonné Tshi- laborative Security Regime in South- yoyo. 2009. “Democratic Republic of ern Africa, ed. Anne Hammerstad Congo.” Compendium of Elections in 153–76. Johannesburg: South African Southern Africa 1989–2009: 20 Years Institute of International Affairs. of Multiparty Democracy, ed. Dennis Matlosa, Khabele, and Dossou D. Zoun- Kadima and Susan Booysen. Johan- menou. 2011. “Identity, Diversity nesburg: Electoral Institute for Sus- and Electoral Violence: Dilemmas of tainable Development in Africa. Democratic Transformation in Afri- Kagwanja, Peter, and Roger Southall. ca.” African Review 3 (2): 141–59. 2009. “Introduction: Kenya—A Moepya, Mosotho. 2010. “The Role of Democracy in Retreat?” Journal of Multi-party Liaison Committees in

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 175 6/25/13 8:33 PM Preventing and Managing Conflicts Western Political Science Association, in South Africa.” In When Elephants 20 March 2008, San Diego, CA. Fight: Preventing and Resolving Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Election-related Conflicts in Africa, ed. Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert M. Khadia- for Conflict Management. Cambridge, gala, and Victor Shale. Johannesburg: UK: Cambridge University Press. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Sachikonye, Lloyd M. 2003. The Situ- Development in Africa. ation of Commercial Farm Workers Møller, Bjørn. 2009. “Africa’s Sub- after Land Reform in Zimbabwe. regional Organizations: Seamless Harare: Farm Community Trust of Web or Patchwork?” Crisis States Zimbabwe. Research Centre Working Papers SADC (Southern Africa Development Series 2, Crisis States Research Cen- Community). 2004. “SADC Prin- tre, London School of Economics and ciples and Guidelines Governing Political Science. Democratic Elections.” Adopted by Mottiar, Shauna. 2010. “The Role of the SADC Summit, August 2004, Civil Society in Elections: The Mauritius. KwaZulu-N atal Democracy and Salih, M. A. 2003. African Political Par- Elections Forum—Reducing Conflict ties. London: Pluto. Dynamics and Promoting Peace.” Sane, Pierre. 2011. “Côte d’Ivoire Elec- Journal of African Elections 9 (1): tions: Chronicle of a Failure Fore- 110–27. told.” Pambuzuka News, 6 January, Mozaffar, Shaheen, James Scarlitt, and issue 511. Glen Galaich. 2003. “Electoral Insti- Solidarity Peace Trust. 2008. “Desper- tutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and ately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe?” Democracies.” American Political Sci- Durban. ence Review 97 (3): 379–90. Straus, Scott. 2012. “Wars Do End! Ochoche, Sunday. 1997. “Electoral Changing Patterns of Political Vio- Violence and National Security in lence in Sub-Saharan Africa.” African Nigeria.” Journal of the Centre for Peace Affairs 111 (443): 179–201. Research and Conflict Research 1 (1). Taylor, Rupert. 2002. “Justice Denied: Omotosho, Mashood. 2008. “Electoral Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal Violence and Conflict in Nigeria: after 1994.” Violence and Transition 6 The 2007 Elections and the Chal- (September). lenges of Democratisation.” Paper Tijjani, Kyari. 2003. “Strategies for presented at the 27th Annual Nige- Controlling Political Violence and rian Political Science Association Regulating Campaigns.” In Strategies Conference, Benue State University, for Curbing Election-related Violence 16–19 November 2008, Makurdi, in Nigeria’s North-West Zone, ed. Nigeria. Attahiru Jega, Haruna Wakili, and Ozler, Serife. “The Relationship between Muhammad A. Umar. Kano, Nigeria: Political Party System and Social Centre for Democratic Research and Movements: A Test of the Political Training. Opportunity Structure.” Paper pre- Zasha, James, Abdul R. Mustapha, and sented at the annual meeting of the Ruth Meyer. 2007. “A Lesson Learnt:

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 176 6/25/13 8:33 PM Exercise Following the 2007 Elec- ———. 2008. Report on the Zimbabwe 29 tions in Nigeria.” United Nations March 2008 Harmonized Elections and Development Programme Basket 27 June Presidential Run-off. Harare. Fund, Abuja. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum. Zimbabwe Election Support Network. 2008. “Political Violence Report: A 2002. The Zimbabwe Presidential Elec- Report by the Zimbabwe Human tion, March 2002. Harare. Rights NGO Forum.” Har are.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 177 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 178 6/25/13 8:33 PM 6 lections are expensive, and conflict, are finding this hard, thus becoming more so in Africa their recourse to external support. E because of rapid population growth and civil conflicts. Several key messages stand out. The Resources, especially money, are Resources are critical to electoral Economics of therefore critical to electoral com- outcomes, but are not the sole deter- Elections petition in both the established and minant in reflecting the will of the emerging democracies (Nassmacher people. Strong political finance reg- 2009; Samuels 2001; Austin and ulatory regimes and powerful EMBs Tjernstrom 2003). As the US poli- are other factors. Yet very few coun- tician Jesse Unruh observed, money tries have such regimes, giving ruling is the “mother’s milk of politics” parties a marked advantage, as they (Nassmacher 2003, 5). Money is a often use both legal and extra-legal double-edged sword, however, and means to access electoral resources, can also distort the electoral process especially as few EMBs have much (Igwe 2011), such that successful, financial autonomy. Equally, pub- sustainable democracy demands par- lic funding for parties is usually very ticular attention to political finance limited, affecting their viability and (Nassmacher 2003). visibility, and turning some of them to illicit practices for campaign fund- The skewed distribution of ing. Elections themselves are at times resources—financial, human, funded externally, from donors in the logistical—affects political parties West (a flow that must be gradually and candidates. Ruling parties (and curtailed to ensure self-determination indirectly their candidates) usually and democratic consolidation) as well have more resources than the oppo- as the diaspora and regional organi- sition owing to their access to state zations (which are gradually assum- resources, undermining the oppo- ing important roles in providing elec- sition’s ability to compete. Female, toral assistance). youth and poorer candidates, even within the ruling party, tend to Election resources and receive fewer resources than other political competition candidates—and it is worse still for The new era of competitive politics those from opposition parties. These that really started in the third wave disparities deny many citizens the of democratization in the 1990s (see opportunity to compete for power. chapter 5)—increasing the number and regularity of elections indis- Elections require resources, dis- pensable for a regime’s legitimacy— bursed on time, every four or five has raised election-funding costs. years, as well as security and peace. These costs must be met by the state Some activities, such as those directly or indirectly, by parties of electoral management boards and by candidates, and in the main (EMBs) like demarcation or delim- have risen hugely, making elections itation, voter registration and civic an activity now affordable largely education, require regular input. to wealthy candidates and well- Some African states, especially after endowed parties.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 179 6/25/13 8:33 PM to finance or buttress their cam- Box 6.1 R eaching out to voters paigns, in which voter outreach—for all candidates—is usually the main A 2005 survey of 12 African countries showed that most election expenses are election expense (box 6.1). related to travel, direct payments to potential voters, rallies and other events as well as personnel and administration (Bryan and Baer 2005). Political parties in the African states that hold multi-party elections show In Zambia, candidates’ most frequent expenses were food, transport, posters, disparities in election resources. The T-shirts and chitenge materials, which varied by location (urban or rural) and major dimension is between the rul- land size of constituency (Bryan and Baer 2005). Huge resources are needed to ing and opposition parties. Levitsky reach rural areas, which partly explains why opposition parties tend to perform and Way (2010, 57) observed that: worse there than in urban areas. These disparities rarely emerge naturally; rather they Since the inception of the third are usually rooted in illicit or wave, many African states have con- autocratic behaviour, including ducted regular multi-party pres- partisan appropriation of state idential, legislative, regional and resources, systematic packing local elections, bidding farewell of state institutions and state- to authoritarianism and its non- run media, politicized distri- competitive single-party elections. bution of state resources, con- In 2012, for example, elections were cessions, and licenses. held in Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Egypt, Gambia, Election resources are critical to lev- Ghana, Lesotho, Senegal and Sierra elling the electoral playing field in Leone, and postponed in Guinea- the game leading to the electoral Bissau and Mali. The range of outcome (box 6.2). Most respond- spending for presidential and leg- ents in the Expert Opinion Sur- islative elections varied from about vey for African Governance Report $7.5 million in Sierra Leone in 2007, (AGR) III shared the view that heav- $8 million in Burundi in 2010 and ily resourced parties and candidates $24 million in Ghana in 2008 to are usually advantaged. In only 4 of $139 million in Sudan in 2010 and the 40 countries did at least half the $647 million in Nigeria in 2011. respondents believe that parties had equal access to electoral resources, The backdrop to election funding mostly or always (figure 6.1). has been changing, attracting new players such as business elites, for- Opposition political parties have eign companies and donors (ranging adopted various means to close the from governments and aid agencies election resource gap. One is elec- to fraternal parties) and the Afri- toral alliance or coalition, which can diaspora, now a major source allows for resource pooling. Another of funding for both parties and is merger, based on the idea that, elections. Yet old habits die hard. to improve their election resources, Incumbents still draw on substan- opposition parties need to reduce tial, taxpayer-funded state resources their number, especially smaller

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 180 6/25/13 8:33 PM ones, by ceding individual party sovereignty to new and larger par- Box 6.2 E lectoral outcomes ties that would command a larger resource base. The gap has also been Do political parties and candidates with the most resources win elections in narrowed when disgruntled mem- Africa? Usually yes—but victory is not automatic, as seen in presidential elec- bers of local ruling classes decamp tions in Zambia (1991), Malawi (1994), Ghana (2000), Senegal (2000 and 2012) from the ruling party and join the and Kenya (2002). opposition. Other factors are at work: the electorate could be so disenchanted with the ruling Various external sources, includ- party that this outweighs the advantages of resources, as could a stand by the ing some governments in Africa, as electoral management board in ensuring that the election results are honoured. well as governments, private groups and individuals in several established Enforcement of political finance regulations is another factor, as it minimizes democracies, have helped opposi- the use of money to distort electoral competition, and possibly the outcome, tion parties by assisting them with helping to see off money as the decisive advantage. money, logistics and paraphernalia such as T-shirts and caps. The assistance is clandestinely provided, South Africa (2009), Sudan (2011) especially from governments in and Zimbabwe (2000 and 2002; some of the democracies, so as not World Bank data, various years). to cause conflict with the African This list is far from exhaustive. In government or undermine the legiti- some of these countries, such actions macy of the opposition (Saffu 2003). contributed to wide government budget deficits as well as a decline in Election spending and economic growth during the election effect on GDP year or shortly after the election. In the period before elections, governments are tempted to splash Some ruling parties spend heavily spending in a thinly disguised on rural development projects during buy-off to attract potential voters, the election year. Before 2008, har- which can involve new roads, clin- ambee (self-help) projects were con- ics, dams and houses. This is a form verted into election campaign plat- of patronage aimed at courting vot- forms and became conduits for vote ers, and can harm the economy well buying, determining regional voting beyond election year itself. patterns in Kenya (AGR III Kenya Country Report 2012). One report Such politicized election spend- estimated that the former ruling ing is seen in a wide range of coun- KANU party spent about $60 mil- tries, from authoritarian regimes to lion on vote buying in 1992; some those consolidating their democra- funds were stolen from the National cies. Countries that have spent heav- Social Security Fund (AGR III ily before elections include Angola Kenya Country Report 2012). Con- (1992), Botswana (2009), Côte d’Ivo- sequences included the collapse of ire (2010), Ethiopia (2005), Kenya “political banks” such as the Trade (1992) and (2007), Malawi (2010), Bank and Euro Bank following dubi- Namibia (2009), Nigeria (1999), ous money-siphoning transactions

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 181 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 6.1 Political parties have equal access to electoral resources—mostly or always Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Algeria Gambia Seychelles Mali Rwanda Cape Verde São Tomé & Príncipe South Africa Egypt Tunisia Cameroon Mauritania Djibouti Namibia Mauritius Gabon Congo Senegal Burkina Faso Ghana Sierra Leone Guinea Benin Ethiopia Mozambique Angola Liberia Nigeria Chad Tanzania Comoros Togo Madagascar Uganda Lesotho Kenya Botswana Malawi Zimbabwe Zambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 182 6/25/13 8:33 PM with several parastatals, costing the electoral cycle. In Nigeria, for exam- government huge sums of money. ple, one estimate put the budget of about 85 billion naira ($575 mil- The large release of funds into the lion) for the country’s 2010 voter economy in the form of campaign registration exercise, or about 1,300 financing generally increases money naira ($8.60) per registered voter, in circulation in the economy, fuel- the world’s highest per capita, even ling inflationary pressures and other though similar full-scale registration economic distortions.1 More widely, exercises had been carried out in the uncertainties that often accom- 1987, 2002 and 2007 (Jinadu 2011). pany election periods tend to discourage the private sector and busi- Countries’ voter-registration systems nesses, inducing them to slow or also vary: some are manual, others delay their investments. Foreign computerized,2 and both types pose direct investment in productive sec- challenges for reliability of the elec- tors also slows (except for the extrac- toral roll. The common problem is tive enclave industries). the lack of a civil register for gener- Adequate ating credible demographic statis- funding Funding electoral tics. In some countries, this stems is critical institutions and parties from logistical difficulties posed for electoral by the country’s topography, espe- Electoral management boards management cially in mountainous and riverine boards to Adequate funding is critical for areas, resulting in poor coverage of EMBs to effectively “umpire” con- the national territory by registration effectively umpire testations for power through the and polling stations, and the lack of contestations for electoral process (see chapter 4), a consistent and uniform system for power through the in two main areas—operational voter registration (Kambale 2011). electoral process expenses and election-related spending—but the amount varies Other costs include funding of polit- hugely among countries. ical parties (where legislated), salaries and emoluments of electoral Operational expenses commissioners and their staff, and Operational expenses cover a broad other administrative and capital gamut, including salaries, logistics expenses. and supplies. The main expenses borne by EMBs usually relate to A major challenge is the huge cost voter registration, boundary delimi- of electoral administration and tation, the voting operation, count- management, when set against ing and transmission of results. Dis- the massive structural problem of pute adjudication, voter education underdevelopment and the endur- and voter information are others. ing economic crisis of the typical African state, especially in view of Voter registration is time-consuming competing budgetary demands for and expensive, especially if not inte- declining, sometimes scarce, public grated as a routine in the registration revenue and resources among min- of vital statistics but repeated every istries departments and agencies.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 183 6/25/13 8:33 PM This makes efficient administrative headings since 2007: staff salaries machinery of EMBs indispensable and remuneration cost $8 million; to free and fair elections. administrative expenses, $4 million; other expenses, $4 million; and Election-related spending capital budget, $6 million. Elections Four countries exemplify spend- used to cost $24 million on aver- ing trends. Benin is one of the new age, but in 2008 the commission democracies where hugely increased budgeted $50 million, as it had to election costs are a concern and update technology for voter registra- bring fears for future funding if tion, renew the car fleet and increase nothing is done. The budget of the election officials’ stipends (Houn- electoral commission has shot up, in kpe 2011). presidential elections from 1.7 billion CFA francs ($3.6 million) In its 2011 annual budget, Nigeria’s in 1996 to 12 billion CFA francs government allocated $299 million ($26 million) in 2006, and in leg- to the Independent National Elec- African states islative elections from 1.1 billion toral Commission to underwrite allocate vastly CFA francs ($2.4 million) in 1995 to its expenses. Of this, $106.3 mil- differing 6.7 billion CFA francs ($14 million) lion was allotted to personnel costs amounts to in 2003 (Hounkpe 2011). (mainly salaries), $146.5 million to their electoral overheads and $46.9 million to capi- management boards In Cape Verde, each of the three key tal projects. bodies involved in election man- in annual budget agement is funded separately. The Funding disparities among countries normal operating budget of the African states allocate vastly dif- Directorate-General for Electoral fering amounts to their EMBs in Process Support is around $850,000 annual budgets to cover operating (in local currency). In an election costs (outside elections), ranging year, its budget covering normal from less than $0.1 million (Mauri- operations and the conduct of elec- tius in 2010) and $1.3 million (Sierra tions is nearly $1.2 million. Before Leone in 2009) to $135 million the 2007 electoral law, this budget (South Africa in 2010). Population included budgets of the Electoral is important of course. The govern- Registration Committee. In a non- ment of Nigeria, Africa’s most pop- election year, the regular operat- ulous country, spent $647 million ing budget of the National Electoral on presidential, legislative, state and Commission is around €250,000 local government elections in 2011 ($340,000) and in election years (including the nearly $300 million to more than €2.5 million ($3.4 mil- the Independent National Electoral lion). For the 2008 local elections, it Commission), while the government was around €4 million ($5.4 million) of Comoros the year before spent of which at least half was to support only $2.1 million. political parties (Fall 2011). Costs per voter also vary widely Ghana’s annual budget for its Elec- (box 6.3), suggesting that a regime’s toral Commission has had four commitment to free and fair

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 184 6/25/13 8:33 PM elections is another major determi- nant, as is the EMB’s relationship Box 6.3 Per voter election costs with the country’s executive, parliament and ruling party, particularly The data on election costs in Africa are sparse and rarely up to date, making in states lacking this commitment. comparisons hard. What can be gleaned, though, suggests that cost variations reflect the democratic environment—stable, transitional, authoritarian or Successes and struggles in funding post-conflict (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011). institutions and elections Countries with a reasonably good Elections in countries with a longer multi-party democratic history are consist- record of supporting their EMBs ently less expensive per voter than where they are a new undertaking—a trend include Namibia, South Africa and that cuts across regions and economic development, as suggested by the Cape Verde. following: Angola $22 per voter, Botswana $2.7, the Democratic Republic of the Congo $2.5, Ghana $0.7, Lesotho $15, Liberia $6.1, Malawi $2.1, Mauritius $11, Despite its relatively small economy Mozambique $6.4, Namibia $1.8, Nigeria $8.0, Seychelles $5.8, Senegal $1.2, and population, Namibia has fully South Africa $7.3, Tanzania $7.6 and Uganda $3.1. (These figures are purely funded its election process and insti- illustrative since they range from 1992 for Angola to 2011 for Nigeria.) tutions since independence in 1990, receiving neither foreign funding nor Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011; AGR III Nigeria Country external assistance for conducting Report 2012. elections (AGR III Namibia Coun- try Report 2012). The Namibia Country Report observed that the for instance, has needed external Electoral Commission of Namibia support to fund elections since 1996. was generally well resourced, with International donors, including the transparent budget allocation and Economic Community of West expenditure. African States (ECOWAS), Euro- pean Union, United Nations and South Africa’s Independent Electoral US government made large finan- Commission not only funds elec- cial contributions. “Without [the tions but also finances political par- international community’s] support, ties. It has funding from the national it would have been almost impos- budget, for which it is accountable to sible for the [electoral commission] parliament (AGR III South Africa to conduct genuine elections since Country Report 2012). It has wit- 1996” (AGR III Sierra Leone Coun- nessed a steady decline in the over- try Report 2012, 110). The cost all cost of election administration, of elections is expected to decline largely owing to efficiency gains. there, especially if a biometric system is introduced, if civic education Cape Verde’s National Electoral is mounted (to minimize violence Commission is financed exclusively and tension) and if the cost of elec- by state funds (AGR III Cape Verde tion security is cut. Country Report 2012). Its budget grew by 32% in 2008–2010. In other instances, EMBs experience challenges of limited financial Some states have found it harder to autonomy and delayed disbursement fund their elections. Sierra Leone, of funds for the election process

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 185 6/25/13 8:33 PM from registering voters to printing prepare for the ballot box, as parties ballots, marring the transparency of also need to function between elec- elections (box 6.4). tions. They may need, for example, to maintain their national, regional Some have used the high cost of or local headquarters (or keep paying electoral administration and man- rent on them), and meet the costs of agement to inveigle against demo- personnel, logistics, travel, equip- cratic competitive party and electoral ment and public relations. politics, seen in a milder form as out- rage at these costs. But as others have These activities are pivotal to estab- pointed out, these expenses are best lishing or extending parties’ pres- viewed as unavoidable investments in ence, which is linked to a party’s democracy, development and secu- capacity to compete electorally at all rity. Still, there is also general agree- levels. Ruling and major opposition ment among expert respondents parties that have national reach gen- that much more vigorous enforce- erally fare better in elections than ment of limits on party activities and parties with only a local presence. finances by African EMBs and similar agencies would help hold down Most political parties fund their rising electioneering costs. general operations from four major clusters: the state (in about half of Political parties African countries—table 6.1), internal party sources, diaspora partisans General operations (that is, active or party members in The transition from authoritari- the diaspora), and political parties anism to democracy and the con- and organizations in industrialized solidation of that democracy in countries. (The last two less com- Africa depend partly on the abil- mon funding sources are discussed ity of parties—especially those in below under External funding and opposition—to fund their opera- assistance.) tions outside elections (Ettinghausen 2006). The funding of parties’ gen- Parties have to meet certain crite- eral operations (their non-campaign ria to qualify for state funding. Some spending) is thus crucial for them to 30% of countries give equal amounts to registered parties, some 30% provide funding based on the number of Box 6.4 C hallenges of election funding in Africa seats that a party has in parliament and about 27% use the criterion of States sometimes hold off providing their share of election funding (Mutume the proportion of votes received in 2005), which adversely affects the election timetable in planning for activities the last election. New political par- like voter registration and education. This may result in adjusting the election ties in Chad, for example, receive a calendar or executing those election-related activities poorly. Changing the subsidy of $10,000 from the govern- election schedule or poorly organized pre-election activities usually raises ment to cover costs. Helpful per- voters’ anxieties and sometimes generates political tensions, which if not well haps, but it could encourage parties managed may distort or undermine the entire electoral process. to set up purely to get the subsidy— and then become moribund.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 186 6/25/13 8:33 PM Table 6.1 State funding for parties, 2011

Countries that provide funding Countries that provide funding Countries that do not provide for parties’ general operations for election campaignsa either type of funding Algeria Angola Botswana Burkina Faso Benin Central African Republic Benin Cameroon Gambia Cameroon Burkina Faso Ghana Côte d’Ivoire Burundi Guinea Congo Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau Dem Rep. Congo Chad Liberia Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Libya Egypt Gabon Mauritania Ethiopia Lesotho Senegal Gabon Mozambique Sierra Leone Kenya Rwanda Swaziland Madagascar Tunisia Zambia Malawi Uganda Mali Morocco Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda São Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles South Africa Tanzania Togo Uganda Zimbabwe

a. Some countries in addition to general operations. Source: IDEA 2012; AGR III Country Reports 2012.

Public funding of parties’ operations per party are too small, especially for faces three main problems. First, non-established opposition parties, funding formulas have ambigui- for them to make any real headway. ties that give the incumbent regime latitude to favour or punish parties Internal party sources are multi- when distributing funds (as in Tan- ple. Membership dues are impor- zania). Second, eligibility require- tant and come mainly from well- ments favour established politi- off members.3 Some members even cal parties with seats in parliament pay more than their dues (voluntar- (Burkina Faso, for example). Third, ily or as a wealth levy). Some politi- both total funding and allocation cal parties hold fund-raising events,

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 187 6/25/13 8:33 PM and some well-established parties and candidates in 2011. States usu- generate revenue from their invest- ally grant payments on various crite- ments, as exemplified by Zimba- ria, such as eligibility requirements bwe’s ZANU-PF, the ruling party, for which political parties and can- and the Movement for Democratic didates should receive subsidies; the Change, the main opposition party. vexing issue of the timing of the They have extensive webs of busi- payment of the subsidies; spending ness interests from which they derive restrictions; and reporting obliga- income (Masunungure 2006). tions (Walecki 2006).

Ruling parties of course have access Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique to various lucrative sources (for both and Tanzania provide public fund- general operations and campaigning to both political parties and ing), including the state treasury presidential candidates: $30,000 per (Wondwosen 2009; Saffu 2003), candidate in Equatorial Guinea, and and kickbacks and donations from $9,600 each in Tanzania. Benin pro- The disparities contractors and other businesses, at vides public funding in the form of in resources home or abroad (Levitsky and Way reimbursement only for the political between 2010; Saffu 2003). With these huge campaigns of presidential candidates ruling and resources, they can construct or who win at least 10% of the votes, opposition parties rent offices throughout the country and parliamentary candidates who have profound and employ national and local staff. win a seat. The total allocation for Some have their own radio stations reimbursement is at the incumbent implications and newspapers. All these activities president’s discretion. for electoral allow them to maintain a nationwide competition and presence and to be regularly in the One issue is that public funding for outcomes in Africa public eye, positioning them well for political parties and candidates is elections through reach and name small in per capita and aggregate recognition (alongside the other terms. (Although in Morocco, for advantages of incumbency). example, it is steep. Morocco provided $13.6 million in 1997 to help The private sector often contrib- fund parties’ political campaigns in utes to the ruling parties (Wond- the parliamentary election.) Another wosen 2009) and opposition parties problem is that total funding is not that they determine have the good always specified. The related prob- chance of winning the next election. lem is then that, as in Benin and One reason is that they expect a later Morocco, the decision is left to pres- return on their contribution, such as idents and prime ministers, who contracts and other privileges, once have partisan interests. the election is over. Ruling parties tend to have far Campaigns greater funding than other parties, Fourteen of 53 states in Africa (see and some use their control of the table 6.1, column 2) provided dif- state’s political machinery to illegally ferent amounts of public funding use public resources in their politi- for election campaigns to parties cal campaigns. In the 2011 Ugandan

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 188 6/25/13 8:33 PM presidential and parliamentary elections, for example, the conduct of Box 6.5 G rass-roots view on incumbent advantage in the National Resistance Movement, Uganda the ruling party, prompted Dame Billie Miller, the Head of the Com- A focus group discussion in Mukono reported that “in Uganda, there is no monwealth’s Election Observer equal distribution of electoral resources” adding that “money, transport [and] Team, to lament, “the magnitude of security . . . go to those in the system. Therefore, some people cannot compete resources [the National Resistance with those in the system”. Movement] deployed and huge level of funding challenged the notion of The incumbent president moved with a fleet of vehicles, helicopters and a a level playing field” (Sebunya 2011). huge number of security staff. He also hired musicians to entertain prospective voters, swaying many fence-sitters as they realized that victory was virtually Some of the major opposition parties already secure. also have huge resources—the Action Congress of Nigeria and the New The ruling party used the local village council structures to run its campaigns, Patriotic Party (Ghana) even rival the so that every village had 30 people to carry out its campaign. ruling parties—giving them national presence and reach and thus a com- Source: AGR III Uganda Country Report 2012. petitive position during elections. But most opposition parties have few resources. Some have permanent competing for state offices, espe- national headquarters but fewer do cially the presidency (Levitsky and in the regions, and they find running Way 2010), though with exceptions their own media or gaining access to (see box 6.2). them problematic. Their marginal existence makes it hard for them to Little is known about parties’ cam- prepare for elections. paign resources. Decisions on raising or spending money are usually made Undoubtedly, the disparities in by a small group of individuals— resources between ruling and oppo- often the leaders of the party—and sition parties have profound impli- “procedures for recording financial cations for electoral competition transactions are weak due to negli- and outcomes in Africa. Using gence, lack of capacity, or purpose- what Greene (2007) calls “hyper- fully to prevent evidence of illegal incumbent advantage” (box 6.5)— activity” (Bryan and Baer 2005, 3), as in their control of vast amounts masking parties’ lost or wasted of election resources—ruling par- funds. And the parties do not expect ties can dispense largesse to voters, their candidates to do any better— distribute campaign paraphernalia the information required to meet en masse, conduct huge media cam- disclosure laws (where they exist) is paigns and establish a presence in simply missing. virtually every corner of the country to reach nearly all voters. Candidates Self- funding is the principal method Conversely, inadequate resources used by candidates (party nominees inhibit opposition parties from and independents) to support their

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 189 6/25/13 8:33 PM campaigns, as other sources of fund- what far exceeds the allowed amount ing are quite limited (Bryan and when campaign-spending ceilings Baer 2005). Legislative candidates in are in place (El-Rashidi 2010). Nigeria have invested large amounts of their savings to contest elections Candidates who are interested in (box 6.6; Okunade et al. 2009). serving the “common good” but are hamstrung by lack of money cannot During the 2007 Nigerian elections, afford to run for public office either a gubernatorial candidate spent within political parties or as inde- $3 million in the primary election of pendents. Amid a crisis of leadership the ruling People’s Democratic Party on the continent, African states are (personal discussion with George being deprived of the services of com- Kieh in 2010). Despite this, the can- mitted individuals, including women. didate did not win the party’s nomination. In Ghana, several members Little access to campaign finance of parliament revealed during a sur- for women vey that they spent large amounts of Access to electoral finance is a major their personal financial resources to obstacle to women’s election to par- fund their campaigns for parliament liament, presidency or other repre- (Lindberg 2003). sentative institution partly because women have traditionally been The increasing costs of candidates relegated to the private, domes- funding their campaigns have sev- tic sphere. Women “thus have nei- eral ramifications. Only individu- ther the personal financial resources als willing to invest serious amounts nor the moneyed networks to allow of money can become candidates them to compete effectively in (Okunade et al. 2009). The related increasingly expensive electoral poli- consequence is that with no rigor- tics” (Ballington 2003). ous expenditure monitoring systems in place throughout Africa, candi- Two attempts to rectify the balance dates with deep pockets can spend stand out, the first in Malawi during the 2009 election. A group of local non-governmental organization Box 6.6 C andidate funding in Nigeria representatives founded a Gender Coordination Network for Women The electoral process in Nigeria has become so expensive that only the rich or in Politics, which encourages women those dependent on the rich can run for political office. The absence of effective to take more active roles in politics regulation of the amount of private funding that parties can receive from private and elections by providing them with sources has made all forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible. moral, monetary and other material support (AGR III Malawi Coun- There is a heavy reliance on private funding. Parties generate income through try Report 2012). International aid sale of nomination forms, fund-raising dinners, donations from party big wigs, agencies also pumped resources into contractors and those who control major sectors of the economy. the project. Concurrently, the Min- istry of Women and Child Develop- Source: AGR III Nigeria Country Report 2012. ment launched a national programme to increase the number of female

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 190 6/25/13 8:33 PM parliamentarians. Called the “50–50 networks that are critical to carry- Campaign”, it was aimed at achieving out services for the chosen can- ing equal representation of male and didates, including vote rigging; and female candidates (AGR III Malawi the financial resources for mobiliz- Country Report 2012). Female can- ing thugs to spread fear and violence, didates won about 22% of the seats including death. in the 2009 election. It was a start. As Jolly Nyame, the former gover- The second was in Ghana, where nor of Terabi State in Nigeria, put the two main parties, the National it: “Whether you like it or not, as a Democratic Congress and the New godfather, you will not be a gover- Patriotic Party, have sometimes nor, you will not be a president, but been accused of not doing enough you can make a governor, you can to ensure that enough women are make a president” (Ibrahim 2003, elected to the legislature. Thus they emphasis added). So, some candi- granted a 50% rebate in filing fees to dates for public offices in various female parliamentary and presiden- African states where godfatherism is tial aspirants. The impact of these prominent believe that they cannot concessions has not yet been estab- entirely rely on voters to win demo- lished, however (AGR III Ghana cratic elections (Ibrahim 2003). Country Report 2012). Godfatherism subverts democratic Campaign finance and elections and broader democratization corruption by using an assortment of unethical, “God fatherism”, illegal funding, immoral and even criminal methods vote buying and kickbacks are four to fund the campaign of candidates main campaign finance issues com- chosen by godfathers, and to foist mon to political parties and their them on the citizenry at various lev- candidates. els. In return, godfathers receive pay- backs from the candidates whom Godfatherism they financed and got elected, such as Godfatherism is a major feature of access to the corridors of power, con- the electoral landscape in some Afri- tracts for themselves, relatives and cli- can states. According to Ibrahim ents, and access to state resources.4 (2003), “Godfathers are generally defined as men who have the power The godfather phenomenon has personally to determine both who accentuated politics as the route to gets nominated to contest elections acquiring power for privately accu- and who wins”. mulating wealth by public officials and their supporters (and family), They have several assets: wealth or and reflects “the crudeness with access to wealth that can be used to which wealth triumphs over the rule fund the campaigns of preferred can- of law, and powerful people employ didates; influence in political parties wealth and political power to sub- to the extent that they can determine vert the sovereign will of the people” the nominees; control over patronage (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006, 40).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 191 6/25/13 8:33 PM Illegal funding change, or do not change, their elec- Undermining the integrity of dem- toral behaviour in exchange for tan- ocratic elections, domestic or exter- gible rewards. Second, givers might nal donors funnel illegal funding have to generate “normative com- to some political parties and candi- pliance”—if successful, recipients dates. Domestically, some individu- change, or do not change, their als and groups, including businesses, electoral behaviour because the provide illegal funding to their pre- offer convinces them of the good- ferred political parties and candi- ness or worthiness of the candidates. Externally, some governments date, or because they somehow feel provide money. normatively obligated. Third, givers may hope to generate “coercive During the 2011 Ugandan pres- compliance”—namely, by bully- idential and parliamentary elec- ing recipients into changing, or not tions, about $2 million was report- changing, their electoral behaviour. edly funnelled from a neighbouring Recipients fear retribution if they state to the opposition Forum for decline the offer or if they do not Democratic Change, which received vote as directed after accepting the another $3 million from other exter- offer (Schaffer 2002). Candidates use nal sources (Sebunya 2011). Appar- a range of methods to monitor voters’ ently, that support from the neigh- compliance, although it is unclear if bouring state was a tit for tat for the vote buying secures those votes. claim that the Ugandan government had funded the campaigns of oppo- Voters may initiate the transaction sition candidates during that neigh- with candidates in two major ways. bouring country’s election (Sebunya Based on “rational choice” calcula- 2011). The governments of some tions, they ask several candidates for of the established democracies and a pay-off for their votes, and vote other countries have also used what for the highest bidder. The other the ACE Electoral Network (2011) approach is framed by rent-seeking refers to as “secret funds” to support logic: realizing that few politicians the campaigns of their preferred cater to their needs as citizens after parties and candidates. they are elected, voters initiate transactions with as many candidates or Vote buying parties as possible, in a bid collect as Vote buying is a two-way electoral much rent as possible from them, irre- transaction between candidates for spective of the size of the pay-offs. public office and voters, initiated by either side. Candidates have three As an anonymous voter in São main ways to get recipients to vote— Tomé and Príncipe explained “We or not vote—for a particular candi- [the voters] do like vote buying. It date (Schaffer 2002). is essential. That is the only way we have to see anything good coming First, candidates might hope to pro- from the politicians. Anyway, I can duce “instrumental compliance”— vote for whoever I want” (Vincente if successful, the voters as recipients 2013, emphasis added; box 6.7).

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 192 6/25/13 8:33 PM In Nigeria, almost one in five people is personally exposed to vote buy- Box 6.7 B anho in São Tomé and Príncipe ing. It enhances partisan loyalty but, perhaps because most citizens con- With the illegal practice of banho, many voters gather around the polling venue, demn campaign manipulation as discreetly implying to candidates’ or parties’ promoters that their finger has wrong, their compliance with politi- not yet been marked by the ineffaceable ink that shows that they have voted— cians’ wishes is not assured. Defec- and that they are open to an “inducement”. They must get this before voting tions from threats and agreements because few voters believe that the officials, once elected, will fulfil their cam- is more common than compliance, paign promises. especially where voters are cross- pressured from both sides of the par- Source: AGR III São Tomé and Príncipe Country Report 2012. tisan divide (Bratton 2008).

Kickbacks These are a major source of cam- Box 6.8 Kickbacks and donations to campaigns funds paign finance for some ruling parties. Because they are necessar- The difference between the amounts of money available to governing and to ily opaque, authenticated evidence opposition parties tends to be far larger in Africa than elsewhere. The differ- is scarce. Kickbacks are negotiated ence in fortune cannot be explained in ideology, policies or the social bases of between a ruling party and inves- party support. tors, local or foreign, in exchange for government contracts and sub- Instead, the primary explanation lies in the advantages of incumbency. Kick- stantial campaign donations. Privat- backs, abuse of office and corruption play a large role in party financing. Only ization of assets as part of economic governing parties are in a position to award contracts, grant other favours or reforms may offer wide oppor- divert funds illegally to themselves. African governments exploit the opportu- tunities for an incumbent party nities of office to bankroll their parties without many of the political constraints (box 6.8). and restraints that operate in mature democracies.

Regulating political In Africa, because there is not much alternation in power between competing finance powers or clear ideological differences, or because the competitive multi-party Money in political financing is a process has only just begun again, opposition parties tend to attract political double-edged sword. It is indis- entrepreneurs, rather than business owners, if they manage to find any wealthy pensable for funding party estab- business backers at all. lishments and political campaigns. But, unregulated, it can distort and The reluctance of ordinary business owners to donate to opposition parties is corrupt the electoral process and one legacy of the recent authoritarian past and explains much. Governments ultimately undermine the broader still find it difficult to accept that business owners who donate to opposition democratization project (Igwe 2011). parties are as entitled to bid for government contracts as anyone else. As Pollock (1932, 32) put it eight decades ago: “Healthy political life Source: Saffu 2003. is not possible as long as the use of money is unrestrained”. which has three main implications. In Africa, political financing is First, some African states do not underregulated, or a matter of have regimes for regulating polit- unregulated self-help (Saffu 2003), ical finance covering the funding

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 193 6/25/13 8:33 PM majority of financial transactions in Box 6.9 Four gains from regulating political finance Africa, including election-related expenditures, are cash would make The value of regulating political finance lies in four areas: their task extremely hard, casting out the potential gains of proper • preventing abuse and influence-buying in parties by interest groups or regulation (box 6.9). wealthy individuals, and so seeking to restore public confidence in the electoral process and establishing a level playing field of competition between External funding and parties; assistance

• legislating on political finance to help to equalize the conditions of compe- Party funding from the diaspora tition, which help ease the entry of new parties in the political scene or to Diaspora partisans are major sources reduce the pressure on parties to align their policies with corporate or other of funding. Some political parties wealthy interest groups; (including some ruling parties) have members and chapters abroad that • empowering voters, which is ensured through disclosure rules that allow contribute to their operations. This them access to information and thus to make an informed choice on elec- has made these partisans major play- tion day; and ers in some parties, even up to using their contributions as springboards • helping strengthen parties to become responsible actors for effective and for party nomination for elected sustainable democracy. office.

Source: Fogg et al. 2003. African diaspora groups residing especially in the United States, Can- ada and Europe constitute a major of party establishments and politi- cluster of party campaign fund- cal campaigns. This gives political ing, as they are in a better economic parties and candidates freedom to position than their compatriots at raise money from a raft of sources, home. For example, during the 1996 including illegal ones. Ghanaian presidential election, some groups of Ghanaians in the Second, even if particular politi- United States contributed $100,000 cal parties have excellent visions for to the presidential campaign of the building democratic and developed opposition New Patriotic Party societies, the constraints imposed by (Wondwosen 2009). Similarly, dur- money militate against their ability ing the 2005 parliamentary elec- even to articulate their plan to the tion in Ethiopia, diaspora Ethiopi- electorate, let alone to compete and ans served as the principal source win. of campaign funding for opposition parties, especially the main opposi- Third, even in countries like Benin tion group, the Coalition for Unity and Liberia with full regulatory and Democracy (Wondwosen 2009). regimes, enforcement is a problem, especially the lack of monitoring Diaspora members contribute for systems (Saffu 2003). Even if they several reasons. They may be genu- were in place, that the overwhelming inely interested in being involved in

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 194 6/25/13 8:33 PM their home-country politics. Others Table 6.2 Countries that ban or allow foreign donations might have selfish motives, such as to political parties and campaigns government positions or, for entre- Ban Allow preneurs, government contracts (if Algeria Benin their party wins the next election). Angola Burkina Faso Legitimate contributions (where Burundi Central African Republic a political finance regime permits Cameroon Chad them), can help to level the inter- Congo Lesotho party playing field by helping cut Côte d’Ivoire Malawi the enormous resource advantage Dem. Rep. Congo Mauritius of the ruling party (though not all Egypt Mozambique contributions of course go to the Ethiopia Namibia opposition). Gabon Seychelles But illegitimate contributions (that Ghana South Africa is, contravening political finance Guinea Swaziland regulations) serve to corrupt the Guinea-Bissau Tanzania electoral process by, for example, Kenya Togo supporting vote buying. They may Liberia Zambia also bolster factionalism in political Libya parties, possibly leading to conflict. Madagascar Election funding from states and Mauritania organizations in industrialized Morocco countries Niger Some African states expect external Nigeria donors, especially in their presidential and parliamentary elections, to underwrite some of the cost—such Source: AGR III Country Reports 2012; IDEA 2012. sources are becoming indispensable in African elections. Twenty- one countries, however, have banned candidates from receiving foreign a donor-funded body such as the funds for campaigns (table 6.2 and International Federation of Electoral box 6.10). Systems. External donors provided funds for elections in 2007–2010 External funds are often used to (table 6.3), with positive and nega- help underwrite the costs of electoral tive effects. activities, including voters’ registration and education, and ballot print- Benefits ing. Some funds provide technical In light of the lukewarm atti- assistance in managing elections, tude that some African states have including preparing for and running towards funding their own elec- them. This assistance is either given tions (possibly due to doubts about directly by the external donor or by democracy; box 6.11), as well as

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 195 6/25/13 8:33 PM 2011), which is important to the Box 6.10 Foreign funding and campaign spending in Tunisia elections’ integrity. Fifteen countries in the AGR III survey accept for- According to a decree adopted in July 2011, candidates are forbidden from eign donations for party campaigns obtaining foreign funding for campaign spending. Since the revolution, the (see table 6.2). financing of election campaigns is subject to controls. The Forum for Inde- pendent Senior Elections (ISIE) is responsible for ensuring that the provisions Various non-government sources of the Decree on the Election of Members of the Constituent Assembly are in the established democracies as enforced. The aid allocated to parties was estimated at €3.7 million. well as international party federa- tions (Liberal International, Social- The control of election finance campaign is assigned to the Ministry of Finance, ist International and others) provide the ISIE, the Administrative Court, Courts of Justice and the Court of Auditors. funding for African political parties. The most an individual can donate is €30,000. Political parties do not have the These include German Stiftungs right to offer privileges or incentives in money or in kind to voters. (political foundations), the West- minster Foundation (from UK polit- Source: AGR III Tunisia Country Report 2012. ical parties mainly to Anglophone African states) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy the cost, the funds from states and (in South Africa and Mozambique; inter-governmental organizations Mathisen and Svasand 2002). in industrialized countries are critical to free and fair elections (Cyllah Disadvantages 2010). Funds are used on such activ- Democratic procedures are still frag- ities as voter registration, voter edu- ile, especially in post-conflict states, cation and ballot preparation and and the case remains strong for exter- production. nal electoral assistance. Still, it generates concerns (box 6.12). Abderha- Furthermore, since democratic elec- mane Nang, an election consultant in tions are a fairly new phenome- Mali’s 2002 elections, said: “The for- non on the continent, most African eign funding, which we received for states are still developing the neces- running [our elections], undermined sary technical know-how (Kimenyi our national sovereignty” (Tadegron

Table 6.3 Examples of external sources of funding, 2007–2010

Country Year Donor $ million Sierra Leone (P&P) 2007 International community 17.5 Rwanda (P) 2010 European Union, United Kingdom and Netherlands 4.4 Sudan (P&P)a 2010 European Union 175.5 Tanzania (P&P) 2010 European Union and United Kingdom 22.1 Uganda (P) 2011 International community 13.5

a. Includes a contribution of $55 million from the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. P&P = presidential and parliamentary; P = presidential. Source: Compiled from www.eisa.com and AGR III Country Reports 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 196 6/25/13 8:33 PM 2003), typifying the “loss of sovereignty” argument. Box 6.11 Are all governments convinced by democracy?

This is linked to a second worry, that Some government officials on the continent resort to the proverbial “lack of donors may use their electoral con- money in Africa” claim as a veneer to mask resistance to democratic elec- tribution to interfere directly. In the tions. This sense of revulsion towards elections, however masked, reflects the 2005 Liberian elections, for example, broader problem that the authoritarian mind-set remains the bedrock of some the United States used its contribu- states’ political cultures even as they sing, as it were, a requiem to the demise tion to attempt to influence the elec- of authoritarianism in Africa. toral process, when the US ambas- sador arrogated to that country the The belief underlying this mind-set is that elections are not a major national right to vet the presidential and vice- priority, but rather a pet project of the established democracies. In other words, presidential candidates (interview some African leaders regard regular free and fair elections as both an irritant with a presidential candidate, 23 and a waste of public resources and not as a public good indispensable to February 2011). As Mwesiga Baregu peace, stability and democracy. Hence, they reason, because the established at St. Augustine University in Tan- democracies are enamoured of elections, the best an African state can typically zania puts it: “By interfering in the do is contribute to the elections’ costs, rather than underwrite them fully. social contract space, donor funding has the effect of undermining Source: UNECA 2011. electoral legitimacy. Donor funding creates a patron–client rather than a citizen–public servant relation- those the voters support), and makes ship between the citizens and elected it hard to forge local ownership over leaders” (Muramira 2010). choosing national leaders.

Another concern is that some exter- Electoral assistance from regional nal donor states might use their fund- and subregional organizations ing to impose their preferred electoral The African Union and some sub- framework on recipient states, usually regional organizations have given reflecting the historical experiences modest funding for elections. of both sides and often when the ECOWAS, for example, contrib- recipients are transitioning to post- uted $350,000 to help fund the 2009 conflict peace building. Some have presidential election in Guinea- sought to persuade African states to Bissau (Pan African News Agency adopt an electoral template used in 2009). It also gave the government other post-conflict states in Asia, of Guinea $500,000 to help conduct Europe or Latin America. the presidential election in 2010 (Jalloh 2008). Although too small to Such funding can hobble Africa’s fund the elections fully, they repre- steps to democracy because, when sent important steps towards Africa’s clandestine, it undermines state self-reliance in conducting elections. efforts to regulate political finance, as it is impossible to regulate money Moves to self-sufficient election given this way. It also usually favours funding only some opposition political par- Some states have enough domestic ties and candidates (not necessarily resources to fund the entire electoral

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 197 6/25/13 8:33 PM Conclusions and Box 6.12 Donor-dependence concerns recommendations This section aims to give pointers for Some African states that rely on external assistance to help fund their elec- ensuring effective and fair financ- tions convey the impression that donors, especially Western ones, are obliged ing of elections in Africa and thus to pay. As Hitimana (2009) observes, “the Rwandan government budgeted for promoting democracy and devel- $6.2 million [for the 2010 presidential election] and expect[ed] the balance to opment. Success ultimately rests on come from development partners”. the willingness of African citizens to become involved in their country’s This “donor-dependent” approach raises major concerns. At the vortex is the affairs, including the electoral process. impression that the authoritarian proclivity that portrays democratic elections as a Western imposition remains ensconced in the foundation of the political Making election funding a national cultures of some African states. The effect is a seemingly half-hearted com- priority mitment to the centrality of democratic elections as integral elements of the It is very important for African democratization project. The related concern is that democratic elections are states to assume sole responsibility relegated to non-priority areas in national budget and extra-budgetary spend- for funding their elections for two ing, especially when that spending is conflated with other activities. reasons. First, it establishes national ownership over the electoral process, For instance, one major activity is the sizeable amount of money spent by some including the critical issue of choos- African states on foreign travel by government officials. Another is the substan- ing the country’s leaders. This would tial amount of public funds spent on projects that reflect conspicuous con- augur well for the broader democra- sumption—a new presidential aircraft perhaps or cars for government agencies tization project. and officials. Second, it would help to obliterate the Making funding for democratic elections a national priority is far more impor- external prejudice that sees Africa as tant to state legitimacy and the maintenance of peace and stability than allot- a region where people are intrinsically ting resources to unnecessary foreign travels and conspicuous consumption. incapable of governing themselves, and much more broadly “cannot do Source: UNECA 2011. anything right”. Such self-reliance would also help to end the depiction of the continent as a perpetual crisis process (including Botswana, Cape zone that requires seemingly unend- Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Sey- ing interventions from external actors. chelles and South Africa). Oth- ers require large external assistance If democracy is to take firm root (including São Tomé and Príncipe throughout Africa, governments and Tanzania as well as post-conflict should make election funding a states such as the Democratic Repub- national priority. Government offi- lic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozam- cials, political parties, civil society bique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and and citizens throughout Africa need South Sudan). And yet others have to assume primacy as stakeholders, improved their capacity to finance because collectively they have the the process over the past decade, with ultimate responsibility for the well- the hopeful prospect that they will be being of their countries. Thus all self-sufficient in a few years (Ghana, these groups need to play pivotal roles Kenya, Malawi and Uganda). in ensuring that their governments

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 198 6/25/13 8:33 PM treat elections as public goods indis- future. For example, if an African pensable to democracy, development state holds its presidential or parlia- and durable peace (although interna- mentary elections every five years, tional donors, especially the indus- the budget for the election could be trial democracies, may be able to help formulated. Then based on the total encourage regimes that view elections cost, the state would allocate money as a Western imposition). in the annual budget over a five- year period covering the total cost. African states should endeavour The Election Commission of Sierra to fully fund their own elections. Leone is an example of good prac- Although external funding helps tice on this, having written a budget states transition from war to peace, for presidential and parliamentary thereafter these states should assume elections in 2012 and 2016. the sole funding burden. A complementary step would be Donor states should give technical setting up a “basket fund” for help- assistance for electoral management ing to support elections. Managed African before an election, enabling states to by the African Union, participat- states should select electoral officials for training. ing states would make annual con- endeavour to Subsequently, these trained elec- tributions (using a formula to be fully fund their tion officials could then conduct in- collectively decided). Based on a own elections house workshops and seminars for state’s needs, money from the fund the staff of their EMBs to prepare would help that state fully support for later elections. its election costs. Such a continental approach to self-help would be far Moving to full state support for more acceptable to electorates than EMBs and elections continually relying on the estab- Administrative and operational lished democracies. expenses of EMBs need to be fully funded in African states’ annual Preventing abuse of public budgets, and once approved, dis- resources in campaigns bursed promptly. Similarly, the Some incumbent parties and leaders budget for conducting elections pilfer state resources for campaign should be spent well. The govern- purposes. The ruling party tends to ment would need to ensure that the dominate public media. Other states funding process does not provide enlist state security agencies such as opportunities for corrupt activities the police and intelligence services by EMB staff or state officials, and to support their campaign. All these that the budget reflects actual, cost- elements tilt the balance heavily in effective spending. favour of the incumbent party and leader and away from the opposition. Since elections are held periodically, a strategic funding plan could Laws are therefore needed to level be developed that includes setting the playing field for contesting par- aside a portion of the state’s annual ties, and they should be enforced budget to fund elections in the impartially and rigorously to ensure

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 199 6/25/13 8:33 PM the credibility of the electoral pro- passed without the support of par- cess. The rules governing access ties holding elected power and con- to the media should be fair and trolling parliamentary action (Bryan transparent—and enforced. and Baer 2005). Even when such laws have been passed, the ease with Adopting public funding of parties which parties often escape regu- and campaigns lation through loopholes suggests that genuine reform can only come Given the gross disparities in about when parties voluntarily adopt resources between and among polit- reform measures. ical parties and candidates, African states not already doing so should Reducing the cost of elections consider adopting public fund- Elections are expensive affairs, and ing, using a formula reflecting each this partly explains why some Afri- state’s needs. Each system would can states accept external funding. need to be equitable. Efforts to reduce their cost, such as Efforts to automation, need to be replicated. reduce the cost Public funding is less dangerous than South Africa, for example, has of elections having politicians in search of funds seen its election expenses per voter in Africa need to turn to interested money or corrupt decline in the past three elections. be replicated practices, but public funding needs to strike a balance between encouraging Countries that have rising costs per parties to maintain their grass-roots voter, such as Nigeria, should seek base (through membership support ways to cut costs, including rigor- including dues) and funding from ously enforcing electoral regulations taxpayers (which should not make and addressing corruption in the the parties remote from that base). election process itself.

Regulating political finance Developing a consensus for African states that do not have polit- political finance reform ical finance regulatory regimes may Unless key stakeholders—chiefly consider establishing them. This the contesting parties and electoral is important because the distortive institutions—share a consensus on influence of money on electoral pro- political finance reform, such reform cesses needs to be addressed if elec- will not advance, as laws that do not tions are to have integrity. Those draw on the legitimacy of wide con- countries that do have such regimes sent are unlikely to be sustainable. need to improve how they monitor— Hence stakeholders need to carefully cash transactions particularly—and build understanding and support on enforce the regulations. this matter, including among smaller parties. They should consult a wide Since parties lie at the heart of the range of experts (individual or enti- party funding challenge, they should ties) on proposals for such reform. be necessarily included in any solu- But new political finance laws tion through regulation, because no should be clear and suited to a coun- anti-corruption legislation can be try’s capacity.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 200 6/25/13 8:33 PM In short, a “one-shoe-fits-all” groups such as women and youth, approach will achieve little. Each people with disabilities and minori- country has an opportunity to ties is necessary, so there is a need to develop laws and mechanisms for remove the barriers to their election its own needs, aiming to make its funding. Campaign finance regu- political finance regime transparent, lations and electoral system proce- accountable and equitable. dures should be reviewed and reor- iented to improve opportunities for Building skills in fund-raising and these groups. reporting Beyond public funding, parties need Notes to broaden the base of supporters 1. These funds come from both domes- engaged in fund-raising beyond tic and external sources: diaspora a small coterie in the leadership. funds, funds stashed illegally abroad A more professional approach is by political actors (among others) and required, particularly when a party funds from businesses. heavily raises funds among the pri- 2. Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra vate sector and individual party Leone have taken or are considering supporters. Fund-raising skills are measures to use digital and biometric required in persuading individuals equipment as a measure to enhance and corporates to make donations. the reliability of voter registration They are also required in identi- and as a cost-saving measure in the fying organizations in civil society long run, although steps to do this that have potential for positive are controversial. response to appeals for donations. 3. Given the poverty on the continent Parties should therefore invest in among most of the rank and file they training their cadres in this area. are usually symbolic. Parties also need to boost their 4. Some godfathers fall out with their— reporting and accounting expertise, now powerful—client when he seeks for funds from the private and pub- to assert himself but they insist on lic sectors. retaining control and recouping their investment (Agbaje and Adejumobi Thus in a culture of disclosure and 2006). transparency, parties need staff both to raise funds and account for them. References EMBs and donors can help to pro- ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. vide all-party training programmes 2011. “Electoral Systems.” http:// on such skills. aceproject.org/main/english/st, accessed 20 February 2011. Managing election funding and Agbaje, Adigun, and Said Adejumobi. diversity 2006. “Do Votes Count? The Travails A core issue of this report is that of Electoral Politics in Nigeria.” Africa diversity should be positively man- Development 31 (3): 25–44. aged in the electoral process. As ear- Austin, Reginald, and Maja Tjernstrom, lier chapters argued that affirmative eds. 2003. Funding of Political Parties action for representing some social and Election Campaigns. Stockholm:

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 201 6/25/13 8:33 PM International Institute for Democracy Greene, Kenneth. 2007. Why Dominant and Electoral Assistance. Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization Ballington, Julie. 2003. “Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective. New York: in Political Party Funding.” In Fund- Cambridge University Press. ing of Political Parties and Election Hitimana, Bosco. 2009. “Rwanda: Presi- Campaigns, ed. Reginald Austin and dential Election to Cost $10.6 mil- Maja Tjernstrom. Stockholm: Inter- lion.” allAfrica.com, 19 September. national Institute for Democracy and Hounkpe, Mathias. 2011. “Benin.” In Electoral Assistance. Election Management Bodies in West Bratton, Michael. 2008. “Vote Buying Africa: A Comparative Study of the and Violence in Nigerian Election Contribution of Electoral Commissions Campaigns.” Electoral Studies 27 (4): to the Strengthening of Democracy, ed. 621–32. Ismaila Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele Bryan, Shari, and Denise Baer, eds. 2005. L. Jinadu and Pascal Kambale, 12–48. Money in Politics. Washington, DC: Dakar: Open Society Foundations. National Democratic Institute for IDEA (International Institute for International Affairs. Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Cyllah, Almami. 2010. “Democracy and 2012. “Political Finance Database.” Elections in Africa: Recent Trends Stockholm. and the Role of the International Ibrahim, Jibrin. 2003. “The Rise of Community.” Testimony before the Nigeria’s Godfathers.” BBC News, U.S. House of Representatives’ Sub- 10 November. committee on Africa and Global Igwe, Uche. 2011. “Nigeria: Political Health, 24 March, Washington, DC. Financing, Incumbency and Free and El-Rashidi, Yasmine. 2010. “Hire a Thug Fair Elections.” Pambazuka News, and Other Campaign Expenditures.” 10 January. Ahramonline. 15 December. Jalloh, Bhoyy. 2008. “ECOWAS to Con- Ettinghausen, Clare. 2006. Paying for Pol- tribute U.S.$500,000 to Country’s itics: The Principles of Funding Political Election.” Concord Times (Freetown), Parties. Hansard Society Discussion 7 February. Paper. London: Hansard Society. Jinadu, Adele L. 2011. “Nigeria.” In Elec- Fall, Ismaila. 2011. “Cape Verde.” In tion Management Bodies in West Africa: Election Management Bodies in West A Comparative Study of the Contribu- Africa: A Comparative Study of the tion of Electoral Commissions to the Contribution of Electoral Commissions Strengthening of Democracy, ed. Ismaila to the Strengthening of Democracy, ed. Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L. Ismaila Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele Jinadu and Pascal Kambale, 108–61. L. Jinadu and Pascal Kambale, 49–75. Dakar: Open Society Foundations. Dakar: Open Society Foundations. Kambale, Pascal. 2011. “Overview: The Fogg, Karen, Patrick Molutsi, and Maja Contribution of Electoral Management Tjernstrom. 2003. “Conclusion.” In Bodies to Credible Elections in West Funding of Political Parties and Elec- Africa.” In Election Management Bodies tion Campaigns, ed. Reginald Austin in West Africa: A Comparative Study of and Maja Tjernstrom. Stockholm: the Contribution of Electoral Commissions International Institute for Democracy to the Strengthening of Democracy, ed. and Electoral Assistance. Ismaila Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 202 6/25/13 8:33 PM L. Jinadu, and Pascal Kambale, 1–11. Successful Elections in Guinea, Dakar: Open Society Foundations. Guinea-Bissau.” Abuja, 22 June. Kimenyi, Mwangi. 2011. “Africa’s 2011 Pollock, James Ker. 1932. Money and Pol- Elections.” Foresight Africa, 3–5 January. itics Abroad. New York: Alfred Knopf. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. Saffu, Yaw. 2003. “The Funding of Politi- “Why Democracy Needs A Level cal Parties and Election Campaigns in Playing Field.” Journal of Democracy Africa.” In Funding of Political Parties 21 (1): 57–68. and Election Campaigns, ed. Regi- Lindberg, Staffan. 2003. “It’s Our Time nald Austin and Maja Tjernstrom. to ‘Chop:’ Do Elections in Africa Stockholm: International Institute for Feed Neo-patr imonialism Rather Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Than Counteract It?” Democratization Samuels, David. 2001. “Money, Elections, 10 (2): 121–40. and Democracy in Brazil.” Latin Masunungure, Eldred. 2006. Regulation American Politics and Society 43 (2): of Political Parties in Zimbabwe: Reg- 27–48. istration, Finance and Other Support. Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2002. “What Harare: Zimbabwean Elections Sup- Is Vote-Buying?” Paper presented port Network. at the International Conference on Mathisen, Harold, and Lars Svasand. “Trading Political Rights: The Com- 2002. Funding Political Parties in parative Politics of Vote-Buying,” Emerging African Democracies: What Center for International Studies, Role for Norway? Report 2002:6. Ber- Massachusetts Institute of Technol- gen, Norway: Chr. Michelson Institute. ogy, 26–27 August, Cambridge, MA. Muramira, Gashegu. 2010. “East Africa: Sebunya, Crespo. 2011. “Huge Uganda EAC Delegates Rap Donors on Election Funding Questioned.” Election Funding.” allAfrica.com, Medeshivalley News, 2 March. 21 August. Tadegron, Noel Kokou. 2003. “Africa: Mutume, Gumisai. 2005. “Beyond the Foreign Funding for Elections Comes Ballot.” African Renewal 18 (4): 10. under Attack.” Inter Press Service, Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. 2003. “Intro- 1 May. duction: Political Parties Funding and UNECA (United Nations Economic Democracy.” In Funding of Political Commission for Africa). 2011. “Back- Parties and Election Campaigns, ed. ground Paper on the Economics of Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernstrom. Elections.” Addis Ababa. Stockholm: International Institute for Vincente, Pedro. 2013. “Is Vote-buying Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Effective? Evidence from a Field ———. 2009. The Funding of Party Com- Experiment in West Africa.” January. petition. Berlin: Nomos Publishers. www.pedrovicente.org/banho.pdf. Okunade, Bayo, Olalekan Taiwo, Stephen Walecki, Marcin. 2006. “Direct Public Lafenwa, and Idowu Johnson. 2009. Funding of Political Parties.” 2 June. “Campaign Financing Distorts Nige- www.knab.gov.lv/uploads/eng/ rian Elections.” Briefing Paper, Center public_funding_in_latvia.pdf. for the Study of African Economies, Wondwosen, Teshome. 2009. “Political Oxford, UK. Financing in Africa: Ethiopia as Case Pan African News Agency. 2009. Study.” International Journal of Human “ECOWAS Leaders Move to Ensure and Social Sciences 4 (6): 406–19.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 203 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 204 6/25/13 8:33 PM 7 he objectives of electoral, are imperative if the steps towards constitutional and politi- democracy are to be sustainable. T cal reforms, as a strategy It does this through the prism of to improve and democratize gov- the African Governance Report Electoral, ernance in Africa, are threefold: to (AGR) III country reports and Constitutional manage diversity in ways to mute Expert Opinion Survey. and Political diversity-related fallout—especially Reforms violence—when ethnicity and other This chapter finds that, for reforms identity-based diversity is mobilized; to be deepened, just as the impe- to bring about structural and institu- tus for democratic transition did not tional changes in the architecture of originate only from parties and state democratic governance; and to reori- institutions (pressures from above), ent anti-democratic political cultures so too will the role of civil soci- through civic and voter education to ety and other sectors remain vital advance the prospects and possibili- in safeguarding and then broaden- ties of democracy. ing reforms (pressures from below; box 7.1). In combination, these ele- Encouragingly, many African coun- ments of reform will determine the tries have made long strides in these quality of overall democratic trans- three interlinked areas of reform formation on the continent. since the democratic transition of the 1990s, but unevenly—and a few Dynamic links among too slowly to signal a break from electoral, constitutional authoritarianism. and political reforms State institutions, political parties South Africa’s historic constitution and society are not static. Africa is in the mid-1990s was followed by undergoing deep economic, social those in Kenya and Zimbabwe, as and demographic changes. Diver- well as by reviews in Nigeria, Tan- sities are also in flux. Countries zania, Zambia and elsewhere to deal therefore need to respond to these with deficits that had contributed changes promptly and appropriately, to political crisis. In North African adapting their electoral systems and, countries such as Egypt, Libya and beyond them, to the advances in Tunisia, new constitutions became communication technology. imperative to map out new patterns of distributing power in the after- How the state and parties respond math of authoritarianism, mak- to these wider changes is significant. ing way for a democratic transition. Neither state institutions nor parties Electoral reforms have necessarily are models of democratic practices been part of those reforms. and they suffer from deficits in internal democracy. It will thus remain a But further constitutional reforms challenge for parties to interpret the are necessary in some countries to changes and resulting demands in address limitations in their elec- society, and dynamically shape them toral systems. This chapter looks into constitutional and electoral at key areas where further reforms reforms that will manage diversity.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 205 6/25/13 8:33 PM helped generate electoral reform—a Box 7.1 Pressures from below central development in the post- colonial history of such countries Although political parties and state institutions like electoral management boards as Cameroon and Gabon in Cen- will remain anchors of the electoral process and key stakeholders in managing tral Africa; Kenya, Tanzania and diversity, groups from civil society are clamouring for greater political voice. Uganda in East Africa; Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in Women’s groups, for example, continue to press for equitable representation North Africa; Benin, Cape Verde, in legislatures and executives, as do marginalized groups such as minorities on Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra the economic and geographical periphery, people with disabilities and youths. Leone in West Africa; and Malawi, Trade unions seek greater voice not only in economic policy but in bodies South Africa, Zambia and Zim- charged with reviewing the constitution. babwe in Southern Africa.

Media institutions, too, are demanding greater freedoms, aided by a shifting Electoral reforms in Africa have technological frontier that makes mobile phones and the Internet more accessible attempted to resolve the deficits of in Africa’s urban and rural areas, which has a direct bearing on how elections are electoral governance through three conducted, including monitoring. These technologies have been used by youth main strategies (box 7.2 and see groups in reform campaigns and electoral processes in countries as diverse as chapter 3). First, they have modi- Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe (see chapters 2 and 3). fied electoral systems, particularly first past the post (FPTP). The objective is to bring about electoral Yet societies are not homogeneous, diversity by redressing the historical and they are a source not only of pro- underrepresentation of marginalized gressive ideas but also regressive ten- groups, such as ethno-regional, lin- dencies. The interface between par- guistic or religious groups; women; ties and state institutions, on the one and small or weak political parties. hand, and society and its various constituent groups, on the other, is crucial Second, electoral reforms have gen- in reforming the electoral system and erally sought to strengthen the inde- in managing diversity. The pressures pendence of EMBs. The objective is from below should not be ignored to enhance the procedural certainty in favour of arrangements between of the electoral process to ensure elites—the pressures from above. the substantive uncertainty of its outcome, and so enhance the gen- The following sections show the eral public confidence in, electoral views of respondents to the AGR III administration and management. Expert Opinion Survey on aspects of the three areas of reform, includ- Third, in the post-1990 demo- ing political-party reforms. They cratic transitions in Africa, man- also indicate areas for further aging diversity took on concrete reform, drawing heavily on the constitutional and political form country reports. in entrenching constitutional provisions that guarantee the rights Electoral reforms of marginalized groups to cor- Pressures from above and below in porate existence and to inclusion a range of African countries have in governance institutions and

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 206 6/25/13 8:33 PM processes. The provisions also recognize group rights to promote Box 7.2 Three strategies of electoral reform group interests and sometimes set up human rights commissions to Electoral reform in Africa reveals three overlapping themes. monitor observance or violations of these rights. Redesigning electoral systems. Some governments took steps to achieve a more democratic management of diversity by combining elements of first past Electoral reform in post-1990 Africa the post and proportional representation to make party representation in leg- has also been about issues of access islatures reflect more accurately the proportion of votes cast, as in Lesotho, to the electoral process and its integ- or to achieve fair representation and diversity in the legislatures, as in South rity to accommodate and promote Africa. They also took steps to require a second round of elections, or run-offs, pluralism in public policy. Improv- in presidential elections if the initial electoral outcomes did not meet certain ing and democratizing the legal requirements, either of a minimum regional spread of support, as in Nigeria, or framework for managing elections if no candidate won 50% or more (an absolute majority), as in Ghana, Senegal have featured in electoral reforms in and Sierra Leone. several African countries. Strengthening electoral management boards’ (EMBs) independence. Govern- Promoting and protecting diversity ments diminished the influence of the executive by strengthening the mech- is therefore a major force for ensur- anism for appointing and removing EMBs’ members and by guaranteeing the ing accountability in public polit- bodies’ financial independence. (They also entrenched EMBs in the constitu- ical life. Improving the credibility tion.) See, for example, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and South Africa (AGR III of electoral governance and man- Country Reports 2012). agement strengthens elections for democratically managing diversity As part of these strengthening moves, some countries unbundled EMBs’ pow- and political succession. Explicitly ers and functions by creating two (or sometimes more) EMBs to undertake accommodating diversity through major elements of electoral administration and management. Examples are electoral, constitutional and political seen in the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration means also makes up for the inade- Commission in Sierra Leone; the National Election Commission and the Regis- quacy of liberal democratic theory to trar of Political Parties in Tanzania; and the National Electoral Commission, the recognize minority group rights as Directorate General for Electoral Process Support (in the Ministry of Internal requiring constitutional protection Administration) and electoral registration committees in Cape Verde. and promotion. Entrenching constitutional or electoral laws. Sometimes these measures That is the theory. How then do the included a Bill of Rights, as in Kenya’s and South Africa’s constitutions. Other expert respondents view African’s laws provided for regulation and oversight of party activities, including financ- on-the-ground progress in electoral ing, nomination processes and electioneering campaigns by either a national reforms? electoral commission (Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria), a political parties regulation commission (Sierra Leone) or a registrar of political parties (Tanzania); and for Electoral system public finance of political parties (Nigeria). The major systems in Africa are FPTP and proportional representation, whose merits are (figure 7.1). Three of the remaining greatly debated (see chapters 3 and four (Egypt being the exception) 5). More than half the respond- have fairly small populations, per- ents in 36 of the 40 countries haps indicating that diversity is not favour proportional representation a major issue for them.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 207 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.1 Proportional representation promotes electoral stability and diversity management—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Kenya Lesotho Zimbabwe Nigeria Rwanda Burkina Faso Uganda Tunisia Angola Mauritania Malawi Mauritius Algeria Senegal Djibouti South Africa Mali Sierra Leone Chad Benin Botswana Tanzania Gabon Namibia Zambia Togo Mozambique Ethiopia Guinea Seychelles Cameroon Cape Verde Liberia Congo Madagascar Ghana Comoros São Tomé & Príncipe Egypt Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 208 6/25/13 8:33 PM Procedure for appointing and Africa, and to enhancing the legit- removing electoral commissioners imacy of electoral outcomes and The procedure for appointing and political succession (see chapter 5). removing electoral commissioners For that reason, some countries have is a major recurring reform issue in introduced electoral reforms. electoral management and administration, and an overwhelming The general objective of electoral majority of expert respondents in adjudication is to protect and promote nearly all countries believe it should diversity, provide remedies for elec- be handled by an independent non- toral irregularities (national and local partisan body (figure 7.2). elections, party nominations) and protect the electoral mandate from being The jobs of electoral commission- stolen. It is also to ensure the account- ers should be openly advertised and ability of EMBs and to prevent them competed for nationally by citizens, from being judges in their own cases. according to the country surveys, Thus constitutional and other legal making for greater credibility and provisions such as electoral laws spell The jobs of integrity of EMBs and reducing the out the institutions and processes for electoral influence of the executive or other adjudication. Equally important are commissioners arms of government. In 17 of the 40 the legal framework for conducting should be openly countries, at least 75% of the expert the elections and general confidence advertised respondents agree or strongly agree in the judiciary’s independence. and competed with this position (figure 7.3). Confidence in dispute management for nationally Autonomy for electoral though is not high: only in eight coun- by citizens management boards tries did more than half the expert The autonomy of EMBs resonated in respondents consider election disputes almost all the country reports. The to be well managed to the satisfaction clear reform message from the Expert of all political parties, pointing to the Opinion Survey is that EMBs should need for policy reform (see figure 5.4). enjoy relative autonomy in political, administrative and financial spheres: The country reports suggest that in 39 of the 40 countries, more than such reform needs to create inde- half the expert respondents agree or pendent and credible institutions strongly agree that EMBs should to handle election disputes; insti- enjoy relative autonomy in political, tutionalize dispute adjudication for administrative and financial inde- elections; ensure sets time limits for pendence (figure 7.4). disposing of election disputes and petitions; issue information regularly Election adjudication and dispute to the political parties and citizens resolution on how the dispute is being resolved; The importance of transparent, explore alternative conflict reso- impartial and expeditious adjudi- lution mechanisms; and carry out cation of election disputes is now regular review and auditing of the well accepted as crucial to defusing processes of election dispute man- pre- and post-election violence in agement, including their efficacy.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 209

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 209 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.2 Appointing and removing electoral commissioners should be handled by an independent non-partisan body—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Zimbabwe Tunisia Kenya Algeria Botswana Nigeria Malawi Mauritania Mauritius Zambia Uganda Burkina Faso Djibouti Mozambique Gabon Madagascar Chad Lesotho South Africa Comoros Rwanda Tanzania Cape Verde Sierra Leone São Tomé & Príncipe Namibia Seychelles Angola Ghana Togo Congo Senegal Liberia Benin Mali Ethiopia Guinea Cameroon Egypt Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

210 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 210 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.3 Positions of electoral commissioners should be advertised for national competition Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Agree or strongly agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly disagree or disagree

Kenya Zimbabwe Lesotho Botswana South Africa Angola Namibia Zambia Nigeria Mauritius Mozambique Tanzania Sierra Leone Malawi Liberia Rwanda Tunisia Comoros Ethiopia Senegal Uganda Cape Verde Ghana Mauritania Seychelles Madagascar Djibouti Cameroon Benin Burkina Faso Guinea Togo Gabon Congo Mali Egypt Chad São Tomé & Príncipe Gambia Algeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 211

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 211 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.4 Electoral management boards should have relative autonomy in political, administrative and financial independence—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Ghana Kenya Cape Verde Mauritania Uganda Mauritius Comoros Tunisia Nigeria Gabon Lesotho Burkina Faso Malawi Botswana São Tomé & Príncipe Zambia Senegal South Africa Djibouti Mali Chad Zimbabwe Mozambique Madagascar Algeria Rwanda Togo Sierra Leone Tanzania Benin Seychelles Congo Guinea Liberia Namibia Angola Cameroon Ethiopia Egypt Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

212 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 212 6/25/13 8:33 PM Security of elections and the role the electoral commission; in other of security agencies countries, it lies with another neutral The “security” of electoral govern- body. In both cases, what informs ance may be seen along broad and the arrangement is the need to insu- narrow perspectives. The broad late the EMBs from partisan party perspective focuses on securing political use by incumbent political the electoral process from distor- authorities. tions, violations and manipulations, in ways that will generate and sus- In a number of countries, the debate tain confidence in the legitimacy of is about who should be the con- democratic elections and democratic trolling and disbursing authority political succession. Critical is the of the financial arrangements for notion of free and fair or credible deploying security agencies, and democratic elections (see box 4.7). who should bear the cost. Another Securing the electoral process in problem concerns the control and this way has been the preoccupa- coordination of the operational tion of electoral reform in Africa activities of the security agencies since the 1990s. It requires plan- deployed for duty in the electoral ning, training, inter-agency coordi- process, and the nature of the train- nation and interaction between elec- ing they must undergo for their toral commissions and stakeholders election-related duty. in state and society. This aspect of securing the integrity of the elec- The challenge for African EMBs toral process is as important as the remains the daunting capacity- specific and election-related deploy- building one of how to engage in ment and use of security agencies, inter-agency coordination with secu- to keep the peace and move men rity agencies, ministries, depart- and equipment to difficult terrains ments and other agencies of the state just before, during and after elec- without alienating the EMBs’ oper- tion day. ational autonomy and their ultimate responsibility for ensuring credi- The narrow sense of security refers ble elections. The problem then is to using security agencies, such how to ensure that the security and as the police, for specific electoral other agencies deployed for elections functions and duties in the electoral are under the control of the EMBs, cycle, beyond their normal law-and- in respect of the election-related order role. In this view, there is nec- assignments of the security agen- essarily the need to determine what cies. This is further complicated by kinds of security agencies and secu- the problem of the extended span rity actors to deploy and use. When of control of the EMBs, in view of there is agreement on deploying the necessarily decentralized nature security agencies for electoral duties, of managing the electoral process in there may be disagreement over many countries, and the discretion- where the operational authority over ary power on the ground wielded by them should lie. The operational local officials and temporary staff of authority lies in some countries with EMBs.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 213

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 213 6/25/13 8:33 PM Some African countries have Box 7.3 Constitutional bans on ethnic-based political reformed their party system to de- parties: Ghana and Kenya emphasize dysfunctional ethno- political and related violence in com- The Constitution of Ghana, 1992 petitive party and electoral politics, by proscribing ethnic-based political Section 55(4): “Every political party shall have a national character, and mem- parties (box 7.3). bership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions.” These and similar provisions provided the legal basis for the attempt The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 to engineer the emergence of political parties with a national outlook Article 91(1): “Every political party shall . . . have a national character as pre- through structural or organiza- scribed by an Act of Parliament; promote and uphold national unity; . . . respect tional requirements and regulations, the right of all persons to participate in the political process, including minor- spelt out in electoral and other laws, ities and marginalized groups; [and] respect and promote human rights and which political associations seek- fundamental freedoms, and gender equality and equity.” ing recognition and registration as political parties should satisfy. The Article 91 (2): “A political party shall not be founded on a religious, linguistic, EMBs in some countries, for exam- racial, ethnic, gender or regional basis or seek to engage in advocacy of hatred ple, have the mandate to ensure on any such basis.” political party compliance with the constitutional requirements of broad national outlook. In the AGR III survey, in 19 countries at least half the expert respond- However, the character of politi- ents consider their security agencies cal parties in terms of their func- to be fair and non-partisan in their tional spread and national out- roles in the electoral process, less look is a major contentious policy than half in the other 21 (see figure issue. Some argue that since polit- 5.3). This point emphasizes the need ical parties are free associations of to reform how security forces engage like-minded people with same ide- in the electoral process. ological orientation and conviction, parties do not necessarily have to be Political party reforms national and trans-ethnic in orien- Political party reforms have been tation; parties could be sectarian, central to electoral reforms in Africa, local or community based, so long if only because competitive party and as they do not threaten national electoral politics is one of the defin- interests. But others argue that ing characteristics of liberal democ- for parties to be agencies of diver- racy. The challenges of reforms for sity management, they need to be political parties include how to pre- national in orientation and tran- vent parties from being sectarian scend sectarian identities. What- along ethno-regional, racial or reli- ever their composition, though, par- gious lines; to be inclusive of differ- ties need to be instruments of social ent social classes and categories; and cohesion, national integration and to practise internal democracy. political stability.

214 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 214 6/25/13 8:33 PM Internal party democracy is for women to be mainstreamed in Political parties in many A frican governance processes. This reinforces countries have a wide deficit in the position of regional institutions internal democracy: only in 12 of the like the African Union and some 40 countries did more than half the regional economic communities like respondents agree or strongly agree the Southern African Development that political parties practise internal Community for quota systems for democracy (figure 7.5). women in public institutions.

Lack of such democracy fuels inter- Effective constitutional checks and nal party feuds and conflicts, under- balances in governance mines any credible process of leader- When there are effective checks on ship selection and compromises the the use of power, the propensity is quality of leaders presented as candi- for group and minority interests to dates for national elections. be well protected in the political system. More than half the experts in Constitutional and 33 of the 40 countries indicate that A competent, political reform issues there are significant or full checks corruption-free When the constitutional and polit- and balances among the three and independent ical context of electoral govern- branches of government (figure 7.7). judiciary is central ance does not provide for effective to democratic diversity management, the elec- But more needs to done. Many leg- governance toral architecture on its own cannot islatures are quite weak (see chap- bridge social diversities in cohesion. ter 2), with executive dominance still Some of the more important issues the norm in many countries. There requiring reform are now discussed. is a need to reinforce the capacity and better fund the legislature, Constitutional safeguards to while ensuring transparency and protect marginalized groups accountability in its affairs. Marginalized groups include minorities, women, youth and people A competent, corruption-free and with disabilities. Affirmative action independent judiciary is proposed in many of the coun- A competent, corruption-free and try reports for those groups, beyond independent judiciary is central to constitutional provisions, which democratic governance, respect for themselves should be more explicit the rule of law and ensuring that on recognizing diversity and pro- diversity is not compromised. Con- tecting minority rights. fidence in the judiciary may make all the difference in electoral gov- In practical politics, in 32 of the 40 ernance as political actors who feel countries more than half the experts cheated can have recourse to the agree or strongly agree that a quota judiciary for electoral justice. In system should be adopted for appoint- Nigeria, for example, the judiciary ing women to legislative and execu- has been crucial in keeping the dem- tive positions (figure 7.6). The clear ocratic project on course through preference among expert respondents landmark electoral judgments that

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 215

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 215 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.5 Political parties practise internal democracy in electing party officials and party candidates for national elections Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Agree or strongly agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly disagree or disagree

Ghana Cape Verde Rwanda Liberia São Tomé & Príncipe Botswana Tanzania South Africa Sierra Leone Angola Seychelles Namibia Guinea Comoros Senegal Madagascar Egypt Congo Gambia Zimbabwe Gabon Mali Ethiopia Lesotho Algeria Cameroon Chad Zambia Togo Uganda Djibouti Nigeria Tunisia Mauritania Benin Mauritius Mozambique Malawi Burkina Faso Kenya 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

216 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 216 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.6 A quota system should be adopted for appointing women to executive positions and parliament—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Algeria Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Kenya Mauritania Guinea Nigeria Rwanda Zambia Botswana Congo Ethiopia Chad Djibouti Madagascar Namibia Cameroon Liberia South Africa Ghana Lesotho Tanzania Comoros Mauritius Togo Tunisia Senegal Uganda São Tomé & Príncipe Seychelles Burkina Faso Mozambique Gabon Benin Mali Malawi Egypt Cape Verde Angola Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 217

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 217 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.7 Significant or full constitutional checks and balances among the different branches of government exist in most countries Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Signiﬁcant or full checks and balances Limited checks and balances No checks or very few checks and balances

Cape Verde Liberia Seychelles South Africa Kenya Sierra Leone Rwanda Malawi Uganda Ghana Nigeria Mali Senegal Ethiopia São Tomé & Príncipe Mauritius Guinea Mauritania Benin Chad Tunisia Gabon Namibia Congo Botswana Djibouti Mozambique Lesotho Zambia Comoros Tanzania Cameroon Angola Togo Madagascar Burkina Faso Egypt Zimbabwe Algeria Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

218 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 218 6/25/13 8:33 PM gave justice to aggrieved electoral 1, 2 and 5). A frequent challenge parties. In several states in Nigeria, after elections, however, is form- electoral verdicts have been over- ing a national unity government turned by the judiciary and election that includes all or the main parties, tribunals, averting the possibility of against a backdrop of violence, as in violence (Adejumobi 2010; Agbaje Kenya and Zimbabwe. and Adejumobi 2006). The policy message from the coun- However, while checks and bal- try surveys is that this option should ances are increasing, corruption in be adopted as a temporary measure the judiciary remains daunting (fig- in a post-election crisis, in order to ure 7.8). Many respondents regard ease the crisis and avoid destruc- the judiciary as corrupt: only in tion of lives and property. In 32 of seven countries did at least half the the 40 countries, more than half experts consider their judiciary to be the respondents endorsed the for- largely free from corruption. mation of a national government as a viable option (figure 7.9). How- African countries The goal is that judiciaries should be ever, this option should be only a have made purged of corruption. Policy reform temporary measure, and not assume important measures may include appoint- permanence in competitive elec- strides in promoting ment and removal of judicial officers toral politics. Reform of the elec- inclusive governance based on clear procedure and, pos- toral system towards mixed forms sibly, entrusted to an independent of proportional representation may body (such as a judicial service com- provide an inclusive mechanism for mission); adequate remuneration ensuring a more national method of and protection for judicial officers in representation. their work; regular training for judicial officers to ensure state-of-the- Government delivery of services art knowledge in dispensing justice; A major expected dividend of regular audits of the conduct of the democracy is the delivery of pub- judiciary, which should involve par- lic services. When government ser- liament, civil society and profes- vices are inefficient, inaccessible sional groups; and adequate sanc- and based on patronage, the result is tions for erring judicial officials tried usually low commitment and sup- through legal process. port to the democratic project— what some refer to as democracy National unity government in post- fatigue—and possibly tension and election crisis conflict in society. The govern- African countries have made impor- ment’s service delivery capacity is tant strides in promoting inclusive thus a key conflict-mediating mech- governance through redesigning anism. Individuals and groups that institutions and governance systems, can access affordable public goods including decentralization, diver- without relying on ethnic or other sity in the constitution of govern- sectarian connections are likely to ments and the executive, and reform reinforce national unity and identity of the electoral system (see chapters (UNECA 2009).

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 219

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 219 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.8 Judicial corruption remains daunting Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Largely free from corruption or above corruption Fairly free from corruption Completely or fairly corrupt

Cape Verde South Africa Algeria Namibia Mauritius Botswana Rwanda Seychelles Malawi Senegal Egypt Gambia Tunisia Angola Congo Djibouti Ethiopia Ghana Mauritania Gabon Comoros Lesotho Cameroon Guinea Tanzania Madagascar Liberia Uganda Zimbabwe Zambia Chad Mozambique Benin Nigeria Togo Kenya Mali São Tomé & Príncipe Sierra Leone Burkina Faso 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

220 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 220 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.9 Formation of coalition or national unity government is a viable option—agree or strongly agree Share of experts surveyed agreeing with the statement, by country (%)

Rwanda Guinea Mauritania Mali Zimbabwe Benin Madagascar Tunisia Chad Cameroon Togo Liberia Djibouti Burkina Faso Tanzania Comoros Congo Lesotho Gabon Mauritius Uganda Senegal Nigeria South Africa Zambia Ethiopia Algeria São Tomé & Príncipe Malawi Kenya Angola Egypt Seychelles Botswana Mozambique Namibia Sierra Leone Ghana Cape Verde Gambia 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 221

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 221 6/25/13 8:33 PM Unfortunately, access to such ser- Conclusions and vices is a major challenge in many recommendations African countries, fuelling pub- The backdrop of pressures for lic disaffection and social conflicts deeper electoral, constitutional and in some of them. In only 7 of the political reforms in Africa is painted 40 countries did more than half not only by political parties and state the respondents perceive access to institutions but also by society more government services to be read- broadly. Reforms must come from ily or mostly accessible to the citi- below as well as above. zenry; in the remaining countries, the popular perception from the Survey findings underline the need experts is that access to public ser- for such reforms, especially in coun- vices is either limited or difficult tries that have to fully consolidate (figure 7.10). This is not a good democracy. Reforms are required snapshot in eliciting public sup- to improve the credibility of elec- port for Africa’s nascent democratic toral governance, including ensuring African countries systems. autonomy for EMBs. have to devise mechanisms Governmental conflict-management EMBs must be insulated from that ensure that capacity beyond elections party political pressure by incum- domestic conflicts Some countries have established bent authorities. They should also are well mediated conflict-management structures, build capacity to engage with secu- including in rural areas, while oth- rity agencies, ministries, depart- ers have failed to institutionalize ments and other state agencies, them, leaving them patchy and without alienating their opera- ineffective. So, although inter-state tional autonomy and their ultimate conflicts have sharply declined responsibility for ensuring credible in Africa in the last two decades, elections. intra-state conflicts remain a dis- turbing feature of the political EMBs also need to work with other landscape. stakeholders in state and society to secure the electoral process, includ- These conflicts stem from various ing planning, training, inter-agency roots: indigenous/settler citizen- coordination and interaction. This ship conflict; resource-based scar- is as important as the specific and city, including water, grazing and election-related use of security forces other pastoral rights; or relative eco- around election time. nomic deprivation. Whatever the source, African countries have to Resolving election disputes fast devise mechanisms that ensure that and fairly is crucial to stemming domestic conflicts are well mediated election-related violence and to and do not assume national propor- enhancing confidence in electoral tions, especially as experts in only outcomes and political succession, 11 countries believe that the govern- so that the electoral mandate is seen ment has these mechanisms in place as having been awarded freely and (figure 7.11). transparently.

222 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 222 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.10 Access to public services remains a major challenge Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Ready or mostly ready access to government services Limited access to government services Difﬁcult or very little access to government services

Seychelles Botswana Cape Verde Mauritius Rwanda Namibia Ethiopia South Africa Djibouti Ghana Senegal Tunisia Malawi Algeria Egypt Cameroon Tanzania São Tomé & Príncipe Comoros Mozambique Benin Kenya Congo Togo Gabon Mauritania Angola Lesotho Mali Madagascar Liberia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Burkina Faso Guinea Sierra Leone Gambia Chad Nigeria 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 223

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 223 6/25/13 8:33 PM Figure 7.11 States have weak capacity for managing intra-state conflicts in most countries Share of experts surveyed, by country (%)

Usually or always effective Occasionally effective Completely ineffective or rarely effective

Algeria Rwanda Seychelles Cape Verde Botswana Mauritius Namibia South Africa Ethiopia Tanzania Djibouti Zambia Sierra Leone Senegal Ghana Mozambique Egypt Liberia Cameroon Malawi Angola Guinea Gabon Benin Uganda Congo Lesotho Tunisia Mauritania São Tomé & Príncipe Mali Kenya Comoros Zimbabwe Burkina Faso Chad Nigeria Madagascar Gambia Togo 0 25 50 75 100

Source: AGR III Expert Opinion Survey 2012.

224 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 224 6/25/13 8:33 PM Thus a mechanism or forum in to parties’ internal democracy, and which various groups in society, par- moves by the EMB (or other agency) ties and state institutions consult to ensure that political parties con- regularly on issues of electoral and form to the electoral law on internal constitutional reforms would be val- democracy. Finally, African govern- uable. It would also consider how to ments will have to scale up efforts at manage diversity issues. improving the delivery of affordable, high-quality public services. Political parties need more internal democracy, both to promote a demo- References cratic culture and to help select good Adejumobi, Said. 2010. “Democracy leaders. Trans-ethnic and national and Governance in Nigeria: Between parties may better promote diver- Consolidation and Reversal.” In Gov- sity management in multi-ethnic ernance and Politics in Post-Military African societies, suggesting this is Nigeria: Changes and Challenges, ed. the approach to follow, but policy Said Adejumobi. New York: Palgrave reforms will have to be contextual, Macmillan. based on the conditions and experi- Agbaje, Adigun, and Said Adejumobi. ences of the countries involved. 2006. “Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria.” Africa African countries will have to Development 31 (3): 25–44. devise incentives and sanctions to UNECA (United Nations Economic make their political parties demo- Commission for Africa). 2009. cratic internally, which may include African Governance Report II. Addis state financial support that is tied Ababa.

Electoral, Constitutional and Political Reforms 225

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 225 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 226 6/25/13 8:33 PM 8 he dominant theme of this either the structural roots of these report is how to organize conflicts or the conjunctural trig- T elections in a credible, fair gers, although good practices are and transparent fashion amid an envi- emerging. Policy ronment of wide diversity—whether Recommen- in ethnicity, religion, region, class, The recommendations, in five parts, dations gender or age. As democracy has are candid, highlighting the need for deepened in Africa, elections have further political and constitutional occupied a central place. Elections reform to secure yet greater gains have become more regular but also in electoral governance. Resolving more closely contested, making them political, social and economic diver- tinder boxes that must be sensitively sity through elections will be long organized—and occasionally doused. drawn out, but putting the item prominently on African countries’ The report therefore argues for political agendas is a prerequisite for strengthening and democratizing the continent to continue its demo- electoral governance. Credibility, cratic transformation. fairness and transparency are imperative in running an electoral process, The political system even more so when conditions are diverse. Every stage in the process Constitutional reforms and diversity should h ave—and be seen to have— Most constitutional reforms in procedural certainty, and hence a Africa were undertaken to accom- level playing field for contending pany the democratic transition, but parties and candidates, to ensure the some were directed towards electoral substantive uncertainty of an elec- change and diversity management. tion’s outcome. Across a large number of Afri- can countries, expert panellists did This final section presents a synthe- not believe that the constitution of sis of policy recommendations made their country promotes diversity and by expert panels, focus group discus- inclusive governance or adequately sions, country reports and analysis protect minority interests. Constitu- in the preceding chapters. Findings tional protection of diversity is une- from these sources are more consist- ven among countries, and enforce- ent than divergent. ment also varies.

A major theme running through the Constitutions should have provi- report is not only the recognition of sions for protecting diversity and diversity as a possible source of con- for assuring a national mechanism flict between and during elections— to monitor how those provisions are but the need to address it. The carried out. (The country reports potential of elections to accommo- for Ghana, Kenya and Namibia date diversity depends on the meas- expound on this at some length.) ures designed to pre-empt or resolve diversity-related conflicts. Most For diversity to be well protected countries have not fully resolved through the constitution, the voices

227

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 227 6/25/13 8:33 PM of the people and their aspira- a national language, but through tions must resonate in the consti- national dialogue and consensus tution. The best way is to adopt explore the possibility of a common a bottom-up and people-driven national language or languages (as in approach in constitutional engineer- South Africa) being adopted. ing. As Kenya’s experience with its 2010 Constitution suggests, this Indigenous people, settlers, is a good pathway to promoting migrants and citizenship constitutionalism. The political and economic rights of non-indigenous peoples in a Management of ethnic diversity given country need to be addressed Constitutional provisions that urgently in an open forum to achieve merely forbid discrimination against national consensus. A legal frame- minorities have largely failed to work should be constructed, to resolve ethnic exclusion. One pol- ensure that their relations with icy response would be to establish a indigenous people at election time Institutions Commission for Diversity Manage- do not degenerate into conflict and of horizontal ment to champion groups’ concerns violence. Citizenship should be accountability and to oversee implementation of redefined to emphasize birth, resi- need to be the diversity-inclusion agenda, espe- dency, tax obligations, and civic and established or cially in public institutions (as prac- national values rather than ancestry strengthened in tised in Nigeria and now put in place and ethnicity. in Kenya under the recent constitu- promoting respect tion). “Ethnic auditing” should be Strategies are also required for for peoples’ rights conducted regularly at both national ensuring that citizens understand and provincial or state levels to iden- the benefits of diversity and the tify and penalize those who engage rights of migrants as well as their in practices that enforce ethnic positive contributions to the country. exclusion in hiring as well as in dis- Citizens need to be encouraged to tribution of public resources. learn about cultures and languages of others. There should be comple- Lingua franca and diversity mentary programmes to nurture Language is a powerful instrument social cohesion in wider society. of social identity and diversity con- vergence. A common language facil- Institutions of horizontal itates inter-communal and interper- accountability sonal communication in a country Institutions of horizontal account- and can crystallize a national cul- ability need to be established or ture that supersedes parochial affin- strengthened in promoting respect ities of race, ethnicity, regional- for peoples’ rights and democratic ism, religion and class—recognizing management of diversity. These multiculturalism. In Tanzania, institutions include the office of the national cohesion has been facili- auditor general, ombudsman, anti- tated through the common national corruption body, human rights insti- language of Kiswahili. This report tutions and the judiciary. The goal does not urge countries to impose is to ensure that citizens’ rights are

228 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 228 6/25/13 8:33 PM protected, public accountability is affirmative action for youth and ensured, the rule of law is main- people with disabilities as well. tained and the democratic system is unhindered. Recommendations from the country reports range from affirmative Government of national unity and action in legislative and local elec- election outcomes tions to the placement of candidates Electoral malpractice and dis- from marginalized groups on party putes led to crisis in some coun- lists in proportional representation tries (including Kenya and Zim- systems. Governments, electoral babwe) and to negotiations that management boards (EMBs), par- subsequently resulted in a coali- ties and civil society organizations tion government as an emergency (CSOs) should adopt quotas for gen- or temporary measure to stop elec- der equality and women’s empower- tion conflict from escalating into ment including party quotas, candi- violence. date quotas and reserved seats. Governments, The Expert Opinion Survey points Parties should adopt affirmative electoral to a strong view in most countries action measures by ensuring gen- management that a government of national unity der equality during party prima- boards, parties is desirable in a post-election con- ries and nomination of election and civil society flict, but this should be tempo- candidates. More generally, special organizations rary and not a means of rewarding measures should be considered to those who rig elections or commit raise the level of representation of should adopt quotas other electoral fraud. (Indeed, fraud women, youth, minorities and peo- for gender equality should be criminalized, where it is ple with disabilities in bodies such not already, and heavily sanctioned, as parliament and electoral insti- to deter would-be riggers.) A gov- tutions. There is a reasonable case ernment of national unity may also for affirmative action that would be necessary after a war but, as with empower these marginalized groups post-election conflicts, should be with resources to run for office and well crafted based on local circum- serve in electoral institutions. Poll- stances to avoid rewarding warlords ing stations, as well as centres for with power. voter registration and issuance of identity cards, should have special Affirmative action for women and facilities in order to encourage par- other marginalized groups ticipation of people with disabilities Expert panellists in most coun- and the elderly. tries show a strong consensus that affirmative action, including quo- Marginalized communities such as tas for women, is necessary in elec- the Basarwa (in Southern Africa) and toral and political processes. This Batwa (in the Democratic Repub- consensus recognized that women lic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda are still marginalized in most coun- and other countries) are poorly rep- tries, but they are not the only ones: resented in parliament and state it has become customary to advocate institutions. Governments should

Policy Recommendations 229

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 229 6/25/13 8:33 PM undertake affirmative action to and authority to create mechanisms assist these excluded communities to promote cooperation among to run for office, and need to review political parties, CSOs and candi- citizenship-empowerment strategies dates with the objective of building to cultivate indigenous entrepreneur- trust and consensus among those ship and sustainable economic devel- participating in the electoral process, opment. In a related vein, if a country and preventing or defusing electoral is to succeed in managing diversities disputes. such as marginalized youth, it must pursue inclusive economic policies Political party reform and diversity that embrace all social groups. The country reports show great concern that most parties—central Electoral institutions, players in the electoral process—are processes and finance formed to mobilize electoral support on a sectarian identity basis which Reform of electoral management can often be a polarizing factor in Political parties boards national politics. Expert panellists should embrace EMBs are crucial to the electoral in most countries tend to agree with diversity in system, but the picture is not good, this proposition. their membership as evidenced by the country reports. and outgrow their Their institutional and financial Most country reports indicate original ethnic and autonomy is imperative, and should that parties generally lack internal be enshrined in the national con- democracy. Some parties have even regional bases stitution. Most country reports rec- split due to contestants’ unwilling ommended that the appointment of ness to accept results of party pri- EMB members should not be the maries. There is therefore a need for prerogative of a president but should genuine internal party democracy. be either a process that follows a And like other organizations, such mechanism of open advertisement or as CSOs, parties should be required a vetted process in which CSOs and to register, and have appropriate political parties are involved. governance mechanisms.

Other African Governance Report Parties should embrace diversity in (AGR) III country reports rec- their membership and outgrow their ommended that the processes of original ethnic and regional bases. appointing and removing EMB They should also have a monitoring members should be handled by an mechanism to ensure representation independent non-partisan body. of various ethnic and social groups And the majority of surveyed pan- (including women, youth and people ellists agreed. EMBs should be with disabilities) among their key diversity-sensitive in their staffing, organs and leadership positions. and include women and minorities with requisite skills and experience. Reform of the electoral law Electoral law provides the basis Furthermore, EMBs should be of the electoral process and elec- endowed with the necessary powers toral competition. If it is flawed, the

230 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 230 6/25/13 8:33 PM electoral process will most likely be Voter registration corrupt. Electoral legislation must Voter registration encounters huge not only guarantee that the requi- challenges in most countries, from site institutions, rules and processes manipulation, through inflation, of electoral engagements are clearly undercounting of potential voters spelt out, but must also recognize and inclusion of dead voters, to and accommodate diversity in all obstacles in registering certain its manifestations. Many country groups—those in remote areas or reports call for reform of the elec- slums, pastoral populations and toral law to make it more responsive internally displaced peoples. Its to contemporary needs and demands, credibility, transparency and effi- and to be more sensitive to diversity. ciency need to be vastly improved, which should include a post-election There are two major policy concerns review by the EMB to yield dis- across countries. First, the electoral aggregated data on groups such as law should be periodically reviewed women and youth. These data will and updated to keep up with chang- help in electoral planning. Relevant new ing political dynamics in the coun- technologies try. Second, the revision or reform of Countries need to meet the chal- to speed up the electoral law must be an inclu- lenge and responsibility of regis- and vet voter sive process that involves not only tering voters among their diaspora registration should parliament and political parties, but communities, especially as the dias- be embraced also other stakeholders. pora vote is growing in importance. At home, identity and voters’ cards Electoral system and diversity should be harmonized to broaden The quality of an election hinges the voters’ register and ensure con- on the type of electoral system in tinual registration. a country. The capacity to manage diversity depends on the plural- And relevant new technologies to ity and inclusiveness of the system, speed up and vet registration should which falls into two broad catego- be embraced. The biometric voter ries. Proportional representation (or registration has vastly improved the a hybrid) could balance legislative accuracy of the voter registration sys- membership among ethno-regional tem in countries such as Sierra Leone parties and other minority groups, and electronic registration through and, particularly in post-conflict the Internet and mobile phones has countries, could counter the winner- made advances in Rwanda. African takes-all, disenfranchising out- countries should adopt modern tech- come that first past the post tends nology for registering voters, but it to encourage. Countries dissatisfied must be cost effective, affordable, with the latter system may wish to adaptable to the local environment review it and consider proportional and locally serviceable. representation or a variant of the two systems, consulting as widely Voter education as possible in an attempt to reach More widespread voter educa- consensus. tion in Africa is indispensable.

Policy Recommendations 231

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 231 6/25/13 8:33 PM Recommendations in the coun- media. More women, young peo- try reports are quite specific, and ple and people with disabilities include: should be trained and deployed as voter education facilitators. • Voter education should be an instrument for addressing diver- Election observation and monitoring sity in politics. Important as Election observation and monitoring information about the technical —international and domestic— aspects of voting may be, voter contributes to democratic change education programmes need to by exposing electoral malpractices, include the issue of diversity, as while new technology has made well as political and social tol- it possible to communicate posted erance. Not only should stren- results and reveal discrepancies uous efforts be made to extend immediately, helping to deter brazen this education to marginalized rigging. groups, but the themes of unity Voter education in diversity, responsible citizen- The capacity of countries to moni- should be made ship and peaceful conduct of tor local elections should be encour- more widespread politics should be infused into aged and reinforced, as in Sierra and materials such programmes. Leone in the 2007 national elections more accessible, when domestic groups formed a especially for • Continuous targeted civic edu- network—National Election Watch cation, especially at young peo- —to monitor them across the coun- marginalized groups ple, should be undertaken to try. Increased capacity of domes- help eliminate electoral vio- tic election monitoring promotes lence. As a matter of urgency, greater national ownership of the governance and leadership edu- electoral process and encourages cation should be carried out political accountability through citi- alongside civic education in zens’ influence on the process. schools and universities. Political finance • Voter education should be made If democracy is to take firm root in more widespread and materi- Africa, governments should make als more accessible, especially election funding a national prior- for marginalized groups. EMBs ity. Citizens and CSOs, too, play a should publish user-friendly crucial role in ensuring that their electoral lists and related texts government treats elections as basic on elections. public goods.

• CSOs—particularly youth, Very few countries’ political par- women’s and professional ties have equal access to electoral groups—should work with the resources—the ruling parties are EMB to raise awareness of the usually heavily advantaged. Other election process in towns and vil- issues relate to campaign funding, lages using channels as diverse as donor and private funding, and reg- radio, print, electronic and other ulation of political finance.

232 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 232 6/25/13 8:33 PM The AGR III country reports offer African countries should endeav- several recommendations. our to fully fund their own elections, and so reduce (and ultimately elimi- • Introduce and enforce strict reg- nate) their dependence on the West, ulations on campaign finance both to establish national ownership for parties and candidates and and to reflect a new determination fully disclose private cam- to erase the stereotype of a conti- paign funding. To receive fund- nent in perpetual crisis, dependent ing, parties must disclose their on others. sources of income and expenditure, cooperate with relevant Managing electoral integrity agencies, adhere to conflicts and disputes requirements set by law and observe codes of conduct. Violence Some of the countries where vio- • Grant political parties (ruling lence is a major feature of political and opposition) equal access to campaigns, according to the expert Citizens and electoral resources (media, state panellists, include Benin, Chad, civil society funding and public property). Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozam- organizations This should be codified in law bique, Nigeria, the Congo, Sierra play a crucial role and strictly enforced. Parties that Leone, Togo, Zambia and Zim- in ensuring that disadvantage others in accessing babwe. Violence during elections has their government state-owned electoral resources reached serious levels in recent years using incumbency powers should in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic treats elections as receive stiff sanctions. Republic of the Congo, Kenya, basic public goods Nigeria and Zimbabwe, for example. • Safeguard against corruption The country reports show a consen- in election funding. Election sus that this scourge of the electoral money-laundering poses a par- process should be eradicated. And ticular danger as does buying when the credibility of the EMB is political influence through cor- in doubt and the electoral process rupt funding. The use of state compromised, parties’ disaffection resources for patronage should often increases, also sometimes lead- be outlawed. ing to violence.

• Consider setting up a national The following policy measures are election fund, possibly with recommended: external donor support, to address the gap created by inad- • Tools for preventing electoral equate election funding. Coun- violence must be woven into tries may allocate money to this each stage of the electoral cycle. fund continuously through their national budgetary cycle, in • All political parties must give a election year or otherwise. This written commitment to a peace- fund can therefore be relied on ful and non-violent electoral for elections. process through a binding code

Policy Recommendations 233

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 233 6/25/13 8:33 PM of conduct. Parties violating this Role of state security agencies commitment should be sanc- The police, military forces, intel- tioned by the EMB or other ligence services and related bodies statutory body. display partisanship in the electoral process in most African countries • Inter-party dialogue should be according to the Expert Opinion encouraged where parties can Survey, and often brutalize opposi- air their concerns and fears. tion political parties and supporters. This platform should be institu- Activities of civil servants, local gov- tionalized and made more reg- ernment officials and traditional rul- ular. The EMB should also be ers have also provoked controversy part of such dialogue. over bias, compromising the credibility of elections and increasing the • Party militia groups or violent chances of conflict. youth wings of political parties should be outlawed. Parties The following policy measures are The election who maintain them should be recommended in the AGR III coun- atmosphere sanctioned. try reports: should be voter friendly in • Political parties’ regulatory • Security forces should be pro- all situations authority needs to be supported fessional and neutral towards in order to monitor abuse of parties during elections. public resources during campaigning by incumbents; to pre- • Clearer rules need to be intro- vent and penalize verbal vio- duced and enforced to ensure lence among parties and civic civilian control of security forces groups; and at the constituency and insulate them from party level, to build capacity for par- politics. Checks and balances are ties and broaden ownership, required to subject security agen- monitoring and enforcement of cies to democratic rules even as party codes of conduct. they provide the necessary security during elections. Security • The EMB must display trans- agencies should be given human parency, non-partisanship and rights education and election- professionalism in managing related training to improve their elections. understanding of their role in the electoral process. • Countries may also consider drawing on existing modes of • The high visibility of soldiers, conflict management in the police and other security per- electoral process to pre-empt sonnel at polling stations makes violence, such as party liaison for an environment ill conducive committees in South Africa and to free and fair elections. the conflict-resolution model of the Electoral Institute for Sus- • The election atmosphere tainable Democracy in Africa. should be voter friendly in all

234 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 234 6/25/13 8:33 PM situations. Repressive environ- • Special electoral courts may be ments during elections should needed in regions and districts, be discouraged. but their selection and composition must be secured by consen- • Civil servants, public officials, sus among all political parties. local government officials and traditional rulers should be out- • As many current mechanisms lawed from using their official are very time consuming, a set positions to intimidate voters and short time-frame should or otherwise use their power in be introduced and enforced for the electoral process (though resolving election disputes. they naturally keep their voting rights). They must keep to the • EMBs should keep electorates ethics and electoral law in dis- updated on progress in such dis- charging their duties. putes, including cases that have gone to court. Transparent and efficient Properly adjudication of election disputes • Good practices in alternative institutionalized Most countries have dispute adjudi- dispute resolution should be and credible cation mechanisms, although capac- widely publicized. dispute settlement ity and credibility vary. When these Regional mediation in election mechanisms mechanisms are weak, partisan or are required corrupt, the propensity for violence disputes and poll outcomes is usually high. Countries are showing increasing recourse to regional and interna- The following policy measures are tional mediation to resolve election recommended: disputes, including Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe, as well as • As failure to resolve conflicts Madagascar. promptly may result in inces- sant petitions catalysing con- The powers of sanction by such flict, properly institutionalized organizations as the African Union and credible dispute settlement (AU), the Economic Community of mechanisms are required. West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development • The electoral law should be very Community (SADC) and others clear and concise on adjudicat- have been used to deny legitimacy ing disputes and on the insti- to those regimes that come to power tutions responsible. It should through coups, and to intervene in allow for results to be chal- election disputes. This role is sig- lenged in the courts. nificant and should be as proac- tive as possible. Countries should be • The independence of such encouraged to ratify protocols that courts handling electoral mat- relate to elections and democratic ters has to be guaranteed. governance.

Policy Recommendations 235

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 235 6/25/13 8:33 PM Regional organizations have a moral parties and candidates engaging in and political authority to encour- these activities. age member states to ratify and implement necessary democracy Civil society should be empowered charters and protocols as well as to build programmes around the pursue strategies of peaceful set- courts’ handling of election-based tlement of election disputes. Their offences, and such programmes role in promoting democracy and would seek to ensure that the police good governance (beyond dispute and courts are constrained from management) should be supported ignoring election offences. Informa- by their member states and harmo- tion on election offences and trials nized to maintain policy coherence should be collated and kept in the Africa-wide. public domain.

Conflict management and early Regional and international warning systems organizations and Elections should Elections should be transformed promotion of electoral be transformed from conflict triggers into conflict integrity from conflict managers. Conflict management Electoral norms set by regional triggers into structures and processes should be organizations like AU, ECOWAS conflict managers established to ensure that electoral and SADC have defined the disputes are handled amicably and framework and expectations for dealt with early enough so that they their members’ electoral integrity. do not escalate into violence. These bodies, as well as international organizations and develop Local initiatives should be boosted ment partners, can encourage to reduce the necessity for exter- states to adhere to basic norms nal assistance or intervention. of electoral integrity by a pplying And national early warning sys- peer pressure on states that do not tems should be set up to identify respect them, but they need to regions or areas prone to election- stand up for such integrity before related conflict and head it off. elections. The wealth of information available should inform decisions on such The AU should ensure rapid imple- interventions. mentation of the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections Electoral justice and Governance, which has already Some countries have adopted pro- gone into force. The regional eco- visions or mechanisms to deal with nomic communities must do the those who contravene electoral rules same with their regional protocols and engage in fraud, hate speech and standards on democracy and and violence. Country report recom- good governance. mendations include laws that cancel immunity for those involved in Regional organizations should create electoral violence and fraud, and and clearly communicate their “red that impose tough sanctions against lines”—prohibitions of egregious

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 236 6/25/13 8:33 PM malpractices that, if violated, would non-partisan basis. There need to be trigger condemnation and sanctions. programmes to develop the capacity of election administration staff in Policy dialogue, training promoting policy dialogue between and research stakeholders and in managing con- The country reports draw atten- flicts. That conflict management tion to a vacuum in capacity among training should draw on some of key stakeholders—EMBs, polit- the best practices illustrated in this ical parties, state institutions and report (see chapter 5). CSOs—to administer and influence the election process effectively. Finally, both policy dialogue and They recommend building capacity training would benefit immensely in EMBs, and introducing internal from research on key issues per- democratic values and practices in taining to elections and diversity. parties, as well as encouraging reg- Comparative experiences of federal- ular inter-party dialogue. Training ism and devolution show how some and policy-oriented research would countries have sought to address Policy dialogue contribute to greater capacity, pro- socio-economic and political diver- should be fessionalism and institutional sity. It would be useful to identify initiated on effectiveness. best practices and draw lessons from how to implement them, in which countries under- election dispute Policy dialogue should be initiated taking constitutional reform could management where the key stakeholders do not reflect on these lessons and their already have it. It should also be possible relevance to them. Research instruments more used to consider and implement should be conducted on: effectively measures relating to cross-cutting diversity management issues. Policy • links between electoral sys- dialogue should be initiated on tems and conflict, with a focus how to implement election dis- on whether particular electoral pute management instruments more arrangements lead to or reduce effectively. conflicts (possibly including case studies); Some of these instruments are weak and thus incapable of responding • how to expand the African to the sophisticated election mal- research base on elections and practices increasingly prevalent in related conflicts, dispute man- African elections. Inter- and intra- agement, and comparative expe- party democratic deficits should be riences of African EMBs in plugged, and credible forums and promoting electoral integrity; mechanisms for managing internal and party disputes set up. • the role of regional organiza- To deepen policy dialogue, plat- tions like the AU and regional forms should be built for party-to- economic communities in man- party dialogue and cooperation in aging diversity in African gov- responding to national issues on a ernance and elections.

Policy Recommendations 237

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 237 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 238 6/25/13 8:33 PM Appendix emocratization in Africa, The first edition of the AGR in which began about two 2005 covered 27 African countries, UNECA Project D decades ago, has seen the while the second edition in 2009 on Good collapse of authoritarian and one- covered 35. This third edition cov- Governance: party regimes and the ascendance ers 40.1 Background, of elections as a means of political Methodology change and an instrument for politi- After the first two editions, there and Calculating cal legitimation. was a rigorous review of the entire the Indices project, with broad consultations In 1999, the United Nations Eco- with experts, stakeholders and part- nomic Commission for Africa ner institutions. A project review (UNECA) started the “Assess- workshop was held in July 2009. ing and Monitoring the Progress Subsequently, two decisions were towards Good Governance in made: Africa” project, a background to the African Governance Report (AGR). • To adopt a thematic approach in The underlying premise of the pro- producing the report. Besides ject is that development in Africa the thematic approach to the has been slow and stunted because biennial AGR report, there of poor governance on the continent. would be a general report pro- With improved governance, Afri- duced every six years to monica’s economic progress and devel- tor the general progress of Afri- opment will be enhanced and sus- can countries on improving tainable. So UNECA embarked governance. on the AGR project with the main objectives of promoting consensus • To partner with the United on good governance and the capable Nations Development Programme state in Africa; providing a mecha- (UNDP). UNECA and UNDP nism for monitoring good govern- have forged a new partnership ance, while showcasing best prac- to produce the AGR and the tices for improving governance by national country reports, which African countries; and formulating hitherto were produced solely by policy recommendations to address UNECA. UNECA continues capacity gaps and other governance- to lead the project. related challenges that face African countries. In choosing a theme for AGR III, UNECA and UNDP were guided The AGR, the most comprehen- by three considerations: the findings sive report on governance in Africa, of AGR I and AGR II; the cross- assesses and monitors the progress cutting issues identified by the Afri- African countries are making on can Peer Review Mechanism; and governance. It identifies capacity general pressing African governance gaps in governance institutions. And issues. And four major issues arose: it makes appropriate policy recom- elections and diversity management, mendations to improve governance corruption, gender and constitution- on the continent. alism. After exhaustive deliberations

239

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 239 6/25/13 8:33 PM and consultations, it was decided AGR represents the most thorough that AGR III should focus on “Elec- and empirically substantial attempt to tions and the Management of Diver- measure governance in Africa to date, sity in Africa”. it has become invaluable for enriching policy content and dialogue across AGR III monitors governance per- the continent towards strengthening formance in African countries by institutional governance. systematically collecting and analysing qualitative and quantitative data Some main project objectives are: using selected key indicators. The selected indicators of AGR III were • to monitor governance trends aimed at assessing how elections can and the progress African coun- be a tool for better management of tries are making towards pro- diversity and at facilitating political moting democracy and good inclusion while promoting the demo- governance on the continent; cratic values of transparency, freeness and fairness of elections in Africa. • to provide a mechanism for monitoring efforts at creating In selecting key indicators and pre- and sustaining capable demo- paring for AGR III and its asso- cratic states that support broad- ciated outputs, background papers based growth, sustainable devel- were prepared, methodology refined opment and poverty reduction; and five workshops held. All were geared towards fine-tuning the • to better understand govern- framework, methodology and key ance processes, mechanisms and indicators and training the UNDP policies and promote an ana- focal points on the objectives, lytically founded dialogue on essence and strategic orientation of governance; AGR III. • to maintain governance issues Rationale and objectives on the agenda of political lead- The overarching rationale for the ers, policy makers and other AGR is the emerging consensus key stakeholders for improving that for Africa to meet the interna- governance performance on the tional development goals in 2015 continent; and reverse the continent’s economic, social and political predicament, • to improve the capacity of African states have to create an ena- national research institutions in bling environment of good govern- conducting governance research ance. In addition, the project also and analyses in Africa; and provides a valuable analytical framework for realizing the various govern- • to identify capacity gaps in gov- ance agendas adopted by the Heads ernance institutions and pres- of State Implementation Committee ent relevant policy recommen- of the New Partnership for Africa’s dations and interventions to Development (NEPAD). Since the address them.

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UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 240 6/25/13 8:33 PM To ensure legitimacy for and own- political, economic and social affairs ership of the project within coun- of each country. tries, national research institutions were selected to conduct the coun- Expert Opinion Survey. The Expert try studies. The collaborating insti- Opinion Survey has two parts. First, tutions are required to establish it deals with specific questions on national steering committees com- elections and the management of prising government representatives, diversity. Second, it asks 24 general civil society, businesses and religious questions derived from key com- organizations. The committees were ponents of governance from previ- established through in-country con- ous AGR studies. These indicators sultations. Two workshops were on governance monitor progress on convened—the methodology work- good governance in African coun- shop to explain the research for the tries against the backdrop of AGR I national country study to stakehold- and II. ers and the validation workshop to present the findings after the Some of the indicators in the Expert research has been completed and the Opinion Survey are presented in a report prepared. “cafeteria” format with five options ordered that the condition most Apart from national ownership, the favourable to elections and man- other core principles of the AGR agement of diversity is the foremost process are: option, and the worst is last.

• independence and objectivity; The Expert Opinion Survey uses a national expert panel comprising • scientific rigour; 120–150 national experts in each project country. In each country, • inclusiveness and national con- members of the expert panel were sultation; and drawn to ensure representation with regard to age, gender, education, • mainstreaming of peoples’ views social status, political orientation, and voices. field of training and ethnic, regional and religious background, as well as Methodology representation from the private sector and civil society organizations. Research instruments The AGR III methodology uses The target panel members were also three research instruments: an drawn from the academy, political Expert Opinion Survey, focus parties, professional groups, inde- group discussions and desk-based pendent civil society organizations, research. The research instruments policy makers, media, bureaucrats, were designed to obtain informa- police service, election management tion on elections and the manage- bodies, judiciary, parliamentary and ment of diversity in Africa and mon- executive members, and enlight- itor governance trends based on the ened citizen-voters such as retired

Appendix 241

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 241 6/25/13 8:33 PM professionals, church leaders active The focus group discussions were in community development and conducted in both rural and urban social issues and educated and expe- areas for each of the selected target rienced business leaders. groups. In all, between 10 and 12 discussions were conducted. Once collected, the data from each expert panel study were further sub- Desk research. Desk-based research jected to rigid quality control to was used to collect factual informa- ensure that they were consistent and tion and hard data to complement reliable. information gathered through the other two research tools. Focus group discussions. Focus group discussions were used by collaborat- By compiling data, the national ing research institutions to ascer- research institutions extracted infor- tain how participants in each group mation from secondary sources feel about elections and the man- like government documents and agement of diversity. They were gazettes; electoral management designed to stimulate free discus- bodies; available documentation sions, fresh ideas and new insights from political parties and civil soci- in the groups. ety organizations; publications at the local, national and regional lev- The number of discussion partici- els; textbooks, journals, newspa- pants was limited to 8–12 people for pers, magazines and periodicals; and each session, and they were selected other relevant sources. from the same socio-economic group or with a similar background and Calculating the indices experiences in relation to the issue The indices are based on the data under discussion. from the expert panel study only. AGR I and II contain 83 and 85 UNECA identified five groups indicators, respectively, while for the focus group discussions. AGR III contains only 24 indicators, The national research institutions which were clustered by UNECA. organized the following five groups Some sub-indices are not mutually as targets for the focus group exclusive. discussions: The overall index is calculated • women groups; using all 24 indicators for each project country. There is no input from • youth groups; other countries in the overall index of any country. Each reflects the • political party members; opinions of experts in the country. Each governance index is con- • community-based organizations structed using average scores, which in the field of governance; and are combined and rescaled to bring each to a common range of 0–100 • the informal sector. using the following approach:

242 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 242 6/25/13 8:33 PM Let national opinion leaders of the country. Cross-country comparisons Ti = sum of the mean scores of should be avoided since there are the indicators in cluster i, i = 0, serious factors that negate the valid- 1, 2, . . .,C, where C is the total ity of such comparisons. number of clusters in the study. Project implementation

Ki = the number of indicators in cluster i, i = 1, 2, . . .,C Selection of collaborating national research institutions

Gi = Index of governance based Only independent national research on cluster i, i = 0, 1, 2, . . .,C. institutions were considered to conduct the study in each coun- Then, Gi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . .,C , the index try. UNECA and UNDP country of governance for the i th cluster, fol- offices were responsible for recruit- lows as: ing those institutions. In all, they recruited 40 competent national Ti – Ki research institutions in a highly Gi = * 100 = Ki (s – 1) competitive bidding process.

Ti – Ki * 100, i = 0, 1, . . ., C As per procurement rules and pro- 4 * Ki cedures, UNECA and UNDP solic- ited institutions to submit bids. where K0 = 24, T0 is the total of the Further to the submission of bids, a average scores for all indicators in capacity assessment evaluation was the study, and s, which is 5 in the undertaken to ensure if the institu- Africa Governance Project, is the tions partaking in the highly com- maximum score that is assignable petitive bidding would be best in any of the 24 indicators, so that placed to undertake the AGR work. the corresponding “Overall Index of The collaborating research institu- Governance” will also be given by: tions were selected in accordance with United Nations procurement c T0 – 24 rules and regulations. G0 = 100 = 100 * wiGi , * i∑ = 1 96 Methodology workshops Ki wi = c The collaborating national research institutions in all countries held an ∑ Ki i = 1 official methodology workshop with government representatives, civil The weighted average formula society, private sector, international is valid only if the C clusters are partners and other relevant stake- strictly mutually exclusive and holder groups to introduce the pro- exhaustive. An index close to 100 ject, promote a suitable implemen- is perceived to reflect good govern- tation environment and ensure the ance as perceived by the respective process of national ownership.

Appendix 243

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 243 6/25/13 8:33 PM Establishment of a steering submitted. In every country, it was committee an essential event for promoting The collaborating institutions in all national ownership, essential for the the 40 countries each established a credibility and acceptability of the National Steering Committee com- report. prising people of high personality and impeccable credentials in the Collaborating research institutions country to play an advisory role, to The national research institutions at popularize the project and to sup- the country level that implemented port the project as necessary. the in-country surveys, facilitated the focus group discussions, pre- Preparation of national country pared the country reports and facil- reports and country profiles itated the national stakeholders’ The collaborating national research consultations in the 40 countries institutions collected the data, covered by AGR III are shown in obtained UNECA’s quality con- the appendix table. trol clearance, analysed it and produced a national country report in Note accordance with agreed guidelines. 1. The 40 countries are Algeria, UNECA further provided technical Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina oversight to ensure conformity with Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, its detailed instructions and agreed Comoros, the Congo, Djibouti, upon work plans and report formats Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, and reviewed the final results. Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Validation workshops Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, The collaborating national research Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São institutions convened national Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, stakeholder validation workshops Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South to discuss the findings and draft Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, report before the final report was Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

244 African Governance Report III

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 244 6/25/13 8:33 PM Appendix table: AGR III collaborating research institutions

Country Research institutions Algeria Centre National d’Études et d’Analyses pour la Population et le Développement Angola Agostino Neto University, Center of Excellence in Public Politics and Local Governance Benin Académie Alioune Blondin Beye pour la Paix Botswana Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis Burkina Faso Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique Cameroon Centre d’Études et de Recherche en Économie et Gestion Cape Verde Afrosondagem Chad Cabinet MAGI Communication, Presse et Services Comoros University of Comoros Congo Unité de Recherche en Analyse Sociétales Djibouti University of Djibouti Egypt Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies Ethiopia African Institute of Management, Development and Governance Gabon Directeur des Études de la Recherche Appliquée Gambia University of The Gambia, School of Business and Public Administration Ghana Ghana Center for Democratic Development Guinea Stat View International Kenya University of Nairobi, Institute of Development Studies Lesotho National University of Lesotho, Political Science Department Liberia Agency for Economic Development & Empowerment Madagascar Études, Conseils et Assistance à la Réalisation Malawi Director of the Centre for Social Research Mali Cabinet du CATEK Groupe Mauritania Council on Economic and Social Development Mauritius StraConsult Mozambique Centre for Democracy and Development Studies Namibia Institute for Public Policy Research Nigeria Center for Democracy and Development Rwanda National University of Rwanda, Center for Conflict Management São Tomé and Príncipe Sociedade de Consultoria e Gestão Lda (Consultant and Management Firm) Senegal University of Dakar Sierra Leone Alternative Consultancies Seychelles StraConsult South Africa Institute of Democracy in South Africa Tanzania University of Dar es Salaam Togo Université de Lomé, Faculté des sciences économiques et de gestion Tunisia Institut Arabe des Chefs d’Entreprises Uganda Centre for Basic Research Zambia Center for Policy Research and Analysis Zimbabwe Mass Public Opinion Institute

Appendix 245

UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 245 6/25/13 8:33 PM UNECA AGR3 0625.indd 246 6/25/13 8:33 PM