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Russia and the Ukraine Affair Russia and the Ukraine Affair Too Few Facts, Too Much Fiction Third Age Learning – York Region Aurora Cultural Centre 21 September 2015 POPULATION OF UKRAINE, 2007 CENSUS Total — 45.49 million Ethnic Ukrainian 77% (37 m) Ethnic Russian 17.3 % (8.3 m) (others: Romanian, Moldova, Belarus, Hungarian, Tatar, Jewish, etc.) Languages spoken at home: Ukrainian 67% Russian 30% Donetsk Oblast (No. 1) 4.4 million Luhansk Oblast (No 7) 2.3 million Crimea 2.3 million 58.3% Russian; 24% Ukrainian; 12% Tatar Native Language in Crimea: 77% Russian; 11% Tatar; 10% Ukrainian Native Russian Speakers in Ukraine. Survey conducted by Kyiv-based Razumkov Think Tank, 2011, Kyiv-Post War Dead & Refugees Ukrainians killing Ukrainians • DEAD — Euromaidan protests — 110-125 (end of Feb 2014) • Crimea — 6 (end of March 2014) • Odessa — Trade Union Bldg massacre (2 May 2014) – 48 • Donbass— official 7,000 (end of Aug 2015) – 67% civilian • Unofficial — perhaps 50,000 • Missing — 2,000 • REFUGEES — 1.4 million – majority to Russia • — 430,000 official applications for refugee status in RF • — 122,000 applied for permanent residency by June • — Tens of thousands unofficial & hope to return to Ukr • INJURED — many, many more! Ukrainian Presidential Elections 2010 1st round Viktor Yanukovych - 35.32% Julia Tymoshenko 25.05% Viktor Yushchenko – 5.5% (5th) 7 others (turnout 67%) 2nd round Yanukovych 48.95 Tymoshenko 45.47 1.2% invalid 4.45 ‘Against all’ (turnout 69%) Verkhovna Rada(Parliamentary) Elections 2012 450 seats; 50% party lists/ 50% simple-majority; 5% election threshold Party of Regions- 185 seats (30.4%) (6.1 m) Batkivshchyna (Fatherland)- 101 (25.5%) (5.2 m) UDAR- 40 (14%) (2.8 m) *Svoboda (Freedom)- 37 (10.4%) (2.3 m) Communist- 32 (13.8%) (2.7 m) * “racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic” PACE, 2012 (no coalition resolution) * “neo-Nazi” – World Jewish Congress, 2013 The Battle is Joined Economic Choices — November 2013 A) EU Association – no tariffs on EU goods; tariffs remain on Ukrainian goods; Must reform banking & taxations, set EU standards; no subsidies; market prices on domestic use of gas; end corruption; end free trade with RF B) Customs Union (RF, Kazakhstan, Belarus; Armenia, etc) Broader free trade (already had free trade with RF & CIS) $15 Billion bailout 30% discount on gas price Yanukovych chooses B 31 November 2013 1) Demonstrators on Maidan Nezalezhnosti [Independence Square] - seize buildings (eventually 9 govt. bldgs occupied); set up barricades; closed centre of capital city for 2.5 months (!!) 2) 18 Feb 2014 — violence 26-100 killed 3) 21 Feb 2014 — TRUCE & DEAL 1) Yanukovych to stay in office; but early election 2) Both sides step back 3) Opposition to form govt of “national unity” - Brawl in parliament; Euromaidans rejects (cleared out only in September)- Yarosh (Rt. Sek.) called for armed resurrection 4) 22 Feb 2014 — Yanukovych flees to Kharkiv Coup d’état – 23 February 2014 • Interim Government 23 February 2014 – No “Government of National Unity” – Batkishchyna (Yatsenyuk) – *Svoboda • Legislation: 1) ban language laws • 2) No federalization • 3) Join NATO • 4) Lustration Law (1 March) • 24 February – general Uprising in eastern Ukraine • (prior to any Russian action in Crimea) • *Political arm of Right Sector (Praviy Sektor) & Azov Battalion Crimean Parliamentary Elections 2010 100% opposed to joining NATO • Party of Regions 80 • Communist Party 5 • Tatar Party 5 • Soyuz 3 • Russian Unity (Aksyonov) 3 • Strong Ukraine 2 • Batkivshchyna 0 (2.6%) • Svoboda 0 (0.2%) • Population of Crimea 2.2 million Separatism is Crimea 1994 • “Separatist Winning Crimea Presidency” The New York Times, 31 January 1994 • “A separatist candidate who wants Crimea to leave Ukraine and integrate with Russia won more than 70 percent of the vote today in run-off presidential elections, . .” Crimea “annexation” or “reunification’? 1 Post- coup d’ état 27 Feb 2014 - RF forces seize Black Sea Naval Base at Sevastopol 1 Mar - Masked troops seize govt buildings in Crimea - Russian flags pop up everywhere in Crimea - Aksyonov named PM - announces referendum - RF takes over Crimea without firing a shot 2 Mar – Ukr forces (e.g. Ukr Chief of Navy Staff) in Crimea defect, or turn weapons over to rebels. Crimea “annexation” or “reunification’? 2 6 Mar 2014 – Crimea parliament secedes from Ukraine (had done so in 1992 & 94, failed) 7 Mar - Sevastopol City Council votes to join Russia 11 Mar – Crimea Parliament proclaims official independence from Ukraine (cites Kosovo precedent) 16 Mar – Referendum in Crimea: a) join Russia or b) revert to Const. of 1992 -- 80% turnout; 92% say ‘yes’ to “a” [no foreign monitors allowed] The West accuses Russia of meddling BUT 5 Dec 2013 — John Baird in Kyiv offering help to EuroMaidans 9 Dec 2013 — Joe Biden (Hunter-Burisma) calls Yanukovych, tells him to join EU if he wants US financial aid 15-16 Dec 2013 — McCain in Kyiv offering help to Maidans 10 & 16 Dec 2013— US’s Victoria Nuland & EU’s Catherine Ashton hand out bread to Maidans in Kyiv & offer support 4 Feb 2014 — Nuland telephone recording tells US Amb. Pyatt that US wants Yatsenyuk to take over Ukr Govt - adds ‘Fuck the EU’ when Pyatt says EU won’t like it. 12-13 April 2014 – head of CIA Brennan in Kyiv (secretly) 22 April 2014 - Joe Biden back in Kyiv promises financial aid 5 Feb 2015 –Obama boasts on TV that “we brokered a transition government in Ukraine” – oops! 10 Feb 2015 PACE Commissioner admits threatening Ukr in Nov- Dec 2013- told - PM Azarov that if he didn’t sign the accord with EU then it would be signed by “another government.” Meddling Anyone? US Assist Sec. of State Victoria Nuland, Tyahnybok (Svoboda), Klitschko (UDAR) Yatsenyuk (Fatherland) – 10 December 2013 Oleh Tyahnybok, head of Svoboda, a party labelled “racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic” by European Parliament (2012) & “neo-Nazi” by World Jewish Congress (2013) John McCain in Kyiv with Svoboda leader, 15 December 2013 Don’t Go Away. Here’s Our Guy getting his photo-op, 4 December 2013 Foreigners Awarded Ukrainian Citizenship by Petroshenko and named to key government posts • Natalie Jaresko, American, Minister of Finance; CEO Horizon Capital; co-founder of ‘Open Ukraine’ with Yatsenyuk; former US State Dept. official (Dec 2014) • Alexander Kvitashvili, Georgian, Minister of Health (degrees from US universities) (Dec 2014) • Aivaras Abromavicius, Lithuanian, Minister of Economic Development. Doesn’t speak Ukrainian (Dec 2014) • Michael Saakashvili, former Pres. of Georgia; heads Ukr’s International Council on Reforms (with John McCain); named Gov. of Odessa Region June 2015. Wanted in Georgia for crimes • Giorgi Lortkipanidze, former head of Georgia’s MVD – now head of MVD in Odessa Region • — US “to pay staff of Odessa Administration and provide police from California to train Odessa police” – Saakashvili 5 July 2015 Former Georgian President Saakashvili Gets Ukrainian Citizenship; gives up Georgian citizenship Saakashvili & McCain head Poroshenko‘s International Advisory Committee What our Media wants to Believe 1:Yatsenyuk claims 10,000 Russian regular troops & 30,000 “Russian-led terrorists trained” by FSB & Russian army in Ukraine, 9 June 2015 What our Media wants to believe 2: Poroshenko on Russian Troops in Ukraine, Spring 2015 — 6 May Por. tells Ukr Security Council — 40,000 — 4 June: Por. tells Ukr Parliament — 9,000 — 12 June: Ukr. Defence Minister (Stepan Poltorak) told Ukr-NATO Council — 42,500 men and 558 tanks — 21 June: Ukr. Field Commander — 54,000 — 30 June: Por. tells Corriere della Sera (Rome): “Today, on Putin’s order, there are 200,000 men and an arsenal of armoured vehicles, sophisticated missile systems and anti-air arms amassed” in Ukraine. • [i.e. Nearly a quarter of Russia’s entire armed force!] What our Press tells us 2a: Poroshenko on Russian troops in Ukraine, August 2015 • 1 August 2015: Poroshenko tells interview for Libération (Paris), there are 9,000 Russian troops in Ukraine • BUT — no intelligence service or the OSCE has seen them — there has been NO DEMONSTRATED EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE RUSSIAN TROOP PRESENCE IN UKRAINE — 25 Aug 2015: Delovaya zhizn reports compensation to families of 2,000 dead or injured Russian troops in “eastern Ukraine’ !! Wild Accusations 2. After a Swiss Red Cross Worker was killed in Donetsk by (illegal) cluster bomb • Ukrainian Foreign Ministry: “bandits and terrorists, in a barbaric way [did it]. He was killed as a result of shelling by terrorists’. • Mayor of Donetsk: “can they really believe we are shelling ourselves?” • Human Rights Watch after 2-week investigation: Ukrainian armed forces “launched cluster munitions attacks on Donetsk” and killed the Red Cross Worker (20 Oct 2014) • This NOT reported by our media Wild Accusations 6 Russia a greater threat to USA than ISIL • US General Joseph Dunford, new US Joint Chief of Staff: “Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.” 9 July 2015 • US General Philip Breedlove, NATO Supreme Commander Europe, PBS interview, agrees with Dunford, 30 July 2015 • Gen. Ray Odierno, outgoing US Army Chief of staff, “Russia is the most dangerous” threat to the US, The Hill, 12 August 2015 • Ashton Carter, U.S. Defense Secretary, “Russia is a very, very significant threat” to US, Pentagon News Conference, 20 August 2015 Wild Accusations 7 10 August 2015 • O. Turchynov, head of Ukrainian Security Council: “In the occupied territories [of Donetsk and Luhansk regions] Russian special services are in the process of identifying targets with a high civilian concentration: kindergartens, schools, apartment buildings, infrastructure facilities, etc., scheming the execution of various scenarios of terrorist acts” — to attack and then blame Kyiv forces of crimes against humanity. • [printed in Voice of America, 10 August 2015] (Rtd.) Gen. Scales “the only way to turn tide [in Ukr] is start killing Russians . killing so many that Putin’s media can’t hide the fact .
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